Winter 2008

Crossing the Rubicon: The European Project in the Era of Globalization

Momchil Jelev  
*Macalester College*

---

Follow this and additional works at: [http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl](http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl)

---

Recommended Citation

Available at: [http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol20/iss1/10](http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol20/iss1/10)

---

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Global Citizenship at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Macalester International by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Crossing the Rubicon: The European Project in the Era of Globalization

Momchil Jelev

I. Introduction

The European Union (EU) as a historical experiment has already survived more than fifty years of development during which economic integration triggered political cooperation, the establishment of common institutions, and a genuine fledgling transnational European identity and solidarity. Borders have disappeared and, most remarkably, the Iron Curtain has collapsed, opening the path toward a true unification of the continent beyond its Eastern frontiers. However, this “adventure,” as Zygmunt Bauman calls it, continues, and the shape and functions of the European Union are in constant flux. This has prompted questions about the future of the continent beyond its already established economic integration. Is it possible that Europe could become a federal state? How likely is it that nation-states will increasingly cede political sovereignty to the EU, thus creating an entity much like the United States? What exactly is Europe in purely geographical and normative terms, and does a European identity exist? What are the wider ramifications of the European project in a globalized world? These are only some of the contentious issues that occupy the minds of politicians both in Brussels and in the capitals of the member states. The recent attempt to craft a Constitution for Europe was meant as an answer to at least some of the problems surrounding the destiny of the Union. Unfortunately, the popular rejection of the document in France and the Netherlands in 2005 led the EU to yet another Rubicon in its development.
At the same time, the other central concept forming the background of this essay is certainly globalization, a complex and multifaceted term that has been conditioned by the diverse forces of history, politics, economics, culture, and technology. The density of the concept has been widely discussed in the literature, but for the purposes of this project, I define it as a historical period that fundamentally shapes the current moment and is characterized by the compression of time and reorganization of space to an unprecedented degree in human history. More specifically, globalization includes a number of underlying features, among them the expansion of the capitalist economic system and liberal democratic politics, as well as unequalled technological innovation and progress. At the same time, globalization has created excesses—big winners and losers—along all the defining fault lines of the time: politics, economics, culture, and access to technology. The world has been reorganized between the aging Global North of industrialized developed countries and the growing multitudes of the Global South of poor and politically unstable nations. Overall, globalization has revealed tremendous new opportunities, but it has also disenfranchised many, thus intensifying the fundamental contradictions of the modern world.

My interest in the phenomenon that stands at the core of this study is a result of my European background as well as an extensive interest in history and scholarly work in political science and economics at Macalester College. However, aside from my personal engagement with European unification, the EU, as a unique regional entity in the global world, deserves significant attention.

On the basis of these preliminary remarks, my objective is to analyze the evolution, future, and potential of the European project with a clear recognition of the limitations that the task implies. In the process, the essay will also compare the EU governance structures (to the extent that they exist) to those that emerged in the United States more than 200 years ago. Moving beyond the internal structures of the EU, I will also dedicate space to analyzing the potential significance of Europe in the era of globalization.

This article is the culminating product of research, interviews, and discussions carried out throughout the two semesters of Macalester College’s Globalization in Comparative Perspective program. The structure of the essay reflects the division between research done in the first semester in the United States and in the spring of 2007 in Maastricht in the Netherlands. However, a variety of topics and discussions
were initiated in the fall and completed or examined in further depth in the spring. As a result, a rigid temporal division of the analysis was neither feasible nor desirable.

In the fall semester, research was mainly a result of library inquiries at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. In contrast, the scholarly work performed in the spring stemmed from a variety of sources at Maastricht, such as the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) and the University of Maastricht, as well as an educational excursion to Brussels. Maastricht also offered the opportunity of arranging a number of interviews that enhanced the content and depth of the study. Moreover, the core seminar of the program in January offered lectures and discussions that enriched my knowledge and understanding of the European Union, introduced me to one of the expert interviewees for this project, and in many ways served as a bridge between the fall and spring components of the research.

II. Operational Strategy

The essay is divided into four parts. As a product of the first semester of research and an indispensable foundation for the rest of the paper, a historical overview of European integration up until 2003 will be offered in Section III, followed by a discussion of the Constitutional Treaty. Here, I have attempted to focus on the major steps in an otherwise complex narrative, and as a result, some details along the historical timeline have inevitably been left out.

Section IV, which emerged as a bridge between the fall and spring components of the research, will focus on more theoretical points on the nature of the EU as well as comparing and contrasting the integration of Europe with the forging of the United States of America. Naturally, a complete view of all the literature on the issue would be too daunting a task; thus, without any claim to comprehensiveness, I have selected some seminal theoretical concepts and ideas about the EU and its relationship to the American federal model.

In order to complement the theoretical and research-based aspects of the essay, the views of four intellectuals on the future of Europe are summarized in Section V. In this section, the goal is to provide a balanced approach, offering the opinions of a Brussels-based EU researcher and lecturer, a former EU Commissioner from the Netherlands and founding member of the Union, an established diplomat and lecturer from Bulgaria (the most recent member state of the EU),
and an American expert on economic affairs. Gathered throughout spring 2007, the varied perspectives of the four are an uncontestable asset to the depth and breadth of this study, illustrating the distinct added value of my experiences in Maastricht. Nevertheless, as the nature of interviewing implies, these are all personal opinions that do not reflect the official positions of the EU or the respective member states. Moreover, the selection of the individuals was also a function of the limitations of travel and resources during the second semester of the program.

Finally, as a culmination to the essay, Section VI deals with the future ramifications of EU political integration, turning to the broader context in which the European project exists and bringing together the concepts, discussions, and research from both semesters of the program. Here, questions about the role of Europe as a new political model transcending the paradigm of the nation-state are examined within the framework of globalization.

