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“Normalizing” Japan?: Contestation, Identity Construction, and the Evolution of Security Policy

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“Normalizing” Japan?: Contestation, Identity Construction, and the Evolution of Security Policy

Political Science Honors Thesis

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Abstract

In this thesis, I address two puzzles regarding Japan’s security policy: (1) its minimalist military posture despite its economic power during the Cold War and (2) the recent shift from this minimalist security policy to an assertive one marked by a strengthening of its international security role and military. I argue that although many IR scholars, mainly from the realist camp, claim that the formation of the original security policy (puzzle 1) and subsequent transformation (puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s rational response to external conditions in the international security environment, it can more adequately be explained by the complex dynamics of internal contestation among “identity groups” with different visions of Japan’s national identity and interest.
Acknowledgement

This honors project has been a challenging yet rewarding experience that required much of my time and energy over the last year. I cannot imagine finishing the project without all the help I have received along the way. I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who have contributed to the completion of this thesis.

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# Table of Contents

**Introduction** ................................................................................................................. 1

**Theoretical Framework** .................................................................................................. 7

- Literature Review............................................................................................................. 7
- Theoretical Framework.................................................................................................... 15
- Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 24

**Japan’s Postwar Identity Construction and Security Policy** ............................................. 26

- The Cold War Era: The Rise of Pacifist and Mercantilist Identities............................... 26
- The Post-Cold War Era: The Rise of Normalist and Internationalist Identities................. 51
- After the 2009 Election: A New Party in Power, a New Identity for Japan?.................... 87
- Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 93

**Policy Implications** ...................................................................................................... 95

**Theoretical Implications** ............................................................................................ 102

**Conclusion** .................................................................................................................. 109

**References** .................................................................................................................. 114
Introduction

Japan has always been an intriguing case for scholars of International Relations (IR). Despite its devastating defeat in the Second World War, the country successfully transformed itself into the world’s second-largest economy. Observing this economic rise, Kenneth Waltz, one of the founding fathers of neorealist theory, asserted that the economic powerhouse would necessarily become a great power by acquiring military capabilities, including a nuclear arsenal, to secure itself and advance its interests in the self-help milieu of the anarchic international system.\(^1\) Contradicting this predicted rational course of action, however, the “economic giant” remained a “military dwarf” with a relatively small Self-Defense Force and reliance on the United States for its national security. For Waltz, the country was a “structural anomaly,”\(^2\) and scholars have since attempted to explain Japan’s “irrational” security policy.\(^3\) In short, Japan constitutes a “puzzle” for many IR experts.

More recently, this puzzle has been complicated by Japan’s shift to a more “normal” security posture with a strengthening of its international security role and military since the end of the Cold War. Japan has participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) since the early 1990s and in the war on terror at the beginning of the twenty-first century while investing in advanced weaponry and even moving toward a revision of Article IX of its constitution, the famous “peace article,” in which the state renounced war forever. For realists, this transformation from the previous passive security policy to the new, more assertive one embodies a rational response to the changing post-Cold War security environment. In their accounts, the new

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2. Ibid., 66.
post-Cold War security challenges, including the Gulf War, the War on Terror, North Korea’s nuclear and missile crises, and China’s rapid military expansion, have finally led the “anomalous” nation to embrace increased realism in its foreign policy and to become a muscular, “normal” nation. And yet, a question still remains as to why these policy changes are occurring at this precise moment in history. There were numerous occasions during the Cold War that might have triggered such policy changes. Moreover, we also have to account for the specific character of Japan’s recent transformation, which is not full-blown rearmament including nuclear capabilities leading the state to become a great military power as realists would expect. The recent shift in Japan’s security policy remains another, second puzzle for scholars of IR.

In this thesis, I address these two puzzles regarding Japan’s security policy. I argue that although many IR scholars, mainly from the realist camp, claim that the formation of the original security policy (puzzle 1) and subsequent transformation (puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s rational response to external conditions in the international security environment, it can more adequately be explained by the complex dynamics of internal contestation among “identity groups” with different visions of Japan’s national identity and interest. This contestation among competing identity groups, I claim, reached its peak in the aftermath of the Second World War when Japan was reconstructing its identity and state structure, and has emerged in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War as the state is exposed to the new security challenges that compel it to reconsider its existing identity.

These two pivotal moments of identity construction, during which Japan’s existing identity became no longer sustainable and the urgent need to construct a new identity emerged, are what I call an “identity crisis.” This crisis has led Japan to replace its long-held existing

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identity in favor of a novel one and undergo an “identity shift.” In each of these identity crises—the first in the aftermath of the World War II, and the second after the end of the Cold War—there were multiple different identity groups, domestic political camps that have their own distinct visions of national identity and interest, or what I call “part-identities.” These groups underwent political contestation in determining the content of the new state identity as a whole, or what I call a “whole-identity.” Through the contestation, a dominant, or hegemonic, identity group emerged and incorporated perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing a whole-identity that can be best described as a “mosaic” of multiple discourses.

I argue that there were three part-identities—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist—at work during the first identity crisis at the beginning of the postwar period. The outcome of this contestation was that the mercantilist camp won the prime minister’s office, incorporated the pacifist principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant nation” and a “peace nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both mercantilism and pacifism. This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized the state’s defense spending and international security role, and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S. for its security. This doctrine ultimately set Japan on the path to becoming an economic power without simultaneously becoming a great military power.

However, the new security challenges that emerged after the end of the Cold War convinced domestic political actors that the existing state identity was no longer sustainable. The sudden collapse of a financial bubble in 1991 and the subsequent “lost decade” of economic stagnation also attacked the self-confidence of the merchant nation. The extant mercantilist identity evolved into a new part-identity, internationalist, and another new part-identity, normalist, emerged in the place of the revisionist, while the pacifist identity group faded away
from the political front. Because of these changes, Japan is currently undergoing a second identity crisis, in which the normalist camp has emerged as the new hegemonic identity, while incorporating elements of the internationalist discourse in a subordinate fashion. This new dynamic of Japan’s security discourse is effectively shifting its whole-identity to one that characterizes Japan as a “normal nation” with a greater international security role and military capabilities, and also as a “global civilian power” emphasizing its use of force for humanitarian noncombat missions to promote world’s peace and security. Because Japan still has no desire to aggressively pursue its national interest or send its force for combat missions across the globe, the new security policy and identity are significantly more nuanced than pure militant realism would anticipate.

In addition to decoding the two puzzles surrounding Japan’s security policy, I will seek to contribute to the broader IR debate about theoretical paradigms and policy analysis. On the theory front, I will present the model of state identity construction via the contestation among competing identity groups as a causal mechanism between changes in the international security environment (exogenous shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change). This mechanism takes the form of a holistic constructivist analytical perspective and offers an avenue through which systemic and unit-level constructivism can interact. I also demonstrate how the “mosaic” picture of identity presented by this model complicates the dominant assumption in all paradigms of IR, namely that state actors are monolithic entities with coherent sets of interests. On the policy front, I suggest that a deeper understanding of the complexity underlying nation-state identity could reveal the direction of Japan’s security policy discourse. In other words, understanding identity not only helps us make sense of past policies but also puts us in a better position to predict the potential future trajectory of Japanese policymaking.
The following chapters discuss these points in greater depth. Chapter Two begins by reviewing the existing literature on Japanese security policy and identifying the flaws in the arguments that need to be addressed. It then lays out a theoretical framework for my analysis of identity construction while explaining how my approach differs from existing ones, and aspects of state behavior that IR scholars have largely neglected. The framework defines identity in a way that helps explain more thoroughly how identity construction processes occur both domestically and internationally, involving contestation among multiple identity groups, producing identity as a mosaic of multiple discourses, and determining states’ interests and security policy frameworks.

Chapter Three addresses the two puzzles of Japanese security policy in the following three sections. The first section decodes the first puzzle—the state’s minimalist security policy despite its economic might during the Cold War. It analyzes the first identity crisis at the end of the Second World War and delineates how Japan came to foster a pacifist, mercantilist identity and aspire to become an economic power rather than a great military power. The next two sections decipher the second puzzle—the transformation of Japan’s passive security policy after the Cold War. This second section examines Japan’s second identity crisis in the post-Cold War era and how this crisis resulted in the recent developments in Japan’s security policy. Specifically, this section discusses the emergence of the normalist and internationalist identities during 1990s and political takeover of power by the normalist in the twenty-first century. The last section of the chapter focuses on the most recent developments in Japan’s identity and security policy after the 2009 election, in which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ended the Liberal Democratic Party’s half-a-century-long domination (LDP) of Japanese politics. This section illustrates the continuity of the normalist policy agenda implemented by the previous LDP administrations.
despite the DPJ’s attempts to form a new security policy.

Chapter Four discusses the theoretical implications of this thesis. In this section, I seek to contribute to the broader IR literature by exploring how my model of identity construction can intervene in existing theoretical paradigms. Chapter Five suggests the potential trajectory of Japanese security policy by consulting what I establish in earlier chapters about the state’s identity and interests. Chapter Six, the concluding part of the thesis, summarizes the argument and proposes questions and problems for which future research is needed.
Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical framework to analyze Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the two identity crises. In forming this framework, I begin by consulting Rawi Abdelal et al.’s depictions of the “content” and “contestation” of identity. Later, I go on to combine this analytical frame with Kai Schulze’s “levels of identity” which comprise the whole-identity and part-identity of nation-states. Before doing so, I will briefly review the existing literature and describe why I employ the constructivist methodology and how my approach is unique.

Literature Review

This section reviews how the existing literature on Japan’s security policy has attempted to answer two puzzles: Japan’s minimalist military posture despite the state’s economic power during the Cold War (puzzle 1) and its recent transformation after the Cold War (puzzle 2). Specifically, I map out the discussion among realists, liberals, and constructivists and ultimately side with the constructivist approach while simultaneously identifying its limits, which my theoretical framework attempts to overcome.

There is rich existing literature by IR scholars, including realists, liberals, and constructivists, that explores Japan’s security policy. For neorealists such as Christopher Layne and Kenneth Waltz, Japan’s disproportionate military power relative to its renowned economic growth and strength is an enigma. They expect economic powerhouses like Japan to transform themselves into great powers by acquiring military capabilities, including a nuclear arsenal, in order to secure themselves and advance their interests in the self-help milieu of the anarchic
international system. To neorealists, the country is a “structural anomaly.”

In response to this enigma—the gap between Japan’s economic might and minimalist military posture, and the first “puzzle” regarding the state’s security policy—a new generation of realists has offered varyingly persuasive accounts by introducing different tenets of realist thought. Jennifer Lind, a defensive realist, contends that the conduct of Japan’s passive post-war security policy is consistent with the strategy of “buck-passing,” a balancing strategy that does as little of the required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of others. Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels argue that Japan’s foreign policy is consistent with “mercantilist realism,” which “recognizes technoeconomic security interests…as central considerations of state policy,” based on the idea that technology and national wealth are as important as military power in maintaining the state’s security standing as they increase the state’s political leverage and independence. Postclassical realist Tsuyoshi Kawasaki contends that Japan’s security policy is “no puzzle for realism,” and explains that states maximize their security without threatening others with a security dilemma, all the while being highly sensitive to the economic costs of defense. By emphasizing different aspects of the security apparatus, these scholars, with new –isms in the realist thought, have provided various accounts of Japanese security policy.

Whereas realists are primarily concerned with security issues, liberals like Richard Rosecrance emphasize economic considerations and argue that Japan’s foreign policy centers on commercial interests rather than security ones. In his account, the country has been simply following the logic of economic rationality as a “trading state,” or, in former Prime Minister

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Yoshida Shigeru’s own terms, a “merchant nation” (*shonin kokka*). The underlying assumption is that the free-trade system allows states to transform their positions through economic growth rather than through military conquest. Rosecrance argues that the post-1945 “trading world” of international relations offers the possibility of escaping...a vicious cycle [of warfare and following interludes] and finding new patterns of cooperation among national states.” In this new world of cooperation, he contends, “[s]tates, as Japan has shown, can do better through a strategy of economic development based on trade than they are likely to do through military intervention in the affairs of other nations.”

Whereas both realists and liberals focus almost exclusively on material factors such as the distribution of military and economic power when explicating Japan’s security policy, constructivists like Thomas Berger and Peter Kazenstein employ an ideationalist approach in which they emphasize the roles of *ideas*, *culture*, *norms*, and *identity*. Claiming that domestic and international experiences of states generate societal norms that limit the possible policies the nation’s leaders can select from, they argue that Japan has fostered norms against war, or what they call a “culture of antimilitarism,” coming out of military defeat in World War II. Constructivists rely on such ideational factors for their explanation for the nation’s low military profile and passive security policy (puzzle 1). According to Berger, any attempt by the state “to significantly expand...[the] Japanese defense establishments and international roles foundered on the shoals of domestic opposition” due to the antimilitarist norms embedded in public discourse.

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11 Ibid., ix.
12 Ibid., ix.
In these attempts to answer the first puzzle of Japan’s security policy—its minimalist military posture despite its economic might—the ideationalists seem be able to provide a more satisfying account than the materialists. The materialist scholars such as realists and liberals, on the one hand, base their analysis on a rational actor, interest-based approach. They regard the states as unitary, calculating actors who seek to maximize their interests following the logic of military or economic expediency. In doing so, materialists, or rationalists, assume that interests are “exogenous to social interaction” and, thus, actors (be they individuals or states) enter social relations with a “pre-existing set of preferences.” The material conditions of the international structure determine a state’s behavior as states are essentially pursing a given set of interests. As Robert O. Keohane observes, “the link between system structure and actor behavior is forged by the rationality assumption, which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond to the incentives and constraints imposed by their environments. Taking rationality as a constant permits one to attribute variations in state behavior to various characteristics of the international system.” Yet by doing so, realists and liberals cannot adequately elucidate the causes for variances in states’ behavior despite facing similar material conditions. Nor can they fully explain state behavior that appears similar, but is in fact constituted by different meanings than those posited by rationalist theories of IR. This is why Japan remains a “structural anomaly” to neorealists as its limited military posture does not support their argument that the anarchic international structure compels economic powers like Japan to become military powers in order

to secure themselves in such a self-help system.\textsuperscript{19}

In response to this criticism, neorealists might still point to the recent shift in the nation’s security policy during the post-Cold War era—the second “puzzle” regarding the policy—to justify their claim. In fact, some realists regarded the end of the Cold War as the last barrier for Japan to fully remilitarize.\textsuperscript{20} In \textit{Japan’s Reluctant Realism}, Michael Green argued as early as 2001 that Japan is “reluctantly” embracing increased realism in its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{21} In short, Japan has finally become a muscular, “normal” nation.\textsuperscript{22} In this regard, realists do succeed to some degree in predicting the direction of the policy and thus addressing the second puzzle, though the recent change in the policy is nowhere near their image of a fully remilitarized Japan equipped with nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, realist explanations do not illustrate why the state decided to redirect its course at this precise moment, but not at other occasions during the Cold War such as during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. At best, the realist prediction is that “\textit{at some point} Japan is likely to build a military machine that matches its economic might,”\textsuperscript{23} without specifying when exactly “\textit{at some point}” is. To be fair, the new derivations of realism do provide plausible reasons why Japan has not developed military capabilities to the degree that neorealists would anticipate. They do so, however, by tweaking the realist theory to fit into Japan’s case, sometimes even to the extent of “violating (or modifying) the core assumptions of existing realist theory.”\textsuperscript{24} This stretching of theory to fit the empirical data, however, renders the universal applicability of the theory suspect, at least as it applies to

\textsuperscript{19} Layne “Unipolar Illusion”; and Waltz “ Emerging Structure.”
\textsuperscript{21} Michael J. Green, \textit{Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power}. (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
\textsuperscript{22} Christopher W. Hughes, \textit{Japan’s Re-Emergence}.
Japanese foreign policy.

While Japanese minimalist military policy poses realists serious questions, Japan’s focus on economic development seem to be in line with liberalism, which emphasizes that free trade and economic interdependence promote economic cooperation rather than military conquest. However, liberals still have difficulty with explaining the origin of Japan’s aversion to militarism, an important factor that had developed before the causal, structural conditions stressed by liberalism had an opportunity to have much influence. Furthermore, liberals cannot adequately explain the depth of Japanese antimilitarism compared to that of other nations in similar structural conditions. While war is unpopular in the increasingly liberal, democratic world, no other states possess as intense a sense of antimilitarism as does Japan. Rationalists, be they realists or liberals, therefore do not seem to provide compelling accounts.

Ideationalist scholars such as constructivists, by contrast, contend that understanding how actors formulate their identities is crucial to explaining their actions, as in Alexander Wendt’s words, “identities are the basis of interests.” Put differently, rather than treating states as unitary actors with a set of pre-existing interests and disregarding internal factors such as identities, ideationalists open the black-box of states and argue that both identities and interests are socially constructed. According to these theorists, differently constructed identities lead to different states’ interests, different understandings of the surrounding environment, and thus different behaviors. With this logic, interests are not pre-socially determined variables but

27 The only exception is neoclassical realism, which incorporates both external and internal variables. While treating external factors such as relative material capabilities as the independent variable, it acknowledges the effects of these factors on foreign policy are mediated by the intervening variables, that is, internal dynamics such as decisions-makers’ perceptions about threats and their ability to mobilize resources behind policy initiatives. Although neoclassical realists open the black-box of states by accounting for the internal factors, they still do not question the formations of interests or identities. See Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51 (1998): 144-72.
depend upon socially constructed identities. States act differently even when facing similar material conditions as a result of their distinct identities and interests. The variations in states’ behavior, including Japan’s “anomalous” minimalist security policy (puzzle 1), are not a puzzle for constructivists. Moreover, while the materialist camp treats interests as a constant variable and the distribution of power as an independent variable, constructivists argue that “power only explains what it explains insofar as it is given meaning by interest.”

Stripped of the discursive meaning rendered by socially constructed interest, material factors carry only the significance that actors give to them.

This is not to deny the strategic instrumentality of mechanisms such as buck-passing and balancing set forth by materialists as rational means to advance states’ interests, or ends, under the given external conditions. When employing these concepts, however, we need to replace such objectively defined rationality and interests assumed by materialists with “subjective” ones that are socially constructed based on ideational factors. Put differently, states can still employ these strategies, or means, to advance what they perceive as interests, or ends, according to their own logic and internally rational calculations. In order to account for which strategies states would choose, therefore, one needs to consider the construction of state interests by analyzing state identities. My analysis employs a constructivist approach that enables explanations of state behavior in the materialist and ideational terms that actors within states employ to construct their state’s identities and interests.


30 Using realist and liberalist concepts given the condition of identity may not be a novel idea. Yet, existing constructivist arguments about Japan’s security policy tend to underestimate or not even discuss realist and liberalist accounts. For instance, Kawasaki argues how the concept of security dilemma is unappreciated by the constructivist accounts by Berger and Katzenstein, which, Kawasaki claims, “seriously undermine their case.” Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism,” 225-6. Being aware of such somewhat biased accounts by constructivists, I attempt to maintain a balanced stance between materialist and ideationalist, while I still base my analysis on the latter.
However, the extant constructivist accounts of Japan’s anti-militarist norms seem to contradict the recent transformations in Japan’s more assertive identity and security policy, failing to decipher the second “puzzle.” Critics attribute this inadequacy of constructivist explanations to two misleading assumptions about identity. First, Berger and Katzenstein overemphasize the stability of Japan’s pacifist identity to the point of making it appear “static.” Thus, they assume the continuity of the nation’s security policy. Critics claim that this is why they have difficulty explaining the recent shift in the identity and security policy of Japan.

Second, constructivists treat identity “as a property concept, that is, as an intrinsic attribute of a state.” Instead, critics argue that identity is a dynamic, relational concept since identity is constructed by drawing social boundaries, or differentiating, between oneself and others. As the social context changes as states interact with one another, they engage in new forms of differentiation processes that produce new identities. Of course, identity is “relatively stable” and needs to be so to serve as a plausible variable in analyzing states’ behavior. Yet, as other constructivists insist, “if constructivism is about anything, it is about change.” Therefore, identity is not a static but fluid entity.

In order to treat identity as both relational and fluid, I employ a holistic constructivist approach that combines Berger and Katzenstein’s unit-level approach that focuses on the intrastate identity construction and a systemic approach that concentrates on the interstate

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31 Berger, “Norms,” 324.
33 Ibid., 184.
36 Hagström, “Identity Politics,” 185, emphasis added.
identity construction. In doing so, I pay particular attention to how the competing domestic views of Japan’s national identity contest one another in determining the national identity as whole. This enables me to explain how Japan constructs its identity through its interactions with other states at the international level and the complex dynamics of the internal contestations among competing identity groups at the domestic level. I illustrate that changes in the state’s relations to others can transform the dynamics of the domestic identity discourse, and vice versa, which leads to a shift in the state’s identity and thus in security policy. I will discuss this identity construction process in greater depth in the next section.

**Theoretical Framework**

In this section, I explain the theoretical framework employed in this thesis to analyze the identity construction and security policy of Japan. This framework proposes a holistic form of constructivism that treats identity as both relational and fluid. Before building such a framework, however, the definition of identity as used by IR scholars needs more clarification.

The concept of identity has been increasingly welcomed by IR scholars with the “rise of constructivism” after the end of the Cold War. However, as the proliferation of identity analysis has produced multiple conceptualizations and definitions of identity in the field, “the current state of the field amounts to definitional anarchy of identity.”38 This led critics to condemn the utility of identity, as it is “too analytically loose,”39 or it “means too much, too little, or nothing”40 to be a valid variable for the social sciences. This lack of consensus on the definition

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39 Ibid., 695.
40 Rogers Brubaker and Fredrick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 1. Condemning the lack of conceptual clarity of identity, the authors even argue that it is time now to abandon the concept altogether and “go beyond ‘identity,’ not in the name of an imagined universalism, but in the name of the conceptual clarity required for social analysis and political understanding alike” (36).
of identity creates what Abdelal et al. calls “conceptual issues”—unanswered questions of how to compare different types of identities and use identity as a variable—and “coordination gaps”—a lack of consistency in the use of the concept. The definitional anarchy of identity also leads to an incomplete definition of the concept as a result of “the analytical blindness for [identity’s] multidimensionality and complexity.”

