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Making War and Securing Peace: The Viability of Peace Enforcement as a Mechanism for Promoting and Securing Civil War Termination

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The Viability of Peace Enforcement as a Mechanism for Promoting and Securing Civil War Termination

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Honors Thesis

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Macalester College
Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA

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Advisor: Andrew Latham
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ABSTRACT

Peace enforcement—the threat or use of military force to compel belligerent adherence to a civil war settlement—has become increasingly salient in the past decade. Using a hazards analysis of all civil wars and associated third party interventions between 1945 and 2013 in addition to three structured, focused case studies, I argue that peace enforcement operations that 1) utilize the appropriate typological spoiler management strategy and 2) maintain legitimacy and impartiality through close cooperation with UN peacekeepers, are the most successful at catalyzing civil war termination and securing durable peace. I also provide a theoretical framework through which to study peace enforcement operations that builds upon Stephen Stedman and Barbara Walter’s conceptualization of spoilers, third party security guarantees, and the strategic alteration of belligerent cost-benefit calculus.
List of Acronyms

AFRC – Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CDF – Civil Defense Forces
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
COW – Correlates of War
CoxPH – Cox Proportional Hazards Model
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DPKO – UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG – Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
EO – Executive Outcomes
IFOR – International Force
IMI – International Military Interventions
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
MONUC – United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo
MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo
NA – Northern Alliance
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMG – Neutral Monitoring Group
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
ONUC – United Nations Organization in the Congo
ONUCI – United Nations Operation in Cote D’Ivoire
PDPA – People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PE – Peace Enforcement
PEO – Peace Enforcement Operations
PRIO – Peace Research Institute Oslo
RUF – Revolutionary United Front
SFOR – Stabilization Force
SLA – Sierra Leonean Army
UCDP – Uniform Collateral Data Portal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Chapter I

Introduction

Peace enforcement—the threat or use of military force to compel belligerent adherence to a civil war settlement—has become increasingly salient in the past decade. Despite a now vast and comprehensive literature on intrastate peacekeeping, few studies explore peace enforcement’s efficacy or the underlying causal mechanisms through which it impacts belligerent decisions about pursuing peace or returning to war. While peace enforcement’s rapid proliferation in recent years is attributable to a variety of factors including increased western interest in civil war resolution and counterterrorism, the underlying problem remains the same: the international community continues to be plagued by seemingly intractable civil wars responsible for killing over 20 million people worldwide since 1945, and displacing 67 million more.\(^1\) Considering this stark reality, what mechanisms does the international community possess to end and prevent intrastate conflict?

Amidst untenable peace or ongoing civil war, even the most robust, multidimensional peacekeeping operations often prove unable to make peace where there is no true peace to keep in the first place. Under these circumstances, peace enforcement operations must be deployed to make and implement peace, thereby enabling peacekeepers to do what they do best: keep a peace that has already been established. While intrastate peacekeeping has a strong, causal effect on the duration of peace in the

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aftermath of civil war only peace enforcement missions possess the ‘teeth,’ or mandate and means, necessary to make peace. Does peace enforcement work? Is it more effective at ending conflict than conventional third party interventions in civil wars? If so, how does peace enforcement work? These are the questions that drive and inspire this thesis.

Currently, our understanding of peace enforcement suffers from three major gaps: we (1) know too little about whether or how much peace enforcement contributes to making peace; (2) lack a concrete understanding of the causal mechanisms through which it establishes and enforces peace; and (3) know almost nothing about those variables that determine operational success or failure. This thesis utilizes quantitative and comparative case study methodologies to address these fundamental gaps while examining peace enforcement as both a determinant of civil war termination and a settlement implementation mechanism capable of resolving cooperation and coordination problems that prevent disarmament and stable power sharing in a conflict’s aftermath. I demonstrate that under the right circumstances, namely with the appropriate strategic approach and UN cooperation, peace enforcement operations can accelerate civil war termination and significantly improve the likelihood of successful settlement implementation. My overall argument is more nuanced, however, and attempts to explain how peace enforcement affects peace.

Drawing from Barbara Walter’s theory of civil war resolution and Stephen Stedman’s typological theory of spoiler management, I propose a causal theory of peace enforcement success. I argue that there are three causal mechanisms through which peace enforcement motivates belligerents to (a) genuinely agree to a ceasefire or negotiated

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settlement and (b) demobilize and abide by the terms of that settlement. These mechanisms are by (1) counterbalancing belligerent military advantage and raising the cost of war and relative benefits of peace; (2) enforcing a settlement’s terms by making reneging more costly and providing the security guarantee necessary to prevent belligerents from taking advantage of their opponent’s compliance; and (3) establishing momentum in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of belligerents so that the transition to a follow-on peacekeeping operation can occur seamlessly. In sum, my theory is premised upon a model of interaction between a government and rebel group(s) that entails mutual distrust and interrelated commitment problems that prevent belligerents from rationally committing to either (a) or (b) as outlined above.

Accompanying this theory, I contend that regardless of force capability, peace enforcement operations are the most successful when they utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy, and maintain impartiality and legitimacy through close cooperation with, and the delegation of sensitive post-conflict tasks to, UN peacekeepers. While peace enforcement operations can provide the security guarantee necessary to halt or prevent violence, only hyper-neutral UN peacekeepers can effectively facilitate sensitive post-conflict tasks such as DDR and state building. In the absence of these operational elements and an amenable division of labor between peace enforcers and UN peacekeepers, peace enforcement can exacerbate rather than mitigate belligerents’ perception that they must fight for ‘all or nothing’ in a conflict. Beyond improving our overall understanding of peace enforcement operations and how they might be most effective, my purpose here is partly to highlight how little we know about peace
enforcement operations and third party intervention in general—and stimulate further scholarship and debate on the subject.

Due to the small population of modern peace enforcement cases ripe for analysis at the time of writing, this thesis cannot provide a definitive causal theory of peace enforcement success. While my statistical findings overwhelmingly indicate that peace enforcement operations that utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy and cooperate closely with UN peacekeepers significantly increase the likelihood of civil war termination, a lack of covariates calls into question some of these results. Additionally, my case studies cannot meet the standard set forth by George and Bennett for structured, focused comparisons. Consequently, this thesis is intended to serve as a plausibility probe, or preliminary study of relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive testing in the future is warranted.³

In order to test my theory further and strengthen its explanatory power, I would need to supplement this thesis with interviews (with ex-combatants and others to uncover their true motives for agreeing to and abiding by a settlement) and cases of peace enforcement that better lend themselves to Mill’s methods of agreement and difference. Operation Serval in Mali (2012-time of writing) and Operation Linda Nchi (2011-2012), for example, would be excellent candidates for a more rigorous structured, focused comparison. Despite these insurmountable obstacles, I utilize the structured, focused comparison methodology outlined by George and Bennett to test my causal theory of success in the most methodologically rigorous manner possible.

³ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 75.
Defining Peace Enforcement

Before outlining my research design, it is important to explicitly define ‘peace enforcement operations’ and a number of other key terms. Considering the general lack of consensus among scholars as to what distinguishes peace enforcement from peacekeeping, I have decided to deviate slightly from the academic norm and embrace the United States Military’s own broad and inclusive definition of peace enforcement operations:

a. Peace enforcement operations (PEO) enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel conducting foreign humanitarian assistance missions, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties. PEO may be conducted pursuant to a lawful mandate or in accordance with international law and do not require the consent of the host nation or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is preferred. Forces conducting PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. In PEO, force is threatened against or applied to belligerent parties to terminate fighting, restore order and create an environment conducive to resolving the dispute. Although combat may be required, PEO are not classified as major operations and normally have more restrictive rules of engagement. Forces conducting PEO generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting.

b. The impartiality with which the PEO force treats all parties and the nature of its objectives separates it from major [traditional military] operations. The purpose of PEO is not to destroy or defeat an adversary, but to use force or the threat of force to establish a safe and secure environment so that peacebuilding can succeed. The term “peace enforcement” is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter; however, the UN Charter’s language allows the UNSC to authorize military operations ‘as may be necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security.’ PEO are often conducted by lead regional organizations or a coalition of states under a lead nation. Since PEO may include offensive and defensive operations, missions must be clear and end states defined. In a particular operational area, offensive, defensive, and stability operations may occur simultaneously.  

4 JD 3-07.3 Peace Operations, United States Army.
This definition suits my purposes in that it outlines the core tenant of peace enforcement—the threat or use of coercive force to compel belligerent cooperation—and alludes to the predominant role non-UN actors play in executing peace enforcement operations.

While peacekeeping operations are almost always carried out by the United Nations, peace enforcement is usually conducted by leading regional organizations or a coalition of states under a lead nation, sometimes alongside UN peacekeepers. The current division of labor ideally entails regional organizations and single states enforcing peace, and the UN conducting follow-on peacekeeping operations to strengthen peace after hostilities have ceased. While peace enforcement operations are not always explicitly authorized by a UN Security Council mandate, nearly all enjoy the public support of the United Nations Secretary General. The United Kingdom’s enforcement operation in Sierra Leone, for example, was never granted an explicit UNSC mandate, but was

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5 JD 3-07.3 Peace Operations, US Army.
deployed to support the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone at the request of Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Because of peace enforcement’s relatively recent proliferation, scholars writing in the late 1990s or early 2000s (the vast majority of literature on peace operations) tend to erroneously label a number of robust UN peacekeeping missions such as UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR, UNTAET, and UNAMSIL as ‘peace enforcement operations.’ As Trevor Findlay points out, all of these missions exhibit some characteristics and elements of peace enforcement, but lack the credible threat of force that is the cornerstone of true peace enforcement operations. Table 1.1 nicely illustrate the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in terms of both force capability and belligerent consent—using UN and NATO missions in Kosovo and Bosnia as examples for context. Drawing a clear distinction between contemporary intrastate peace enforcement and peacekeeping is essential, and not especially difficult after dismissing earlier UN-led ‘peace enforcement’ operations such as UNOSOM and UNPROFOR as ‘chapter VI½ peacekeeping.’

That being said, not all modern peace enforcement operations are created equal. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, for example, has not always treated all parties with conditional impartiality as outlined by JD 3-07 above—a shortcoming I discuss at length in Chapter 5. While enforcement missions often initially treat all parties to a dispute with impartiality, it is sometimes necessary for them to

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7 UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold originally coined the term ‘chapter VI½ peacekeeping,’ and it has since been adopted by policymakers and practitioners to describe robust peacekeeping operations that fall short of the mandate and force capability now expected of true peace enforcement operations.
8 “Enforcement missions” also embody their own distinct operational category (albeit a seldom used one), but for the duration of this thesis, any mention of “enforcement mission(s)” is merely shorthand for “peace enforcement operations”
compromise this impartiality and conduct operations in support of one particular party against another. This is especially true when greedy or total spoilers with immutable goals are involved. In most cases, this use of force is only necessary until the noncooperative party is defeated or agrees to a settlement. The use of the terms ‘neutral’ ‘impartial’ throughout this thesis are not intended to mean impartial in the strict sense of the term. Rather, they are tied to Stedman’s spoiler management strategy discussed in Chapter 2. A peace enforcement operation is considered ‘impartial’ or ‘neutral’ in this thesis so long as it is not utilizing an inappropriate spoiler management strategy or, in other words, using fore against actors willing to negotiate and agree to a settlement.

Traditionally, peace enforcement operations entail two distinct operational stages: first, a coercive strategy is employed to force belligerents to abide by a ceasefire or otherwise participate in negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict and, second, a selectively coercive strategy is employed to provide the security guarantee necessary to implement a negotiated settlement or other agreement after hostilities have ceased. Peacekeeping missions rely upon impartiality, the limited use of force, and belligerent consent for success while peace enforcement does not necessarily require any of these elements.\(^9\) As first outlined by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*:

> In theory, peace enforcement is the creation of peace through the military support of one side in a conflict in order to force a victory or stalemate that makes it rational for the opposing side to cease fighting militarily and begin negotiating diplomatically. Successful peace enforcement creates the conditions for peacekeeping. Peacekeepers, on the other hand, are a neutral force sent in to maintain a peace that has already been established, tentative though it may be, so that the theatre of conflict between warring parties can switch from the battlefield.

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to the boardroom. Successful peacekeeping holds the balance of power on the ground constant so that a negotiated political solution can be reached and institutionalized, based on that balance.\textsuperscript{10}

Unlike peace enforcement, peacekeeping operations rely upon traditional principles of belligerent consent and the strictly defensive use of force to achieve their aims.

While some scholars suggest it is possible to distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement solely on the basis of whether a mission possesses a Chapter VI peacekeeping or Chapter VII enforcement mandate, there are a number of UN-led missions with Chapter VII mandates that I would not classify as enforcement operations by any stretch of the imagination.\textsuperscript{11} What scholars now refer to as ‘multidimensional,’ ‘wider,’ or ‘second generation’ peacekeeping refers to more robust contemporary peacekeeping operations that are carried out \textit{with} belligerent consent, but in an environment that may still be volatile.\textsuperscript{12} These increasingly common missions are large and complex, often involving “sizable political, military, police, refugee, humanitarian, electoral, and often human rights components.”\textsuperscript{13} While they may operate alongside peace enforcement operations, multidimensional peacekeeping constitutes a distinct operational type that has already been studied at length in the existing literature.

Distinguishing between peace enforcement and third party intervention may appear tricky at first glance, but is infinitely more simplified by my classification of only UN-sanctioned post-1990 military actions as ‘peace enforcement,’ and all other unilateral

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} UN-led ‘peace enforcement’ missions in Somalia and Bosnia, for example, were deployed under a Chapter VII mandate, but were in reality what I would consider ‘Chapter VI½’ missions: while they were formally authorized to use force beyond strict self-defense, they lacked the means and political will to even attempt to deliver upon these mandates. Since the Brahimi Report, a number of multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed under a chapter VII mandate, but in practice are only realistically able to use force in self-defense.
\item \textsuperscript{12} HMSO, \textit{Wider Peacekeeping} (London: Ministry of Defence, 1995).
\item \textsuperscript{13} Fortna, \textit{Does Peacekeeping Work?}, 1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
military action ‘third party intervention.’ Other common types of peace support operations include *peace building*, which encompasses stability actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild government infrastructure and institutions to avoid a relapse into conflict; *peacemaking*, the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it; and *conflict prevention*, a peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and military means to monitor and identify the causes of a conflict and take timely action to prevent occurrence, escalation, or the resumption of hostilities.\(^\text{14}\)

While there are no recent UN operations\(^\text{15}\) that meet the qualifications necessary to be classified as peace enforcement operations, there are several that come close. The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO, previously MONUC), for example, comes closest—authorized under a Chapter VII mandate and occasionally fighting alongside the Congolese government—but has more often than not refused to fight in the face of rebel advances. In Côte d’Ivoire, UN peacekeepers deployed under ONUCI fought alongside French peace enforcement forces in the 2011 Second Ivorian Civil War, but likely would not have done so on their own accord. Much of this thesis is concerned with highlighting the optimal effectiveness of an amenable division of labor between the UN and other non-UN actors while simultaneously exploring variables that are determinant of mission success and failure.

After outlining my research design below, I devote the remainder of Chapter I to a discussion of peace enforcement’s historical and normative evolution.

\(^{14}\) JD 3-07.3 Peace Operations, I-8.  
\(^{15}\) Except possibly ONUC
Research Design

This thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to improve our overall understanding of peace enforcement operations. Before testing my causal theory in three carefully selected case studies, I analyze contemporary peace enforcement’s impact on civil war termination and compare its affect to third party interventions more generally. My quantitative analysis of a dataset encompassing all intrastate conflicts and associated third party interventions between 1945 and March 2013 provides breadth, while my structured, focused comparisons seek to compensate for the depth that is lost when conflicts and battle deaths are reduced to mere numbers in a statistical model.

Quantitative Analysis

In Chapter III, I test whether modern peace enforcement operations have an impact on civil war termination. By employing duration models (also known as hazards, or survival models) to explore the affect peace enforcement operations have on the length of civil war, I am able to measure their impact on civil war termination relative to third party interventions more generally. In my duration models, I use Cox proportional hazards models (henceforth Cox PH models) that make no assumptions about the underlying “hazard function” of civil war termination, or whether conflicts become more or less likely to last given that they have held thus far, and whether this likelihood fluctuates over time. 16 In simplest terms, Cox PH models allow me to determine the risk of conflict termination given that the conflict has not terminated yet. Conflicts that are

16 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?, 11.
ongoing, such as that in Afghanistan, are ‘censored,’ meaning that the model accounts for the fact that the case has not yet ended to date.

The dataset I created for this thesis builds upon that compiled by Patrick Regan for his article *Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts*. While Regan’s dataset claims to include all intrastate conflicts and associated third party interventions in the post-WWII period, I found a number of errors and inconsistencies that I corrected when I applied my own variables to the dataset. As a result, my final dataset resembles Regan’s in structure, but for the most part only includes data on duration and third party involvement that I have meticulously coded on my own.

My operational definition of a civil war is less restrictive than the Correlates of War definition, which requires at least 1,000 battle deaths per year. I included all conflicts that reached at least 200 deaths per year, but marked the conflict as low intensity (a control variable) if it did not meet the 1,000 deaths/year threshold. Data on third party interventions and their respective qualities was coded from the International Military Intervention Database (IMI) and original research was conducted on each intervention to verify IMI’s coding.