III. A Historical Canvass: The European Project from 1945 to 2005

Ideas of a united Europe date back to the time of Charlemagne circa the 9th century, and several after him have attempted to bring the peoples of the continent together, among them Napoleon and Hitler. When the war-torn Europe of the post-1945 years was recovering from hatred, destruction, and poverty, few would believe that European states could ever work together in a constructive way toward sustainable peace. However, a qualitative difference in the post-World War II era was that no one desired unification through warfare anymore, and a genuine belief emerged that the same goal could be pursued through cooperation, common interests, and security. The creation of common interest between former adversaries would allow them to share each other’s resources and not fight for them, decreasing the possibility of war by eliminating its underlying roots. What is more, there was a strong sentiment among the intellectuals of the time in favor of a European Union much like the American state on the other side of the ocean. In a famous speech in Zürich in 1946, Churchill stressed the importance of re-creating the European family in a structure like that of the “great Republic across the Atlantic Ocean.” “We must build a kind of United States of Europe” was Churchill’s conclusion, and this gave the impetus behind the idea of a federal union among former enemies.²
As one of the founding fathers of the European Union, Jean Monnet had a particular vision about the long-term evolution of the project. He believed that unification should happen gradually, and its tangible benefits would naturally lead to the formation of a federation. He did not want to set a specific timeline for the process but rather argued that it would happen in “piecemeal, incremental steps.” Robert Schuman, the French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, then set the beginning of the project in his declaration on May 9, 1950, which forged the European Coal and Steel Community. However, it was clear to him that the finalité politique of European integration would render an entity much different from a loose union based on the pooling of natural resources. A European federation would be built over time through “a series of concrete achievements, each of which will create a de facto solidarity.” Similarly, Monnet believed that at some point in the future “a qualitative change would occur in the political relation between states and people,” but only when the “force of necessity” makes it “seem natural in the eyes of Europeans.”

Granted, Monnet had his critics, who were skeptical (to say the least) of the possibility for quantitative benefits leading to qualitative changes in the European mentality vis-à-vis a common state. Among them, Altiero Spinelli was the most vocal. He claimed that Monnet failed to address issues of the organization of European power and that independent European institutions would not be capable of superseding the nation-state. In short, he considered too ambitious Monnet’s assumption that functional achievements would necessarily lead to the building of political Europe. Without fundamentally transforming power distribution between member states and European institutions, Spinelli argued, the core of a federal Europe would always be too weak relative to the individual governments. In this context, Spinelli claimed that Europe would hardly move beyond a Common Market. Indeed, this sparked the most fundamental and lasting debate surrounding the European Union. Its two polarized articulations are still with us today, shaping the discussion on the future of Europe: some believe the EU should focus on intergovernmental cooperation, leaving sovereignty to member states, while others argue that the Union should evolve into a supranational entity in which decision making is centralized. The following sections will address more closely these diverging views on what precisely Europe could represent.

Against the backdrop of long-term visions like these, the actual unification gradually began to take shape. In 1957, the Rome Treaty
was signed between six countries, forming the European Economic Community (EEC) and clearly expressing the objective of working toward an “ever closer union.” The treaty established the norms and principles of European integration, as well as the incipient structures of a political Union. Naturally, the economic path was seen as an easier starting point for the project, and the belief of many was that as economic cooperation intensified, the need would gradually emerge to create tighter political cooperation, ultimately culminating in the formation of a federal union.

In this context, European integration continued, often hitting obstacles but always eventually overcoming the roadblocks on the way. The steady integration of the Common Market (in goods, services, labor, and capital) made the EEC attractive to new member states and, in the 1970s and 1980s, six new members joined. In 1985, following the Schengen Treaty, physical borders and border control between most EU member states were also removed and people could move freely throughout the Union without going through immigration and customs control. Finally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 fundamentally changed the global political order with the collapse of communism. This opened up Eastern Europe, offering the continent a unique chance to become truly united for the first time in history. The importance of the opportunity was expressed by Pope John Paul II: “Europe has two lungs. It will never breathe naturally until it uses both of them.”

Meanwhile, Western Europe had reached a degree of economic integration that called for a common monetary union and ultimately the adoption of a common currency. Following the 1989 Delors Report and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a true European Union emerged (both as a term and in substance), which had reached almost complete economic integration. The “deepening” continued with the official introduction of the Euro as a common medium of exchange in 1999 and the substitution in 2002 of all previous currencies in twelve EU member states. At the same time, another expansion had taken place in 1995, and the candidate members from Eastern Europe were already knocking on the doors of the Union.

While the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s were characterized by a variety of changes in the EU, questions arose about longer-term issues. Many wondered to what extent the Union could continue to expand, i.e., what was its absorption capacity? If it would pursue expansion, what reforms in the structures and functions of the Union were necessary to enhance decision making, cohesion, and solidarity?
Underpinning these problems was the fact that while economic integration had evolved and intensified during the previous fifty years, political cooperation had lagged behind, and nation-states were reluctant to act together in big policy areas like security, justice, and external relations. The asymmetry between these two aspects of unification called for a clearer articulation of European common principles, institutions, and decision-making mechanisms. As a result, following the Laeken convention in 2001, a mandate was given by the European Council to establish a Convention on the Future of Europe. Two years later, the members of the Convention proposed a finished product, a Constitution for Europe.

