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From British Colonization to the Green Revolution: Legacies of Imperialism on the Development of a Sikh Consciousness of Nationhood in the 1980s

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Abstract

This paper connects the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist movements in the 1980s, which sparked a widespread consciousness of a Sikh nationhood, to a history of imperialism that both led to smallholders’ economic precariousness and encouraged an exclusive, masculine Sikh identity over time. Through a process of friction, which considers a history rooted in political economy, both smallholders and young educated men joined the agitation against the central government as it refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the demands highlighted in the Anandpur Resolution. The British first facilitated wide-scale agricultural commodification and along with urban Sikhs, advocated for an exclusive Sikh identity. The Indian state, during Import Substitution Industrialization, built on Britain’s economic institutions, favoring regions such as Bangalore and Hyderabad for the fruition of the software industry. Punjab, however, remained India’s ‘breadbasket’ as the Indian government, along with other western international actors, implemented the Green Revolution in the 1960s.
From British Colonization to the Green Revolution: Legacies of Imperialism on the Development of a Sikh Consciousness of Nationhood in the 1980s

During Operation Bluestar, Prime Minister Gandhi devastated the holiest gurdwara[^1] in Sikhism, the Golden Temple, which further gave rise to Sikh militancy and outrage during the late 1980s. With the operation, Prime Minister Gandhi attempted to arrest Sant Bhindranwale[^2], who led the militant Sikh Fundamentalist movements of the 1980s, sparking a Sikh consciousness of nationhood. In this paper, I employ a historical perspective rooted in political economy to analyze the legacies of imperialism, starting with British colonization and continuing with the Green Revolution, that produced friction expressed as Sikh Fundamentalist Resistance in the 1980s. Such movements were the results of imperial legacies that both degraded smallholders’ economic positions over time and further encouraged an exclusive, masculine Sikh identity.

The British, along with urban Sikh reformers, set the impetus for Sikh resistances in the 1980s by encouraging a keshdhari and Khalsa Dhari Sikh identity. Furthermore, through large-scale agricultural commodification, the colonial state laid the groundwork for smallholders’ attraction to Sant Bhindranwale’s militant movements, both exacerbating smallholders’ economic positions and fueling tensions between the central government and Punjab during the Green Revolution. During Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), the Indian government built on Britain’s economic institutions, neglecting to advance Punjab’s industry, which led

[^1]: Sikh holy place of worship
[^2]: Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (June 2, 1947-June 6, 1984) was the leader of the militant organization, the Damdami Taksal. He is portrayed as the symbolic leader of the Sikh revolutionary movement against the central government’s oppressive policies in Punjab. He advocated for a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of Sikhism. Bhindranwale did not survive Operation Blue Star, when Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian army to raid the Golden Temple in an effort to remove both him and his supporters. To Sikhs, Bhindranwale is considered a martyr.
young educated men to join Sant Bhindranwale’s movements in the 1980s as they remained unemployed both industrially and agriculturally.

In this paper, I first contextualize my argument in relation to other scholars such as Shiva, Purewal, and Chopra. Then, I discuss the impact of British colonization on Punjabi society: as the colonial state led smallholders to engage in petty commodity production, smallholders’ took on debt, which attracted them to the financial advantages offered by the military. I also analyze how the British state advocated for a distinct, masculine form of Sikhism. Subsequently, I shift to the ISI period in order to discern the industries and regions the Indian state favored as it built on Britain’s institutions. While Punjab received education and infrastructural funding during this period, the Indian government continued to treat it as an agricultural breadbasket. Finally, in the last section, I use Tsing’s framework of friction to illustrate the Green Revolution’s consequences for emergence of Sikh Fundamentalist movements rooted in a historical, political economy context. I focus in particular on the plight of young men and smallholders in order to extrapolate their motivations in joining militant Sikh resistance movements.

Below, I explain the arguments of scholars such as Shiva (1991) and Purewal (1998) who trace the emergence of Sikh resistance movements in the 1980s to the Green Revolution. While Shiva (1991) emphasizes both the intensification and commodification the Green Revolution produced, Purewal (1998) employs a class-based perspective in his arguments. Chopra (2008), on the other hand, asserts that the rise of Sikh movements can be attributed both to electoral politics and Sikhism’s distinctiveness as a religion in India.

**Sikh Resistance Movements in the 1980s**

Shiva (1991) argues that the rise of Sikh Fundamentalism in the 1980s (which I claim sparked a Sikh consciousness of nationhood) can be attributed to the Green Revolution. She
posits that the intensification processes the Green Revolution required put pressure on political systems, fueling conflicts between the central government and Punjab. According to Shiva (1991, pp. 164-166), conflicts erupted over the central government’s efforts to centralize Punjab’s water boards. While conflict with the central government played a role in the emergence of Sikh movements, they also emerged as a response to the homogenization the Green Revolution produced: agricultural commodification stripped away the sacridity of traditional forms of society, creating an ethical vacuum where everything entailed a price (Shiva, 1991, p. 174). In order to correct the ‘moral issue’ of commodification, Sikh ‘revival’ movements emerged (Shiva, 1991, p. 175). According to Shiva (1991), the motivation for the rise of Sikh movements can be reduced to the Green Revolution itself.

Purewal (1998), among others, employs a class perspective to explain the rise of Sikh resistance movements in the 1980s. He perceives Sikh movements as “ethnonationalist,” occurring as a result of a class struggle between Sikh capitalist farmers and the Hindu industrial bourgeoisie of India (Purewal, 1998, p. i). He explains that the transition to capitalism in Punjab’s agriculture (the Green Revolution) allowed a powerful class of capitalist farmers (the Kulaks) to own the majority of the state’s land. The Kulaks used the ideology of Sikhism to bond with the marginal, landless Sikh peasantry in an effort to dominate the commercial Hindu bourgeoisie. Militant Kulak units fought with the central government, which defended the interests of the Hindu bourgeoisie. The Kulaks demanded transferring jurisdictions to the provinces or calling for complete independence from India, leading Sikh ethno nationalistic movements (Purewal, 1998, p. ii). Purewal points to the class conflicts between the Hindu urban bourgeoisie class and the Sikh rural class as the source leading to the emergence of Sikh movements in the 1980s.
Other scholars, such as Chopra (2008, pp. 191-192), argue that the preeminence of Khalistan (the Sikh nation-state) can be attributed to Sikhism’s distinctiveness in the larger nation and as a product of Indian politics. Chopra characterizes the formulation of Khalistan as part of a historical emphasis that held Sikhism distinctive linguistically, ethnically, and religiously. In addition, the Indian government attempted to fracture the Akali Party by supporting Sant Bhindranwale. Simultaneously, however, the Congress Party also joined hands with the Akalis. Later on, Sant Bhindranwale garnered the support of young men, leading them in agitation for the creation of Khalistan (the Sikh nation-state). Chopra contends Sant Bhindranwale’s strength was also a product of the Congress Party’s electoral politics as they first aided his rise.

My research contributes to this literature by taking seriously the legacies of imperial histories, beginning with British colonization and continuing with the Green Revolution, that fueled the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist Movements in the 1980s, sparking a Sikh consciousness of nationhood. Nor the Green Revolution or the analysis of a ‘capitalist’ class during this period alone can account for the dominance of Sikh Fundamentalist movements as a marketized system of agriculture began well before the Green Revolution: the British first began the project of transforming Punjab into a “breadbasket” through large scale agricultural commodification. Furthermore, while Chopra attributes the Sikh movements to Sikhism’s distinction religiously, Sikh identity is not static over time. As I will show, beginning with colonization, the British advocated for a masculine, exclusive Sikh identity by encouraging reformation movements that aided their goals of recruiting Sikhs in the army.