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In Chapter III, I test the following five hypotheses of varying complexity with my Coxph models:

**Hypothesis 1:** Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

**Hypothesis 2:** Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than conventional third party intervention.

**Hypothesis 3:** Modern peace enforcement operations that utilize an appropriate spoiler management strategy and level of cooperation with UN peacekeepers will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

**Hypothesis 4:** Third party interventions that utilize an appropriate spoiler management strategy will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

**Hypothesis 5:** Third party interventions motivated by concerns for regional stability and human rights will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than interventions motivated by economic/military interests or ideological concerns.

Most importantly, I find evidence in Chapter III to confirm hypothesis 3 which is in essence the core argument of this thesis. I conclude that while my results are statistically significant and indicate a strong relationship between the variables, more rigorous testing is needed to confirm my hypotheses through the inclusion of more control variables, or covariates.

**Case Studies**

In discussing controlled comparisons, the study of two or more instances of a well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every respect but one, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett emphasize that it is extremely difficult (and sometimes
infeasible) in political science to find two or more cases that actually fit this criteria.\textsuperscript{20} Considering the small number of civil war cases I can identify that feature genuine peace enforcement operations, the task of finding enough ‘similar’ cases was difficult from the outset. A number of authors have suggested ways for dealing with imperfect comparisons, and even more have come to accept that it is inevitable.\textsuperscript{21} Arend Lijphart, for example, while acknowledging that it is “difficult to find cases that are comparable enough and that one seldom can find cases similar in every respect but one, believes that ‘these objections are founded on a too exacting scientific standard’ and that research can be accomplished by studies that approximate the standard as closely as possible.”\textsuperscript{22} New methodologies such as Adam Prezeworski and Henry Heune’s “most similar” design embody attempts to modify and relax Mill’s methods to account for problems of dissimilarity that pervade political science.\textsuperscript{23}

To address the dissimilarity inherent in my small-n case study analysis, I attempt to come as close as possible to Mill’s method of similarity while supplementing my cases with process tracing. Overall, the logic of structured, focused comparisons is straightforward: “the method is ‘structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and culmination of the findings of the cases possible.”\textsuperscript{24} I employ this method precisely between three distinct instances of peace enforcement in two cases. Because of some

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{20} Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case studies and theory development in the social sciences} (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 151-152.
\bibitem{21} George, \textit{Case Studies}, 164.
\bibitem{22} Arend Lijphart, \textit{Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method} (Beuxelles, Belgique: Association International de Science Politique, 1969), 688. quoted in \textit{Case studies}.
\bibitem{23} George, \textit{Case Studies}, 165.
\bibitem{24} George, \textit{Case Studies}, 67.
\end{thebibliography}
minor dissimilarities between my cases that transcend the dissimilar operational variables I am examining, I employ within-case analysis to establish the causal power of peace enforcement and specific operational variables in each instance.\textsuperscript{25} Charles Ragin and David Collier characterize this supplement as an alternative approach focused not only on the analysis of variables across cases, but on the causal path in a single case.\textsuperscript{26} George and Bennett take a firm position on this point by stating explicitly that it is “our position…that within-case analysis is essential to such [small-n] studies and can significantly ameliorate the limitations of Mill’s methods.”\textsuperscript{27}

My case studies analyze three instances of peace enforcement (PE) that have occurred in two cases since the end of the Cold War. I classify three distinct mission outcomes in my cases: (1) no peace; (2) temporary peace; (3) lasting peace with settlement/peace agreement implementation. Peace enforcement in my two cases, Sierra Leone (which features two distinct instances of peace enforcement) and Afghanistan, is classified by mission impartiality (or the use of an appropriate spoiler management strategy) and whether or not UN peacekeepers played an instrumental role in the peace enforcement mission.

\textsuperscript{26} David Collier, \textit{New perspective on the comparative method} (Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1990), 17.
\textsuperscript{27} George, \textit{Case Studies}, 179.
Table 1.2
Case Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Peace</th>
<th>Temporary Peace</th>
<th>Lasting Peace + Settlement Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impartial PE +</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone 2000-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Large UN Role</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impartial PE +</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone 1991-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No/Minor UN Role</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partial PE +</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan 2001-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No/Minor UN Role</strong></td>
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While there are some differences between these cases that transcend variations in operational impartiality and UN involvement, I find through process tracing that these two key variables are intimately linked to operational strategy and mission outcomes. In Afghanistan, for example, ISAF’s hardline anti-Taliban approach to the conflict and the absence of UN peacekeepers ultimately drove Taliban and Haqqani parties to the conflict, who were initially willing to negotiate a settlement with the central government, to adopt immutable goals and become powerful, total spoilers. Despite critical differences between Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, each have easily extractable resources (diamonds and opium, respectively) and a variety of other factors that fuel conflict and have been found to significantly increase the likelihood of conflict intractability as I outline in Chapter II.\(^{28}\)

The three major questions I ask in each of my structured, focused comparisons are as follows:

1. What is the situational difficulty in the case, and what critical conflict variables may have some impact on peace enforcement’s feasibility and outcome?

2. What are the key operational variables (features) of the peace enforcement operation?

3. What was the conflict’s ultimate outcome, and was a settlement/ceasefire successfully and sustainable implemented?

These broad, overarching questions are further broken down into multiple components in Appendix I that allow me to address specific variables in each case.

The first case I explore in Chapter IV is Sierra Leone, which I divide into two distinct instances of peace enforcement. The first was unsuccessful (1991-1999) and saw a variety of actors attempt to make peace through the Abdijan cease-fire of 1996 and Lome agreement of 1999: both of which ultimately failed and resulted in renewed conflict. The second was from 2000-2001 during which the United Kingdom and UNAMSIL utilized an appropriate spoiler management strategy against the RUF and successfully implemented the Abuja agreements. The variation between the first and second major attempts to enforce peace makes this case especially good for analysis and comparison.

In Chapter V, I explore the Afghan civil war post-2001. Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which have been heavily involved in the conflict since 2003, attempted to enforce peace and for a time succeeded (between 2003 and 2006). A US-driven hyper-coercive strategy against parties to the conflict who demonstrated a genuine willingness to reach a negotiated settlement
in 2003 coupled with the absence of UN peacekeepers proficient in post-conflict
statebuilding and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), ultimately
resulted in the ignition of a full-blown insurgency after 2007 that continues into March
2013.

Chapter VI offers some conclusions and inevitable policy recommendations that
flow from my analysis.
Chapter II
Conceptualizing Peace Enforcement and Civil War

My thesis argues that peace enforcement operations have a clear causal effect upon both civil war termination, and the effectiveness of settlement implementation in their immediate aftermath. I argue that the causal mechanisms through which peace enforcement motivates belligerents to (a) genuinely agree to a ceasefire or negotiated settlement and (b) demobilize and abide by the terms of that settlement is by (1) counterbalancing belligerent military advantage and raising the cost of war and/or relative benefits of peace; (2) enforcing a settlement’s terms by making reneging more costly and providing the security guarantee necessary to prevent belligerents from taking advantage of their opponent’s compliance; and (3) establishing momentum in the DDR of belligerents so that a follow-on peacekeeping operation can be deployed successfully. My argument is premised upon a model of interaction between a government and rebel groups that entails mutual distrust and interrelated commitment problems that prevent belligerents from rationally committing to either (a) or (b) as cited above. This chapter begins by providing a brief overview of peace enforcement’s historical development before outlining a theoretical model of belligerent interaction in civil war and engaging in a review of the existing literature on peace support operations and third party intervention more generally. Qualitative literature will be explored first, followed by quantitative studies of civil war termination, peace support operations, and situational difficulty.

Because existing literature on contemporary peace enforcement is scant, much of Chapter II is devoted to constructing a common framework for my argument by
exploring existing scholarship on civil war, peace operations, and civil war termination more broadly.

**Peace Enforcement’s Roots**

While the normative foundations for modern peace enforcement were first laid by the League of Nations in the mid to late 1920s, the United Nations Organization in the Congo (ONUC) is widely considered to be the international community’s first significant attempt at intrastate peace enforcement. Although ONUC’s involvement in the Congo Crisis between 1960 and 1964 would nearly bankrupt the United Nations and fail to prevent violence amidst covert US and Soviet involvement in the conflict, the precedent set by ONUC would ultimately plant the seeds for peace enforcement’s revival in the aftermath of the Cold War.

In 1992, shortly after the conclusion of the Gulf War, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was asked by the Security Council to prepare a comprehensive report on how the United Nations’ capacity for preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping could be made more effective. The resulting report, *An Agenda for Peace*, outlined Boutros-Ghali’s vision for peace enforcement as the midpoint between peacekeeping and full scale enforcement operations:

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The purpose of peace enforcement units (perhaps they should be called “cease-fire enforcement units”) would be to enable the United Nations to deploy troops quickly to enforce a ceasefire by taking coercive action against either party, or both, if they violate it…The concept goes beyond peacekeeping to the extent that the operation would be deployed without the express consent of the two parties…UN troops would be authorized to use force to ensure respect for the cease-fire.\(^{31}\)

While the underlying legal basis for Boutros-Ghali’s proposal was already present in Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, political deadlock on the Security Council during the Cold War had previously prevented the UN from deploying any meaningful Chapter VII peacekeeping missions to mitigate intrastate disputes.

Eager to take advantage of the UNSC’s recent thaw by testing the limits of UN peacekeeping, 20 new UN missions were authorized and launched between 1988 and 1993 including two UN ‘peace enforcement’ missions in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). While aesthetically robust (endowed with both the legal mandate and means necessary to be effective), a lack of political will on the part of member states rendered these new ‘enforcement’ missions practically impotent in the face of escalating violence and ethnic cleansing. Coupled with well-publicized peacekeeping failures in Rwanda and Angola, these costly experiments with ‘peace enforcement’ would ultimately prompt the United Nations to take a brief hiatus from peacekeeping in the late 1990s. During this hiatus the seeds for the emergence and spread of modern peace enforcement would be planted—first by NATO’s conduct of the first true peace enforcement operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and second through the United Nations’ radical reassessment of its strategic approach to peacekeeping and peace support operations.

Ascension and Proliferation

In 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) carried out the international community’s first modern peace enforcement operation in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. Amidst escalating violence and ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian war, the UN-led peacekeeping contingent, UNPROFOR or the UN Protection Force, proved unable to adequately protect UN designated “Safe Areas”\(^3\) from Serbian forces or deliver humanitarian aid to their inhabitants (even with NATO air support and a Chapter VII mandate). In response, UNPROFOR’s commander, British Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, gave NATO the green light needed to conduct air attacks against the Serbs—effectively giving NATO the approval it needed to initiate its own UN-endorsed peace enforcement operation.\(^3\) Alongside Croat and Bosniac advances, NATO air attacks raised the cost of war for the Serbians and provided the leverage needed to move the US-led negotiating effort forward. In November 1995, Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević signed the Dayton Accords that effectively ended the conflict; less than a month later, the first elements of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) were deployed into Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the Accords—initiating the second stage of NATO’s peace enforcement operation in the conflict.\(^4\) A year later, the NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force, Stabilization Force or SFOR, was deployed to replace IFOR and

\(^3\) “Safe Areas” in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were established during the Bosnian war by a resolution of the UN Security Council. These territories were under the protection of UNPROFOR who was authorized to use “all necessary means, including the use of force” to defend them. Unfortunately, almost every safe area attacked by the Serbs during the war was overrun, and the ethnic cleansing of their inhabitants ensued.

\(^3\) NATO, "Statement by the Secretary General of NATO" (press release [95] 73, August 30, 1995), www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-073.htm.

keep the peace IFOR had made and implemented two years prior. In many ways, NATO’s peace enforcement operation in Bosnia continues to serve as a model for enforcement operations in the present day, and is responsible for establishing a number of precedents and norms that still surround the use of force, and non-UN peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

Almost simultaneously with NATO’s enforcement operations in Bosnia, the United Nations experienced a period of dramatic transformation during which its strategic approach to peace support operations was redefined, and the scope of operations it was willing and able to conduct limited. First, in 1999, two inquiries into the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica laid bare the political and strategic shortcomings that led to the UN’s loss of credibility in the late 1990s and the near-dissolution of UN peacekeeping that occurred thereafter. The next year, the Brahimi Report explicitly outlined the United Nations’ nuanced strategic approach to peacekeeping and articulated the UN’s refusal to deploy peacekeepers into future ongoing conflicts without a broad and explicit mandate for the use of force and civilian protection, and the means necessary to fulfill such a robust mandate. The release of these scathing, self-critical reports alongside the radical overhaul of the UN’s peacekeeping strategy precipitated a more positive outlook on peacekeeping internationally, and within the United Nations itself. The reelection of Kofi Annan, the former head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as Secretary General and appointment of Richard Holbrooke:

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(instrumental in negotiating the Dayton Accord) as US Ambassador to the UN sent a clear signal of renewed international support for the revival of UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{38}

Between 1999 and 2004, UN peacekeeping rebounded in a big way as a number of new UN missions with robust mandates were deployed in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and East Timor. Alongside three of these missions, non-UN actors would follow in NATO’s footsteps by launching their own substantial enforcement operations to terminate the conflict and enable floundering UN peacekeepers to accomplish their own long-term strategic objectives. Launched in tandem with the institutionalization of the Brahimi Report, these enforcement operations reflected a nuanced strategic relationship between United Nations peacekeepers, and independent states and organizations. While the United Nations was understandably weary of deploying its peacekeepers into ongoing conflicts post-Brahimi, a partnership with non-UN actors established a viable division of labor based upon relative legitimacy and force capability: non-UN actors provided the robust military capacity necessary to coerce conflict termination, and the UN provided the impartial expertise necessary to preserve and build peace after enforcement operations scaled back or ceased.

In what many scholars term ‘subcontracting,’ the UN has in recent years “entered into different types of contractual relationships with service-providing NGOs, regional organizations, and pivotal states…to overcome its lack of enforcement capability and simultaneously ensure that [these actors] promote the purposes and principals of the UN Charter rather than their own interest.”\textsuperscript{39} Despite initial reservations during the Cold War,


\textsuperscript{39} Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. \textit{Understanding peacekeeping} (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004): 211.
references to regional organizations have appeared in a number of UNSC resolutions since 1991. Regional organizations have been delegated under Chapter VII to use force in a number of cases such as Yugoslavia (1992), Haiti (1993), and Sierra Leone (1997), ultimately inspiring then-Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to author Supplement to An Agenda for Peace in 1997, urging the UN to make better use of its partnerships and engage in joint operations with non-UN actors. Simultaneously, a number of regional organizations and single states began developing their own strategic doctrines and manuals for the conduct of peace operations—signaling their embrace of this new responsibility.

First in Kosovo, NATO built upon the precedent it established in Bosnia by launching operation “Allied Force,” an air operation against Serb forces, and later Kosovo Force (KFOR), a full scale peace enforcement mission alongside the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Later that year, in East Timor, the UN authorized the deployment of Australian-led International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET) under a Chapter VII mandate to halt escalating violence and prevent the country from sliding into civil war—enabling the UN to deploy the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) shortly thereafter. In Sierra Leone, like Kosovo, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) teamed up with a regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to combat Charles Taylor’s supremely destructive Revolutionary United Front (RUF). When the UN and ECOMOG (composed primarily of Nigerian troops) encountered stiff resistance and heavy casualties, the United Kingdom deployed its own peace enforcement operation in 2000, with the UN Security Council’s support, to defeat

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40 Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping, 213.
the RUF and finally establish a true peace for UNAMSIL to keep. With three of the four major UN peacekeeping missions launched in 1999 relying heavily on their non-UN, peace enforcement counterparts to achieve success, peacekeeping’s turn-of-the-century revival would also mark modern peace enforcement’s decisive inception. Since then, peace enforcement operations have been successful in a number of diverse cases as recently as in Operation Serval—the French-led, UN-backed 2013 operation into Northern Mali. Partly in response to the perceived threat posed by international terrorism and the far-reaching effects of the Arab Spring, western nations have demonstrated an unprecedented willingness since 2010 to commit substantial military assets to assist in achieving peace in ongoing intrastate conflicts. From Pakistan and Afghanistan, to Libya, Syria, Yemen Cote D’Ivoire, Uganda, and now Mali, western militaries have willingly embroiled themselves, either overtly or covertly, in the throes of civil war.

Despite peace enforcement’s predominant role in facilitating UN success in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and countless other notable cases, the most recent wave of literature on peace operations (which emerged partly in response to these successes) focuses almost exclusively on answering outstanding questions about UN multidimensional peacekeeping while neglecting to explore peace enforcement and its effects. Answering such basic empirical questions as whether peacekeeping makes peace more durable and why some missions are more successful than others, scholars have found, overwhelmingly, that peacekeeping makes civil war much less likely to resume.

once a ceasefire is in place, but can have an insignificant or even counterproductive impact on peace when deployed before a settlement has been established.

Considering these deeply troubling revelations and the pivotal role peace enforcement plays in laying the groundwork for the successful deployment of peacekeeping missions, it is somewhat surprising that recent research has, for the most part, failed to examine peace enforcement operations in depth. Partly attributable to scholars’ vague and often inconsistent classification of peace operations, namely a tendency to lump peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations together in their research, our current understanding of peace enforcement is both incomplete and grounded in methodologically flawed research. Even scholars such as Virginia Fortna and Lise Howard, who have essentially pioneered the contemporary study of peace support operations, oftentimes fail to distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in their case studies and quantitative analyses.