A. The Constitution and its Fate

In terms of rhetoric, the chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Giscard d’Estaing, considered the panel a historic moment in the development of the European Union. On numerous occasions, the former French president compared it to that held in Philadelphia more than two-hundred years before. According to Walker, there was a clear sense among the EU officials and even more among the delegates of the Convention, that Europe had reached its “constitutional moment” and was firmly on the path towards the finalité politique first envisioned by Monnet and Schuman. In fact, there was even a proposal to call the European Union the “United States of Europe,” but this was eventually rejected. Other debates centered on the inclusion of a religious element (Christianity) and the specification of Europe’s geographic borders for the purpose of setting limits to enlargement. Neither of those was adopted, and while mentioning Christianity was stricken from the text, the exact boundaries of the continent and the requirements for becoming an EU member remained as vague as possible. While calling the document a constitution was a clear evolution from the EU treaty tradition, nations still remained the “masters of the treaty” since signatures and ratifications were required by all members before it was officially adopted.

Setting aside form, the constitution offered few substantial innovations. In fact, as some argue, it is more than ninety percent an amalgamation of existing EU law and regulations, and only a very small portion contains genuine innovations. First, more power was accorded the European Council, giving it an elected President. Second, the Commission would become two tiered. Third, there would
be an official Minister of Foreign Affairs, a symbol of a new level of coordination of foreign policy among member states. Fourth, through strengthening the EU Parliament, more co-decisions were introduced and some of the issues related to the EU’s “democratic deficit” were addressed. Fifth, qualified majority voting (QMV) would become more common in the Council, enhancing efficiency at the expense of allowing states to veto all aspects of policy making on the EU level. Sixth, a Charter of Fundamental Rights, much like the U.S. Bill of Rights, was included, and the European Court received direct jurisprudence in its observance. All these areas, however limited in number and scope, clearly indicated that the Union would change in terms of both structure and function.

Nevertheless, the Constitutional Treaty failed. Even though it was signed by the EU Heads of State in 2004, national referenda in France and the Netherlands rejected it, rendering the text irrelevant and putting further political integration to a temporary halt. It is worth looking at some of the proposed reasons for this failure, while keeping in mind their complex interconnection. First, as Walker explains, the EU failed to create the necessary awareness about the work of the Convention and the final text of the treaty prior to the national referenda. Second, the objective of simplification was eventually set aside, and the final document was a virtually unreadable text of considerable volume.19 Third, as Fossum argues, there was no genuine movement in support of the Convention among civil society in Europe.20 The decision to work towards an EU constitution was seen as a top-down imposition from Brussels, the result of high-profile deliberations and virtually no communication with European citizens. Fourth, both in France and the Netherlands, the referendum was used as an opportunity for people to express discontent with the policies of their respective governments. Voting against the document was seen as a powerful message. Fifth, Europeans had just received their common currency and were psychologically unprepared for another fundamental change in accepting a common constitution.21 This idea is supported by those who believe that the pace of changes at the EU has alienated the citizenry, a notion that has become increasingly worrisome in Brussels.22 Other explanations include the familiar fear of creating a European superstate and giving up more national sovereignty to the EU. Evidently, this problem could have been rectified through a clear communication and awareness policy from Brussels to all 450 million Europeans. Finally, one of the underlying reasons for the failure of the constitution is the absence
of a true European identity and the inability of the majority of Europeans to think beyond the notions of the national. This, along with other theoretical underpinnings of the European project (including the formation of a single European demos) and the linkages between the European and American federal models will be the subject of the following section. In addition, the penultimate section of the essay will discuss in further detail more views within the EU on the reasons why the constitution failed.

IV. Several Views of the Elephant: The Nature of the EU and its American Nuances

As the history of the EU shows, the Union is a highly complex and contradictory project that often inspires diametrically opposite views about its functions, structures, effectiveness, and future. At the outset, it is important to distinguish between the terms often used to characterize the EU. Hueglin and Burgess explain that federalism means a centralization of power into a single superstate structure that in the majority of occasions overrules the decisions of member states. The United States could be labeled a federation, and so could Canada or Germany, although the degree of centralization varies in different cases. At the same time, a confederation implies that power remains in the hands of member states (hence, an intergovernmental system), and this appears as a more appropriate label for the EU at its current level of political integration. Bulmer agrees with this characterization and calls the EU a “form of governance without government,” with relatively weak Union-wide representative bodies. Thus, for him, the central question is whether states are returning to the familiar power relations of the Westphalian system, using the EU to increase their own autonomy and sovereignty. This is a plausible argument, since most decisions at the EU level are adopted by consensus, which effectively gives veto power to every single member.

Beyond the difference between federation and confederation, Hueglin goes further and distinguishes between two types of federalism, constitutional and treaty federalism, in an attempt to characterize more precisely the European Union. He ascribes constitutional federalism to the American system in which the U.S. Constitution clearly establishes the primacy of federal legislation. Despite efforts to coordinate laws on the local and national levels, the Union-level always prevails. According to the so-called “Hamiltonian project,” both people and states...
are represented in the federal government and in this way individual rights are protected. The House represents different political groups within society, while the Senate reflects the fifty states in the Union. Finally, constitutional federalism also eliminates any possibility for territorial sovereignty and imposes considerable limitations on the powers of states.

In contrast, Hueglin describes treaty federalism as a more flexible system of governance, with the EU notion of subsidiarity as its central pillar. All members within the Union are equal and decisions are made on the lowest possible level. As a result, the added value of EU legislation should be clearly demonstrated and defended before decisions are made on this highest level. In addition, even when the EU sets rules for the entire Union, implementation is left to the different member states. Within this structure, only the European Council can change the Union treaties themselves, while the Council of Ministers effectively acts as a legislative body.

Hueglin also acknowledges that treaty federalism in the context of the EU is a constantly evolving system, and the power of nation-states is gradually reduced in some areas of decision making. Thus, even though countries remain the central agents within the EU, there is a pronounced movement beyond simply confederate governance. In this respect, Hueglin argues that the EU is a unique political entity, which could constitute the leading model of governance in the era of globalization. This issue will be explored further in following sections.

