Document Type

Honors Project On-Campus Access Only

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Advisor: Professor Andrew Beveridge

Abstract

In a multiple office election, a voter's preference for one seat may depend on their prediction of the outcome of another seat. This encourages strategic voting, and in the worst case, no voter ballot matches the final outcome. A subset of seats is separable when a voter's preference on that subset is independent of their preference on the remaining seats. We explore three independent questions. First, we generate the preference for a two-party election whose separable sets are a given collection of subsets which are closed under unions and intersections. Second, we generate the preference for a two-party election whose non-trivial separable sets are two given sets and their intersection. Last, we generate all of the preferences for an election where every subset of seats is separable.

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