**Framing Civil War: Problems of Credible Commitment and Mutual Distrust**

Modern civil wars typically end in one of two ways: through an outright military victory by one side, or with a negotiated settlement. Oftentimes however, civil wars are “all or nothing” enterprises. As James Fearon and David Laitin so eloquently state, “never will a rebel group say ‘we are fighting in order to induce the government to change its policy on X, and once that is accomplished we will disband and leave

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42 Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*, 104-126.
politics.” Rather, intractable civil wars are perpetuated by problems of credible commitment—rebels cannot trust the government to implement their desired policies, and the government in turn cannot trust the rebels enough to offer policy concessions in exchange for their demobilization. Partly as a result of this prisoner’s dilemma, civil wars since 1940 are significantly more likely to end in an outright military victory (70%) than in a negotiated settlement (19%) or a ceasefire/stalemate (11%).

While this may suggest that military victories are empirically ‘more effective’ than negotiated settlements at resolving intrastate conflicts, the international community and United Nations have a strong preference for the latter. In many ways this preference is understandable: negotiated settlements are overwhelmingly seen as more impartial and legitimate in that they prevent the destruction of one or more parties to a conflict and avoid granting one actor a monopoly over a nation’s political and material resources. Unlike military victories, however, negotiated settlements rely solely on positive and negative benefits to entice actor compliance. In other words, rational belligerents will only willingly become party to a settlement if they determine it will provide them with benefits that outweigh the potential benefits minus the risks they associate with continuing hostilities.

Because of this, settlements entail a wide variety of commitment problems that prevent disarmament, the establishment of power sharing institutions, and inherently

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lack what Stedman terms a ‘security guarantee’—a potentially coercive mechanism (safeguard) to prevent actors from taking advantage of a settlement. Without a security guarantee to forestall deception and backstabbing, settlements are just too risky for belligerents to accept. Rather than incentivize compliance, settlements by their very nature can incentivize both parties to renege on their commitments and catch their opponents off guard. Because contracting parties to a settlement rarely (if ever) possess identical force capabilities, weaker belligerents will naturally be tempted to turn settlements into strategic ceasefires and gain the strategic upper hand in a conflict while stronger belligerents will be tempted to use the opportunity to exterminate their adversary once and for all. Monica Toft labels this force disparity between contracting parties disequilibrium, implying that if at least one party possesses a significant military advantage over the other, the risk the weaker party takes in signing the settlement outweighs most potential benefits. In sum, signing a peace agreement puts leaders at risk from both their adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement, and disgruntled followers who may see it as a betrayal of their key values.

On average, and primarily because of this security dilemma, civil wars last significantly longer than interstate wars. While combatants in interstate conflicts usually retain their armies and political authority after a peace deal is reached,

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49 Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the peace.
51 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Civil War Termination.”
combatants in civil wars must put blind faith in a negotiated settlement or fight to the death by choosing “all or nothing.” Considering this, it comes as no surprise that for conflicts in the post-WWII era, the median duration of intrastate wars was about seven years, compared to less than three months for interstate wars during that same period.\textsuperscript{52}

In the view of most scholars, negotiated settlements are often only viable when a neutral third party actor is introduced who is able to implement a settlement and counterbalance disequilibrium (create equilibrium). Barbara Walter, who provides a framework for conceptualizing problems associated with negotiated settlements, argues that the most serious impediment to durable peace is an inability for actors to commit to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of their soldiers.\textsuperscript{53} Arising from insecurity, these commitment problems can only be overcome by the introduction of a third party who is willing and able to enforce a negotiated settlement—thereby alleviating the risk of an adversary reneging on the agreement and strategically resuming hostilities in the midst of DDR. Third party enforcers can, in other words, “guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept”\textsuperscript{54} by increasing the cost of noncooperation. Walter even goes so far as to claim that third-party guarantees of security are the key determinants of successful peace agreement implementation.\textsuperscript{55}

Stephen John Stedman advances a similar and more comprehensive theory for why negotiated settlements fail. According to Stedman, Walter’s conceptualization of distrust is incomplete. While he partly agrees with Walter that fear compels parties to

\textsuperscript{52} James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars:” 275-301.
violate or oppose peace agreements, motivation and other factors also play a significant role in informing belligerent choice. Stedman suggests that the first step towards formulating a successful implementation strategy is to “recognize that parties in civil wars differ in their goals and commitments—dimensions that are crucial for understanding why some parties undermine peace agreements” and others do not. For this reason, I pay close attention in my case studies to whether rebels are vying for the center or power, or merely control of a region.

Stedman and David Rothchild cite six recurrent problems that plague implementation agreements in civil wars: vague and expedient agreements, a lack of coordination between mediators and implementers, lack of coordination among implementing agencies, the incomplete fulfillment of mandated tasks, a short time horizon and limited commitment of implementers, and the presence of spoilers—“leaders or factions who use violence to undermine implementation.” In his later work, Stedman elaborates upon the spoiler concept by creating a typology of spoilers based upon their position in the peace process, number, intent, and whether spoiling behavior rests with leaders or followers of a party. He also proposes specific strategies for managing different types of spoilers.

In Stedman’s view, decoding spoiler behavior and motivation is the key to determining why some parties undermine peace agreements and others do not: and formulating appropriate strategic responses to spoiler behavior. While most authors have a tendency to boil intrastate belligerent behavior down to sterile cost-benefit calculations, Stedman and Rothchild are nuanced in that they attempt to account for actors who are not

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57 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems:“ 5-53.
necessarily rational—and are motivated by deep-seated ideological or religious beliefs. While my argument assumes that civil war termination is primarily hindered by mutual distrust and interrelated commitment problems, the presence of spoilers and utilization of spoiler management strategies are also key variables in my analysis. Consequently, I explore Stedman’s spoiler classification scheme at length.

Stedman classifies spoilers as (1) limited, (2) greedy or (3) total depending upon the goals they pursue and their commitment to achieving these goals:

At one end of the spectrum are limited spoilers, who have limited goals—for example, recognition and redress, security for its followers, [or] a share of power. At the other end of the spectrum are total spoilers, who pursue total power and the exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is, their goals are not subject to change. Total spoilers are led by individuals who see the world in all-or-nothing terms and often suffer from pathological tendencies that prevent the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements of conflict. Total spoilers often espouse radical ideologies; total power is a means to achieving such goals as the violent transformation of society. Greedy spoilers lie between the limited spoiler and total spoiler. The greedy spoiler holds goals that expand or contract based upon calculations of cost and risk. A greedy spoiler may have limited goals that expand when faced with low costs and risks; alternatively, it may have total goals that contract when faced with high costs and risks.

With only superficial knowledge of a conflict, it is relatively easy to infer which category a spoiler falls into. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, for example, was led by several pathological individuals such as Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, and sought total power and authority as demonstrated through its failure to adhere to either the Abidjan or Lome peace processes. As such, Sierra Leone’s civil war only ended after the RUF was coerced to the negotiating table with overwhelming coercive force. By Stedman’s classification, the RUF would undoubtedly be considered a greedy, bordering

on total, spoiler. Conversely, other spoilers or groups of spoilers can sometimes be significantly more complex and difficult to deconstruct—such as Laurent Gbagbo and his forces in the Second Ivorian Civil War, or the Taliban/Haqqani who over time evolved from limited spoilers willing to negotiate a power sharing agreement to a mix of total and greedy spoilers perpetuated by profit and advancing an immutable, radical religious ideology.

Drawing from his typology of spoilers, Stedman argues that international actors overseeing the implementation of peace agreements should shape their strategy according to the type of spoiler they are attempting to control. Stedman cites the three primary strategies used to manage spoilers that I adopt in my case studies and policy recommendations:

1) *Inducement*, or giving the spoiler what it wants,
2) *Socialization*, or changing the behavior of the spoiler to adhere to a set of established norms, and
3) *Coercion*, or punishing spoiler behavior or reducing the capacity of the spoiler to destroy the peace process.\(^{59}\)

Effective peace enforcement operations utilize these three strategies in varying capacities. Inducement is typically used when spoiler behavior is caused by fear and a demand for greater protection (as Walter discusses).\(^{60}\) The introduction of a third party can create ‘force equilibrium’ and alleviate security concerns motivating spoiling behavior. Socialization involves strategically using carrots and sticks to raise the cost of noncooperation while enticing or coercing spoilers into complying with peace agreements.

\(^{59}\)Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems:" 12.

\(^{60}\)Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems:" 12.
and settlements. Coercion, used primarily with total spoilers, is observable in Sierra Leone and Libya, and relies on the use or threat of punishment to deter unacceptable spoiler behavior and reduce the capacity of spoilers to disrupt the peace process.\(^{61}\) While Stedman, writing in 1997, points out that the application of force to defeat a spoiler is incredibly rare, the recent proliferation of peace enforcement has finally placed Chapter VII mandated coercion on the table as a viable strategic option for implementing peace agreements.

The theoretical framework outlined above adds critical structure to my causal theory of peace enforcement success and posits that, for the most part, changes in third party intervention status can alter belligerent cost-benefit calculations and expedite civil war termination.\(^{62}\) Highlighting the interplay between actor capacity, actor behavior and motivation, and implementation strategy, the work of Stedman, Toft, and others makes it possible to understand the mutual distrust and interrelated commitment problems that inhibit both civil war termination and settlement implementation. Working within their framework allows me to clearly explore peace enforcement’s impact and the causal mechanisms through which it functions. Within this framework, peace enforcement operations can accomplish a wide variety of objectives including alleviating parties’ fear of victimization by providing security, facilitating the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, reassuring parties of each other’s compliance with the terms of a negotiated settlement, identifying and combating spoilers, and promoting more moderate actors in the resolution process.

\(^{62}\) Laitin discusses this specifically and for the most part aggregates many of Toft, Stedman, and Walter’s arguments while confirming them quantitatively, James Fearon and David Laitin, “Civil War Termination.”
Literature Review

While the vast majority of existing scholarship on peace operations explores multidimensional peacekeeping almost exclusively, some recent studies have gone to great lengths to identify variables and strategies that empirically impact the outcomes of third party intervention and attempts at peace agreement implementation. Because it would be possible to write an entire thesis on the content and variable quality of contemporary literature on UN peacekeeping and third party intervention, I will focus on only the most pertinent and methodologically sound scholarship to date. For the most part, this recent scholarship is quantitative in nature: identifying environmental variables such as the presence of spoilers that increase situational difficulty, and how success varies between actors (UN, regional organizations, etc.) involved in peace operations. Determinant studies, designed to ascertain which variables are associated with implementation success or failure, have been especially popular in recent years (but are also of varying quality). Despite their strictly quantitative nature, some of these analyses provide valuable insight into the principal weaknesses of implementation strategies by highlighting variables that are applicable to a large spread of dissimilar cases. In this literature review, the most rigorous motivational, environmental, and determinant studies will be reviewed first, followed by studies of ‘subcontracting’ that provide insight into variations in legitimacy and relative capacity and, finally, scholarship examining determinants of civil war duration and termination.

Writing on the actor dynamics underlying civil conflict, a number of authors have explored the motives and grievances that drive individual and group decisions to

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63 For a concise overview of the development of the peacekeeping literature in the last five decades, see Virginia Fortna and Lise Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects."
participate in rebellion. Ted Gurr advances relative deprivation theory, which views tensions that develop from a discrepancy between the “ought” and “is” of collective value satisfaction as partially responsible for rebellious behavior.\footnote{Ted R. Gurr, \textit{Why Men Rebel} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 22-58.} Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein view the decision to rebel as distinct from the decision to participate in civil war violence. In other words, individuals with participative agency weigh the costs and benefits of participating in rebellion before determining whether they can somehow achieve material gain through participation in civil war violence.\footnote{Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War," \textit{American Journal of Political Science} 52:2 (2008), 436-55.} Paul Collier and Anke Hoffler’s test of these two competing ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ theories finds little explanatory power for Gurr’s grievance theory of rebellion but considerable support for greed theory.\footnote{Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” \textit{Oxford Economic Papers} 56:4 (2004), 563–95.} Most scholars believe that there is considerable interplay between greed and grievance theory, and other theories of individual participation such as social sanctions, which posits that individuals are pressured or coerced by their local communities or social organizations into participating in civil war violence.\footnote{Jeremy Weinstein, \textit{Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-24.} While I deal only briefly with individual motivation in my case studies, these theories are important to keep in mind when thinking through the participatory mechanisms underlying broader environmental determinants of situational difficulty.

Stedman and George Downs, writing in 2002, cite three principal environmental variables as deterministic of peacekeeping failure: the presence of spoilers, the presence of valuable commodities or spoils, and the presence of neighboring states that oppose the
peace agreement. They complement these findings with an analysis of how cases of peace implementation vary depending upon the willingness of international actors to provide resources and risk the deployment of troops. They conclude that while the UN can succeed at peace implementation in the easiest conflict environments, regional or major power interest is crucial to succeed in the most difficult ones. This is because without major power interest, the robust mandate, resources, and troops necessary for coercive strategies to succeed will not be provided.

Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis explore the nexus among strategy, context, and resources in their rigorous quantitative analysis of all civil wars since 1945. They find that variables such as the presence of a treaty, scale of death and displacement, war motivations other than identity, war duration, a small number of factions, and lack of natural resource dependence all create easier environments for implementation. Their main argument is that three central factors constitute a ‘peace-building triangle’ that characterizes and explains what is needed to establish postwar civil peace: “the deeper the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more one needs international assistance to succeed in establishing a stable peace.” Secondary arguments claim that peacebuilding has a higher success rate than military victories in recent years (challenging Toft), that peace operations must be specifically tailored to fit each

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68 Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending civil wars, 24 and 43-71.  
69 Doyle and Sambanis are widely considered the foremost scholars on peacekeeping and peace implementation. It is an understatement to say that Making War and Building Peace has redefined our understanding of peacekeeping, civil war dynamics and termination.  
individual case, and economic reconstruction must accompany peacebuilding operations to increase the probability of success.\textsuperscript{72}

Recently, scholars have transcended a strictly UN-centric evaluation of peacekeeping and have begun to assess what Bellamy et al. term the ‘subcontracting’ of operations—something especially pertinent to my analysis of peace enforcement and exploration of cases involving a wide variety of actors. While arguments have been made for and against the involvement of regional organizations and single states in UN-chartered peace operations, this normative shift in favor of subcontracting\textsuperscript{73} has spawned a new strain of scholarship evaluating the comparative effectiveness of these organizations at conducting peace operations and third party intervention more generally. Patrick Regan, for example,\textsuperscript{74} who is interested in all types of economic and military third party intervention rather than peace operations specifically, analyzes data generated from all intrastate conflicts and any associated third-party interventions in the post-WWII period.\textsuperscript{75} He finds several trends: that interventions supporting the government were twice as likely to succeed as those supporting the opposition, interventions on the whole

\textsuperscript{72} Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, \textit{Making war and building peace}, 5.
\textsuperscript{73} Although some scholars contend that non-UN peace operations have not fundamentally challenged international society’s norm of nonintervention without host nation consent such as Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Who’s keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace operations," \textit{International Security}, 29:4 (2005): 157-195.
are associated with longer running conflicts, and mixed intervention strategies that combine economic and military mechanisms are the most effective.

Conclusions such as these are common among studies that abstractly analyze external conflict intervention and its characteristics in a manner that is not actorspecific.\textsuperscript{76} Important examples include Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom who estimate a hazards model of the duration of civil wars and find that ethnic fractionalization has a strong negative influence on the expected duration of conflict. They additionally find that the balance of capabilities between the government and rebels has no relationship with civil war duration.\textsuperscript{77} Lindsay and Enterline also use hazards models to argue that third-party support for a government is associated with longer lasting civil wars while disputing the notion that ethnic homogeneity is related to the expected duration of conflict.\textsuperscript{78} Eldabawi and Sambanis use microeconomic models to show that external support for combatants can significantly affect the costs of continuing a war by making rebel fractionalization more likely—thereby increasing conflict length.\textsuperscript{79} While none of these studies are especially pertinent to my analysis, it is important to recognize previous research with hazards models on the duration of intrastate conflict.

\textsuperscript{76} For Examples not explored here, see: Kevin Siquiera, “Conflict and Third-Party Intervention,” \textit{Defence and Peace Economics} 14:6 (2003):389-400.
\textsuperscript{78} Dylan Lindsay, and Andrew J. Enterline, “Prolonging the killing? Third party intervention and the duration of intrastate conflict, 1944-92,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association (March, Seattle, WA).
Several more pertinent studies have provided conflicting perspectives on the effectiveness of UN as opposed to non-UN peacekeeping operations. Case studies by Paul Diehl and William Durch describe potential advantages and disadvantages of UN and non-UN operations and offer detailed accounts of particular operations, but fail to provide explanations for variations in success between them.  

80 Birger Heldt and Peter Wallenstein observe a similar success rate between UN and non-UN operations, but identify UN operations as succeeding in significantly more difficult environments overall.  

81 Heldt, cited in the same study, argues that UN and non-UN operations have the same success rate even if one controls for operational difficulty.  

82 Virginia Fortna’s analysis finds that peacekeeping has an overall positive effect, but is driven primarily by UN missions.  

83 Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl compare the effects of the two by using Doyle and Sambanis’ ecological model of peacebuilding and find that although non-UN operations have no statistically significant effect on successful peacebuilding, UN operations have a large positive effect.  

84 However, they also find evidence that non-UN peace operations complement UN operations, and that non-UN operations undertaken by militarily ‘advanced’ countries are often more successful at preventing the recurrence of war.