A particular set of contradictions that could define the future of the EU are enunciated by Giegrich in *Continuous Controversies in the Debate on the European Constitution.* First, he argues that the EU needs to make it clear whether it is barely an association of states or a union of nations. Both terms are mentioned in the Treaty of the European Union, the former reflecting the current status quo and the latter representing a future goal. Second, there is a certain vagueness as to whether the Union focuses on dynamism or consolidation in its integration. In this context, an ultimate destination for integration was never articulated (a move away from consolidation), and the constitution does not address this issue. Therefore, it seems that dynamism is retained as the path towards consolidation and “a common destiny.” Finally, Giegrich focuses on the dynamics between national and European constitution- and their potential to evolve together, rather than continue to be in constant tension. In this domain, Giegrich argues, the constitution would have also introduced important changes, strengthening the Par-
liament, introducing more QMV, and increasing the transparency in the work of the EU.

Another interpretation of the political integration issues facing the EU is presented by Fossum. He identifies two possible lenses through which one could look at the EU today. On one hand, Fossum talks about deep diversity as an articulation of complete constitutional tolerance, i.e., the recognition of multiple *demoi* within the Union. This contrasts with the ideas of Habermas, for example, who claims that the EU needs common principles and values that bind the European *demos* as a basis for increased solidarity, integration, and cooperation. In fact, Fossum claims that “plurality of ways of belonging” are accepted and even encouraged in the EU. This seems to describe the EU well: it is still a conglomeration of different nations and peoples, and the governing authority is derived from the will of all members. At the same time, Fossum describes another vision that could shape the future of Europe. Constitutional patriotism, as a clear path toward a single democratic state and an expression of a common allegiance to transnational values and principles, is a future objective rather than current reality within the EU. One of its prerequisites is a popular endorsement of a constitution and a system in which member states cannot veto decisions. Overall, Fossum, much like Hueglin and Giegrich, describes a framework that tightly reflects the *status quo* of the EU, but he also suggests that the Union is in constant evolution and strives to achieve a longer-term vision of political integration and power dynamics.

In conclusion, it is important to return to the divergences between the American and European political models. While in the U.S. federation was imposed through a single constitutional document, the EU has adopted an incremental system of integration that would gradually lead to tighter political cooperation. Moreover, while the U.S. began unification through political consolidation, Europe undertook the path of economic integration and concrete functional achievements (common market, single currency, etc.) on the way towards a *finalité politique*.

With regard to the European constitution and its American counterpart, three differences are significant. First, while the U.S. constitution claims to establish a contract between a state and its people, the EU analogue is primarily a contract between states for shared responsibilities between them and the Union. Second, the U.S. model is a constitutional federation, while the EU focuses on treaty federalism. Third, as Fossum argues, the EU is still within the realm of “deep diversity”
while the U.S. has reached closer integration through “constitutional patriotism.”³⁶ Thus, among others, Burgess concludes that, “the EU is not a federation in the conventional sense” but rather “a new kind of federal-confederal union that we can classify either as a ‘new confederation’ or a new federal model.”³⁷

V. Beyond the Theory: Two Images on the Future of the EU

Aside from the written literature, this essay relies on interviews with intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic and within different regions in the EU. Firstly, within the European Union, it is valuable to examine the opinions of a Brussels researcher, a Dutch politician and former European Commissioner, and a Bulgarian diplomat and scholar. These interviews have the goal of illustrating the internal dynamics of the EU vis-à-vis the future of the Union, highlighting possible disparities in the views of old and new member states. Secondly, I will return to a larger-scale analysis with an outsider’s perspective on the global implications of the European political project; this will also serve as a bridge to the last section of the paper.

A. “Old” and “New” Europe: Common Interests or Division of Priorities?

In an interview in June 2007 as a follow-up to our discussion during the January seminar of the program, Ruben Lombaert, a researcher at the Institute for European Studies in Brussels, addressed some of the core issues related to the future of Europe. Mr. Lombaert attributes the failure of the European constitution to a number of factors. Firstly, he emphasizes the poor communication on the part of the EU, which only improved once there was a real threat of negative votes during the ratification referenda. Moreover, the choice of the word “constitution” was, in his opinion, a mistake which did not take into account the particular emotional and historical significance it carries for Europeans. Overall, Lombaert claims that the entire project was neither carefully prepared, nor explained, nor “sold,” to the general population. What is more, the continued behavior of EU leaders along the lines of “we’ll carry on as if nothing happened” has not been helpful in the period after the negative votes.³⁸

Lombaert continues his sobering analysis of the political situation in the EU by arguing that there is no possibility in reviving the Constitu-
Momchil Jelev

tional Treaty. However, in his view, the June 2007 European Summit\(^{39}\) clearly showed that while most of the symbolic elements of the document have to be removed, “the essence is still there.” At the same time, though, he does not see sufficient political will among European leaders to move towards considerable tightening of the European political integration process: “I have the feeling many people [in Brussels] are ‘walking on eggs.’” This clearly summarizes many observers’ opinions about the sentiments that pervade Brussels on the issue of further political unification. A sense of uneasiness and extreme care in rhetoric and action alike will hardly lead to bold moves toward an “ever closer union.” Yet, as the recent summit showed, Europe often manages to continue forward even in the most unlikely of circumstances.

