Building an Asia-Pacific Security Community: A Role for Australia?

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Building an Asia-Pacific Security Community: A Role for Australia?

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Senior Honors Thesis
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May 3, 2011
Abstract

Australia’s foreign policy has recently shifted from great-power dependency towards self-reliance in the Asia-Pacific. In light of this shift, there have been calls for the creation of a regional security community. This project looks at two existing security communities, the OSCE and ASEAN, to ascertain the necessary conditions for building a security community. From there, I examine whether or not these conditions exist in the Asia-Pacific, and investigate Australia’s ability to produce the remaining conditions. I conclude that Australia does not have the diplomatic power to overcome regional competition, and that rivalries amongst regional powers mitigate against the community’s creation.
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Acknowledgements

This project could not have been completed without the help of several individuals. First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Andrew Latham for being my honors advisor. He has been a wonderful mentor to me and has pushed me to exceed what I thought I was academically capable of. I would also like to thank Professor Julie Dolan and the members of the Honors Colloquium: Cali Cope-Kasten, Mikey Freedman, Maria Paschke, Shelle Shimizu, Vera Sidlova, and Owen Truesdell. They have provided me so much feedback and helped to maintain my sanity throughout this process, and to them I am eternally grateful for helping me accomplish this task. I also appreciate Professors David Blaney and Terry Boychuk for being members of my defense panel and for providing me valuable feedback. I also want to thank my family for always being there for support. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge Rebecca Flanagan, whom I worked with this past summer at Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Talented Youth, for helping me to develop my research question and for editing my proposal. Finally, I must thank my best friends and housemates Stephanie Fenner, Chris Portero Paff, Adam Van der Sluis, Rachel Wisthuff, and Leigh York for helping me through this process. They have read drafts, helped me through difficult times, and were always there to provide me with comic relief. Thank you to everybody who helped me to accomplish the greatest academic project that I have done. I am forever grateful.
Introduction

The 2009 Defence White Paper: *Force 2030* establishes an adaptive change in Australian defense policy, stating that, “Our engagement with major and emerging powers is part of the Government's strategy to develop a regional community with the capacity to forge a constructive Asia-Pacific security environment” (*2009 Defence White Paper* 96). The United States has become less willing to and capable of stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region and the major regional players, China, Japan, and India, are reconfiguring their foreign policies to gain regional supremacy (Tubilewicz 1). This new regional security initiative forces Australia to depart from the pragmatic bilateral engagement strategy that has characterized recent Australian foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd¹, despite his call for a regional security community to include the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states of the region in 2008, continued to pursue preferential trade agreements and extensive bilateral relations with particular Asian nations (Elias and Johnson 4).

This project examines the role of middle powers in fulfilling the conditions for a regional security community by assessing the viability of the strategic political projects of *Force 2030*. I ask the following questions: What are the conditions necessary to create a security community? Do they obtain in the Asia-Pacific? Assuming that some conditions do obtain, what is the role of middle powers such as Australia in creating the remaining unmet conditions?

I argue that while most conditions necessary for a security community exist in the region, rivalries among potential member nations, specifically the US and China, prevent the desire for a

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¹ Rudd was replaced by Julia Gillard on June 24, 2010 through a leadership ballot held amongst the 115 member Labour Party caucus the day before. She was not elected by Australian citizens until the next federal election on August 21, 2010, when she defeated Tony Abbott, the Coalition Party representative.
mutual security agreement to manifest. Australia does not have the strategic strength through its diplomatic and military forces to overcome those conflicting interests. It should instead focus its efforts on achieving the other Force 2030 goals so that Australia can take a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific in the future because the strategy of a regional community is based on faulty premises. Force 2030 is the first step towards a stronger Australia, but the multilateral community articulated by the Paper cannot be properly implemented until Australia’s defense capabilities and diplomatic independence are improved.

This project uses comparative historical analysis to infer the necessary conditions for building a security community. I first look at the existing literature about security communities to establish a baseline set of conditions to investigate. Following the literature review, I utilize two case studies that exemplify two security communities currently in existence: the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, (OSCE), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The OSCE is the world’s largest intergovernmental organization, comprised of 56 member states from Europe, the Caucasus, North America and Central Asia, and was initially created to resolve East-West tensions during the Cold War. A distinguishing feature of the OSCE is the presence of a third-party mediating nation during its creation, Finland. The OSCE case will assist in creating a security community in which great powers and regional powers are involved, and how middle powers played a role in its development.

ASEAN is the only institutionalized security community in East Asia, and is premised on the goals of non-interference and state sovereignty. While the organization attempts to stay true to its Southeast Asian membership, it has taken steps to broaden its membership through the
establishment of other institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Plus 3. The ASEAN case provides an Asian example of a security organization, setting the community-building process in a different geographical and normative context.

These two cases best represent the needs of this project. The OSCE is an appropriate case because it was designed to mediate in a bipolar world. The Asia-Pacific region is on the trajectory towards becoming a region with several regional power interactions, thus the political context between the status quo and the OSCE is somewhat similar. Additionally, the OSCE represents a collective security arrangement.

The ASEAN case was chosen because the project requires an Asian example to examine a more geographically contextual example for how Asian nations build institutions. Moreover, since this paper examines the way in which Australia, a Western nation, can better engage with Asia, both a Western and Asian example are needed to determine whether or not Australia can create the remaining conditions by leveraging a Western form of diplomacy to bring Asian nations to the negotiation table with the United States.

My goal with this project is not to produce a set of policy recommendations for Australia, nor to predict the future of Asia-Pacific strategic interests. I assess the viability of a new foreign policy strategy described in Force 2030 by looking at historical cases to draw inferences on the conditions necessary for a security community. While the literature on Australian foreign policy suggests that Australia’s limited engagement with Asia is affected by its conflicting “Western versus Asian” identities, I do not plan on addressing these issues because it would complicate a policy-based discussion of Australian foreign policy. The identity issues are acknowledged in the paper but I will not be discussing the ways in which Australia’s identity can be reconciled.
However, this paper uses a comparative method to compile a master list of conditions necessary to build a security community, which is not present in the current literature. Additionally, I address one of the United States’ most solid and under-discussed alliances, exploring different ways in which the US can shape its foreign policy in the region through its South Pacific ally.

This paper begins by providing a context for the research question and by examining the changes in Australia’s foreign policy over time in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 will discuss my methodology and how I will utilize the OSCE and ASEAN case studies in greater detail. It will also explain my three-step evaluation process for compiling a master list of conditions. The following chapter will survey the literature about security communities and the role of middle powers in the process of mediation. Chapters 4 and 5 are historical examinations of the OSCE and ASEAN, and will each conclude with discussions of the creation conditions that each of these cases demonstrates. Chapter 6 discusses the current security and political environment in Asia and how the prospect of a security community interacts with the potential future scenarios of the region. Chapter 7 presents the master list of conditions, whether or not those conditions obtain, and what Australia can or cannot do to bring about the remaining unmet conditions. The project concludes with how the project implicates the current literature and how policymaking may change if this measure is implemented.
Chapter 1- The Context of Australian Foreign Policy

Australia’s foreign policy strategy towards its region and the wider world has been characterized by disagreement concerning what constitutes national interest and how that interest should best be pursued (Jones and Benvenuti 103). This foreign policy structures Australia’s perception of its ever-present security dilemma: should it autonomously engage with its region and the rest of the world, or does it depend on great powers that are culturally and ideologically similar beyond the region for its external policy determination? The conflicting ideals on foreign policy strategies reflect a rationalist attempt both to engineer an Australian identity and to renegotiate Australia’s place in the region and the world.

Australia’s identity as a Western outpost alienates it from the other nations in the region and challenges the way it shapes its defense strategy towards Asia. Does Australia promote its image as a representative of liberal democratic values and engage with Asia in an autonomous fashion, or does it remain skeptical of Asia and treat it as a threat that requires reliance on a great power? Australia’s past has demonstrated that these two solutions may work in tandem, but cannot fully address Australia’s true interests. Rather, it has fashioned two distinctive foreign policy traditions and two distinctive mythologies to sustain them. The most conscious tradition emphasizes regional engagement and assumes that Asia is harmonious and uniform, which it is not. The second emphasizes external ties to an Anglospheric West and relates to the immediate neighborhood pragmatically and skeptically, spending much of its focus on itself and how it can relate to the world in accordance with its past history (ibid 121). The question remains as to which foreign policy mythology is best suited for an Asian century.
Australian foreign policy currently attempts to adapt to the power politics of the Asia-Pacific. Numerous regional powers are challenging for dominance in the Asia-Pacific, and a powerful China is forcing Australia to make strategic decisions regarding its engagement strategy towards Asia and the rest of the world. Australian foreign policy in the status quo relies on “great and powerful friends”\textsuperscript{2} to act both as policy determiners and as shields against international crises. However, US primacy wavers in the region and Australia faces an important decision: it can continue to partner with great powers that heavily influence its foreign policymaking, or it can shift towards a more self-reliant foreign policy and create strong diplomatic relationships with Asian regional powers independently from the United States and the United Kingdom.

This chapter explores Australia’s foreign policy history and provides a historical and political context for the research question. I begin with a brief historical overview of the themes that characterize Australia’s foreign policy in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. Next, a discussion about the 2009 Defence White Paper: \textit{Force 2030} highlights Australia’s current strategic interests and defense policies. The following section examines Australia’s current foreign policy towards Asia and discusses how Australia is engaging with the specific nations that will be a party to the Asia-Pacific community. Finally, I investigate Australia’s past attempts at creating a security community or community-type arrangement.

\textbf{The History of Australian Foreign Policy}

The Commonwealth of Australia was created in 1901 through an Act of the British parliament. Although it acted as an independent nation and had the freedom to act on several

\textsuperscript{2}“Great and powerful friends” typically refers to the United States and the United Kingdom, although currently the United States provides the greatest source of influence on Australian foreign policy.
policy actions such as immigration\(^3\) and foreign economic policies, it was still not considered a sovereign state. It lacked the legal capacity to make treaties with foreign states, did not possess overseas diplomatic posts except in London, and abdicated the responsibilities of foreign relations and defense to the British government. Australian inhabitants considered Britain “home” (Firth 23).

Australia continued to act as a subset of the British Empire until the 1942 when the Labor Party ratified the Statute of Westminster. This piece of British legislation, originally created in 1931, gave the self-governing Dominions the right to make their own laws without British interference, the ability to advise the Crown, and the right to make their own foreign policy (ibid 26). Australia’s exclusive reliance on Britain in areas of trade and security continued until World War II.

Australia established ties with the United States during World War II after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Australian government, under Labor Prime Minister John Curtin (1941-1945), faced the possibility of an attack from Japan itself and determined that depending on the UK alone was no longer the safest way to protect its national interests. Total reliance on the UK ended when Japan overtook British Singapore, and Britain tried to send Australian forces over to British Burma, overlooking the security interests of Australia in 1942 and signaling a break in common interests. Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1939-1941 and 1949-1966) further dissolved Australia’s ties with Britain by raising a large dollar loan from the US, imposing import restrictions on British companies, and renegotiating imperial preferences to reduce the UK’s competitive advantage. This is not to say that Australia shifted from one Great Protector to

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\(^3\) Australia exercised its authority on immigration, passing the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901, which prohibited non-white migrants, and abandoned free trade in favor of protectionism from Britain.
another within a year, but that US-Australia ties strengthened over time and Australian reliance on the UK inversely diminished. In 1951, circumstances made it possible for a mutual defense treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the USA known as the ANZUS Security Treaty (ANZUS). This military alliance initiated a process of integrating Australia’s defense policy into the global military and diplomatic strategies of the US.

Australia’s independence from British reliance thus signaled a shift to the policy of forward defense. Under this policy, Australian forces engaged the enemy in other arenas because it lacked the capabilities to defend itself on its own land.⁴ By giving military assistance to the Great protectors, Australia not only appeared to its allies as a worthy partner, but also gained leverage in the event that Australia needed assistance from its partners. The policy of forward defense can be best exemplified by Australia’s dependence on and identification with American foreign policy during the Vietnam War (1955-1975), when Australia sent multiple battalions to help the Americans prevent collateral damage from spilling over to Australian territory. This action seemed to deepen mutual aid between the US and Australia, but the US later declared through the Guam Doctrine of 1969 that its allies in the Asia-Pacific would have to bear the responsibility for their own defense and could no longer rely on American support unless a nuclear threat was present (ibid 37).

In 1972, Gough Whitlam (1972-1975) sought to change the direction of Australian foreign policy to be more independent on international affairs. He withdrew the last military advisors from South Vietnam and established full diplomatic relations with East Germany and

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⁴ This is not to say that Australia has the capabilities to protect its own continent right now. *Force 2030* articulates several technological changes that are designed to bolster Australia’s defense capabilities for engaging an enemy on its own land. The contrast to forward defense is continental defense, which is the ability for Australia to defend its own continent.
China. Whitlam also removed racial restrictions on immigration and oversaw Papua New Guinea’s transition to independence. This independence troubled the Americans, who saw these policy moves as anti-American, but Whitlam conceptualized his actions as pro-Australian.

Australia’s economic condition in 1983 forced the Labor government under Bob Hawke (1983-1991) to act independently of its great and powerful friends. Hawke inherited an economy that was losing international competitiveness, and had to undo Australia’s regulating and protectionist economic policy. The capital market was deregulated and opened to foreign investment, exposing Australia to the destabilizing influences of international financial markets. While this new policy did not necessarily improve Australia’s economy as much as the government had hoped, Australia was beginning to interact more with globalizing forces that were overtaking the global economy.

These economic considerations led to Labor’s two major trade initiatives in the late 1980s. Australia created the Cairns Group of Fair Traders in Agriculture in 1986 to bring together fourteen efficient agricultural nations to campaign for the inclusion of agricultural commodities in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Hawke also created the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 to liberalize trade and investment in the region, mirroring the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (ibid 60-62).

My assessment of Australia’s foreign policy development highlights three themes that reflect Australia’s foreign policy debate throughout its history: dependence, protection, and a fearful relationship with Asia. Australia relied militarily and diplomatically on the more powerful states overseas through forward defense and was defined by its imperial connections.

5 The very first APEC meeting was held in Canberra and chaired by Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans.
Australia’s economic policies focused on protectionism to prevent foreign investment, insulating its economy from foreign takeovers and foreign economic instabilities, demonstrating the theme of protection. The final theme is Australia’s fear of Asia that distanced its policies towards the region. Australia’s fear of Japan after WWII drove Australia to a strong dependent relationship on the US and against the assumption of a partial Asian identity.

**Australia’s Current Place in the International Hierarchy: A Middle Power**

Former Labour Party leader Herbert Evatt framed Australia’s history as a middle power in the 1940s based on Australia’s hard power resources and strategic concerns of the stability of the Southwest Pacific region (Ungerer 2008 27). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Australia’s middle power status became apparent through its in-between rank in the hierarchy of states and its economic and military resources. While some scholars would argue that Australia is currently a pivotal power that acts as a linchpin between competing powers to achieve diplomatic breakthroughs, its dependence on great and powerful friends negate that prospect.

Carl Ungerer analyzes Australia’s status as a middle power through the framework of the eight elements of national power set forth by Hans Morgenthau. Australia’s *geographic position* as the sole occupant of an island continent produces a physical and psychological distance from the rest of the world which substantially reduces Australia’s power projection abilities, especially relative to the Asia-Pacific. Australia also lacks *natural resource reserves*. Although it currently maintains self-sufficiency through natural gas production, it does not have the capabilities to sustain those resources in the future. The Australian economy focuses on resource extraction and services, relying on imported manufactured goods, limiting its *industrial capacities*. Australia’s *military preparedness* is rather strong given the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) small size of
about 52,000. However, its self-sufficiency wavers since the ADF relies heavily on ANZUS for intelligence sharing, weapons procurement, and joint training exercises. Australia’s population supports its industrial capacity and military preparedness, and the government has used immigration to supplement its labor force despite debates over a relatively liberal immigration policy. Australia’s national character and national morale, as with other nations, fluctuates when citizens support or do not support the foreign policies of its government. Australia also has a good quality of diplomacy, or the art of bringing different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect. Australia embraces a diplomatic approach based on practicality, legalism, and low gear idealism. Based on these evaluations, Australia is considered to be a middle power mainly because diplomacy is Australia’s best tool and instrument of statecraft, whereas great powers also have both military strength and diplomatic prowess (41-49).

Australia’s middle power approach to international affairs offers insight as to how far its diplomatic and military capabilities can develop. Australia has a preference for working through multilateral institutions and promoting international legal norms. Its self-interest is filtered through the practical consideration of when and where middle powers can achieve successful diplomatic outcomes in pursuit of national interests.

Ungerer concludes that three main themes can be found in Australian middle power diplomacy: nationalism, internationalism, and activism. The nationalist theme stems from Australia’s desire to create a tradition of foreign policy that deviates from the imperial nature of the United Kingdom and forges a multilateral identity by engaging with its neighbors. The second characteristic, internationalism, is a direct product of assertive independence in international engagement that is influenced by its nationalist ideals. Australia had the potential to diplomatically influence others through persuasion, and needed to establish international ties
using diplomacy as its main tool since it did not have the military power to do so otherwise. The
final characteristic, activism, is the most important aspect of Australian middle power foreign
policy. In the absence of structural or material capacities to affect outcomes, middle powers like
Australia must rely on diplomatic skills and energy to pursue their national interests. Success
depends on the degree to which initiatives can be promoted and sustained on the international
stage over time (542). These aspects also shape the discussion of middle power foreign policy to
represent how Australia could leverage its abilities: a linchpin state in the inter-bloc system
between superpowers, a moral or normative strain between the North and South or East and
West, or a descriptor of diplomatic behavior, such as multilateral coalition-building (ibid 548).


The 2009 Defence White Paper: Force 2030 articulates the strategic interests, outlooks,
and defense planning that are shaping the changes in Australia’s defense policy. Australia’s
strategic outlook has been predominantly defined by United States hegemony; therefore its
responses to the changing global environment react to the changing distribution of military,
economic, and political power of the United States. However, the main change in Australia’s
strategic environment underscoring Force 2030 is the advent of an Asian century. Force 2030
argues that, “The wider Asia-Pacific region will see the continued evolution of mechanisms
aimed at building confidence among the major powers, providing tools for managing crises or
misunderstandings, developing cooperative approaches to issues of regional concern, and
strengthening strategic dialogue and transparency” (33). Australia must take a more self-reliant
stance, especially if the parties in conflict all have agreements with Australia.
*Force 2030* identifies a set of four meta-level strategic interests that Australia needs to focus on through its foreign and defense policy: a secure Australia, a secure neighborhood, a secure Asia-Pacific region, and a stable, rule-based security order. The first goal of a secure Australia is based around the need for continental defense and focused on securing air and maritime areas through improving its military capabilities. The next goal regards securing, stabilizing, and maintaining the cohesion in the immediate region around Australia; Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, East Timor, and the South Pacific island states. *Force 2030* recommends that Australia use military and diplomatic pressure to maintain the security and the internal stabilities of its neighbors, continuing to provide foreign aid that has been a major component of Australia’s foreign policy. The third goal is to ensure a secure Asia-Pacific region, calling on Australia to maintain a diplomatic and military presence in the region. Australia needs to enhance relations with these states to fulfill its national interests while asserting itself as a regional power player. The final goal is for a global security order, which means that Australia needs to be present in the United Nations and other multi-national organizations in order to preserve the rule of law and to prevent nuclear proliferation, environmental destruction, and human rights violations (41-45).

**Australia’s Alliances**

*Force 2030* also analyzes Australia’s current alliances and the need to build more bilateral and multilateral relations. The report states that, “Central to Australia's strategic posture, and one of the most important ways Australia seeks to promote its strategic interests, is our network of alliances, our bilateral and multilateral defense relationships, and the growing range of multilateral security forums and arrangements in our region” (96).
Australia’s most important defense alliance is with the United States. The current defense policy works to deepen relations with the US in order to gain access to intelligence and material capabilities and joint facilities. US satellite communication systems provide the ADF with necessary intelligence\(^6\), and both nations continue development of the Joint Combined Training Capability, reducing the cost of and improving the quality of unilateral and bilateral training. The joint facilities are an integral part of the US’ command and control systems, and Australia benefits from technical assistance. These capabilities include systems related to intelligence collection, ballistic missile early warning systems, submarine communications, and satellite-based communications.

*Force 2030* also identifies Japan, the Republic of Korea, and India as critical partners in the Asia-Pacific region in the areas of trade and defense industry cooperation.\(^7\) Japan and Australia share common views of valuing the security and reconstruction of fragile states through military forces. Additionally, the 2008 Memorandum on Defence Cooperation provides a framework for expanding practical engagement between the ADF and Japan Self Defense Forces. Australia’s relationship with South Korea reflects mutual interests in regional stability and a common alliance with the United States. These two nations engage in cooperative activities, including peacekeeping training, professional and educational exchanges and defense industry cooperation. India is an important partner for Australia given their shared democratic values, maritime interests in the Indian Ocean, and commitments to combating regional and global terrorism and maintaining a rules-based global security order. Australia’s relations with

\(^6\) This occurs through the US-Australia Military Satellite Communications Partnership Statement of Principles of 2008.

\(^7\) These alliances will be expanded upon later in this chapter. This section only discusses how the alliances are described in *Force 2030*. 
these nations move towards building a regional community in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment.

Australia’s relations with Indonesia are the most important of its relations with Southeast Asian nations. The two nations share similar interests such as counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism, and Australia has a fundamental interest in a stable, unified and democratic Indonesia underpinned by a professional military. Most recently, the Lombok Treaty on Security Cooperation, ratified in 2008, is the key element in a robust framework of agreements being developed to advance shared security interests. This framework is further expounded in 2009 with the signing of the Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation (ibid 94-100).