**British Colonization: Agricultural Commodification & the Exclusivity of Sikhism**
In this section, I describe how Britain transformed land tenure through agricultural commodification, which substantially contributed to smallholders’ economic vulnerabilities and incentivized army recruitment. By also considering Sikhs a martial caste, the British led efforts, along with urban Sikhs, to promote a *keshdhari* version of Sikhism that differentiated Sikhs from the ‘shaven’ Hindus. Both agricultural commodification and recruiting Sikhs in the army served the imperial interests of the British state as they sought to uphold their political dominance abroad and export cash crops to fund their own global hegemony. While Britain favored cultivating cash crops such as wheat in Punjab, they neglected to invest in Punjab’s industrial sector despite Punjabi leaders’ desires to do so. I begin with Britain’s transformation of Punjab into an agricultural ‘basket’ and a short briefing on the annexation of Punjab.

The British first annexed Punjab in 1849 for its strategic position as a barrier to outside invaders. Punjab historically served as a frontier region where invaders entered into India; it also acted as a barrier to the Russian threat. To the colonial state, annexing Punjab was important for preserving British security in India (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 65). Securing Punjab proved a challenge, as it strongly resisted Britain’s colonizing attempts (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 65). After Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s death, the British took advantage of a split Punjabi society in order to finally secure the region (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 64). Jamu Gulab Singh, a courtier of the Lahore Kingdom, helped the British secure Punjab; he was rewarded with the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846, which transferred the valley of Kashmir to him in exchange for money (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 65). The British also fought the Sikhs in the two Anglo-Sikh wars before they affected control over the region (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 65).

*Agricultural Commodation: Systems of Land Tenure and Cash Crops*
The British organized Punjabi colonies into *Mahalwari* land revenue settlements—as opposed to Raiyatwari or *Zamindari* systems—as they sought to exploit the region agriculturally (Sarwar 2012). In Bengal, the *Zamindari* systems were more common, while the Raiyatwari systems remained prominent in Madras and Bombay (Sarwar, 2012, p. 16). In the North West, including Punjab, the British created *Mahalwari* systems, which varied in implementation over time. Under such a system, entire bodies of villagers were jointly and separately responsible for the revenue extraction of the entire village (Sarwar, 2012, p. 19). While under the *Zamindari* system, the British set a distinct intermediary (or *zamindar*) bound by contract in order to collect land revenues, *Mahalwari* systems also included an intermediary, though they were more proprietary and held the settlement (Sarwar, 2012, p. 21).

The colonial rulers transformed Punjab’s land into intensified systems of irrigation, which involved growing cash crops. In particular, during the formation of the famous Chenab colony, the Chenab river was transformed into a system of perennial canals (Barrier, 1967, p. 356). The British considered the Chenab colony its “model” colony, using it as a blueprint as they sought to transform other areas in Punjab. Overall, in the colony, six million acres of desert land were converted into systems of intensive irrigation (Talbot, 2012, p. 7). The British introduced cash crops, including wheat, tobacco, sugarcane, and cotton at the expense of traditional crops (Talbot, 2012, p. 5). By the end of the 1920s, Punjab produced a tenth of India’s total crop production and a third of its wheat; its per capita crop output increased by forty-five percent between 1891 and 1921 (Talbot, 2012, p. 5).

Wheat was an important cash crop because of its export value. In the Chenab, Jhelum, and Lower Bari colonies, wheat alone made up more than thirty-percent of all cultivated areas (Ali, 2014, p. 224). In other areas, it sometimes made up half of all cultivated land due to the
abundant supply of canal water, and commanded high prices since it was primarily grown as an export crop. New varieties of wheat were created in order to fulfill the needs of the British market; the English, under Forbes Watson, tested more than one thousand samples of Indian wheat (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 8). Traditional red wheat started to be replaced by white wheat, as the British favored the latter for bread and flour (Ali, 2014, p. 244).

The British encouraged farmers to cultivate another cash crop, cotton, to support their own textile market (Ali, 2014, p. 225). Although cotton was not as popular in the early years of colonization, from 1910 to 1940, the proportion of cotton increased by fifty percent in both the Jhelum and Chenab colony; in the Lower Doabi colony, cotton cultivation at times equaled the production of wheat (Ali, 2014, p. 225). Furthermore, the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) received a grant of 7,500 acres for the cultivation of cotton; the grant was the largest given to a metropolitan commercial organization in the colonies (Ali, 2014, p. 226). The BCGA bred seeds for positive traits, managing crops that were later exported to textile mills in Lancashire (Ali, 2014, p. 226): colonial innovation adapted American long staple cotton to Punjab’s soil and climate (Ali, 2014, p. 225). More than one thousand samples of Indian wheat were tested in England under Forbes Watson (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 8). The British strategically chose cash crops, such as cotton, based on their profitability as exports.

While colonialists privileged Punjab as their ‘breadbasket’ region, they neglected to build an adequate industrial sector. Colonial governor Sir Malcolm Hailey rejected proposals of constructing sugarcane, wine, or canning factories because such industrial pursuits did not align with Britain’s goals for Punjab (Ali, 2014, p. 40). Instead, the colonial state targeted ‘engineering’ efforts towards producing cash crops for export, rejected proposals for
manufacturing as they favored others regions in India for industry, which I will further elaborate on in section two.

Agricultural commodification, including prioritizing cash crops, degraded smallholders’ economic positions. Both agricultural prices and wages began to be controlled by the market. Commodity transformed peasants into commodity producers, growing cash crops to earn money (Fox, 1985, p. 38). The colonial government encouraged smallholders to engage in petty commodity production as smallholders only secured roughly twenty-five acres of land (Fox, 1985, p. 43). Smallholders largely relied on labor-intensive means of cultivation, while larger farmers could afford more technologically advanced inputs (Ali, 2014, p. 231).

In 1876-1877 and 1886-1887, moneylenders began accepting land as a security loan because the increases in mortgages produced economic difficulties for smallholders (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 10). As a response to the growing power of moneylenders, the colonial government passed the Land Alienation Act of 1900 Bill in an attempt to protect agriculturalists from moneylenders by restricting land from the non-cultivating castes (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 11). The bill, however, did not save small-scale farmers: the lack of co-operative movements and other forms of credit only deepened smallholders’ economic insecurities (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 11).

As a result, smallholder debt increased: while the debt of British India as whole remained at Rs. 900 crores, Punjab’s total share persisted at Rs. 135 crores (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 12). Punjab contained seven percent of British India’s population, but its share of debt exceeded fifteen percent of India’s total (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 12). The marketization of agriculture augmented smallholders’ economic vulnerabilities as moneylenders’
power grew and the colonial state neglected to institute sufficient social protections to protect smallholders.

Militarization & Reformation Movements

One way smallholders could alleviate their financial struggles was through military service (Fox, 1985, p. 43). Colonial authorities depended on Punjab for army recruitment for their imperial army (Fox, 1985, p. 43). The rising burden of debt led smallholders to seek out opportunities in the army even though they paid a low wage (Fox, 1985, p. 44). The British shepherded Punjabi smallholders into the Indian army: during World War I, more than sixty-five percent of Indian combat troops originated from Punjab (Fox, 1985, p. 44).