With respect to more general questions about the future of the Union, Lombaert offers nuanced, yet well-founded opinions. He argues that the European Union shares some common features with the U.S. federal model, but the differences outnumber the similarities, especially in terms of the powers and representation of member states, decision-making procedures, and the structure and functions of the various core institutions. As a whole, Lombaert claims that the systems are fundamentally different, and while some parallels can be drawn, those certainly should not be overstated. Finally, when addressing the much-discussed issue of a common European identity, the Brussels researcher is careful in pointing out that the formation of identities is a dangerous project, and one first needs to establish what a European identity would mean, i.e., what binds all Europeans together. In his words, “a common identity should be based upon a common recognition and acceptance of a number of distinct values,” and yet, “talking about European identity and ‘creating’ one is in some ways opening Pandora’s box.” Thus, in contrast with other interviewees, Lombaert proves the most cautious when talking about a common European identity as a precursor of a deepened political integration of the continent.\(^{40}\)

Karel Van Miert, former Commissioner on Competition and Transport and an active participant in Dutch public policy, offers another perspective on European unification and the failed constitution. He argues that Europe is “in a state of confusion and disarray” after the negative votes in France and the Netherlands.\(^{41}\) What is even more serious is that this makes it impossible to explain where exactly the EU is headed in the future. This is, of course, a critical issue, which Lombaert also underlines, and it is highly influenced by perceptions
of the public about the EU itself. Indeed, Van Miert underscores that public opinion has gained significant prominence in the EU. While in the past people were hardly consulted on European matters, now the pressure for public votes on a number of fundamental EU policies and reforms is much greater. In this context, Van Miert agrees with Lombaert, admitting that the EU continuously fails to present itself positively to its citizens. This was both the reason for the defeat of the constitution as well as for the constant attribution of policy failures to the EU—and not at the member-state level. Thus, to him, it is crucial that whatever Europe’s leaders decide about the future, it is well communicated to the public so that the will of the citizens is respected and they are sufficiently well informed to make the right choices about the fundamental direction of the Union.

More specifically, again in agreement with Lombaert, Van Miert doubts that the constitution can be revisited: “I don’t think it can be rescued as it is.” He sees the way forward in altering it and preserving as many of its positive contributions as possible. In the short run, though, he is certain that political unification in the EU would be very difficult to achieve; in his own words, “it is not in the cards for some time to come.” According to Van Miert, rather than emerging as a genuine internal process, further integration might be facilitated by external events that in one way or another force European states to cooperate more and expand the range of common policies, especially in the realms of defense and security, as well as external affairs. In the end, Van Miert’s guarded optimism is palpable. To him, leadership is key, and he argues that all developments in the EU have occurred when a group of states get together and act, without obliging the rest to join, and letting them follow over time. As a result, rather than always seeking consensus decision making, Europe can proceed with integration as long as the leadership in the major states has the political will to push the process forward and gradually entice the rest of the unwilling members.

The future of Europe as seen from Bulgaria appears equally uncertain. Vladimir Gradev, former Ambassador to the Holy See and the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, and Professor in Philosophy and History or Culture at Sofia University, agrees on some points with Lombaert and Van Miert but claims that the failure of the constitution was much more a result of negative votes against the Dutch and French governments than a reflection of negativism vis-à-vis Europe. Gradev also goes further in accusing European leaders that, in their effort to
satisfy their own constituents, they shied away from “taking the European idea forward and coming up with a pragmatic vision about its further realization.” When asked about the future of the European constitution, Gradev states that despite the incremental steps forward at the June 2007 Summit, there is no distinct plan as to the future of the Union beyond the short term. His view is that the EU is moving further away from the federal model, which was once again shown at the Summit when the word “constitution” was scrapped from the discussions on a reformed EU treaty. Thus, much like Van Miert and Lombaert, Gradev does not see a real possibility for the further political integration of the Union.

However, when asked about Bulgaria’s place in the EU integration process, Gradev clearly illustrates the divergence between the views of old and new member states: “Currently, Bulgaria needs to complete its integration into the Common Market, successfully absorb the EU cohesion and structural funds, and achieve overall improvement in the standard of living. The idea of EU political integration is completely foreign to politicians in the country and we could not expect Bulgaria to be an active driver in this process.” This illustrates a possible divide between new and old members of the Union and poses a question about the extent to which different members are devoted to the future of the European Union. The idea of further political integration certainly appears at the front of the agenda in “old Europe” while most new members from the East (perhaps with the notable exception of the largest among them, Poland) are more preoccupied with their own development and growth on the path to economic convergence with the West. This implies a division in priorities that needs to be addressed because in an expanded 27-member Union, diverse agendas hold the potential to further stall internal political reforms.

Finally, Gradev offers his views on the long-term goals of the EU. Unlike the majority of observers and in sharp contrast with Lombaert, he claims that a common European identity already exists. He uses the examples of the euro as a common currency, as well as the political regime all EU members share—liberal democracy—as the underlying commonalities that bind together Europe’s citizens and governments. Accordingly, this is fertile ground for the formation of a single European state, but what is necessary (as in every project of such magnitude) is “sufficient political will and leadership” to bring the Union toward a definite finalité politique.
B. The Washington Perspective: A European Grand Narrative

Aside from views within the EU, it is important to include a view from the other side of the Atlantic, an outsider’s perspective, on the challenges and opportunities that lie on the path of the European project. As is usually the case when seen from the outside, the Union rarely appears as a confused entity in constant search of a meaningful identity and direction. On the contrary, both in his book *The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream* and at the 2007 Schuman Lecture at University of Maastricht, Jeremy Rifkin, a Washington-based economist and EU observer, manages to build a grand narrative about the past and future of the EU. Rifkin argues that Europe is indeed the growing new power in the world, and its unique model of governance, particular values and moral standards, and specific understanding of what living a good life means will be at the core of a fundamental paradigmatic shift in the global social, political, and economic structures.