In order to address these problems surrounding the concept of identity, I attempt to lay out a clear theoretical framework to treat it as a tangible and complex, multidimensional variable. I follow Abdelal et al.’s definition of collective identity as “a social category that varies along two dimensions—content and contestation.” I then enrich this analytical perspective by consulting Schulze’s concept of identity as a multi-dimensional character which comprises different “levels of identity”:

Content of Identity: Constitutive Norms, Relational Comparisons, Social Purposes, and Cognitive Models

For Abdelal et al., content describes the meaning of collective identity and takes the four following forms: constitutive norms, relational comparisons, social purposes, and cognitive models. The first two forms—constitutive norms and relational comparisons—play a crucial role in constructing identity by enabling actors to perceive and define who they are. Constitutive norms are “constitutive rules” which define group memberships and therefore enable a group to

41 Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 696.
42 Ursula S. Urrestarazu, “‘Identity’ in International Relations and Foreign Policy Theory” (paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, Montreal, 16-19 March, 2011), 9.
43 Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 695, emphasis added.
44 Kai Schulze, “The Rise of China and Changes in Japan’s Identity Construction” (paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 17-20, 2010), 2-5. In his article, Schulze uses the terms “identity as a whole” in contrast to “part-identity.” However, in this paper, I choose to use the term “whole-identity” for reasons of convenience.
distinguish itself from others.\footnote{Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 697.} They determine the roles of an identity by stipulating the appropriate behavior for a particular identity. Moreover, constitutive norms are “the very actions that lead others to recognize an actor as having a particular identity” as they “define the boundaries and distinctive practices of a group.”\footnote{Ibid., 697.} Following such practices helps group members determine the social meaning of the group and enable group-recognition.

The concept of relational comparisons tells us that the content of a collective identity is relational to an extent that it is a product of comparisons and references to other identities. An identity is “defined by what it is not, i.e., by some other identities.”\footnote{Ibid., 698, emphasis in original.} As Michael Barnett explains, identity represents “the understanding of oneself in relationship to others… [and therefore] is fundamentally social and relational, defined by the actor’s interaction with and relationship to others.”\footnote{Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (1999): 9; quoted in Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 698.} Put differently as a “self/other lens,”\footnote{Alexander Bukh, “Identity, Foreign Policy and the ‘Other’: Japan’s ‘Russia,’” European Journal of International Relations 15 (2009): 320.} a self constructs its identity by defining what is unique to itself and therefore different from the other. This distinction between self and other constructed through their interaction defines the idea or definition of self and thus the identity. As the international system comprises states and other groups as its dominant actors, a definition of the self in the IR sense is equivalent to a definition of a group, or a membership, stipulating who is a member of that group and who is not. Therefore, constitutive norms shape and construct state identity as a membership determinant in relation to other states.

Moreover, the notion of relational comparison implies that the identity construction of self is influenced by the other. Identities “may be contingent, dependent on the actor’s interaction
with others”\cite{footnote50} and thus can change as interactions and relationships of the self with the other develop into different forms. This perspective of identity formation is crucial in analyzing a state’s identity as a fluid entity because it is continuously produced and renewed as a result of the nation’s constantly evolving foreign relations with other actors in the international arena.

The last two forms—social purposes and cognitive models—depend on the first two forms. The concept of social purposes “is analytically similar to the common sense notion that what groups want depends on who they think they are”\cite{footnote51} and defines actors’ goals, interests, and preferences. By “lead[ing] actors to endow practices with group purposes and to interpret the world through lenses in part by those purposes,” this purposive content of identity establishes “obligations to engage in practices that make the group’s achievement of a set of goals more likely.”\cite{footnote52} In the context of state actors, this implies that states form foreign policies in pursuing their goals, or interests. Meanwhile, as actors see the world through their identities, they shape their understanding of the world, creating a cognitive model—“a worldview, or a framework that allows members of a group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions.”\cite{footnote53} Therefore, states may act differently according to how they perceive their interests and such conditions based on their identities. This point corresponds to the aforementioned argument about why I analyze state identity before discussing the state’s security policy in terms of the material, strategic concepts of realism and liberalism.

To summarize, the content of identity explains that norms define and construct an identity and assign social meanings and roles, which in turn form interests and cognitive perceptions of the world. This process happens through social interactions with others, and identity can change,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{50} Michael Barnett, “Israel’s Road to Oslo,” 9; quoted in Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 698.
\footnote{51} Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 700.
\footnote{52} Ibid., 698.
\footnote{53} Ibid, 699, emphasis in original.
\end{footnotes}
or remains fluid, as the interactions develop into different forms.

*Level of Identity: Whole-identity and Part-identity*

Abdelal et al.’s concept of identity, however, does not address the multi-dimensional aspect of identity. As the meaning of relational comparison suggests, a self engages in interactions not only with one other but with *multiple* others. Therefore, state identity is “conceived not as a coherent structure but as a multiplicity of discourses, which emerge in relations with multiple other [states].” For instance, by analyzing the construction of European Union’s postmodern collectivity through its interaction with Central/Eastern Europe, Morocco, and Turkey, Bahar Rumelili demonstrates the formation of the self involves various modes of differentiation with multiple others. Within such manifold interactions with the others, “[a state’s] relationship with the same ‘other’ [state] can also involve multiple modes of differentiation that result in a complex identity construction” comprising “multiplicity of identities.” Against this backdrop, Alexander Bukh, examining Japan’s identity construction through self/other lens and locating the USSR/Russia as Japan’s “other,” argues that the political and socio-cultural identities led to different constructions of the Japanese “self” in the bilateral relation. What these statements suggest is that a state can sustain *multiple* different identities within itself in relation to other states.

Being cognizant of this multi-dimensional aspect of identity, Schluze employs the concepts of whole and parts by Harry D. Gould and those of levels of analysis by Nicholas Onuf

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55 Rumelili, “Constructing Identity.”

56 Bukh, “Japan’s Russia,” 320; 340.

57 Ibid.
and contends that there are two different levels of national identity: whole-identity and part-identity.\textsuperscript{58} Within a national identity as a whole on the highest level, there exist smaller parts—part-identities—which interact with each other on the same level as well as upward and downward to form higher level identities. These part-identities are the multiple identities constructed via a state’s interaction with other states, e.g., pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist during the Cold War and internationalist and normalist during the post-Cold War period in Japanese case.

Moreover, as Schulze argues, the part-identities “on the same level…are not necessarily exactly the same”\textsuperscript{59} but rather have their own contents: constitutive norms, relational comparisons, social purposes, and cognitive models. This is why each of Japan’s part-identities has a distinct vision of national identity and interest, e.g., Japan as a “peace nation” by pacifist and as a “merchant nation” by mercantilist. This is also why state (or any) identity “can never be reduced to a single element”\textsuperscript{60} but must be delineated as what I term a “mosaic” of multiple discourses, not a monolithic entity as assumed in most of IR theories.

\textit{Contestation of Identity and Identity Construction}

Here, I will attempt to integrate this levels framework into the last concept of identity: contestation. Contestation “refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of the shared identity,” and therefore “content [of identity] is the outcome of a process of social contestation within the group.”\textsuperscript{61} Thus, identity discourse is “the working out of the meaning of a particular collective identity through the contestation of its members.” And the contestation

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{58} Schulze, “Rise of China,” 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 4.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 700, emphasis added.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
never ceases as the individuals are continuously proposing and shaping the meaning of the group to which they belong. Thus, identity is always subject to such “endogenous change”

remaining fluid as a result of the constant contestation process.

We can utilize this notion of contestation as a descriptor of the degree to which there is consensus within a group called Japan over the content of the state’s identity as a whole, or whole-identity. Identity discourse is a process of determining the content of the whole-identity through the contestation of the members of Japan, specifically the part-identity groups that have their own distinct contents and whose members comprise the Japanese public, bureaucrats, and politicians. It follows that the established content of the whole-identity determines the state’s purposes, interests, understanding of the world, and therefore foreign policy.

While this contestation occurs within states, the identity of a state is also formed through its constant interaction with other states. These two different avenues—intrastate and interstate—of identity construction are represented in what Christian Rues-Smit calls “unit-level” and “systemic” constructivism, respectively. In concert with neorealists’ adoption of a “third-image” perspective, systemic constructivism focuses solely on interactions between unitary state actors. Ignoring what happens within the domestic political realm, it explains world politics simply by theorizing how states relate to one another in the external, international domain. Wendt provides a prime example of this form of constructivism. By drawing a distinction between the social identities (the status, role, or personality that international society ascribed to a state) and corporate identities (the internal human, material, ideological or cultural

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63 Schulze discusses each part-identity constitutes of what he calls a “carrier group” and limits the members of that group to the foreign policy decision makers of the country. However, in this paper, I refrain from using the term to avoid unnecessary terminological confusion. More importantly, I do not limit the members to the decision-makers but expand them to the public, bureaucrats, and politicians in Japan. I contend that all these internal actors are participating in the identity discourse and collectively forming the national identity, though certainly some of them have more influences in the contestation process than others. See Schulze, “Rise of China,” 5.
64 Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” 199-201.
factors that make a state what it is), Wendt brackets corporate sources of state identity and only focuses on how structural contexts, systemic processes, and strategic practices produce and reproduce different sorts of state identity.\textsuperscript{65}

Whereas the systemic approach treats identity as a relational entity by focusing on its construction at the interstate level, unit-level constructivism concentrates on the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states, drawing attention to the internal, domestic determinants of national policies. Berger’s and Katzenstein’s works on Japan’s antimilitarist norms use this form of constructivism. Their analyses, however, cannot adequately account for how Japan’s identity has shifted through its evolving relations with other states in the post-Cold War era precisely because they ignore the systemic level, which prevents them from handling identity as a \textit{relational} concept. Moreover, despite their focus on the intrastate level, in their accounts “little attention has been devoted to the question of how contending views of security identity in Japan have structured specific security practices.”\textsuperscript{66} Due to this lack of the systemic perspective and attention to the “contestation” among the competing identity groups, the existing account cannot treat identity as a \textit{fluid} entity and, thus, capture Japan’s recent identity shift. This is why Berger and Katzenstein cannot explain the recent changes in the state’s security policy (puzzle 2).

Given these limits of the existing constructivist literature on Japan’s security policy, my approach takes a combination of both systemic and unit-level, or what Rues-Smit calls “holistic” constructivism, which bridges the two realms and “brings the corporate and the social into a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and the international as two faces on a

\textsuperscript{65} Wendt, \textit{Social Theory}.
\textsuperscript{66} Andrew L. Oros, \textit{Normalizing Japan}, 40.
single social and political order.\textsuperscript{67} This is because both the domestic and international levels interact with one another in forming state identity. Though the identity is constructed through the internal contestation among identity groups, the dynamics of the contestation is always subject to changes in the state’s interactions with other states and position in the international system as the domestic actors are discussing the vision of the state that would be appropriate in this international context. If these external, or systemic, conditions transform (e.g., from the Cold War to the post-Cold War), the existing state identity may become no longer sustainable. A reverse could happen as well, if the domestic conditions alter (e.g., from economic growth to downturn) and compel domestic actors to reconsider the state’s relations to other states and standing in the international community.

Facing such challenges to its identity both internationally and domestically, a nation will undergo what I call an “identity crisis,” an intense internal contestation process in its search for a new definition of state identity. The new round of contestation involves changes in the dynamics of the internal balance of power among the part-identities or identity groups caused by the rises and falls of the extant groups as well as the emergence of new ones, which leads to a shift in the state’s whole-identity and thus in security policy.\textsuperscript{68} As a result, identity is never static but fluid. Also, it is this contestation process that bridges systemic and unit-level constructivism and serves


\textsuperscript{68} This model of identity construction reflects Stephen Jay Gould’s evolutionary theory. In his account, evolution involves a two-step process. First, a variety of new forms emerges; second, some environmental pressure selects the fittest for survival. This mechanism creates what he calls “punctuated equilibrium”: One form will be dominant until environmental changes lead to the emergence of several new forms, one or two of which will become the new dominant ones. Inserting identities instead of forms, Gould’s theory could apply to the contestation process of a state’s identity construction. For details on Gould’s work, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002). Also, the application of Gould’s evolutionary theory can be found in Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). Spruyt examines how new institutional forms (city-league, city states, and kings) supplanted old forms (feudalism, the church, and empires) by the early fourteenth century and why territorial kingship became the dominant form among the other alternatives.
as a causal mechanism between the changes in the international security environment (exogenous shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change).

While I will address the theoretical implications of such a causal mechanism in greater depth in chapter four, it should be noted that contestation does not simply result in one victor part-identity solely determining the content of the whole-identity, as the literal meaning of the term may imply. Rather, the dynamic of the contestation process is much more complex; some part-identities are contradicting, complementing, corresponding, or even depending on one another. There can be compromises among the identity groups in reaching an agreement on the content of the state identity as a whole. Due to such complex relationships, the dominant, or hegemonic, identity group (e.g., mercantilist during the Cold War and normalist in the post-Cold War period) could incorporate other groups (e.g., pacifist during the Cold War and internationalist in the post-Cold War period) into its own discourse in a subordinate fashion and construct the whole-identity, which as a result encompasses multiple aspects of each identity group and remains a “mosaic” of multiple discourses. It is this heterogeneous nature of identity that complicates but also enriches our assertions about the concept. It also challenges a dominant (and perhaps misleading) assumption in all paradigms of IR that state actors are monolithic entities with a coherent set of interests. I will delve into this point more deeply in chapter four.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I reviewed the existing literature on Japan’s security policy and provided justification for my use of constructivist approach. I then illustrated the theoretical framework employed in the thesis, specifically content, level, and contestation of identity. Regarding my analysis of identity construction, there are three points to be emphasized: the construction
process (1) occurs both at the international and the domestic levels, (2) involves multiple identity groups, and (3) produces an identity as a mosaic of multiple discourses. A state forms its identity through its interactions with other states and its complex dynamics of the internal contestations of multiple identity groups. Both the international and domestic levels interact with each other in the sense that changes in the international system can transform the dynamics of the contestation, and *vice versa*. The established identity encompasses different discourses of multiple identity groups. Against this backdrop, the next chapter discusses Japan’s identity construction and security policy in the postwar era.
Japan’s Postwar Identity Construction and Security Policy

The Cold War Era: The Rise of Pacifist and Mercantilist Identities

In this section, I describe Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the Cold War. I argue that the identity crisis took place through a contestation among three identity groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist. The mercantilist camp emerged as the hegemonic identity and incorporated the principles of pacifism into its foreign policy agenda under the Yoshida Doctrine, defining the content of the state’s whole-identity as a “merchant nation” and a “pacifist nation.” As a result, Japan had come to eschew its military sword while concentrating on its economic development, and not to pursue military independence, and instead relying on the U.S. for its security.

1945-1960: The First Identity Crisis and the Establishment of the Yoshida Doctrine

After defeat in the World War II in 1945, the Japanese state embarked on a challenging task of nation-building under American occupation (1945-52). This task included not only the reformation of economy, government, and constitution but also the reconstruction of state identity. Under U.S. influence, Japan underwent the first “identity crisis” in which there were three competing identity groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist—who had different visions of state identity and interest. This internal contestation culminated in the 1960 mass demonstration over revision of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, in which the revisionists’ vision was utterly shuttered and the mercantilist Yoshida Doctrine emerged as the centerpiece of Japan’s postwar foreign policy and identity.

This contestation, however, did not take place independently from the external, or

69 The labels of the three subpart-identity groups correspond to Berger’s characterization of Left-idealist (pacifist), centrist (mercantilist), and Right-idealist (revisionist). For details, see Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 55-66.
systemic, pressures from other countries and the Cold War power game, in which Japan had no choice but to side with the West bloc and follow the world order defined and sought by the Western powers, namely the United States. This was especially the case for Japan, a country that was defeated in the world war and needed to appropriately position itself in the new international system to make peace with its former enemies. Therefore, Japan’s state identity was also shaped by its interaction with other states, especially the United States and its neighboring nations, and by its position in the Cold War bipolar order.

The new world order awaiting postwar Japan was a Liberal Democratic Order, in which the Western powers sought to disseminate free trade and democracy. The Bretton Woods institutions were established to ensure a new international system based on a belief that free trade would not only promote international prosperity but also international peace. The unprecedented growth of world trade following the aftermath of the devastating war under U.S. initiative presented Japan a path to economic power. Also inspired by liberal principles, the United States embarked on a universal project of promoting democracy to achieve international peace. This project included a liberal reformation of Japan as the top priority for the American occupation authorities, which demanded a series of democratization and demilitarization reforms. Among these reforms, the new Peace Constitution, mainly written by the Occupation force, was one of the significant outcomes as it contained Article 9 that reads:

1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{70} The translation of the Constitution of Japan at the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet’s website, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.
These principles of Article 9 have been a cornerstone of Japan’s domestic pacifist discourse and identity, constraining options for security policy decision-making.\textsuperscript{71}

In addition to authoring the constitution, U.S. liberal agendas played a role in selecting the new Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, whose opposition against the militarist establishment made him palatable for U.S. Occupation as a candidate for the next leader of postwar Japan.\textsuperscript{72} He served as the head of the state, and concomitantly as foreign minister, for most of the first decade of the postwar period. This long-time service in office enabled him to shape the domestic security discourse, the conception of national purpose, and the new identity of postwar Japan.

The very first task facing the new leader was regaining the sovereignty of the defeated state. The San Francisco Treaty in 1951, which granted Japan peace with former enemies during the war and acceptance by the international community, marked a pivotal moment for the state to redefine its standing and identity in the postwar world. In addressing the treaty, Yoshida and his followers including Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato, who are known as mercantilists (and also as mainstream conservatives) envisioned Japan as a “merchant nation” (\textit{shonin kokka}), a country that focuses on economic prosperity rather than pursuit of military power. Reflecting deeply on the lessons of defeat in the Second World War, they had come to believe that postwar Japan could best pursue its national interest by concentrating on building industrial strength so as to become a powerful trading nation. They were determined that postwar Japan would not seek

\textsuperscript{71} Of course, the article is subjected to interpretations and can be partly revised with substantial political support, and thus the role of Article 9 should not be taken for granted. Yet, in fact Article 9 has never been amended and had a significant, lasting impact on Japanese domestic identity and security discourse. Chai Sun-Ki, “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization,” \textit{International Organization} 51 (1997): 396.

\textsuperscript{72} Serving as ambassador to European countries, including Italy and Great Britain, during the 1930s, Yoshida formed in his belief that it was in Japan’s best interests to accommodate to the Western powers and make use of them for the benefit for the state, which led to him to conclude that Japan’s international relations at the time “needlessly affronted” the Western powers. During the war, his opposition to militarists and attempt to bring an early end to the war cost him the custody of the military policy (\textit{Kempeitai}). Such records of antimilitarism worked in favor of the U.S. occupation’s sanction of Yoshida’s appointment as prime minister in 1946. Kenneth Pyle, \textit{Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose} (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007), 226.
military independence as they believed that their country would be able to address internal security on its own but would have to depend on the United States for preventing direct invasion from outside. Therefore, stationing U.S. forces in Japan following the peace treaty was seen as “a matter of course.” Based on this new representation of postwar national identity, Yoshida concluded the peace treaty, and his followers later implemented mercantilist policies, setting the state on a path to economic power.

Meanwhile, this new representation of postwar Japan was based on Yoshida’s masterful understanding of international relations at the time. He understood that in order to restore the nation’s reputation and gain acceptance by the international community, Japan needed to demonstrate to world opinion its commitment to a new, peaceful course. He foresaw that it was in Japan’s interests to draw itself close to the United States, the new hegemonic power and the promoter of the peaceful Liberal Democratic order. He was also confident that Japan’s aspiration to become an economic power with only minimal military power was made possible by the emerging Bretton Woods System and, more importantly, U.S. commitment to promote Japan’s economic development and to maintain its military presence in Japan and the region for fighting against the Communists.

Yoshida was correct. In the late 1940s, a few years before the San Francisco Treaty was signed, the U.S. government came to see Japan as a center part of its containment doctrine against the East bloc, as the triumph of the Communists in the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in the following year put Asia in the crosshairs of U.S. Cold War strategy. Fearing that Japan could be incorporated into the Soviet orbit in the wake of the

Communists’ surge in the region, George Kennan, or “the farther of containment,” recommended that the purpose of U.S. Occupation in Japan fundamentally shift from liberal reform to economic recovery.\textsuperscript{75} Concern that economic unrest could give momentum to the Communist and socialist movements in Japan prompted the Occupation Force to adopt Kennan’s proposal.\textsuperscript{76} As part of the containment doctrine, there was also a broad consensus among American policymakers that their country would keep its military presence in Japan.

While these international conditions gave Yoshida a great bargaining leverage in the negotiation of the peace treaty, he faced two intractable problems. The first was Japan’s rearmament. In the wake of the emerging tensions between the East and West blocs in Asia, the United States demanded Japan’s remilitarization. However, Yoshida was already planning to resist such a demand, believing that rearmament was not desirable for either Japan or the region as a whole at that moment. Suffering from their agonizing experiences during the devastating war, the Japanese people were not likely to support such a move to remilitarization. Nor would Japan be able to bear the burden of rearmament with its fragile postwar economy. Many feared that economic unrest would potentially cause social mayhem, resulting in a less secure Japan. Furthermore, the public and many intellectuals at the time were concerned that rearmament would encourage the return of militarism, which had led their country to enter into the recent tragic war. This concern was shared among the other neighboring countries in Asia, many of which experienced invasion by imperial Japan during the war.

The second related problem was how Japan would accommodate U.S. force in its

\textsuperscript{75} Kennan recommended, “No further reform legislation should be pressed. The emphasis should shift from reform to economic recovery…. Precedence should be given…to the task of bringing the Japanese into a position where they would be better able to shoulder the burdens of independence.” Kennan’s recommendations were subsequently accepted by National Security Council and approved by President. Pyle, \textit{Japan Rising}, 221.