In order to encourage smallholders to join the army during World War I, Britain offered financial advantages in the form of land grants. However, only some soldiers received land grants (Fox, 1985, p. 44). In the Nili Bar colony (established from 1925 to 1940), well-established families obtained land grants of 4000 acres each (Ali, 2014, p. 5); in the latter half of the century, though, the British preserved nine percent of the land for army pensioners (Ali, 1985, p. 38). Sikh soldiers often complained about and protested the inferior pay of Indian troops compared to British troops’ wages (Fox, 1985, p. 44). Following World War I, military recruitment played an increasingly significant, sustaining role in central Punjab than in other regions.

While financial incentives factored prominently in Sikhs’ decision to join the army, the British also considered Sikhs a ‘martial’ caste. The British perceived Sikhism as a ‘rational,’ ‘progressive’ religion due to its monotheism, rejection of idols and priests, and repudiation of caste (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 308). The British compared the founder of Sikhism, Guru Nanak Dev Ji, to Martin Luther, as they considered Guru Nanak Dev Ji to be a reformer of Hinduism.
(Ballantyne, 2006, p. 249). Aligned with urban Sikhs, the British advocated for a ‘rational,’ ‘masculine’ form of Sikhism in the countryside, where Sikhs commonly worshipped Hindu deities and intermarried with Hindus (Fox, 1985, p. 110).

The reformation movements, led by the urban Sikhs under the Tat Khalsa3, promoted a ‘pure,’ ‘masculine’ form of Sikhism, which involved convincing Sikhs in the countryside to abandon folk traditions and superstitions (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 297). The British administration feared the decay of Sikhism if it was not separated from Hinduism (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 289). Through meetings, preaching, and handing pamphlets, the Tat Khalsa advocated for both theirs and the colonial state’s version on Sikh identity; it included an emphasis on kes (which also involved keeping a turban, along with hair) and the five K’s (Ballantyne, 2006, pp. 298).4 Urban Sikhs reformed rural Sikhs’ death rituals, naming rituals, and marriage practices (Ballantyne, 2006, pp. 316-322). Both the Tat Khalsa and colonial state encouraged an exclusive, masculine Sikh identity.

Sikh masculinity was predicated on the inferiority of Hindu masculinity while white colonists positioned themselves as superior to all men. Sikhism’s ‘martial sensibility’ characterized by the turbaned, keshdhari (keeping hair) male, led the British to perceive it as a masculine faith (Ballantyne, 2006, pp. 328, 308). Colonials favored Khalsa Dhari (followers of the Sikh panth) Sikhs in part because they embodied Sikh masculinity from their outward ‘martially sensible’ appearance and their demonstration of the five K’s. Both Khalsa Dhari and keshdhari Sikhs’ appearance includes facial hair and the keeping of one’s hair, which is distinct

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3 The Tat Khalsa is a faction of the Singh Sabha movement that advocated for an independent Sikh identity (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 65). In 1888, Tat Khalsa leaders insisted to the colonial government that Sikhs should not be confounded with Hindus (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 66).

4 The five K’s are the physical symbols of faith worn by Sikhs. They date back to the creation of the Khalsa Panth by Guru Gobind Singh Ji. The five K’s each carry an important meaning in the Sikh faith. They include Kesh (uncut hair), Kara (steel bracelet), Kanga (comb), Kaccha (cotton underwear), and Kirpan (sword).
from Hindu men who do not keep hair. Thus, the British incentivized deepening distinctions between Hindu and Sikh identity, which later created tensions when Hindu nationalists constructed the nation of India on the precedent of a Hindu identity.

Because the British thought Sikh men expressed more ‘civility’ than Hindu men, colonial ideals of Sikh masculinity were also predicated on the superiority of Sikh men over Hindu men. White colonizers considered themselves more superior, ‘rational,’ and ‘civil’ than anyone else. The British favored a particular masculine, exclusive Sikh identity as they recruited Sikhs as soldiers in the World Wars and as a police force in Hong Kong (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 369).

Post World War I & the Great Economic Depression

After World War I, smallholders’ economic position became even more precarious as petty commodity production deteriorated and the British cut military remittances (Fox, 1985, pp. 76-77). Unequal market competition, unequal exchange in the colonies, and eroding social protections also exacerbated smallholders’ economic positions (Fox, 1985, p. 77). Upon returning home, Sikh soldiers struggled to sustain their families after the colonial government stopped issuing military remittances due to their own fiscal problems. Furthermore, both waterlogging problems and decreasing canal grants also induced cultivation problems for smallholders (Fox, 1985, p. 77).

While smallholders already shouldered debt as a result of agricultural marketization, the Great Depression from 1929 to 1933 exacerbated smallholders’ already vulnerable economic positions (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 12). The shift from kind to cash revenues in the 1920s led smallholders to borrow money at harsher terms and conditions (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 9). As water rates, land revenues, agricultural imports, and land prices increased
more than eighty percent of smallholders acquired more debt as a consequence of the transition ("Agrarian Conditions of Punjab," p. 9).

Moreover, food grain prices fell, which created immense economic difficulties for smallholders engaged in petty commodity production ("Agrarian Conditions of Punjab," p. 10). As a result of the worldwide fall in food prices, smallholders earned less for their produce ("Agrarian Conditions of Punjab," p. 12). They could not pay their land revenues, and were displaced from ancestral lands ("Agrarian Conditions of Punjab," p. 10). The Punjab Legislative Assembly attempted to pass several laws to assist smallholders by reducing land revenues by thirty to fifty percent, but the colonial government did not pass them ("Agrarian Conditions of Punjab," p. 13). As co-operative movements also failed, by 1929, the total debt of the peasantry rose to 1350 million rupees ("Agrarian Conditions of Punjab," p. 13). As their land inevitably transferred to moneylenders, many agriculturalists were forced to work as landless laborers ("Agrarian Conditions of Punjab," p. 13).

Smallholders’ economic situation deteriorated along with the marketization of agriculture, which worsened in the face of worldwide economic shocks, thus exacerbating their financial instability. During such times of immense economic volatility, smallholders resisted colonial government, which at times included military resistance.

In sum, in addition to privileging Punjab as the “breadbasket” region, the colonial state continued to favor a masculine, exclusive Sikh identity, which aided their goals of recruiting Sikhs in the military. Because of their tenuous economic situation, smallholders joined the ranks of the army due to the financial incentives it provided; though, even those degraded when soldiers arrived home after World War I. As the colonial state refused to invest in industrial policies or substantially aid smallholders’ situation, they remained in extremely fragile,
dangerous financial situations. Instead of providing more non-rural employment options in Punjab, the British privileged other regions, such as Maharashtra and Karnataka, as their industrial centers, which the Indian state built on during ISI.

**Import Substitution Industrialization: Building on Britain’s Economic Institutions**

In this section, I argue the Indian state continued to favor historically privileged centers through its investments during the ISI period, which led to particular regions’ advancement during the period of trade liberalization. The ISI period entailed the development of industry in a protected, inward environment (Franko, 2007, p. 59). It involved active industrial policy, protective international instruments, and an accommodationist fiscal and monetary policy with transnational participation (Franko, 2007, p. 61). Throughout the ISI period, the Indian state largely neglected Punjab’s industrial growth by continuing to use it as an agricultural region, building on Britain’s agricultural institutions.

First, I will explain the necessity of ISI post-independence as I draw on debates that attempt to determine the general successes and failures of ISI broadly (namely, outward orientation versus protectionism). Second, I turn to India’s ISI experience, illuminating its successes and failures, as well as its strategies. Third, I analyze the software industry in order to illustrate both the regions and industries that benefited the most from ISI. Finally, I show how the Indian state continued to invest in labor-intensive, agriculturally related industries in Punjab, maintaining its role as a ‘breadbasket.’