Similar to the analysis presented by T.R. Reid in *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*, Rifkin provides a comparative analysis of the U.S. and Europe through the lens of history, philosophy, and economics. According to him, the dream that spread from the U.S. into the rest of the world in the past century implied that freedom was a combination of autonomy and mobility, success was based on self-reliance and individualism, property and civil rights were sufficient for a good life, and the market was the dominant force that governed human relations. In contrast, the new dream (much like the old one) that emerges in Europe includes freedom as a reflection of a good quality of life and embeddedness in a tight social network of relationships and connectivity, a focus on human and social rights, a balance between work and play, a combination of market and state forces in governing the economy, and a view of the future beyond economic growth and along the lines of sustainable development. Rifkin argues that it is precisely this new view of the world that will gradually supersede the American dream, which inspired and excited generations of people in the past. Further, he claims that in terms of economic strength, the EU should already be seen as one entity, and its building units, the member states, should be compared not to the U.S. as a whole but to specific U.S. states. This not only implies that from the outside Europe is often seen as an emerging single state (at least as far as the economy is concerned), but it
also indicates the scale of transformation that an entire continent has undergone in just fifty years. Furthermore, Rifkin claims that Europe’s engagement with sustainable usage of resources and its potential to create new systems of energy production, supply, and distribution could revolutionize world economics, creating a horizontal, more equal global economy and thus making the European dream a common goal for all people on earth.

Indeed, Rifkin’s view of Europe as a reorganizing force that could transform the world in the era of globalization is a provocative one. What is more, the author quickly solves the historical debate between federalists and confederalists by arguing that Europe will neither assume the shape of a superstate, nor will it return to fragmentation. Rifkin prefers to see the EU as an unprecedented political project organized as a horizontal political network where no one dominates and all peoples, states, and interest groups have an equal voice. In his opinion, an entity like the EU has never existed in the global political tradition, and the fundamental ways in which it rearranges notions of power, society, and economics is more important than its weaknesses, failures, or inconsistencies. Thus, while those within the EU see the future of the Union along organizational and structural lines, expressing concern about internal disagreements and functional issues, the view from the outside paints a more general picture that places Europe at the forefront of political, economic, and social innovation in the 21st century. This perspective certainly deserves more attention and analysis in the following section.

VI. Europe on the Global Stage: A New Model of Citizenship and Governance

At the conclusion of this project, I find myself facing the task of extracting the lessons that studying the European Union can offer about globalization. First, I would argue that since the relevance of the European project springs at least partially from the very structure of the Union, it is critical to reach a conclusion, albeit a tentative one, as to what the European Union looks like structurally and what its importance could be in the era of globalization. Despite various attempts to classify the EU neatly within familiar theoretical and conceptual frameworks, a notion exists that it might not be possible to describe the European project with the currently available scholarly tools. Thus, I am particularly disinclined to narrow the European political model
and place it within limited categories. Hence, my research has shown that Europe is a new political form, somewhere between a confederation (grounded in intergovernmentalism) and a federal, or supranational, state (sui generis). In this context, the challenge for the EU will be to preserve the achievements of the nation-state in a new form that transcends national borders. Therefore, I would venture to suggest that Europe has the potential to temper the excesses of globalization, but this would only come with closer political integration. The European model is indeed a fitting political configuration for a 21st century characterized by a plurality of actors from different socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds. Thus, this could be “the only model as yet that makes the taming of the forces of globalization at least thinkable.” To those like me—who see globalization as a phenomenon dominated by an unfettered market, producing big winners and losers and intensifying the global reach of security threats, natural disasters, and epidemics—this is certainly a welcome point. It also nurtures the hope of those who perceive the uniqueness of the European political, economic, and social model as an antidote to the liabilities that globalization carries in its wake. This comprises the first lesson that I derive from the in-depth analysis of the European project in a globalizing world.

Secondly, working on this research demonstrated an idea that I had always been reluctant to accept: the role of the nation-state is fundamentally changing. Today it needs to convince rather than to command. Thus, cooperation through common interest, rather than control through sheer power, should be the priority of the state of the future. This fits the theoretical arguments of Immanuel Kant better than the views of Thomas Hobbes. The former would characterize Europe and its inclusiveness through common interest and cooperation as a foundation for perpetual peace. The latter worldview focuses on the forceful arrangement of power relations in an uncertain and violent world, and largely constitutes the theoretical canvass for the development of the U.S. as a cohesive political entity. Therefore, I would argue that in a globalized, interdependent, and interconnected world, Europe could provide the dominant model of governance for the 21st century, much like the U.S. symbolized the one of the 20th century.

Third, for the sake of specificity, one could call united Europe a “postmodern state” that transcends the familiar Westphalian paradigm. Indeed, in an increasingly borderless globe where identities and citizenship are more flexible and defined by a variety of forces, the emergence of transnational societies will become ever more com-
mon. This process of preserving diversity while eliminating physical borders between peoples signals the emergence of a European transnational society, an entity that is in the making, albeit perhaps unintentionally. This new political creature has triggered the necessity for a fundamental paradigmatic shift from the familiar statist framework to a qualitatively new type of structure that would best encompass the complexities of new transnational relations between peoples, cultures, and countries. It is important to understand, however, that the project of a European supranational state (that many advocate, both in the academic and political arenas) is not appropriate either, as it would operate within the old paradigmatic framework, tracing its roots to Westphalia. Hence, the research convinced me to shift my initial preference for a European superstate to a different kind of political entity, a postmodern state, or perhaps even a “network-state.”