An Emphasis on the Rise of China

The rise of China motivates much of the foreign policy shifts in Force 2030, which focuses on how China’s growth affects the region and how Australia must use its diplomatic abilities to respond to China’s foreign policy. Australia’s foreign policy towards China reflected the US’ relation with China until 2001. However, Kevin Rudd, considered to be the most “Chinese-literate” prime minister, improved relations by establishing close diplomatic and business relations with China, yet criticizing its human rights record and military build-up (Tubilewicz 151).

Force 2030 infers that China would soon be challenging a diminishing United States. New regional powers would challenge the US vacuum, leading to a high likelihood of strategic competition. However, the Chinese leadership’s appreciation of the benefits of a peaceful Asia-Pacific could facilitate its commitment to maintaining regional stability. Force 2030 commits Australia to engaging China as a responsible stakeholder in support of stability, prosperity, and
good governance while encouraging greater transparency in military affairs (151). It also argues that Australia must maintain the ANZUS alliance because a strong US presence in the region deters China from taking drastic actions (ibid 155).

Australia’s Defense Policies According to Force 2030

Force 2030 articulates four different views that Australia can take on its strategic posture. Australia’s strategic posture can invoke armed neutrality as the best approach to secure its territory and people. However, that strategy may require disengaging from the alliances that Australia has relied on for the entirety of its foreign policy history. Australia can also rely on a multilateral security system with the United Nations at its pinnacle, which is derived from its middle power foreign policy. The third view engages Australia in military operations with other like-minded nations to assure that it would receive aid if Australia’s security was ever threatened. The final view is Australian self-reliance despite limited resources. These four views are contested in the paper, but a few common themes underscore the debate around Australian defense policy: a need to increase military capabilities, the continental defense versus forward defense debate, and a need to make critical decisions about what alliances to maintain or to place less importance on.

Australia’s military power requires three capabilities: the ability to act independently when there are unique security interests at stake, the ability to lead military coalitions in the event of shared interests, and tailoring contributions where Australia shares wider strategic interests with others and are willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests. Australia must improve its military capabilities to obtain the ability to conduct independent military operations that control the aerial and maritime approaches to Australia, and that deny an
adversary the ability to operate in the immediate neighborhood. *Force 2030* states that, “Our military strategy is crucially dependent on our ability to conduct joint operations in the approaches to Australia - especially those necessary to achieve and maintain air superiority and sea control in places of our choosing” (53).

The lack of a cohesive view of a strategic posture in *Force 2030* reflects the unlikely event of an attack on Australian soil, explaining Australia’s focus on a forward defense strategy. Australia’s geostrategic location distances it from traditional theatres of conflict between the major powers, and there is an absence of serious or enduring disputes with its neighbors that could provide a motive for an attack. If there ever were to be an attack, it would most likely come from Australia’s immediate neighbors because of its maritime location. However, Australia’s maritime approaches give it strategic depth in relation to any conventional military force that might be projected against it, making continental defense a possibility. The ADF's capabilities are a deterrent against threats posed by all but a handful of the world's most significant military powers.

The role of the ADF is also defined in relation to two themes: cooperation with the United States and collaboration with other nations. Australia’s reliance on the United States for nuclear protection and defense capabilities is indispensable for its security. Self-reliance under this model means that Australia would only expect the United States to come to its aid in circumstances where it were threatened by a major power whose military capabilities were beyond Australia’s capacity to resist. The second theme defines the ADF in relation to international allies and partners. Collaboration on military operations can be done by developing and maintaining a network of defense partnerships as an important foundation for being able to work together when required. One option for bolstering such capabilities is to increase the
interoperability of ADF forces with those of selected allies and partners, such as the United States, New Zealand, and partners in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). While Australia’s immediate operational environment is the South Pacific islands, Australia might need to selectively project military power or demonstrate strategic presence beyond the primary operational environment.

Development of the Australian Defence Force

*Force 2030* concludes with a plan for developments in military technology that will enhance Australia’s defense capabilities by 2030. Australia is currently acquiring various carriers, jets, and combat capabilities to update its Navy and Air Force. The Department of Defense is also building and procuring land-based combat mechanisms and restructuring the army deployment system for rapid response and better ground communication. Australia cooperates with the United States to improve its intelligence capabilities, taking advantage of the joint facilities that it shares with the US as a benefit of the alliance. These priorities in military strength are preparations for a more self-reliant defense posture, since Australia will be able to better project its superiority in the air and on the sea (2009 Defence White Paper 96).

The Goals of Force 2030

Australia faces two urgent policy challenges over the coming years to respond to the future that *Force 2030* describes. The diplomatic challenge is to promote the evolution of a stable order in the Asia-Pacific through multilateral and bilateral engagement. The military challenge requires properly equipping Australian military forces in the event that the balance in

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8 The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) are a series of defense relationships established by bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore signed in 1971, whereby the five states will consult each other in the event of external aggression or threat of attack against Peninsula Malaysia or Singapore.
Asia becomes riskier for Australia’s security. Diplomatically, Asia’s stability and Australia’s security has depended on stabilizing factors through strong relations between China, Japan, and unquestioned US primacy. However, since China does not need to surpass the US to attain primacy in Asia, Australia must take on a more activist role. It needs to promote the possibility for shared power amongst China and Japan and the emergence of a new regional order, or it will revert back to the forward defense policies of the 1950s and 60s based on the assumption that the US will maintain primacy without a challenge from China (ibid 22).

**Australia’s Engagement with the Asia-Pacific**

Australia’s engagement with Asia is indecisive yet pragmatic. During the post-Cold War decolonization period, Australia was forced to make ties with certain Asian nations in order to maintain global and regional stability. However, Australia had to decide which foreign policy tradition it should pursue in Asia: it could either join a pan-Asian community, or it could continue to follow the containment policies of the United States. Australia continued leaning towards maintaining reliance on the United States, but it also took some independent diplomatic measures, such as establishing diplomatic relations with China and removing its recognition of Taiwan. Australia’s pragmatic foreign policymaking in Asia also brought about Canberra’s membership in the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, and the UK, and establishment of dialogue status with ASEAN (Griffiths and Wesley 15-16).

Australia also used trade as a primary mechanism for interacting with Asia. The Cairns Group of 1986 pressed the US and European nations into including agriculture on the agenda for global trade talks, and allowed for Asian industrialization to create markets for Australian commodities exports. Additionally, the formation of APEC included the key Asian economies in
a dynamic trading cycle. These trade institutions were critical to Australia’s engagement with Asia, which was motivated primarily by economic self-interest (ibid 18).

Pragmatic Ambivalence

Pragmatism and ambivalence characterize Australia’s most recent interactions with Asia, reflecting the Coalition and Labour parties’ opposing viewpoints on Asian engagement. Coalition Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007) argued that Australia did not need to choose between its history and identity, and that Australia could celebrate its own voice without alienating its existing allies. Pragmatism highlighted Howard’s Asian foreign policy, as he selectively engaged in instances that affected Australia’s security such as the Bali bombings. This strategy opposed predecessor Paul Keating’s (1991-1996) foreign policy, which championed economic globalization and multiculturalism as a way of forging a new identity outside of British rule.

Australia’s ambivalence towards Asia can also be described theoretically. “Asia” has often operated as an ambivalent sign and symbolic in Australian domestic politics, defining Australia while constructing an opposing Other. Australia remains trapped not only by geography, but also ideology. Australia is unsure about its position as a European enclave, but still maintains an oscillating view of its relationship with Asia (Johnson, Ahluwalia, and McCarthy 60-61). Representations of Asia often changed, and multiple “Asia’s” were created and evaluated by Australian leaders (Walker 48). For example, John Howard believed that Australia could be an intersectional society, and that it was possible to have good foreign relations with the region without having to engage with Asia in ways that would influence Australian culture. This view contradicts Rudd’s argument that Australians need to be “Asia
literate” and that Australia should adapt its foreign policy style to Asia (Johnson, Ahluwalia and McCarty 66).

Australia and the United States

The ANZUS Treaty places Australia in a unique position. On the one hand, ANZUS is an insurance policy in desperate military conditions and a resource by which Australia can gain important military technology. On the other hand, the alliance is considered a liability. If the United States were ever to lose influence in the region, then Canberra would have problems responding to first-order situations under a different global hegemon (Ungerer 2008 57). ANZUS is not a security guarantee, and Australia cannot influence the United States’ or alliance policies without its own substantial military force. However, Australia’s plan to pursue a self-reliant defense posture is predicated on continuing access to advanced US information and weapons technologies (Cotton and Ravenhill 43).

China will test Australia’s alliance with the United States. Australia currently maintains cooperative engagement with China, a relationship that is necessary if Australia is to remain economically competitive with the rest of the world. US reduction of globally deployed military personnel will force nations such as Australia to have more regionally based roles and alliances for security assurances (Tow 212). The high potential for conflict between the US and China means that there needs to be a more comprehensive set of amicable relations between Australia and China to ensure Australia’s safety. The question remains as to whether or not Australia can leverage its position as a potential mediator to ensure the stability of US-China relations.

Australia and China
Constructive engagement with China is central to Australia’s evolving relations with East Asia, primarily because China could be another “great and powerful friend.” Australia is similar to China in that it has a flexible foreign policy that coincides with China’s non-binding method of consensus and interpersonal ties (Ungerer 2008 193-4).

Australia’s relationship with China also places it in a precarious position. China’s increasing interest in developing its relationship with Australia was initially driven by focus on improving its relationship with neighboring countries. As a middle power, Australia was more attractive than other nations as a potential partner because it would never present a substantial threat against Chinese interests. However, Australia’s strong relationship with the US could place Australia in the middle of a political battle. The US has bases in Australia, and Australia has publicly declared its support for the US’ ballistic missile system, indicating that in the case of a military conflict, Australia would side with the US. Additionally, China’s only military alliance is with North Korea, making Australia a likely target to draw the United States into an Asia-Pacific conflict. Australia will have to use its diplomatic force to create insulation from the US-China tensions.

Australia and Japan

Trade and commercial linkages characterize the Australia-Japan relationship. Japan is one of Australia’s most important trading partners, and there are expectations of further trade liberalization between the two (Cotton and Ravenhill 73). A 2002 Joint Statement about the Australia-Japan Creative Partnership established that Australia supported Japan’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, affirmed commitment in East Timor, endorsed the expansion of security dialogue and cooperation, and promoted deeper economic
linkage between the two nations (ibid 75). Australia is also a member of a trilateral security dialogue mechanism with the United States and Japan. Neither Japan nor Australia initially wished to pursue a direct security alliance since bilateral consultations made the need for a formal alliance unnecessary (ibid 85). However, both countries agree that neither wants to be looked at as a direct agent of the US, even though both are tightly connected to superpower.

_Australia and India_

Australia’s interests in South Asia trail far behind its interests in East Asia. As a result, engagement with India has been characterized by neglect, since Australia has spent its focus, diplomatic capital, and money towards furthering relations with Japan, China, and Indonesia. The Australian government is, however, showing signs of growing rapprochement through official pronouncements that acknowledge India’s importance to Australia. The 2000 Defence White Paper recognized that India was growing in the wider Asia-pacific strategic system and urged establishment of dialogue (Mayer and Jain 139). _Force 2030_ also mentions India as a crucial ally in Australia’s foreign policy towards a rising Asia.

The major source of tension between these two nations, however, is Australia’s refusal to sell uranium to India. Despite India’s peaceful nuclear energy program and membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it still has a nuclear arsenal. India continues to press the Labour government to change its stringent policy, but Labour’s hard-line approach on nuclear and uranium issues prevent the likelihood of a reversal (ibid 141). Without this change, intensive bilateral security and strategic ties will not develop as quickly as is necessary.

_Australia and Indonesia_
The status of Australian relations with Indonesia depends on timing and leadership. Indonesia’s authoritarian regime under Sukarno during the 1950s and 60s damaged bilateral relations between the two nations because of irreconcilable differences in government structure. However, as Indonesia transitioned to a democracy in 1968, ties improved and are now in a position to be strengthened. The relationship has been influenced by a number of events, such as Australian intervention in East Timor, the Bali bombings, Australian aid after earthquakes in Aceh and Bantul in 2004 and 2006 respectively, and the recent flows of Indonesian asylum seekers to Australia (Sulistiyanto 118).

Priyambudi Sulistiyanto frames the Australia-Indonesia relationships through four perspectives. The geographical and historical proximity perspective argues that historically, these geographical neighbors have maintained relatively strong relations out of necessity. The political and strategic perspective argues that a stable Indonesia is an important partner for Australia not only because of political necessities, but also because all Australian exports require passage through Indonesia’s air and sea space. The identity and fear perspective argues that these two countries still do not “know” each other well. Australia has yet to figure out its identity, and fears that instability in Indonesia will cause a refugee overflow, creating anxiety. The final perspective is the domestic and foreign policy perspective, which recognizes the important connection between democracy, foreign, and domestic policy in the shaping of Australian-Indonesian relations (118-121).

Australia and South Korea

Full diplomatic relations between South Korea and Australia were established in 1961. In February 1962, the Republic of Korea Consulate-General in Sydney (opened in 1953) was
elevated to embassy status, and, in June 1962, the Australian Embassy in Seoul was opened. Australia and the ROK share key security interests in North Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, with peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula critical to the economic performance and security of both countries. Both nations’ high-level leaders meet on a regular basis, and the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force meet with South Korean forces to discuss specific strategies that each respective military branch can collaborate on (“Republic of Korea Country Brief” 2010). The Australia-South Korean relationship is steadily growing, as both nations are in the process of redefining themselves in the wake of a shifting power dynamic in the Asia-Pacific.

Australia and South Korea currently enjoy a strong relationship built around economic and strategic grounds and common interests. Australia provides South Korea with minerals, energy, raw materials, and travel and education services, as well as a market for South Korea petroleum, passenger vehicles, electronic goods and household appliances, as well as other manufactured goods. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is Australia's fourth-largest overall trading partner, have in 2009, the nations began negotiations for a free trade agreement. According to Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia and the ROK have common strategic interests, particularly in seeking a peaceful resolution to tensions on the Korean peninsula. Both countries have important alliances with the United States and both have made…efforts to secure regional security and stability…” (ibid).

Australian foreign policy is primed for further engagement with Asia, and a security community would greatly benefit its interests in the region. Its reliance on diplomacy and multilateral institutions also place it in a unique position to be a third-party mediator in the event of community-building. The following chapters will aid in deciding the proper course of action for Australia, and whether or not its involvement is even needed.
Chapter 2- The Methodology

This section explains my methodology for approaching the research questions. It begins with a description of my case studies and how those cases inform the master list of conditions that I will apply to the Asia-Pacific region. I conclude this chapter by defining the key concepts and terms that are used throughout the project.

Comparative Analysis: A Derivation of Deutsch’s Methodology

Determining the necessary conditions for building a security community requires looking at existing examples as Karl Deutsch did in 1957. He isolated scenarios such as the Hapsburg Empire, the US/Canada continental alliance, the British Isles, and the Scandinavian nations as successful security communities in which war was completely excluded as a tool of conflict resolution. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett continue Deutsch’s analysis by adding levels of development to the study of security communities, utilizing case studies of existing security communities to further their analysis. This thesis employs two case studies to determine the conditions necessary to build a security community to maintain consistency with the literature. These case studies were previously discussed by Adler and Barnett in 1998, but I apply them through a comparative methodology rather than the empirical analysis that Adler and Barnett use.

The Case Studies

This project examines two different security communities that are considered to be in the early stages of development as case studies, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The selection of these two different case studies reflects the differences in diplomatic styles between the East and
the West. Additionally, these cases reflect Australia’s two divergent foreign policy strategies of dependence on great powers and self-reliance in the form of multilateral engagement with Asia. Earlier in the research process, I had considered using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a Western case study. However, NATO’s collective defense doctrine would not be suitable in a study of security communities because war and the use of force are not considered options for conflict resolution, whereas collective defense implies that it can be.

The OSCE, initially called the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was created through mediation to reconcile differences and to restore international order during the post-Cold War détente period. Mediation by third-parties was used not only to bring the two warring factions to the negotiating table, but also to ensure that any changes made in the European political system would positively affect the rest of Europe. The OSCE is an ad hoc organization under the United Nations Charter Chapter VIII concerned with early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE’s provisions are non-binding, and allow for flexibility in the evolution of improved cooperation to avoid disputes or sanctions over implementation. This style of diplomacy also allows signatories to recognize that treatment of citizens within their borders is also a matter of legitimate international concern.

The membership of the OSCE has grown tremendously since its formation, and extends beyond Europe to include nations like Canada. While the presence of a great power such as the US would appear to nullify some of its initiatives, the OSCE’s flexible nature of diplomacy and consultations places each nation in low-pressure situations, encouraging diplomacy and lowering the need to use physical force. The OSCE also has several cooperative partners in the
Mediterranean\textsuperscript{9} and in the Asia-Pacific\textsuperscript{10}, although those partners are not considered members and do not receive the membership benefits (OSCE Website 2010).

ASEAN was created in 1967 by its original five members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines) as a method of reducing war and increasing conflict management without being subject to coercive diplomacy from extra-regional great powers (Acharya 58). The founding members believed in communitarian security arrangements in the area as the solution to regional security and economic development. ASEAN is an instance in which the community was created by recognition of mutual interests, rather than aligning against a particular enemy.

The foundation laid by security-oriented ASEAN has also grown to include several other political and economic goals such as increased trade liberalization and political cooperation through other international institutions. This security community has also grown to include consulting members in China, Japan, and South Korea (known as ASEAN+3) and the ASEAN Regional Forum, which integrates extra-regional states such as the United States, Australia, and members of the European Union. ASEAN is considered to be in early stages of development because while the members have not gone to war with one another since its creation 1967, it has not yet developed a “we-feeling” that can prevent war or intervention as a stable source for stable peace.

The choice of these two cases reflects a need to hybridize Western and Asian ideals of community and security, since the norms of each of these regions are radically different. By

\textsuperscript{9} Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia

\textsuperscript{10} Japan, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Australia
looking at a successful European example, I can infer the conditions that are necessary to create a security community in an area that has slowly been integrating, exemplified by the European Union. European norms also differ substantially from Asian norms, and the political climate in Asia offers a point of opposition in Europe because there are multiple regional power-interactions in East Asia.

ASEAN is the sole security community in East Asia, thereby making it the only case study that I can use. Its membership is comprised of second and third world countries, and formed in different historical and political circumstances. Scholars have also argued that ASEAN exemplifies key aspects of Asian diplomatic norms, demonstrating how two different styles of international relations can interact. The history of a security community in the Asia-Pacific region will allow me to look at the conditions necessary for the community’s formation in Asia, which is easier and more appropriate to apply to the Asia-Pacific region.

There are, however, inherent tensions between these two cases that must be resolved. The first is the lack of applicability of liberal democratic peace theory. The OSCE’s formation remains consistent with the theory that democratic states are more inclined to maintain peace, but ASEAN’s history would have concluded that the possibility of a security community developing among those nations would be remote. The second tension is the difference in economic status between the two case studies. The original five ASEAN member-states were, and mostly still are, considered developing nations, complicating the comparison. The OSCE demonstrates that economic interdependence may facilitate the development of security communities because economic regionalism is considered a necessary precondition for regional integration. However, ASEAN members neither shared liberal democratic values, nor were they bound by a high degree of mutual economic interdependence (Acharya 35).
ASEAN government leaders and academic specialists believed in the early 1990s that the idea of cooperative security and the CSCE/OSCE would not function in Asia because the conditions that had facilitated the CSCE’s initial creation such as a well-defined alliance framework and rigid bipolarity, had been absent in Asia. The Asia-Pacific was considered too complex and diverse a region for CSCE-type arrangements (ibid 196). However, given the current security and political environment in the region, connections can be made to change the framework by which security communities can be evaluated.

Application of the Case Studies

Each case study undergoes a three-step evaluation. The first step is a historical analysis of the security community and examination of the initial triggers that pushed for its development, and how the security community has developed to address issues post-9/11. From that analysis, I ascertain a set of conditions that existed both for the creation of the particular example, as well as the maintenance and institutionalization of the security community from an alliance to a regional organization. I then look at the different norms created through the security community. This analysis not only informs the diplomatic means by which different regions conduct foreign policy, but also how the security community in the Asia-Pacific may or may not manifest.

The second methodological step consolidates the conditions presented in the case studies. Based on the different histories of the OSCE and ASEAN, I assume that the conditions will probably have minimal overlap. My goal is not to only find characteristic conditions in security communities in general, but also to make an evaluation of the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific to determine the most context-specific conditions. Creating a master list of conditions by taking all overlapping conditions and all conditions that apply to the region allows me to provide
a framework for my evaluation of a security community as a viable foreign policy strategy for Australia. Without a region-tailored list, I would be unable to determine how Australia could create the remaining unmet conditions because the master list would be too broad and universal and inadequate to answer my research question.

Once the master set of conditions is compiled, I determine whether or not those conditions obtain in the Asia-Pacific region in the final step. If all conditions are met, further analysis will predict how the security community would operate and how member nations would interact. If some conditions are not present, I will look at Australia’s foreign policy decisions and capabilities to answer the question of whether or not Australia can create the remaining conditions that are necessary for the security community.

**Key Terms and Concepts**

This paper employs several concepts that are critical to answer the research question. The definitions of these terms and concepts are contextualized in the literature and in relevant documents and studies pertaining to the topic of the paper.

*Security Community vs. Security Regime*

Deutsch defines a security community as a group of states which have developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and have ruled out the use of force as a method of conflict resolution. While this may seem unique, the idea of a security community is often conflated with a security regime. Amitav Acharya defines a regime as, “a group of states that cooperate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their assumptions about the behavior of other’s differences” (19). Members are neither wholly compatible nor wholly competitive. Security regimes react based on predictions
and perceptions of another state’s actions, while security communities rely on a degree of mutual trust and collective identity. War still remains an option because nations do not view the interests of the regime as their own, and self-interest guides decision-making (Collins 208).