States that had recently obtained independence turned to the protection afforded by ISI in order to be more competitive in the world economy. Before ISI, ‘developing’ countries regularly traded primary goods for more advanced, technological ones (Franko, 2007, pp. 58-59). It is important to note that agricultural products comprised a low income elasticity due to the decline
of the relative demand of primary goods as economies grew (Franko, 2007, p. 59). ‘Developed’
countries that exported technologically-advanced products reaped substantial profits in the world
economy as technological entrepreneurship surged the market price well beyond that of basic
inputs (Franko, 2007, p. 59). By primarily trading commodities, the economies of developing
countries also remained vulnerable to shocks (Bruton, 1989, p. 1603).

To gain leverage in the world economy, developed countries facilitated the process of
learning to create technologically advanced products on their own. The North continued to
control both labor and firms with monopoly power (Bruton, 1998, p. 905). Market failure alone
could not explain the need for ISI in developing nations; rather, it was the division of labor
between rich countries and poor ones that led the latter to poverty. Even the industrial centers of
developing countries remained strongholds of western powers. With ISI, developing countries
could gain autonomy from the power interests of the most economically robust nations over
time, and could eventually forge their own paths toward development (Bruton, 1989, p. 1603).

In order to forge their paths of development, developing countries instituted ISI, which
entailed both economic protectionism and government intervention. The development process is
depicted as one with a thin neck: inputs were constrained from flowing freely from the bottle
through the restrictive neck as technology, infrastructure, and entrepreneurial capital were scarce
(Franko, 2007, p. 60). Backward linkages stimulated supplier chain growth while forward
linkages facilitated their growth further along in the supplier industry (Hirschman, 1998, pp. 6-7).

Furthermore, governments protected their economies through high tariffs, which allowed
their own firms to develop the necessary conditions to innovate and begin the process of
 technological advancement (Franko, 2007, p. 63). Tariffs were also imposed on intermediate
goods. States subsidized domestic firms, granting both tax credits and soft credit in order to jumpstart the industrial sector (Franko, 2007, p. 64). States’ also implemented protective walls so that less competitive, infant industries could gain the chance to become as competitive as large multinational firms (Franko, 2007, p. 63).

The protectionism of ISI is often compared to export-orientation strategies. Countries in East Asia exhibited higher rates of growth and Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) than other countries practicing ISI, dubbing it the “East Asian Miracle.” East Asia’s export-driven strategy was lauded as the source of its remarkable success (Bruton, 1998, p. 929). The World Development Report (1987) suggested Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong were more successful than other countries due to their outward-orientation; for example, their real manufacturing value added averaged 15.6% growth from 1963 to 1973 (Bruton, 1998, p. 928). According to the literature, as result of policies that opened their countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s respectively, China and India also achieved sharp increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), agriculture, industry, and exports (Bruton, 1998, p. 928). Countries that did not open their economies drastically, including those in Latin America, the Ivory Coast, and Kenya, according to the World Bank, ended up with lower growth rates than those that did (Bruton, 1998, p. 928).

Bruton (1998, p. 929) argues that shifts in economic paradigms such as ‘outward-orientation’ are not plausible explanations for assessing ISI’s successes and failures. Instead, he argues fostering cultures of knowledge accumulation are more important to determining the success of economic programs. Bruton (1998, p. 929) explains strong indigenous learning processes entail on-the-job learning, learning by doing, and using technology. Furthermore, if done correctly, protection from Import Substitution Industrialization could successfully foster
learning in firms. Governments, too, can play important roles in implementing policies to foster cultures of learning (Bruton, 1998, p. 931).

Bruton (1998, pp. 921, 922, 931) posits that ‘initial conditions’ are important for determining outcomes of learning accumulation. He argues East Asia’s success could be attributed to its experience of colonization: Japan as a colonizer facilitated collective learning environments that encouraged innovation. Latin America’s colonizing experience, varying by region, also shaped the extent of its ability to foster cultures of knowledge accumulation, especially as inequality continues to remain a pressing issue.

*India’s Experience of ISI*

India’s ‘initial conditions’ as a former colony shaped its economic nationalistic rhetoric, specifically regarding its promotion of ISI as the national economic strategy. After independence, previously colonized countries turned to economic nationalism to promote industry (Amsden, 2004, p. 77). Nationally owned firms had a greater incentive than foreign owned ones to take the lead on ISI in efforts to encourage local cultures of knowledge (Amsden, 2004, p. 77). Often, national ownership and government initiative is greater in countries with a colonial prewar manufacturing experience, but national ownership is less clear in countries marked by the emigre experience, where the distinction between foreign and national is often unclear. This is particularly true in regions marked by extremely violent histories of colonization (Amsden, 2004, p. 78).

After British independence, India began a national effort to develop technologically advanced industry. Shortly after British independence, India developed an indigenous variant of Keynesianism under Nehru’s government: a ‘mixed economy’ approach through which the government strove to invest in the public sector (Ahmed, 2009, p. 38). Nehru's government

As an example, it is worth looking at the differences between Korean and Indian domestic policies in order to assess the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of ISI. Compared to Korea, India gained in its technological maturity, but did not obtain high rates of total factor productivity growth (TFPG). In the later half of the 1950s, India resorted to protecting its imports in the manufacturing industry: import availability ratios substantially declined from 1960 to 1965 (Bruton, 1989, p. 1620). However, in the mid-1960s, India adopted more of an export-oriented strategy rather than adhering strictly to ISI. In the final half of the 1960s, the average annual rate of manufacturing exports fell to less than five percent, but increased fifteen percent per annum from 1967-68. Korea also focused on an export-oriented strategy during the 1960s. From 1973-1080s, Korea’s manufacturing average was at almost ten percent per annum, which was substantially larger than other countries (Bruton, 1989, p. 1622). TFPG remained largely negative in India, but positive for Korea during ISI. Although India lagged behind in terms of TFPG, its technological growth was impressive: India imported more technology than both Brazil and Korea, creating a comprehensive technological base in its capital goods protection (Bruton, 1989, p. 1631).

Because India favored capital-intensive industries, it also failed to usurp enough labor to involve poorer segments of the population. The Heckscher-Ohlin Model considers capital or
labor intensity for a country; because India has traditionally been labor-abundant, it should have theoretically specialized in industries requiring larger amounts of labor, such as agriculture and textile goods. Because countries like India sought to catch up with richer countries, it was necessary for them to build capital-intensive industries that required technological maturity (Kulkarni and Meister, 2008, pp. 8-9). Nevertheless, poverty remained a large problem in India in spite of ISI.

India’s poorest regions still did not significantly develop throughout ISI despite the pro-poor rhetoric of Indian politicians. Bottlenecks remained a problem, as they inhibited India’s growth due to poor infrastructure. Under Nehru’s government, the commitment to alleviating poverty was more rhetorical than action-led, despite state-directed efforts (Kohli, 2012, p. 85). Discussing redistribution was a rhetorical strategy--it was never actually put into practice. In fact, industry remained concentrated in a few Indian regions that were historically privileged, particularly during colonization. The software industry, as discussed below, emerged from supply side conditions created during ISI in India’s historically favored centers.

**ISI: Software Industry Hubs**

ISI policies fueled investment in institutions of higher learning, stimulating the supply side conditions that led to the growth of software hubs (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263). For example, the government of India invested in the Indian Institute of Technology, a well-regarded, nation-wide education center (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263). The government also invested in defense research and other areas of the public sector during ISI. This was because the private sector would not make these necessary investments due to the inherent competition with large tech giants that dominated the market (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1264).
In addition to public sector investments such as education, the government instituted software industry parks and provided support to private firms. The Indian software industry originally began in Bombay in the late 1970s in the Santa Cruz Electronics Processing Zone (SEEPZ) (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267). However, a shortage in skilled labor led the industry to shift to Bangalore due to its larger supply of skilled labor. The Indian government also invested in elite institutions of science, including electronics, aeronautics, and various machine tools during ISI; these, too, were concentrated in the city (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267).