Finally, I would like to emphasize the fundamental challenges that stand in the way of the European dream becoming a truly global phenomenon. The positive views of the future of the EU would remain merely an incomplete normative statement without a sober analysis of the current and very immediate limitations of the EU. Indeed, it is important to recognize the major liabilities carried by the European Union in the age of globalization because only after successfully addressing them can European leaders claim that their model of governance and social and economic relations could lead the world through the 21st century. Realizing the weaknesses of the European project was also one of the invaluable lessons extracted from this project, since it helped explain the seemingly bizarre sense of pessimism that Europeans overall (mainly politicians but some academics as well) have expressed about the EU, particularly after the unsuccessful constitutional referenda. Among the major issues, I would highlight the democratic deficits of EU institutions, the disconnect between elites and the general public, xenophobia and immigration (especially in its Muslim dimension), an aging population, economic asymmetry between EU member states, climate change and energy, as well as insufficient funding for globally significant research and development. What is clear, however, is that the central challenge concerns the identity of Europeans and their readiness to begin thinking in terms of generations and beyond the short run, in order to create real solidarity and cohesion among themselves. Crafting a common European identity is central not only to the European project, but also as a key to the formation of a global sense of empathy that transcends national allegiances.
Whether this new type of global thinking is possible remains unclear, and after all, as Rifkin pointed out during his lecture at the University of Maastricht, “dreams are not what you are, they reflect what you would like to be.”\textsuperscript{49} In this context, perhaps it will be up to Europe’s educated youth to cross the Rubicon and shift many of the political, economic, and social fundamentals in order to adapt the entire continent to truly global life and mentality. The question remains whether the European Union can successfully follow the principles and values that make up its own tissue. I hope it will, since this would reaffirm the last lesson that I take from this project: despite its numerous weaknesses, the EU is a symbol of hope because in a world where leaders still think in terms of nation-states, the European political project is an ambitious and revolutionary undertaking, which could one day represent the standard for more tolerant and inclusive political structures and cross-cultural and transnational relations.

VII. Conclusion

As a final synthesis of the research, interviews, and discussions during the Globalization in Comparative Perspective program, two perspectives have emerged through which the European Union’s future can be analyzed. On the one hand, one could trace the history of internal integration and the technical issues of decision making, the balance between the relative powers of member states, or the substance and failure of the European constitution. When looking through this lens, Europe truly stands at a crossroads. The EU lacks a clear idea as to what its structural and functional future should be; there is ambiguity as to the geographical or normative identity of the Union; and there is a persistent gap between decision-makers in Brussels and a growing and ever more influential civil society. Moreover, there is not only a considerable divergence of priorities among member states as to the political outlook of the EU, but it is also unclear to what extent a coherent vision of Europe’s future exists or could be created. Here scholars offer a number of solutions and yet most of them agree that the Union is characterized by fundamental contradictions—between deep diversity and constitutional patriotism, or between constitutional and treaty federalism. These inconsistencies, which the constitution failed to resolve, also make up the major differences between the European and American constitutional moments, which (despite exhibiting some similar features) remain considerably distanced in time, substance, and
outcome. As a result, it would be reasonable to conclude that Europe is a political entity that differs from the U.S. and is unlikely, as most interviewees across the EU confirm, to move towards a single super-state in the near future.

On the other hand, it is precisely the uniqueness of the European project that becomes the inspiration for a number of analysts who offer a larger-scale view into the future of Europe as it relates to the process of globalization. Scholars like Habermas, Rifkin, and Bauman all allude to the unprecedented model for social, political, and economic relations that is the European Union. It is certainly premature to talk about the completion of its emergence and transformation, and yet, its potential to generate a fundamental paradigmatic shift away from the familiar concepts of nation-state, pure market economics, and social individualism could become the driving force behind a new form of globalization. It remains to be seen whether the EU can offer a new social and political model to the world, and, as Rifkin argues, build a more equitable economic order in which resources are openly distributed and shared between people in horizontal networks.

I would argue that answering this question means blending together the two perspectives on the European project, looking at the larger-scale picture with a clear consciousness of the processes taking place within the EU. Perhaps the failure of the constitution was a step backwards in the movement towards an “ever closer union,” but at the same time, as the views from within indicate, the Union is still in the process of transformation. Paraphrasing the words of former commissioner Van Miert, one can think of the European project as a train that started its trip fifty years ago, has no strictly defined direction, still has not stopped at a station, and yet continues incessantly to move forward. And this is indeed what matters the most—both to Europeans and to the world.

Notes
1. All four interviewees were asked the same set of questions in an attempt to gauge both the fundamental differences as well as the minute nuances in their views on Europe's future.
4. Ever since 1950, May 9th has become “Europe Day” and is celebrated annually throughout the European Union.
5. Reid 2006, p. 43.
7. In the early years of the European Union, this view was espoused particularly by Charles de Gaulle, who opposed the idea of European integration at the expense of national sovereignty.
8. Originally, the EEC members were France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
9. Denmark, United Kingdom, and Ireland in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Spain and Portugal in 1986.
11. The Delors Report focused on the potential for forming an Economic and Monetary Union, thus giving the impetus for including EMU in the Maastricht Treaty and creating the three-stage transition to EMU, which constitutes the roadmap for EU members to adopt the common currency.
12. According to the requirements for joining the EMU in the three-stage process, by 1999 only eleven countries had managed to reduce deficits below 3% and keep inflation within 2% (along with other benchmarks). These were joined after 2001 by Greece and thus only twelve states adopted the common currency, discarding their own national currencies and surrendering a great deal of macroeconomic policy to the European Central Bank (ECB).
13. The economically developed Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU relatively easily, while referenda in Norway and Switzerland rejected membership. The Swiss, however, are part of the European Free Trade Area, which de facto makes them members of the common market. Moreover, the addition of East Germany to the EU in 1990 is also seen as a quasi-enlargement but did not resemble in scale any of the other ones and was considered a natural unification of a separated people.
14. The Eastern Enlargement consisted of two phases: in 2004, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members (along with Cyprus and Malta), and in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania brought the total number of EU members to 27, almost twice the size of ten years ago.
15. The makeup of the Convention was diverse and widely representative. The Heads of State or Government of the 15 EU countries and the 13 candidates (including Turkey) were all invited, and all of their Parliaments also sent two representatives each. Moreover, the EU Commission, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions comprised the core EU institutions that were also given a voice. As Burgess (2006) explains, the convention “could hardly be considered Europe’s equivalent to the Philadelphia Convention (1787) but it certainly represented the key players in the next stage of the European project” (p. 241).
18. In fact, as Nügent (2006) argues, the Constitutional Treaty offered much less substantial innovations than previous treaties (e.g., the Single European Act or the Maastricht Treaty) but its high profile and the use of the word “constitution” made its ratification a much more complicated and uncertain affair.
Momchil Jelev