A security community also differs from other security arrangements. It is distinct from an alliance or a defense community because an alliance is conceived and directed against a pre-recognized and commonly-perceived external threat. Security communities do not identify such a threat and have no joint defense mechanism. Threats may trigger states to form a security community; the purpose of the community is not to create a response to an external enemy. These communities also do not serve the function of a collective security arrangement, which deter war by punishing acts of aggression rather than through strong institutions and collective identity. Collective security systems usually require cooperation among major military powers of the international system, whereas security communities can emerge among any group of states (Acharya 21-22).

The Area: Asia-Pacific

A literal definition of the area defines the region as nations that border the Pacific Ocean and includes East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. In terms of institutions, “Asia-Pacific” seems to encompass ASEAN Plus 3 and the Pacific Islands Forum. The membership of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) convolutes the definition of the region since the area would extend north to Russia, as well as to South America. Force 2030 geographically defines the region from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean. Moreover, Kevin Rudd, the originator of the security community defines membership as United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia.

11 Force 2030 geographically defines the region from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean. Moreover, Kevin Rudd, the originator of the security community defines membership as United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia.
and the other states of the region (Asia Society 2008). These definitions are quite vague, but are shaped by the current and rising regional powers that Australia would like to integrate into a security community. Force 2030’s definition is not concrete, but this paper will utilize it for the purposes of analysis as the most contextual in Australia’s changes in foreign defense policy.

“Middle Power”

According to Carl Ungerer, a middle power is not necessarily defined by its physical size, but by its economy, military, and diplomatic capabilities. Middle powers are considered to have adequate capabilities, but not enough to compete with great powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Middle powers also have a preference for working through multilateral institutions and promoting international legal norms and a proactive use of their capabilities to promote selected outcomes that benefit their national interest (Ungerer 2007 539). Australia’s middle power approach has been historically used in the form of coalition building with other like-minded countries and focused on three concepts: nationalism, activism, and internationalism, which were described in the previous chapter. While these three concepts are found as foundations of Australian foreign policy, shifts towards a multilateral regional approach are consistent with Australia’s ranking as a middle power.

“Norms”

This paper speaks to norms and how the adoption of norms in security communities strengthens the ability for the community to foster stable peace. As discussed in Chapter 2, norms are ideas that are accepted by a community as regular practices or modes of thought. Norms do not describe how the world works, but rather how the world ought to be. These concepts are predicated on constructivism’s recognition that international reality is a social
construction. International actors are embedded in a structure that is normative and material and operate based on a set of assumptions that are considered acceptable by the international community and other global forces. Norms develop through mutual understanding and cognitive evolution. The more norms socialized and adopted by community-members, the more successful the community will be in consensus-building and developing mutual trust.

“Helpful Fixer”

The idea of the helpful fixer, while not explicitly labeled as such in the paper, will also be discussed throughout the literature. The invoking of this concept is especially true in the context of describing the role of third-party mediators and middle powers. The role of the helpful fixer can constantly be found in international relations. While not specific to middle powers in particular, helpful fixers are usually the most effective when undertaken by neutral and nonaligned nations and other less powerful states. One example is when the United States invaded Iraq under the guise of a helpful fixer, but through its democracy promotion campaign ended up setting progress back significantly for a few years. An example that proves the effectiveness of the role being taken by a smaller power, however, is the case of Finland in mediating between the US and USSR during the détente period of the Cold War. The specifics of the history of Finland’s diplomatic interactions will be discussed in the following chapter.

The helpful fixer is an important concept in answering the research question because it determines the role of Australia in the Asia-Pacific security community. Whether or not Australia can create the remaining conditions will be discussed later on in the paper, but the role of the helpful fixer is an important starting point in determining how a middle power can act in the Asia-Pacific security environment, whether it is a mediator, aid provider, or military presence.
Chapter 3- A Review of the Literature

The security community literature hybridizes theoretical discussions and political analysis. The theoretical aspect discusses variations of constructivist theories of international relations and range from basic understandings of the theory to regional security complex theory. Political analyses regarding security communities refer to multilateralism and the maintenance of regional institutions.

The reviewed literature covers three different stages of development regarding security community research: the earliest stage prior to the Cold War, the research published after the Cold War, and the potential for future research and analysis in the area of security communities. The literature review also examines the role of middle powers in international relations. I use the existing literature as a theoretical foundation by which my research expands upon. While I employ some empirical historical analysis as Deutsch and Adler and Barnett did, I depart from the literature by adding comparative analysis to the study of security communities.

Karl Deutsch and Security Communities

Karl Deutsch and his colleagues introduced the concept of a security community in 1957. Looking at several historical examples ranging from the Hapsburg Empire to the US-Canadian border, Deutsch examined the ways in which different nations interacted with each other with regards to issues of conflict resolution through transactions. His focus on the transactions among nations brought the attention of scholarship back to the processes and interactions between societies and states. According to scholars, these transactions and interactions generate reciprocity, new forms of trust, and the discovery of new interests and collective identities (Adler and Barnett et al 14).
A security community is defined as a group of nations that are integrated and have attained a sense of community and institutional order for long enough that conflict resolution is resolved through peaceful means, excluding the possibility of resorting to physical force (Deutsch 5). Within these communities, member nations’ governments must simultaneously balance the interests of the individual nation and the community at-large.

Deutsch isolates two different subsets of security communities: pluralistic and amalgamated. A pluralistic community is defined as a group of nations that use independent decision-making centers, such as the US-Canadian border, while an amalgamated community represents a formal merger into a single unit or entity, such as the fifty states of the United States merging into a single unit (ibid 6). This distinction is important because it offers two theoretical possibilities for the research question; the Asia-Pacific community could either be a group of sovereign nations united under common interests, or it could unify to create a single political unit under one government. While the latter is near impossible, Deutsch’s distinction provides insight to the different ways in which states interact, allowing for a broader discussion of alternate forms of organization in a security community.

Deutsch focuses his research primarily on the conditions and factors of success in amalgamated communities, which are harder to maintain than pluralistic communities because of a more rigid governmental structure. Amalgamation increases the degree of preoccupation with domestic affairs and reduces the ability of those governments to respond promptly and effectively to the needs and interests of governments and people outside national borders (ibid 25). Amalgamated communities are highlighted by a sense of “we-feeling,” or mutual trust and cooperation, and the recognition of community interests as national interests.
Conditions for an Amalgamated Community

Motivations for political behavior and the values and expectations held in states differ depending on the political context in which a nation is undergoing that particular decision-making process. The main values of a state can be determined from the internal politics of the participating units independently from the issue of union within broad margins of error. Values are most effective politically when incorporated into formal political institutions and in habits of political behavior which permitted these values (ibid 46-7). While motivations are highly important in catalyzing such a political change, Deutsch isolates several conditions that are necessary for the creation and maintenance of a successful amalgamated community.

Deutsch argues that the capabilities of the participating states need to be considered the most important when determining the success rate of a security community. The most important capability is an increase in political and administrative capabilities of the main states, or whether or not a nation has the ability to coordinate its internal structures to maintain membership in a multilateral institution (ibid 50). These capabilities can be diplomatic structures, departmental support, or overall intergovernmental coordination between states. In relation to the first condition, there must be the presence of unbroken channels of communication among units and the relevant strata within them. Members must also exhibit superior economic growth, or demonstrate that their economies are resilient relative to the rest of the world. Another condition is the broadening of the political, social, or economic elite, both in regard to its recruitment from broader social strata and to its continuing connections with them (ibid 52).

Deutsch’s last three conditions address the needs of the community at-large, and how the individual states need to act for the better of the community. The first of these is the access of
persons to mobility within the community. Historical examples of this can include most empires, while the European Union provides the best current example because citizens of EU states can move between individual sovereign states, as they are considered citizens of both their home state and the EU community (ibid 53). In addition, successfully amalgamated security-communities require a range of different common functions and services with different institutions and organizations to execute them (ibid 54). The final condition is the mutual predictability of behavior, a key aspect of common culture and common group character (ibid 55). Deutsch does not specify what this entails, or the extent of how these sentiments must be exercised in order to prove success, but it is expected that there must be a great degree of mutual predictability and commonality.

Conditions for a Pluralistic Community

Deutsch he does not provide as many conditions necessary for the creation of a pluralistic community because it follows less stringent rules than an amalgamated community. Pluralistic communities are made up of states that share similar interests, but operate as individual sovereign states. The compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making is of utmost important, since the community would resemble a military alliance. The participating states or governments must have the capacity to respond to each other’s needs quickly, adequately, and without resorting to violence. Finally, Deutsch reiterates the final point he made in his discussion of amalgamated communities by stating the need for mutual predictability of behavior, making joint decisions only about a more limited range of subject matters (67).

Deutsch also discusses the concept of functionalism, or a role that a state plays in the broader community, in relation to security communities. He explains that some governmental
functions are delegated by the states on a low or a high level of decision-making, reflecting a more selective and partial process rather than complete integration at the start of community formation (79). Deutsch argues that functionalism is a device that has been widely used both in successful and in unsuccessful movements toward amalgamation, somewhat as functional devolution and decentralization have been used in successful and in unsuccessful attempts at secession (81). This discussion of functionalism is Deutsch’s only theory of potential stages of a security community’s development.

**Democracy as a Condition**

Deutsch also discusses the need for democracy as a precondition to integration. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein argues that Deutsch made no distinction between inter and intra-state relations, but postulated that the world was made up of different political communities. He further states that democratization is the precursor to the development of a security community (346). Eberwein also argues that democracy is the single key component for integration of a political security community to succeed because it is the best way to enforce compliance and mutual respect. The more incompatibilities in governing structure, the more likely integration will fail because of corruption and the lack of potential to build trust. Michael C. Williams furthers this argument by arguing that liberal democracies are less likely to go to war with one another because they recognize each other and share common norms (528). While Deutsch, Eberwein, and Williams assume democratic peace theory’s resilience, their reliance on democracy as a fundamental need in a security community speaks to the lack of feasibility of building a security community with states that do not share similar governance structures.

**Limitations of Deutsch’s Analyses**
The biggest limitation to Deutsch’s arguments in relation to the research question is that his work dates back to 1957. As a result, all of his case studies date prior to the Cold War and include examples from the 1800s such as the post-revolutionary United States. Deutsch’s analysis also forgoes any comparison between security communities and other institutions that may qualify or be perceived as security communities. His analysis includes various methods of integration, such as the use of symbols and military alliances, but he seems to assume that integration would not be a long-term process and would occur rather quickly.

Deutsch’s analysis also falls short on a methodological level. He does not focus on the development of a security community, but rather on describing ones that are currently in existence. Additionally, his work is based on the study of empirical examples and discussing how they fit into his theory, rather than using a comparative method to demonstrate the distinctions between a security community and other security arrangements. I cannot draw directly from his work, but his analysis informs the theoretical foundation of my argument and allows me to build upon the literature, filling in gaps that Deutsch left in his initial analyses.

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett and Security Communities: Furthering Deutsch

The work of Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett reflects a modernization of Deutsch’s initial arguments, modifying the focus of security communities by looking at them through the lens of constructivist international relations theory. The two scholars also integrate the work of their colleagues by utilizing case studies from various regions. Adler and Barnett do not conduct regional analysis, but provide a framework by which to look at those case studies. The review of this body of literature starts with a summary of Adler and Barnett’s approach to security community studies. It then considers the conditions that are identified as necessary for the
creation of a security community. An analysis of the integration of constructivist ideologies and communitarian international relations follows, and concludes with the stages of development that security communities undergo.

Adler and Barnett’s analysis reflects the most recent scholarship about the theory of security communities and provides updated conditions necessary to build upon a security community. Their work also expands upon the different levels of development in security communities, looking at more recent examples. While Adler and Barnett and their colleagues maintain Deutsch’s use of empirical analysis, their choices for case studies informs my own case study selections. I chose to look at two nascent security communities, which are security communities in the earliest stages of development. Looking at this level of security community best reflects the security community in the Asia-Pacific as described in the research question.

A Change in Security Studies

The way in which states conceptualized security changed after the Cold War from merely looking at threats from other states to an examination of the way that external factors affect state security. Economic development/decline, social welfare, and the environment began posing threats to the security interests of sovereign states. The change in perspective also altered the method by which scholars chose to approach security communities. Theorists became interested in how the society of states might upgrade its norms from the recognition of each others’ right to survival to include the prohibition of a use a force and war as a method of achieving security (Adler and Barnett et al 11-12). Scholars argued that the expectation for peaceful change had to occur by a transformation at the international and individual level. While the “individual” level in this instance refers to states and state governments, Adler and Barnett also looked at the ways
in which society and citizens could contribute to the integration of actors in the international
arena. The question became whether or not transnational forces could shape interstate relations
and politics by forcing states to share values, norms, and a common identity through its political
practices.

Adler and Barnett argued that IR needed to be studied through a constructivist lens
noting, “Neoliberal institutionalism cannot explain how a community might be forged through
shared identities rather than through pre-given interests and binding contract alone, or interstate
and transnational interactions can alter state identities and interests” (11). Constructivism
recognizes that international reality is a social construction driven by collective understandings,
norms, and emerges from social interaction. Actors are embedded in a structure that is both
normative and material and allows for shared identities to be tied to stable peace (ibid 10).

Adler and Barnett are clear that a security community that heavily depends on
enforcement is not a security community, as security communities are defined by the degree of
cohesion and coherence among a population. A security community’s governance structure
depends on a state’s external identity and its domestic characteristics. Since states contribute to
the overall identity of a community, cohesion will depend on whether or not those individual
states can reconcile identity differences and can reach a sense of collective identity. States
comprising a security community are still sovereign, although their authority and legitimacy are
contingent upon the type of security community and its ability to interact within the community.
The more amalgamated the community is, the more the state’s role will be transformed to
become an agent of the various desires of the community (ibid 35-36).

*Conditions for a Security Community*
Adler and Barnett discuss the different conditions necessary for a security community in three tiers. While these three tiers do not all need to be met to spark the creation of a security community, they structure the different stages of security community development that will be discussed later in this chapter. The first tier that Adler and Barnett describe contains the precipitating conditions that motivate community-building. These conditions include technological developments, an external threat that causes states to form alliances, the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination and integration, new interpretations of social reality, and transformations in geopolitical patterns (38). Through these conditions, states have an incentive to promote face-to-face interactions, dialogue, and policy coordination.

The second tier of conditions groups together the factors that catalyze the development of mutual trust and collective identity. Adler and Barnett argue that these conditions, “…isolate the structural context in which states are embedded and… shape their interactions, and how these begin to transform their roles and worlds” (39). This tier approaches conditions from a more theoretical perspective and deals with the dynamic between power and knowledge. Power is identified as the central concept for understanding development, since it is necessary for a core state to be able to nudge and coerce others to maintain a collective stance. Powerful states that belong to the core do not create security communities, but orient security communities around them because of their influence (ibid 40.) One could argue that the ability of large nations to coerce others is antithetical to the idea of a security community. However, Adler and Barnett argue that eventually, collective identity and “we-feeling” will nullify the necessity of power and political domination. Knowledge constitutes the cognitive structures that are required for shared meanings and understandings. It represents the categories of practice, action, and legitimate activity that affect the socialization of community norms (40).
Organizations have a role in the building of mutual trust and cooperation, even if a security community does not transform into an international institution. Third-party organizations have the ability to act as mediators and foster communication between the parties. International institutions contribute to the development of security communities because they can promote social practice, norms, or material entities with logistical strengths and support by encouraging interaction and sharing amongst states. The more support an institution can provide, the more state action can include trust-building properties, teaching others the mutual interpretations of how to deal with certain situations and normative understandings. The greater the trust, the more likely the state has the capacity to engineer necessary conditions (ibid 41-3).

The third tier encompasses the necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change. These conditions are not based on political actions, but rather on the necessary steps that need to be taken in terms of interaction and identity for the security community to be sustainable. Mutual trust is the first of these factors, which Adler and Barnett define as believing despite the uncertainty in a community’s strategic environment (46). The constructivist perspective of security community studies states that the development of a security community would change the way that states view domestic and international security because they will no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust and can do so through knowledge and belief about the other members (ibid 46).

The second component of the third tier is collective identity. Identity refers to a state’s relationship to other states. All political identities are contingent and dependent on the actor’s interaction with others. Additionally, the state’s place within the international hierarchy can determine the ways in which threats and enemies are defined. Collective identities require that states not only identify with other state’s interests but also identify themselves as members of the
community, or the “we-feeling” that scholars mention. This sense of “we-feeling” can be pursued through confidence building measures to promote mutual trust. Confidence-building measures contribute to the gradual process of mutual interaction and collective identity that is necessary for a security community to thrive.

The Constructivist Ideology

The constructivist theory of international relations provides a necessary framework by which to view security communities. Constructivism recognizes that international reality is a social construction and that the security landscape is shaped by the actors that engage in it, and approaches international relations from the standpoint of norms, identity, and state interests. Thus, international relations are not created via structural concerns, but by social practice and interaction. Alexander Wendt calls two increasingly accepted basic tenets of Constructivism, "(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (1). It is a non-scientific, post-structuralist approach that does not view the world in a static lens, as realism and neoliberal institutionalism do.

Constructivist scholars have been prominent in resurrecting Deutsch’s concepts, arguing that IR scholarship needs to recognize the social character of politics. State identities are sources of state interests, and as such, the purpose for which power is deployed is constantly in flux. Security communities are built based on how well institutional agents can reconcile cultural similarities and distances (ibid 12).
Constructivism also views the world as dynamic. The world is constantly changing, and not all statements have the same epistemic value. Constructivists adopt the more holistic view that individuals’ identities and interests do not make sense outside of the communities that they belong in and apart from collective understandings and practices. Pragmatic and contingent knowledge is achievable and communities can become transnational because of knowledge dispersal. As such, one can conclude that security communities are transnational regions whose members practice the norm of peaceful change and agree that conflict resolution must occur through peaceful means, reflecting the view that norms and state identities must adapt to create meaningful change.

This ideology represents the middle ground of international relations theory. It looks not only at human actions, but also reconciles the material, subjective, and intersubjective worlds and how they interact in the social construction of reality. While these are often conceived of in terms of collective meanings and identities, the ideas are the medium and propellant of social action, and knowledge-based practices are the outcome of interacting individuals who act purposely on the basis of personal ideas and interpretations.

*Communitarian International Relations*

The communitarian approach to international relations represents a subset of constructivist ideology. Constructivism emphasizes the role of the social construction of knowledge in the construction of social reality, and evaluates both agents and structures as the starting point and focus for analysis (Adler 4). Communitarianism looks at human beings as members of multiple and sometimes overlapping communities. These communities, while different, share a common identity, values and norms, and face-to-face interactions. Individuality
and subjectivity depends on the social context and contribute to the community (ibid 5).

Communitarians believe that the normative communitarian perspective rests on a notion of association based on solidarity, and that mutual recognition of shared identities are best achieved through a community (ibid 9).

Communitarians view the building of communities of practice as evolution through the process of social learning. A community of practice is a group of people, or in the case of this project, states, who are informally and contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice as a function of mutual engagement (ibid 15). Learning is defined as, “...the evolution of background knowledge or the substitution of one set of conceptual categories to give meaning to reality for another such set. Learning thus requires the creation of new knowledge” (ibid 20). Individuals draw upon the evolving structure of background knowledge to build upon their own subjectivities and alliances to communities through negotiating the meanings of experiences of membership. In a transnational context, communities of practice have boundaries in which national allegiances may never meet, but the practices of the community are based off of the language of cooperative security (ibid 24).

Formation of norms and identities in communities of practice occur through a process of cognitive evolution. Cognitive evolution is a process in which external conditions motivate the changing of ideologies and political assumptions about issues related to international phenomenon, such as conflicts and conflict resolution (ibid 58). In order to achieve an area of activity that is routine or institutionalized, states need to create new orders through instability by reconciling the new ideas and knowledge that are required to respond. Adler argues that foreign policy is a process by which intellectual innovations are carried by domestic institutions and politically selected to become the normative set of understandings of what it takes to advance the
nation (71). Cognitive evolution replaces the cause-effect and end-means relationships that collectivities accept as true, leading to new political, military, and economic strategies, such as the use of a security community to ensure international security (ibid 74). This re-conceptualization of the international system allows for the emergence of new values and a change in expectations regarding the outcomes for the agent.

Applications of Communitarianism to Security Communities

The security community is an example of a political manifestation of communitarian international relations. Security communities are socially constructed cognitive regions of states that are territorially and politically organized and take their identity cues from the community-region. These liberal community-regions become security communities because of mutual understandings, a shared sense of identity, and the common notion of inhabiting a non-territorial region. States are not viewed as an abstract individual unitary actor. Community-regions are not limited to specific geographic places, but are made up of states whose common identities and interests are constituted by shared understandings and normative principles other than territorial sovereignty (ibid 188).

The norms and practices of security communities are derived through mutual understandings. When institutionalized, security communities socialize states into adopting selected liberal practices through power or shared meanings that embody the identities, interests, and practices of states as well as the conditions that confer, deter, or deny access to goods and benefits. Membership is not achieved through power, but rather the authority and legitimacy that other states view each other as part of the community and the ability to abide by the cognitive normative structure of the region. States perceive threats when their authority is challenged or their existence is endangered, but also when the understandings of the community are threatened.
The development of a security community is favored where the expected utility of peace exceeds war, such as through technological and economic development, and when the perception of war is an inefficient tool of conflict resolution.