\textsuperscript{76} To revitalize the Japanese economy, U.S. government sent the Detroit banker Joseph Dodge to Japan as a financial advisor and in 1949 implemented so-called Dodge Plan to curb inflation and to attract foreign investment by balancing the national budget and establishing an official exchange rate.
territory following the peace treaty and enter into a collective-defense arrangement. In negotiating a security alliance treaty, the U.S. government insisted that it could not establish such an arrangement with Japan, since Japan did not have the means to defend itself nor could it help defend the United States. These roadblocks to creating a bilateral security arrangement, coupled with the intensification of the Cold War due to the outbreak of the Korean War at the time, created increasing pressure from the United States on Yoshida to accept Japan’s rearmament.

Moreover, it was not only the pressure from outside but also from inside Japan that Yoshida confronted. A competing identity group, the pacifists, opposed the signing of the peace treaty and its accompanying security treaty with the United States. This identity group, consisted of the Left, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, strongly opposed Japan’s rearmament and its involvement in the Cold War. In response to the experience of the devastating war and inspired by the new Peace Constitution, they envisioned Japan as a “peace nation” (*heiwa kokka*), a country dedicated to the pacifist ideals of its constitution, and advocated for forthright unarmament. The pacifists also called for Japan to take a neutral stance in the emerging Cold War, fearing that the security alliance treaty with the United States would align the state against the East bloc, invite Soviet hostility, and entrap the country in the Cold War conflicts between the two superpowers. For the pacifists, it was not appropriate for peaceful postwar Japan to rebuild its military and enter into the *realpolitik* of the Cold War power game. “Unarmed neutrality” (*hibuso churitsu*) was the correct path for the peace nation.

Despite these pressures from the inside and outside of Japan, Yoshida was able to skillfully deflect U.S. pressure for Japan’s rearmament and conclude the peace treaty and its accompanying security agreement by incorporating the pacifist discourse into his mercantilist foreign policy agenda. He thereby reconciled the coexistence of two different visions of national
identity—“peace nation” and “merchant nation”—despite their fundamental ideological difference. Domestically, Yoshida adopted the tone of pacifism in addressing the Diet: “It is my belief that the very absence of armaments is a guarantee of the security and happiness of our people, and will gain us the confidence of the world, and will enable us a peaceful nation to take pride before the world in our national polity.”

In the negotiation with the U.S. government, Yoshida argued that Japan had a constitution that, inspired by U.S. liberal ideals and the lessons of defeat in the devastating war, renounced the possessions and use of arms, and that the Japanese people were determined to uphold such pacifist principles. Yoshida’s firm position throughout the negotiation led Douglas MacArthur, the head of U.S. Occupation, to accept that Japan should remain a nonmilitary state and instead contribute to the free world through its industrial production. As a result, Yoshida only made minimal concessions—U.S. bases on Japanese soil and a limited rearmament—which were sufficient to gain U.S. agreement to a peace treaty and to a postoccupation guarantee of Japanese security under the bilateral security arrangement.

While the signing of the peace treaty in 1951 marked a first step in determining Japan’s standing and identity in the postwar world, the road ahead was not smooth. First, Japan now had to rebuild its own forces. Upon Yoshida’s agreement to a limited rearmament in the treaty negotiation, U.S. government disclosed its specific demand in 1952 that Japan would develop a 300,000-man ground force with ten divisions. Prioritizing economic recovery, however, he

77 Pyle, The Japanese Question, 22, emphasis added.
78 He also argued that rearmament would stifle Japan’s economic growth and create the kind of social instability that could trigger the surge of the Communists and Socialists in the country, while cautioning that rearmament would agitate the fear among the neighboring Asian nations about a remilitarized Japan and aggravate the security dilemma in the region. His stubborn resistance to rebuild Japanese forces in response to the Cold War flabbergasted John Foster Dulles, a former Republican senator who was appointed as a chief consultant to the secretary of state on the signing of the treaty. He famously stated later that he felt “very much like Alice in Wonderland” during the negotiation with Yoshida. Ibid., 24.
79 Ibid.
reacted negatively to the proposal. Despite a month of intense negotiation, it was not possible for the two governments to reach an agreement on Japanese rearmament.

However, the following year saw a shift in the stance of U.S. government as both the domestic and international environments had changed. Domestically, a recession hit the Japanese economy due to a drop in procurements related to the Korean War and a tight fiscal policy implemented at the end of 1953. Internationally, the tension in the region was reduced with the end of wars in Korea in July 1953 and in Indonesia in July 1954. The conclusion of these conflicts set a clear geographic demarcation between the East and West blocs, turning the focus of the Cold War into a long-term development within each bloc. The U.S. government ultimately came to support Yohida’s position of focusing first on economic reconstruction over or before rearmament.80

Moreover, when establishing the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in 1954, Yoshida made a decisive move not to revise the Peace Constitution but to create the forces under the tenets of the constitution despite the tension between such armed forces and Article 9 that forbids Japan to have “war potential” (senryoku). In 1952, he ordered the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) to craft an interpretation of the article that would allow limited rearmament.81 In 1954, the CLB declared unconstitutional SDF participation in any collective self-defense arrangements. These ingenious interpretations not only preserved Article 9 but also allowed Yoshida to use the constitution as a means to limit Japan’s military buildup, and as a shield to protect against U.S.

80 A policy paper drafted in 1955 on U.S. policy toward Japan confirmed that the United States would not demand the rearmament of Japan at the expense of Japan’s political and economic stability and should allow Japan to decide the specifics of its rearmament program. The paper did not even include any reference to concrete numbers with regard to force levels. Iokibe and Eldridge, The Diplomatic History, 58.
81 The CLB declared that war potential “refers to a force with the equipment and organization capable of conducting modern warfare….Determining what constitutes war potential requires a concrete judgment taking into account the temporal and spatial environment of the country in question….It is neither unconstitutional to maintain capabilities that fall short of war potential nor to utilize these capabilities to defend the nation from direct invasion.” This interpretation later became construed as the “minimum necessary level” of capability required to protect Japan from direct attacks in the late 1950s. Samuels, Securing Japan, 46-47.
demand for rearmament.

Meanwhile, in order to alleviate public anxiety about the return of militarism, Yoshida established a National Defense Council in conjunction with the creation of the SDF to provide parliamentary oversight of the armed forces—one of the important instruments of civilian control over Japan’s military. To further ensure civilian control over the SDF, Yoshida created civilian defense councilors (sanjikan) to oversee the Internal Bureau (naikyoku) within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). In addition, the Upper House passed a resolution forbidding the overseas dispatch of the new armed forces based on the tenets of Article 9. These antimilitarist mechanisms served as hadome, or “brakes” in the evolution of Japanese defense policy, which ultimately worked in favor of Yoshida’s mercantilist agenda.82

While building such constrains on Japan’s military as part of his strategy, Yoshida faced another obstacle: an emergence of a third competing identity group, the revisionists (also called the “anti-mainstream conservatives”), led by Ichiro Hatoyama and, later, by Nobusuke Kishi after the signing of the peace treaty.83 These revisionists welded a muscular notion of national identity by holding to a traditional vision of Japan as a unique “national polity” (kokutai) marked primarily by its imperial statute and neo-Confucian values, which emphasize unity and sacrifice for the national order.84 In line with the realist understanding of the foreign policy, they declared that for Japan to become a genuine sovereign state, it must repeal Article 9 and rearm as well as maintain a reciprocal security commitment with the United States.

The increasing opposition from the revisionists, combined with consistent presence of

82 Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 58.
83 Most of the leading figures in the revisionist camp were expelled from the official positions in government by the American Occupation as they were affiliated with the war conduct during the World War II. The ban was lifted after the signing of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, which explains why the camp came on the stage in Japanese politics after the mercantilist camp first held power and signed the treaty.
the pacifist opponents, severely weakened political support for Yoshida, which led to his resignation in 1954. As a result, in 1955, Japan saw a reconfiguration of its political party system, which would be later called the “1955 system” (*taisei*). In the new environment, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) emerged as a coalition of the revisionist and mercantilist camps, based on a platform supporting the capitalist system and the alliance with the United States.85 The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) championed the left pacifist position, while the more radical Japanese Communist Party (JCP) slowly grew stronger on the fringes.

Under the new party system, two revisionists, Hatoyama and Kishi, occupied the prime minister’s office from 1955 to 1960. With their ideal vision of a muscular Japan, they attempted to revise the constitution, to carry out a forthright armament, to negotiate a more equal security treaty with the United States, and generally to pursue a more autonomous independent course. In seeking an independent diplomacy free of U.S. influence, Hatoyama sought to improve relations with communist nations so as to maximize Japan’s room for diplomatic maneuvering. In 1956, Hatoyama succeeded in signing a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. However, the revisionists faced great obstacles in implementing the rest of their agenda, especially the revision of the constitution, due to the pacifists’ opposition.86 This turned the revisionists’ attention to revising the U.S.-Japan security treaty, as they hoped to use the issue to trigger a greater military buildup and to pave the way for Japan’s participation in a regional collective-security system. Inevitably, it was believed, such an expanded military role would force the issue of constitutional revision back on the front burner of the political landscape.

The revisionists’ militant foreign policy agendas, however, not only mobilized the

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85 This is why identity groups are not necessarily formed according to the party affiliations but intraparty factional affiliations (*habatsu*). For details, see Keiko Hirata, “Who Shapes the National Security Debate? Divergent Interretations of Japan’s Security Role,” *Asian Affairs* 35 (2008): 127-128.
86 In fact, revision of Article 9 became politically impossible as the pacifists now firmly held more than a third of the lower house, a number of seats necessary to block any constitutional amendments.
pacifist opposition on the left, but also alarmed many mercantilists on the center. These fears were reinforced as the government prepared to revise the security treaty, with a legislative proposal to strengthen the powers of the police forces, which was seen by the public as a way to suppress anticipated anti-revision popular protests. The fact that the new Prime Minister Kishi was once involved in the policymaking during the world war aggravated the concerns that he might bring abandoned militarism into peaceful postwar Japan.

Consequently, Prime Minister Kishi’s announcing his intention to revise the security treaty in 1958 resulted in an unprecedented level of political contestation among the three competing identity groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist. Protests spread across Japan over the next two years, reaching its climax the spring and summer in 1960 (1960 Ampo Toso). The Socialist and Communist Parties, along with prominent leftist reform intellectuals (kakushin interii), mobilized the popular protests against revision of the security treaty. With increasing violence and political tension, the Kishi administration came under growing criticism from the mainstream media, the business community, and even the mercantilist camp within the LDP. Eventually, Kishi was able to obtain ratification of a revised treaty, but only at the price of his resignation on June 23, 1960.

On the surface, the battle over the revision issue was a mere political struggle. On the deeper level, however, it marked a defining moment in determining Japan’s postwar identity, i.e., the conclusion of the first “identity crisis.” Kishi’s defeat and the consequent fall of the revisionist camp paved the way for the successive mercantilist administrations and consolidation of Japan’s national identity as a “peace nation” and a “merchant nation,” marked by a minimalist approach to defense and national security, and by the prioritization of economic prosperity over

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87 Confrontation between the police and protestors became more and more violent, while a radical group of students repeatedly invaded the Diet compound and clashed with law enforcement. There was even an attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Kishi by the radical left terrorists.
rearmament. This grand strategy would later be referred as the Yoshida Doctrine, which was further implemented by his followers who repeatedly occupied the prime minister’s office for most of the Cold War period. This doctrine was defined by its three fundamental tenets:

1. Japan’s economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political-economic rehabilitation with the United States was necessary for this purpose.

2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. The Self-Defense Forces would not be deployed abroad. Japan would not participate in collective defense arrangements. Not only would this low military posture free the energies of its people for productive industrial development, it would prevent divisive domestic political struggles.

3. To gain a long-term guarantee of its own security, Japan would provide bases for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.88

The pragmatic policies of the Yoshida Doctrine indeed brought some criticisms of the identity account of the doctrine in later years. Some scholars argue that Yoshida did not use identity language such as “peace nation” and “merchant nation” in actual identity terms, as he and his followers “focused on national interest rather than national identity.”89 It is undeniable that Yoshida and his followers saw a political value in the rhetoric of a “peace nation” and Article 9 for deflecting U.S. pressure against Japan to expand its security responsibilities during the Cold War, and for unifying the opposing domestic political parties. In fact, Yoshida admitted that “The day [for rearmament] will naturally come when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious (zurui), but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives us a perfect justification. Politicians who want to amend it are fools.”90 However, this argument does not necessarily deny the importance of the identity variable. Even though the intention was

88 Pyle, Japan Rising, 242. Kenneth Pyle is credited with coining the term “Yoshida Doctrine.”
89 Boyd and Samuels, “Nine Lives?,”16.
more of a commercial rather than purely pacifist one, the Yoshida Doctrine based on pacifist and mercantilist principles, as discussed in the following sections, later served as a standard of what the nation should do, or even what it is (i.e. identity). In fact, contrary to Yoshida’s prediction, Japan did not “naturally” rearm even when it transformed itself into an economic power in the following decades. As Kenneth Pyle observes, the doctrine “took on a life of its own”\textsuperscript{91} and served as the central constitutive element of Japan’s postwar grand strategy and identity.

\textit{The 1960s and 1970s: The Institutionalization of the Yoshida Doctrine}

The nascent Yoshida Doctrine made at the beginning of the Cold War determined Japan’s foreign policy course for the next forty years. Over the next several decades, Yoshida’s successors significantly expanded his policies until they became a full-blown national strategy. Specifically, under the next two prime ministers, Hayato Ikeda (1960-64) and Eisaku Sato (1964-72), both students of the so-called Yoshida School, the doctrine was institutionalized and consolidated into a national consensus.

Meanwhile, the 1960 demonstrations that cost the revisionist political prominence taught these mercantilist leaders to avoid such divisive issues of military buildup and constitutional revision. They instead adopted a political strategy of a low posture toward the pacifists with a goal of establishing political stability and policies of managed economic growth. The mercantilist camp accommodated the revisionists on the right by maintaining a stable alliance with the United States, while appeasing the pacifists on the left by limiting rearmament and concentrating on economic growth policies that would improve living standards.\textsuperscript{92} Thus,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Pyle, Japan Rising, 242.
\item \textsuperscript{92} This accommodation of the domestic political front worked so well to preserve the mercantilist political prominence that Professor Takeshi Igarashi has referred to it as a “domestic foreign policy system.” Takeshi Igarashi, “Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan,”
\end{itemize}
political compromise among the three competing identity groups that paved a path for the Yoshida Doctrine and a national consensus that Japan would be a “non-nuclear, lightly armed, economic superpower,” i.e., the state’s new identity as a “peace nation” and a “merchant nation” was consolidated.

In forging a path for an economic superpower Japan, Prime Minister Ikeda played a significant role, especially through his articulation of economic policies under his plan for doubling the national income within a decade. This plan capitalized on the emerging national consensus on the priority of economic growth. Due to the 1960 *Ampo Toso*, the revisionist chant for constitutional revision, rearmament, and independent foreign policy from U.S. influence had lost its political appeal for the Japanese public. They also rejected the pacifist demand for Japan’s “unarmed neutrality” wrapped in its pro-Soviet and pro-China socialist narrative, as the living standard improved under the new economic policies and the real picture of the oppressive regime in the Communist bloc increasingly became more widely known. Consequently, the Japanese public came to prefer the limited defense posture under the Peace Constitution. The national consensus was that “the general priority…[should be given to] first and foremost economic growth, with Japan neither adopting unarmed neutrality and socialism nor returning to the dark days of the prewar by adopting large-scale rearmament through a divisive constitutional revision process.”

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94 Reflecting such changes in the popular perception, there emerged a trend among intellectuals to reevaluate and appraise the economic-centered policies of Yoshida, which were initially negatively viewed as devaluation of national pride within the intellectual community. Changes in public attitude were also evident in the issue of constitutional revision. While the pro-revision public opinion had slight edge over the pro-constitution in the mid-1950s, the pro-constitution rapidly gained a widespread popular support during the 1960s, which sustained over the several decades to come. Also, the public support for the SDF steadily increased, from 58 percent in 1956 to 82 percent in 1965. Iokibe and Eldridge, *The Diplomatic History*, 82-83.
Ikeda’s mercantilist agenda captured this emerging national sentiment, consequently co-opting the pacifist discourse of antimilitarism and ultimately settling Japan to a long period of enthusiastic pursuit of high-growth policies over rearmament. And in fact, Ikeda’s economic policies witnessed success that was more impressive than expected. While he targeted annual growth of 7.2 percent to achieve a doubling of national income in a decade, Japan saw a surprising annual growth rate of 10.9 percent during the 1960s. Ikeda not only captured the economic-centered sentiment among the Japanese public, but also was also able to transform the national consensus into actual economic growth, setting a clear path for Japan as an economic superpower and reinforcing the continuity of the Yoshida Doctrine.95

Building upon Ikeda’s success, another Yoshida protégé, Eisaku Sato, held the prime minister’s seat longer (1964-72) than any other individual in Japanese history and further institutionalized the Yoshida Doctrine. In 1967, Sato enunciated the “three nonnuclear principles” that Japan would never possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, or permit their introduction into its territory.96 In the same year, he formulated the policy of the “three principles of arms exports.” The principles held that Japan would not allow the export of arms to (1) countries in the Communist bloc, (2) countries subjected to arms embargoes under U.N. Security Council’s resolutions, and (3) countries involved or likely to be involved in armed conflict. Subsequently, the Miki administration (1974-76) tightened this ban on weapons exports to all countries and

95 Takahusa Nakamura, one of the leading historians of Japan’s postwar economy observes: “Ikeda was the single most important figure in Japan’s rapid growth. He should be remembered as the man who pulled together a national consensus for economic growth and who strove for the realization of the goal…. From a broader perspective, however, Japan consistently adhered to Yoshida Shigeru’s view that armaments should be curbed and military spending suppressed while all efforts were concentrated on the reconstruction of the economy.” Pyle, The Japanese Question, 32-3.

96 Sato later clarified his position in a Diet speech the following year in which he stipulated the four pillars of Japan’s nonnuclear policy: (1) reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, (2) the three nonnuclear principles, (3) promotion of worldwide disarmament, and (4) development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As his aspiring declaration of such a nonnuclear stance gained worldwide recognition, Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974. Iokibe and Eldridge, The Diplomatic History, 102.
defined “arms” to include not only military equipment but also the parts and fittings used in such equipment, practically prohibiting any sorts of arms-related export.

Meanwhile, limiting defense spending to less than 1 percent of GNP became the practice in the 1960s, although it was not official government policy until adoption of National Defense Program Outline in 1976. In conjunction with this financial constraint, the Japanese government further limited its military posture under “The Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” (*Senshu Boei*), introduced in the first Defense White Paper of 1970, which stipulated that the country would only be allowed to use force in the event of an attack and to possess the minimum level of force necessary for self-defense. Furthermore, in 1969, the Diet passed a resolution limiting Japan’s activities in outer space to peaceful and nonmilitary purposes.

These antimilitarist policies implemented by Yoshida’s successors were also rendered possible in “[t]he international environment of the 1960s,” which, Kosaka Masataka, a leading international relations theorist, observed, “looked as though Heaven (*ten*) had created it for Japan’s economic growth.” Given its relatively small economy at the time, the state did not face an immediate need for an increased military role in international politics. The United States, with its predominant economic and military power, was able to continue its commitment to the international affairs and faced little need to rely on Japan’s economy or force for its security strategy. Japan’s economic growth was rather favorable for Washington as it reduced the need for U.S. economic aid to Japan and meant a stronger American ally in Asia. Also, the 1960 antitreaty protest proved the strength of popular resistance to greater defense efforts and the dangers of a socialist political surge. Therefore, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were content to

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97 The outline stipulated that “in maintaining the armed strength, the total amount of defense expenditures in each fiscal year shall not exceed, for the time being, an amount of equivalent to 1/100th of the gross national product of the said fiscal year.” Pyle, *The Japanese Question*, 34.

give priority to Japanese economic development, which they saw as a means to ensure Japan’s stability and democratic development and also as an investment to foster a robust supporter of Pax Americana in the long-term.99

The intensification of the protracted Vietnam War after the late 1960s, however, renewed U.S. interest and determination to increase Japan’s contribution to Asian security. This issue was raised again particularly during the Nixon administration in conjunction with the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 and more broadly the Nixon Doctrine. As the United States was determined to maintain its strategically important bases in Okinawa even after reversion, Sato faced the need to show that Japan was ready to assume a larger regional security role by more strongly supporting U.S. foreign policy in Eastern and Southeast Asia.100 Furthermore, while marking the era of détente (1969-1979) by improving U.S. relations with the Soviet and China, the Nixon Doctrine, announced in 1969, emphasized U.S. expectation for and dependence on its Asian allies to assume greater responsibility for containing communism in the region.

Meanwhile, as the pacifists argued against renewed calls for Japan’s expanding security role, the prolonging of the Vietnam conflict revitalized their agenda discourse in Japan. An anti-Vietnam War civil-society movement spread nationwide, incorporating the existing pacifist discourse and the anti-America sentiment among the political Left, especially among student activists.101

100 The reversion of Okinawa occupied the prime agenda of the Sato administration, which saw the issue as a means to bolster his position within the LDP and to forestall left-wing exploitation of the nationalist issues during the renewal process of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1970, which was anticipated to bring about the struggles of the 1960 demonstration. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 96.
101 This surge of anti-war movement, however, did not lead to an increase in the political support for the Socialist and Communist Parties. Rather, the Japanese public, the majority of who were already enjoying their urban, middle-class lifestyles after a decade of the state’s impressive economic growth, deemed the ideology-driven aspect of the peace movement outdated and continued to support the mercantilist LDP administrations. Given such
Facing this dilemma between U.S. pressure for rearmament and the domestic pacifist antiwar movement, Prime Minister Sato made a minimal concession to U.S. demands. While South Korea dispatched more than 300,000 troops to fight alongside with the American counterparts in Vietnam, the Japanese government avoided any military involvement, satisfying the pacifist constituents at home. Instead of military contribution, Sato only committed himself to an increased economic assistance to regional security arrangements. Specifically, he assumed a leading role in creating the Asian Development Bank (1966) and significantly increased his country’s Official Development Aid (ODA) from approximately $100 million in the early 1960s to $244 million in 1965 and $458 million in 1970.\textsuperscript{102} While the United States and its other Asian allies were attempting to contain the Communist through military conflict, Japan took a different approach to the Cold War by providing economic assistance to stabilize the domestic order of the non-communist regimes in the region. Therefore, although the Vietnam War could have provided Japan with a turning point for its minimalist military posture, the state maintained the existing nonmilitaristic, economic-centered foreign policy.