Software clusters concentrated in Bangalore (Karnataka), Hyderabad (Telangana), Chennai (Tamil Nadu), and Pune (Maharashtra) during the period of trade liberalization due to their ‘initial advantages’ during colonization. Bombay was historically privileged as one of the centers of industry and commerce. After independence, larger landholdings were broken into smaller ones. During colonization, Gujarat and Maharashtra housed manufacturing centers, with strong ties to business (Kohli, 2012, p. 191) while Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh provided strong service industries to the colonial state (Kohli, 2012, p. 122). Because industrial infrastructure already inhabited these regions, the Indian government built on it during Import Substitution Industrialization.

The Indian government built on these areas’ infrastructural advantages by further investing in education and infrastructure, contributing to software firms’ success during trade liberalization. In addition to its advantage in education, Bangalore also had the infrastructure in place for a booming software industry (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267). Additional clusters formed in Hyderabad, Chennai, and Pune because of the simultaneous existence of both universities the government had invested in during ISI that supplied the necessary high skilled labor for the software industry, and private institutions. The government had provided finance,
infrastructural support, legal regulation, and marketing assistance to firms like Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) that would initiate software development both for Tata firms and the public sector (Patibandla et al., 2000, pp. 1265-1266). Infosys, a public sector firm, was created in 1981 by using the capital in public sector institutions. Clusters in Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Pune reaped the most from the government’s subsidized education during ISI (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267) in part because of their pre-existing infrastructural advantages.

State-led supply side investment in education and other public expenditures during ISI fostered the necessary conditions for the software industry’s success during privatization. During trade liberalization, the Indian software industry was open to international trade and multinational investment, starting from the early 1980s. Software clusters partnered with other multinational firms, thereby gaining more technological knowledge (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267). The growth of clusters also led to increased intellectual property rights, corporate governance, capital markets, and business organizations (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1268). Growth was primarily driven by exports, and the software industry became characterized as an “island of competitiveness” (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263), which it achieved with little support from input industries in hardware and telecommunications (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263). These clusters, though, also gained a disproportionate percentage of the industry’s market share (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1268).

Because of weak national demand, the Indian software industry began exporting its products. In their respective cities, software clusters built weak inter-industry linkages between industries while national demand was not sufficient (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263). Additionally, India’s closed-door policy and licensing controls inhibited the competitiveness of its industries (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1264). In 1972, hardware inputs were allowed for
software exports on the condition that the importer earned foreign exchange on the imports through software exports (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1264).

Through supply side support via investment in public sector endeavors such as education and research/development, the Indian state created the necessary supply side conditions that would lead to the software industry’s future success. The Indian state also assisted private firms both financially and infrastructurally. Through trade, software hubs “realized” both their technological maturity and information externalities, becoming “islands of competitiveness” (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267). Firms in Punjab, however, did not receive substantive private funding or infrastructural support during this period.

Punjab’s Experience During ISI

Because the British state believed Punjab’s strength was agricultural rather than industrial, the Indian state did not invest heavily in Punjab’s industrial development during ISI. Punjab instead received investments in agriculture both before and after independence. Punjab received large public investments towards its power services, scientific research, extension services, roads, markets, and other rural infrastructure (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 9). Other large investments were concentrated in education and health: extension services, higher education, and agricultural research received investments during the period of ISI (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 21). Agro-processing industries also dominated Punjab’s manufacturing sector; textiles accounted for about one-fourth of the total manufacturing activity. The next largest manufacturing sectors included food processing and dairy industries (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 10).

After ISI, Punjab shifted to some metal-based industries such as bicycles, including some manufacturing such as repairing vehicles. Industries during the period, 1979-1980, involved basic metals, metal products, drugs, pharmaceuticals, machine goods, and electrical/non
electricity, machinery (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 11). The cotton textiles industry remained popular in the 1970s and 1980s, along with bicycles, sewing machines, and hand tools (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 28). Despite the very slow growth of the trend towards diversification, agricultural industries (agricultural processing sectors) generated the highest backwards and forward linkages in terms of wage income and income without import leakages (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 10).

According to Bhalla et al. (1990, p. 13), the share of agriculture decreased throughout the period of ISI (1960s to 1980s) from 51.3% to 35% (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 13). The secondary sector increased from 7.3% to 11%; net domestic product increased from 25.4% to 32.8% (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 14). Despite such increases, overall, the primary agricultural sector substantially dominated Punjab’s industry. The dominance of the agriculture sector during this period is also due to the Green Revolution, which I will discuss in section three.

The Green Revolution affected the development of industry as the introduction of new technology required purchases of modern inputs from other sectors of both the domestic economy and from outside of the state (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 15). Commercial bank credit expanded in concert with the growth of the Green Revolution while small-scale agro-processing input and consumer goods industries developed (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 19). Agro-industry manufacturing involved the development of machine tools, pipes and fittings, fertilizers, automobile parts for tractors, and processing of cotton textiles, sugar, wheat, and flour (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 28); such industries were and continue to be labor-intensive.

Punjab’s industrial development even remained contingent upon agricultural-related industries while education received substantial funding from the Indian government. Below, in section three, I elucidate how the lack of such capital-intensive industries contributed to youth’s frustrations, leading them to Sant Bhindranwale’s movements. The Green Revolution further
exacerbated smallholders’ vulnerabilities and the Indian government neglected both young men’s and smallholders’ demands, fueling the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist Movements in the 1980s. I also employ Tsing’s framework of *friction* in a historical framework to analyze Sikh resistance below.

**The Green Revolution in Punjab and the Emergence of Sikh Fundamentalist Movements**

In this section, I demonstrate that understanding the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist movements in the context of one ‘universal,’ the Green Revolution, is not sufficient alone. Rather, a history of imperialism, beginning with British colonization, is synthesized to show how the Green Revolution further induced economic vulnerabilities smallholders already faced. During the 1980s, Sant Bhindranwale encouraged an *amritdhari* Sikh identity that not only encompassed baptism, but also included keeping *kes* (hair). Young, educated men first joined Sant Bhindranwale’s movement, in part, because they lacked employment prospects in the industrial sector, which is a consequence of ISI policies described above. The culmination of these ‘universals,’ beginning with British colonization, contributed to the production of *friction* during the Green Revolution. As the central government derived its legitimacy from its Hindu stance, it reacted violently to Sikh resistance movements. Below I begin by describing ‘universals’ and processes of *friction*.

‘*Universals*’ and *Friction*

Heilbroner (1985, p. 33), a systems theorist, characterizes capitalism as a ‘universal’ system that functions to extract wealth from society in the form of capital. He depicts capitalism as one system with a defined nature and logic: capitalism retains both a competitive and expansive nature that manifests itself in social hierarchy (Heilbroner, 1985, p. 56). The dominant
class subordinates the lower class through asserting its economic dominance in a wage
relationship (Heilbroner, 1985, p. 95). Instead of viewing such political and social entities as
autonomous, separate spheres, Heilbroner depicts them as part of one, universal system.