**Divisions of Security Communities**

As mentioned previously, Deutsch describes two different types of security communities in his 1957 work, and categorized security communities to be either pluralistic or amalgamated. Adler and Barnett use Deutsch’s framework as a springboard for further examining the different levels those security communities can be evaluated on. Specifically, Adler and Barnett change from Deutsch’s focus on amalgamated security communities to analyzing pluralistic security communities, which are transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Pluralistic security communities can be categorized according to their depth of trust, and the nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance systems.

Pluralistic security communities appear in two different manifestations: loosely-coupled and tightly-coupled. Loosely-coupled security communities only observe the minimal definitional properties. All parties practice self-restraint, and do not expect bellicose activities, such as a peace agreement between two states. There are certain expectations on either end to maintain peace and stability, but there is minimal “we-feeling,” shared norms, and practices that enforce collective identity.

Tightly-coupled security communities utilize mutual aid and collective system arrangements, and possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional and centralized government. An example of a tightly-coupled security community could
be the European Union; each state is sovereign, but there is a sense of collective identity and
general diplomatic norms that are enforced, as well as various institutions that serve to organize
and to coordinate the members of the region without a central European government. (Adler and
Barnett, 1998, 30)

*Stages of Development*

Adler and Barnett also expand on Deutsch’s analysis of security communities by
describing three developmental stages that describe the possible trajectory of the community in
the future. The first and earliest stage of security communities is the nascent phase. It is during
this phase that state governments begin to consider how to coordinate relations in order to
increase their mutual security, lower transaction costs, and encourage further diplomatic,
bilateral, and multilateral exchanges (ibid 50). Governments are not seeking to create a security
community at this time. This phase also describes the trigger mechanisms that force states to
consider alternate security practices. While there can be several potential triggers, the most
common is a mutual security threat between several states, in which a strategic alliance based on
cooperative security is necessary to maintain security with mutual benefits for all parties.
Homogeneity of state interests is not a symptom of this stage, but can occur in order to bolster
association and interaction. Interactions are not conducted directly between nations, but mostly
likely through institutions that can help to institutionalize reciprocity, identify common interests,
and produce charters and agendas to bring the facilitation of trust (ibid 51-2).

The second phase that Adler and Barnett describe is the ascendant phase. The ascendant
phase is highlighted by increasingly dense networks of state-to-state interaction evidenced by the
creation of new institutions and organizations that reflect tighter military cooperation and
coordination, or a mutual decrease in fear. Cognitive structures promote state interactions and there is a deepening level of mutual trust that facilitates the emergence of collective identities with the goal of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Regional identity and regionalist politics begin to appear, and states are driven by social learning which increases the knowledge that individuals in states have about each others’ interpretations, building regional support from the grassroots level (ibid 53-4).

The final phase is the mature phase, representing the highest ideals of a security community. The mature phase is highlighted by the institutionalization of expectations in domestic and supranational settings, and war becomes improbable between the members of the community. Multilateralism, unfortified borders, changes in military planning, common definition of threats, and discourse and the language of community define this developmental stage. Mutual aid becomes a matter of habit, and national identities are merged. Military strategies such as power balancing, nuclear deterrence, and threats of retaliation are only used to defend against outsiders. There is a movement towards cooperative and collective security, military integration, policy coordination against internal threats, and a free movement of populations (ibid 56-7).

Alternative Security Communities

The study of security communities extends beyond the work of Adler and Barnett, and there are literary discussions about different forms of security communities and different mechanisms to ensure the expectation of peace. The new literature adapts to the current political environment by addressing the role of great powers in security communities and the possibility of orienting a security community around multiple great powers. The role of great powers varies
across regions, and sometimes great powers are crucial to manage regional institutions. Great powers often determine the interests of the security policies within the community, and the great power’s preferences will often be the primary director of community norms. Of the great power-based security communities, three are the most present in the literature: a hegemonic regional order, a balance of power system, and a concert of great powers.

A hegemonic regional order is one in which a single great power plays a leading role managing regional security relations. A great power acts as a regional hegemon, and the role can be filled by either a global hegemon or a regional power. The great power can adopt the approach of a balancer that ignores the policies of particular nations, but seems to maintain the stability of the system. The great power could also lead a Bismarckian alliance system which utilizes a network of alliances with smaller powers in the region. A hegemonic regional order depends on a great power which has the motivation and capability to deal with security externalities and to mobilize resources that help to pursue a hegemonic role (Lake and Morgan 132-133).

A balance of power system places great powers against each other in a competitive system; that is, it forces two or more great powers to balance each other internally or through alliances. The greater the economic, ethnic, or ideological ties exist between the powers, the more likely commitments are to be credible and conflict to be avoided. This system is particularly dangerous because states are still in competition with one another. It can be argued that the lack of “we-feeling” and mutual trust negates its prospects as a security community. Multipolar balances increase the complexity and of diplomatic relations and the risk of miscalculation because of the confusion about commitments of coalition partner.
The third type of security mechanism is a concert of great powers. This system is comprised of two or more great powers agreeing to collaborate on maintaining order and security in the region (ibid 136). A concert can only be achieved if the great powers do not view each other individually or in coalition as an immediate threat, accept the foreseeable future via their own sovereignty and security interests, and agree not to attack each other and to come to the assistance of one attacked (ibid 174). The concert establishes a set of norms about cooperative state behavior, encourages cooperation, and gathers information for transparency, creating disincentives for defection (ibid 267). While the focus of this system is on the great powers, small states become members to support broadly-based collective security mechanisms at both the systemic and regional level because they acquire both assurances from great powers and protection under security umbrellas.

**Middle Power Diplomacy**

There is little literature on the role of middle powers in the context of security communities, since the focus is on great powers and whether or not they can integrate properly. It is assumed that middle powers comprise the group of smaller states that will naturally fall in place with the interests of great powers because they lack the ability to challenge those great powers on a diplomatic or military level. The definition for a middle power is often in flux, however, as there is no standard criteria for evaluation besides the fact that the nation is neither a superpower nor a third-world country. One common characteristic, however, is a commitment to multilateral institutions, the rule of law, and norms constraining the use of power (Manning Clark House 5).
There is substantial literature on the role of mediators and neutral powers and how they can contribute to the creation of unions, particularly alliances and alliance formation. Security communities transcend the basic norms of an alliance, but the same concepts of middle power mediators are still relevant. The theoretical core of this literature asserts that alliances form as a response to external threats or imbalances of power. Alliances are believed to influence the behavior of states outside the alliance, and can involve an exchange of resources between allies rather than the effort at pooling capabilities.

The mediator role is most often fulfilled by a middle power because it is considered a less polarizing agent. The mediator in an international crisis or a perceived threat is usually allied with one of the disputants. Neutral mediators must be able to transcend the rhetoric of the parties. While this impartiality may never be an available option, there are four hypotheses presented by Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane and Celeste Wallendorf that discuss the role of the mediator in several circumstances. The first hypothesis states that the more unequal the mediator’s alliance ties to the disputants, the lower the probability that mediation will be successful. This implies that only weak states can make good mediators, but middle power states may have the necessary resources without needing to threaten to use force as a method of conflict resolution. The lack of balance between the mediator and the disputants means that mutual trust and collective identity cannot be met, increasing the level of potential miscalculation and misjudgment (Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallendorf 112).

The second hypothesis is that the greater the mediator’s military capability, the lower the probability that the mediation will be successful. Coercive tactics by the mediator will reduce the mutual trust because great powers will perceive the mediators as a threat. The lower military capability is conducive to a trust-oriented approach that ensures that war will not be probably
since the war-making capacity of the community is net lower. Coercive tactics only emphasize a loss of trust and an increase in suspicion and misperception. The third hypothesis relates to the idea of coercion and posits that relationships exist between the coerciveness of the mediator’s strategy and mediation success, stating the opposite of the above hypothesis. Moderately coercive strategies will be successful. An alliance represents a promise to intervene with military force on behalf of an alliance partner, but the promise of aid can be valuable, providing a deterrent effect because they represent costly signals of intent. While communities may not conduct war between the members of the community, international perception of the community can still prove to be a potential deterrent factor because of the mixed membership of great and middle powers (ibid 113-114).

The final hypothesis states that the more unequal the mediator’s alliance ties to the disputants, the higher the probability that mediation will be successful, contradicting the first hypothesis. The argument here is that powerful allied mediators may be particularly capable of persuading the disputants in an international crisis to settle. Third-party states are more likely to be deterred by the threat of a powerful mediator which is allied to its opponent. The inequality of the alliance bonds the mediator and disputants interact with the military strength of the mediator. In the context of a security community, this may decrease the amount of trust, but may be the primary mechanisms by which to encourage states to negotiate. The hypothesis does not represent a sustainable strategy, but can be the necessary first step to encourage community building (ibid 117-119).

The literature on security communities provides a theoretical basis by which my research can expand upon. Past work informs my project, but I take a different approach to the study of
security communities and apply this method to a particular region in an attempt to explore future possibilities.
Chapter 4- The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world’s largest intergovernmental organization. It is comprised of 56 member states from Europe, the Caucasus, North America and Central Asia, and was originally created during the Cold War as an East-West forum for negotiation. The OSCE is a regional arrangement under Charter VIII of the UN Charter (Wohlfeld 100). It has evolved from a diplomatic mechanism to a full-fledged security community with its own norms and community identity.

The coordination of positions among OSCE participating states reflects geographic proximity and common interests. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, human rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections, and implements missions concerned with early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in sub-regional contexts. OSCE missions are intended to be cost-effective, timely, and flexible on a broad range of issues and develop tailor made mandates and a pragmatic and goal-oriented cooperation on specific issues. The OSCE also coordinates with other groups for their decision-making process such as the EU and its ten associated states, NATO, the GUAM group, the Baltic States, Central European states, and five Central Asian states (ibid 101-102).

The history of the OSCE provides a unique case study for analyzing the conditions necessary to catalyze the development of a security community, particularly, a set of Western standards by which norms can be built during community creation. This section first analyzes the history of the OSCE’s development and the presence of third-party mediators, and then derives a list of the conditions necessary for the creation of a security. It concludes with a discussion of the standards and norms of Western diplomacy.
History of the OSCE

The history of the OSCE, originally called the Commission on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE), reflects a constant cycle of negotiation. The idea for a European security conference for the Four Great Powers (US, USSR, United Kingdom, and France) was proposed by the USSR in 1954 (US Mission to the OSCE). The Commission was meant to encompass the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force, consulting other states in the event of a danger of armed attack, and collective security arrangements (Leatherman 55). The US and its allies initially rejected the proposal, not only because it was offered as a replacement for NATO but also because the Eastern and Western blocs could not maintain a level of trust between them during the Cold War. However, in the 1960s, NATO countries began to pursue a multilateral détente process in Europe within the status quo power structures rather than through a cross-bloc, transformative European solution (ibid 66).

Both the US and USSR defined the easing of tensions in terms of limits on their confrontation and competition. They committed to preventing the development of situations capable of causing an exacerbation of relations and avoiding military confrontations, recognizing that efforts to pursue conflicting unilateral advantages were inconsistent with their initial objectives (ibid 8). The Commission represented an establishment of an institutionalized body that would work on multilateral negotiations and the inclusion of the principles contributing to the free movement of people, ideas and information.

The 1970s: The Establishment of the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act

The creation of the CSCE culminated after several months of prior negotiations and dialogue in the 1970s. Between late-1972 to mid-1973, preparatory talks in Dipoli, Helsinki...
created a framework by which diplomatic negotiations could occur called the “Blue Book.” After six months of negotiations, the first round the CSCE dialogue occurred on July 3, 1973. The Foreign Ministers of 35 participating states discussed their goals for European security, and adopted the Blue Book. After two more years of negotiations and advising from experts, 35 world leaders, including U.S. president Gerald Ford and U.S.S.R. Communist Party General Security leader Leonid Brezhnev, signed the Helsinki Final Act (CSCE/OSCE Timeline).12

The Helsinki Final Act organized three areas of diplomatic activity into categories called “baskets.” These baskets provided a structural organization to CSCE’s areas of discussion. Basket One outlined the recommendations for European security and included the ten basic principles of the CSCE/OCSE13, guidelines for a cooperative security system based on confidence-building measures, disarmament, and mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Basket Two created the framework for economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation, and stressed the elimination of restrictions to trade, industrial cooperation, and transfers of technology. Basket Three addressed the human dimension and provided the framework for humanitarian and development issues (Adler and Barnett et al 123).

The 1980s: Follow-Ups and Confidence and Security-Building Measures

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12 The full list of signatories of the Helsinki Final Act is as follows: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the USA and Yugoslavia.

13 The ten basic principles are: Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, Refraining from the threat or use of force, Inviolability of frontiers, Territorial integrity of States, Peaceful settlement of disputes, Non-intervention in internal affairs, Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, Equal rights and self-determination of peoples, Co-operation among States, Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law (OSCE/CSCE Timeline)
Two types of events define the CSCE’s development in the 1980s: follow-up meetings and the introduction of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). The second follow-up meeting occurred in Madrid, Spain from November 1980 to September 1983\(^{14}\), and set an agreement to hold a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, scheduled to begin in Stockholm in January 1984 (ibid).

The Stockholm Conference opened on January 17, 1984, "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament" (ibid). The meeting accomplished this goal by implementing safeguards and transparency measures to discourage using of force to resolve conflicts. The Stockholm Conference strengthened the provisions on CSBMs originally set out in Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act. The measures adopted and expanded were: refraining from the threat or use of force, prior notifications of military activities, invitations of observers for military activities, and an exchange of annual calendars of military activities. It also mandated compulsory inspections for increased transparency and verification, increasing arms control in Europe (ibid).

The third follow-up meeting in Vienna in 1986 served as a review of the CSCE’s progress. During the three year meeting, the Foreign Ministers discussed the advances made in the Stockholm Conference regarding CSBMs. It was agreed that negotiations would begin on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) between the 23 CSCE- participating states that were members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact.

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\(^{14}\) The first follow-up meeting was held in Belgrade in 1978 and reiterated the goals of the Final Act. No significant new policies were drafted. (CSCE/OSCE Timeline)
The 1990s: Transition to the OSCE

The second round of CSBM negotiations resulted in more efforts to increase military transparency between member states, as was documented by the 1990 Vienna Document. These efforts broadened the scope of mutual information exchange, including an obligation to provide the following information on an annual basis: existing military forces, planned deployments of weapons systems, and military budgets. It also introduced an Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, which would discuss the application and implementation of the CSBMs. As a result of the CFE talks, the legally-binding Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed by 22 participating States in Paris in 1990. This complex instrument aimed at establishing a military equilibrium at a lower level between the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact states by providing ceilings on the number of military vehicles and aircraft each side could have (ibid).

The end of the Cold War signaled a shift in the CSCE’s negotiations towards institutionalization. This desire was presented during the Second Heads of State Summit in Paris in November 1990. The final document of the Summit, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, functionally formed the CSCE into an institution by establishing a Secretariat, an Office for Free Elections, and a Conflict Prevention Center, and by creating an infrastructure for an international organization. In 1992, the CSCE also expanded its membership to include ten former Soviet states, and changed the Office for Free Elections to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Finally, in Budapest in 1994, the CSCE formally became institutionalized as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The 2000s: Adapting to New Threats
The OSCE was built on binding political agreements and depended on political consensus, but its mandate underwent a process of redefinition after identifying international terrorism as a major threat post-9/11. The Bucharest Plan of 2001 publicly declared that the OSCE would not remain neutral in the fight against terrorism, and provided a mandate for establishing the Action against Terrorism Unit in the existing OSCE Secretariat (Gheciu 123). This Unit did not have military power, but was a new branch of the Secretariat tasked with organizing the OSCE’s response to acts of terrorism. In the 2002 Porto Ministerial Council, the Organization strengthened its anti-terrorist regime by adopting the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, and the OSCE Declaration on Trafficking in Human Beings, both of which placed emphasis on protecting human dignity and human rights in the context of the broader war on terrorism (CSCE/OSCE Timeline).

After the first two meetings in the new millennium, the OSCE adopted a new form of risk-management to account for the fluid security environment of the decade. The OSCE proposed mechanisms for rapidly managing the plurality of ill-defined risks presented by transnational organized terrorist groups. This streamlining occurred during the 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council, when the OSCE enhanced its capacity to prevent terrorism by adopting the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, a strategy designed to increase the transparency of information and to better coordinate counter-terrorism measures (CSCE/OSCE Timeline). During the 2004 Ministerial Council of Sofia, participating states reaffirmed their commitment to terrorism prevention and to address factors that engender conditions in which terrorist groups are able to recruit and win support (Gheciu 124). It is important to note that the OSCE does not have the capabilities to carry out military
operations, as that would undermine its values as a security community, so all anti-terrorism efforts are undertaken at the diplomatic level.

The Role of Third-Party Mediators in OSCE Development

The OSCE’s creation succeeded because of the role of Neutral and Nonaligned (N&N) third-party mediators. N&N had a stake in overcoming the divisions of the Cold War and to promote their own interests through consensual agreements (Leatherman 12). After formal CSCE negotiations began in 1973, N&N began to intervene in the CSCE as a group of countries and to coordinate their third-party initiatives by assuming two major responsibilities: forging consensus and securing the results against backsliding (ibid 119). Third-party coercive intervention can often impede the institutionalization of cooperation because of animosity generated through coercion, but it proved to be effective for producing important intermediate results in the context of the CSCE/OSCE. These functions extended into the post-agreement phase of international negotiations, and proved to be critical for the further development of cooperation over mitigating competitive behaviors and for institutionalizing principles and mechanism of peaceful change (ibid 14-15).

The Normative Theory of Mediation

A third-party’s normative influence varies with its interests and power base, which determine the third-party’s role as either a principal or neutral mediator. Principal mediators have indirect interests in the issues of negotiation, but have a stake in promoting a given outcome to the conflict. They limit the disputants’ interaction and control the flow of communication with each disputant bilaterally. Neutral mediators have no interests at stake and no resources to alter the payoff structure, thus target the disputants’ interact by exploring modes of information
transfer, clarification, and identification of interests. These mediators promote direct interaction (ibid 27). Third-party sensitivity to the main sources of contention between the disputants is important in shaping the way it chooses to intervene and its influence potential.

Janie Leatherman articulates three different mediation strategies: coercive, instrumental, and facilitative. Coercive mediators use “sticks” and build on the model of mediation as a dominant third-party power broker. Coercive mediators enforce norms with low sensitivity, a high level of resources, and indirect interest to the conflict. These mediators usually supply unilateral normative mechanisms of control that inhibit further conflict, but do not transform underlying problems. Additionally, coercive mediators have a variety of resources available to make threats or to offer incentives to bring disputants to an agreement that favors the mediator’s normative preferences and goals (32-36).

Instrumental mediators take a different approach to mediation and to promote norm resolution. These mediators have a position on the issues at stake, lack resources relative to the disputants, and have considerable status and a sense of direction. Leatherman refers to them as “norm entrepreneurs,” who criticize the status quo and try to change the rules of the game (35). Instrumental mediators need to promote solutions that respond to both substantive and political criteria. They are better suited for transforming relations because they have ideational commitments to spreading new norms that address problems of injustice and other obstacles to positive peace. Instrumental mediators propose new solutions or alternative frames to conflict issues and institute CSBMs (ibid 40).

The final mediation strategy is that of a facilitative mediator. Facilitative mediators are likely to make the greatest adjustments in their position, and can change their positions several
times to gain the trust of all parties. They may adopt a problem-solving or emancipator approach to intervene and to inhibit conflict escalation that poses a threat to the international system. Facilitators work to change the confrontation among the adversaries by promoting their direct interaction and focus on assisting the parties to reach an agreement within the framework of the terms that both sides propose (ibid 36-40). Facilitators also help parties overcome pre-negotiation obstacles when the order for treating the issues at stake is in question (ibid 42).

*The Role of Middle Powers and Third Parties: Finland*

Third-party mediators aided the creation and institutionalization of the OSCE. Two nations illustrate this mediator role: Sweden’s used its active neutrality policy as a means of challenging the status quo superpower mentality. Finland followed by using its leverage and non-aligned position to not only aid in establishing a new normative order, but also to satisfy its own interests within the negotiation process. While both of these nations took steps to mediate, Finland decided to change its limited foreign policy approach of working within prevailing power structures to promote stability and change, thus becoming the primary mediator in the CSCE/OSCE process (ibid 78). In the 1960s Finnish President Urho Kekkonen began promoting and strengthening Finland’s credibility as a neutral power in the United Nations to assist in solving problems as a bridge-builder between factions.

Finland’s initiative to host the CSCE was informed by a set of political, economic, strategic, and cultural considerations for more active engagement. The Nordic nation questioned what it meant to be European and how it affected the détente process, which helped Finland to establish ties across ideological lines to bring both the East and the West to the negotiating table. Finland’s push to host the Commission also satisfied an internal motivation to promote Finland’s
neutrality. Institutionalizing international norms and cooperation between the blocs would
cement its neutrality policy, increasing its international credibility as a conflict resolver. (ibid, 86-87) This nonaligned and friendly stance allowed Finland to gain entry into the détente process as a third party, gaining the trust of both the West and the Soviet Union.

Finland’s neutral mediation strategy promoted the development of the negotiation process. It maintained that it did not want to address questions of substance, but acted as a facilitative mediator to create a low-risk environment for those questions to be discussed. During the first phase of negotiations at the Helsinki Conference in 1969, President Kekkonen conducted bilateral explorations with leaders in capitals across Europe and North America to procure information relevant to the negotiation process, such as their goals for negotiation. Kekkonen transitioned from bilateral to multilateral consultations after gathering the necessary information, concluding with a proposition for commencing formal consultations in Helsinki on November 22, 1972 (ibid 110).

