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Solidarity Starts at Home: An Analysis of the Polish Perception of Social Inclusion and Exclusion of Migrants

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Solidarity Starts at Home:
An Analysis of the Polish Perception of Social Inclusion and Exclusion of Migrants

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Honors Thesis
 Presented to the Department of International Studies
 Macalester College St. Paul, MN, USA
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Abstract

With the Eurosceptic and anti-refugee Law and Justice Party in power in Poland, advocating for the rights of Polish migrants in the Brexit negotiations, the question, then, arises: how do Poles simultaneously justify the idea of a borderless EU and the rejection of refugees? I argue that all actors in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants are using the value of solidarity, but defining it differently because of the collective identities that they prioritize. There are two prevalent, historically grounded sides in the debate: one side is liberal, and cosmopolitan, the other is illiberal and ethno-nationalist.
Introduction

Eng.: We want a Polish repatriate, not an Islamic immigrant. (‘Chcemy Polskiego Repatrianta, Zamiast Islamskiego Emigranta [Wideo z Marszu]’)

Europe is not a market, it is the will to live together. Leaving Europe is not leaving a market, it is leaving shared dreams. We can have a common market, but if we do not have common dreams, we have nothing. Europe is the peace that came after the disaster of war. Europe is the pardon between French and Germans. Europe is the return to freedom of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Europe is the fall of the Berlin Wall. Europe is the end of communism. Europe is the welfare state, it is democracy (‘Esteban Gonzales Pons: 'Europe Is Not a Market, It Is the Will to Live Together', Speech on Brexit, European Parliament - 2017’).
In September 2015, Ms Ewa Kopacz from the Civic Platform Party (Polish Prime Minister at the time) vowed to Poland’s parliament that “nobody will teach us [Poles] the meaning of the word ‘solidarity’” (“Resistant to migrants, Poland debates the meaning of “solidarity”). A month later, this claim seemed questionable, as Poland’s conservative Law and Justice Party won the majority at the Polish Sejm and Senate, leaving Polish leftist parties out of the Parliament. The party’s campaign was heavily based on a Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant rhetoric, as many Poles have expressed dissatisfaction with refugee quotas established by the EU. In the UK’s June 2016 EU referendum, the British voted to leave the European Union with the Leave camp using anti-immigration rhetoric to gain votes. Within a week after the referendum British police said that more than 330 incidents relating to hate crimes against race and nationality were reported - that is five times above the average (Agerholm). Some of the incidents involved cards containing the words "No more Polish Vermin" being distributed and a Polish cultural center in West London being vandalized. Many people, including the Poles, called the Brexit vote xenophobic. However, the Poles wouldn’t call themselves xenophobic while refusing to accept refugees into their homogenous society.

Poles drew invisible borders which include some and exclude others. Looking at the image with a slogan saying “We want a Polish repatriate, not an Islamic immigrant,” Poles want to include back in Poland fellow countrymen who left Poland to look for a better future, education or better salaries, while they do not want new migrants to arrive and become a part of Polish society. Furthermore, looking at the Polish history of lost territories, and dependency on other countries, this discourse on social inclusion and exclusion is “a dialectic of trust and fear” (Huysmans 60). That led to my main research
question: In the past year, Polish leaders have both expressed deep hostility to in-
migration to Poland (refugees seeking shelter in the EU) and defended Polish out-
migration to Great Britain, which has been met with serious hostility in the lead-up and aftermath of the Brexit vote. What explains the seeming contradiction in the Polish positions regarding the standards for legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants?

The political elites are not the only actors present in the debate on out-migration to the UK and influx of refugees to Poland, there are present voices of public opinion, local level movements, media and the Catholic Church. In order to further delve into this topic, throughout my research process, I asked: What arguments have the Poles employed, and how do they relate to one another? What principles, norms, and historical precedents have they employed? Which actors employ which arguments? What seems to be driving these positions? How has the Polish diaspora affected Polish perception of inclusion and exclusion? How has the Brexit affected the debate over these issues in Poland? And what are the implications of this Polish positioning for EU refugee policy?