Contrary to systems theorists, Tsing argues capitalism operates in a heterogeneous ways
as it encounters difference through a process of friction. She (2005, p. 8) states universals
mobilize and create new forces as they travel across difference. Universals, though, contain
limits as their forces are dependent on particular historical moments (Tsing, 2005, p. 9). As
universals engage with localisms, they are reformulated and modified (Tsing, 2005, p. 9).
Friction occurs through the process of universals engaging with localities; it can be expressed as
retranslations of the universal in local dialogue (Tsing, 2005, p. 4). Furthermore, friction can also
manifest in the form of localized resistance (Tsing, 2005, p. 4).

In this section, I discern the friction produced by the Green Revolution’s engagement in
Punjabi society manifested in the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist resistance movements, which
emerged not only as a result of the Green Revolution itself, but were the consequences of
imperial histories, such as British colonization, that fueled economic precariousness and
influenced Sikh identity. The Anandpur Resolution highlighted both political and economic
grievances, in part stemming from the Green Revolution. I begin with an analysis on the Green
Revolution below.

*The Green Revolution in Punjab*

The Green Revolution was essentially a universal ‘package’ implemented across the
world, framed as a solution to ending both universal hunger and agrarian unrest (Farmer, 1981,
p. 202). It was supposed to lead to both greater political stability and prosperity (Leaf, 1981-
1982, p. 618) by increasing populations as individuals procured more food. Such a goal is
demonstrated by plant-breeder Norman Borlaug’s acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize for creating the high-yielding varieties (HYV) of grain (The Contradictions of the Green Revolution, p. 1); it is important to consider he received the prize for peace, not a science.

Despite the way it was framed, the Green Revolution’s efforts entailed “modernizing” the countryside through a capitalist system that fostered dependency on new technology as part of the nation-building process (The Contradictions of the Green Revolution, p. 5). Because smallholders needed to purchase new seeds, the Green Revolution reified their structural dependence on a national market in order to obtain such seeds. It aimed to transform agrarian social and political relations by integrating isolated areas and farmers into a capitalist market system.

Corporations supplied inputs to farmers, institutionalizing the transfer of technical knowledge (The Contradictions of the Green Revolution, p. 6). They profited from this venture of capitalism: both bilateral and multilateral financing included irrigation systems, imports for inputs such as tractors and fertilizers, and joint production ventures in order to maximize profits. It also involved a monopoly and control of agrochemicals, seed corporations, and international research centers (Shiva, 1991). The Green Revolution is a capitalist, imperialist venture in the “third-world.” Nations such as India may have gained independence, but imperialist pursuits by external actors certainly did not end.

The American government and international organizations played a large role in applying the Green Revolution to India. International agencies such as the World Bank transferred the American model of agriculture, which relied on intensifying control over nature, to India (Shiva, 1991, p. 29). The Rockefeller Foundation remodeled India’s agricultural research team in 1953 while the Ford Foundation trained and extended agriculture in 1952. Additionally, between the
periods of 1956 and 1970, grants were awarded to Indian leaders so that they could witness American agricultural institutes (Shiva, 1991, p. 30). The World Bank provided the credit to apply a capital-intensive agricultural model to India; along with USAID, the World Bank provided the financial means for the Green Revolution. After the Indian drought in 1966, U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson refused to deliver desperately needed food aid until India agreed to purchase and utilize the technology of the Green Revolution (Shiva, 1991, p. 32). The impact of this international involvement was largely concentrated in Punjab, which contained the demanded irrigation systems as a result of Britain’s imperial pursuits: eighty-four percent of Punjab’s geographical area was under cultivation during the Green Revolution compared to forty-two percent for India as a whole (Shiva, 1991, p. 83).

The Green Revolution of the 1960s introduced newer, high yielding varieties of cereals, chemical fertilisers, insecticides, and pesticides, along with new methods of cultivation in Punjab (Farmer, 1981, 202). Varieties it focused on included both wheat and rice (Leaf, 1980-1891, p. 618). Scholars such as Leaf (1980-1981, p. 625) illustrate that a ‘revolution’ occurred in Punjab as a result of the Green Revolution: other than the introduction of new cropping patterns and the increases in overall income, ‘progressive’ changes occurred between the villagers and the state due to the improved technology wrought on by agricultural marketization.

However, scholars such as Shiva (1991) argue that because the Green Revolution both degraded crop diversity and introduced new methods of intensification, it harmed ecosystems. The Green Revolution packaged GMOs as superior seeds, further degrading the diversity of indigenous seeds in Punjab. Mixtures and rotation of diverse crops such as wheat, millets, maize, pulses, and oilseeds were substituted for monocultures of wheat and rice (Shiva, 1991, p. 81). Furthermore, the new wheat and rice varieties originated from a very narrow genetic base (Shiva,
1991, p. 81). Wheat was grown at the expense of crops mixed with traditional wheat varieties, such as gram, barley, and mustard (Shiva, 1991, p. 83). The area under paddy also expanded at the expense of maize, moong and masoor, green fodder, and groundnut (Shiva, 1991, p. 86).

Even though Shiva posits large-scale commodification and the degradation of crop diversity began with the Green Revolution, it dates back to British colonization. The British first initiated homogenization as they transformed large acres of land into irrigation farming as shown in the first section. Because the British laid the groundwork for the success of crops such as wheat, the Green Revolution built on such existing institutions. Even during colonization, the British experimented with developing new varieties of wheat; likewise, the Green Revolution further “advanced” crop varieties, including wheat and rice, through GMO (genetically modified organism) seeds (Shiva, 1991, p. 120). While Britain exercised authority during colonization, corporations increasingly exercised control with the advent of the Green Revolution.

For example, the genetic breeding, which “optimizes” crop yields and creates GMOs is controlled by major corporations. Genetic engineering is largely at the hands of multinational corporations: eighty-percent of research and development of commercial GMOs is controlled by private groups and a few in the public sector (Kaur et al., 2013, p. 624). Genetic engineering is expensive; profitable GMO crops also continue to be restricted to large landowners that can practice both monoculture and economies of scale, which widened the gap between the rich and poor (Kaur et al., 2013, p. 625).

In Punjab, the Green Revolution both exacerbated existing inequalities between smallholders and wealthier landowners, leading to the increase in rural unemployment. The number of holdings each small farmer possessed declined during the 1980s as smallholders continued to lease out land to both medium and large farmers (Singh, 2002, p. 1626). Already,
during the period of British colonization, smallholders struggled to retain their lands especially due to their indebtedness and further agricultural marketization. During the time of the Green Revolution, land was not redistributed on large scale, either in order to assist smallholders. The ratio of landless workers in the total agricultural workforce also increased from seventeen percent in 1961 to thirty-two percent in 1971; thirty-one percent of marginal farmers lived below the poverty line (Puri, 1983, p. 116).

Additionally, the surge in land prices along with ecological unsustainability heightened smallholders’ economic vulnerabilities. Already pressed by their vulnerable economic situation, smallholders also resisted as the Indian government began to centralize institutions belonging to Punjab. The intensification of the Green Revolution put pressures on Punjab’s irrigation systems, leading to tensions between the central government and smallholders as the Indian government also attempted to coerce Punjab into sharing its water. Smallholders’ economic grievances, originating from British colonization and continuing during the Green Revolution, translated into political ones as the Indian government began to centralize Punjab’s institutions.