In the 1970s, Japan faced a changing international security environment as the Cold War détente emerged with the conclusion of the Vietnam War and the diplomatic reconciliation between the United States and China. In response to this decline in the tension and the likelihood of armed conflict between the East and the West, Japan further consolidated its minimalist defense posture in the National Defense Program Outline in 1976. The outline served as the official basis of the country’s defense planning for the decades to come, stipulating the “Basic Defense Force Concept” (kibanteki boeiryoku koso).\textsuperscript{103} The Concept sets Japan’s defense goals

\textsuperscript{102} Iokibe and Eldridge, \textit{The Diplomatic History}, 100.

\textsuperscript{103} The concept, according to the outline, is “the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat,
as to maintain the “minimum necessary basic defense force” to “repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance” and, in case of larger assault (e.g., a full-scale Soviet invasion), to “continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression.”

The outline was clearly a continuation of the Yoshida strategy, which favored dependence on American military deterrence over the economically costly and politically destabilizing alternative of developing a more autonomous defense posture. The outline even adopted the aforementioned GNP1% cap on defense spending as a new restriction on the defense establishment. Japan again embraced the Yoshida Doctrine.

The last adjustment to the Yoshida strategy was the adaptation of “comprehensive security policy” (sogo anzen hosho) under the Masayoshi Ohira administration (1978-1980). Underlying this new approach to security was the idea that economic security is as important as military security and that diplomacy should comprehensively accommodate military, economic, and other diplomatic resources. It was emphasized that security takes many forms and that policy instruments from different sectors of the government, in addition to more traditional military instruments, can be used to secure the nation. Therefore, when the détente collapsed after the

Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum.”


This reaffirmation and articulation of the Yoshida policies mustered wide support in the Diet. The outline’s moderate and minimalist tone precluded a potential surge of militarism and gained considerable support from the pacifists on the left such as the Democratic Socialist Party and the Buddhist Clean Government Party for its passage. Unsurprisingly, the right-wing revisionists in the LDP strongly resisted the new initiative, criticizing the outline and the one percent limit on defense spending as unrealistic and a grave danger to national security. However, strong centrist mercantilist support for the legislation, coupled with the ongoing détente that reduced perceived threats of armed conflict, allowed them to overcome such opposition within their own party and to pass the new defense plan in the Diet. What the passage of the outline embodied, according to Thomas Berger, was then “an important shift in the overall constellation of forces in Japan’s political-military culture in favor of the Centrist (mercantilist) position.” The Yoshida policies were maintained in the changing international security environment and articulated again to lead Japanese defense policy for the decades to come. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 104.

Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, norms, and
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the United States demanded Japan greater military efforts for the intensified Cold War, Japan increased its oversea aid and diplomatic efforts instead of its military contribution. Specifically, Ohira promised to expedite the implementation of Fukuda’s plan to double Japan’s ODA in five years and expanded the target of Japan’s overseas aid to non-Asian countries. As a result, while Japan’s ODA was $458 million in 1970 and mainly targeted to Asian countries, it surpassed $3.3 billion in 1980 and its scope became increasingly global. With this positioning of such “strategic aid” as part of its “comprehensive security policy,” Japan was again able to maintain its antimilitary posture in light of the increasing international pressure for military buildup following the end of the détente. The Yoshida doctrine was preserved and further enshrined in the heart of Japan’s security policy.

The 1980s: The Reemergence of Revisionist and Its Limited Successes

However, the mercantilist Yoshida strategy did not go unchallenged during the 1980s due to the surge of the revisionist camp under the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration (1982-87). This revisionist call for Japan’s greater defense posture, however, did not resonate with the majority of the Japanese people who had come to view economic rather than martial prowess as a constitutive feature of Japanese national identity. The new revisionist agenda realized limited successes, leaving the Yoshida strategy intact as the guiding principle of Japan’s security policy.

As a longtime outspoken nationalist, Nakasone had been highly critical of the Yoshida’s strategy. Despite his opposition to the mainstream Yoshida policy, Nakasone gained accidental

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107 Following the invasion into Afghanistan, Ohira decided to offer financial assistance to the neighboring countries such as Pakistan. Later, he provided aid to Turkey, Thailand, and other countries in conflict areas, and the successive Suzuki administration (1980-81) included Kenya, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Jamaica, and Oman in Japan’s ODA list. The 1979 Diplomatic Bluebook explains these aids as a means to “guarantee security in a broad sense.”

108 Iokibe and Eldridge, The Diplomatic History, 137.

109 For instance, at the time of the Dulles-Yoshida negotiations on the U.S.-Japan mutual security alliance,
accession to the prime minister’s office in 1982, when the LDP’s party factions were deadlocked over a successor to Zenko Suzuki, who had abruptly resigned. Capitalizing on this opportunity, Nakasone attempted to supplant the Yoshida strategy by consolidating his own revisionist grand design for Japan’s foreign policy. The central tenet of Nakasone’s grand design was Japan’s active global role in international strategic affairs, which he articulated as an “international nation” (kokusai kokka). As the world’s second-largest economic power, Nakasone believed, Japan was no longer a follower nation in the Western world but a state that can and should play a leading role in international affairs, especially in military matters which the Yoshida Doctrine barred.

Against this backdrop, in his first meeting with the newly elected President Ronald Regan, Nakasone promised the reinforcement of the bilateral security arrangement and Japan’s more active role in the alliance. In fact, before leaving for Washington, he granted a cabinet approval of the transfer of purely military technology to the United States, which clearly marked a major modification of the three principles on arms exports set forth by the Sato administration. In Washington, Nakasone pledged Japan’s strategic commitment in the New Cold War, which emerged after the collapse of détente. For instance, he forcefully stated that Japan would “have complete and full control” of straits surrounding the Japanese land “so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines and other naval activities in time of emergency.”

Nakasone initiated a bold opposition campaign against the prime minister’s policy by submitting a petition to General MacArthur asking for constitutional revision and an independent defense establishment. Nakasone remained critical of the Yoshida’s policy throughout the postwar decades, advocating for Japan’s independent defense posture and a genuine alliance with the United States with equally shared security responsibilities. During his term as director general of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), he used his position to reflect his revisionist views by authoring Japan’s first defense white paper, which adopted his concept of a more “autonomous defense” (jishu boei). However, his effort confronted severe criticisms of a potential surge of Japan’s militarism from both the domestic pacifists and the neighboring countries, archiving only little of his revisionist hopes for Japan’s more active security posture.

Nakasone stated that Japan should be “a big aircraft carrier” (okina koku bokan)—which was translated by his official translator as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” (fuchin kubo)—to prevent penetration of the Soviet Backfire bombers into Japanese airspace.

Nakasone’s aggressive stance on security was also evident in the 1983 G8 Summit at Williamsburg, the first summit that took up Western defense and East-West arms control as issues for a joint statement. The main focus of the defense discussion was the removal of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) SS-20 deployed in Europe by the Soviets. Despite the conflicting interests between the Soviets and the United States, the summit was able to produce a joint statement with strong language, thanks to Japan’s active advocacy of the U.S. initiative in the negotiations. Nakasone came to the summit determined to demonstrate Japan was, in his words, not “just an economic animal” and that the country was ready to speak out, to take stands, and to bear responsibilities on matters important to the security and prosperity of the global community. With this renewed active stance widely appreciated among the G8 nations, especially the United States, the Williamsburg summit presented Japan a stage to show its commitment to security issues from the global standpoint as an “international nation.”

Capitalizing on this international momentum, the Nakasone administration moved to remove the GNP 1% ceiling on defense spending. In December 1986, the cabinet decided on a

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operations and further elaborated on this idea in the 1983 defense white paper, which used the term “sea-line defense” for the first time in a Japanese government official document.

The statement included: “Our nations are united in efforts for arms reductions and will continue to carry out thorough and intensive consultations. The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis.” Throughout the negotiation, Prime Minister Nakasone was the biggest proponent for U.S. initiative on the INF negotiation as well as for inserting the phrase that the security of the G8 nations was “indivisible.” Behind his emphasis on the “global” approach to the “indivisible” security issue, he maintained that it would not solve the problem if the Soviet was to redeploy its INF in Asia. In doing so, he was able to gain the G8 nations’ commitment on Asian security so that Japan’s national security would not be threatened. At a press conference following the summit, he explained this strategic move: “We don't want the Soviet Union to use Asia as a garbage dump for any SS-20s it may withdraw from Europe.” Therefore, by playing a strong advocate for the United States, the Nakasone administration was able to contribute to the tangible languages of the joint statement as well as the protection of Japanese security. Takashi Oka, “Japan Takes Firm Stand with West on Defense Issues at Summit,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1983, Accessed April 30, 2013. http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0601/060153.html.
1987 defense expenditure that surpassed 1% of the projected GNP by 0.004 percent. In January of the following year, the Nakasone administration officially abolished the 1 percent cap on defense spending. While this move proved to be a matter of symbolism rather than actual policy transformation (defense spending actually went back to under 1 percent after he left office and has stayed so ever since then), it was a huge political win for the prime minister who came to office declaring that it was time to address hitherto taboo topics, including defense, and “settle all accounts on postwar political issues” (sengo seiji no sokessan).

Nakasone’s agenda also resonated with the political nationalism that emerged during the 1980s. Many high-profile media figures such as Shimizu Ikutaro, Ishihara Shintaro, and Eto Jun led the resurgence of the nationalist discourse by appealing to national pride, and argued for the revisionist agenda that Japan should acquire military power commensurate with its new economic might and should exercise an independent foreign policy. They targeted criticism toward the postwar political system and the Yoshida Doctrine, which they deemed as responsible for the nation’s lack of independent policymaking. Many nationalists attacked that the “imposed” postwar constitutional system deprived Japan of sovereign rights fundamental to a nation-state including the rights of belligerency.\(^\text{112}\) Going further, the sociologist Ikutaro Shimizu advocated Japan develop an independent deterrent capability, including even a nuclear arsenal.\(^\text{113}\)

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\(^\text{112}\) Most notable of such criticism, Eto argued that without the “right of belligerency,” which was renounced in Article 9, Japan could not be a free, sovereign nation, “master of its own fate.” Yoshida wrongfully accepted this servile status and built Japan’s postwar system based on it. “So long as we continue to set up Yoshida politics as the legitimate conservative politics,” Eto contended, “we Japanese will not escape from the shackles of the postwar period, and the road to self- recovery will be closed.” And yet, the time had come, he wrote in 1980, to restore Japan’s right of belligerency so that the nation could prepare to defend itself in times of emergency. Jun Eto, 1946-Nen Kempo: Sono Kosoku [The 1946 Constituion: Its Constraints] (Tokyo: Bungeishunjusha, 1980), 92.

\(^\text{113}\) In his sensational book Nippon yo, kokka tare (Japan, Become a State!), published in 1980, Shimizu argued that, based on his observation of the decline of the United States as the world’s hegemon and its world commitment, Japan must seek an independent defense profile by establishing more than a modest military buildup. Pressing on this point, Shimizu observed that the nuclear powers, “even though they do not use their weapons, are able to instill fears in those countries that do not have them. A country like Japan that does not possess nuclear weapons and is afraid of them will be easy game for the nuclear powers. Putting political pressure on Japan would be like twisting a baby’s arm.” Therefore, Japan, in order to gain power and respect respective to its great power status, must “exercise
Shimizu’s drastic call for militarization, however, became obsolete in the emerging nationalist discourse, which increasingly focused on economic over military power after the mid-80s. As tensions between the United States and Japan over trade and other economic issues grew (e.g. U.S. “Japan Bashing”) through the 1980s, famous right-wing nationalist commentators such as Jun Eto and Shintaro Ishihara increasingly concentrated on Japan’s economic and technological prowess while deemphasizing the military security matter. This emphasis on economy was accompanied by a surge of anti-Americanism among the political Right who began to vigorously attack the United States, using the bilateral trade friction to stir up nationalist passions among the public.

Behind this shift in emphasis was a new focus on the economy as a source of nationalist pride, or the consolidation of national identity as a “merchant nation.” Before 1945, Japan had proudly identified itself as a warrior nation, the land of the samurai, whose martial values distinguished it from the spiritually weak and corrupt West. In the 1980s, however, Japan came to embrace a self-image as “a nation of merchants and manufacturers, endowed with a unique propensity for producing high-quality goods that other people, including Americans, simply could not match.” For the economy-first-minded constituents, it was the Yoshida strategy—not the nationalistic revisionist agenda of militarization and a greater military


115 Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, 146. According to the survey conducted by the Economic Planning Agency in 1985 found that among Japan’s 1,600 leading firms 90 percent believed they had caught up with or surpassed the technological capacity of U.S. firms. The 1980s was also when the Japanese investors, with their unprecedented wealth thanks to Japanese economic bubble, infamously bought up a number of real estates in Manhattan and a Japanese firm purchased the *Sunflowers* by Van Gogh for $39.9 million, the record-high bid for art work at the time. Pyle, *The Japanese Question*, 55.
role—that proved the best approach to their nation’s security.  
Amidst the Japanese economic bubble, a national consensus surrounding the Yoshida strategy was more potent than ever in the postwar era.

Prime Minister Nakasone attempted to transform this mercantilist tone of the national consensus by advocating a new Japan as an “international nation” that makes military contributions to the international community with its enormous economic resources. And he did succeed in articulating such a new vision of Japan’s role in world politics in an attempt to supplant the mercantilist Yoshida strategy. However, the actual accomplishments in changing the strategy were by no means transformative, since only slight modifications to the Yoshida Doctrine were adopted. While bringing a new realism to the defense debate, Nakasone committed Japan to assuming a larger security role and to greater cooperation with the Western allies, especially the United States. His government played an important role in the 1983 G8 Summit to contain the threat of the Soviet INF. Nakasone modified, even if only in a limited way, parts of the Yoshida policy such as the three principles on arms experts and the GNP 1 percent ceiling on defense spending. When the United States demanded a military contribution to address the Iranian naval mines in the Persian Gulf during the First Gulf War (1980-88), however, Nakasone failed to dispatch the SDF for the minesweeping mission due to the constitutional constraints and opposition from the public and even his own cabinet and party. He was forced to stick to the nonmilitary approach of the Yoshida strategy such as economic assistance to that

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116 The national survey conducted in 1988 shows that when asked about their views of how to provide national security, 67.4 percent of the respondents supported the continuation of reliance of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and SDF, while only 7.2 percent supported the revisionist agenda of independent defense posture. 68.8 percent viewed the bilateral alliance as useful, whereas 12.5 percent not useful. When asked about defense expenditure, 58 percent answered it should maintain at the present level, 19.2 percent believed it should decrease, and only 11.2 percent said it should increase. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, 153-155.

ongoing conflict.

Accordingly, Nakasone’s grand design of a new foreign policy met with limited successes. Although the surrounding international environment had significantly altered since Yoshida’s day, his strategy had proved its worth and gained wide support among the Japanese politicians and constituents, who were enjoying the zenith of the nation’s economic growth. They did indeed incorporate part of Nakasone’s vision of Japan’s new international leadership, but only to the extent that “they envisioned nothing less than Japanese global leadership in economic and technological development, the pioneering of a new technocratic society—in short, world leadership in the nonmilitary aspects of the international system.”\(^{118}\) Put differently, consumed in the prevailing economic nationalism, his rearticulation of Japan’s role in the changing international environment was not able to consolidate a new national consensus but rather reinforced the existing mercantilist identity. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the country would come to seriously reconsider its national identity (the second “identity crisis”) facing the new security challenges such as terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and China’s military buildup, and embrace a more robust military posture as a “normal nation.”

**The Post-Cold War Era: The Rise of Normalist and Internationalist Identities**

In this section, I discuss Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the post-Cold War era, in which the nation faced significant changes in both domestic and international environments that compelled reconsideration of the existing mercantilist, pacifist identity. In this second “identity crisis,” two new identity groups emerged: internationalist and normalist. While the former, retaining a similar vein of the Yoshida Doctrine, envisioned a

\(^{118}\) Pyle, *The Japanese Question*, 104.
“global civilian power,” a peaceful economic power that makes nonmilitary international contribution to global order, the latter argued for Japan as a “normal nation” that possesses military capability commensurate to its economic strength while assuming increased security role in global politics.

As new post-Cold War security challenges intensified, the normalist has emerged as a new hegemonic identity, strengthening defense posture and initiating a more assertive security policy. Incorporating the internationalist principles into its foreign policy agenda, however, the new “normal” Japan has not become a great military power uninhibited with regard to the use of force for a pursuit of its interests or combat missions across the globe. Rather, it remains a “middle power” seeking to contribute to a regional and global security order that is struggling to meet the post-Cold War security challenges. Its contribution to international peace and security remains nonmilitary and humanitarian, eschewing any military ambitions of a great power status. As a result, the Yoshida strategy has not been displaced entirely but still resides at the heart of the emerging “normal” security policy, and is likely to remain so for some time to come.

The 1990s: The Gulf War and the Second Identity Crisis

The nearly half-century-long Soviet-U.S. Cold War suddenly came to an end when the collapses of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union shocked the entire world. With the end of the Cold War, the world, including the Asia-Pacific region, witnessed a whole reconfiguration of the international system. This structural change in international politics erased from the Japanese policymakers’ minds the concerns that the country would be caught in the crossfire of a Soviet-U.S. military conflict. But it also presented Japan new anxieties and challenges. With the demise of its Cold War adversary, the United States, it was feared, would revert back to
isolationism it had embraced before the outbreak of the World War II and withdraw its forward military presence in the Asia-Pacific, leaving Japan exposed to deal with possible security challenges on its own. This would mean an extermination of the bedrock of Japan’s postwar Yoshida strategy—reliance on American security guarantee that enabled his mercantilist economic-first agenda and pacifist security policy during the Cold War. The new world order was beginning to raise serious questions about the relevance of the nation’s existing posture, or identity, as a “merchant nation” and a “peace nation.”

Arguably, the most significant post-Cold War external shock to Japan was the Gulf War (1990-1991), which revealed the inadequacy of the nation’s traditional mercantilist, pacifist standing in the new security environment. The war was a turning point in Japan’s foreign policy and identity. “This crisis was a major time of testing for Japan as a nation of peace and the most severe trial we have faced since the end of the war (WWII),”119 observed then Prime Minister Toshiaki Kaifu in the Foreign Ministry’s Bluebook of 1991.

In facing the first major international crisis in the post-Cold War world, the international community called on Japan to dispatch the Self-Defense Force to the Middle East as part of the multilateral, UN-sanctioned peacekeeping force initiated by the United States. This seemingly straightforward task proved to be intractable, however, due to the existing constitutional ban of SDF overseas dispatch under Article 9120 and the pacifist public’s opposition.121 Ichiro Ozawa and his allies within LDP (who later formed the normalist camp) attempted to pass a legislative

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119 Quoted in Go Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State ed. Thomas Berger, Mike Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 75.
120 The CLB’s 1981 interpretation recognizes that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law but is prohibited to exercise the right under Article 9. For details, see Samuels, Securing Japan, 48.
bill that would allow the overseas dispatch under the existing constitutional framework, but in vain. Following the failure of this bill, the Diet resorted to a hefty financial contribution of $13 billion for the war effort against Iraq—which surpassed Japan’s ODA in 1991, approximately $11 billion and the largest ODA disbursement by a single country in the same year.

Consequently, Japan failed to make a meaningful “human resource” contribution, falling short even of Korea’s dispatch of 150 medics and the Philippines’ contribution of 190 doctors and nurses. Funded by $13 billion in aid from Japan, the U.S.-led coalition force implemented its operation in the Persian Gulf without the presence of a Japanese force. Despite its significant monetary contribution, Japan received little international gratitude or recognition. The Japanese government was not able to gain official acknowledgement for its financial support by the Kuwait government. Neither was it able to make its voice heard in the decision-making regarding the UN action, as Japan was excluded from the negotiation among the permanent members of the UN Security Council on how to respond to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis—a traumatic experience for Foreign Ministry officials. The Japanese government came under harsh criticism from the international community, which dismissed its $13 billion contribution as “checkbook diplomacy.” It was not until it sent the SDF for a minesweeping mission in the Persian Gulf—the first-ever overseas deployment of the SDF—that the country finally gained international recognition.