Poland, being one of the largest countries in the EU is also one of the largest recipients of the EU funds. The success story of a post-Communist Poland being transformed into an EU member state might end with the current political agenda of Law and Justice that primarily won the elections based on their ethno-nationalist, Eurosceptic agenda. With the rise of populism in the UK, France, the Netherlands, and many other member states, Poland is no exception. Brexit is a “model example of how easily populism can stimulate the worst instincts and how difficult it is to fight back” (“Rafał Pankowski z NIGDY WIĘCEJ o Reagowaniu Instytucji Brytyjskich Na Ksenofobię, 17.09.2016”). The refugee crisis since 2015 and huge numbers of refugees flowing in
have likely contributed to the rise of nationalism among member states. The refugee issue has become a pretext for expressing xenophobia. Instead of acting as an integrated union, European Union states, including Poland, prioritized their own politics and their own interests. Threatened by the refugees more homogenous member states felt like they were going to lose their national identity. Furthermore, the most homogenous states in the EU are at the same time the newest members and they saw their accession to the EU as a way of regaining their identity after years of a communist regime. The fear of losing core elements of a national identity reveals issues of integration in the EU both between states and within states. Poles, in particular, having their state entirely taken away from them in the eighteenth century, have an abiding sense of threat. The pride in a Polish nation meant for them excluding people from other nations, in particular refugees. However, the question that needs to be asked is how Poles being a large emigrant community in Western Europe, United States, United Kingdom and other places, took their inclusion in these countries for granted, but do not want to allow that guarantee for incoming refugees. In this thesis, I argue that all actors in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants are using the value of solidarity, but defining it differently because of the collective identities that they prioritize. There are two prevalent sides in the debate: one side is liberal, open, and cosmopolitan, the other is illiberal and ethno-nationalist. Both see some use for a Christian European community, but the ethno-nationalist side does not see any reason for solidarity with outsiders who are not Christian European. So the question becomes, to whom do you owe solidarity? And their answers are totally different.
Although scholarly work on Polish out-migration and the lives of Polish migrants abroad is extensive, studies do not address directly the Polish response to in-migration. Many scholars have focused on the response of the multicultural Western states, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, that now are dealing with popularity of the far-right parties that fed off the influx of refugees into their countries; but the topic of Central and Eastern European countries and their response to refugee crisis has not been largely addressed. Poland has not been considered a country that people want to immigrate to; the immigrant population has mainly included the neighboring countries from the Eastern border. Furthermore, the fact that Poland had been ruled between 2007 and 2015 by a pro-European, centrist party did not require scholarly analysis of the nationalist sentiment in Poland. The summer of 2016 with the Brexit referendum and the use of anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric by the Leave campaign proved the hostility towards members within the European Union itself and required analysis of the Polish response to such rhetoric.

This thesis makes a unique contribution to the literature, as it looks at the Polish perception of social inclusion and exclusion from two dimensions: regarding Polish hostility to refugees and defending Polish out-migration to the United Kingdom. In this thesis, I return to the adopted by Poles pride in the “Solidarity” movement and how the understanding of solidarity changed and varies based on whom you show solidarity to. The notion of solidarity is analysed in the broader European context, which makes this thesis unique, as it not only refers to the notion of a required solidarity as a member of the EU, but also assumed solidarity to your fellow émigré compatriots that are being excluded from a fellow EU country. This thesis is also an analysis of an example of one country that is currently experiencing both the rise in populism and Euroscepticism, but
that is a case in a growing number of EU countries. This project is a reminder that EU identity is overshadowed by enrooted national identities, and such understanding needs to be take into consideration when promoting further integration of the union or addressing issues as a union, especially issues that require collaboration of all member states, such as an acceptance of the EU refugee quota to evenly distribute responsibility among the states. What adds nuance to this project is a survey that I sent to Polish politicians in the Sejm and the European Parliament in order to receive an insight into the political elites’ views on the topics of inclusion and exclusion of migrants. A close-up analysis of their answers allows me to hypothesize how their understanding of notions of solidarity, nationalism and xenophobia might have affected a broader public opinion; where their understanding of these issues comes from, and how deeply enrooted they are in history. Furthermore, bringing in Polish-language sources both published and via my survey to an English-language audience provides an understanding of this issue to a larger audience. I believe that it is crucial to keep acknowledging the issues of nationalism and European identity in countries outside of Western Europe, in order to further come up with solutions as to how the EU can be a closer union and tackle issues of the rise of populism and refugee distribution in a more efficient manner.