Tensions escalated as the government centralized the water board and seized Chandigarh. The Indian government, under the 1966 Punjab Reorganization Act, centralized the water system due to heightened irrigation demands (Shiva, 1991, p. 148). Under this law, the government set up the Bhakra Management Board, which supplied water from the Bhakra Nangal Project to the states of Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan (Shiva, 1991, p. 147). The law also signified the split of Punjab into Haryana and Punjab on the basis of language (Shiva, 1991, p. 147). Tensions heightened as the centre forced Punjab into sharing its water with the other regions at a rate it did not agree with: Haryana claimed 4.8 MAF out of the total 7.2 MAF allocated to Punjab, but Punjab believed it deserved the entire 7.2 MAF: its own farmers needed the water, especially as
rice consumed a substantial amount of water (Shiva, 1991, p. 148). Punjab also claimed the
water systems and canals Haryana asserted it deserved remained in Punjab’s geographical region
(Shiva, 1991, p. 152). As the central government further forced small farmers to construct the
canal system to Haryana despite resistances, small farmers resisted by refusing to build the canal
(Shiva, 1991, p. 164-166). President’s Rule was also instituted in Chandigarh, Punjab’s capital
city, as both Haryana and Punjab shared it at the time (Gupta, 1985, p. 1187).

Smallholders expressed their economic and political grievances in the Anandpur
Resolution, which called for a greater share of water for Punjab (Shiva, 1991, p. 50) (as needed
to meet the demands of the Green Revolution) and Chandigarh’s return back to Punjab (Gupta,
1985, p. 1187). As the Green Revolution reproduced past economic grievances and played a role
in introducing political ones, such grievances were translated in the Anandpur Resolution.

The central government, however, considered the Resolution secessionist, and dismissed
it (Gupta, 1985, p. 1187). When the Akalis brought the water dispute case to the supreme court,
the central government withdrew it in 1978 under false pretenses as they claimed the Akalis were
“unpatriotic” and acted “unneighborly” in court (Gupta, 1985, p. 1187). The central government
further claimed if Punjab did want Chandigarh back, it was to sacrifice the cities Abohar and
Fazila to Haryana (Gupta, 1985, p. 1187).

Sikh resistance escalated as young men of lower, rural classes agitated over economic
grievances that stemmed both from the Green Revolution and Import Substitution
Industrialization policies that had neglected the substantial development of Punjab’s industry. As
discussed in section two, ISI constituted government investments in Punjab: rural Jats from
poorer farming classes attended universities in the city in order to receive an education; despite
promises of modernization from the Indian government, young men substantially remained
unemployed (Telford, 1992, pp. 977-979). Also elucidated in section two is that Punjab was not favored as the industrial “center,” so it did not possess technologically advanced industries besides some manufacturing, textile, and automobile industries. Thus, educated young men from universities could not obtain jobs in the cities, and could not effectively participate in ‘modernism’ as Punjab had been historically neglected as an industrial center, dating back to British colonization. Nor could these young men gain attributable employment in the rural sector as their families already struggled financially, further constraining their options for employment (Telford, 1992, pp. 977-981).

During colonization, although smaller farmers served as petty commodity producers, they shifted to serving as laborers and tenants of wealthier landowners, especially after the Great Economic Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Green Revolution also mainly benefited wealthier classes as they could afford the newer, ‘technologically advanced’ inputs. The lower classes remained excluded from accessing all the necessary inputs the Green Revolution required, unless they expanded the enormous amount of debt they already shouldered from the years prior to the Green Revolution, dating back to British colonization.

Not only was the unemployment rate substantially high for young men from rural classes, but few opportunities existed outside of the rural sector. It was estimated that 185,000 youth in Punjab were unemployed at the time (Telford, 1992, p. 981). Punjab received educational investments, but ISI did not lead to the development of technologically advanced industries in Punjab. A RNF (rural non-farm sector) was not promoted in Punjab, but should have been because market uncertainties created dire conditions for poor rural classes already living on the margins (Vatta and Garg, 2008, p. 225). Combined with rural unemployment, the lack of institutional and sectorial opportunities in other sectors did not help to alleviate decades of
economic ills for both smallholders and young men. The British mainly invested in sectors and crops that aided them in their imperial empire; they did not create such substantial alternative institutional mechanisms to protect smallholders from market vulnerabilities the Indian government could then build on, simply because it did not aid their imperial world pursuits as a hegemon.

Furthermore, the Akali Party struggled to uphold its legitimacy in Punjab. Historically, even after the Haryana-Punjab split, the Akalis struggled electorally. In 1966, Haryana split from Punjab in order to encompass a Hindi-speaking majority while Punjab constituted the Punjabi speaking, largely Sikh majority; Sikhs composed sixty percent of the population in Punjab while in Haryana-Punjab as a whole, they comprised only thirty-three percent of the population (Telford, 1992, pp. 970-971). After the split, the Akalis continued their inclusive politics in order to also appeal to non-Sikhs. Because they did not cater specifically to the now-majority Sikh demographic, the Akalis suffered electoral losses both in 1972 and 1980 (Telford, 1992, p. 970).

Beginning with their loss in 1972, the Akalis attempted to appease Sikh constituencies as smallholders agitated against the centralization of the water board (Telford, 1992, p. 971). Both smallholders’ and young men’s economic and political grievances expressed themselves through their religious polarization. Knowing this, Punjab’s local government attempted to cater to these sects politically.

In an effort to accommodate educated young men, the Akalis formed the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) in 1943 to further ally with the Sikh intelligentsia (Telford, 1992, p. 981). The Akalis organized conferences, study circles, and training camps for educated youth (Telford, 1992, p. 981). While the Akalis attempted to attract the members of the AISSF, frustrated, unemployed young men were more drawn to Sant Bhindranwale's militant movement,
and organized themselves under the Damdami Taksal (Telford, 1992, p. 981). The Akalis sought to represent this demographic’s interests as well, joining Bhindranwale to lead the *dharam yudh morcha* (righteous struggle) movement to pressure Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to accept the demands of the Anandpur Resolution (Telford, 1992, p. 984). The Indian government’s policies, which built on Britain’s economic institutions and continued to treat Punjab as a breadbasket region throughout the ISI and Green Revolution periods contributed to the *friction* that expressed as the rise in Sikh militant movements during the 1980s.

Both Akalis and Sant Bhindranwale also advocated for an *amritdhari* Sikh identity. The Akalis incited baptismal campaigns in villages, encouraging Sikhs to baptize (*amrit prachar*) (Kinnvall, 2002, p. 96). A requirement of baptism is abiding by the *five k’s*. Keeping *kes* (hair) is one important requirement for Sikh baptism. The *Singh Sabha* movement, in 1873, led by urban Sikhs, advocated for a *keshdhari* Sikh identity (Telford, 1992, pp. 970-971). An identity that is contingent upon *kes*, or keeping hair, resembles a masculine Sikh identity that differentiates itself from clean-shaven Hindus and Muslims. A masculine Sikh identity, differentiating itself from Hindus, was encouraged by both the colonial state and urban Sikhs as they led reformation movements in the countryside during the time of British colonization (see section one). The British also favored a masculine Sikh identity due to their desires to recruit Sikhs in their armies. The *dharam yudh morcha* movement possessed an ideology of fundamentalism, seeking to represent an exclusivist, Sikh individualism embodying an *amritdhari* identity, which fostered a more exclusive Sikh identity as it encompassed both baptism and the *five k’s* (Singh, 1987, p. 1269).

Sikhs further radicalized, as they demanded the central government meet their grievances expressed in the *dharam yudh morcha* movement (Kinnvall, 2002, p. 96). Sant Bhindranwale’s
rise helped transform Sikh consciousness from marginalized peoples to one of embodying their own nationhood (Singh, 1987, p. 1269). He collectivized Sikhs, frustrated from unjust political and economic systems, into a militaristic movement. The dharam yudh morcha movement manifested in a fundamentalist character as Sant Bhindranwale inspired a Sikh revivalism based off of an amritdhari identity. Although Sant Bhindranwale never explicitly demanded the Sikh nation, Khalistan (Sikh homeland), he stated if it were given, Sikhs would take the opportunity for nationhood (Singh, 1987, p. 1269).