The Finnish approach used consensus-building as the principal tool to accompany its strategy of engendering incremental commitment to overcome the problems of organizing a multilateral approach. The Consensus Rule was a method of making decisions, and defined as the absence of any objection expressed by a representative, and putting forward as constituting an obstacle to the making of the decision in question (ibid 115). The Consensus Rule ensured that great powers would not be subject to the tyranny of the small, but also that small nations would have a place in the negotiation. The norm-generating capacity of this rule carried the potential for forming an international regime to reduce threats and to build peace based on cooperation rather than conflict. Finland examined the positions and attitudes of the different
governments, making practical proposals wherever possible to bring about the convening of the Eastern and Western blocs.

The neutral and nonaligned states were among the most insistent negotiators, lending their weight to ensure the inclusion of issues related to human contacts and other humanitarian issues while guaranteeing that they could deal with military and political security. The non-bloc states emphasized common interests, devised innovative policy options to overcome obstacles to negotiations, and made deals for salient options by suggesting concessions that the blocs could make to reach consensus. Non-bloc states such as Finland contributed to the West’s effort to elaborate a system of CSCE governance that applied to the political-military and humanitarian dimensions of relationships, shaping common understandings among adversaries on more universal commitments, and ensuring that the structure of obligations created in the CSCE would be multilateral rather than a bipolar. N&N nations supported the creation of a forum, and emerged as a grouping in third-party roles of both instrumental and facilitative mediation.

The Conditions Triggering OSCE Development

The history of the OSCE provides a set of Creation Conditions that is crucial when examining the Asia-Pacific security environment and the role that Australia plays in the creation of existing unmet conditions.

A historical analysis of the OSCE presents three sets of conditions that pertain to the creation of a security community, ranging from state-external conditions to the internal affairs and self-interest of the states in the region. The three different subsets are: the conditions that affect the potential members of the community, the conditions that describe the political
condition of the region, and the conditions that must be fulfilled by the third-party mediators/middle powers.

The potential members of the community must meet a few conditions to ensure that a security community is a feasible option for regional security. The first major condition is that states need to orient their foreign policies to a more multilateral posture. This is not to say that states need to rely solely on international institutions, but rather that there needs to be movement towards building security relations with other nations. In the case of the OSC, the states involved in the Cold War began pursuing a policy of détente, easing relations and shifting away from isolationist politics. The second condition is a desire for a mutual agreement. States cannot merely pursue bilateral relations, but needs to be prepared to participate in a security institution. There also must be a framework for interaction. A framework for mediation such as a model or a Track I or Track II diplomatic mechanism does not have to be in place, but a method of mediation need to be in place. In the case of the OSCE, the “Blue Book” was utilized, but regional diplomacy differs in style, and thus the method of mediation will vary depending on the region.

There are two conditions that must exist in the security environment of the region in question. The first of these two conditions is that there needs to be an existing threat or fear that catalyzes the need for states to pursue a new multilateral security arrangement. Threats are not limited to wartime or post-war détente as in the case of the OSCE. The US and the USSR were strategically exhausted and could seek relief in a community arrangement. Rising powers, rogue states, or residual tension can also force states to change their foreign policy strategies in order to

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15 Track I diplomacy refers to official governmental diplomacy, and Track II diplomacy is a specific kind of informal diplomacy, in which non-officials (academic scholars, retired civil and military officials, public figures, and social activists) engage in dialogue, with the aim of conflict resolution, or confidence-building.
implement preemptive diplomacy or to integrate the threat to prevent future conflicts. The second condition that must apply to the region is the presence of a regional power. The OSCE case offers two powers since the world was in a bipolar order at the time, but the two powers were able to mobilize other nations into joining the community because it would be advantageous for smaller states to do so. Creating a security community around one or more regional/global powers is necessary because it would be in the interest of states to participate, therefore expanding the no-war zone.

The last subset of conditions describes the role of third-party and middle power mediators. First, there needs to be a third-party state willing to be a mediator. While the OSCE case does not indicate that the mediator has to be considered a middle power, Finland meets the conditions to be a middle power because it had a middle-sized military and a diplomatic style that relied on multilateral institutions. The Asia-Pacific world will most likely have multiple competitive regional powers or rising powers, thus a middle power would serve as the best mediator because it would be perceived as both credible and non-threatening. Second, the mediator must be either an N&N nation, as Finland was, or be aligned and have established diplomatic relations with several, if not all, major players in the region. The third-party will most likely have an interest in peaceful conflict resolution, but also have other self-interests that would be best served by bringing several powers to the negotiating table. Moreover, the third-party mediators need to have the diplomatic capabilities and diplomatic capital to initiate negotiations with the potential member nations, as Finland did before the Commission convened.

The Establishment of Western Security Norms
The role of the OSCE extends beyond maintaining security in Europe and includes the socialization of Western security and diplomatic norms. Its infrastructure and development model allow for flexible actions and adaptability whilst building a community based around mutual trust and integration. Norms are an important part in the creation of a security community because the success of the community depends on whether or not the member nations agree to similar interests and values. These norms inform the potential for conditions to be met in a given region and provide the foundation for a goal that can be worked towards through diplomacy.

*The Six Characteristics of the OSCE Community-Building Model*

Emmanuel Adler isolates six characteristics that distinguish the OSCE’s security community-building model from other military alliances. The first characteristic is cooperative and demilitarized concept of security. It is predicated on the interdependence of traditional security matters with economic and technological cooperation. Cooperative security is similar to the concept of collective security under which NATO operates, but focuses on recognizing threats as a unit and taking collective diplomatic steps to mitigate threats (Adler and Barnett et al 132). Cooperative security also encourages the growth of mutual understanding and promoting mutual accommodation of other states’ interests without needing to use force. The philosophy reflects an approach of understanding security to reflect a focus on traditional security aspects as well as on the human dimension, democracy-building, the economic dimension, and the environment and humanitarian dimensions (Wohlfeld 109).

The next three characteristics highlight the functional norms of the OSCE. The Organization socializes and teaches norms to each of its member states through meetings and the Ministerial Council. The OSCE incorporated all states that express a political will to uphold the
standards and norms of the community, and the more a state integrates, the more a state benefits from the diplomatic mechanisms of the community. By emphasizing the community aspect of the Organization, the OSCE moves beyond a military alliance to an institution that offers numerous benefits through state interaction. The second of this set of characteristics is the expectation of international legitimacy and accountability within the community. The OSCE creates shared values and achieves mutual responsiveness by exploiting expectations of legitimacy and transforming the region’s constitutive norms, changing the identities and interests to promote expectations and accountability (ibid 134). The final characteristic in this subset is the creation of a cognitive region and agent states. Borders run where shared understandings and common identities end, creating a symbolic area by which states can recognize mutual interests. The collective perception of transnational identity gives a new meaning to the idea of sovereign within a pluralistic security community. States will still act based on their own preferences, but acknowledge the interests of the community and shared understandings (ibid 135).

The final two characteristics define the practices that shape the OSCE’s operations. The more important of the two is the development of a system of governance. Associated institutions and constitutive norms can be considered a crude governance system, but it allows for developing security mechanisms that draw effectiveness from compliance with stated norms. Additionally, the OSCE’s governance structure aids in the spreading of community-building by having a central administrative headquarters and a network of missions/operations in several other European countries, increasing transparency and communication amongst agencies and member states.

The final aspect of the OSCE’s community-building abilities is its reliance on CSBMs. These measures are means of dealing with specific problems by constituting new interests in and
generating the material and institutional resources for their solutions. The informality of the Helsinki process prevented the development of huge bureaucracies, and the Consensus Rule ensured that agreement had higher credibility and increased political weight. The OSCE also engages in seminar diplomacy, which is defined as, “…all types of multilateral diplomacy aimed at promoting political dialogue and international cooperation. Seminar diplomacy is a vehicle to socially construct shared values and mutual responsiveness in a given region and the transnational identity of a region” (ibid 138-9).

**OSCE Security Norms**

The hallmark of the OSCE’s diplomatic mechanism is the development of consensus among its members to ensure a unified action against international threats. The integrative, learning and norm-generating capacity of consensus-building carries the potential for forming an international regime to reduce threats and build peace on cooperation (Leatherman 110). There is a need to overcome the conception of universal applicability of international law, and the OSCE represents a way by which the members of the regional community can define the interests and solutions that allow for the most effective solutions.

Other norms transform conflict by providing adversaries with standard solutions that help them to mutually define and to pursue their interests. Some norms are aimed at putting limits on unacceptable behavior, such as sanctions, while others build trust to resolve specific areas of joint interest or engender cooperative relations more comprehensively (ibid 10). Norms that underpin aversion agreements do not require any change in the level of trust between parties. Rather, they are based on parties’ tacit or explicit commitments to avoid situations that could exacerbate tensions and lead to dangerous confrontations. Reassurance agreements are based on
recognition of minimal degrees of shared interests among the parties, primarily through CSBMs, while institutional agreements set the standards for acceptable practices and pattern behavior.

The OSCE’s Cold War history was shaped by an approach to dealing with conflict that was fundamentally different in a bipolar world. Conflict resolution was based on complexity and comprehensive examination rather than a simplifying of the issues to a linear explanation. It has promoted peaceful change by socializing transitional states to democratic norms and practices, and establishes the parameters for how diplomacy and regional alliances should be accomplished to adapt to the threats of the 21st Century.
Chapter 5- The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) offers an example of how a security institution can be created and managed in an Asian environment. It is a pluralistic security community aimed at peaceful conflict management amongst its members. Another distinctive characteristic of this case study is that a majority of the nations included were and can still be considered part of the Developing World, and many underwent regime changes and democratic transitions. These major differences between ASEAN and the OSCE are crucial in determining whether or not an Asia-Pacific security community will manifest because of Asia’s recent growth and surge in Westernization and modernization. More recently, ASEAN has attempted to expand its membership through institutional means such as the ASEAN Plus 3 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The rapid institutionalization of ASEAN differentiates it from the OSCE case and also allows for a further examination of Asian diplomatic norms and community-building mechanisms.

This chapter follows a similar structure from the chapter prior. It examines the history and compiles a list of conditions present in the creation of ASEAN. The chapter concludes with an examination of the “ASEAN Way” as an example of Asian diplomatic norms.

History of ASEAN’s Creation

ASEAN was established in Bangkok on August 8, 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines (Acharya 54). The original members are dissimilar in physical size, ethnic composition, heritage, identity, and colonial history, but desired war prevention and conflict management through a regional framework that provided a buffer against
coercive diplomacy. Each nation also had its own internal economic and political motivations for joining the community. For example, Singapore wanted to use participation in ASEAN to gain acceptance as part of Southeast Asia and to influence other like-minded countries on issues of mutual interests such as Brunei (ibid, 58).  

The formation of ASEAN was not without its share of tests, however. The major test of ASEAN members was the issue of dependence on extra-regional powers for protection against internal and external threats. Thailand and the Philippines were aligned with the United States, and Malaysia and Singapore relied on assistance from the United Kingdom (ibid 62). ASEAN responded to the dependency by insisting on keeping membership limited and leadership in its own hands rather than accepting the leadership of an outside power, so as not to threaten ASEAN’s identity or cohesion. ASEAN regionalism was a repudiation of regional associations led by bigger countries. Countries such as Australia, Japan, and India offered assistance but were rejected in order to preserve ASEAN autonomy.

Internal conflicts also tested community relations. Between 1968 and 1969, Malaysia and the Philippines re-entered a dispute over the Sabah islands, resulting in tensions after the Filipino press reported that a secret army was being trained to be used for a forceful takeover in Malaysia. Indonesia and Thailand urged restraint on both sides, and although diplomatic relations were temporarily suspended, the conflict was eventually resolved. In an effort to prevent future disputes without a decrease in diplomatic engagement, ASEAN adopted the 1971

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16 Territorially small members such as Singapore and Brunei were consciously fearful of force and coercive measures from much bigger neighbors like Indonesia and Malaysia. Brunei became a member on January 8, 1984, a week after it became independent.

17 Sabah was previously known as North Borneo prior to the formation of the Malaysian federation in 1963. The Philippines through the heirs of the defunct Sultanate of Sulu claim the northeastern part of Sabah as part of their territory on the basis that that part of Sabah was leased only to the British, which was the colonial power in North Borneo in the late 19th century. (Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sabah, no date)
Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which mentioned several principles of the UN Charter as the source of ASEAN norms, listed abstention from the threat or use of force, and called for peaceful settlement of international disputes within the ASEAN institutional framework. Additionally, in 1976, ASEAN adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which provided for an official dispute-settlement mechanism called the High Council (ibid 59-61).

In 1971, ASEAN adopted a protection measure called the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which maintained a degree of neutrality between members and extra-regional powers. However, ZOPFAN was not without its share of controversies. Indonesia and Singapore opposed neutralization because they did not want to concede policing rights of their own borders and state sovereignty to the United States. Additionally, the differing threat perceptions among ASEAN members meant that ZOPFAN would be perceived and dealt with differently, especially because China was becoming more of a long-term threat. ZOPFAN eventually became a nuclear weapons-free zone. However, the US argued that regional nuclear-weapons free zones covering the ASEAN states would impose a one-sided restriction on US military deployments in the region, undermining its nuclear deterrence posture. This argument led to greater ambivalence in the attitude of Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore (ibid 70). Concerns of regional autonomy also enforced the non-use of force and doctrine of non-interference that were codified in ZOPFAN and mutually agreed upon through consensus-building.

The founding ASEAN members expanded the membership of the organization to include other Southeast Asian nations in the 1990s. After the Cambodian revolution was resolved through the Paris Peace Agreements on Cambodia in October 1991, ASEAN changed its policy toward other nations in the region in an attempt to further regional integration. Thailand initiated
a new policy instilling a similar reform process initiated by the People’s Revolutionary Party in Laos with economic management of public enterprises and increasing trade relations (ibid 123). However, the goodwill was not constant, as there were intra-ASEAN divisions and doubts over improved relations with Indochina. The process of reconciliation between ASEAN and Indochina revealed the competitive aspect of relations, especially in the economic sphere. Another key factor in intra-ASEAN differences was Vietnam’s willingness to facilitate a settlement of the Cambodian conflict, which helped to reduce ASEAN’s misgivings. The Singapore Declaration of 1992 allowed all countries in Southeast Asia to sign the TAC; Vietnam and Laos signed first, followed by Cambodia after its internal political structure was settled through elections held under the auspices of the UN (ibid 125). Vietnam became an official member in 1995, and Cambodia and Laos in 1997.

Vietnam’s decision to join ASEAN demonstrates the reasons why a developing nation would take advantage of a regional security community. Vietnam’s decision to join ASEAN was motivated by three factors: to attract foreign investment, to develop and to maintain friendly relations with regional states, and to boost Vietnam’s domestic reform process. Membership in ASEAN would help Vietnam’s international prestige and could enhance its diplomatic standing and integrative security (ibid 126). In order to maintain regional order, Vietnam had to change its regional engagement because it had to accept and adhere to the obligations and norms of ASEAN so that it could be bound eventually within a common political and diplomatic culture.

In the early 1990s, violent conflict in Burma offered a litmus test for ASEAN’s norms and constructive engagement abilities. ASEAN did not want to interfere in the affairs of the Burmese junta because it would be perceived as an attempt to embarrass and isolate them. Additionally, trying to reject interference by the outside powers in Burma’s internal affairs also
molded the belief that the possibility of regional implications stemming from the crisis in Burma was a Southeast Asian issue that needed to be handled by the region’s countries themselves.

Constructive engagement in this instance meant that ASEAN could do what it saw fit, but not to take a collective six-country position. Singapore was the region’s largest investor in Burma, and was concerned with Burma’s ability to maintain its economy for foreign investment. Through their support of the Burmese regime’s interest in ASEAN, Singapore hoped to gain influence and gain more access to the country’s natural resources and weaponry market. For Malaysia and Indonesia, the treatment of Muslims in predominantly Buddhist Burma was a major concern. However, all the ASEAN nations feared that an exclusion of Burma would invite China to take a more prominent role in the region, potentially forcing the United States to take actions that would negatively affect Southeast Asia (Zaw 43). This episode showed that ASEAN had the attributes of a security community, but had no desire to become a democratic security community (Acharya 134).

Tensions and relations among ASEAN members have often been strained by several factors. One of the primary sources of tensions was membership expansion. As mentioned above, the founding members of ASEAN were resistant to the idea of expanding membership. However, within two decades, membership had expanded to include Vietnam, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia. While these nations are all part of the Southeast Asia region, membership expansion carried major implications for regional identity building because of a lack of policy coordination against internal threats. The increase in members required more consultation, making consensus-building extremely difficult because the new members also had alliances with extra-regional powers. Expansion also added to regional economic interdependence, raising the volume of both intra-regional trade and ASEAN’s competitiveness (ibid 142).
Interstate and regional tensions in Southeast Asia also hindered the ability for ASEAN’s development of collective identity and mutual trust. Spillover from domestic, political, ideological, and ethnic conflicts challenged state structure and regime security. A second source of tension was disputes over territory, such as the Malaysia-Singapore dispute over Pulau batu Puteh (ibid 150). These territorial disputes, while diplomatically contested, never resulted in military armament or military exercises, proving that the ability of the security community to prevent armed confrontation has remained strong.

Since ASEAN’s creation in 1967, member states have worked to create a framework for action. They developed a range of bilateral defense ties, including border-region cooperation, intelligence sharing, joint exercises, military education exchanges, official visits, and cooperation on the defense industrial sector. Its flexible form of engagement intended to address newly emerging transnational issues facing ASEAN, including the problems of human rights, environmental degradation, and refugees (ibid 176). ASEAN takes a more relativist strategy when addressing normative concepts, rejecting the notion of universal human rights advocated by the West. The ASEAN statement reflects the opposition of member states to the Western understanding of and efforts in promoting democracy in the region.

ASEAN also offers another point of analysis because of its expansion to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. The ARF was the first multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia-Pacific region, and the only regional security framework in which all major players of the international system were represented (ibid 199). The ARF’s agenda centers on cooperative security and focuses on capacity building, information sharing, and intelligence exchanges on terrorism. Its framework for action uses three categories: confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution (ibid 200). However, given the name of
the forum, its security agenda is limited geographically to Southeast Asian nations, and issues like the Korean Conflict and Taiwanese independence are not included. Additionally, ASEAN does not have the military capabilities to balance or to constrain China’s behavior. As such, this multinational institution’s main actions are to produce defense white papers, offer military observers, complete peacekeeping duties, and to diplomatically engage with nations through Track II processes (Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallender 290-295).

The ARF derives its practices and norms from the members of ASEAN. Since the structure and primary objectives were formed by ASEAN, the ARF maintains regular summits and consultations with ASEAN members in order to develop a greater institution and to pursue ASEAN’s goals globally. According to the ARF, “ASEAN has a pivotal role to play in the ARF. It has a demonstrable record of enhancing regional cooperation…It has also fostered habits of cooperation and provided the catalyst for encouraging regional cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific region” (“ARF Concept Paper”). Cooperation is especially true in the context of confidence building measures, in which the ARF utilizes two different approaches. The first is the track record and the success of ASEAN in quelling conflicts and tensions without using overt confidence building measures through consultation and consensus. The second approach, however, is through the use of an ASEAN-derived list of confidence-building measures. These measures are organized around transparency and include measures such as:

Dialogue on security perceptions, including voluntary statements defense policy positions; Defence Publications such as Defence White Papers or equivalent documents as considered necessary by respective governments; Participation in UN Conventional Arms Register; Enhanced contacts, including, high level visits and recreational activities; Exchanges between military academies, staff colleges and training; Observers at military exercises, on a voluntary basis; and Annual seminar for defence officials and military officers on selected international security issues (“ARF Concept Paper”).
Confidence-building measures contribute to the gradual process of mutual interaction and collective identity that is necessary for a security community to thrive.

The Conditions Triggering ASEAN Development

ASEAN’s history provides a unique case study by which to examine how the Asia-Pacific security community might manifest because of its contrasting history from the previous case study. Some of the conditions will look similar to those of the OSCE, while others are different, providing insight to differences in political norms between the East and the West. This section will again examine the Creation Conditions as a way to create the master list of conditions.

Despite having different colonial histories\(^\text{18}\) and systems of government in 1967, several conditions triggered the five original members of ASEAN to come together to form a security community. Each member perceived a threat large enough to make the decision to enter into a cooperative security arrangement with its neighbors. While the threats that motivated action may not have been a unified vision between the five members, all turned to regional cooperation as the method to resist coercive diplomacy and conflict. Secondly, each state had an internal motivation for joining a regional arrangement to benefit national interests, as exemplified by Singapore’s need to gain credibility within the region. These interests differed and ranged from an increase in credibility to trade mobilization, thus being insufficient to trigger the initial development of collective identity and “we-feeling” that Deutsch and Adler and Barnett discuss is essential to the sustainability of a security community (Adler and Barnett et al 205).

\(^{18}\) Or not, in the case of Thailand.
The internal conditions of the five original member states of ASEAN differed on many levels. However, the conditions that represent the region’s position relative to the rest of the world at the time reflect a degree of unification amongst members. One unifying aspect between the five original members was the fear of extra-regional great power intervention. The states wanted to limit the possibility of great power intervention evolving into a coercive relationship. This fear was further compounded because of the members’ developing economies. In contrast to the OSCE, none of these countries were developed countries in 1967, nor are they considered developed in the present. However, their similar economic conditions also motivated cooperation. Such a regional economic condition pushed the states to utilize a regional security framework as a means of ensuring not only a diplomatic buffer against great power takeover, but also economic cooperation.