Scholars also disagree on the practical and theoretical differences between UN and non-UN operations. Diehl points out that non-UN operations are often perceived to

81 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 60.  
82 Birger Heldt and Peter Wallenstein, Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2004 (Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications, 2005).  
84 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?  
suffer from partiality, bias, logistical issues, vulnerability to domestic politics, and a lack of financial and material resources.\textsuperscript{85} Conversely, other authors cite the reverse of these problems as potential advantages of non-UN operations such as operational stability (over inconsistent and sometimes finite UN mandates), greater local and external support, and an ability to incorporate a wider range of stakeholders.\textsuperscript{86} While it is unlikely that this debate will be resolved any time soon, scholars across the board agree that three important components play into intervention success: legitimacy, impartiality, and technical expertise. I seek to explore all three of these components at length in my case studies and quantitative analysis.

Beyond determinant studies of peacekeeping and third party involvement in intrastate conflict, a larger, more theoretical body of literature complements and provides the foundation for the framework I outlined in the first section of this chapter. Harrison Wagner, for example, extracts from Clausewitz\textsuperscript{87} the idea that war is a bargaining process, entailing a constant risk that one side or the other will win outright when an offer for peace is rejected.\textsuperscript{88} William Zartman, who attempts to explain why belligerents would choose peace in the absence of a third party security guarantee, proposes the existence of ‘ripe’ moments in civil conflict during which parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate—a situation in which neither side can win, yet continuing the conflict will be very harmful—may encourage parties to seek a solution to conflict.\textsuperscript{89} While Zartman’s theory remains largely untested, it is always important to keep in mind.

\textsuperscript{85} Paul F Diehl. \textit{International peacekeeping.}

\textsuperscript{86} Paul F Diehl. \textit{International peacekeeping}


Conclusion

In my case studies, the motivational theories outlines by Gurr and others in addition to determinant theories of conflict intractability help me accurately characterize both situational difficulty and the underlying factors motivating belligerent behavior. My use of these theories is most clearly outlined in my questions for structured-focused comparisons (Appendix I). Scholarship on ‘subcontracting’ by Diehl, Durch, and Doyle & Sambanis add initial credibility to one key aspect of my theory of peace enforcement success: close cooperation with UN peacekeepers help peace enforcers achieve and maintain operational legitimacy and impartiality in the eyes of belligerents. Stedman’s typology of spoilers and proposed strategies for spoiler management also features very prominently in my theory, and both my quantitative analysis and case studies. I adopt Stedman’s typology and argue that peace enforcement operations that correctly match their operational strategy to the type of spoiler they are attempting to manage are significantly more effective than those that do not. Finally, Walter, Stedman, and Toft’s work on settlement implementation and the potential for third party security guarantees to strategically alter belligerent behavior allow me to frame my theory and analysis in a manner that is consistent and easy to understand.
Chapter III
Quantitative Evidence of Effectiveness

In this chapter, I test whether civil wars terminate faster with the presence of peace enforcement operations that utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy and work closely with UN peacekeepers. The dataset I constructed for this analysis encompasses all intrastate conflicts and associated third party interventions between 1945 and March 2013, and is modeled after Patrick Regan’s dataset on interventions in civil conflicts.\textsuperscript{90} In my duration models, I use Cox proportional hazards models (henceforth Cox PH models) to determine the underlying “hazard” (likelihood) of civil war termination both with and without peace enforcement. Below, I test the following 5 hypotheses:

\textit{Hypothesis 1:} Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

\textit{Hypothesis 2:} Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than conventional third party intervention.

\textit{Hypothesis 3:} Modern peace enforcement operations that utilize an appropriate spoiler management strategy and level of cooperation with UN peacekeepers will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

\textit{Hypothesis 4:} Third party interventions that utilize an appropriate spoiler management strategy will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

\textit{Hypothesis 5:} Third party interventions motivated by concerns for regional stability and human rights will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than third party interventions motivated by economic/military interests or ideological concerns.

\textsuperscript{90} Patrick Regan, “Conditions of Successful.”
Patrick Regan, “Third-Party Interventions.”
I ultimately confirm three of my hypotheses (the most relevant being hypothesis 3) and conclude that peace enforcement operations, regardless of their force capability, do indeed have a positive, significant impact on civil war termination that is enhanced further by the use of Stephen Stedman’s typological spoiler management strategy and maintenance of close cooperation with United Nations peacekeepers.

**Dataset and Variables**

While coding my dataset, I operationally defined a civil war as a conflict that reached at least 200 battle deaths per year. Because this is significantly less restrictive than the Correlates of War (COW) definition\(^91\) which requires at least 1000 battle deaths per year, and more restrictive than the UCDP/PRIO definition\(^92\) of 25 battle deaths per year, I mark conflicts with less than 1000 deaths per year as low intensity (a control variable) in my dataset. Conflicts are coded by month, and ongoing conflicts are censored so as to account for the fact that they have not yet terminated at the time of writing. Two of my key dichotomous explanatory variables, an intervention’s use of an appropriate spoiler management strategy and cooperation with UN peacekeepers, require further explanation.

I coded a military intervention as utilizing an appropriate spoiler management strategy if three conditions were met:

1) The operation consistently applied limited coercive force against belligerents who demonstrated immutable goals (total spoilers) and no interest in a peace settlement, and/or belligerents who repeatedly reneged on peace agreements depending upon circumstance (greedy spoilers).

\(^{91}\) Data on battle deaths was compiled from the dataset: Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends.”

2) It did not attempt to appease belligerents demonstrating total or greedy spoiling behavior.

3) It did not use coercive force against limited spoilers, or belligerents willing to agree to a ceasefire or abide by a settlement.

Coding of cooperation with UN peacekeepers was significantly more straightforward. No contemporary peace enforcement missions deployed to date alongside UN peacekeepers have failed to cooperate and coordinate extensively with UN personnel. Intervener motives, strength, and the target of the intervention were coded from the International Military Intervention Database (IMI) and verified through original research, while the conflict type was coded from either the COW database or UCDP.

*Interpreting Results*

Rather than yield coefficients such as in linear or logistic regression models, Cox PH models yield hazards ratios (HR). Hazards ratios are interpreted relative to 1. In this case, ratios significantly less than 1 indicate that a variable is estimated to reduce the hazard, or risk, of civil war termination while ratios significantly greater than 1 mark an increased risk of termination. For example, if a dichotomous variable has a hazard ratio of 2, its presence indicates that the likelihood of civil war termination is 200%, or double (100%), what it would be if it was not present. Conversely, a hazard ratio of .97 indicates that the variable’s presence makes civil war termination 97% what it would be if the variable was not present—or, the variable’s presence makes civil war termination (the hazard) less likely. In short, variables with hazards ratios greater than 1 indicate an

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increased chance of civil war termination while variables less than 1 indicate a decrease in the hazard.

My summary statistic tables display the hazard ratio (HR), robust standard errors (RSE) and level of statistical significance for each finding (P>|Z|). Significance codes are as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05.

Results

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are purposefully broad, and intended to provide a more general, illustrative test of peace enforcement’s effectiveness both overall and relative to conventional third party intervention:

_Hypothesis 1:_ Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

_Hypothesis 2:_ Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than conventional third party intervention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1 CoxPH</th>
<th>Model 2 CoxPH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modern Peace Enforcement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 1.75 (RSE .34)</td>
<td>HR 1.72 (RSE .37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &gt;</td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the first model examines contemporary peace enforcement’s impact on civil war termination across all conflicts, the second examines its relationship only within a subset of those conflicts featuring some type of third party intervention—in other words, model
2 compares contemporary peace enforcement's effectiveness to that of traditional third party intervention. Neither of these models are statistically significant (Table 3.1), but the 1 < x hazard ratio indicates that in both models, peace enforcement (PE) positively increases the likelihood (risk) of civil war termination—by 75% in the first model and 72% in the second. The survival curves below nicely illustrate these relationships in a manner that is visually striking and relatively easy to understand:
Figure 3.1: Peace Enforcement’s Impact on Conflict Duration across All Cases

Figure 3.2: Peace Enforcement’s Impact Compared to Conventional Third Party Intervention
While my first two hypotheses are intended to be primarily illustrative, Hypothesis 3 is the true test of my overall argument:

**Hypothesis 3:** Modern peace enforcement operations that utilize an appropriate spoiler management strategy and level of cooperation with UN peacekeepers will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

To test this hypothesis, I constructed three distinct models. Each model features an interaction term to assess the relationship between conflict duration, and contemporary peace enforcement operations utilizing the appropriate spoiler management strategy and cooperating with UN peacekeepers. The first features no control variables while the second and third control for conflict type and intensity as covariates. Additionally, the third includes whether or not the peace enforcer was a regional organization in the interaction term. Turning to Table 3.2, it is clear that models 1 and 2 are statistically significant and predict the effect I hypothesize. While model 3 is not statistically significant, it does predict a similar increased hazard ratio.

The results in models 1 and 2 are striking to say the least. The hazard ratios for peace enforcement operations with those features discussed ranges from 2.6 in model 1 to 2.98 when control variables are included in model 2—a minor difference. In other words, having peace enforcement operations present that utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy and cooperate with UN peacekeepers increases the hazard, or risk, of civil war termination by 157%—198%, all else equal.
Table 3.2
Effects of Contemporary Peace Enforcement Operations Utilizing the Appropriate Spoiler Management Strategy and Cooperating with UN Peacekeepers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 CoxPH</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2 CoxPH</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3 CoxPH</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HR (RSE)</td>
<td>P &gt;</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (RSE)</td>
<td>P &gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Peace Enforcement</td>
<td>2.596 (.395)</td>
<td>.0157*</td>
<td>2.98 (.4060)</td>
<td>.00723**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spoiler strategy: UN cooperation</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.19 (.2)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>(.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To further test the core argument of my thesis—that peace enforcement operations with the qualities outlined above will achieve the same results regardless of force capability—I run two more models controlling for strength (Table 3.3). Strength in this case is measured by troop numbers, and access to air power in the first model, and additionally whether or not the enforcer is a western state in the second model.

Table 3.3
Controlling for Force Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 CoxPH</th>
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<th>Model 2 CoxPH</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HR (RSE)</td>
<td>P &gt;</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Peace Enforcement</td>
<td>4.18 (.49)</td>
<td>.004**</td>
<td>4.69 (.5)</td>
<td>.0022**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiler strategy: UN cooperation</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both tests also come back significant with the effect I predict on the hazard of civil war termination. Controlling for force capability, peace enforcement operations with the aforementioned qualities increase the hazard of civil war termination by 318%, and 369% if the operation is carried out by at least one western nation.
Taking advantage of my extensive dataset, I test two more hypotheses that are only loosely related to peace enforcement:

**Hypothesis 4:** Third party interventions that utilize an appropriate spoiler management strategy will decrease the expected duration of a conflict.

**Hypothesis 5:** Third party interventions motivated by concerns for regional stability and human rights will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than third party interventions motivated by economic/military interests or ideological concerns.

Model 1 and 3 in Table 3.4 test hypothesis 4 while Model 2 tests hypothesis 5. Model 1 and 3 confirm hypothesis 4, and indicate that regardless of the intervention type, utilizing the appropriate spoiler management strategy significantly increases the hazard of civil war termination. Model 2 returns statistically insignificant results despite indicating that interventions motivated by concerns for regional stability and human rights have an overall positive effect on the hazard of civil war termination.

### Table 3.4
Effects of Contemporary Peace Enforcement Operations Utilizing the Appropriate Spoiler Management Strategy and Cooperating with UN Peacekeepers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 CoxPH</th>
<th>Model 2 CoxPH</th>
<th>Model 3 CoxPH</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HR (RSE)</td>
<td>HR (RSE)</td>
<td>HR (RSE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P &gt;</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiler strategy</td>
<td>2.056 (.32)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.05 (.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>.024*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.7 (.33)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.69 (.86)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The statistical results I report in Chapter 3 are striking to say the least, and validate the core argument of this thesis that peace enforcement operations are most successful when they utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy and maintain impartiality and legitimacy through close cooperation with UN peacekeepers. When enforcement operations that meet these qualifications are present, my proportional hazard models predict the hazard ratio of civil war termination to be a whopping 318%—369% controlling for force capability. There are some serious limitations in this chapter that must be acknowledged: namely, the small number of covariates I include in my models and the skewed distribution of peace enforcement operations in the post-Cold-War era, and third party intervention in the Cold War era. I chose not to cut the dataset off in 1990 because while the international system has changed significantly, most scholars agree the underlying dynamics of intrastate conflict have remained largely the same.

While these results in many ways speak for themselves, they tell us nothing about the causal mechanisms through which peace enforcement operations achieve success on a case-by-case basis. While I maintain that strategy, legitimacy, and impartiality are critical determinants of operational success, I must explore individual case studies in depth to test my more nuanced causal theory. In the chapters that follow, I explore four peace enforcement operations in three difficult cases. The first two cases, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, lend themselves nicely to structured focused comparisons while the third is included primarily to illustrate the potential for short-term, light-footprint peace enforcement operations to contain potentially explosive regional violence.
Chapter IV
Sierra Leone

In almost every way, the Sierra Leonean Civil War epitomizes conflict intractability. Every single environmental variable scholars cite as deterministic of peacekeeping failure and unsuccessful settlement implementation\textsuperscript{94} are present—deep-seated hostility between belligerents, total spoilers, valuable commodities or spoils, a decimated national infrastructure, death and displacement on a massive scale, etc. As such, it is hardly surprising that peace in Sierra Leone was only achieved after ten years of intense war, two major ‘episodes’ of peace enforcement, three peace agreements/ceasefires (two of which failed), and the deployment of one of the largest and most robust multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions to date. In my analysis, I find nearly all of my proposed causal mechanisms at work in a significant and noticeable way. Specifically, by comparing the UK and UNAMSIL’s successful enforcement operation with the other unsuccessful enforcement operation attempted by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) earlier in the conflict, I demonstrate that cooperation and coordination problems between belligerents were only successfully resolved via the nexus between the use of an appropriate spoiler management strategy, actor legitimacy through UN involvement, and impartiality.

This chapter also allows me to justify a key component of my policy recommendations: that there is an ideal ‘recipe’ for the division of labor between UN and other actors in peace enforcement operations. Particularly visible in the relationship between the UK and UNAMSIL, the UN’s instrumental role in facilitating negotiations

\textsuperscript{94} For example, Stedman and Downs, and Doyle and Sambanis as discussed in Chapter 2.
and disarmament efforts while relying upon the UK to provide a credible security
guarantee illustrates what I view as the ideal division of labor in peace enforcement
operations. The UK’s close cooperation with the UN and eagerness to allow UNAMSIL
to take the lead on a number of tasks will later be contrasted in Chapter 5 to the
International Security Assistance Force’s overly ambitious attempt to enforce peace while
simultaneously trying to coordinate tasks best delegated to neutral UN peacekeepers.

Situational Factors

In terms of situational difficulty, there are few ways that Sierra Leone’s civil war
could have been more problematic. While the conflict itself was catalyzed by external
meddling emanating from the civil war in neighboring Liberia, nearly three decades of
corruption, governmental degeneration, and one party rule provided Charles Taylor and
Foday Sankoh with the fertile ground they needed to exploit Sierra Leone’s diamond
riches through rebellion.95 After gaining independence from Britain in 1961, inept
government and rampant unemployment enabled Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal,
to organize disenfranchised Sierra Leoneans under the banner of the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF). Espousing an ideology of ‘democracy,’ Sankoh and his roughly 100
followers received guerrilla warfare training in Libya before attacking Sierra Leone in

Patrick J. Evoe, Masters Thesis: Operation Palliser: The British Military Intervention into Sierra Leone, A
Case of a Successful Use of Western Military Interdiction in a Sub-Sahara African Civil War (Texas:
University of San Marcos, 2008).
March of 1991 with help from Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Burkinabe mercenaries.  

When the civil war began, Sierra Leone was not only virtually stateless, but possessed a notoriously ill-trained, ill-equipped, and understaffed military. In the early months of the conflict, the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), which numbered at around only 3,000 troops, struggled to repel the RUF’s rapid advance into the country’s eastern diamond fields. Initiating an aggressive recruiting campaign that targeted children and criminals, the SLA was able to swell its ranks by over 10,000 recruits in the space of only a few months. Without training or military experience, however, these recruits proved even more incompetent than the original force. Rather than turn the tide of the conflict in the government’s favor, vast numbers of SLA personnel collaborated with or defected to the RUF in the first year of the conflict. This loose collaboration between the SLA and RUF would persist throughout the conflict, and culminate in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a military junta, allying itself with the RUF in 1997 after taking control of the government in a coup.

While the RUF professed political motives, studies suggest that the vast majority of its recruits were either abducted or motivated primarily by greed (via diamonds and

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97 Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*, 55.
looting). It is no secret that the organization itself was primarily interested in the Kono district’s rich diamond mines, smuggling diamonds through Liberia and Burkina Faso to fund itself and Charles Taylor’s NPFL in its war against the Liberian government. Whenever peace talks or ceasefire agreements involved taking control of the diamond mines from the RUF, they would break away. Lansana Gberie describes the RUF’s behavior as “bandatism” and takes note of their primary focus on pillaging natural resources rather than attempting to topple the existing government. While the RUF’s leadership structure is somewhat ambiguous, RUF representatives involved in peace negotiations reportedly did not appear to be highly educated individuals. For the most part, the RUF’s tactics were incredibly brutal and most of their violence was directed against civilian populations. Swelling their ranks further with drugged-up, indoctrinated child soldiers, RUF recruits engaged in mass murders, rapes, and mutilations; later in the conflict their calling card became mass amputations—cutting off the hands of innocent civilians to discourage them from voting in democratic elections. Because of the RUF’s ties to Charles Taylor and his civil war in Liberia, the RUF received some international support from Libya, Cote D’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.