This shaming experience was a wake-up call for Japan. The Gulf Crisis demonstrated the enormous gap between the nation’s economic might and its immature political prowess and

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122 The $13 billion was raised by a special tax on Japanese citizens and compensated for almost one-third of the coalition’s operation.
123 Ambassador Yoshiro Hatano went as far as to state that Japan could have put together a package of proposals for actions if it had had a seat on the Security Council. Go Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State ed. Thomas Berger, Mike Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 76.
124 In approving the deployment, the Foreign Ministry delivered a painful line of reasoning that sending ships was a matter of “navigation safety” rather than a wartime deployment.
still-low level of real internationalization. The traditional low-posture foreign policy that had focused primarily on economic objectives and means, and that had worked so well in the past, was no longer sufficient. The Gulf Crisis also challenged the Japanese people’s perception about international politics. During the Cold War era, Japan maintained a pacifist cocoon, it was the single country in the world where its citizens seriously debated the legitimacy of possessing force and waging self-defense war—it was a unique, if not unrealistic, national stance satirized as “one-country pacifism.” This was rendered possible partly because of the large opposition Socialist Party and other left-wing parties such as the Communist Party, all of which continuously denied the legitimacy of the SDF and the right of self-defense. More important was the fact that, under the “1955 system,” the mercantilist LDP government avoided a confrontation with the pacifist opposition under “a tacit agreement with socialist and pacifist groups that divisive issues of constitutional revision and substantial military spending would be moderated and priority given to economic growth and social welfare.”\textsuperscript{125}

In this political environment, the public and even politicians shunned away from nationwide discussions of their country’s security role and responsibility in maintaining the world order. All of that was blown in the Gulf Crisis, which revealed the inadequacy of Japan’s international contribution to the global security order. The crisis, one analyst observed, “crystallized and magnified the issues that Japan should have addressed long ago, but did not. To Japan, the Gulf Crisis was, in a way, ‘the day of reckoning.’”\textsuperscript{126}

Amid this predicament, an emerging security instability in East Asia attacked the now-fragile standing of the pacifist nation. In 1993, the United States discovered a secret North Korea nuclear weapons program. Concerned about a possible use of the nuclear technology for

\textsuperscript{125} Pyle, \textit{The Japanese Question}, 46.
missile warheads, the United States and other Asian countries negotiated with the North Korean government to halt its nuclear experiment. But both sides were unable to come to an agreement, compelling the United States to consider bombing the North Korean nuclear facility and South Korea to evacuate residents in Seoul, and intensifying the likeliness of armed conflict in the Korean Peninsula to a level not seen since the Korean War. While this rising tension temporarily abated after the 1994 conclusion of the Six-Party Agreed Framework, the 1998 launch of the North Korean Taepodong missile over mainland Japan alerted the Japanese that their country could come under attack from its belligerent neighbor. Another uncertainty rose from China, which conducted a large-scale military exercise, even missile firings, in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. While the Chinese government stopped its provocative action when the Clinton administration dispatched two U.S. aircraft carrier groups to the strait, this incident reminded the Japanese citizens that the old balance-of-power game was not in fact a thing of the past. In short, all these developments, according to some experts, alarmed many Japanese that “national security could not be taken for granted.”

Moreover, the mercantilist nation also faced challenges in the economic realm. The 1997 East Asian financial crisis revealed the fragility of the regional economy Japan had attempted to promote for decades, and how vulnerable the Japanese economy had become in the globalization era. Also, the miraculous postwar Japanese economic growth that seemed to last forever suddenly collapsed after the financial bubble burst in 1991. A decade of economic stagnation following the financial meltdown certainly undermined Japan’s self-confidence in economic and commercial matters, questioning the one-dimensional economy-first policy that the nation had cultivated and embraced so dearly since 1945.

New Identity Groups: Internationalist and Normalist

It was soon recognized that what was needed for Japan was a formation of a new role in the radically changing environment of the post-Cold War order. The country faced a task of reconstructing its identity, or an “identity crisis.” In this second round of postwar identity construction, there emerged two competing views of national purpose and interest (i.e., identity groups): internationalist and normalist stances whose ideals originate from mercantilist and revisionist positions, respectively. Meanwhile, the pacifist camp retreated from the political forefront, and its antimilitarist ideals were carried forward by the internationalist group.

The internationalist, adhering to the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, argued that Japan should continue its role as a “global civilian power” (a term first coined by Yoichi Funabashi, an influential journalist and columnist): a peaceful economic state making (nonmilitary) contributions to international society.128 This new strategy, according to Funabashi, stems from Japan’s unorthodox power portfolio (“economic giant and military dwarf”), which gives the nation a golden opportunity to define its power and role in the radically changing post-Cold War world. In the new world of increasing interdependence, the salience of economic power triumphs that of military power, and Japan should search for various avenues of enhancing political power based on economic strength, not on military might, to contribute to international society. To this

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128 Funabashi, Yoichi, “Japan and the New World Order,” *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991-1992): 58-74. Funabashi establishes this conception of Japan’s new role in the post-Cold War world by consulting Hanns W. Maull’s term “civilian power.” Civilian power implies: “a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on nonmilitary, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.” Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” *Foreign Affairs* 69 (1990): 92-93. The 1999 report published by Office for the Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, Cabinet Secretariat, *The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium* (Tokyo: Government of Japan, 1999), endorses Japan’s role as a “global civilian power” and stipulates the foreign policy goals for the 21st century. For details, see chapter 6 of the report.
end, Funabashi said, “Japan must pursue two psychologically conflicting mindsets and styles—active engagement in world peace and self-restraint as a military power…. Japan should push forward along the path of a global civilian power with its interests reaching well beyond its regional confines, while its military posture is limited to the self-defense of its islands.”129 As for promoting world peace, the nation’s security policy should derive its legitimacy from international institutions such as the United Nations rather than resorting to unilateral actions. The internationalists therefore approve of the SDF’s participation in UN PKO missions, but only nonmilitary ones.

Further developing this internationalist strategy, Yoshihide Soeya introduced the concept of “middle power diplomacy,” foreign policy that is motivated by its desire to play a greater and more active role in promoting international peace and security, or by what he calls “pacifism with an internationalist bent.”130 Japan, according to Soeya, should act like other middle powers such as Canada and Germany by remaining a trading nation which renounces traditional great power ambitions and contributes to international security under multinational auspices. It is therefore necessary for Japan to demonstrate its Asian neighbors that it has no great power aspirations by continuing promoting economic growth across the region rather than acting like a great power. Middle power internationalists, while maintaining the alliance with the United States, would regard important overlapping regional trade and security regimes to maintain friendly relations with other Asian countries. Japan, according to them, should remain a largely unmilitarized U.S. ally that makes international contributions by cooperating with other advanced industrial countries, provides economic assistance to developing countries, and helps

to maintain the international order. If the United States is the indispensable global police, Japan should position itself as the indispensable global merchant.\(^{131}\) The advocates of this middle, civilian power stance includes the members of the Kochikai—a LDP faction that had been a populated by the Yoshida’s followers—such as Hiromu Nonaka, Yohei Kono, Kiichi Miyazawa, and Koichi Kato.

Countering this internationalist view, the normalists call for an incremental armament for national defense and accept a military approach to maintain international peace and stability. On their account, Japan as a “normal nation” (futsu no kuni) should rearm itself to take more responsibility for its own self-defense, especially in the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and deploy the SDF overseas to assist Japan’s allies, particularly the United States, or to take part in UN-led security arrangements. The term “normal nation” was first coined by Ichiro Ozawa in the midst of the mounting international criticism toward Japan’s insufficient response to the Gulf War. Acknowledging the denouncement of Japan as a free-rider on international security and asking “how can Japan, which so depends on world peace and stability, seek to exclude a security role for its international contribution?,”\(^{132}\) Ozawa has forcefully argued that its political passivism is “abnormal,” and that Japan as a “normal” nation should assume greater international responsibilities, including military ones.\(^{133}\) Making Japan a normal nation is not necessarily about becoming a rearmed, militarist Japan, however, as Ozawa contends: “this is, quite simply, not an issue of militarization or aspirations to military superpower status. It is a question of

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\(^{131}\) This stance, according to Kyoto University professor Shinichi Yamamuro, requires not “losing self-control”: “When Japan thinks of itself a small country or as a middle power, it conducts its diplomacy with deep care and consideration for its neighbors. But, when it embraces a big power idea [of itself], it fails.” Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 128.


\(^{133}\) Ozawa defines a normal nation as “a nation that willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community.” Ibid., 94.
Japan’s responsible behavior in the international community.\textsuperscript{134} And yet, this normal security policy still departs from the long-dominant Yoshida strategy that has deemphasized Japan’s military role.

Contending that Japan must shoulder more of the burden of maintaining international order through military cooperation with the United States or other like-minded developed countries, the normalists advocate more a proactive security policy and extensive SDF use. Specifically, they argue that Japan should enter into collective defense arrangements through the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty or the United Nations. To this end, they recognize the need to revise Article 9 of the Peace Constitution that significantly limits the parameters of the SDF operations, including the right of collective self-defense. The recognition of collective self-defense, along with an adequate military buildup, would allow Japan to take a more active role in maintaining world peace, as well as a more reciprocal role to defend its own islands and its ally the United States under the bilateral security alliance. In revising the constitution, the normalists also advocate for establishing a formal “military” (gun\textsuperscript{ai}) instead of “self-defense force” (jieit\textsuperscript{ai}).\textsuperscript{135}

This new military posture, the normalists argue, is especially important given the status-quo of East Asia, where significant security uncertainties loom around China’s rapid military expansion and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. In addition, defending Japan is not the only agenda for U.S. policymakers, and the United States has been experiencing a relative decline on the world stage and might not be able to protect Japan in times of need.\textsuperscript{136} As

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{135} The chief editorial writer and president of \textit{Yomiuri} newspaper (Japan’s largest circulated newspaper), Tsuneo Watanabe, says: “If a nation is ‘normal,’ it has a military,” one that referred to as such (gun\textsuperscript{ai}). Samuels, \textit{Securing Japan}, 125.
\textsuperscript{136} This realistic perspective of national defense, as the former JDA director general Ishiba has mentioned, is “robust pacifism” (honebuto na heiwashugi), as opposed to passive pacifism that had dominated Japan’s security discourse and crippled its military posture during the Cold War. Shigeru Ishiba, \textit{Kokubo} [National Defense] (Tokyo:
for nuclear options, some right-leaning nationalists such as Shintaro Ishihara argue that Japan should not be longer dependent on the United States, and advocate for Japan’s autonomous defense coupled with nuclear capabilities. However, such drastic calls for remilitarization remain controversial among the normalists, the majority of whom are content with bilateral security cooperation. While still adhering to the Yoshida rhetoric of Japan as a peace-loving nation and accepting the U.S.-Japan alliance as the center pillar of security policy, the mainstream normalists believes that Japan as a normal nation should establish a stronger defense policy and do what it takes, including militarily, to maintain peace inside and outside its own islands.

The advocates of this worldview include Juichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and Shigeru Ishiba, who came to form Japan’s “new conservative mainstream” to supplant the traditional mercantilist mainstream of the Yoshida School, and therefore subverting the middle power internationalists in the national security discourse. But this normalist overtake of domestic politics had to wait until the election of Koizumi as a prime minister in 2001, for the balance of power was still in favor of the internationalists during the 1990s, when the Japanese people were slowly adapting from the Yoshida consensus to the new reality. This political positioning between the two competing identity groups led the normalists to incorporate the internationalists’ soft-power foreign policy approach, and to renounce any great power ambitions of full-blown rearmament and global military reach. As one former senior diplomat suggests, “Any notion that Japan had of itself as a great power was pitiable smashed (mijime ni uchikudaku)” in the

Shinchosha, 2005).

Ishihara, one of the most popular politicians in the nation, is a Japanese Gaullist who argues for nuclear options. He writes: “Regarding nuclear weapons, Charles De Gaulle said that a great country like France could not entrust its fate to other nations. Although the atomic arms had no strategic significance, France acquired them, successive governments modernized the force de rappe, and NATO members accepted France’s possession of an independent nuclear deterrent.” Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No, 70.
As a result, Japan’s new security policy and identity seems to be somewhere in between, or a mosaic of, the internationalist and normalist approaches. Certainly, this new “normal” Japan is not a traditional “normal” great military power equipped with full-scale rearmament, including a nuclear arsenal, and willing to use its military prowess to pursue its national interests.

*International Contribution and Peacekeeping Operations*

The originator of the normalist position, as already mentioned, was Ichiro Ozawa, who initiated a series of political experiments in the aftermath of the Gulf War. In light of the international criticism of “checkbook diplomacy,” Ozawa and his allies became more determined to increase Japan’s international profile. Japan, he argued, “must do thing *normally*, in the same way as everyone else.”

Ozawa dismissed the government’s longstanding policy of the constitution bans on overseas deployment of the SDF as a “subterfuge” (*gomakashi*) of the Yoshida strategy, which he said has made Japan selfish and money-grubbing, not shouldering the cost of maintaining the international freedom and peace on which the Japanese economy depended.

Impatient with the LDP’s inability to deal with the crisis in Japanese foreign policy, Ozawa and his allies challenged the party’s mainstream leadership and pushed for legislation that would allow SDF participation in collective security efforts by the United Nations such as UN PKO.

Following intense debate, the normalists finally succeeded in passing the UN

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139 Ichiro Ozawa, “Hoshuseiji no Shissei o Tadasu” [Correcting the Attitude of Conservative Politics], *Voice* (March 1992), emphasis added.

Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill (the PKO Law) on June 15, 1992, which ended the ban on the overseas deployment of the SDF, which had been a key aspect of the Yoshida strategy. In passing the bill, however, the normalist leaders had to converge their policy stance with that of the opposition parties and other LDP members who held internationalist views. When the initial submission of the PKO Law was struck down, the LDP government, led by the mainstream internationalist Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, made several concessions to the centrist Komei Party and the Socialist Democratic Party when submitting the new version. As a result, the new legislation limited SDF deployment to logistical and humanitarian support, monitoring elections, and providing aid in civil administration.\(^\text{141}\) In short, although the ban on overseas dispatching of the SDF was lifted for the first time—a huge step for becoming a “normal nation”—the deployment was restricted to nonmilitary missions, which made the new legislation palatable to the internationalists in the center.

After the passage of the PKO Law, the government dispatched the SDF for its first foreign mission, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in September 1992. The SDF sent 41 civilians (for election monitoring), 75 civilian officers, 8 SDF military observers, and 600 SDF construction personnel for road and bridge repair to Cambodia. The mission was responsible for the daunting nation-building project, and was a test case for the first-time-deployed Japanese peacekeepers, and for the Japanese, who showed fragile support for that deployment. In fact, when a Japanese volunteer, not part of the official mission, and a Japanese policeman were killed in the spring of 1993, the Japanese media went into a “feeding

\(^{141}\) Many conditions were attached to SDF participation in UN PKO. For instance, if the SDF should be sent to conflict areas with small arms, it would need the Diet’s approval. If SDF officers were exposed to dangerous conditions in conflict, they could withdraw from the operation. With these conditions, a section of the law entailing SDF participation in armed UN missions, including disarming combatants, monitoring cease-fires, and patrolling buffer zones, was frozen for the time being.
frenzy,” reflecting the public’s shock at this first loss of Japanese life on foreign soil.\footnote{Pyle, The Japanese Question, 155.} Despite the increasing popular calls for withdrawing the SDF from Cambodia, the government made a bold decision to continue the mission, arguing that the incident did not mean a collapse of the peace agreement. This judgment later proved correct, when elections in Cambodia were held smoothly with an almost 90 percent voter turnout, granting legitimacy and local support for the reconstruction process.

This successful completion of the Cambodian operation in September 1993 marked an important point in the slow evolution of Japan’s international role and its public’s opinion. When the Diet debated the PKO Law in the spring of 1992, public opinion was divided in half. Public support for the Cambodian operation was fragile as the peace agreement process met many difficulties, including the loss of Japanese life along the way. When the UNTAC turned out to be successful, however, the majority of the Japanese came to support the SDF participation in the operation with an increasingly positive attitude toward the multilateral framework. Surprisingly, 59 percent of the public supported the participation and 36 percent opposed it; 68 percent viewed UN PKO “useful” for maintaining peace and 28 percent disagreed with such a view.\footnote{Yomiuri Shimbun, “Nihon no PKO Sanka Beio de Takai Shiji: Yomiuri Shimbunsha no Nichibeio Gokakoku Yoron Chosa” [Japan’s PKO Participation Gains Strong Support from the United States and Europe: Yomiuri Shimbun Public Poll in Five Countries], April 30, 1993, Accessed April 30, 2013. http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/342.htm.} In addition, constitutional revision for increasing international contribution such as UN PKO gained majority support increasing from 23 percent in 1986 to 33 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in March 1993, while opposition declined from 57 percent to 51 percent to 33 percent.\footnote{Yomiuri Shimbun, “Kempo Kaisei Ha 44 %: Ni nen Renzoku de Tasu wo Shimeru” [Pro-Constitutional Revision 44 %: Holding the Majority for Two Consecutive Years], March 31, 1994, Accessed April 30, 2013. http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/279.htm.} The disappearance of the long-dominant taboo of discussing constitutional revision indicated a departure from the old political landscape.
And yet, public opinion remained cautious when the PKO missions would involve military operations. During the Cambodian mission, 66 percent of the Japanese worried about the government expanding the role of the SDF beyond humanitarian and reconstruction missions. Another polls conducted in 1991 and 1993 suggested that the large majorities (63 percent and 74 percent, respectively) of the public did not believe that Japan had a responsibility “to give military assistance in trouble spots around the world when it is asked by allies.”\textsuperscript{145} A 1994 public poll showed that 70.5 percent expressed their support for SDF participation in peacekeeping, but that 71.6 percent opposed expanding participation into peacekeeping operations involving the use of force.\textsuperscript{146} Clearly, the Japanese people were not prepared to see their troops engaging in armed conflict but only in humanitarian operations. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister’s Office poll demonstrated an increase in support for SDF participation in disaster relief operation overseas. The number went up from 54.2 percent in 1991 to 61.6 percent in 1994 and 78.0 percent in 1997 and 86.3 in 2000.\textsuperscript{147} These data demonstrate that the Japanese people increasingly recognized a distinction between overseas deployments for nonmilitary activities (\textit{kaigai haken}) (such as humanitarian and reconstruction missions) and deployments for the sake of using military force (\textit{kaigai hahei}). Obviously, the public was supportive of the former but not of the latter. They viewed nonmilitary, civilian approaches to resolving conflict more effective.

Under the slogan of “international contribution” (\textit{kokusai koken}), the Japanese people began to accept Japan’s new international role, or its “normal” posture in the changing security environment of the post-Cold War world. Following the Cambodian operation, the government

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 18.
expanded the SDF PKO missions, sending SDF personnel to Mozambique (1993-1995), Rwanda (1994), Golan Heights (1996), and East Timor (2002-2005) for UN peacekeeping and other humanitarian activities. This new security role, however, remained nonmilitary and was mainly motivated by humanitarian reasons of promoting world peace rather than aspirations to become a great military power.

The Falls of Normalists and Pacifists

Despite the success in expanding the SDF security role, after passing the PKO Law the normalist agenda of boosting up Japan’s military establishment was stymied. For Japan to truly become a “normal nation,” Ozawa and his allies were determined to end the “1955 system” that had allowed mainstream mercantilist control of foreign policy and maintained the Yoshida Doctrine. And they did so by initiating the June 1993 groundbreaking upheaval in the political system including creating a seven-party “rainbow” coalition government without the LDP. However, the normalists’ days did not last long, with their political support soon collapsing due to the fragile coalition among opposition parties. In June 1994, the government again fell into the hands of the LDP, but this time under the LDP-JSP (Japan Socialist Party) coalition headed by the JSP leader Tomiichi Murayama—a steadfast pacifist who had viciously opposed Ozawa’s normalist policies including the PKO Law—as a new prime minister. Ozawa’s normalist agenda was put to an end.

The election of the Socialist leader as the new prime minister precipitated an unanticipated outcome—a collapse of the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party, under Murakami, came into office for the first time in forty-seven years since the 1947 Katayama administration, but it entailed a huge cost. In building a coalition with the LDP, the leader of the pacifist party
had to abandon all the important ideological positions his party had vociferously maintained since its establishment. For almost a half century, the Socialists had opposed the Self-Defense Force as unconstitutional, denied the legitimacy of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and supported unarmed neutrality. They had boycotted the vote on the PKO Law, which allowed the overseas dispatching of the SDF. Murayama abruptly reversed the party’s policies on all these issues. His abandonment of these party stances marked the end of the opposing axis in security matters that distinguished pacifists from the opposing views of mercantilists and revisionists.

Moreover, in the June 1995, a Socialist-drafted Diet antiwar resolution (fusen ketsugi) expressing “deep remorse” for Japan’s past military aggression and “renewing the determination for peace”148 was largely rewritten by the LDP and voted on in the Diet. While this sort of resolution usually gains the Diet’s approval with unanimous votes, more representatives (241) abstained than supported it (230). Clearly, “pacifism’s day was passing.”149 At the end, Murayama resigned shortly after the 1996 general election, in which the Socialist Party suffered its worst defeat in the postwar era. The party was penalized by former supports who resented the party’s renouncement of its longstanding pacifist values. The most viable opposition party during the Cold War—once holding 136 seats (out of 512) in the Diet—was left with only single-digit representation by the early 2000s.

This marginalization of the Socialist Party, however, was not only a result of its own suicidal move to abandon the pacifist ideals. These ideals were becoming increasingly anachronistic in the changing post-Cold War security environment. The central tenet of the party’s pacifist stance—“unarmed neutrality”—lost its relevance once the Cold War conflict ended. Given the disappearance of the blocs in relation to which Japan should maintain neutrality.

149 Samuels, Securing Japan, 118.
only unarmament and the anti-base movement were left on the pacifists’ agendas. But unarmament proved to be an unattractive, if not an unrealistic, position when North Korea suddenly withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and began to run its course to become a nuclear state. This increased regional security uncertainty contributed to the “awaking” of the Japanese public to national security issues.\(^\text{150}\) In the wake of the following 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1998 North Korean missile launch, the Japanese people began to openly discuss military threats. Moreover, the social status of the SDF—which the Socialists deemed unconstitutional during the Cold War—had been steadily improving and gaining strong popular support.\(^\text{151}\) Pacifism, at least in a strict sense of keeping Japan unarmed, no longer resonated with the public.

**Pacifism in a New Form**

These political losses of the Socialist Party’s presence and its pacifist stances, however, did not necessarily mean that the principles of pacifism had vanished from the public debate. Rather, post-Cold War pacifism took a new form. Postwar pacifism was a forthright rejection of any military activities, emerging from deep remorse about the nation’s past military aggressions. The pacifism of this period did not distinguish wars of aggression, wars of self-defense, and wars for the sake of international security. It was widely assumed that any mode of military activity would lead to a revival of militarism. And yet, the Gulf War demonstrated the lack of Japan’s

\(^{150}\) Ibid.