**The Establishment of the “ASEAN Way”: Insight on East Asian Diplomatic Norms**

An examination of the “ASEAN Way” provides a study on the differences between Western and East Asian diplomatic norms. Since culture informs policy, the “ASEAN Way” describes an organized group of learned responses and adjustment of traits that a social group may develop through socialization. The “ASEAN Way,” in effect, is a synthetic and learned construct and manages diversity while finding common ground for institutional harmony (Krause 57). It is indicative of both the norms and practices that shape ASEAN policies and diplomatic functions.

Amitav Acharya frames the discussion of the ASEAN Way in terms of four sources: close interpersonal ties among its founding leaders, expression of cultural similarities, regulatory norms of ASEAN or the principles of interstate relations, and the process of interaction and the socialization that has marked ASEAN’s evolution since 1967 (56). This discussion will follow.
the list that Acharya provides. However, I will not go into much detail about the interpersonal
ties of the five founding leaders. Rather, I will group that source with Acharya’s last source
because it provides the best context for discussing the methods of interaction and socialization
that those five leaders started.

*Expression of Cultural Similarities*

The best measure of the expression of cultural similarities in the ASEAN context is by
looking at the ways in which collective identity is created. Collective identity can be understood
as a process and framework through which its member states began to adapt to a regional
existence with a view of reducing the likelihood of using force to in interstate relations (Adler
and Barnett et al 208). Four factors play a pivotal role in the development of a collective identity
within ASEAN. The first factor is multilateralism Even though much of the focus of diplomatic
interactions has been through bilateral negotiations and dialogue, most intra-ASEAN disputes
and defense cooperation is done under a multilateral framework, which serves as a social and
psychological barrier to extreme behavior. The multilateral framework does not have to deal with
conflicts directly and openly, but encourages the socialization of elites and facilitates problem
solving through peaceful means. While border disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia or
Malaysia and Thailand were all handled by bilateral joint border committees, multilateral
oversight allows for more resources to either party and can promote community awareness of the
issue at hand (ibid 208).

The second element of ASEAN’s collective identity is the development of the ground
rules of interstate relations within the ASEAN community. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
signed at the Bali summit in 1976 outlined the norms of mutual respect for the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means; and the renunciation of the threat of use of force (ibid 209). This framework motivated ASEAN members to overcome conflicting security interests and territorial disputes within the grouping, moving it on the path towards becoming a security community (ibid 210).

The third element of collective identity-building involves the creation and manipulation of symbols. This is known as the “ASEAN Way,” which has been invoked to reduce bilateral tensions and to unify its members. This symbol of unity allows for members to resolve conflicts through a common devotion to a way of being. One example is when Malaysia and the Philippines broke diplomatic relations over the Philippines’ claim to the Malaysian state of Sabah. Resolution occurred not through formal arbitration by ASEAN or mediation, but through the value that Malaysia and the Philippines placed on ASEAN, as a way to resolve through a community psyche. The goals of ASEAN were valued much more than the islands themselves and the mutual interests of the community outweighed the claim over Sabah. Since then, ASEAN nations have avoided the use of formal mechanisms and procedures for conflict resolution and default to more informal ways in international behavior as a cultural trait. The TAC provides for an official dispute settlement mechanism, the High Council, to take cognizance of the existence of disputes and situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, but the invoking of the “ASEAN Way” as a unifying element has contributed to the identity-building of ASEAN.

The final factor that develops collective identity is the principle of regional autonomy. Initially shaped by the concern of being forced to align with powerful nations, regional autonomy has reinforced ASEAN’s normative framework for conflict regulation by refraining
from inviting or giving consent to intervention by external powers in the domestic affairs of the regional states. Additionally, the concept of ZOPFAN prevents foreign military basing within the territory of zonal states (ibid 213). Self-reliance is championed, and while cooperation and agreements with other great powers exist, they do not extend beyond mutual consultations and access arrangements, such as between Singapore, Malaysia and the US Navy (ibid 213).

Regulatory Norms

The 1976 TAC also championed the two regulatory norms of informality and the principle of non-interference. ASEAN elite eschewed legalistic approaches to conflict resolution in favor of socio-cultural norms they themselves propagated. It is through these norms that ASEAN can be thought of as a security community that embodies norms and procedures that have become the modus operandi directing its members’ interactions (Collins 212). As mentioned in the previous section, the norm of informality is considered to be a characteristic of East Asian politics. In a culture in which saving face and preventing embarrassment is considered to be of utmost importance, the use of Track II dialogue and informal meetings aid in conflict resolution by allowing states to engage without the fear of being shamed (Krause 63).

The cardinal norm and objective of ASEAN being a support network for the governing elite, however, is the norm of non-interference. As evidenced by the discussion of conflicts between members in the history section, ASEAN members rarely intervene in conflicts in which they are not directly involved. Acharya argues that the obligations posed by ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference on its members contain four main aspects. Members must refrain from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people. A state may not criticize the action of states which were deemed to have breached non-interference. Additionally, states
must deny recognition or other forms of support to any rebel group, and must provide political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against subversive activities (Acharya 72). Non-inference also applied to refraining from using the use of force to change established governments or internationally recognized political orders.

Processes of Interaction and Socialization

The final aspect of Acharya’s framework for looking at the “ASEAN Way” is the idea of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus (muafakat) implemented through Track II dialogue. The use of these two mechanisms in dialogue highlights the ways in which ASEAN undergoes decision-making, contrasting it substantially from the OSCE case. The authoritarian nature of the consensus not only represents the types of governments represented in ASEAN, but also reflects ASEAN’s mode of security cooperation through non-confrontation. Comfort level is considered a precondition for success in multilateral consultations and negotiations, and the leaving out of bilateral disputes from multilateral discussions speaks to how consensus and mutual understanding plays a pivotal role in ASEAN policy. The consensus approach, while limited in capacity, facilitates security cooperation by stressing the fundamental importance of consultations in a non-threatening multilateral setting, guided by a shared commitment to moderation and accommodation (Krause 66). Consultation and consensus are often highlighted in ASEAN documents, and demonstrate how cohesion and non-intervention manifest in the context of a security community.

Consultation and consensus are typically reached through Track II diplomatic means. Track II diplomacy is characterized as peacemaking through professional conflict resolution, but not considered official governmental activity (Sandole 55). Track II dialogue is conducted
through non-officials such as academic scholars, retired civil and military officials, public figures, and social activists with the aim of conflict resolution, or confidence-building. Ideas developed at the Track II level can move quickly to Track I, official governmental diplomacy, and define the Track I agenda better because of initial low-stress informal discussion. Additionally, Track II dialogue can filter or sanitize proposals that would otherwise be deemed more controversial (Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallender 303).

The ASEAN case study offers a point of comparison from the previous OSCE case study. The history of ASEAN differs in that the nations involved in the creation of this nascent security community perceived external threats and attempted to use a regional framework to counter outside intervention despite being developing countries. Additionally, the norms that guide ASEAN’s policymaking speak to the differences in diplomatic techniques between the West and East Asia. In order to compile a proper list of conditions necessary for the creation of a security community in the Asia-Pacific, such a case is necessary to provide some contrast by which further analyses can be executed.
Chapter 6- The Security and Political Environment in the Asia-Pacific

The security and political environment in the Asia-Pacific region greatly determines whether or not a security community is even a feasible option. Since the security community coincides with a regional framework, it is important to examine the political climate in the area and how that affect the security interests of the states involved. In alignment with Kevin Rudd’s initial proposal to include, “…the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states of the region” (Asia Society 2008), a majority of my analysis focuses on the aforementioned countries. For the purposes of this section, “other states of the region” will also include South Korea, since recent events in the nation greatly affect the security environment of the Asia-Pacific. 19 The discussion of the political and security environment will not speak directly to each individual country, but will provide a general overview of the issues that would need to be addressed prior to the formation of a security community. 20

Regional Powers: Competition and/or Strengthened Relations

One primary characteristic of the security and political environment in the Asia-Pacific is the rise of regional powers and inter-regional competition. Several nations come to the forefront as regional contenders in terms of economic, political, and military power, such as India, South

19 It is important to note that by definition, India would not make the region known as “Asia-Pacific.” However, since Rudd included the nation in the proposal, I will go with his list, as it is the best definition in the literature regarding Australia’s foreign policy towards that region. The referenced conflicts in the Koreas include the 2010 singing of the ROKS Cheonan and the North Korean artillery firing at South Korea’s Big Yeonpyeong Island.

20 Several of these arguments regarding the political and security environment in Asia-Pacific will be argued from the perspective of Australia, since that is the main body of literature that I used.
Korea, Japan, and China. China and India possess nuclear arsenals, while South Korea and Japan are pondering armament as a potential strategy to defend their national interests. While these four nations form a regional force that seems to maintain regional stability, they also cause an immense amount of tension amongst each other, creating scenarios by which conflict becomes an increasing possibility. In addition, all of these nations are in talks with the United States and other major Asia-Pacific nations such as Indonesia and Australia, creating more of an interconnectedness that can either further or fracture ties, depending on the nature of the issue.

Each major power faces a specific set of dilemmas, and each needs to take certain measures to ensure that their security interests are protected. For the United States, it will involve the question of its own primacy, and what it would be willing to pay to retain primacy in Asia. China will have to decide whether or not it will settle for something less than primacy, and how to organize the region so that it has a dominant voice in regional matters. Japan faces the question about its willingness to attempt dramatic changes to resist its decline, and India needs to decide whether or not it intends to compete with China and how to strategically engage with East Asia and the United States (Cook, Heinrichs, Medcalf, and Shearer 6). South Korea will have to decide how involved it wants the United States to be, both in diplomatic ties and in military presence, especially given the recent conflicts with North Korea. In all of these cases, the seemingly suboptimal choice from a national interest point-of-view may be the best for region-wide stability, as the security community would require all nations to compromise their own interests.

21 The United States is also within the discussion of regional powers, even though it is considered a “Pacific Power,” thus being excluded from some of the literature. However, in terms of security cooperation, the US is often mentioned and discussed as part of the security features of the region because of its immense presence.
The unpredictability of the region also affects decision-making and the ways in which nations engage in security cooperation. Seemingly sudden changes in domestic politics such as Japan’s economic downturn and the recent natural disasters can have profound international consequences because they change the ways in which that a country will conduct itself politically. China’s growing wealth, power, and confidence creates uncertainty about its future capabilities and intentions amongst many other steps. While strategic uncertainty cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced through powerful states taking steps to make their capabilities, intentions, and expectations transparent. Given the geopolitical fluctuations in Asia, regional governments will eschew foreign and defense policies that assume just one trajectory for the strategic environment. Small and middle powers are especially vulnerable, since the decisions by major powers could change the region’s future and will ultimately be beyond other countries’ control (ibid 5).

Some scholars argue that, “States in Asia will not allow multilateral bodies to manage their core security interests…the creation of some elegant, overarching regional organization will be no substitute for relations of trust and transparency among power states” (ibid 5). However, the recent actions of Asian nations seems to conclude the opposite, as “Asians themselves take architecture seriously and view multilateral institutions and agreements as essential to the development of their region” (Feigenbaum and Manning 3). The United States is still the primary balancer for stability in the region. This relationship sets up several multilateral arrangements that characterize the current strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific and Asia-Pacific cooperation. There has been an increase in multilateral institutions that help to govern relations and economic cooperation amongst the Asia-Pacific nations, such as the Asian Monetary Fund,
and the Chiang Mai Initiative among the ASEAN Plus Three countries (ibid 8). Additionally, the ASEAN Regional Forum provides an institution by which nations in the region can collaborate on many issues that plague the area.

The regional powers currently engage in several multilateral diplomatic mechanisms. Feigenbaum and Manning argue that the new US-China-Japan trilateral alliance joins a confusing mix of at least five existing Asian trilaterals: US-Japan-South Korea, China-Japan-South Korea, US-Japan-Australia, China-India-Russia, and US-Japan-India. Lingering sentiment remains for a quadrilateral arrangement among the US, Japan, Australia, and India (12). There is also the possibility for further integration, such as the addition of Russia into Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate that includes the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia (ibid 13). Finally, an important trilateral mechanism focused on economic issues has been set up between China, Japan, and South Korea (the Plus Three) (ibid 22).

The increasing number of cooperative mechanisms amongst the regional powers has several implications. First, it demonstrates a positive movement towards a “détente” period in the Asia-Pacific. It also, however, complicates regional politics because cooperation becomes contingent on whether or not engagement through a security community would be counter to the interests of the trilateral mechanisms already in existence. It is also important to note that none of these trilateral mechanisms include Indonesia, who is projected to be a member of the security community, making its potential integration in the community difficult given the status quo strategic environment. Another important observation is that American and Chinese participation

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22 The Chiang Mai Initiative is a multilateral currency swap amongst the ten ASEAN nations and the Plus Three (South Korea, Japan, and China).
in these trilateral or quadrilateral mechanisms is mutually exclusive and the two rival nations never cooperative directly, implying that the two nations are in heavy competition with one another and are unwilling to politically engage.

*Shocks to Asia-Pacific Security and Stability*

Malcolm Cook, Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf, and Andrew Shearer of the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, highlight four major shocks that could damage the stability of the Asia-Pacific region: US strategic retrenchment, Chinese legitimacy crisis, significant disruption of the region’s Middle East fuel supplies, and regime collapse in North Korea (4-5). These shocks are predictions of potential disturbances in the region that could greatly affect the feasibility of a security arrangement, be it a security community or another mechanism.

Scholars argue that, “The current regional security order rests on and is defined by US power - economic, political and, fundamentally, military…any sudden diminution in American power in Asia – particularly military power – would transform the regional balance…” (ibid 64). Even though the US has been a Pacific power for a long time, events such as Pearl Harbor, the Vietnam War, trade tensions with Japan in the 80s, and the loss of bases in the Philippines have foreshadowed potential US retrenchment. US interests in Asia remain great, but if global power shifts away from the US to other Asian nations, East Asian regional players are looking to increase its influence over the working of the international system.

The United States desires to remain a presence in Asia, but military overstretch and wavering diplomatic capital are constricting its abilities to do so. Complete retrenchment remains highly unlikely, but US strategic disengagement is not impossible and can be caused by sustained economic decline or a collapse of public support for the US’ role as a global provider.
of security in Asia. Additionally, major military setbacks in Asia or the Middle East could also trigger US strategic disengagement. Cook, Heinrichs, Medcalf, and Shearer predict scenarios such as the United States defending Taiwan and suffering major losses, deterioration in US-Japan relations driven by Japanese domestic politics could prompt the withdrawal of all US forces from Japan, a major US strategic reversal in the Middle East, and drastic cuts in US defense spending (65). The most likely scenario, however, seems to be the deficit in the US economy, which is already hindering its ability to power project in the region. The US has made recent budget cuts in defense spending which decrease the US’ power projection abilities, such as the cutting of the F-22 fighter program and the DDG-1000 Zumwalt destroyer. The one likely outcome of US strategic retrenchment will be the inevitable rise of China as an undisputed regional hegemon.

The second shock described in the Lowy Institute Report argues that China could face a domestic legitimacy crisis. The report states that, “Uncensored opinion polling inside China clearly reflects the population’s own concerns with internal problems. In a 2009 poll…environmental issues and food and water shortages easily topped a list of internal and external threats” (ibid, 68). This domestic leadership crisis could lead to many of China’s neighbors resisting Beijing, or a mixture of a shattered government and international disruption.

An oil crisis in the Middle East is the third shock outlined by the report. 70-80 percent of Asia’s oil supplies are currently being imported from the Middle East, with China, India, South Korea, and Japan being the primary consumers. A shock could result in three outcomes:

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23 The Japanese public is getting increasingly unsupportive of US military bases in Futenma, Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Kadena, all of which are located in Okinawa.

24 The Zumwalt class destroyer (DDG-1000) is a planned class of United States Navy destroyers, designed as multi-mission ships with a focus on land attack.
disruption of trade, diplomatic conflict, and competition over energy security. The most immediate implication of a Middle East oil crisis would be a disruption of trade and the reversal of economic integration. Inflation would damage GDP growth, and international instability would ensue. Another negative outcome of an oil crisis is an attempt among the powers of Asia to bolster their political and military influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Internal diplomatic competition would increase tensions amongst the nations, changing the political environment from a peaceful one to one in which competition manifests potentially in conflict.

The final and most serious outcome would be an intense security and resource competition in Asia itself. As China’s energy dependence increases, the likelihood of a resource conflict would as well. This is evident in China’s development of its naval capabilities around the Indian Ocean, creating competition and military tension with India. It has also invested in the Gwadar Port in Pakistan to shorten its sea lines to the Gulf and to ensure energy supplies in the event of a maritime blockade. The implications of an oil conflict would also spillover to territorial disputes over the Spratly and Senkaku Islands, fuelled by a scarcity in hydrocarbon resources and a need to diversify (ibid 68-72).

The final shock outlined by the Lowy Institute report is a North Korean crisis. The fall of the house of Kim Il-Sung would leave an internal security vacuum and could lead to civil conflict between military factions and general chaos in the country. Refugees would escape to South Korea or China, increasing the need for external intervention and humanitarian action. Moreover, there would be an increased international presence in the region, damaging the current alliances and relations established between the nations. The role of China is also in question with regards to North Korean fallout. China could either work with the intervention or fight against it. It could be tempted to occupy parts of North Korea to protect its extensive interests there, or to
veto a mission there. Most importantly, the fate of the North’s nuclear devices and other weapons of mass destruction would be a critical concern. The possibility of a dying North Korean regime to take a “Samson option” to attack Japan or South Korea with WMDs and ballistic missiles remains a high possibility and would also see a regional power vacuum that would invite conflict amongst regional powers in a battle for supremacy (ibid 73-75).

Four Potential Outcomes

The Lowy Institute report also examines four potential outcomes that could shape the future of Asia: US primacy, balance of power, concert of great powers, and Chinese primacy. These predictions are not meant to counter the idea of creating a security community in the area, but are important in the evaluation of the role of Australia and how the security could potentially manifest, whether or not it deviates from Adler and Barnett’s analyses.

The first potential future in Asia is the maintenance of US primacy. The US economy is three times the size of China’s in market exchange rate, and its defense expenditure exceeds the combined defense spending of the next thirty-four countries combined. The US is adapting its position to engage China, which will also drive other allies to focus on strategic engagement with the United States. Also, US-centered bilateral and multilateral engagement will continue to be the most important institutional pillars of regional security. US strategic commitment to the region has been more consolidated on the presence of China, and motivated by North Korea and terrorism (ibid 19).

In addition, American primacy is motivated by increasing security relationships with Asian partners over the past decade. Singapore announced in 1998 that the new Changi Naval Base would be made available to US naval forces, and post- 9/11, the US has increased military
exchanges with Indonesia, readmitting them into the International Military Education and Training Programs. Obama also outlined a comprehensive economic and security partnership with Indonesia (ibid 20). Security cooperation has increased between the US and India, and the United States has been viewed as a bilateral great power in the region, engaging in military advances much closer to allied forces in Asia. Japan, South Korea and Australia are now central to US-led missile defense capabilities that are crucial for both Taiwan Strait and Korean peninsula contingencies (ibid 21).

The strengthening of the US alliance system in Asia occurs principally through America’s longstanding system of bilateral Asian security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, through a “wheels-and-spokes” approach. Non-allies such as Singapore, Indonesia, India and Vietnam have also sought or accepted closer security ties with America (ibid 26).

The second outcome outlined by the report details an Asian balance of power, in which competitive equilibrium arises from competition over national interests between regional powers such as the US, India, Japan, China, and South Korea. Beijing’s military modernization is putting limits on US power projection in the region, and Japan and India are bolstering up their forces and security policies to counter China’s power. Indonesia, Russia, and Vietnam could also join in the balance of power.

The driving force of Asia’s balance of power is China’s growing economy, assertive diplomatic posture, and rapid militarization. China is currently developing ballistic missiles to target US carrier battle groups and forward bases. It is also producing modern submarines, destroyers, and cruise missiles in an attempt to counter US naval capabilities. Japan also has a
choice to be a part of the regional balancing dynamic. Japan was formerly East Asia’ sole major power, until its rapidly ageing population and competing interests against China have produced a sense of strategic anxiety. Japan’s other anxiety stems from the militarization of Korea. The new Democratic Party of Japan government in Tokyo has signaled that it will continue to pursue a more independent foreign policy while remaining committed to the US alliance, leveraging its economy and highly technological military powers as a bargaining tool to gain more regional support.

South Korea and India remain swing players in Asian geopolitics. South Korea has a strong economy, although its ability to play is contingent upon border and peninsular relations. India’s shift away from non-alignment and building of strategic ties after the US brought it out of the nuclear cold also add to its abilities to balance as a nuclear power. Other smaller nations, such as Australia, can engage in internal balancing by increasing their own military capabilities as a hedge against a diminishing US presence. Australia plans on accomplishing this task, outlining a substantial expansion of maritime capabilities in *Force 2030*.

Maintaining the equilibrium requires continual vigilance and flexibility to prevent miscalculation. Sudden and unpredictable power shifts also exacerbate danger, especially where strategic intentions lack transparency. Smaller regional powers will face difficult choices in a balance of power system, but must assert their voice to leverage alliance relationships. A balance of powers system also offers advantages to key security providers such as the US. Balancing can serve the US’ interests by allowing it to husband US national power and to focus on increasing limited resources where effective (ibid 34-36).
The third potential outcome is a concert of powers, which is a mechanism of preventing hegemonic war by balancing through mutual agreements of the major regional powers. It does not need to be a formal multilateral institution, and may in fact, be exclusive, in which Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea should feel wary. The creation of the concert, however, would begin with recognition of mutual interests and the treating of each other as genuine peers.