Since this topic is an ongoing issue, as a part of my research I have been checking Polish and international news on a daily basis. However, a lot of the arguments used in the debate take their roots in Polish history, and as such I reviewed literature on nations and nationalism and provided a history of Polish nationalism. As political elites are the most outspoken actor in the debate, I wanted to learn their opinion on the use of anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric during the Brexit referendum; why Poles, who experienced
diaspora themselves, are indifferent to refugees’ experience nowadays; and what does European solidarity mean? I sent out a survey to Polish politicians at the European Parliament and Members of the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament). I received ten responses from different political parties, which allowed me to see different approaches to the mentioned topics. The responses became incorporated in Chapter 4. A close-up analysis of the Polish political elites’ approach to the issues of migration within the context of the European Union allows for a better understanding of the role that a homogenous Member State would like to see the EU to take in terms of security issues and further integration.

My thesis has been organized in a way that a reader can familiarize themselves with the definition of nationalism and European identity, moving on to the history of Polish nationalism, background on Poland and in-migration and out-migration in the context of the European Union, finally moving into the analysis of the different perceptions on social inclusion and exclusion presented by different actors.

Chapter 1 is a literature review addressing the intersection of two distinct scholarly conversations: the debate on nationalism and the conversation on European identity. For the scope of this project the debate on nationalism focused on a review of two scholars – Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith. Their different approaches on the origins of nationalism stem from the rootedness of nationalism, Gellner seeing it as a political project undertaken by the elites and Smith seeing it as rooted in ethnies. The understanding of nationalism is crucial, as it is one of the main arguments used by various actors in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants. The relevance of this project is larger than only applying to Poland, it applies to the European Union
project, and therefore a second part to my literature review is a review of several theories of European identity. The fear of losing a national identity to a European identity is a recurring problem not only in the case of Poland. In the second part of Chapter 1, I will look at what scholars have written about the interchangeability of EU identity with European identity.

Chapter 2 addresses the origins of Polish nationalism. Poles different view on nationhood comes from the fact that at the end of eighteenth century Poles lost their land for 123 years. That’s where the Chapter starts and moves chronologically through the situation of the Polish population during the partitions and the Second World War. Additionally, during the communist years in Poland the role of the Catholic Church greatly increased and the understanding of such rootedness and attachment of Poles to the Catholic Church is important to keep in mind throughout the thesis, as the Church is one of the prominent actors in the debate on inclusion and exclusion of migrants. In this Chapter, I will also describe the role of the Solidarity movement post’89 elections.

After providing the historical timeline of Polish nationalism and a creation of Polish identity, Chapter 3 will address Poland and both in-migration and out-migration in the context of the European Union. I will discuss the history of out-migration of Poles to the UK since the World War II up until the current day and the Brexit vote and its results. The second part of the Chapter will be an introduction to migration policies in Poland within the framework of the EU. In order to understand the in-migration patterns to Poland, I will briefly explain the refugee crisis and the Polish response to it.

Chapter 4 is an analysis chapter of actors present in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants and their arguments while referring to questions on how the
Polish diaspora affected Polish perception of inclusion and exclusion; what other principles, norms and historical precedents might have been employed by different actors; and what seems to be driving these positions. The actors include: the political elites (the Law and Justice party, surveyed politicians), local level movements (far-right political movement), the Catholic Church, media (state-controlled and Radio Maryja), and popular opinion. When analyzing these actors, five main themes have become overarching: nationalism, xenophobia, Euroscepticism, solidarity and economic reasons.