Over the course of the conflict, there were three major settlements/ceasefires that are important to note. The first was the Abidjan Agreement in 1996. After reaching a

106 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War.
military and political stalemate in 1995, another coup led to peace talks with the RUF and elections in March 1996.\textsuperscript{108} While Sankoh refused to recognize the elections, he met with the newly elected government and agreed to a ceasefire and demobilization in exchange for amnesty. As part of the agreement’s terms, a Neutral Monitoring Group was to observe implementation, but was never deployed because Sankoh refused to accept the proposed 750-person UN peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{109} Weeks later, fighting resumed and the accords collapsed as Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria and SLA and RUF soldiers fought for control of the diamond mines and other resources.\textsuperscript{110} The second was the Lome Agreement in 1999. After the introduction of ECOMOG, significant pressure from the US and UK led to a ceasefire in May 1999 and then to the Lome Peace Agreement on July 7. More comprehensive than Abidjan, Lome exonerated Sankoh from prison, gave him the status of vice president and control of strategic resources, made the RUF a political party, and provided a blanket amnesty for RUF, AFRC, Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and SLA combatants. Lome broke down after UNAMSIL (formerly UNOMSIL) positions were attacked by the RUF, several peacekeepers were killed and over 500 taken hostage, and captured UN equipment including armored personnel carriers used by the RUF to advance on Freetown.\textsuperscript{111} The third and only successful settlement was the Abuja Agreements. Signed after the United Kingdom and UNAMSIL militarily coerced the


\textsuperscript{110} David Lord, \textit{Paying the Price}, 5.

RUF into the settlement, Abuja entailed extensive nationwide DDR and democratic elections in May and June 2002.\textsuperscript{112}

Raw statistics give a good summary of both the intensity and complexity of Sierra Leone’s 10 year civil war. When Abuja was implemented the conflict was estimated to have killed over 70,000 civilians, displaced 2.5 million (half the country’s population), left 20,000 survivors of the conflict with RUF inflicted amputations, and involved over 27,000 child soldiers.\textsuperscript{113} A state on the brink of collapse at the conflicts onset, Sierra Leone’s governmental and economic infrastructure was decimated by the war. GDP growth was negative until 2001, when it was only 3.8%.\textsuperscript{114} Summary statistics also tell the story of the force disparity between the RUF and SLA. At its peak, the RUF numbered at over 15,000 combatants while the SLA would only peak at around 14,000 after aggressively recruiting children and criminals to swell its ranks.\textsuperscript{115} In addition to crimes committed by the SLA, RUF, and AFRC junta, the Civil Defense Forces (a pro-government paramilitary organization) committed vast numbers of atrocities and human rights abuses alongside ECOMOG. To date, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has attempted to hold some of these abusers accountable but has, for the most part, been only sporadically effective. Charles Taylor’s recent sentencing to 50 years in prison by the ICC does, however, give some hope for justice.

\textsuperscript{112} Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work, 60-61.
\textsuperscript{113} Malan, Mark, Phenyo Rakte, and Angela McIntyre. “Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone,” 13.
\textsuperscript{114} Trading Economics, Sierra Leone GDP Annual Growth Rate, Online; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/sierra-leone/gdp-growth-annual (9 April, 2013).
\textsuperscript{115} Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Non-State Actor Data, Online; http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html (9 April, 2013).
Before ECOMOG: Executive Outcomes

Before a regional attempt at peace enforcement was made by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) between 1997 and 1999, Executive Outcomes, a South African private military company (PMC) was contracted to support the SLA against the RUF. While Executive Outcomes’ (EO) involvement in the Sierra Leonean civil war cannot be classified as a peace enforcement operation per se, it begins to expose the RUF’s spoiling nature and adds credibility to my argument by further illustrating how counterbalancing military advantage and raising the cost of war can alter belligerent behavior. Additionally, EO’s inherently partial posture (considering it was directly contracted by the SLA to destroy the RUF) made it an unlikely candidate to equitably ‘enforce’ any type of settlement. Even if EO had stayed on after the Abidjan Agreement, it would not have been able to effectively help the SLA coordinate the DDR of the RUF without a significant impartial UN presence.

In 1992 amidst the SLA’s disastrous attempts to swell its ranks with children and criminals, consistent RUF gains provoked SLA Captain Valentine Strasser to oust the incompetent President Joseph Momoh in a coup and alter the government’s strategy by pursuing a dual-track political/military approach to resolving the conflict. Strasser did this by first requesting UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali facilitate a dialogue between his government and the RUF that would hopefully lead to national elections. On the military front, rather than rely primarily on the incompetent SLA Strasser contracted Executive Outcomes (EO) to train Kamajors (local hunters who had organized to defend their villages from the RUF) and organize them into the Civil Defense Forces

(CDF), a paramilitary organization. Through 1996, the combined CDF/EO combination proved a more dangerous adversary to the RUF than the dysfunctional SLA. The division of labor in this relationship was strikingly efficient:

EO served as a force multiplier for the Kamajors and leveraged their knowledge of the local jungle, which surpassed that of the more urban RUF, as well as the intelligence they were able to gather from the local population. Using counterinsurgency tactics they employed under the SAFD [South African Defense Forces], EO efficiently secured Freetown, regained control of the diamond mines, destroyed the RUF headquarters and cleared areas of RUF occupation in a series of five major offensives from May 1995 to October 1996.119

In the aftermath of these offensives, a weakened RUF signaled its willingness to negotiate and sign a peace agreement with the government in November 1996. However at Sankoh’s request and in response to international pressure, a clause was written into the agreement that dictated all foreign militaries (and PMCs) had to leave the country. After the significant gains EO and the Kamajors made against the RUF, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (a group of renegade SLA officers) staged a coup within 100 days of EO’s departure (as EO’s intelligence had predicted) and allied itself with the RUF. Ousting the recently elected Joseph Kabbah, the AFRC/RUF proceeded to reclaim all of the territory it had previously lost to the EO-reinforced Civil Defense Forces.122

Militarily, there are few differences between Executive Outcomes’ involvement in Sierra Leone, and the United Kingdom’s successful involvement four years later.

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117 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 145.
118 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 146.
120 Leslie Hough, “A study of peacekeeping.”
121 Leslie Hough, “A study of peacekeeping.”
122 Leslie Hough, “A study of peacekeeping.”
Composed of 80-350 soldiers drawn from elite units in the SADF, EO’s force in Sierra Leone had extensive counterinsurgency training and excellent unit cohesion that enabled it to utilize a flexible and aggressive military strategy. High morale and discipline allowed EO to remain credible throughout the operation by decisively projecting force against the RUF. By taking the diamond mines from Sankoh, the primary source of wealth fuelling his rebellion, EO’s involvement significantly altered the RUF’s cost/benefit calculus by exponentially raising the cost of continuing hostilities. Standing to gain more from negotiation than hostilities, Sankoh ingeniously made his compliance with the Abidjan Agreement contingent upon EO’s departure. Never intending to actually abide by the agreement, Sankoh simply waited out EO’s departure and the AFRC’s coup while resisting the deployment of a UN-led Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) to oversee DDR and ensure the RUF’s compliance with Abidjan. This illustrates the first of two occasions in the Sierra Leonean Civil War in which inducement, or giving a spoiler what it wants, was improperly utilized as a strategy for managing a greedy spoiler.

Motivated solely by continued access to the diamond fields, Sankoh had no real interest in transforming the RUF into a political party under the Abidjan Agreement, or pursuing any real political goals for that matter—essentially casting the RUF as greedy spoiler whose decisions changed based upon calculations of cost and risk. Without EO or the proposed NMG (a security guarantee), the SLA and CDF’s weakness relative to the RUF (disequilibrium) was an open invitation (incentive) for backstabbing. In essence, the Abidjan Agreement was plagued by all six of the problems Stedman and Rothchild cite as

124 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work, 57.
impediments to settlement implementation: vague and expedient agreements, a lack of coordination between mediators and implementers, lack of coordination among implementing agencies, the incomplete fulfillment of mandated tasks, a short time horizon and limited commitment of implementers, and the presence of spoilers. The AFRC’s coup aside, Kabbah made a serious mistake in choosing to utilize Stedman’s strategy of inducement with a greedy, bordering on total, spoiler. Rather, with the RUF cut off from its main source of funding, Kabbah theoretically could have used EO and the CDF to follow through with a coercive strategy that would have brought the RUF to the negotiating table and demanded a strong, neutral implementation force be provided to oversee the agreement’s implementation and deter the RUF from taking advantage of the settlement.

While EO’s intervention was successful overall, the RUF at the time was only composed of a few thousand rebels, mostly ‘situational opportunists’ and around 350 ‘hardcore’ fighters. After EO’s departure, the RUF swelled to upwards of 35,000 soldiers (including 4,500 child solders). This in some ways allows for a downplaying of EO’s role in the conflict by claiming it had a significant military advantage at the time. Before ECOMOG’s deployment, the AFRC Junta’s split from the SLA would create even more anti-government forces and a now-rogue Civil Defense Force. Additionally, EO’s relentlessly offensive tactics were made possible by its use of premium close air support,

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namely recently purchased Soviet Mi-8, Mi-17, and Mi-24 helicopters, night vision, napalm, and cluster bombs.\textsuperscript{128}

ECOMOG: Attempted Peace Enforcement

The first true attempt at peace enforcement in Sierra Leone came in the form of Nigerian intervention through ECOMOG, or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ceasefire Monitoring Group. At the conflict’s onset, ECOMOG troops were already deployed in the region to support Liberian President Samuel Doe’s regime against Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Because Sierra Leone was a troop contributor to ECOMOG and served as a logistical support base for its mission in Liberia, ECOWAS inevitably felt some responsibility to treat Sierra Leone as a second front of the Liberian Civil War. When the RUF made its first advances in the southeast, however, ECOWAS forces were bogged down fighting the NPFL in Liberia and could not immediately organize an ECOMOG-type mission to help then-President Momoh curtail the RUF’s rapid advance.\textsuperscript{129}

Meanwhile, as discussed previously, the government contracted Executive Operations for upwards of $35 million over the course of 21 months—between 1995 and implementation of the Abidjan Agreement in January 1996.\textsuperscript{130} As Executive Outcomes departed, and in the midst of elections, the RUF stepped up its brutal aggression against the civilian population by hacking off limbs and dumping them in bags at the doorsteps

\textsuperscript{128} Leslie Hough, “A study of peacekeeping,” 18.
\textsuperscript{129} William J. Durch, \textit{Twenty-first-century peace operations}, 146.
of government buildings—a revolting reference to Kabbah’s campaign slogan, ‘the future is in your hands.’

Months after Kabbah’s victory, all of EO and the CDF’s progress was undone as the renegade AFRC junta overthrew Kabbah and allied itself with the RUF in May 1997. While Nigeria initially attempted to use unilateral military force (as it had some troops already stationed in Sierra Leone) to reinstate Kabbah, that effort failed to reverse the coup and Nigerian President Sani Abacha transitioned to shuttle diplomacy to cultivate support for a full scale intervention. In June, ECOWAS finally recognized the direness of the situation in Sierra Leone and at the Organization for African Unity’s request moved to redirect ECOMOG units from Liberia to liberate Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital, from the RUF and coerce a new settlement. In the six months following ECOMOG’s initial deployment, ECOMOG would fail to change the status quo in any significant way. Finally deciding to contract Sandline International, a British PMC, to assist ECOMOG in early 1998, progress against the RUF was resumed until ECOMOG departed in 1999 after the Lome Peace Agreement was ratified and the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed in ECOMOG’s place.

While ECOMOG was deployed to Sierra Leone under the guise of ECOWAS, it was in many respects a “single state” enforcement mission since all but 1,000 of ECOMOG’s 13,000 troops were Nigerian. Led by Sani Abacha, a military dictator, Nigeria had the unique political will necessary to stomach a large-scale enforcement mission with heavy casualties. While ECOWAS’ intervention in Sierra Leone was

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133 Lise Morjé Howard, *UN peacekeeping in civil wars*, 304.
endorsed by the President of the UN Security Council, Nigeria’s motives in the intervention were questionable. Since ECOWAS’ inception in 1975 Nigeria had used the organization as a vehicle for pursuing its diplomatic and economic interests and maintaining regional hegemony. Because of this, it is likely that Nigeria’s overtly dominant role in ECOMOG reflected hegemonic and material motivations rather than humanitarian motives. This self-interested approach to the enforcement operation inevitably precipitated Nigerian tension with Ghana and Guinea, the other two nations contributing troops to the operation, and manifest as poor leadership and limited military cooperation. Furthermore, although ECOWAS authorized the mission, the coalition did not contribute meaningfully to the planning or even authorization of the mission itself.

ECOMOG’s military failure was attributable to a variety of factors: exceedingly poor command and control and a lack of cooperation between Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Guinean battalions resulted in incompetence, corruption, poor coordination, almost no intelligence sharing, and an overall disunity of effort. This was most apparent in the RUF’s surprise attack on Freetown despite optimistic security reports—which legitimately surprised both ECOMOG and the United Nations who were assumed to be at the very least attempting to monitor RUF movements. The deployment of Nigerian troops alongside questionably loyal SLA units that included rebel elements or sympathizers further sabotaged ECOMOG operations and often allowed the RUF to stay one step

ahead of ECOMOG’s activities. Nigerian Major General Maxwell Khobe, the leader of the force, often complained that his forces lacked the appropriate military equipment to successfully engage in counterinsurgency operations against the RUF on unfamiliar terrain.

These issues adversely affected morale and discipline throughout the operation and ultimately resulted in ECOMOG failing to successfully implement the UN’s embargoes and sanctions. Lacking the capacity to secure Sierra Leone’s ports and border with Liberia, diamond and arms smuggling continued to feed the rebellion. Despite Sandline International’s involvement (a British PMC) in training and advising Nigerian units, there were few improvements in their conduct and professionalism over time. The DDR process was also inhibited by a lack of funding and low participation. Nigeria’s questionable motives and operational disorganization together with the sloppy conduct of ECOMOG’s operations, which often involved gross human rights abuses and summary executions, ultimately eroded ECOMOG’s legitimacy and complicated its relationship with the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL’s predecessor, which at the time consisted of a very small contingent of 50 observers to monitor the security situation and DDR efforts).

Tracing the course of ECOMOG’s enforcement mission, it is easy to see how these operational shortcomings compounded with the contingent’s lack of professionalism and in the end failed to successfully coerce the RUF into cooperating

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with the UN’s diplomatic initiatives. In June 1997, seven days after the AFRC junta
deposed Kabbah and allied itself with the RUF, Nigeria’s small ECOMOG contingent
based in Sierra Leone unsuccessfully attempted to retake Freetown in Operation
Sandstorm. Insufficient logistical support and insecure communications allowed the junta
to receive advanced warning of the attack and induce heavy casualties on the Nigerians.
After the new ECOMOG Task Force was approved, a second assault was launched on
rebel-held Freetown in February 1998. Unwilling to incur the same cost, Nigerian forces
shelled Freetown for several days before the offensive and caused more harm to civilians
than to the RUF. In 1999, when the RUF launched a surprise assault on Freetown
(Operation no living thing), more than 5,000 civilians were killed by forces on both sides,
150,000 residents displaced, and 2,000 children abducted by the RUF. Massacring
civilians and burning buildings throughout the capital, the RUF nearly drove ECOMOG
out of Freetown before ECOMOG hastily launched a counterattack that entailed
undisciplined Nigerian soldiers torturing, raping, and summarily executing anyone
remotely suspected of being involved with the AFRC/RUF. In the countryside,
corruption among ECOMOG forces sometimes resulted in corroboration with the RUF
and the trading of supplies for diamonds, but never to the same degree as the SLA. The
Nigerian Operation ‘Death Before Dishonor’ was criticized by many for its serious
human rights abuses. Nigeria’s near defeat at Freetown and Nigerian President

143 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 155.
Abacha’s sudden death in 1998 ultimately resulted in Nigeria’s new democratic
government demanding the country’s 12,000 troops be withdrawn from Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{146}

Scrambling to fill the void, the UN, UK, and ECOWAS pushed the reinstated
Kabbah to reach a peace deal with the AFRC/RUF. Negotiations ultimately led to a
ceasefire in May 1999 and the Lome Peace Agreements on July 7.\textsuperscript{147} Under Lome,
Sankoh was transferred from Nigerian death row to the Deux Fevrier Hotel in Lome, a
blanket amnesty was given to all combatants, and Sankoh was appointed vice president of
the country. As ECOMOG departed UNOMSIL was transformed into a larger and more
robust peacekeeping mission called the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).
Deploying 6,000 peacekeepers in 1999 to take ECOMOG’s place and implement Lome,
UNAMSIL would quickly run into serious trouble only a year later when its attempts to
access the diamond mining areas would be repelled by the RUF and ignite a new cycle of
violence that would result in Lome’s failure.\textsuperscript{148}

ECOMOG’s failure has a little to do with the increased situational difficulty after
EO’s departure, and a lot to do with the contingent’s lack of tact. Intervening several
months after Executive Outcomes’ departure, ECOMOG faced a significantly larger,
more experienced, and better armed RUF. Poor strategy, a disunity of effort, questionable
motives, and a lack of legitimacy ultimately led to ECOMOG’s failure to coerce the RUF
to the negotiating table or successfully implement the UN’s embargos or sanctions. While
the operation was successful at driving the AFRC from Freetown and reinstalling

\textsuperscript{146} Nigeria was reportedly spending a million dollars a day on operations and hundreds of soldiers lost
\textsuperscript{147} Virginia Fortna, \textit{Does Peacekeeping Work}, 59.
\textsuperscript{148} Virginia Fortna, \textit{Does Peacekeeping Work}. 