A concert of powers is a highly discussed possibility in the debate about Asia’s security prospects. The report defines a concert of powers to mean, “…an arrangement for managing power relations within a strategic system, involving an unusually high degree of voluntary consultation and restraint among the strongest countries” (ibid 41). Such self-restraint is expected from recognition of interests and a belief that war is too costly to use as a conflict resolution tool. In some ways, this arrangement seems to mirror the idea of a security community that it includes the great powers. The report further argues that:

Some of the more specific features of a concert arrangement are: the desire to avoid hegemonic conflict (war to establish the rank order of great powers); consensual management of differences through regular consultation; where necessary, the creation of agreed geographic spheres of influence; a high priority given to tackling threats in common; and, in line with all of these goals, a determination to insulate major powers’ relations with each other ‘against crises between the other members of the society of states’ (ibid 41).

A concert is not a regional institution, community, or end of a rivalry, but rather a high-level management of security relations among big countries, and does not require a community-like arrangement involving abrogation or dilution of sovereignty on domestic matters.

Only four nations are considered great contenders for membership in the concert. China’s economy and overall presence in Asian affairs makes it a guaranteed member. The United States is assumed to be a member because of its enmeshment in East Asian affairs and its military and
diplomatic capabilities to maintain the concert. However, if the concert were to exclude non-Asian nations, then the United States would have to rethink its posture. Japan would also appear to be a member because of its strategic investment in the region, and its increased relations with China. India would highly likely join the concert arrangement, in part because of its rising strategic and economic equities in East Asia, and its balancing of cooperative and competitive relations with other powers, especially given its increased maritime and nuclear capabilities (ibid 43-4). Russia could possibly join the concert, but would still pursue its interests despite the agreements of the members. South Korea is also a potential candidate, but its focus would be fixated on peninsular disputes. However, the inclusion of South Korea would also raise the expectations of candidacy for other similarly sized nations such as Indonesia and Vietnam, or other nations of sizeable military and economic weight, such as Australia (ibid 45).

The final outcome that the report discusses is the possibility of Chinese primacy. China’s recent resurgence in regional power politics indicates that it is set on gaining regional, if not global, primacy. In analyzing past great powers, the report concludes that, “each great power that made a bid for primacy did so largely out of a deep-seated sense of insecurity, which is itself a pervasive feature of the international system” (ibid 53). However, China has grown under the indirect auspices of US primacy. As a result, China likely feels the need to gain higher prestige and to gain greatness under the shadow of the US. China also seeks greater prominence because it cannot be sure that the US will continue to act in the benign manner that it has for the past couple of decades (ibid 54).

China’s preparations for a rise to primacy have been developing for awhile. China’s economy is steadily growing every year, and it has maintained amicable relations with the United States, extending its diplomatic base to expand its global sphere of influence. China’s
current strategy of restraint could prove to be the most optimal for its goals of attaining primacy because it can grow while the US is still in the forefront of policy. Rising quietly without challenging US interests has also prevented its rivals from getting closer to the United States, keeping them at a distance to prevent a power struggle in the future. Simultaneously, Chinese military modernization has continued with rapid pace. Investment has been focused on advanced air, maritime, strike and anti-satellite capabilities, all of which are part of an asymmetric strategy that seeks to confront the US military’s conventional superiority.

The difficulty for China, however, is gaining recognition as the new global hegemon. China will have to struggle in a region with the most major-power interactions in the world and the United States’ continuing primacy. Additionally, Japan and India are starting to push back against the growth of Chinese power as a result of increased anxiety on the part of both nations. Finally, it is speculative as to whether or not China will be able to economically grow to the point of surpassing the United States and to overtake it successfully. China will have to either win a military confrontation against the United States or patiently wait for US retrenchment (ibid 59-61).

APEC: An Existing Community in the Asia-Pacific?

Some scholars argue that the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) can be considered a regional security community. APEC was created in January of 1989 by Australia in response to a number of Australian and Japanese concerns, including increased conflicts over Pacific trade, particularly between Japan and the US, which threatened to promote greater unilateralism and exclusive bilateralism in trade after the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s Uruguay Round had stalled (Adelphi Series 1999 63). APEC’s initial projects were
designed to appeal to ASEAN so that both could work together to create an Asia-Pacific framework. Eventually, the US began to take interest, exemplifying the extra-regional intervention that ASEAN members were worried about. However, as APEC was only a forum, it could not be used as an enforcement mechanism, easing ASEAN’s initial worries.

In the same way that ASEAN’s expansion threatened its core values because it had to increase the number of consultations and to attempt consensus, APEC’s expansion did as well. With China, the United States, and Russia eventually integrated into the membership, APEC’s political significance had increased, being used as both an economic and political forum dominated by major powers. Despite APEC’s commitment to deepen the spirit of community between its members, competing identities complicated the potential viability of APEC representing an Asia-Pacific community. APEC became less of a community and more of a great-power dictated forum in which larger nations could dominate discussion and create trade policies that did not benefit the smaller member nations. The forum’s inability to create a sense of community between its members was due to the emergence of cross-cutting groupings (ibid 73).
Chapter 7- Potential for an Pacific Security Community: Australia’s Role

This chapter examines the prospects for an Asia-Pacific security community by looking at whether or not my master list of conditions obtains in the current strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Based on analysis of the OSCE and ASEAN, I will compile and justify a master list of conditions to determine what is necessary for a security community to be created in a given region. The following section discusses whether or not all the conditions are met in the status quo. Assuming that some conditions are not met, the final section examines whether or not Australia can create the remaining conditions so that a security community arrangement can be triggered.

A Master List of Conditions

As described in Chapter 3, a master list of conditions will be created through a process of consolidation. The histories of the OSCE and ASEAN are extremely different, and thus have minimal overlap of conditions, although overlapping conditions are present. The master list includes all overlapping conditions, as well as conditions that, based on my review of the existing literature, apply to the creation of institutions and alliances in the current strategic environment. The conditions that are present in one case study but not in the other have been added to the master list because they represent aspects of the status quo that will have to be overcome by the potential members and Australia in the building of the security community. Below I outline the six conditions that are instrumental in the development of a security community.

Desire amongst potential members for a mutual agreement
The first and foremost condition is that potential members must show an interest in or movement towards mutual agreement with other states. While an obvious necessity, states who desire a peaceful means of conflict resolution often do not constructively engage through a mutual agreement or arrangement. Simply utilizing bilateral/multilateral diplomacy cannot qualify as satisfying the condition. States must actively engage in attempts at bridging differences and creating consensus on interests and goals.

Both case studies demonstrate the validity of this condition. In the case of the OSCE, both the United States and the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{25} were taking steps to improve relations. The post-Cold War détente period provided an opportunity for both states to express a desire for a mutual agreement when they agreed to engage in diplomatic agreements to ease tensions and to prevent future conflict. Not only were the two great powers engaging with each other in dialogue, but each power’s respective allies were participating in conflict resolution as well.

ASEAN’s history also indicates that the desire for a mutual security agreement needs to be present. The five founding members mutually agreed felt that their own self-interests could only be achieved through a regional security arrangement. While these interests may have differed, there was consensus amongst the five leading elites that a regional alliance was the best mechanism by which to address the threats to their national security. As a result, the five nations took steps to meet and to sign the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, providing a textual basis by which relations could be strengthened.

\textit{Threat Perception or Fear}

\textsuperscript{25} These two nations will often be referred to in this chapter as the “two great powers,” since it is descriptive of their global statuses at the time.
The second necessary condition is the perception of a major threat against national interests. The threat can be a state or a political action such as proliferation. States need an incentive to join a multilateral arrangement, whether it is economic cooperation, intelligence sharing, or a unified front against a particular threat to national interests. In the context of a security community, however, states will join a multilateral security arrangement in order to maintain their security interests or to create a war deterrent by aligning itself with other states. States do not need to perceive the same threats, but there must be a significant threat in order to trigger a state to move beyond its own resources to rely on other states for assistance. Such a factor is also a necessity for enhancing the willingness of the great powers to engage in promoting conflict resolution and to encourage or to impose peace (Kacowicz, Bar-Wiman-Tov, Elgstrom, and Jerneck 63-4).

This condition is also deduced from an overlap between the two case studies. The OSCE case shows distrust between two great powers after the Cold War and a nuclear arms race to be a motivating factor for negotiation. The US and USSR were still apprehensive of one another and there was an overall fear of the fallout of the détente. Both saw the OSCE as a method of normalizing relations and preventing their respective allies from backsliding. Both powers still perceived each other and respective nuclear arsenals as threats to their national security, but the CSCE/OSCE was seen as a forum for conflict resolution.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, the original member nations of ASEAN each perceived different threats from different nations. All five nations were aligned with different great powers, and thus their own security interests differed. The difference from the OSCE case lies in the fear of extra-regional great power intervention. The five nations did not perceive each other to be a threat, but saw outside states as the main source of potential tension between them. The security
community made it possible for these five nations to become a unified front to prevent conflict in a regional context.

**Desire for Security Cooperation in a Regional Setting**

This particular condition may seem identical to the first condition outlined above, but it is important to stress the difference between a mutual security agreement and one that is based on a regional context. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever argue that a regionalist perspective stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states. They go on to assume two different scenarios in which regionalism rises: the decline of superpower rivalry reduces penetrative quality of global power interest in the rest of the world, or the transition from great powers to light powers and domestic dynamics pull them away from military engagement and strategic competition in the trouble spots of the world (10-11). The rise of regionalism suggests that states that act in a regionalist framework first respond local factors and developments as a priori regional issues because it is the most important environment that affects their security interests. Additionally, regional mechanisms are less dependent on the continuing engagement of external powers in the region (Kacowicz, Bar-Wiman-Tov, Elgstrom, and Jerneck 57-61).

Both the OSCE and ASEAN demonstrate states’ movement towards a regional framework for securing interests. Given that the Cold War was contested primarily by two nations on different continents, the region that the OSCE brought together was much more geographically abstract and referred less to a geographic region. The region was thus based more on Western cooperation and an integration of the US and Europe. The OSCE also engaged in a method of integration that incorporated the enemies or adversaries into a security arrangement rather than create a coalition against the enemy.
ASEAN also demonstrates how regional neighbors provide the most unified front against intervention from extra-regional powers. Since great power interference was the unifying threat among the five founding members, using a regionalist mechanism allowed for resistance to be successful not only because of cultural similarities in their histories, but also diplomatic similarities, such as a reliance on consensus building and the maintenance of sovereignty. Additionally, these five nations were politically and economically weak at the time, and needed to increase their global statuses. Regional integration provided a way to not only increase diplomatic strength and political weight, but also economic interdependence. Eventually, ASEAN expanded its model of regional integration by creating the ASEAN Regional Forum and incorporating numerous other countries that were considered neighbors and extra-regional into its framework for interaction.

Third Party Mediator

A third party mediator is often used during or after disputes as catalysts for diplomatic dialogue and peace processes. Chapter 3 outlines not only the interests that mediators must have in order to maximize their individual interests while maintaining the integrity of the mutual agreement, but also the avenues that they can take with regards to how they can interact with states to create the best outcome. Whether the mediator is coercive, instrumental, or facilitative, security arrangements are better organized with fairly neutral third parties that can provide a framework by which interaction can be supervised.

This condition is found exclusively in the study of the OSCE. Finland helped to lay the groundwork for interaction between the US and the USSR and was essential for easing tensions and for bringing other European nations in. Its role was not limited to hosting the initial
conference, but also included acting as a “telephone” between the two great powers. By limiting direct dialogue in the beginning stages of the negotiation process, Finland was able to ensure that the meeting would be productive and would also create the desired outcome for all parties because there would be a filter to prevent inflammatory statements that would reverse progress. It is not applicable to the ASEAN case because none of the five founding nations were considered to be great powers or even regional powers at the time. Additionally, as none of the nations or immediate neighbors was developed or had negative sentiments towards the other members, a mediator was not necessary because there was less of a political gap needing to be bridged.

As a condition that is not based on an overlap between the two conditions, the justification for the choice of needing a third-party mediator lies in the current strategic environment of the region that I am focusing on. The great power scenario is more relevant in the current political environment and the rise of several regional powers requires more effort on the part of smaller states to ensure that they can participate in the peace process. Unlike in ASEAN’s history, negotiation will not occur without a third party actively promoting dialogue.

*Similar Political and Economic Condition*

The need for the members of a security community to be similar in political and economic condition/status also contributes to the success or failure of a security community. The greater the disparity amongst members, the less likely the “we-feeling” that Deutsch discusses will actually manifest. Moreover, the gap between developed and developing nations with different systems of government would be difficult to overcome through negotiation, preventing peaceful change from actually occurring. Democratic states will function differently than
totalitarian states, and the lack of consensus and ability to relate to one another will upstage the peace process completely. Additionally, confidence building measures are more likely to succeed when all member states are able to participate and to keep up with one another.

The states of the OSCE were all considered economically developed, and still are today. Although not all of the states were democratic at the time, specifically the USSR, the presence of the mediator managed to reconcile those differences and to continue pushing the peace agreement, strengthening the community and collective identity-building. ASEAN also meet this condition, but converse to the OSCE. None of the states were considered developed at the time, and not all were democratic. However, all of the states except Thailand had colonial histories, and were undergoing transitions toward democracy, albeit at different stages by 1967. Instead of using a mediator, the desire for a collective identity and a regional security arrangement managed to transcend the differences and to allow for the community to develop and to expand beyond regional borders.

This condition is important because states must be able to adequately address security issues and to prevent free-riding from smaller nations. Community cannot be built unless all states actively participate in community-building efforts, be they policymaking or theoretical identity shifts. Having similar political and economic conditions allows for collective identities to be established faster and for mutual understanding to develop. This is critical in a diverse community to have similar political contexts, and thus similar strategic goals.

Multilateral Foreign Policy

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Arguably, none of the five member states are considered developed now, although Indonesia is gradually becoming considered a regional power.
The final condition of having an established multilateral foreign policy or a developing multilateral foreign policy is crucial to the establishment of a security community simply because states have to be willing to interact with multiple states at the same time. States must take the interests of the community as their own, and multilateral engagement offers a starting point for building that level of trust. In this sense, multilateralism does not just mean that multiple states must work in concert with each other over a particular issue. It also means that states must be able to work in multiple styles of diplomacy to complement the diplomatic norms of the various member states. This diversity of diplomatic styles does not apply to each of the case studies, since engagement occurred amongst states with similar diplomatic norms, although the creation of those communities relied on the member states’ multilateral stances. However, given the nature of the area addressed in the research question, the security community will experience an amalgamation of various styles of politics that will need to be reconciled for the community to succeed.

Application of Conditions to the Regional Security Environment

In looking at the various conditions that I have created from my two case studies, one can compile the following list of conditions that must be examined in reference to the area that the research question examines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Desire among members for a mutual agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threat perception or fear</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desire for security cooperation in a regional setting</td>
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The following section addresses each of these conditions individually to decide if a security community can be built in the Asia-Pacific. My analysis will be based off of the strategic environment that has been outlined in the previous chapter. Since the next section determines whether or not Australia can bring about the remaining unmet conditions, certain analyses will include references to Australian foreign policy changes as described in Chapter 1. Conditions that are considered met will be marked with a circle (○), conditions that are not met will be marked with a filled circle (●) and conditions that are partially met will be marked with both. All conditions must be fully met in order for the security community building process to be successful.

*Desire for Potential Members for a Mutual Agreement: A Condition in Flux*

Deciding whether or not the potential members of the Asia-Pacific security community desire a mutual agreement is extremely difficult, as constructive engagement between the members is constantly in flux. As described in the previous section, Asian politics are constantly undergoing transformation, and often contradictory perspectives characterize the literature surrounding its strategic condition. Some scholars argue that multilateral institutions or multilateral arrangements will never be able to solve in Asian politics, but Feigenbaum and Manning demonstrated that Asian nations take the architecture of the region seriously and view multilateral institutions and agreements as essential to the development of their region.
multilateral institutions have become the locus of economic and financial trends, and preferential trade agreements are being used to create solidarity and cooperation between all of the states. Additionally, ASEAN Plus Three\(^{27}\) has increased the cooperation and multilateral engagement with smaller nations in Southeast Asia, while maintaining a forum by which their own interests can be satisfied and discussed to create consensus through the “ASEAN Way.”

However, despite evidence of greater cooperation, certain aspects of Asian multilateralism indicate that individual states are not entirely committed towards creating a community in the Asia-Pacific. APEC has been used to increase the financial strength of the region and to allow for economic interdependence under the auspices of a larger multilateral institution, thus creating the impetus for some further cooperation on security issues. This assumption, however, is somewhat flawed as evidenced by a lack of consistency in addressing major security threats in the region through other forums. Additionally, the ARF is considered Asia’s leading security forum, as its membership covers all of the potential members of the community and others,\(^{28}\) but seems to ignore the most likely sources of major conflict in the area: China-Taiwan, North Korea-South Korea, India-Pakistan, and sensitive territorial disputes (Feigenbaum and Manning 9). It can be argued that these issues are purposefully left off of the table as a tribute to the informal nature of the forum, or as a way of encouraging consensus amongst ARF members. However, ignoring these critical points of conflict could also highlight the ever-present source of tension amongst these nations and whether or not a security arrangement such as the ARF can even manage to address the issues.

\(^{27}\) The “Plus Three” are China, Japan and South Korea.

\(^{28}\) The current participants in the ARF are as follows: all the ASEAN members (Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Timor-Leste, United States and Sri Lanka.
Another potential spoiler to the Asian nations’ desire for a mutual agreement is the United States. While the United States has immense interest in participating in Asian multilateral institutions that exclude it, it must demonstrate to Asian nations that a redefined US role will be important if a coherent and purposeful architecture for the twenty-first century Asia is to emerge. Additionally, the US is aligned and pursuing relations with several of the potential members in an attempt to maintain its primacy. The US has significant troop presence in Japan and South Korea both as part of security guarantees to those respective nations, but also as a deterrent against China and North Korea. Japan and South Korea are also under the US nuclear umbrella, as they do not currently possess their own nuclear weapon arsenals. Of course, such a large US presence will be and has already been perceived as a containment measure, and China and North Korea will be less likely to desire pursuing a mutual security agreement with the United States, which the Australian proposal specifically highlights as a necessary measure to ensure a proper sense of balance. Moreover, Chinese and American interests are fundamentally opposed and cooperation to identify mutual interests would not function in an institutional setting since neither is strategically exhausted at this time.

The United States, however, has demonstrated a desire for mutual agreement and cooperation with Asian nations. It is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit, another ASEAN-associated organization. Moreover, its enhanced cooperation with the regional powers of the Asia-Pacific indicate a shift from needing to constantly counter nations to one of working with nations to create some semblance of peaceful relations, even though it has to do so out of necessity to maintain its own national interests.

In this context, “spoiler” can be considered one who prevents, or a party that prevents action.
Based on these findings, I would argue that the condition is partially met. All of the potential member nations have demonstrated the capacity and willingness to forge ties through multilateral agreements and to work with other regional powers to create some mutual arrangement where the security interests of all the nations involved are satisfied. However, due to the ever changing nature of the region, and the likelihood that a single event could trigger more catastrophic outcomes, the state of flux that is present would indicate that while all members are open to the idea, that conflicting interests may still intervene.

**Threat Perception and Fear: Internal and External Triggers**

The condition of threat perception encompasses the idea that states will be indirectly forced to look to another for peaceful conflict resolution when they perceive enough threats to mandate such an action. Given the current strategic environment, there is enough evidence supporting the argument that each of the potential members perceives enough threats either internal or external that will spur it to take multilateral steps to ensure its interests are preserved. The threats seem likely to be resolved through a security community-type mechanism because of increased dialogue. In this particular instance, “internal” means both the domestic politics of a nation, but also threats and fears emanating from within the hypothetical community.

As mentioned in the above sections, all of the potential nations are perceiving threats that are counter to their interests and can potentially devastate them. Several of these factors originate from within those individual states, and the solution for resolving those issues lie in multilateral engagement. China is experiencing political instability, overpopulation, separatist movements, and an environmental crisis that threaten to unravel its domestic and international legitimacy. Moreover, China is attempting to portray itself as a potential global power and is spending
significant diplomatic capital and political will on establishing relations overseas while at the same time tainting its reputation on the United Nations Security Council as a nation that constantly vetoes action. Japan and South Korea are experiencing economic declines and anxiety over the rogue actions of North Korea. India and Indonesia also share the identity as rising political forces, and are dedicating much of their domestic and foreign policy to elevating their statuses in the security environment. The United States is currently declining in military primacy and increasing its involvement in several conflicts in the Middle East. As a result of its unilateral actions, the US is being excluded from more international institutions, hurting its credibility and damaging its reputation as a global hegemon.

The threats also extend to an external level, as most of the nations in the hypothetical security community are perceiving threats from one another, making the threat both within the community and beyond the borders of each individual nation. All nations within the potential community view China as a threat, both in terms of balancing and military power. China’s political decisions are rather unpredictable, and Asia-Pacific nations remain wary of what its next move could be. Additionally, the presence of the United States further compounds the level of anxiety amongst members, since China and the United States are engaged in a power struggle. Many of the member states are closely aligned with the US, and a conflict could draw other nations in, creating a catastrophic scenario. North Korea’s rogue actions could provoke a military response at any time, and the India-Pakistan conflict remains to put the region’s interests in the Middle East in jeopardy.

A security community could provide the mechanisms necessary to prevent conflicts from escalating, with the possibility of the elimination of war in totality within the region. The OSCE provides a solid example in which the enemy or enemies were integrated together to form a
collective rather than interacting through other means. NATO provides a counter-example, in which nations banded together against a common enemy and protect each other from external threats. In the case of the OSCE, several states saw a security community as a chance to bring both sides to the table and to resolve the conflict while maintaining interests. Thus, I would conclude that the condition of needing a threat or something to fear has been met in the region.