Based on these four chapters, in my conclusion I provide answers to the questions on what arguments Poles employed when looking at standards for legitimate inclusion and conclusion of migrants; what principles and norms they used; where these positions come from; what role the Polish diaspora in the UK played; and what are the implications for the EU refugee policy.
Chapter 1. Defining nationalism and European identity: Literature review

Introduction

The investigation of the contradiction in the Polish positions regarding the standards for legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants rests at the intersection of two distinct scholarly conversations: the debate on nationalism and the conversation on European identity. To understand the rootedness of Polish nationalism and to find out why some actors employ nationalism as their argument against Syrian refugees or to defend Polish out-migration, this chapter reviews two definitions of nationhood. These theories will illuminate the complexity of nationalism, while simultaneously working to inform my personal definition of nationalism as propagated by the Polish Law and Justice Party in their ethno-nationalist agenda. The complexity and the novelty of my topic of analyzing responses to both in-migration and out-migration reflects broader issues facing Europe and therefore requires a second part to my literature review – a review of several theories of European identity. While the project of European integration came as a response to the rise of nationalism that fueled World War II in Europe at the time, the Poles asked themselves, “isn’t the integration a threat to our national identity, the realization of our newly gained sovereignty, and to the strength of Catholicism?” (Bachmann 200). Keeping that question in mind, I will look at what scholars have written about the interchangeability of EU identity with European identity.

This chapter will start by addressing the different approaches to nationalism by Gellner and Smith, each of which represents an influential school of thought in the scholarly literature on nationalism. While Gellner sees nationalism as a political project
undertaken by elites, Smith sees it as rooted in *ethnies*. I will look at their definitions of a nation and nationalism, and decide which definitions are most applicable to my exploration of Polish nationalism. After addressing the debate on nationalism, I will explore how collective identity is addressed by scholars in the context of European identity, the civic and cultural aspect of the European identity, as well as the adoption of the European identity by Eastern and Central European states as a way for them to access the European Union.

**Defining nations and nationalism: the debate between modernists and ethnosymbolists in the Polish context**

There are two models of nationhood – one based on citizenship, the other on ethnic belonging. Civic nationalism has been equated with terms such as: ‘constitutional’, ‘Western’, ‘patriotic’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘good’ nationalism, while ‘ethnic’ can be associated with ‘cultural’, ‘Eastern’, ‘exclusive’ or ‘bad’ nationalism” (Gledhill 350). While the West is generally associated as a place “where the State precedes the nation,” the Eastern model is based on the people who share the same language, culture and ethnicity, “where the nation is in search of the State, wavering between imitation and rejection of the Western model” (Rupnik 60), Keeping in mind the scope of this project, I decided to only look at two scholars who debate on the origins of nationalism. While Ernest Gellner argues that nationalism and nations are associated with the modern industrial era and are a product of the elites, Anthony Smith is convinced of the rootedness of nationalism in *ethnies*.

Smith defines an *ethnie* “as a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture,
including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among
the elites” (*Myths and Memories of the Nation* 105). The main difference between an
*ethnie* and a nation is the fact that an *ethnie* does not need to have a mass public culture,
but a basis in genealogical “attachment to communal heritage” (*The Ethnic Origins of
Nations* 49). People’s identification with ethnies comes with a sense of wider kinship that
expands “outwards in space and down the generations in time” (*Myths and Memories of
the Nation* 127). Often in the past ethnies were subjected to oppressive empires, which
resulted in the “sense of collective mission and destiny, and kept alive popular sentiments
of ethnic election” (192). For many ethnies, including Poles, such incorporation led to a
stronger sense of ethnic identity (192), and “the Court, clergy and szlachta formed an
aristocratic ethnie ruling over a culturally mixed peasantry, with significant German and
Jewish trading and artisan minorities in the towns forming semi-autonomous enclaves”
(141).¹ Smith’s historical description of Polish elites imposing a common ethnic identity
reflects the use of ethnicity in Law and Justice’s political agenda, and therefore Smith’s
approach to ethnicity will be used in this thesis.

For Gellner, on the other hand, “ethnicity becomes ‘political’, it gives rise to
‘nationalism’, when the ‘ethnic’ group defined by these overlapping cultural boundaries
is not merely acutely conscious of its own existence, but also imbued with the conviction
that the ethnic boundary ought also to be a political one” (*Encounters with Nationalism*
35). Moreover, he emphasizes that one ethnicity is bordered within one political unit, and
as such the unit should be ruled by members of the same ethnicity, and often reflects the
exclusion of foreigners in such societies.

¹ *Szlachta* is Polish aristocracy, nobility.
The debate between ethno-symbolists and instrumentalists about defining a nation addresses the origins of a nation. While ethno-symbolists emphasize centuries of social and cultural trends when researching nations, instrumentalists date it back only to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when industrialization took place in Europe.