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Kabbah, rampant human rights abuses and an inability to capture the RUF controlled diamond fields failed to significantly alter the rebels’ cost benefit calculus. Now facing more rebel groups, including the AFRC, West Side Boys, CDF, and breakaway elements of the SLA, ill-equipped ECOMOG units were never able to gain any real military advantage over belligerents without helicopters, sufficient armored vehicles, training, intelligence, or strategy. In the end, ECOMOG made the same strategic mistake Kabbah did years earlier: it failed to follow through with a coercive spoiler management strategy and instead pushed the government to appease, or induce, the rebels at its departure. While ECOMOG did maintain some degree of impartiality, as evident by its willingness to see Kabbah make peace with the rebels, its shortcomings never allowed it to fulfill its mandated responsibilities, or establish itself as a credible or legitimate force. The DDR initiative it had been charged with managing was only sporadically successful and disarmed barely 3,000 combatants in 1998.\(^{149}\) Although ECOMOG did not stick around long enough to implement Lome, it is likely that its soldiers’ poor discipline and lack of professionalism would have resulted in collusion and seriously threatened implementation efforts.

**UNAMSIL and the United Kingdom: Successful Peace Enforcement**

As ECOMOG pulled out, UNAMSIL deployed a force of 6,000 peacekeepers to oversee the terms of the Lome Agreement. Its ranks initially consisted of 3,000 Nigerians, 2,000 Indians, 1,000 Guineans, and 15 unarmed British military observers.\(^{150}\)


\(^{150}\) Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War*, 162.
While UNAMSIL was technically a peace enforcement mission authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it did not deploy with enough personnel or equipment to provide a credible security guarantee or ensure that noncooperation with Lome would be punished with force.\textsuperscript{151} Almost inevitably, as UNAMSIL attempted to deploy into the RUF controlled diamond fields, RUF forces began attacking UNAMSIL’s positions. Around the time Lome was ratified, a split occurred within the RUF as forces loyal to Sam Brokerie engaged both RUF troops loyal to Sankoh and UNAMSIL.\textsuperscript{152} Increasing its presence from 6,000 to 11,000 personnel, incidents between the RUF and UNAMSIL increased steadily in 2000. Embarrassing run-ins with the RUF involved the kidnapping of hundreds of peacekeepers, the seizure of massive amounts of UN weapons and ammunition, and the use of UNAMSIL uniforms to lure other UN troops into ambushes.\textsuperscript{153} Several including UNAMSIL’s commander would criticize Resolution 1270 as being weak and ambiguous on UNAMSIL’s ability to use force against the RUF.\textsuperscript{154} On May 5, 2000, however, the RUF’s brazen ambush and capture of 208 Zambian peacekeepers and their 25 armored personnel carriers (APCs)—and subsequent use of these vehicles to attack Freetown—triggered a British intervention.

As the RUF once again advanced on Freetown with its newly captured APCs and UN supplies, the British launched Operation Palliser: the second enforcement mission I assess in this chapter. Although Palliser initially began as an ‘evacuation mission’ for British citizens and EU nationals in Freetown, the deployment of its rapid reactionary force brought about an immediate change on the ground. While Kofi Annan had initially

\textsuperscript{151} Fortna, \textit{Does Peacekeeping Work}, 59.  
\textsuperscript{152} Fortna, \textit{Does Peacekeeping Work}, 107.  
\textsuperscript{153} Lansana Gberie, \textit{A Dirty War}, 162,163,166.  
requested the US, France, and UK bolster UNAMSIL, the British were the ones to ultimately respond to their ex-colony’s woes and entered Sierra Leone knowing the scope of their mission would be ambiguous once their evacuation mission was complete.\textsuperscript{155} Within 24 hours of agreeing to the operation, Britain’s Operation Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) had deployed to Sierra Leone, followed by more than 600 Royal Marine Commandos and paratroopers equipped with attack helicopters and Sea Harriers only a few days later.\textsuperscript{156} While the international media questioned the scope of Britain’s operation, British SAS forces were carrying out operations well beyond Freetown by May 9 as British forces dug in alongside UNAMSIL to defend Freetown from an impending RUF offensive.

As the British began engaging the RUF for the first time, British forces proved to be surprisingly impartial in their interactions with hostile RUF units. British units typically left rebel elements alone but, when attacked, decimated the RUF with overwhelming firepower and air support: often without a single British casualty.\textsuperscript{157} A string of British victories ‘persuaded’ Koroma, head of the AFRC junta, and the Civil Defense Forces to switch allegiances and join the British/UNAMSIL in fighting the RUF. When Operation Palliser concluded, the British withdrew the majority of their forces, but maintained a formidable presence in the country and offshore to train the SLA and discourage the rebels from taking advantage of UNAMSIL. Special Forces units also assisted UNAMSIL in rescuing peacekeepers held hostage by the RUF in Operation Basilica, Khukri, and Barras. By September 2000, Sankoh had been captured and

\textsuperscript{157} Lansana Gberie, \textit{A Dirty War} 173.
imprisoned, Guinea deployed its military alongside UNAMSIL to increase pressure on the RUF, and Taylor was forced to cut (read curtail) his support for the RUF.\textsuperscript{158} By November, a militarily and politically weakened RUF signed the Abuja agreements and UNAMSIL began to focus more on settlement implementation while capitalizing upon the perception that it was still backed in full by British forces.

While it is undeniable that Britain’s rapid deployment of Special Forces troops to support UNAMSIL ‘shocked and awed’ the RUF and AFRC junta, this is only one factor that contributed to the operation’s overall success and UNAMSIL’s successful implementation of Abidjan. Unable to deploy in support of a Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG for political reasons related to Abacha’s poor human rights record, UNAMSIL provided the neutral foundation Britain needed to launch a temporary, low-risk peace enforcement operation. While UNAMSIL had the impartiality and international credibility it required to successfully implement Lome, it was unable to legitimize itself on the ground as the RUF and AFRC junta reneged, attacked, and humiliated its peacekeepers on several occasions. On top of RUF attacks against peacekeepers, David Keen and Virginia Fortna describe a ‘spiral of mistrust’ between the RUF and government-allied Civil Defense Forces as primarily responsible for the failure of the Abidjan Agreement:

Progovernment forces’ fear of an RUF offensive lead to preemptive Kamajor [CDF] attacks against RUF bases…The RUF stepped up its own attacks in response. Sankoh explained that Kamajor attacks after Abidjan proved that the government was not ready for peace, “so we prepared for the worst.” Without peacekeepers [or peace enforcers] present, “It was hard to rein in the Kamajors or to reassure RUF combatants, in particular, about their future safety.” Similarly,

\textsuperscript{158} Virginia Fortna, \textit{Does Peacekeeping Work}, 60.
while the RUF’s aggressive intentions certainly played a role…RUF combatants were afraid to disarm without the CDF being disarmed as well.\textsuperscript{159}

Britain’s enforcement operation provided UNAMSIL with the firepower it needed to radically alter the rebel’s strategic calculus, exemplified in the AFRC junta and CDF’s decision to switch sides in the early stages of British intervention. The AFRC and then-renegade CDF, which can be classified as strictly opportunistic greedy spoilers, were quickly pacified through a strategy of socialization and coercion—changing the behavior of the spoiler to adhere to a set of norms. The RUF, however, a greedy/total spoiler, was necessarily coerced by the British until it no longer possessed the capacity or will to undermine the peace process. As Abuja was implemented and the RUF resisted some of its implications, British forces held a number of high-profile military exercises to demonstrate their support for UNAMSIL and play off of the RUF’s newfound fear of British firepower. Tony Blair demonstrated that even with a small contingent offshore, the British had the political will to respond with overwhelming force if UNAMSIL’s weakness was taken advantage of.

With British help, UNAMSIL was able to refine its strategy and capabilities by utilizing satellite imagery and intelligence, and bringing in helicopter gunships for additional firepower.\textsuperscript{160} The SLA, previously incompetent and questionably legitimate, was trained and advised by the British so it could better support UNAMSIL. In some instances, British officers even wore the SLA uniform and operated directly within the

\textsuperscript{159} Fortna, \textit{Does Peacekeeping Work,} 151. Fortna’s account here is based on interviews with former government ministers involved in the Lome Peace process.

\textsuperscript{160} Patrick J. Evoe, \textit{Masters Thesis: Operation Palliser,} 102-103.
SLA’s command structure. Helping UNAMSIL create a safe and secure environment, the cornerstone of effective counterinsurgency strategy, the British scaled back their role relatively quickly while conducting a number of high-profile military exercises in Sierra Leone to remind the RUF of their presence. When UNAMSIL did run into trouble, or attempted complex hostage rescue operations, the SAS was more than willing to follow through with enhancing their firepower through direct UK participation. In short, the UK’s expertise in counterinsurgency had not existed in Sierra Leone since Executive Outcomes’ departure several years earlier.

Providing security for DDR initiatives early on before withdrawing most of its forces, the UK created the momentum UNAMSIL needed to be successful in settlement implementation. Increasing its troop presence to 17,500, UNAMSIL was finally able to provide a credible security guarantee by forcefully punishing would-be spoilers of Abidjan. As a highly professional and disciplined force, in stark contrast to ECOMOG, the British were viewed as both legitimate and credible by other actors in the conflict. Able to pursue their objectives with overwhelming force and decision, the AFRC junta, CDF, and fractured elements of the RUF responded to Britain’s decisive strategy by switching sides so as to avoid being targeted (responding to the relative benefit of peace and high cost of continuing hostilities). Possibly most importantly, the British remained impartial throughout their involvement, actively choosing to accept the surrender of these units rather than seek their outright extermination. Working alongside the UN and welcoming belligerents who wanted to change allegiances, the British very clearly demonstrated their impartial humanitarian approach to the conflict and avoided making

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the fragmented rebels view the conflict as an ‘all or nothing’ affair ending in either victory or death.

A counterargument can be made here that a coercive spoiler management strategy was only effective because the RUF was motivated primarily by greed rather than a radical ideology—thereby making it a rational ‘greedy’ spoiler sensitive to cost-benefit calculations rather than a total spoiler with inflexible, immutable goals. While this criticism is indeed warranted, the number of belligerents in the history of intrastate war motivated purely by a radical ideology is negligible. As I demonstrate in the next chapter, even the Taliban, an organization popularly perceived to be driven by a ‘radical Islamist ideology’ is composed primarily of cash-strapped farmers and an inconsequential number of hardline al Qaeda fighters. If anything, the Taliban are significantly more attentive to cost-benefit calculations than members of the RUF, who were for the most part drugged-up, abducted children or young adults.

Britain’s peace enforcement operation, which peaked at only 750 personnel, provided UNAMSIL with the force it needed to change the rebels’ cost/benefit calculus, and effectively implement Abidjan by swiftly punishing noncooperation and attempts at backstabbing. Dramatically raising the cost of continuing hostilities, Britain followed through with its operation into the implementation phase (as ECOMOG did not) by creating momentum for UNAMSIL’s ultimate supervision and coordination of the DDR process. However, critical tasks such as DDR and policing were left to the United Nations who was viewed as the most impartial and legitimate actor in the conflict. While the UK did take the lead in security sector reform within the SLA, it did not attempt to micromanage peace-building efforts by any means—leaving most of these tasks to the
UN. This division of labor is in essence the perfect ‘recipe’ for the delegation of tasks to the UN and non-UN enforcement elements in peace enforcement operations.

When belligerent elements attempted to spoil Abidjan, the British demonstrated their willingness to redeploy themselves at a moment’s notice—thereby making reneging outright deadly. Maintaining its impartiality and legitimacy by working alongside the UN and using coercive force against any and all spoilers to the agreement, the British provided the impartial security guarantee necessary for both progovernment forces (the CDF) and anti-government forces (the RUF, West Side Boys, etc.) to disarm without risk. Even the RUF, the primary antagonist in the conflict, was allowed to continue to exist as a political party in the next election—further demonstrating the UK and UNAMSIL’s steadfast commitment to neutrality and impartiality. This impartial posture prevented RUF combatants from seeing the conflict as a ‘victory or death’ affair.

In the long term, UNAMSIL’s continued presence into 2005 helped ensure peace did not fail after the UK’s departure. To this day (March 2013), the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone continues to ensure Abidjan’s longevity while promoting economic and democratic growth in the country.
Chapter V
Afghanistan

Much like Sierra Leone, Afghanistan’s more than 30-year long civil war is a case study in conflict intractability. Inhabited by ethnically and linguistically diverse tribes living amidst billions of dollars’ worth of poppy (opium), Afghanistan has suffered from decades of brutal civil war, governmental degeneration, and superpower meddling. While the Afghan Civil War has been ongoing since 1978, the most recent phase of the conflict that began in 2001 is the primary focus of this chapter.

Afghanistan demonstrates how peace enforcement operations can, without the appropriate spoiler management strategy and UN cooperation, exacerbate rather than mitigate belligerents’ perception they must fight for ‘all or nothing’ in a conflict. Analyzing the failed attempt by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to make and enforce peace in Afghanistan post-2001, I argue that a series of strategic and political errors ultimately prevented ISAF and OEF from making and implementing peace through the causal mechanisms of peace enforcement success I propose. Specifically, by tracing ISAF and OEF’s involvement in the conflict, I demonstrate that cooperation and coordination problems between belligerents were exacerbated by the peace enforcement operation’s targeting of limited spoilers with coercive force and an overall failure to maintain impartiality and legitimacy without the support of UN peacekeepers. Rather than delegate delicate post-conflict stabilization tasks requiring extreme impartiality to the United Nations, ISAF and OEF
attempted to play the role of both peace enforcer and peacekeeper by launching their own unsuccessful peacebuilding initiatives.

While Afghanistan is arguably the most situationally difficult case I explore, ISAF and OEF oversaw more than four years of relative peace and stability between the ousting of the Taliban in 2001 and the Taliban insurgency’s escalation in mid-2006. Despite its initial success, OEF’s persistent targeting of the Taliban with unwarranted coercive force in the aftermath of the 2001 invasion radicalized and galvanized, rather than pacified, Taliban and Haqqani fighters. Snubbing sincere attempts by the Taliban to negotiate for peace, the OEF and ISAF turned the Taliban from moderate limited spoilers into a deadly mix of internationally-funded total and greedy spoilers with nearly immutable goals. While ISAF and OEF were only recently unified under the same command structure in the late 2000s and legally distinct entities for much of the 2001-2006 period, I consider them together as one peace enforcement operation in my analysis. This is partly due to the fact that both have been normatively linked to the Bonn Agreement (discussed below) and the Afghan Central Government for the duration of their deployment.

**Situational Factors**

Comparable in many ways to the Sierra Leonean Civil War, Afghanistan’s civil war was fueled by external meddling, decades of corruption, nepotism and governmental disintegration, rampant poverty, and economic stagnation. For most of the country’s history, the vast majority of Afghans have relied upon subsistence farming for survival,
and traditional tribal societies for law and order—creating constant tension between rural Afghans and attempts to unify the country under centralized state institutions.162

This longstanding disconnect between Kabul, the capital city, and the traditional values and customs of rural Afghans drove Islamist resistance movements emanating from the countryside to violently oppose attempts by the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to modernize the country in 1978. By 1979, infighting within the PDPA and rapid gains by the Islamist insurgency placed Afghanistan at the brink of state collapse. Seeking to support its client, the PDPA, and avoid a regional crisis, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979—ultimately galvanizing the Islamist resistance movement and internationalizing the conflict. In response, dozens of countries including the United States began funneling arms to Islamist guerrillas known as the mujahideen. This influx of international military support enabled the mujahideen to consolidate their political and military position in the conflict, and attracted powerful non-state international backers with their own lofty political and religious agendas.163

As the conflict progressed, the mujahideen’s struggle against the Soviet Union attracted the attention of powerful Islamist leaders and regional powers jockeying for military advantage in the region. Characterizing the mujahideen’s struggle as a jihad, or religious crusade, competing sponsors caused the mujahideen to split into rival factions—some of which sought to create a pure Islamist state based upon a strict interpretation of Islamic religious law known as Sharia law or Wahhabism. Sustained by millions of dollars in foreign military aid channeled through Pakistan’s military intelligence agency,


163 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 467-472.
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the mujahideen fought a brutal war of attrition against the Soviet Union and its client, the PDPA, for nearly a decade.\textsuperscript{164}

In a half-hearted attempt to craft peace, the US and USSR signed the Geneva Accords in 1982 pledging the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces in exchange for the disengagement of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the conflict. Despite this, both sides continued supporting their clients in the conflict even after the Soviets began withdrawing in 1985.\textsuperscript{165} After the Soviet withdrawal was completed in 1989, Afghanistan’s PDPA-controlled central government finally folded to the Mujahideen in April 1992. In the violent chaos that ensued, the country was divided up along regional and ethnic lines as rival mujahideen factions controlling seven different semiautonomous regions authored a new, more brutal chapter in Afghanistan’s civil war.\textsuperscript{166}

With each rival group sustained by a different international backer— from Russia and Iran to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—regional powers were unable to reach consensus on how to end the conflict and continued to actively undermine each other’s efforts at the expense of the Afghan people.\textsuperscript{167} In 1994, Pakistan’s ISI established the Afghan Taliban (\textit{Quetta Shura Taliban}) in an attempt to resolve the ongoing violence in southern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{168} Within two years, the highly disciplined and well-armed Taliban successfully wrest control of the vast majority of the country from competing mujahideen