\(^{151}\) According to a public poll by Prime Minister’s Office, the percentage of the public who thought it was good to have the SDF increased from 58 percent in 1956 to 81.9 percent in 1965 to 79.6 percent in 1975 to 82.6 in 1984. Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2004*, ch. 5. The document is available at http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2004/2004/html/1654c3.html.

One important factor behind the public support for the SDF is the dominant public perception of the SDF as “nonmilitary” forces whose main mission is aid administration during natural disasters, rather than national security provider. 71% of the Japanese public shared this view in 1969, followed by 73 percent in both 1981 and 1993. In contrast, the percentage taking the national security as the main benefits of the SDF remained low from 8.3 percent to 9.3 percent to 7 percent during the same period. Chai, “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine,” 404.
contribution to international security, and the successful UNTAC operation the fruitfulness of such contributions. The Japanese people came to recognize their nation’s international security cooperation and to distinguish between the three categories of war, while at the same time supporting pacifism and the philosophy of international accord. This emerging pacifism, however, was different from the existing one in that while condemning wars of aggression and mindless nationalism, factors that had led to Japan’s defeat in the WWII, the Japanese began to appreciate security activities grounded in a healthy spirit of international accord.152

Both normalists and internationalists then adopted these new pacifist ideals, promoting the notion of Japan’s “international contribution” to maintaining world peace, while they disagreed over whether the contribution should be made militarily. The government came to allow SDF foreign deployments after the passage of the PKO Law, but the operation avoided any armed missions and remained mainly humanitarian. Pacifism may have not survived in its strict terms of forthright rejection of any military activities but still continued to influence policy decisions in terms of the emerging internationalism. In fact, the 1995 National Defense Program Outline—in which the Japanese government, for the first time in twenty years, comprehensively reviewed its security posture—emphasized Japan’s contribution to international society. Given the passage of the PKO Law few years earlier, the new NDPO added two new missions to the SDF’s portfolio: disaster relief and international peacekeeping.

Moreover, this soft-power approach, which was further developed under the Keizo Obuchi’s administration (1998-2000), adopted “human security” as a pillar of Japanese security policy. In response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Japanese government, along with South Korea and China, took the initiative in establishing ASEAN+3 to promote regional economic

152 Office for the Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, Cabinet Secretariat, *The Frontier Within*, ch. 6, 11.
cooperation. At the ASEAN+3 summit in December 1998, Obuchi expressed his concerns regarding the crisis’ impacts on human security in the region such as the well-being and development of the socially vulnerable segments of the population. Acting on such ideas, he announced a total $4.2 million ODA package to establish a “Human Security Fund” under the United Nations—later renamed the Trust Fund for Human Security—to assist neighboring Asian countries in need, and to promote human security projects by UN agencies around the world.

Preparing for a “Normal” Security Policy

While these moves represented a soft-power, internationalist approach in line with Japan as a “global civilian power,” there was also a slow evolution toward normalization. While it maintained the Basic Defense Force Concept, the new NGPO identified emerging security uncertainties in Asia and upgraded the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the event of a regional crisis, calling for establishing “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces” to meet these security challenges. In the post-Cold War world, the bilateral security alliance, which first began as part of U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union, now found its new values in addressing regional security challenges. The 1996 U.S. Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed these new values, reemphasizing the importance of the bilateral security cooperation in the post-Cold War and stipulating that such cooperation is not limited to Japan’s national defense and bilateral framework but includes regional and global security. The declaration also recommended revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, which took place in the following year. The new guidelines identified specific terms of possible security cooperation regarding “situations in areas surrounding Japan” (shuhen jitai) and declared that Japan would now take fuller responsibility for defense of such areas, a move that one analyst has called “a
significant upgrade of operability in responding to regional contingencies.”

These new security commitments marked a bold step toward upgrading, or “normalizing,” Japan’s security posture in the changing post-Cold War security environment. Whether such commitments were to be put into tangible action, however, remained to be seen in the 1990s. The real test came as the world welcomed the twenty-first century, in which Japan encountered a series of security challenges—terrorism, intensifying North Korean nuclear and missile tests, and China’s rapid military buildup and renewed assertiveness in the region—that posed serious policy questions to the normalist leaders.

The 2000s: The Era of Normalism

As Japan entered the twenty-first century, it welcomed in Junichiro Koizumi as its new prime minister (2001-06). Koizumi was certainly a new type of leader in Japanese politics. He had been calling for groundbreaking political reforms, and appealing for public dissatisfaction with the government’s inability to reform the country during the so-called “lost decade” of economic stagnation and political disarray. Attacking party faction politics and the cozy relationships between party institutions and bureaucracies as the “cancer” of incompetent postwar Japanese politics, he pledged to “destroy the LDP” (jiminto wo bukkowasu) and start a new kind of politics. As a result, Koizumi came into office with overwhelming popular support. Keeping his promise, he and his allies effectively weakened the influence of factions in his party, including the now-splintered Kochikai, which had been a cluster of Yoshida’s followers (i.e. the

153 Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 178. While taking this bold move, the Japanese government also maintained a degree of strategic ambiguity by insisting that “The concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational.” This awkward reasoning was said to be retained largely to avoid specifically including or excluding Taiwan and therefore offending China. Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 103.
Cold-War mercantilists and the post-Cold War internationalists).\footnote{154} Instead of forging political support based on factions and interest groups, he initiated a new type of populist politics that appealed to public support via political performances through which he was able to implement new policies. In his five years of prime ministership—the longest term since the Sato administration (1964-72)—Koizumi and his allies initiated a series of new normalist policies amidst sweeping popular support, which previously went unimplemented due to the internationalist opposition from his own party and other opposition parties during the 1990s.

A political stage for the new normalist policies was in fact already in place with the election of the George W. Bush administration in the United States. Criticizing the Clinton administration’s accommodative approach to China and North Korea, President Bush made it clear that the U.S.-Japanese alliance was the central pillar of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Acting on this idea, he appointed Richard L. Armitage, a pro-Japan veteran and politician who was one of the masterminds of that new foreign policy strategy, as the Deputy Secretary of State.\footnote{155} U.S. policymakers at the time were determined to encourage Japan to increase its international role while respecting its autonomy, and with the ultimate goal of bilateral relations to the level of U.S.-U.K. relation.\footnote{156} Prime Minister Koizumi was quick to respond to Bush’s love call by

\footnote{154} Even before Koizumi’s election as prime minister, the Kochikai was already losing its influence in the party, as the faction got splintered over its attempt to overthrow the Yoshiro Mori administration (2000-2001). The then faction’s leaders, Koichi Kato, joined forces with opposition parties tried to bring down the Mori government, but the faction divided in half as to where to support Kato’s rebellious move. At the end, Kato was not able to muster support of all of his faction members and did not succeeded in ending Mori’s prime ministership, only to find his faction get splintered into two factions of pro-Kato and anti-Kato after the failure. This series of events, however, exacerbated the confusion within the LDP and contributed to the election of Kozumi as the party’s leader in the spring of 2001.


\footnote{156} The Nye-Armitage Report holds Great Britain up as a model of what Japan should become as a U.S. ally. For an assessment of progress made in meeting the goals set by the commission, see Cossa Ralph and Brad Glasserman, “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Become the Great Britain of Asia?,” Pacific Forum CSIS Issues & Insights 5 (2005).
visiting the United States and establishing a close personal relationship with the new President.

Supporting the War on Terror

Japan’s strengthening bilateral relationship first came under scrutiny when on September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists mounted the first attack on the U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor. Pledging to fight the terrorist threats, President Bush declared the beginning of the “war on terror” a few days before U.S. Congress officially did so on September 20. In response to these developments, Prime Minister Koizumi visited the United States two weeks after the tragedy in order to express Japan’s steadfast support for the new war effort. This uncharacteristically responsive move was largely the result of the lessons learned during the Gulf War, during which Japan was unable to swiftly or substantively contribute to the U.S.-led war effort and was consequently snubbed by the international community. After 9/11, Japan was determined not to make the same mistake again.

In October 2011 when the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Koizumi administration swiftly passed a special anti-terrorism legislation and moved to provide tactical support for the US war effort. By providing offshore, rear-area, noncombat logistical support for the US-sanctioned coalition and deploying Aegis-equipped destroyers and tankers to shuttle fuel to coalition navies in the Indian Ocean, Koizumi sought to demonstrate that the SDF was prepared to play a larger-than-ever role in a war effort—a revolutionary development for postwar pacifist Japan.

The war in Afghanistan was only a beginning of the emerging war on terrorism. After President Bush delivered his famous 2002 State of Union Address condemning Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil,” the so-called “second stage” of the U.S. global war against
terrorism commenced. Under its new anti-terrorism strategy, the United States began to wage a war against Iraq on March 20, 2003 under the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” without explicit U.N. approval. Despite fierce domestic opposition and concerns about invasion’s legitimacy, especially from the internationalists who emphasized the necessity of a U.N. resolution to justify the war effort, Prime Minister Koizumi immediately expressed his support for the controversial military intervention. In response, the Japanese government approved the deployment of a small contingent group of SDF ground troops for humanitarian and infrastructure missions. The mission itself was limited to “noncombat” zones—which were controversially defined by Koizumi as “the area where the SDF is operating.” Regardless of whether the area was actually a noncombat zone, this operation marked the first deployment of the SDF into an active conflict. This deployment marked a turning point in Japan’s postwar security policy. After nearly a half century of de facto nonparticipation in maintaining international security, the country found itself supporting, and dispatching its forces in, the global war on terrorism.

Coping with the Security Challenges in East Asia

The emerging terrorist threat was not the only security concern for the Japanese policymakers. Instability in East Asia intensified as North Korea periodically continued its nuclear and missile tests for more than a decade. Of equal or possibly more importance was the rise of China as an economic and military power. Such concerns were well reflected in the new 2004 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG, previously called NDPO). While calling the North Korean nuclear and missile programs “a major destabilizing factor to regional and

international security.” The NDPG was the first national document that openly identified a potential threat from China, noting that the country was seeking to “modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces” while “expanding its area of operation at sea.”\(^\text{158}\) The Japanese public was also increasingly alarmed. A China-Japan joint public polling conducted in 2006 showed that 72.4 percent of Japanese respondents identified North Korea as a military threat while 42.8 percent also identified China as such.\(^\text{159}\)

The NDPG also identified “new threats and diverse situations,” including ballistic missile attacks (by North Korea and China), attacks by guerrillas and special forces, aggression against oceanic islands, intrusion into territorial air and maritime space (i.e. Chinese intrusion into Japanese territorial waters and airspace near the Senkaku Islands), and large-scale disasters. In addressing these various security challenges, the NDPG, in line with the previous NDPO, declared that Japan needed to develop “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries.” Against this backdrop, the NDPG set the agenda for the augmentation of Japan’s defensive and potentially offensive power-projection capabilities.\(^\text{160}\)

Alongside these military procurements, the most significant and controversial development in the early 2000s was arguably the introduction of Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. The BMD project first started as a joint research project between the United

\(^{158}\) The 2004 NDPG is available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html. The 2006 version of Japan’s Defense White paper first used the expression “concerns” regarding China’s military expansion, arguing “in order to array concerns held by those [neighboring] countries over China[’s military], it is important for China to increase transparency in its national defense policy and military capabilities.” The 2008 version went further in explicitly identifying China’s military as “concern” for Japan’s security, noting that “there is concern about how Chinese military strength will impact the regional situation and Japanese security.”


\(^{160}\) For details, see the 2004 NDPG and Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization, ch. 2
States and Japan in the wake of the 1998 North Korea missile test. The 2003 government officially announced deployment of the BMD system, including Aegis-type destroyers with the Standard Missile System (SM-3) and ground-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) lower-tier. The North Korean missile threat was the prime justification for the deployment, although the BMD could also be mobilized to counter increasing Chinese ballistic missile capabilities, which the 2004 NDPG noted. Furthermore, when issuing the 2004 NDGP, the Koizumi cabinet also decided to proceed with the co-development of BMD with the United States in December 2004—clearly violating the self-imposed ban on the export of arms.\textsuperscript{161} The BMD deployment raised questions about its use for collective self-defense, as it could be used to intercept missiles targeted toward third parties, specifically the United States.\textsuperscript{162}

In addressing North Korea’s missile threat, the Japanese government also responded by expanding its use of outer space. In response to the 1998 North Korean missile launch, the government announced its plan to deploy surveillance satellites, although such moves would possibly contradict the 1969 principle of the nation’s “peaceful use of space.” Between 2003 and 2007—occasioned by the 2006 North Korean missile launch—Japan launched four nationally produced intelligence-gathering satellites in order to monitor North Korea’s missile bases. Furthermore, in March 2006, the LDP shifted from the 1969 interpretation of “peaceful” (heiwa no mokuteki) as meaning “nonmilitary” (higunji), announcing its intention to allow the use of

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161 In a separate announcement in issuing the NDGP, Prime Minister Koizumi defended his decision by declaring that the BMD project would be excluded from nonexport principles. The government also maintained its flexible stance for further development for BMD, saying that “Decision will be made on the basis of individual examination of each case, in light of Japan’s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that aims at avoiding the escalation of international conflict.” Samuels, \textit{Securing Japan}, 106.

162 In its announcement of introducing BMD, the Koizumi government insisted that the system “will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries” and later argued that the issue of collective self-defense was irrelevant because Japan’s BMD was “physically incapable” (butsuri-teki ni muri) of pursuing missiles targeted at third nations. The government also delivered a second line of argument that Japan might intercept missiles heading toward the United States on the basis that they were passing through Japanese airspace and could eject debris over Japanese territory, risking national security and mandating a BMD intercept in exercising the right of individual self-defense, not collective self-defense. Hughes, \textit{Japan’s Remilitarisation}, 116-117.
space for what it called “nonoffensive defensive purposes.” In June 2007, the party introduced a new Basic Law for Space Activities, which states that Japan will conduct activities in space in compliance with the principles of the constitution, thereby permitting the use of space for “defensive” purposes.163

Despite the controversial nature of BMD and its use of space for military purposes, these moves toward militarization gained widespread support among Japanese lawmakers and the public. The decisions on the joint development and deployment of strategically important BMD overcame differences among the relevant ministries and gained strong support from both LDP and DPJ members.164 The deployment of the BMD system also appeared to enjoy considerable support from the public. A 2006 national poll found that 56.6 percent (25 percent strongly, 31.6 somewhat) support missile defense, versus only 25.1 percent (8.9 percent strongly, 16.2 percent somewhat) opposing it. The government’s decision to speed up the process of deploying BMD system following the 2006 North Korean missile and nuclear tests gained support from the LDP-led ruling coalition as well as the opposition DPJ. When LDP Prime Minister Taro Aso (2008-09) announced the deployment of the BMD system in April 2009 to intercept North Korean missiles, an overwhelming 74.7 percent of the public supported the decision, while only 16 percent opposed it.165 The new legislation regarding the use of space also gained widespread support from the Diet, including the Komeito Party and the opposition DPJ. Clearly, Japanese politicians and public were increasingly alarmed about the North Korean security threat. As a result, despite the controversial nature of the BMD and military use of space, the Japanese appeared to be increasingly tolerant of their nation’s new “normal” security posture.

163 Ibid., 48-50.
165 Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion, 186.
In tandem with Japan’s domestic military buildup, the government increased international security cooperation with its partners, including Australia and India, under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In May 2005, the Koizumi government, with its U.S. and Australian counterparts, established an annual Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) in order to strengthen bilateral links with Australia and embed Japan within the wider structure of the U.S. alliance while increasing U.S. regional security ties. Prime Minister Koizumi and his successor, Shinzo Abe (2006-07), appeared to perceive the trilateral talks as an important means of mobilizing the three key democracies in the region in order to counter a rising China. Moreover, in December 2006, Abe forged the “Strategic and Global Partnership” with India, entailing cooperation on maritime security, and was supportive of attempts by the Bush administration to develop quadrilateral security cooperation between Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. These four countries, along with Singapore, held joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean in September 2007.

Simultaneously, bilateral security ties between Japan and Australia culminated in the signing of a Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007, also known as a “quasi-alliance.” The joint declaration emphasizes broad cooperation on issues such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as more direct military cooperation in peacekeeping, defense exchanges, search and rescue, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In June 2007, the two countries established their own “2+2” foreign- and defense-ministers’ dialogue, and concluded a “Comprehensive Strategic, Security, and Economic Partnership” in June the following year. Under the partnership, both countries sought to build cooperation through strategic information sharing in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, PSI, and anti-piracy activities. They have also begun integrating their intelligence and forces
into U.S. global and regional strategy for missile defense, especially sharing missile launch detection data.\textsuperscript{166}

\textit{Reforming the Institutionalized Yoshida Doctrine}

Concomitant with increasing Japan’s military capabilities and security cooperation with the important partners in the region, the normalist leaders attacked the postwar bureaucratic regime that had sustained the Yoshida Doctrine. First, Prime Minister Koizumi weakened the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). The CLB, as argued before, had played a central role in managing the Yoshida Doctrine by providing strict constitutional interpretations, including the 1952 definition of “war potential” and the 1981 ban on collective self-defense, which had significantly downsized the SDF’s military capabilities and security roles. The problem, from the normalist perspective, was that CLB officials had worked closely with the LDP mercantilists in the past to severely constrain the country’s security profile. Therefore, Koizumi sought to exert more political power over the bureaucratic privilege. Under the new regime, the director general could no longer answer Diet interpellations on behalf of cabinet ministers—a practice often done to maintain the CLB’s voice in issues regarding constitutional interpretation. The CLB was forced to conduct its business on a very short political leash, making it difficult for the institution to issue more noncongenial interpretations. The same CLB that ruled in 1996 that “it is problematic to amend the law to enable the prime minister to control and supervise the ministries and agencies—even during an emergency” came under fuller political control.\textsuperscript{167}

The political reform also targeted the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). Throughout the

\textsuperscript{166} Huges, \textit{Japan's Remilitarization}, 89-91.
\textsuperscript{167} Samuels, \textit{Securing Japan}, 76. There was even an attempt to abolish the CLB. In May 2003, Takuya Tasso, a young Liberal Party legislator who formerly was a MOFA officer, introduced a bill in the Diet that would abolish the CLB altogether. Since the Liberal Party was in the opposition at the time, the LDP did not support the measure.
postwar period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) took overall responsibility for devising security policy, whereas the JDA was regarded a junior partner in security policymaking. Lacking full ministerial status, the JDA was incorporated into the Prime Minister’s Office. In an attempt to keep military officers out of the institution under the principle of civilian control, the Internal Bureau (naikyoku) of the JDA was overseen by civilian defense counselors (sanjikan). These civilian assistants were seconded from other ministries, including the MOFA, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). The JDA’s administrative vice-minister and top bureaucrat were generally a MOFA or METI official on secondment. Overtaken by the opinions of other ministries’ officers with no defense policy experience, the JDA was unable to exert its own influence in security planning. Some analysts even suggest that these civilian-control practices have been strict to the point of compromising the basic functions of the SDF to defend the nation.\(^{168}\)

Koizumi and his allies also weakened the councilors in the JDA, which were part of the current regime that had devalued the institution. JDA Director General Ishiba forcefully argued that the politicians who understood national security issues should assume control of defense planning and should no longer depend on the councilors as their proxies. He also elevated the status of senior military officers in each service branch to the equivalent of the councilors, allowing military officials to have more influence in the policymaking within the Internal Bureau. In addition to the tradition of posting junior politicians to each ministry as parliamentary vice ministers to educate them about policy issues, Koizumi and his followers appointed senior lawmakers as vice ministers to give politicians even more supervisory influence in

\(^{168}\) Tsuneo Watanabe, “The Bankruptcy of Civil-Military Relations in Japan,” \textit{NIRA Review} (1996). Tsuneo argues that cited civilian-control practices has left the LDP and the bureaucracy pursue military policy in a “black-box,” free from evaluation by anyone, be it public or opposition parties. This “hollowing out” phenomenon has made civil-military relationship dysfunctional in that public discussion on the nation’s defense policies are effectively stifled.
Koizumi’s successor Shinzo Abe (2006-07) continued these reform efforts by promoting the JDA to the full ministerial level. As a result, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is now gaining more ground in security policymaking. The MOD’s new-found confidence in its status was evinced when, in 2007, Takemasa Moriya, a career ministry official and then-administrative vice-minister, resisted attempts to impose a secondment from the National Policy Agency (NPA) as his successor, insisting instead on an internal promotion. As seen in the “2+2” dialogues with the United States and Australia, the MOD now enjoys equal footing with the MOFA in security negotiations. The MOD also possesses the same budgetary authority as other ministries so that it no longer needs to go through the cumbersome process of consulting with the Cabinet Office (naikakuhu) before gaining Prime Minister’s approval when proposing the defense budget. The same procedure applies to decisions regarding mobilizing the SDF, which will allow for the swift deployment of the force in times of emergency under the decision of the Defense Ministry.

Meeting Public Opposition: The Limits of Normalist Policies

Despite these incremental but tangible steps toward a more robust security policy, the normalist leaders again met the shoals of public opposition as they had in the 1990s, leaving much of their agenda unimplemented. Prime Minister Abe, for example, tumbled on the most controversial topic of constitutional revision—an unavoidable issue when expanding Japan’s security profile due to its constraints on the nation’s use of force. During his campaign to become LDP leader and Japanese prime minister, Abe expressed his clear intention to seek constitutional

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169 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization, 55.
170 For details, see ibid., ch. 3; Samuels, Securing Japan, 49-59, 74-77.
revision, and, after winning the election, made this issue a top priority of his agenda.\textsuperscript{171} Subsequently, Abe put forward legislation in the Diet to create the formal procedures for the national referendum required for revising the constitution. Inheriting a two-thirds “super-majority” in the Lower House from his popular predecessor Koizumi, Abe resorted to a forceful, partisan stance in passing the legislation in May 2006. The prime minister then moved to campaign on the issue of constitutional revision in the September 2007 election for the Upper House.\textsuperscript{172}

However, Abe’s passion for revising the constitution did not resonate well with the public, who did not view the issue as urgent when problems of economic stagnation and inequality in Japanese society appeared more pressing. The LDP experienced a historic loss in the election, losing the majority in the Upper House. Following Abe’s consequent fall from power, the successive and ephemeral Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Aso administrations (both only staying in office about one year) did not have the stomach for pursuing controversial constitutional revision. The debate on revising the constitution soon faded away.