As an instrumentalist, Gellner claims that nations are not natural and inherent, and that it is nationalism that invents nations. Gellner frames a nation as a product of the process of modernization, as he says “pre-modern societies and cultures had neither use nor room for nations” (*Myths and Memories of the Nation* 6). Moreover, he argues that once nations were formed, they became social actors on the political stage (165).

Smith defines “nation” as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (*Myths and Memories of the Nation* 11) and argues for “an essential continuity between earlier forms of cultural identity and newly emerging nations” (Malesevic 113). In other words, nations are “social entities that have been gradually built around pre-modern ethnic cores; that is, ethnies” (Ibid.). For Poles, having a shared memory, culture, and a pre-existing territory kept them together during the fight for independence.

Since Polish nationalism takes its roots at the end of the 18th century with the rise of the gentry’s dissatisfaction and only the elite aristocrats enjoying the common privileges of the Polish commonwealth, I believe it is crucial to look how at relevant Gellner’s argument is in this case or whether Smith’s definition is more applicable. The loss of the land and independence did not diminish the Polish sense of identity, as in the early 1800s the Polish culture was deepened on the historical and philological base, and
appreciation of the peasantry, not only the elites, was to be translated into political
inclusion in the active nation. Such historical background is critical in understanding the
formation of the rootedness of Polish nationalism that is reflected in the protection of
Polish homogeneity from newcomers nowadays, in this case, refugees. Gellner and
Smith’s theories will illuminate the complexity of nationalism, starting from the tension
between the civic and ethnic understandings of the nation in the Preamble to the current
Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2\textsuperscript{nd} April 1997:

We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic, Both those who
believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as
those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as
arising from other sources, Equal in rights and obligations towards the
common good - Poland, Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their
struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture
rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human
values (“The Constitution of the Republic of Poland”)

The first line of the Preamble juxtaposes an ethno cultural entity of the Polish
nation with a community of citizens in an attempt to redefine the concept of the Polish
nation in civic terms, by including the wording of “all citizens of the Republic,” not only
the ethnic Poles. Since Poland was deprived of a state for 123 years, which is for most of
her modern history, the Polish nation and the state have historically been understood as
separate from each other.

The main debate that emerges between modernists (Gellner) and ethnosymbolists
(Smith) is the question of whether common values, ideas and beliefs or political and
economic interests were more important in shaping the direction and intensity of nationalism. Gellner defines nationalism primarily as “a political principle that encompasses political and national unity” (*Nations and Nationalism* 1), however in theory “ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones,” especially within one state (1). In addition to the political principle, Gellner sees nationalism as a sentiment “aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment” and as a movement (1). Such movements occurred among populations in Eastern Europe, who according to Gellner “were still locked into the complex multiple loyalties of kinship, territory and religion. To make them conform to the nationalist imperative was bound to take more than a few battles and some diplomacy” (100).

Gellner’s definition implies that once nations are formed, they can become exclusive.

Gellner further frames nationalism as a phenomenon accompanying the industrialization of the world: “nationalism is not a sentiment expressed by pre-existing nations; rather it creates nations where they did not previously exist” (*Nations and nationalism* xxv). Gellner acknowledges “that where nationalism has acquired power and prestige, it can give rise to derivative or imitative forms, for example, the creation of ‘nation states’ in central Europe by the victor states after 1918” (*Nations and nationalism* xxv). Gellner argues that the emergence of nationalism forms part of the transition from agrarian society to industrial society, which differs from the previous type of society in its mobile and egalitarian structure (*Nations and nationalism* 40). He argues that in pre-industrial, face-to-face societies, people were defined through structure and the roles that they were assigned in the society (*Nations and nationalism* xxiii). Gellner also affirms “nations and nationalism are not natural because they are not a permanent feature of the
human condition but came into being with the transition to industrialism” (*Nations and nationalism* xxiii).