\textsuperscript{166} Barnett Rubin, \textit{The Search for Peace in Afghanistan} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
factions, and began implementing their own extreme version of *Wahhabism* nationwide.\(^{169}\)

In 1996, Osama Bin Laden’s expulsion from Sudan brought him back to Afghanistan where he had initially fought alongside and funded the Taliban’s attempts to consolidate their control over the country.\(^{170}\) From 1996 onwards, Bin Laden slowly but steadily built his floundering terrorist network, al Qaeda, into a full-fledged terrorist organization. Through al Qaeda’s 1998 embassy bombings and into 2001, al Qaeda’s leadership became increasingly intertwined with that of the Taliban who continued to attract powerful international donors and political sponsors.\(^{171}\) Immediately prior to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001, the Taliban controlled approximately 75 percent of Afghanistan’s territory.\(^{172}\) The remainder was controlled by the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (hereafter the “Northern Alliance”), and other political and military groups that had previously fought one another during the period of intense warfare between 1992 and 1996. For the most part, these factionalized groups existed under decentralized leadership structures “which in pre-war years rested largely on the structures of customary institutions (tribal and religious), by 2001 rested on control of military and financial resources generated by participation in the conflict and the war economy.”\(^{173}\)


\(^{170}\) Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil*, 128-40


**Operation Enduring Freedom and the Ousting of the Taliban**

While the first stage of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was not in and of itself a peace enforcement operation, it was in many ways an attempt to change the status quo in Afghanistan’s ongoing civil war. Twenty-six days after the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States launched OEF against al Qaeda and its Taliban protectors with the intention of depriving al Qaeda of hiding places and sources of support by “accelerating the transition of the world’s more politically problematic corners towards a democratic capitalist future.”\(^{174}\) Severely miscalculating the likely US reaction if its demands to turn Osama Bin Laden over were not met—and basing its predictions upon the limited US response to the 1998 embassy bombings—the Taliban’s leader Mullah Omar presented the US with the same offer he had made in 1998: to turn Bin Laden over to another Islamic country for trial in a multinational Islamic court. Claiming to regard the protection of a guest as a serious religious and cultural duty, the Taliban perceived their standing in the Islamic world as riding upon them resisting US demands about Bin Laden. Solidifying their position even further were repeated assurances from the Taliban’s primary ally, Pakistan, that it would support the regime in the event that the US followed through with its threats.\(^{175}\)

At the time of the invasion, the United States derived OEF’s mandate primarily from Article 51 of the UN Charter, which explicitly recognized a state’s right to use military force in self-defense.\(^{176}\) Choosing to dislodge the Taliban as quickly as possible

without first considering the long-term consequences, the Bush Administration decided that despite the Taliban’s offer to extradite Bin Laden to a multinational Islamic court, a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which US forces could battle and search for al Qaeda activists in Afghanistan. Initially, Taliban and al Qaeda air defenses, bases, command and control facilities, and training camps were targeted by American air power, followed by “targets of opportunity” such as military vehicles and defense emplacements around major cities. Afterwards, UK and US Special Forces and CIA paramilitary teams embedded themselves in Northern Alliance militias to advise and coordinate attacks against Taliban positions with close US air support. By November 12, 2001, US-backed Northern Alliance forces controlled roughly 70 percent of Afghanistan including Kabul.

The haste with which Enduring Freedom was carried out allowed most of al Qaeda and the Taliban’s top leadership, including Bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, to escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan. This allowed the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network to remain potentially formidable belligerents in the conflict despite their initial military defeat and subsequent exile. Between 2001 and 2006, the Taliban would successfully rearm and restructure their organization in preparation for the prolonged insurgency that lay ahead. In the early stages of their regrouping, from 2001 to 2003, the Taliban utilized its historically strong ties with Jamiat-e-Ulema, the Pakistani

military, ISI, and various extremist groups based in Pakistan’s border region to obtain the weapons and supplies it needed for the insurgency while establishing a secure area of operational retreat.\textsuperscript{182} Taking advantage of the Pakistani perception that US involvement in Afghanistan would be brief and limited, the ISI and military were convinced by Mullah Omar of the Taliban’s continued utility as an instrument of Pakistani foreign policy—previously administering a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan that provided Pakistan with strategic depth while pacifying secessionist movements in its border regions.\textsuperscript{183}

Simultaneous with their transfer of weapons, ammunition, food, and supplies to preexisting stockpiles in Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership focused upon funding their insurgency by soliciting domestic and international donations from sympathizers in Saudi Arabia and within the Pakistani military and intelligence ranks.\textsuperscript{184} The flourishing of Afghanistan’s drug trade two years after the toppling of the Taliban regime would provide millions if not billions of additional dollars in opium revenue to the Taliban and al Qaeda over a five year period. These funds would later enable the Taliban to increase the financial incentives they could offer participants in their insurgency,\textsuperscript{185} and take advantage of the US-backed central government’s failure to provide economic reconstruction and security to the population by creating ‘shadow’ governments and governors in several provinces.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{182} Linscholten, “Separating the Taliban,” 6.
\textsuperscript{184} Ahmed Rashid, \textit{Descent into Chaos: The United States and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia} (New York: Viking, 2008) 244.
\textsuperscript{185} Rashid, “Descent,” 355.
While the political and strategic moves the Taliban made to rearm their organization are of little relevance to my argument overall, they are important to keep in mind as I discuss the US and ISAF’s strategic and political failures below. Misperceiving the Taliban and Haqqani as a ‘spent force,’ American pressure to exclude the Taliban and others from the Bonn Agreement and subsequent transitional government would ultimately drive the organization’s exiled leadership from attempts at peace, to rearmament and the adoption of a ruthless insurgency strategy in 2006.

The Bonn Agreement, the US, and ISAF

Before the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was formally established in December 2001, important political and military developments began sowing the seeds for ISAF and OEF’s ultimate failure. After Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance in 2001, a diplomatic scramble began to politically organize Afghanistan’s non-Taliban political leadership into a coherent centralized government. Flush with US funding, arms, and training from OEF’s initial push to topple the Taliban, the same factional armies that had fought one another between 1992 and 1996 were quick to reclaim the regional territories they had lost to the Taliban five years prior. On top of this potentially explosive situation, the US was forced to shape its own political goals in Afghanistan around UN Security Council Resolution 1378 which called for a “central” UN role in establishing a transitional administration, and invited member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.\(^{187}\) Also calling for a new government that would be “broad-based, multi-
ethnic and fully representative of all the Afghan people.” 188 1378 laid the foundation for the deployment of a multinational security force to create the “political space” needed in Kabul to prevent factional violence and allow for the creation of such a diverse representative government. 189

While the Northern Alliance, who was in complete control of Kabul at the time, swiftly rejected the proposal for a neutral security force, the US and UN successfully persuaded the Northern Alliance along with other US-aligned Afghan parties to meet in Bonn on November 27 to decide upon the makeup and structure of a new Afghan state. The result of these talks, the Bonn Agreement, would acknowledge in its own preamble that many key political and ethnic actors were not “adequately represented” at the talks. 190 Featuring representatives from only four of Afghanistan’s main ethnic groupings 191 and no Taliban whatsoever, Afghan civil society groups from both inside and outside the country immediately challenged the legitimacy of the Bonn process and held their own alternative forums in the city on the same day. 192 Reminiscent of the numerous failed peace talks mediated by the UN between 1992 and 1994, UN special representative for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi expressed concern as the Panjshiri Tajic faction of the Northern Alliance and Shura-i-Nizura (the two groups with the strongest military and ties to the US) dominated the talks. When the diplomatic dust settled in December 2001, Hamid Karazi, a politically moderate Pashtun tribal leader, was chosen as head of the interim administration, the Northern Alliance agreed to the deployment of

189 Chopra, McCallum, and Their, “Planning Considerations,” 2-4.
190 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 481.
191 The Northern Alliance, Rome Group composed of the former king’s family and supporters, the Peshawar Group consisting of Pashtun mujahideen and tribal and religious leaders from Pakistan, and the Cyprus group comprised of a mixture of factions with close ties to Iran.
192 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 481.
a limited international security force in Kabul, and a transition process was decided upon
that would lead to the creation of a new constitution and election within thirty months.\textsuperscript{193}

In compliance with Annex I of the Bonn Agreement, the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) was authorized to deploy to Kabul on December 20, 2001 by
UNSC Resolution 1386. Authorized as a peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, ISAF was mandated to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim
Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure
environment.” The power to take “all necessary measures” was granted to ISAF to fulfill
this mandate and enforce the provisions of the Bonn Agreement.\textsuperscript{194} This included
provisions requiring all armed groups in the country to come under the command of the
Interim Authority, a new Afghan army be created, and the removal of all participants’
military units from Kabul and other areas where the UN-mandated international force
was deployed.\textsuperscript{195}

Most notably, however, Resolution 1386 permanently linked ISAF with the
questionably legitimate Bonn Agreement, and thus the Interim Authority that would later
become Afghanistan’s central government. By linking ISAF to Bonn, the mission’s
impartiality and legitimacy was compromised from the onset. While certain provisions of
the Bonn Agreement were intended to mitigate the fractious security situation, the
Northern Alliance and other powerful political players took key steps to ensure they

\textsuperscript{193} William J. Durch, \textit{Twenty-first-century peace operations}, 481.
\textsuperscript{195} Bonn Agreement Art. V(1) and Annex I(2-4).
would come out on top in the new central government. When the 2002 *loya jirga*\(^{196}\) that Bonn required was held to choose a new government (the Afghan Transitional Administration) that would run Afghanistan until the scheduled 2004 election, Hamid Karzai was, unsurprisingly, appointed president of the Administration and proceeded to grant key cabinet posts to powerful members of Shura-i-Nizar and the Northern Alliance\(^{197}\).

Immediately following the *loya jirga*, various factional leaders discontent with the post-Bonn division of power threatened peace even more acutely than the Taliban or al Qaeda did at the time.\(^{198}\) On several occasions, OEF (who, unlike ISAF, was able to operate outside of Kabul in 2002) was forced to play coercive mediator in several ‘green-on-green’ disputes between warring ‘pro-Bonn’ factions.\(^{199}\) Beyond stoking tensions among pro-Bonn actors, the deliberate exclusion of Taliban and Haqqani leaders from the 2002 *loya jirga* and Northern Alliance’s stranglehold on the new government made a return to civil war all but inevitable.

*Coercive Force against Limited Spoilers*

In mid-2002 as the central government was taking shape, senior Taliban and Haqqani figures (including all former high-ranking ministers and cabinet members) met in Pakistan to agree upon a course of political reconciliation with the new Afghan state.\(^{200}\) The very fact that this meeting occurred indicates that in 2002, powerful pro-

\(^{196}\) A traditional loya Jirga is a grand assembly of notable Afghans, typically powerful tribal and military leaders.


Taliban elements had a genuine desire to make peace with the Afghan central government in exchange for some type of power-sharing and political inclusion. Misperceiving the Taliban as a spent force at the time, both the Afghan government (dominated at the time by the Northern Alliance, the Taliban’s ‘arch political enemy’) and the United States refused to grant the Taliban the assurances of immunity needed for negotiations to take place in Kabul.\textsuperscript{201} Further evidence of the Taliban’s willingness to negotiate a formal surrender immediately after the \textit{loya jirga} is evident in Khairullah Khairkhwa’s capture and extradition to Guantanamo Bay in 2002. Formerly the Taliban’s interior minister and governor of Western Herat province, Khairkhwa was captured by US Special Forces operatives in Pakistan while allegedly seeking to negotiate the Taliban’s surrender and integration into the new Afghan government.\textsuperscript{202}

These attempts to negotiate a settlement to the conflict point to the Taliban and Haqqani being limited, not total or greedy, spoilers immediately following the 2002 \textit{loya jirga}. While steadfast US opposition to dialogue at the time means we may never know the feasibility of the settlement the Taliban sought to negotiate, it is safe to assume that the weakened and crumbling force (or at least its leadership) would have settled for some type of political inclusion or power-sharing arrangement with the new government. As ISAF remained constrained to Kabul through most of 2003, OEF focused its efforts on intensive combat operations against Taliban concentrations in southeast Afghanistan, and Pakistan via drones.\textsuperscript{203} Although quick victories in these operations convinced US commanders the Taliban had been decisively defeated military, it is this unprovoked military action that likely catalyzed the Taliban’s transformation from limited to total

\textsuperscript{201} Linschoten, “Separating,” 6.
\textsuperscript{203} Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,” 19.
spoiler. Rather than negotiate with the Taliban when they were willing to do so in 2002, and utilize inducement and socialization, the US created and enhanced the perception that pro-Taliban belligerents must fight for ‘all or nothing’ in the conflict.

**Failings**

As discussed previously, OEF’s use of a coercive spoiler management strategy against a conciliatory Taliban was likely the driving force behind the Taliban’s transformation into what can for now be considered a total spoiler with immutable goals. Compounded with the exclusion of key political and ethnic actors from the Bonn Agreement, OEF and ISAF delegitimized themselves from the onset through their perceived unconditional support for Bonn and the resultant Afghan Central Government dominated by the Northern Alliance. When the Afghan Government, plagued by corruption and nepotism, grossly failed to legitimize itself in the eyes of its citizenry by failing to provide economic reconstruction and security to the population several years after its establishment, the legitimacy of OEF and ISAF also suffered.\(^{204}\) Solo efforts by the US and ISAF to develop Afghanistan economically with provincial reconstruction teams were ultimately offset by the central government’s almost total failure to consolidate its economic and political authority.

Without an avenue for political reconciliation and inclusion via a settlement, the Taliban and Haqqani transitioned from limited spoilers with presumably limited political goals into greedy spoilers whose perception of the relative ‘cost’ of war was lowered by the opportunity for launching an insurgency amongst a frustrated and disenfranchised Afghan populace. Dismissing failure (extermination) and reconciliation as unviable

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\(^{204}\) Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance.”
options, the Taliban set out to lay the groundwork for their 2006 offensive by utilizing their limited manpower and resources to target Afghan officials, aid workers, and other soft targets while bribing or terrorizing the local population into supporting their cause.\textsuperscript{205} Flush with cash from the drug trade,\textsuperscript{206} the Taliban took full advantage of the central government’s failure to provide economic reconstruction and security to the population, and began creating ‘shadow’ governments and governors in several provinces.\textsuperscript{207} This “semblance of an alternative government” filled the power vacuum created by the absence of justice and became a key recruiting tool for the Taliban who carried out a “primitive, justice on the spot system” consistent with their interpretation of Sharia law.\textsuperscript{208} While the population did not necessarily prefer Sharia law, it was preferable to the Karzai government’s “inability to provide the level of security and economic assistance the population expected.”\textsuperscript{209}

Alongside the failure for the Central Government to legitimize both itself and its OEF and ISAF backers, negligible UN involvement further cast OEF and ISAF as an overtly partial force. While some of ISAF’s early failings were ameliorated by political cooperation with UNAMA, the miniscule UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ISAF’s inability to venture outside of Kabul until late 2003 meant it could not adequately maintain security or facilitate the DDR of combatants outside of the city. Rather, OEF was the only peace enforcer capable of operating outside of Kabul at the time, but was almost exclusively hell-bent on destroying the Taliban and al Qaeda and generally unconcerned with ‘peacekeeping.’ Until 2002, the Bush Administration and US

\textsuperscript{205} Rashid, “Descent,” 252-253.
\textsuperscript{206} Rashid, “Descent,” 355.
\textsuperscript{208} Rashid, “Descent,” 362-363.
\textsuperscript{209} Thomas J. Barfield, \textit{Afghanistan: a cultural and political history}, 273.
Department of Defense publicly opposed ISAF’s expansion, concerned about a “peacekeeping force getting in their way, needing airlift support, or perhaps needing rescue.” Instead of delegating sensitive post-conflict roles requiring impartiality to the UN or even ISAF, OEF unsuccessfully attempted to play force guarantor, mediator, and DDR facilitator while relentlessly continuing to seek the annihilation of remaining Taliban and Haqqani elements. In essence, the lowest-risk/cost option for the Taliban post-2001 was to regroup and launch an insurgency in the absence of any viable avenues towards DDR or a ceasefire/settlement with their long-time enemy, the Northern Alliance.

Much of ISAF and OEF’s strategy in Afghanistan runs counter to the theory of peace enforcement success I outline. Rather than counterbalance military advantage between the Northern Alliance and largely depleted Taliban in the early months of the conflict, OEF used relentless coercive force against a retreating Taliban eager to reach a settlement with the new Northern Alliance controlled government. Had OEF been serious about its commitment to democratization and sustainable and lasting peace in Afghanistan, it would have sought to raise the relative benefits of peace by extending opportunities for political reconciliation to the Taliban leadership and thereafter provided the security guarantee necessary to establish a more diverse representative government in Kabul. ISAF’s initial mandate, to create a ‘neutral zone’ in Kabul for the establishment of such a government was a start, but the exclusion of the Taliban and other key political players from Bonn cast both OEF and ISAF as partial toward the Northern Alliance and Shura-i-Nizura. Without a settlement or ceasefire in place, attempts by OEF and ISAF to orchestrate DDR and ‘implement’ Bonn were futile. Illegitimate in their perceived

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210 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 523.
connection to the Karzai government and partial in their determination to destroy the Taliban, OEF and ISAF were unable to convince combatants seeking reintegration that they would not be themselves targeted in the process. Had UN peacekeepers been assigned the task of facilitating DDR and other important tasks such as governance reform and economic restoration, it is possible that a number of factional belligerents involved in the ongoing 2013 insurgency would have been disarmed and the Karzai government wouldn’t have failed so absolutely in its attempt to provide economic reconstruction and security.