The dharam yudh morcha movement unified Sikhs into a common struggle and laid the groundwork for Sikh Fundamentalist movements, especially as both political and economic grievances continued unresolved from the years prior (Telford, 1992, p. 984). The rise of Sikh nationalism was then not only a result of the Green Revolution itself or Sikhism’s inherent distinctiveness, but grew out of years of economic marginalization and the progression of a masculine, Sikh identity the British had encouraged, manifesting as friction in the form of a localized dharam yudh morcha movement during the 1980s. The dharam yudh morcha movement gained impetus as it grew to not only include members of the AISFF, but also incorporate frustrated smallholders as well (Telford, 1992, pp. 984-985).

Regions where Sikh Fundamentalism appealed the most included Gurdaspur and Amritsar, where large proportions of smallholders lived (Telford, 1992, pp. 976-977). During colonization, the British targeted central Punjab for the purposes of recruitment in the army by providing financial incentives. Smallholder economic grievances continued post-independence, perpetuated by the Green Revolution while the Hindu nationalist state not only added to economic grievances, but also refused to acknowledge their legitimacy.
The Akalis attempted to appease Sant Bhindranwale in order to maintain their power, but through supporting his rise, they also undermined their own legitimacy. This came to a head during the Nirankari clash, which legitimized Bhindranwale’s authority in the Damdami Taksal (Telford, 1992, p. 976-977). The Nirankari Sikhs believed in a living Guru instead of scriptural one, unlike orthodox Sikhs. The Sant Nirankaris organized a convention on April 13, 1978, but members of the Damdami Taksal perceived this to be an insult to Sikhism as the date coincided with Baisakhi, an important Sikh religious holiday. Sikhs from the Damdami Taksal attempted to prevent the Nirankari organization, leading to a clash that resulted in sixteen deaths (Telford, 1992, pp. 976-977).

Sant Bhindranwale orchestrated his own arrest for the murders of Nirankaris publicly; he proclaimed his innocence, and surrendered to the police (Telford, 1992, p. 984). The Akalis, aiming to retain their power among their Sikh constituency, swiftly released Sant Bhindranwale from jail (Telford, 1992, p. 984). Sant Bhindranwale also demanded his “blood brother,” Amrik Singh, be released from jail as well, who was also arrested for the murders of Nirankaris (Telford, 1992, p. 984). The Akalis ceded to the demands, but after Amrik Singh’s release in July 1983, Sant Bhindranwale abandoned the Akali Party, undermining its authority.

During this time, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi classified the Sikh Fundamentalist movements as ‘terroristic,’ hoping to marginalize this extremist group to for electoral gain. First, Indira Gandhi classified Sikh resistances as a “national threat,” and she aimed to justify searching for and prosecuting leaders of the fundamentalist movements that included Sant Bhindranwale and his followers. Rhetoric concerning Punjab transformed from “The Punjab Problem” to a “Sikh threat;” the threat was articulated within the rhetoric of the bounds of the Hindu nationalist state (Singh, 1987, p. 1273). Despite Gandhi’s rhetoric, her real concern
remained electoral: the midterm elections in 1982 and 1983 predicted the Congress Party’s possible defeat (Singh, 1987, p. 1273). Gandhi’s tone became authoritarian, as it had during the Emergency; she labeled Sant Bhindranwale and his followers as ‘terrorists,’ seeking to arrest them. Bhindranwale and his followers established their refuge in Sri Harmandir Sahib (or the Golden Temple).

Under Operation Bluestar, Indira Gandhi violently struck at the Golden Temple, igniting outrage by Sikhs. The military operation to remove the militants from the Golden Temple consisted of three phases: phase I entailed clearing the militants from the building, phase II demanded the capturing of militants from the complex as well as extinguishing fires or repairing structural damage to the site, and finally, phase III involved fighting against resistances in other parts of the state (Hussain, 2014). In Akal Takht (located in Sri Harmandir Sahib), tank fire and chemical gases were used to murder militants (Hussain, 2014). Two tanks fired about twenty shells at Akal Takht; militants were killed in the attack or murdered and captured by Indian officials. Sant Bhindranwale, as well as many civilians, did not survive the attack. Important Sikh archives caught in the fire during the attack (Hussain, 2014).

While the exact number of civilians murdered remains controversial, Sikhs claim thousands of civilians were killed while the Indian government states the numbers ranged in the hundreds. Quickly, outrage and discontent spread in the Sikh community because the methods employed by the Indian army devastated the lives of so many civilians (Hussain, 2014). Furthermore, the army could have first attempted less violent measures: for example, they could have cut the water and electric supply, which would have eventually forced the militants to surrender (Hussain, 2014). As outrage spread, Gandhi’s two Sikh bodyguards assassinated her (Hussain, 2014).
Following Indira Gandhi’s assassination in Delhi on October 31, 1984, Hindu mobs violently murdered, tortured, and raped Sikhs within days of the assassination across the nation (Das, 1985, p. 4). By November 3, 1984, it was clear the Indian police supported the killings, and did not act to stop the murders (Das, 1985, p. 4). The army did not take responsibility for helping victims, either (Das, 1985, p. 4). In some cases, upper-class Sikhs were able to escape with only property damage with the support of other upper-caste individuals, but lower-class Sikhs became the targets of horrific violence. When asked about the killings, Rajiv Gandhi (the son of Indira Gandhi) encouraged the killings, by stating (in translation): “when a big tree falls, the Earth shakes” (Daily News and Analysis).

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the friction manifesting itself as the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist movements in the 1980s, which sparked a Sikh consciousness of nationhood, is the result of imperial legacies traced back to British colonization and continued with the ISI and Green Revolution periods. Young men, frustrated by the lack of opportunities in both the industrial and rural sector, collectivized themselves in Sant Bhindranwale’s *dharam yudh morcha* movement, along with smallholders in precarious financial positions. Both smallholders and educated young men first translated their grievances with the Anandpur Resolution, but the central government considered it ‘secessionist,’ thus further radicalizing Sikh resistance movements.

The British laid the impetus for both young men and smallholders’ political and economic grievances during the 1980s through large-scale agricultural commodification and military recruitment. Smallholders joined the military as it provided financial incentives; the colonial state also encouraged an exclusive Sikh identity that contributed to the emergence of Sikh Fundamentalist movements in the 1980s, which also advocated for an exclusive, *amritdhari*
identity. The Green Revolution in the 1960s built on Britain’s agricultural institutions in Punjab, introducing new forms of market vulnerabilities for smallholders, who had already struggled financially since the British first marketized agriculture. During ISI, the Indian state neglected Punjab’s industrial sector, but favored other historically privileged centers of manufacturing and commerce, such as Bangalore and Hyderabad.

As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi considered Sikh Fundamentalist resistance secessionist, she led the Indian army to brutally attack the Golden Temple, which sparked Sikh outrage. Indira Gandhi’s assassination led to the tragedy of the Sikh Genocide of 1984. As economic grievances induced by the British continue unresolved, Sikhism will continue as militant, especially as further marketization exacerbates smallholders’ financial positions. Because the Indian state refuses to properly acknowledge the violence it enacted against Sikhs, those grievances will also remain unaddressed, further fueling Sikhs’ frustrations. As long as the Hindu nationalist state derives its legitimacy from ‘othering’ religious minorities with violent, authoritarian swings, Sikh identity will be forced into exclusivity, fostering a very dangerous situation for Sikhs throughout India.
References


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