Behind the government’s reluctance was also the fact that the public’s support for constitutional revision appeared to be declining. According to a 2004 public poll by \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun}, support for revising the constitution reached a record high of 65 percent, with only 22.7 percent opposing revision. In spring 2008, however, a narrow majority opposed revision for

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\textsuperscript{171} Abe himself regarded revision of the constitution and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense as an essential part of his vision for Japan, in which the nation extricates itself from the constraining regime imposed by the postwar settlement (\textit{sengo regimu kara no dakkyaku}) and reasserts its identity as a great power. For details, see Shinzo Abe, \textit{Ustukushii Kuni E} [Toward a Beautiful Country] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunji, 2006).
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\textsuperscript{172} Before campaigning on the issue, Abe established a Council on Reconstruction for the Legal Basis for Security within the Prime Minister’s office in November 2005, to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the LDP’s founding. The commission was charged with researching legal justification for a range of new security scenarios facing the SDF, including the use of collective self-defense in relation to BMD. Abe’s intention on the right of collective self-defense was obvious in that he specifically chose experts already known to be supporters of exercising that right. The commission’s report, published in June 2008, in fact recommended that Japan, in light of the new security challenges in the new century, would have to revisit issues of collective self-defense and constitutional reinterpretation. This recommendation of constitutional change through a combination of formal revision and reinterpretation was in line with LDP policy.
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the first time since 1993. Analysts attribute this change to the public’s alarm surrounding the perceived rise of nationalistic discourses during the Abe administration. In parallel with the ideological attitudes of the Abe government, hawkish nationalist intellectuals and commentators came to occupy Japan’s mass media, with some calling for drastic military expansion and more autonomous defense, and others even denying the postwar Japanese identity. The partisan manner in which Abe pushed the national referendum law did not help cultivate a broad consensus among the Japanese people either, who came to understand the issue in a partisan rather than pragmatic frame. Despite their support for BMD system to address the North Korea’s missile threat, the public remained alarmed with what appeared to be a “rightward drift” in Japanese society and rhetoric.

Regarding their country’s nuclearization, the Japanese people also remained cautious. Against the backdrop of North Korea’s detonation of a small nuclear device in October 2006, right-leaning politicians, such as former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Foreign Minister Taro Aso, and LDP policy chief Shoichi Nakagawa, argued for a debate on the nuclear option. However, the antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese public that had endured since 1945 still remained incredibly potent. A public poll conducted at the time showed that 78 percent of Japanese citizens opposed nuclear armament, while only 14 percent supported the option. In light of such public opposition, Prime Minister Abe, despite his reputation as a hawk, rejected the

175 In response to the North Korean test, Nakagawa initiated a debate on the potential utility of Japan’s own nuclear deterrent, making the following comment in a popular TV Asahi talk-show program on 15 October that “there exists a logical argument that the possession of nuclear weapons lowers the probability of being attacked, and thus it would be appropriate to debate this.” Joining this nascent discussion, Aso made remarks in the Diet that while the government had no intention of breaching the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, it was important that nuclear option was freely debated. Hughes, Japan’s Militarization, 103.
176 Mainichi Shimbun, November 26, 2006.
nuclear option, declaring that Japan would adhere to its non-nuclear principle and would not further debate this issue within his government. The discussion on nuclear armament remained closed when his successors, Fukuda and Aso, were in office.

The same negative reaction to militarization was seen during the war on terror. The Japanese public showed weak support for SDF participation in the Afghanistan war although the deployment was mainly a logistical, noncombat mission in support of the U.S.-led military action. A public poll taken in November 2001 showed 44 percent showed support for and 48 percent expressed opposition to the SDF mission in the Indian Ocean.\(^\text{177}\) The dispatch of Aegis destroyers to the mission, because it implicated military involvement, also proved unpopular and contentious among the public and even within the ruling LDP-led coalition. Consequently, the Koizumi government was not able to justify the deployment on military grounds but to claim that the dispatch was a way to enhance the amenities available for SDF sailors.\(^\text{178}\) Moreover, when the antiterrorist special legislation needed a renewal for continuing the mission in fall 2007, the LDP government, due to opposition from the public and the DPJ, had to defend the renewal as providing noncombat support for a U.N.-centered mission designed to interdict weapons and drugs and maintain maritime security rather than directly linking it to the war on terror or the war in Afghanistan.\(^\text{179}\)

The Iraq War also encountered public opposition against military involvement. After dispatching the SDF for humanitarian efforts in Iraq, Koizumi sought to provide a more military contribution by providing a novel constitutional interpretation. In his press conference announcing Japan’s participation in the Iraq war on December 9, 2003, he suggested that more

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\(^{178}\) In fact, Japanese Aegis avoided any involvement in the March 2003 invasion of Afghanistan. After just the rotation of two destroyers in the Indian Ocean for nine months, the Aegis destroyers were withdrawn from further deployment.

important than the war-renouncing Article 9 was the preamble of the constitution, which obligates Japan to contribute to the realization of high ideals in the world, such as the banishment of tyranny and oppression and promotion of international peace. Koizumi cited sections of the constitution: “We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone… We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honors to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.” He then concluded, “Indeed, I believe the international community is calling upon Japan, and the people of Japan to act in accordance with the ideals of our Constitution.”

By arguing such an interpretation, Koizumi appeared to be trying to persuade public opinion to accept broader missions for the SDF beyond humanitarian and reconstruction operations.

However, his ambition to upgrade Japanese security profile did not resonate well with the public, who remained dissatisfied with Koizumi’s explanation. The public poll following the press conference found 63 percent of respondents expressing dissatisfaction with Koizumi’s justification of Japan’s participation in the Iraq war, as opposed to only 23 percent showing satisfaction. Another poll demonstrated that the approval rating for the prime minister declined from 47 percent to 41 percent after the speech. This trend continued for weeks after the press conference, as 85.7 percent believed the prime minister had not provided adequate explanation for the SDF deployment, versus only 10.7 percent who viewed his explanation adequate.

Facing these dismal public polls, Koizumi and other members of his cabinet stopped advancing their hawkish arguments for expanding the SDF’s security missions in Iraq. Instead of suggesting that Japan had an obligation to send military forces overseas to overthrow tyranny and promote peace, the Japanese government justified the Iraq deployment as a purely humanitarian and reconstruction operation, as it did for the Cambodian UN PKO mission ten years earlier.

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180 Ibid., 135.
181 Ibid., 135-136.
Japan’s participation in the war on terror was certainly a historic event considering the nation’s longstanding low-key security profile. Japan's participation, however, remained a logistical supporting role in the Indian Ocean and essentially noncombatant and humanitarian in Iraq. In enhancing security in and assisting with the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the government sent financial assistance instead of its armed force, and was in fact the second-largest investor in the country between 2001 and 2011.\textsuperscript{182} The war on terror was definitely a step toward Japan’s expanding security role as a “normal nation,” but the approach itself chiefly maintained more of a civilian, rather than military, one that a “global civilian power” would find appropriate.

The recent normalization process has also suffered from financial constraints on Japanese defense spending. Defense expenditure has in fact kept within the GNP 1 percent limit already officially abandoned by former Prime Minister Nakasone in the late 1980s. It even consistently declined for ten consecutive years since 2002. Japanese military capabilities have been indeed strengthened in quality with the recent procurements. However, these financial constrains have significantly limited the caliber of remilitarization.

Consequently, despite the emerging normalization of its security policy, Japan has not yet reasserted itself as a normal great military power. While assuming a larger international security role and strengthening its defense force to confront regional security challenges, it still remains hesitant to pursue a drastic course of militarization or use its newly acquired military might for the pursuit of its national interest. Rather, Japan prefers a civilian approach to

\textsuperscript{182} For instance, holding the first International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo in January 2002, the government announced a total $4.5 billion financial aid plan. This economic security approach aligns with the “comprehensive security policy,” which has been the cornerstone of the Yoshida security strategy, suggesting that the strategy is not yet abandoned. A similar economic security approach can be found in Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea, Myanmar, and Iran. For details on this point, see Maaike Okano-Heijmans, “Japan’s Security Posture in Asia: Changing tactics or strategy?,” ISPI – Analysis (July 2012).
international security instead of the use of force, unlike other great powers such as France or Great Britain that routinely send forces on combat missions across the globe. Japan’s identity therefore remains to be somewhere in between, or a *mosaic*, of a “normal nation” and “global civilian power.” The Yoshida Doctrine, which has significantly deemphasized Japan’s use of force for more than a half century, was not entirely replaced but rather was restructured and thus endured in the twenty-first century.

*After the 2009 Election: A New Party in Power, a New Identity for Japan?*

The arrival of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and the DPJ in office after the 2009 election raised interesting questions about how a non-LDP administration would settle existing alternative identities for Japan. The DPJ, which has a more internationalist bent than the LDP, put a greater emphasis on the UN and multilateralism and the relations with an emergent East Asian regional community, and therefore possessed a potential penchant for the global civilian power vision. However, before reversing the trend toward normalization, the DPJ political foundation rapidly collapsed while facing a series of international and domestic challenges. The DPJ administration eventually came close to embracing the LDP’s normalist foreign policy agenda. This suggests that there seems to be an emerging national consensus on Japan’s identity as a “normal nation,” though this “normalcy” still does not equate to great military power status.

The DPJ came into office with a vision of Japan’s grand strategy significantly different from the LDP’s, with their stronger focus on achieving the East Asian Community (EAC) and a more symmetrical balance of power (*seisankakkeiron*) among Japan, the United States, and China. The DPJ leaders have argued that the LDP has been overly simplistic in asserting that as long as U.S.-Japan relations were healthy, then positive East Asia-Japan relations would follow.
According to the DJP, Japan has been “too dependent on the United States” (Beikoku ni izon shisugita) and needed to form a more Asia-focused policy and a more symmetric U.S.-China-Japan triangle.\(^{183}\) Therefore, they argued that East Asian regionalism should serve as the bedrock of Japan’s grand strategy and that the EAC should be the prime vehicle for establishing greater regional institutionalization. The purpose is not either to counterbalance or to contain China; rather it is to enmesh China (Chugoku o koritsu sasezu, Ajia nonaka ni makikomi) within a more effective macroregional framework in order to provide the necessary collective leverage among East Asian states to actively engage against any shift toward Chinese unipolarity. Put differently, the DPJ has embraced the emerging multipolarity in East Asia and has attempted to maintain friendly relations under one regional framework. As a result, the DPJ has been reluctant to follow the LDP’s course of depending on and cooperating with the United States to maintain U.S. unipolarity and counterbalance against rising China.\(^{184}\)

However, their foreign policy strategy fell into a quagmire after a series of diplomatic disasters, which led the new party in power to reconsider its policymaking and ultimately to follow the LDP’s normalist security policy agendas. The first diplomatic disaster was the mishandling of the U.S. base issue in Okinawa. While implementing the 2009 campaign manifesto of removing the U.S. military bases from the islands, the Hatoyama government attempted to reverse the 2006 Road Map, in which the previous LDP administrations managed to forge an agreement with local and U.S. governments for relocating the Futenma base from the densely populated area to Henoko, a less populated area in the north.\(^{185}\)


\(^{185}\) While Hatoyama’s renegotiation of the Futenma agreement was publically advertised to reduce the burdens on the Okinawans, it was also interpreted as part of long-term strategy to unravel the entire U.S. base infrastructure in
However, Hatoyama’s abrupt move understandably aroused the Obama administration’s concerns about Japanese intentions. This was further compounded with the seemingly poor communication with the new DJP government via spokesmen, divisions between the State and Defense departments over how to respond, and then Defense Secretary Robert Gate’s outright rejection of renegotiation during his trip to Japan in October 2009. It was, as one analyst has called, a “mini-crisis in U.S.-Japan relations.”

In the midst of such a diplomatic crisis, Hatoyama had nowhere to go, without a vision of where else to relocate the Futenma base and sufficient consultation with the local populations on alternative sites. He then slowly moved to reverse his stance on the issue and to accept the 2006 agreement, but only to find himself in the fierce public uproar and consequent calls for resignation even from his own party. Before realizing his foreign policy objectives, the new prime minister resigned in June 2010, only months after the historic landslide election that eliminated the LDP from power for only the second time since 1955.

Hatoyama’s successor Naoto Kan also faced a diplomatic obstacle: the Senkaku Islands territorial dispute. In September 2010, Japanese officials arrested a Chinese captain whose fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships near the islands. This detainment evoked a number of vociferous actions from China: a call for the captain’s release, accusations against Japan of endangering the safety of Chinese fishermen and fishing boats in waters near China’s territory, and a deployment of Chinese patrol ships near the islands. The Chinese government maintained its retaliatory response even after Japanese officials released the

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captain, demanding Japan’s apology and compensation, allowing anti-Japan protests and continuing deployment of patrol ships and military assets near the islands in the following months. In response, President Barack Obama, State Secretary Hilary Clinton, and Defense Secretary, one after another, declared that the Senkakus are covered by the U.S.-Japan security treaty, promising that the United States would side with Japan in times of emergency. The Senkaku issue was emerging as a tangible security concern and testament of Chinese assertiveness in the region, threatening the optimistic prospect of establishing the East Asian Community while testifying the importance of U.S. security guarantee in the region. The DPJ government now needed to rethink its security policy and alliance with the United States.

The DPJ government ultimately chose a more robust defense posture and security cooperation with the United States—de facto continuation of the LDP’s normalist policy. The 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines abandoned the longstanding “Basic Defense Force Concept” and adopted a new concept of “Dynamic Defense Force.” The new concept calls for the SDF’s enhanced readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability and versatility, reinforced by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities. The goal of the new force structure is to become able to deter and repel small-scale opportunistic or fait accompli expansion with an immediate and seamless response.187

Clearly, the scenario in mind was expulsion of Chinese intrusion into the Senkakus. In fact, the 2010 NDPG mandated “the SDF will permanently station the minimum necessary units on off-shore islands where the SDF is not currently stationed” and secure “bases, mobility, transport capacity and effective countermeasures necessary for conducting operations against…

187 The 2010 NDGP also marked a fundamental change in military doctrine regarding what sorts of attacks Japan must prepare for. It abandoned the dichotomy of peace-time and wartime, arguing that a new and more likely defense challenge would come from “gray area,” i.e. stealthy, small-scale, piecemeal expansionism that does not involve war or even major combat. Although not explicitly stated in the guidelines, it is obvious that this concern stems from China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the South China Sea and more recently in the East China Sea.
attacks [on these islands].” The NDPG called for deployment of a GSDF force of 1,000 troops as a “coastal monitoring” unit on Yonaguni, the closest inhabited Japanese island to the Senkakus. The DPJ also promoted the establishment of an amphibious-assault unit (similar to the U.S. Marine Corps in function) in the GSDF, as a means to boost the defense of the southern islands. Meanwhile, the SDF has been increasingly engaging in military exercises designed to address any future amphibious attacks on offshore islands on Kyushu and Okinawa for responding to amphibious attacks on offshore islands. It also has conducted similar training exercises with U.S. troops in the wake of the August 2012 Chinese activists landing on the Senkakus and the following repeated intrusions by Chinese vessels into Japanese territorial waters near the islands.

In the 2011 “2+2” ministerial meeting with the United States, the Japanese government essentially promised to maintain the 2006 Road Map, while at the same time pledged to cooperate with its ally in maintaining regional order, with its newly structured Dynamic Defense Force. The joint declaration listed areas of cooperation including missile defense and protection of the freedom of navigation and safe and secure sea lines of communication, which implicitly referred to the Chinese increasing ballistic missile capabilities and assertive behavior in both the South and East China Seas. The list also included intelligence operations and cyberspace, among other things, and spoke of a U.S.-Japan Space Security Dialogue following the 2008 lifting of the ban on use of space for military purposes.

Moreover, following the joint declaration, the Japanese government moved to relax its longstanding ban on the export of weapons and military equipment. This move would provide the country with opportunities to participate in multinational development projects on everything from missile defense systems to fighter jets. It opens international market for Japanese defense corporations, which is expected to reduce the costs of procurement for the SDF. The ban would
also allow the country to export military equipment for peacekeeping missions and international cooperation such as UN PKO. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kan’s successor, Yoshihiko Noda, even showed his willingness to exercise the right of collective-defense, stating “We want to make detailed discussions (on a review of the interpretation) within the government” in a Diet session.\footnote{Asahi Shimbun, July 10, 2012, Accessed April 30, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201207100073. Noda later clarified that his government would not seek to change the existing constitutional interpretation while still advocating for meaningful debate on the issue.} Clearly, the opposition DPJ had moved to come to terms with the normalist agendas of the previous LDP administrations.

However, none of this is to say that the penchant for a more civilian approach has vanished. Having consistently opposed U.S. use of force overseas during the 2000s, the Hatoyama administration terminated the SDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Instead, the DPJ put together a $5 billion package over five years for civilian support for Afghan reconstruction programs including police training, employment of former combatants, and development of agriculture and energy. In line with this civilian approach, the DPJ government dispatched the SDF to Haiti for a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and reconstruction mission, following the 2010 devastating earthquake in the country. The DPJ later approved a SDF deployment to South Sudan for a noncombat reconstruction mission in the aftermath of the state’s long-awaited independence. As it has been a strong proponent of overseas deployments of the SDF for UN centric non-combat HADR and reconstruction, the DPJ willingly approved these operations, keeping its civilian power stance. The Japanese public was also in favor of their country’s civilian posture. A 2012 public poll by Cabinet Office demonstrated an overwhelming majority of 87.4 percent expressed their support for SDF peacekeeping missions.\footnote{Mainichi Shim bun, May 1, 2012, Accessed April 30, 2013.} In its use of force for international security, Japan has still retained its
civilian posture, despite the emerging wave of normalization. It is therefore this combination, or a mosaic, of normalist and internationalist identities that characterizes Japan’s current identity.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I described Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Specifically, I argued that the country has undergone two identity crises, each in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Cold War. In the first identity crisis, the mercantilist camp emerged as a hegemonic identity, incorporated the pacifist principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant nation” and a “peace nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both mercantilism and pacifism. This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized the state’s defense spending and international security role and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S. for its security. The doctrine ultimately set Japan on a path to becoming a peaceful economic power rather than a great military power.

The second identity crisis occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War, which presented new security challenges to Japan such as the Gulf War, North Korean missile and nuclear programs, China’s military expansion, and the war on terror. In this second identity crisis, the normalist camp has emerged as a new hegemonic identity, incorporating elements of the internationalist perspectives in a subordinate fashion. This new dynamic of contestation shifted Japan’s identity to one characterized as a “normal nation” that has a greater international security role and military capabilities, but also as a “global civilian power” that emphasizes its use of forces for humanitarian noncombat missions in promoting the world’s peace and security rather
than for an aggressive pursuit of its national interests. Therefore, the new security policy is more nuanced than pure militant realism, and the new national identity less drastic than a muscular, “normal” Japan defined by realists.
Policy Implications

In this chapter, I attempt to explore policy implications of the findings established in the earlier chapters. I have depicted the recent transformation of Japanese security policy as a result of the internal contestation between two identity groups—normalist and internationalist—and its consequent “mosaic” nature of Japan’s new identity consisting of two different part-identities. This mosaic picture presents us long-term implications for Tokyo’s evolving security strategy.

First, Japan will gradually eliminate the constraints on, and enhance the capabilities of, its military force for fully conducting operations related to homeland defense. Despite its constitutional and other legal constraints, Japan has proceeded to procure a BMD system in response to the perceived threats of North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile programs while moving to accept space activities for military purposes. As we have seen in the previous chapter, these moves for building a more robust military posture, despite its controversial nature, have gained considerable support among both Japanese policymakers and public. In addition, the legislation enabling these procurements have mustered votes from parties across the aisle, and the vast majority of the public has showed their support every time the BMD system was deployed in anticipation of North Korean missile launches.

Among these domestic developments in homeland defense, the Senkaku Islands territorial dispute is arguably the most highlighted and time-sensitive case in point. This longstanding issue between China and Japan has nearly scaled up to nearly the point of a potential armed conflict since the Chinese intrusion into, and the Japanese nationalization of, these islands in the summer of 2012. Since then, there have been a number of Chinese intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters and even territorial airspace. Once, Chinese and Japanese fighter jets came to the scene when the Chinese government sent a civilian surveillance plane near the
disputed islands.\textsuperscript{190} In response, Japan’s security ally, the United States, has demonstrated its commitment to guarding the islands if they come under attack by Chinese military force. However, such reassurance of the American deterrence guarantee cannot completely assuage the fears of Japanese policymakers, when it is conceivable that U.S. policymakers would not willingly take a course of entrapment by committing to such a futile military fight over the small rocks in the vast East China Sea, instead expecting Japan to take necessary steps to defend its own territory.

In response to such concerns, the Japanese government has been taking steps to bolster its defense on the southeast, including increased military exercises for territorial defense and the recent purchase of four AAV-7s (amphibious assault vehicle).\textsuperscript{191} The procurement of AAVs signals Japanese increased concerns for and commitments to defending its territory, as the offensive-oriented nature of the crafts may violate the longstanding principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy of the SDF. In January of this year, the Japanese Defense Ministry even announced its plan to strengthen its security over the Senkaku Islands by deploying U.S. Global Hawk unmanned drones over its territory in the East China Sea.\textsuperscript{192}

And the Japanese public appears to be supportive of these moves toward a more robust defense posture. The January 2012 public poll by Cabinet Office shows that a vast majority of 71.5 percent (a big increase from 60.1 percent in 2011) selecting “national defense” as an area where the SDF should put more focus. Behind this perception lie concerns about the Chinese

military. The latest public poll conducted by The Genron NPO and the China Daily in June 2012 shows that 58.7 percent of the Japanese public regarded China as a military threat, the highest number since the poll was begun in 2005. This increased commitment to homeland defense, or a more “normal” security posture, seems to be a continuing trend as long as the security concerns surrounding China endure.