*Desire for Regional Security Cooperation: Expanding the Status Quo*

Based on the observations above, there is evidence to assert that a desire for regional security cooperation in the region exists. The ARF has provided an instance in which cooperation beyond East Asia to include other Western nations has been accepted by the major regional powers in the Asia-Pacific, and a framework by which a security community can be built is present. Additionally, the ARF set the stage for current interaction between hypothetical member states. Australia is a member of the ARF, and can build upon the diplomatic foundation that the ARF laid down for it to bring the other nations to the negotiating table.

With states willing to cooperate in a regional setting over security issues, the question remains as to whether or not the security community can move beyond the somewhat ineffective ARF to actually address the major sources of conflict in the region while maintaining peaceful and transparent interactions. The increase of bilateral and trilateral security arrangements and relations in the region address this fact, and prove that with several baseline levels of regional cooperation amongst the community members in existence, that a stronger arrangement can potentially be made among the diverse group of states.

*Third-Party Mediator: The Missing Link?*
If an Asia-Pacific security community were to begin the development process right now, there would not be an assumed third-party mediator. None of the great powers would be willing to take on the role as a mediator because they have too much interest in a particular outcome, and thus the community would not be a genuine one created around a collective identity, but rather a security arrangement dominated by one or two regional powers. Whereas in the ASEAN case in which none of the states were great powers and thus a mediator was not necessary, the current political and security climate of the Asia-Pacific mirrors closer to that of the initial dialogue of the OSCE, where there were multiple great/regional powers interacting in the region.

A mediator is particularly important in this region because of the number of great-power interactions already taking place in the status quo. Mutual trust, transparency, and norms cannot be promoted without a mediator laying a framework by which negotiations can be made and a consensus can be found. It is beneficial to have a nation that differs in history and diplomatic norms so that there can be an objective mediator to aid in the developmental process. The mediator can ease relations and can promote mutual trust by encouraging interaction. If the security community is to succeed in the Asia-Pacific, then a mediator is necessary to bring the regional powers to the negotiating table.

*Similar Political and Economic Conditions: Common with Degrees of Variance*

This condition is present in the Asia-Pacific region. All of the member nations are considered to be economically developed and considered regional powers, with the United States being the only one who has been unanimously determined to be a great power. These nations participate in multilateral institutions and regimes, and have established economies that contribute to global trade.
The primary area of variance amongst potential members is in political and security conditions. This is not to say that they differ to the point where consensus is unreachable, but rather that the governments of the states are run differently and thus have different governing styles. All the states are technically democracies, although China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party. The main difference is in military capabilities, specifically nuclear weapons. Of the potential members, three nations, the US, China, India, have nuclear arsenals. The presence of nuclear weapons greatly affects the ways in which states function in a security community, because the fear of nuclear weapons and the leverage that can be gained with their possession can damage collective identity and mutual trust immediately. However, all three nations have credible nuclear policies such as China’s No First Use policy that keep the weapons as a deterrent, but decreases the likelihood of their use. Additionally, since US and Russia recently signed the START Treaty\textsuperscript{30}, both American and Russian nuclear arsenals will decrease and will be controlled by more safeguard measures.

Overall, the political and economic conditions are similar enough to the point that connections could be established and a security community could be developed.

\textit{Multilateralism: Present in the Status Quo}

The final condition of states having a multilateral foreign policy is certainly present in the region. As discussed above, all potential member states engage in multilateral institutions and dialogue with other nations, forming cooperative ties with one another. Trade interdependence and regular diplomacy also aid in the development of bilateral agreements that a security community can be built upon, since the nations in the region are becoming increasingly

\textsuperscript{30} Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ratified by the US and Russia on January 26, 2011.
interconnected. The challenge will be to determine how far states are willing to take their multilateral stances and whether or not they can begin to recognize other states’ interests as their own to promote a successful security community.

Given the analysis above, the chart below indicates that all conditions have been met except for the desire for a mutual agreement (to an extent) and a third party mediator. The next section further explores these missing conditions, and, more importantly, examines how a Western middle power such as Australia can contribute to the creation of the security community.

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<td>○●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat perception or fear of an external entity</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desire for security cooperation in a regional setting</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Party Mediator</td>
<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Similar political and economic conditions between members</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral foreign policy strategies</td>
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**Australia’s Role in Community-Building**

In 2008, Kevin Rudd proposed the building of an Asia-Pacific community that would involve the aforementioned nations, with Australia taking the lead. This proposal got rejected soon after, and the scholarly debate around the issue fell rather stagnant. I argue that Australia could not follow through with the proposal is because it did not define a clear role for itself.
Rudd did not mention what Australia’s specific role would be in the community, nor did he provide much more detail about whether or not this would be a community arrangement or an institutional organization. However, Rudd’s proposal brings into question whether or not Australia has the capacity to engage in the daunting task of bringing together the Asia-Pacific’s regional powers to a community based on mutual trust and cooperation. In this section, I will determine how Australia can leverage its foreign policy to accomplish a security community by creating the unmet conditions outlined above.

**Filling the Void: Australia as a Third Party Mediator**

Australia’s dependence on multilateral diplomacy and international institutions makes it an optimum choice to be the third party mediator needed to trigger community-building. Australia’s foreign policy has shifted its focus towards Asia, and its reliance on multilateral engagement methods as demonstrated by its involvement in the ARF and APEC have proven that it has embraced some of the key assumptions of security communities (Adler and Barnett et al 278). In addition, Australia has readily accepted the idea of community through its constant push towards framing itself as a good global citizen who works towards maintaining a rules-based global order under the auspices of multilateral institutions. The evolution of middle power foreign policy is represented in the logical response to the recognition of Australia’s changing structural location in the global order. As a self-declared ‘activist middle power’, Australia should be trying to promote the outcome of regional order because it has never had a higher diplomatic priority (White 22).

Australia also has interest in mediating amongst regional powers. For one, mediation may be another way of strengthening Australia’s own relations with the regional powers, potentially
leading to a higher likelihood that it could be out of harm’s way should a conflict occur. Carl Ungerer cites two megatrends that will shape the direction of Australia’s external relations policy in the near future: the globalization of the international economy, and the changing relativities of power and influence which flow from East Asia (252). Therefore, Australian diplomacy in Asia will need to operate with a greater degree of independence and interoperability between diplomats and security forces.

Ungerer continues his argument by arguing that adaptation will require a few critical elements. Australia must maintain a greater degree of independence within an alliance framework, implying that Australia needs to declare a greater voice for itself in the ANZUS relationship. Australia has already demonstrated a strong preference for collective security principles, but needs to build effective coalitions of like-minded countries to support common security interests. It should have a strong regional focus since it lacks the force to project power beyond its immediate region. Additionally, Australia needs to maintain a high degree of defense self-reliance, ensuring that Australia can act speedily in response to threats to its borders, and can provide some military weight to motivate engagement. Force 2030 outlines how Australia is rising to these challenges, and that it remains committed to the construction of new partnerships (266-269). Mediating in the Asia-Pacific offers Australia a unique opportunity to adapt and to establish new levels of connections, while demonstrating to the United States that it is taking independent steps to further its own self-interests, making it a more appealing mediator for American rivals such as China and furthering a perception that it is rather neutral in relation to the Asia-Pacific.

In looking at whether or not Australia would be a good fit to be a mediator, one can apply the framework offered by Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallender discussed in Chapter 3. The first
argument presented is that the more unequal the mediator’s alliance ties to the disputants, the lower the probability that mediation will be successful. It can be argued that Australia is unequally tied to the United States, which would make China less likely to enter into a round of negotiations. This argument is true, but given the nature of the security community and the context of the mediation, this act of engagement with other regional powers could be a determining factor in China’s acceptance of Australia.

The second argument is that while strong military powers negatively affect negotiation, but that having some coercive abilities are necessary. The Australian Defence Force is not the preeminent military force in the world by any means, but the developments described in Force 2030 provide an insight into what Australia’s military force could do. Additionally, its access to American military technology may give it some leverage if it needs to resort to it.

The final argument is that the more unequal the mediator’s alliance ties to the disputants, the higher the probability that mediation will be successful because states are more likely to be deterred by the threat of a powerful mediator which is allied to its opponent. This provides an interesting perspective because it provides a scenario in which nations like China would want to enter into a security community arrangement with its rivals because to do otherwise could jeopardize its national security. In any hypothesis, Australia seems to be positioned to be a proper mediator.

The role that Australia could take in mediation can be determined through Janie Leatherman’s analysis on the different types of third party mediators. Given that Australia is neutral but aligned, it will have to make an important decision as to how it can most effectively mediate. Australia obviously does not have the military capabilities on its own to take on the role
of a coercive mediator, although its alliance with the United States may be a form of indirect coercion. However, leveraging the United States’ resources may not be in the best interest of Australia, as it would turn many nations away from the idea of trusting the United States because Australia would be viewed as a puppet. Rather, Australia should take on the roles of an instrumental and facilitative mediator. As stated before, instrumental mediators have a position on the issues at stake, lack resources relative to the disputants, have considerable status, and have a sense of direction. Their job is to promote consensus on norms and have ideational commitments that are consistent to the end goal that they try to promote. Facilitative mediators change the confrontation among the adversaries by promoting their direct interaction, and operate in a much more flexible manner, making adjustments where necessary. The strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific is relatively unpredictable, thus a hybrid of the roles of an instrumental and facilitative mediator would be best to bring the nations to negotiations. Australia needs to promote the norms of community and mutual trust while encouraging states to interact with one another and to create some form of consensus.

 Desire for a Mutual Agreement: The Obstacle

The biggest obstacle for Australia is leveraging its diplomacy to convince the regional powers of the Asia-Pacific to work together in a method of mutual trust and transparency. Although those nations currently interact in multilateral security institutions such as the ARF and APEC, direct interaction and transparency will be extremely difficult to obtain. The sheer presence of the United States will make collective identity near impossible, and neither the United States nor China is strategically exhausted to the point that a security community provides the only sources of relief. The biggest issue for Australia is how to solve power rivalries. Unfortunately, given Australia’s current capabilities, resolving rivalries and tensions is
not going to be attainable in the short-term. Australia is a middle-sized country separated by
great distances from the main areas of great-power competition. Despite its diplomatic track
record, Canberra is unlikely to exert a level of strategic weight sufficient to tip the balance in one
direction or another, much less have a decisive effect on the way major powers decide to manage
their relations or respond to conflicts (Heinrichs 2).

Adler and Barnett highlight several problems with the creation of a security
community in the Asia-Pacific. The first is a problem of boundaries. How is a regional
community going to be defined given that there is little consensus on what constitutes the Asia-
Pacific? There are connections between the economic understandings of the region and security
understandings of the region, but there is little overlap. Australia seems open to interacting in the
Asia-Pacific based on the economic definition, but remains skeptical with regards to the security
definition. Additionally, there is no shared ideology of community. There is certainly a shared
sense of cooperation which emphasizes the importance of informal, non-binding, non-legalistic
interaction, and security arrangements do not need to be sanctified by some form of institutional
framework. However, the idea of a “community” is still rather abstract and disagreed upon. Also,
Asian political culture tends to resist Western understandings of sovereignty. For example, the
norms described in the ASEAN case represent the Asian norm of non-interference and the
granting of full control over one’s territorial borders (Adler and Barnett et al 282).

These problems are certainly present on a theoretical level, but it is also important to note
that, while valid criticisms, Adler and Barnett’s analysis comes from 1998, and does not account
for the current strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific. The fundamental difference from Adler
and Barnett’s view and the current reality is that while cooperation is inevitable, the rivalries
between the major Asia-Pacific nations are quite insurmountable at this time. China has been the
newest convert to the doctrine of “Asianism,” that regionalism in East Asia should be a mechanism for Asians to resist Western dominance in the region and to contest it instead (Griffiths and Wesley 24).

This scenario carries a worrying message for Australia. It shows that Australia’s diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific region may be irreparably damaged as the by-product of rivalries among Asia’s great powers. These rivalries are no longer subordinate to global dynamics, but are taking an active step in shaping them. Asia-Pacific regional powers have fewer normative goals in common, and agreement on international order will form around much lower common denominators, such as sovereignty, limits on the use of force, and the validity of treaty enforcement (ibid 25).

While Australia’s role in mediation may not lead to a security community in the Asia-Pacific at this time, Australia needs to remain vigilant with the other foreign policy goals that it set up in Force 2030. A security community in the Asia-Pacific is not completely out of the question, and Australia needs to continue to constructively engage with the regional Asian powers in order to increase its own benefits and to remain ready in the event that a community building opportunity arises in the future. Raoul Heinrichs argues that:

Canberra has nothing to lose by using its good diplomatic standing to encourage Chinese moderation, American accommodation, or Sino-Japanese rapprochement, some coalescence of which is needed to lay the foundations for a benign future in Asia. However, it is only realistic to acknowledge that competition among Asia’s major powers is deeply entrenched in the structure of the international system, and as such, may prove impervious to even the most adroit diplomatic efforts (2). Australia needs to prevent being drawn too far into both multilateral institutions that are too large and inclusive, and more importantly, a potential balancing scenario in which it has to pick sides.
Maximizing its strategic weight is the most beneficial to Australia in the new Asian century. It would improve Australia’s capacity to manage its security amidst regional instability and strategic competition. It would also give Australia more confidence to dissent from American policies that do not satisfy Australian interests at a time when strategic divergence is higher and entrapment is more dangerous. Finally, it would mean that Australia could defend itself from any hostile major power while insuring itself against the possibility that the US might be unable or unwilling to meet its commitments to Australia.

The Near-Future of the Asia-Pacific

So what will this region look like absent a security community? This question is quite difficult to answer, but I will refer to the four strategic options for the region articulated in Chapter 6. US primacy will most likely decline. This is not to say that US retrenchment will occur, but that the US’ military presence and influence will most likely be diminishing in the region. However, it will still be a physical and diplomatic force in the Asia-Pacific, which also means that Chinese primacy will probably not be the outcome either. The major powers of the Asia-Pacific are still growing and changing their foreign policies to reflect those of great powers and for regional dominance. Thus, I deduce that the most likely outcomes for a security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific will be either a balance of power or a concert of great powers.

The more likely of the two outcomes is an Asian balance of power, since a concert of powers would require the major powers to eschew power-maximizing strategies and to set aside their own narrow self-interests in the interest of maintaining overall stability. This paradigm shift is at odds with existing patterns of state behavior (Heinrichs 2). China’s rapid modernization and militarization is causing immense anxiety in other major states, and with the US military
umbrella decreasing, Japan and South Korea will most likely begin to develop their own nuclear programs. As such, the region would be in somewhat of a standstill. Security and monetary mutually assured destruction would apply, since the use of force would end up doing more damage to each state individually than the states that they are fighting against, and a competitive equilibrium can be reached.

Another derivative of the balance of power system that may occur is the expansion of ASEAN Plus 3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) to include the five players who have cooperated in the Six Party process, thereby including Russia and the United States. Expansion would bring the five major actors in the North Asia-Pacific together, combining interests, resources, capacity and expertise on many issues. This arrangement offers a better chance at setting an agenda for the region, but would exclude India and Indonesia, which may be problematic given the rising strength of these nations. However, a five-party mechanism is appealing on several levels, although the United States may have to stand aside as some pan-Asian institutions advance without it (Feigenbaum and Manning 22). Although North Koreans have rejected the ultimate objective of denuclearization during the Six Party Talks, the past has shown that these five nations can indeed work towards a focused and functional objective. Each has strong capabilities, diplomatic, economic, or political, that they can offer to the table. “At this point, then, the more compelling rationale for security-related cooperation among the five is contingency planning, including managing the transition to an eventually reunified Korea” (ibid 24). Resolving the North Korea issue would assist in the building of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and can act as a springboard for these nations to work together on other issues in a more transparent manner.
The balance of power arrangement is something that Australia is not accustomed to. China will be on one side, with the US, India, and Japan (and most likely South Korea) on the other, leading to potential militarization. However, as long as Australia constructively engages with all the major players in the region while developing its own military capabilities, it will best achieve its national interests as a nation. Australia will never be on one of the “sides” in the event of a balance of power. Rather, it will be caught in the middle, since it maintains strong political and economic ties with all parties, and will continue to do so as implicated by the 2009 Defence White Paper. Even in the event of a concert of great powers, Australia’s role as a mediator does not guarantee that it will be a member of the community, simply because it does not have the capacity to keep up with the other members. Australia’s best hope is to engage and take on the mediating role when necessary as a unilateral helpful fixer. This is not to exclude the possibility of Australia to develop itself to become a power on par with Japan, India, and South Korea in the future, nor do I argue that Australia will not have the capacity to drive the development of a security community later on. For now, Australia must focus on the path it has set for itself, and remain flexible to maintain a presence in the security politics of the Asia-Pacific.
Conclusion

This project examines how Australian foreign policy can function in a region that is becoming extremely politically relevant. The Asia-Pacific region differs from other regions because of the multiplicity of regional power interactions that occur on a daily basis. In order to respond to these shifts in the strategic environment, Australia has adapted its foreign policy to engage with Asia-Pacific nations more independently from the United States, who it has held close ties with for decades. The 2009 Defence White Paper: Force 2030 outlines Australia’s new strategic interests and outlooks in the region, and how it is looking to build closer relationships with major Asian nations. Force 2030 also outlines the ways in which Australia is looking to develop its own defense capabilities, signaling a departure from its reliance on the United States for military protection.

More specifically, I investigate the new foreign policy initiative of a regional security community put forth in Force 2030. The current political climate in the Asia-Pacific is one based on multilateral institutions that are not effective in ensuring the stability of the region or to deter conflict. A security community offers an ideal option, because it ensures that war will never occur between nations with strong military forces and nuclear weapons. Moreover, a security community allows for better foreign policymaking because the process is based not around self-interest, but the interests of the community at-large and for the good of the collective whole.

Two case studies were used to determine the conditions that have to be in place in order for a security community to begin the developmental process. The OSCE case provides a Western example in which a community was built to incorporate global dominant forces into a
peace-making mechanism through consultations and dialogue. ASEAN outlined ways in which Asian nations create security institutions in a different political and economic condition.

The histories of these two cases provide insight into the conditions that triggered their developmental processes. My method of comparing and contrasting led me to the creation of a master list of conditions to apply to the Asia-Pacific. The strategic political environment of the Asia-Pacific showed that two critical conditions were missing: a third-party mediator, and the desire for a mutual security agreement.

I argue that Australia’s primary role in the building of the Asia-Pacific security community is as a third-party mediator. It has relied not on its military hard power, but rather on diplomacy and multilateral institutions. Although Canberra and Washington are close allies, Australia is making a conscious effort to distance itself from the United States and to build alliances with the shapers of the security condition in the region, in the event that the United States is unable or unwilling to come to its rescue. However, despite all of these changes, Australia simply cannot overcome the obstacle of resolving rivalries and promoting an Asia-Pacific community. Its foreign policy strategy is based on faulty premises, and I contend that the great power disparities in the region are insurmountable, as neither China nor the United States are strategically exhausted and in need of pursuing a security community. Australia’s diplomatic and military capabilities do not have the weight necessary to change the minds of regional rivals bent on challenging each other for regional primacy.

While a security community is not a likely outcome in the Asia-Pacific, Australia must continue the strategy that it developed in Force 2030. An Asia-Pacific balance of power scenario would exclude Australia from maintaining a strong voice in regional politics. If Australian
foreign policy continues down this path of heightened regional engagement and military self-reliance, than it will see a better chance of taking the lead on developing a security community in the future, when the opportunity presents itself.

**Implications for the Literature and Policy**

This project attempts to update the discussion of security communities as a function of foreign policy. It does so by sorting through the existing literature and applying the most relevant parts to a specific area through a comparative method rather than a linear descriptive narrative that exists in the current literature. The literature has not produced a master list of conditions based off of comparative analyses of existing communities, and my research attempts to create a starting point by which more conditions can be added. Moreover, the project discusses the Asia-Pacific region, which has been an area of vital importance for global security, given the rise of China and the decline of American primacy. By combining these two themes into a broader analysis, my project not only looks at what a security community could look like in the present, but also how the politics of the region affects the security of the world.

The focus of this paper extends beyond the Asia-Pacific region, however, and looks at an area that is often overlooked by political analysis: Australia and the South Pacific. Australia has always been considered the puppet of the United States, doing what the US wanted and shaping its foreign policy around the interests of the US. However, Australia is slowly becoming more independent, and the literature has yet to address how Australia’s interactions with Asia-Pacific nations can affect, or not affect, regional conflict and security. Middle power diplomacy has a place in international security, and those nations rarely get the attention that the US or China do.
By highlighting Australia in the broader context of Asia-Pacific security, this project opens the doors to further research of the role of middle powers in international security.

From a policy perspective, this paper implicates how Australia should continue to shape its foreign policy. While I do not offer specific policy recommendations, I make reasoned judgments about how Australia should change its foreign policy strategy in order to maintain its interests in the region. Moreover, it defines a potential role for Australia to take to assert itself as a strong middle power worthy of being included in security arrangements with large powers that would otherwise exclude its participation. If this paper were to make a policy recommendation, it would argue that Australia should gradually operate more independently from the United States in order to demonstrate to Asian nations that it wants to be involved in the politics of the region. The regional powers would take Australia more seriously, while not assuming Australia to take the side of the Americans if conflict were to arise. Australia is not ready to lead a security community in the status quo. If it accomplishes its military goals set forth in Force 2030, then it may be able to implement coercive diplomacy in 2030. However, Australia should remain vigilant in engaging with the regional players to ensure that it would not be excluded if a security community were to ever be formed.

This project demonstrates that war is still an option for conflict resolution in the Asia-Pacific because none of the regional powers are strategically exhausted. The nations involved simply are not ready politically or ideologically to enter into that kind of binding agreement. Over time, there is a chance that tensions may ease and the rivalries for power projection may somehow decline, and the possibility for a security community will increase. However, that idea is not yet a viable option for the Asia-Pacific.
Works Cited