19. Burgess (2006) characterizes the document as “a huge, unwieldy tome that remains for the moment a mystery to the vast majority of EU citizens, who are not yet properly engaged with the processes of constitution-building and ratification” (p. 243).


21. Also articulated during Ruben Lombaert’s lecture in Brussels at the January core seminar.

22. As former EU Commissioner Van Miert explains in the penultimate section of the paper, the importance of European public opinion has grown disproportionately in the last decade, and it appears inconceivable to continue with the development of the European project without consulting the continent’s citizens on the major decisions along the way (Van Miert, May 2007).


26. Decision-making by consensus has been the preferred system in the EU since its establishment. It provides each state, regardless of its economic or demographic importance, an equal say during voting in the European Council. The enlargement of the Union has made this system extremely cumbersome, significantly decreasing the efficiency of the EU. There are strong calls for expanding the recently introduced Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), in which each state has a specific voting weight, to as many EU competence areas as possible. So far, QMV is only applied to a limited number of policy areas, the ambition being to constantly expand it into new domains of decision making.

27. The “Hamiltonian Project” bears the name of Alexander Hamilton, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States and a vehement supporter of the federal idea during the 1787 Constitutional Convention.


29. In academia and among some politicians, the expression *sui generis* is often used to characterize the EU. In Latin it means “of its own kind” or “unique in its characteristics.” In political science, the term is often applied to the European project, placing it somewhere on the continuum between the federal and confederal tradition (Burgess 2006, p. 240).


31. Signed in Maastricht in 1992, the TEU remains the major structural and functional foundation of the EU (especially after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty).

32. Ibid., p. 7.


34. This illustrates the idea that there are diverse communities that live within the Union and the formation of a common identity is neither probable nor desirable within the framework of constitutional tolerance (which recognizes the equal importance of all nations and their unique cultures and identities).

35. Ibid., p. 3.

36. Fossum 2004. This is a point that was also articulated by Ruben Lombaert during the seminar visit to Brussels in January 2007. Lombaert used it to show the difference
between the harmonization pursued at the U.S. federal level and the preservation of diversity that defines the European project.

37. Burgess 2006, p. 239.
39. The June 2007 EU summit concluded the German Presidency that sought to revive the Constitutional Treaty. The goal of European leaders is now to push forward the reforms present in the rejected document through a series of smaller treaties that would not have to pass a popular vote. After heated debates and considerable disagreements among member states, an agreement was reached on a mandate for the articulation of a new EU Treaty. Areas of change include the increase of QMV voting by 2014, the creation of a High Commissioner on foreign policy, and other reforms that have been, in one way or another, part of the Constitutional document. Upon completion of the final version of this essay, the EU managed to agree on the Lisbon Treaty, a new reform document largely based on the rejected Constitution. The draft treaty was adopted in October and formally signed in December 2007 and is expected to pass national ratifications by the end of 2008.

40. Bauman (2004) most clearly articulates the identity problem for Europeans: “we, the Europeans, are perhaps the sole people who have no identity—fixed identity, or an identity deemed and believed to be fixed: ‘we do not know who we are,’ and even less do we know what we can yet become and what we can yet learn that we are” (p. 12).
42. Gradev interview, June 2007.
46. This relates closely to discussions during the January core seminar on the issues of transnational empathy as a tool for addressing the excesses of globalization. In One World: The Ethics of Globalization, Peter Singer touches upon issues of trans-border identity, which is similar to the notion of solidarity that is fostered between EU citizens. Singer claims that this paradigmatic shift in seeing the self as part of a global community is the key to addressing many of the liabilities carried by globalization. In this context, the European Union model fits well with Singer’s ideas and this illustrates its enormous potential in the age of globalization.

47. The contrast between a Hobbesian and Kantian worldview is further laid out in Bauman’s Europe: An Unfinished Adventure. Bauman explains that the uniqueness of the European project is indeed the movement away from a Hobbesian perspective to the one of perpetual peace spelled out by Immanuel Kant. The disparity between the anarchic, brutal Hobbesian world and an existence in a Kantian constant state of peace—reflected in the foreign and domestic policy on each side of the Atlantic—is also the core point of divergence between the U.S. and EU worldviews, as Robert Kagan explains.
48. In Rifkin’s book, the chapter “The Immigrant Dilemma” goes into considerable detail in discussing immigration as a fundamental challenge to the cultural outlook and values of Europe, but also as a potential economic “medicine” that could offset the problems of
an aging population and decreasing workforce throughout the continent. The problem of immigration has many dimensions that were discussed in-depth and experientially examined throughout the January core seminar and the program as a whole, and certainly the issue deserves attention in the context of the EU. However, a proper handling of the subject would go beyond the scope of this paper.


Bibliography