Second, as a result of the first trend, Japan will incrementally reduce its dependence on the United States in many areas as the SDF becomes more capable in traditional national defense operations. Postwar Japanese security policy, at least until the end of the Cold War, had been marked by its total dependence on the American deterrence guarantee. Jennifer Lind has argued this security strategy adheres to defense realism’s “buck-passing” strategy, a balancing act against a threat mainly through relying on the efforts of others rather than its own. The recent transformation of Japanese security policy then exemplifies a move toward more of buck-sharing in the bilateral security arrangement, at least as far as homeland defense is concerned. By acquiring more advanced military capabilities and removing constrain on the use of force, Japan is stepping toward shouldering its own share of responsibility in defending its territory.

However, none of this suggests that Tokyo is now abandoning the American security guarantee and seeking to establish military independence or autonomous defense. Such calls for autonomous defense do exist among the right-wing nationalists in the normalist camp, such as Shintaro Ishihara, who would like to see Japan extricate itself from its dependence on U.S. forces and establish an autonomous defense posture even through nuclearization. However, as seen in

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194 Genron NPO, “Dai Hachi Kai Nichu Kyodo Yoron Chosa ni tsuite” [The Eighth Japan-China Joint Public Poll], June 20, 2012, Accessed April 30, 2013. http://www.genron-npo.net/world/genre/cat119/2012-a.html. According to the same poll, majorities choose China’s continuous military buildup (61.5 percent), disputes over territory and maritime resources (55.2 percent), and little information available on China’s military capabilities (51.8 percent) as the reasons for viewing China as a military threat.
195 Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?”
the previous chapters, such nationalistic demands have not gained any significant support from the Japanese people but rather warned them against the “rightward drift” in Japanese society, or such a radical representation of Japan as “a normal nation.” Japan’s intention is rather modest; the country is just struggling to assume a more “equal” responsibility in the bilateral security alliance.

Third, Japan is very unlikely to agree to make certain military contributions, such as participation in joint combat operations or stand-alone security and stabilization missions with U.S.-led or U.N.-led coalition forces, in theaters such as Afghanistan or Iraq that are distant and involve missions not directly linked to Japan’s territorial defense. As in the case of the war on terror, the Japanese people still have little tolerance for their forces participating in military missions abroad, especially in armed conflict that does not, in their view, threaten national security. When the country commits itself to such overseas war efforts, it will very likely remain a supplementary, logistical role that does not involve combat operations. But even such nonmilitary missions are not welcomed by the Japanese people as in the case of the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.

Rather, the public would like to see their forces contributing to international peace and security in a civilian fashion such as humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and disaster relief missions, or their country providing financial assistance for these humanitarian efforts. And this civilian approach is what Tokyo has adopted since the end of the Cold War: participation in U.N. PKO noncombat operations, the humanitarian mission in Iraq, and the five billion dollars ODA package for Afghanistan reconstruction. Despite the emerging wave of normalization of its security policy, Japan has remained “a global civilian power” in promoting international peace and security.
Lastly, these three trends suggest that Japan is neither boosting up its security posture for a great power ambition nor becoming a normal great military power. The military buildup in response to the new security challenges, such as China’s rapid militarization and assertive behavior in its surrounding seas and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, remains to be purely defensive in its intention. The Japanese government does not aspire to great power status in its recent military efforts, or to pursuit of its national interests through using its newly acquired military capabilities. To call the new nation’s military posture “a normal military power,” as realists might, is also misleading as the country is still inhibited in the use of force, unlike other military powers such as Great Britain and France that routinely send military forces for combat missions across the globe.

This enlightened portrait of Japan’s new “normal” security policy also reveals a striking continuation of the Yoshida Doctrine. Yet, the recent transformation of security policy has indeed led many analysts to question the relevancy of the doctrine today, including Kenneth Pyle, who has declared it “a dead letter.” This characterization, however, is misleading. Despite the nationalist demands for autonomous defense from the right-wing fringe of society, the country has remained content with the U.S. military presence in the region as the status-quo power and stabilizer, and has moved to maintain the U.S. military superiority by assuming more responsibility in the bilateral arrangement. As Yoshihide Soeya describes, Japan has remained, and continues to be, a “middle power” that is closely bounded by U.S. military strategy, and whose role remains a supplementary one to that strategy, rather than playing an independent one. Moreover, this supplemental role emphasizes nonmilitary, logistic missions as in the case of the refueling operation in the Indian Ocean, or humanitarian ones as in the case of U.N. PKO

196 Hughes, Japan’s Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power.
197 Pyle, Rising Japan, 374.
198 Soeya, “A ‘Normal’ Middle Power.”
operations. Japan’s military role continues to be as de-emphasized as it has traditionally been under the Yoshida strategy during the Cold War. The Yoshida Doctrine is not entirely displaced but updated to the new security environment while reflecting the new articulation of the country’s identity.

Whether all these trends continue for decades to come of course remains to be seen, as the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a forthright normalist, has regained power. Determined to implement the unfinished agenda during his last term, he has already promised to resume the process of constitutional revision to establish a “national defense military” (kokubogun) and recognize the right of collective self-defense. He has also proposed to increase defense expenditure for the coming fiscal year of 2013, which has been contracting for ten consecutive years since 2002. The Japanese public seems to be showing support for increasing the country’s defense capabilities. The recent poll in Yomiuri Shimbun conducted in the mid-January 2013 shows 54 percent expressing support, versus 36 percent expressing opposition. The new prime minister has also demonstrated his commitment to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security cooperation by playing a more active role in light of the intensifying security concerns over China and North Korea.

None of this, however, has seemed to suggest a drastic derailment from the aforementioned trends. Japan will likely continue its normalization process by beefing up its security posture in homeland defense and in the U.S. security alliance, but still only commit itself to non-military and civilian missions when called upon to contribute to international peace and security. At least it is safe to confidently affirm that Japan is not becoming a great power with full-blown rearmament including nuclear capabilities and using its force overseas in pursuing its

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national interests, as some neorealists have predicted.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{200} Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”; Waltz, “Emergent Structure.”
Theoretical Implications

In the previous chapters, I have illustrated that the making of Japanese security policy was a product of the internal contestation among identity groups, or part-identities, which have different visions of national interest and identity in forming Japan’s identity as a whole, or whole-identity. Through the contestation, a dominant, or hegemonic, identity group emerges and incorporates perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing the whole-identity that can be best described as a “mosaic” of multiple discourses. This model of identity construction presents us a number of serious theoretical implications for the field of IR.

First, a state cannot be treated as a unitary actor with a pre-given set of interests or as a black-box that conducts its foreign policy independent of its internal political dynamics. The materialist schools of IR theory, such realism and liberalism, have depicted state actors unitary, calculating actors who seek to maximize their interests following the logic of military or economic expediency. This rationalist approach assumes interests are exogenous to (i.e., prior to or separate from) social interaction and therefore states have a pre-existing set of interests. State behavior is then just a rational response to the material conditions of the external environment. For rationalists, what happens within states is insignificant: States are reduced to a mere black-box. Ignoring the domestic context explains why the rationalists, especially realists, have confronted the two puzzles regarding Japanese security policy: (1) the postwar minimalist security posture despite its economic might and (2) the recent normalization of that posture that still deviates from the realist prediction of becoming a great military power.

However, as I have illustrated in the earlier chapters, the development and implementation of Japan’s security policy has been deeply grounded in its domestic political dynamics, i.e. the internal contestation among the competing identity groups. Japan has indeed
been responding to the material conditions of the external environment, but this response was mediated through the internal context in which the domestic actors constantly construct social meanings out of the international (and national) events and propose new visions of national interest and identity based on those meanings. As Keiko Hirata writes:

A state’s foreign policy is shaped by the international environment and the domestic political context in which political actors interpret national and international events, compete with each other, and make their views prevail. The development and implementation of security policy in Japan, as elsewhere, involves competing interpretations of state identity and political conflict among the actors who promote these differing interpretations.\(^{201}\)

It is this complex foreign-domestic interaction that determines Japan’s foreign policy. Therefore, without moving beyond the black-box rhetoric and accounting for these dynamics at work, one can hardly explain Japan’s (or, for that matter, any states’) foreign and security policy.

Second, the negation of the black-box rhetoric raises the importance of ideas in international politics. The rationalist school of IR theory pays attention to only material factors such as distribution of military and economic power as the basis of its analysis of state behavior. It is true that the realist prediction of Japan’s more assertive security policy does seem to align with the current trajectory of the “normalization” process. Irrespective of the role of ideas in international politics, Japan (or any state for that matter) may follow the supposed-to-be “rational” course of realist security policy. To this extent, certain material forces (e.g. North Korea’s existential missile threat, especially combined with the nuclear program) appear to have independent effects on state behavior (e.g. Japan’s controversial development and deployment of a BMD system).\(^{202}\) However, this argument does not deny the fact that domestic political actors

\(^{201}\) Hirata, “Who Shapes the National Security Debate?,” 147.

\(^{202}\) This point corresponds to Wendt’s “rump materialism,” which makes a “significant idealist concession to materialism” by admitting that “interests are not ideas all the way down.” Wendt argues so by acknowledging because brute material forces such as an existential threat posed by the nuclear weapons do have independent effects on international politics, “ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality.” Wendt,
construct social meanings about national interest and identity out of material conditions, and form foreign policy based on those meanings: whether Japan should become “a normal nation” by claiming greater defense capabilities and a more assertive security posture. In other words, material interests are meaning-laden and can be interpreted in a variety of ways and produce different policy effects depending on the interpretation. Therefore, ideas matter as much as material reality does in determining state behavior.

Also, disregarding the role of ideas in its analysis, one can hardly account for the meanings and intentions behind states’ actions, which can differ even when these actions take similar forms. This point is especially important when one can misconstrue Japan’s intention behind its more assertive security policy as the realist prediction of a great military power ambition, while the intention is more benign to become just “a normal nation,” and this normalcy is even less militaristic due to its mosaic aspect that incorporates the “global civilian power” approach.

Third, the state identity construction process via contestation among competing identity groups serves as a causal mechanism between the changes in the international security environment (exogenous shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change). As seen above, the internal contestation is always subject to changes in the state’s interactions with other states and position in the international system as the domestic actors are discussing the vision of the state that would be appropriate in this international context. If the international context changes, the domestic actors will propose alternative accounts of national interest and identity as responses to such changes. This new dynamics in the contestation then leads to a new articulation of identity, or an identity shift. Put differently, changes in the external balance of power among states (material change) influence the internal dynamics and balance of power among competing

*Social Theory*, 109-13, 130-5, emphasis in original.
identity groups which read such material conditions through their different ideational frames, and produce a new identity (ideational change), and vice versa. This is why the domestic actors in Japan have proposed new visions for the country—a “normal nation” and a “global civilian power”—in addressing the new security environment of the post-Cold War order, and consequently constructed a new state identity that incorporates principles of both visions. This internal change, in turn, changes Japan’s position and the balance of power in the international system. In sum, the contestation process serves as a mediator between exogenous changes in the international system and endogenous transformations of the intrastate identity variable.

It is important to note that this perspective is rendered possible because of the holistic constructivist approach that I have adopted in my identity construction model. The existing constructivist accounts of Japanese security policy such as Thomas Berger’s and Peter Katzenstein’s have taken the form of unit-level constructivism and only focused on the internal political dynamics that have created what they call a “culture of antimilitarism.” According to their account, this culture of antimilitarism has contributed to Japan’s minimalist military posture despite its economic prowess, or its antimilitarist identity. Katzenstein goes further by saying “Japan’s security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power.” While he correctly pays attention to the domestic political dynamics in arguing for the influences of internal cultural norms on foreign policy decisions, Katzenstein seems to underestimate the evidence that the domestic context is shaped by the international systemic factors. As seen in the earlier chapters, it is precisely because of the lack of attention to the systemic level that prevents the existing constructivist accounts from treating identity as a relational and therefore a fluid entity that constantly interacts with others and renew itself as the social context changes. As a result, Berger’s and Katzenstein’s work does not seem to reflect the

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203 Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 204, emphasis added.
recent “normalization” of Japanese security policy based on changes in the state identity. The model presented in this study overcomes such a setback in the existing account by taking the form of holistic constructivism and presents the internal contestation process as a causal mechanism between the changes in the international security environment (exogenous shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change).

Last but not least, the “mosaic” picture of identity presented by this model complicates a dominant assumption in all paradigms of IR, namely, that state actors are monolithic entities with coherent sets of interests. I have illustrated that how, in the dynamics of internal contestation, a hegemonic identity group emerges and incorporate perspectives of other groups in a subordinate fashion in constructing the whole-identity that can be best described as a mosaic of multiple discourses. As we have seen in the earlier chapters, Japan’s identity has accommodated multiple identity groups’ discourses despite their different visions of national interest and identity: the mercantilist and the pacifist discourses during the Cold War and the normalist and internationalist discourses after the Cold War. It is this mosaic nature of identity that has allowed me to adequately account for a Japanese security policy that cannot be explained by a one identity vision, i.e. the mercantilist Yoshida strategy that incorporated pacifism in maintaining the minimalist armed forces and security role, and the recent normal security policy that, despite its strengthening of military capabilities and international security role, still adheres to a civilian approach in assuming that role and does not use forces to pursue its own interests. Moreover, if we think about the quotidian reality of politics, the mosaic metaphor should not be so surprising. Just as we make adjustments and compromises to come to an agreement in any political processes when our interests and proposals conflict one another, so do we when coming to a consensus on what the interest and identity of our nation should be.
And yet, this more enlightened (and perhaps commonsensical) portrait of state identity does not seem to be so prevalent in the field of IR theory that presupposes state actors as monolithic entities with coherent sets of interests. It goes without saying that rationalists trap themselves in such a unitary actor assumption as they leave states as a black-box. This misleading assumption, however, is not only unique to the rationalist but is widespread in ideationalist or constructivist accounts. Following the “third-image” perspective of neorealism, systemic constructivism, on the one hand, focuses solely on interactions between “imaginary” unitary state actors. Ignoring what happens within the domestic political realm, it explains world politics simply by theorizing how states socialize one another in the external, international domain. According to the systemic accounts, there is a social structure to international politics, constituted by norms, ideas, and meanings that have “intersubjective” qualities. States acquire identities through such intersubjectivities that are constituted by the social structure of international politics. Therefore, little attention is paid to the intrastate arena, where contestation among competing visions of national interest and identity produces the mosaic nature of state identity; states are treated as monolithic actors.

On the other hand, unit-level constructivism does investigate the intrastate process of identity construction by concentrating on the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states. It is problematic, however, that this form of constructivism attempts to account for the sources of state identity by attributing to one overarching socially dominant norm, e.g. Berger’s and Katzenstein’s accounts of the “culture of antimilitarism” in Japanese case. This move has somewhat homogenizing effects in that their characterization of the cultural norm represents Japan’s identity solely based on that norm, rather than the aggregate of the alternative visions of multiple identity groups. However, as seen in the

\[204\] Wendt, Social Theory; i.d., “Anarchy.”
earlier chapters, it was the combination of mercantilist and pacifist norms that had comprised Japan’s postwar identity during the Cold War. This is why its identity was a mosaic of “merchant nation” and “peace nation.”

Accordingly, to fully appreciate the mosaic nature of state identity, one needs to start questioning the dominant assumption in all paradigms of IR that state actors are monolithic entities with coherent sets of interests. This move may result in a less parsimonious and elegant account of state behavior than the existing IR theory. And yet, it has the merit of a more exhaustive analysis of identity construction that can help us explain what may appear as residual behavior based on the monolithic picture of identity.
Conclusion

In this thesis, I have addressed two puzzles regarding the state’s security policy: (1) Japan’s minimalist military posture despite its economic power during the Cold War and (2) the recent shift from this minimalist security policy to an assertive one marked by a strengthening of its international security role and military. I have argued that although many IR scholars, mainly from the realist camp, claim that the formation of the original security policy (puzzle 1) and its following transformation (puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s rational response to external conditions of the international security environment, it can more adequately be explained by the complex dynamics of internal contestation among identity groups with different visions of Japan’s identity and interest. The culmination of this contestation process is what I call an “identity crisis,” in which a new dominant, or hegemonic, identity group emerges and incorporates perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing the state identity as a “mosaic” of multiple discourses.

I have illustrated that the first identity crisis happened in the aftermath of the World War II, in which there were three competing part-identities—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist. The outcome of this contestation was that the mercantilist camp emerged as a hegemonic identity, incorporated the pacifist principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant nation” and a “peace nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both mercantilism and pacifism. This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized the state’s defense spending and international security role and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S. for its security. The doctrine ultimately set Japan on a path to becoming a peaceful economic power rather than a great military power.

However, the new security challenges that emerged after the end of the Cold War
convinced the domestic political actors that the existing state identity was no longer sustainable. The extant mercantilist identity evolved into a new part-identity, internationalist, and another new part-identity, normalist, emerged in the place of the revisionist one, while the pacifist identity group faded away from the political forefront. Consequently, Japan is currently undergoing a second identity crisis, in which the normalist camp has emerged as a new hegemonic identity while incorporating elements of the internationalist perspectives in a subordinate fashion. This new dynamic of contestation shifted Japan’s whole-identity to one characterized as a “normal nation” that has a greater international security role and military capabilities, but also as a “global civilian power” that emphasizes its use of force for humanitarian noncombat missions in promoting the world’s peace and security rather than for an aggressive pursuit of its national interests. Therefore, the new security policy is more nuanced than pure militant realism, and the new national identity less militaristic than a muscular, “normal” Japan defined by realists.

The model of identity construction which I have laid out in this thesis is applicable not only to Japan but also to any other countries as their domestic actors have competing views of national identity and interest. In fact, there are similar accounts of identity formation in the IR literature, though it does not necessarily use the language of constructivist theory. For instance, many scholars have identified in the U.S. identity discourse what they call an “identity dichotomy” consisting of “exemplary” exceptionalism (an isolationist posture exemplified by Puritan John Winthrop’s “City upon a Hill” speech and George Washington’s warning against “permanent alliances” in his farewell address of 1796) and “missionary” exceptionalism (an internationalist posture exemplified by Woodrow Wilson’s mission to make the world safe for
Some of these scholars have described that American foreign policy is cyclical, i.e. swinging like a pendulum between isolationism and internationalism. Others have argued that isolationism dominated the early years of U.S. foreign policy, whereas internationalism conclusively won after the country entered into the Second World War. While which argument offers more convincing accounts is not a matter to be discussed in this thesis, these past studies suggest the applicability of my model to countries other than Japan. Therefore, by applying my model to other case studies, we might be able to achieve more interesting, exhaustive, and complex understanding of world politics and potentially expand the boundaries of the existing IR theories.

My model, however, is by no means a conclusive answer to how we should conceptualize and analyze identity as a variable. It rather problematizes the ways in which we think of the concept and proposes areas in which future research is needed. For instance, constructivists have introduced identity as an alternative to, or the basis of, interests that are hitherto assumed as given and fixed. And yet, the fluid aspect of identity highlighted in my model demonstrates that we need to treat identity not only as an independent variable to interests (a dependent variable), but also as a dependent variable subjected to changes in external conditions of the international system (an independent variable). This dual aspect of identity as a

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variable demonstrates the true meaning of the constructivist intervention in IR theory, namely, that structure and agency are “mutually constructed,” warning us against treating identity as given and requiring us to pay close attention to the identity construction process.

The fluidity of identity also raises the importance of the concept’s relational aspect, which needs further examination. I have illustrated that identity is relational in that domestic actors constantly form competing visions of national identity based upon their different interpretations of the country’s changing relationship to other states. This relationality in a self/other, systemic sense, I have demonstrated, leads to the fluidity of identity. Meanwhile, my empirical analysis seems to suggest that identity is also relational in a historical sense. That is to say, domestic actors construct their visions of national identity partly based on their different readings of the country’s history. Put differently, these visions are re-articulations of a self that are based on the different interpretations of the past self and that are projected onto the future (i.e., what the self should become in the future). For instance, during the Cold War, Japanese domestic actors formed the pacifist and mercantilist visions by reflecting on the devastating consequence of Japan’s prewar militarism. The collective memory of Japan’s past may be fading away as time passes and generational changes happen. However, it is still possible that domestic actors reflect on the current militaristic normalization in terms of the past tragedy, as efforts to preserve the war memory continue today. Furthermore, neighboring states in Asia can also prompt this remembrance of history. For instance, China and South Korea accuse Japan of not truthfully facing its past aggression when Japanese politicians make controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals of World War II are honored. Such replays of the records of history could have a significant impact on the ways in which Japanese domestic actors seek to redefine their country’s national identity. This point also raises the role of recognition in identity
formation at the systemic level; whether an acceptance or a rejection of a self’s identity articulation by others (e.g., China rejecting Japan’s “normal nation” vision by evoking the war memory and repentance among the Japanese and in the international community) could influence the self’s identity formation. Further research could explore these dual faces—systemic and historical—of the relational aspect of identity.

Lastly, I would like to conclude by noting the political significance of Japan’s ongoing normalization, as this redefinition of national identity could determine the country’s international standing for the decades to come. As the new Prime Minister Abe, at the time of writing, is again promoting the issues of constitutional revision as one of his priorities for this year’s upcoming Upper House election, a nationwide discussion on the definition of Japan’s “normalcy” is an urgent matter. While I have attempted to account for this normalcy as a mosaic of two visions held by the normalists and internationalists, it is ultimately in the hands of Japanese domestic actors to decide what kind of a “normal” nation Japan will become. Therefore, it is my sincere hope that my thesis inspires and contributes to further public discussions on the country’s new role in the rapidly evolving international security environment.
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