Intractable War

A counterargument can be made that because most Taliban were motivated by a radical Islamist ideology, their spoiling behavior was total, not limited or greedy, and thus required a strictly coercive peace enforcement strategy. This is simply not true, and evidence to the contrary exceeds that found in the Taliban’s attempts to negotiate a settlement in late 2002. Recent 2012 reports suggest that the vast majority of Islamist hardliners among the Taliban and their allies number at “less than 100 or so” with the majority interested in mineral wealth, controlling smuggling routes, opium, and territory according to US intelligence reports. In other words, despite the common misperception that the Taliban are a strictly radical Islamist force, most Taliban are motivated by ‘greed’ and thus theoretically greedy spoilers responsive to inducement or, at the very least, financial incentives for making peace.

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211 Rashid, “Descent,” 47.
As OEF and ISAF transitioned from peace enforcement to counterinsurgency in 2006 and 2007, potential avenues for a ceasefire or settlement with the Taliban continued to be deliberately erased. A critical facet of US President Obama’s post-2010 counterinsurgency strategy entails the deliberate killing or capture of as many senior Taliban leaders as possible. While ‘cutting the head off the snake’ would make sense in an interstate war, this has only created a ‘crisis of control’ within the Taliban as younger, more radical leaders closely connected to jihad and less willing to negotiate or compromise with foreigners\textsuperscript{213} have stepped in to take the place of the older generation who is struggling to maintain its authority over the insurgency and its various elements.\textsuperscript{214} The likelihood of the recently established Taliban office in Doha, Qatar making a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Government possible appears a pipe dream as President Obama’s targeted killing strategy further fractionalizes the Taliban and its many allies. At the time of writing, March 2013, Karzai government appears uninterested in peace even as ISAF and OEF prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan and hand over full security responsibility to the central government.

\textsuperscript{213} Rashid, “Descent,” 47.
\textsuperscript{214} Linscholten, “Separating the Taliban,” 9.
Chapter VI

Conclusion and Implications

This thesis seeks to demonstrate that peace enforcement operations not only have a strong positive impact on the likelihood of civil war termination, but can also serve as a viable settlement implementation mechanism capable of resolving cooperation and coordination problems that prevent disarmament and stable power sharing in a conflict’s aftermath. Using Cox proportional hazards models, I found a strong relationship between conflict duration, and the presence of contemporary peace enforcement operations utilizing the appropriate typological spoiler management strategy and cooperating with UN peacekeepers. Controlling for enforcement mission strength, this relationship remains nearly as strong, suggesting that my overarching causal theory is valid at the macro-level. When compared to traditional third party interventions, peace enforcement operations are significantly more effective at catalyzing civil war termination, although not in a statistically significant manner.

On a more micro level, I demonstrated through my two case studies the instrumental role peace enforcement operations can play in crafting peace when they utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy, and maintain impartiality and legitimacy through close cooperation with UN peacekeepers. In the absence of these operational elements, such as in Afghanistan, peace enforcement can exacerbates rather than mitigates belligerents’ perception that they must fight for ‘all or nothing’ in a conflict. In Sierra Leone, Operation Palliser demonstrated the validity of my causal theory of peace enforcement success most clearly. The three key causal mechanisms
through which Palliser and UNAMSIL motivated belligerents to (a) genuinely agree to a ceasefire and negotiated settlement and (b) demobilize and abide by the terms of that settlement were by (1) counterbalancing belligerent military advantage and raising the cost of war and/or relative benefits of peace; (2) enforcing the settlement’s terms by making reneging more costly and providing the security guarantee necessary to prevent belligerents from taking advantage of their opponent’s compliance; and (3) establishing momentum in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of belligerents so that the transition to UNAMSIL’s follow-on peacekeeping operation could occur seamlessly.

Because my case studies do not perfectly follow Mill’s method of agreement and difference, future research is necessary to further test my causal theory of peace enforcement success. At the very least, however, this plausibility probe does indeed demonstrate that there is an important connection between modern peace enforcement, and both civil war termination and durable peace.

Several policy recommendations inevitably follow from this thesis. First, peace enforcement operations must conduct military operations in a manner that is consistent with impartiality via Stedman’s typological theory of spoiler management. Second, enforcement operations must cooperate closely with UN peacekeepers and delegate sensitive post-conflict stabilizations tasks such as DDR and statebuilding to UN personnel perceived as more neutral than conventional military forces. In terms of an amenable division of labor between enforcement operations and UN peacekeepers, peace enforcers should continue to provide the force capability UN peacekeepers lack rather than attempt to play the role of both peace enforcer and peacekeeper in the aftermath of a
conflict. Through recognizing the utility of the division of labor I outline and the
effectiveness of Stedman’s spoiler management strategy, policymakers and practitioner
can maximize the effectiveness of peace enforcement operations while working to prefect
peace operations doctrine and best practices for future missions.
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## Appendix I

### Questions for Structured-Focused Comparisons

A) Conflict Variables:

- What were the factors driving the conflict and motivating belligerents (ethnic, political, secessionist, etc.)?
- How many actors were there, and what were their strategic aims and political goals?
- What type of leadership structure did each of the belligerents have (both government and rebels)?
• Were any of the belligerents receiving support from international or regional states?
• Were there any previous ceasefires/settlements in the conflict, how long did they last, and which actors (if any) agreed to them?
• Which actors (if any) spoiled or otherwise reneged on those ceasefires/settlements?
• What was the state of the conflict immediately prior to the beginning of peace enforcement?
• Did regional actors support the peace process/peace enforcement or continue to support opposing belligerents?
• Was there a UN peacekeeping or other foreign military presence before, during, and/or after peace enforcement?
• Did the nature of the conflict change over time?
• Was there a stalemate?
• How long had the conflict endured?
• How many battle deaths had there been, how many people had been killed overall, and how many people had been internally displaced or made refugees by the conflict?
• How damaged was the countries’ infrastructure before the operation?
• Were there any easily extractable valuable commodities in the conflict zone (diamonds, oil, etc.)?

B) Operational Variables:
• At what point in the conflict did peace enforcement commence (during a stalemate, shortly after a peace agreement, etc.)?
• What politically catalyzed the peace enforcement operation?
• Was the operation explicitly or tacitly UN authorized?
• Which actors were involved in the peace enforcement operation(s), with what motives, strategy, and force capability?
• Were the actors involved neighboring states, regional powers, or former colonial rulers?
• Were the actors unified by an organization or ad hoc coalition?
• Did UN peacekeepers fight alongside peace enforcers or play a more passive role?
• Was the operation deployed with the consent of the host nation and/or the rebels?
• Was the peace enforcement operation strictly composed of military elements or did it also include multidimensional elements (state building, economic reconstruction, etc.)?
• Were there any noteworthy incidents of civilian casualties or other negative events/accidents associated with the operation?
• Did the enforcement operation commence with impartiality or with clear preference for one belligerent over another?
• How many fatalities did the operation incur?
• Was there a mutually hurting stalemate at any point during the operation?
• Did the peace enforcement operation stay in the country beyond the end of hostilities to enforce a settlement/ceasefire or oversee DDR?
C) Outcomes:
- Did major fighting occur between the enforcement operation and rebels/government?
- How long after the enforcement operation was deployed was a ceasefire or settlement achieved, if at all?
- Did the settlement last in the short and/or long term? What was the nature of and reasons for the breakdown (if one occurred)?
- What were the terms of the settlement? Did they have any impact on the settlement’s preservation or disintegration, and which actors signed on to the settlement?
- How long after a settlement or ceasefire was in place did the peace enforcement contingent depart?
- Was a UN peacekeeping force present after peace enforcement’s conclusion? What was the mandate and strength of this force (if there was one)?
- Did the humanitarian situation improve?
- Are there any after-action reports on the intervention? If so, what were their conclusions?
- Did peace last in the long term?
- Did democratization occur in the long or short term?
- How quickly did economic and institutional reconstruction occur?
- Were there any incidents after major hostilities ceased or during the DDR process?
Table 3.1 Model 1 CoxPH

```r
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe)
> summary(mod1)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe)
n= 12558, number of events= 134

coef exp(coef) se(coef)    z  Pr(>|z|)
modernpe 0.5601    1.7509   0.3478 1.61  0.107

exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
modernpe     1.751     0.5711    0.8855     3.462

Concordance= 0.511  (se = 0.01 )
Rsquare= 0   (max possible= 0.083 )
Likelihood ratio test= 2.22  on 1 df,  p=0.1359
Wald test            = 2.59  on 1 df,  p=0.1073
Score (logrank) test = 2.66  on 1 df,  p=0.1028
```

Table 3.1 Model 2 CoxPH

```r
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe)
```
> summary(mod1)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe)
n= 5582, number of events= 61

    coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z Pr(>|z|)
modernpe 0.5414    1.7184   0.3674 1.473    0.141

exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
modernpe     1.718     0.5819    0.8363     3.531

Concordance= 0.525  (se = 0.021 )
Rsquare= 0   (max possible= 0.069 )
Likelihood ratio test= 1.92  on 1 df,  p=0.1654
Wald test = 2.17  on 1 df,  p=0.1406
Score (logrank) test = 2.22  on 1 df,  p=0.136

> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop)
> summary(mod1)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop)
n= 12558, number of events= 134

    coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z Pr(>|z|)
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop 0.9542    2.5965   0.3950 2.416   0.0157 *

---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 .’ 0.1 ’ 1

exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
### Table 3.2 Model 2 CoxPH

```r
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint)
Warning message:
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop + :
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 3
> summary(mod1)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint)
n= 12558, number of events= 134

    coef  exp(coef)   se(coef)   z  Pr(>|z|)
ideology -0.2343    0.7911    0.2315 -1.012  0.31157
religion -0.9427    0.3896    0.3555 -2.652  0.00800 **
ethnic     NA        NA        NA      NA        NA
lowint    -0.3193    0.7266    0.2003 -1.594  0.11090
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop  1.0905    2.9758    0.4060  2.686  0.00723 **

---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

    exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
ideology  0.7911   1.264     0.5025    1.245
religion  0.3896   2.567     0.1941    0.782
ethnic    NA        NA        NA        NA
lowint    0.7266   1.376     0.4907    1.076
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop  2.9758   0.336     1.3428    6.595

Concordance= 0.579  (se = 0.027 )
Rsquare= 0.001   (max possible= 0.083 )
Likelihood ratio test= 14.85  on 4 df,  p=0.005033
Wald test       = 14.85  on 4 df,  p=0.005033
Score (logrank) test = 15.65  on 4 df,  p=0.00352
```

### Table 3.2 Model 3 CoxPH

```r
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint)
Warning message:
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional + :
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 3
```
> summary(mod1)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint)
n= 12558, number of events= 134

coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z  Pr(>|z|)
ideology                          -0.1958    0.8221   0.2315 -0.846  0.39760
religion                           -0.9762    0.3768   0.3664 -2.664  0.00772 **
ethnic                                NA        NA   0.0000 NA NA
lowint                               -0.3216    0.7250   0.2017 -1.594  0.11089
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional  1.1618    3.1956   0.7452  1.559  0.11901
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
ideology                              0.8221     1.2163    0.5222    1.2942
religion                               0.3768     2.6543    0.1837    0.7726
ethnic                                   NA        NA        NA        NA
lowint                                  0.7250     1.3793    0.4882    1.0766
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional  3.1956     0.3129    0.7417   13.7692

Concordance= 0.571  (se = 0.027 )
Rsquare= 0.001  (max possible= 0.083 )
Likelihood ratio test= 11.12  on 4 df,   p=0.02525
Wald test          = 9.91  on 4 df,   p=0.04189
Score (logrank) test = 10.16  on 4 df,   p=0.03789

Table 3.3 Model 1 CoxPH

> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop+ideology+religion+ethnic+lowint+strength0+strength1+strength2+strength3+strength4+airpower)
Warning message:
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop + :  
X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 3 9
> summary(mod1)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint + strength0 + strength1 + strength2 + strength3 + strength4 + airpower)
n= 12558, number of events= 134

coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z  Pr(>|z|)
ideology                          -0.1596    0.8525   0.2342 -0.682  0.49555
religion                           -0.9148    0.4006   0.3557 -2.572  0.01012 *
ethnic                                NA        NA   0.0000 NA NA
lowint                               -0.4578    0.6327   0.2071 -2.180  0.02711 *
strength0                           0.7010    0.0007   0.0007  331.996  < 2e-16 ***
strength1                           0.1940    1.2141   0.8091  0.243  0.80910
Table 3.3 Model 2 CoxPH

```r
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint + strength0 + strength1 + strength2 + strength3 + strength4 + airpower + western)
```

Warning message:
In `coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop + `:
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 3 9

```r
> summary(mod1)
```

Call:
`coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint + strength0 + strength1 + strength2 + strength3 + strength4 + airpower + western)`

n= 12558, number of events= 134

```r
coeff exp(coef) se(coef)  z Pr(>|z|)
ideology     -0.1514  0.8595  0.2351 -0.644  0.51972
religion     -0.9602  0.3828  0.3596 -2.670  0.00758 **
ethnic                NA       NA   0.0000     NA       NA
lowint       -0.4490  0.6383  0.2074 -2.165  0.03036 *
strength0     0.7492  2.1154  0.5259  1.425  0.15428
strength1     0.4306  1.5382  0.8420  0.511  0.60905
strength2     1.3272  3.7706  0.5240  2.533  0.01131 *
strength3     1.4849  4.4143  0.6736  2.204  0.02751 *
```
Table 3.4 Model 1 CoxPH

```r
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint)
```

Warning message:
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy + ideology + :
X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 4

```r
> summary(mod1)
```

Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint)

n= 12558, number of events= 134

```
coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z Pr(>|z|)
spoilstrategy  0.7208   2.0560  0.3214 2.243  0.0249 *
ideology      -0.1856   0.8306  0.2311 -0.803   0.4217
religion      -0.8959   0.4082  0.3546 -2.526   0.0115 *
ethnic             NA      NA  0.0000     NA       NA
lowint        -0.2939   0.7454  0.2018 -1.456   0.1453
western      1.2050   0.3293  0.74243 1.638   0.1000
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop  4.6957   0.2130  1.7415 2.504   0.0121 *
```

Concordance= 0.588  (se = 0.028 )
Rsquare= 0.002   (max possible= 0.083 )
Likelihood ratio test= 24.98  on 10 df,  p=0.005376
Wald test            = 23.75  on 10 df,   p=0.00829
Score (logrank) test = 25.04  on 10 df,   p=0.005273
Table 3.4 Model 2 CoxPH

```r
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~factor(motives)+ideology+religion+ethnic+lowint)
Warning message:
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ factor(motives) + ideology + : 
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 7
> summary(mod1)
Call:
  coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ factor(motives) +
         ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint)
  n= 12558, number of events= 134

  coef     exp(coef)   se(coef)      z  Pr(>|z|)
factor(motives)1  0.5395    1.7151     0.3397  1.588   0.1123
factor(motives)2 -0.5260    0.5909     0.3537 -1.487   0.1369
factor(motives)3 -0.1434    0.8664     0.5226 -0.274   0.7838
factor(motives)4  0.5257    1.6917     0.6047  0.869   0.3846
ideology         -0.1536    0.8576     0.2359 -0.651   0.5149
religion         -0.8550    0.4253     0.3564 -2.399   0.0165 *
ethnic                NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA
lowint           -0.3023    0.7391     0.2046 -1.478   0.1395

---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

  exp(coef)     exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
factor(motives)1  1.7151     0.5831    0.8812    3.3378
factor(motives)2  0.5909     1.6922    0.2955    1.1819
factor(motives)3  0.8664     1.1542    0.3111    2.4132
factor(motives)4  1.6917     0.5911    0.5172    5.5335
ideology         0.8576     1.1660    0.5402    1.3616
religion         0.4253     2.3513    0.2115    0.8552
ethnic                NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA
lowint           0.7391     1.3530    0.4949    1.1037

Concordance= 0.592  (se = 0.028 )
```
Table 3.3 Model 3 CoxPH

> mod1 =
> coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint + opposing.interventions)
> summary(mod1)

Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy + ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint + opposing.interventions)
n= 12558, number of events= 134

    coef exp(coef)  se(coef)     z  Pr(>|z|)  
spoilstrategy           0.7226    2.0598   0.3222  2.243   0.0249 *
ideology               -0.1840    0.8320   0.2321 -0.793   0.4280
religion               -0.8915    0.4100   0.3592 -2.482   0.0131 *
ethnic                      NA        NA  0.0000     NA       NA
lowint                 -0.2892    0.7489   0.2109 -1.371   0.1703
opposing.interventions  0.0199    1.0201   0.2570  0.077   0.9383

---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

exp(coef)  exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
spoilstrategy           2.0598     0.4855    1.0953     3.873
ideology               0.8320     1.2020    0.5231     1.311
religion               0.4100     2.4388    0.2028     0.829
ethnic                    NA        NA        NA        NA
lowint                  0.7489     1.3353    0.4954     1.132
opposing.interventions  1.0201     0.9803    0.6165     1.688

Concordance= 0.583  (se = 0.028 )
Rsquare= 0.001   (max possible= 0.083 )
Likelihood ratio test= 13.52  on 5 df,  p=0.01897
Wald test       = 13.29  on 5 df,  p=0.02078
Score (logrank) test = 13.8  on 5 df,  p=0.01693