Nationalism creates nations, not the other way around, and Gellner explains that nationalism is nothing but the desire to live in a country with one common culture. He approaches the cultural aspect of nationalism through its selective use of cultures or cultural wealth (*Nations and Nationalism* 55). The selective aspect of it is what distinguishes instrumentalists from other nationalists’ approaches to the study of nationalism, as they portray nationalism as “the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality of the population” (57). A high culture is a “literate, sophisticated culture, serviced by specialized educational personnel and taught formally in mass, public, standardized and academy-supervised institutions of learning” (“Memory and Modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism”). Gellner’s central argument states that the “mobility of modern societies promotes the rise of new cultural ties” (*The Ethnic Revival* 52). For him nationalism is closely tied up with a role of language and culture, and “hence there is always a tendency to aspire to cultural and linguistic homogeneity in the modern world, and to define pretty sharply the boundaries of the new cultural/linguistic units, or ‘nations’” (47). Gellner’s lack of focus on other elements of a nation could be seen as exclusivity. While Poland is a homogenous state, it has not always strived for it through the use of high culture, as Polish nationalism shifted to include all social classes to fight together for Polish independence.

Smith disagrees with Gellner’s approach to high culture as he claims that it is not well supported how low cultures transformed themselves into high cultures and
disregarded the promoters of high culture – the elites (Myths and Memories of the Nation 7). More importantly, he disagrees with Gellner on his lack of acknowledgment “to the pre-existing cultures and ethnic ties of the nations that emerged in the modern epoch, thereby precluding any understanding of the popular roots and widespread appeal of nationalism“ (9). Smith believes that memory is integral to cultural identity and that maintenance of these memories is crucial to the survival of such collective identities (10). Memory plays a big part in Poles’ identification as Poles being between two powerful states – Germany and Russia – Poland feared for its borders and stability.

For Smith, although the roots of nation can be found in antiquity, nationalism is a modern phenomenon, but what “gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias” (Myths and Memories of the Nation 9). What matters the most in Smith’s definition of nationalism is the importance to “create, defend or maintain nations – their autonomy, unity and identity – by drawing on the cultural resources of pre-existing ethnic communities and categories” (19). The ethnosymbolist approach puts special importance on the subjective components of national identity, while simultaneously emphasizing the “sociological bases of collective cultural identities, like ethnies and nations” (When is a nation 5). Polish nationalism was aimed to preserve Polish culture and an ethnic structure of the nation and to create an independent Polish state based on the above values.

Another aspect that Smith touches upon in his analysis of nationalism is the role of religion, which is an important aspect in the case of homogeneously Catholic Poland. He claims “some collective religious sentiments can reinforce a sense of national identity,
as we witness today in Ireland, Poland and Israel” (Myths and Memories of the Nation 229). The Polish national consciousness came to be strongly tied to a Catholic religious identity, as Poland was partitioned and occupied primarily by Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia, so religion may seem to be a natural focus of identity for the Poles. Additionally, religion is an argument that is currently used by right-wing Polish politicians claiming that Muslims could never be integrated into a Polish society.

Smith argues that “the modernist paradigm pays insufficient attention to the long-term formation of national identities and, moreover, to the political power of the ‘myth-symbol complex’ and of ‘myth-memories’ in modern nations and nationalist movements” (“Anthony D. Smith”). As a result, I believe that Smith’s approach to nationalism is more applicable in the Polish case, as Poland over the course of its history maintained a strong connection with myths, symbols, culture and religion.

Having addressed the debate between Gellner and Smith on defining nationalism, state, nation and the role of ethnicity, I decided to apply Smith’s approach to the topic while referring to the concepts mentioned throughout my thesis. Since nationalism is only a part of the argument being used in the debate on anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric used during the Brexit campaign and the hostility towards Syrian refugees in Poland, I will now move on to discussing the role of European identity in the context of Polish positions regarding legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants.

Background on the European Union

Another core element of the discussion of refugees’ inclusion in Polish society has been a concept of European identity and European community. In order to analyze how the political elites, popular opinion and other actors present in the debate understand
the meaning of Europe, I will address scholarly literature on the topic of European identity below, but first I will provide a brief background on the idea of the European Union project.

The European Union (EU) started with an idea to create a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe (“EUROPA - The History of the European Union”). Following the tragedy of the Second World War, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) originated as a way to bring European countries closer together economically and politically. While for the first few years ECSC focused on reducing direct state control over the production of coal and steel, it developed into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1967 and focused instead on economic and agricultural cooperation (“Profile: The European Union”). The European Union, as we know it today was established on November 1, 1993 after the signature by the members of the European Community of the Treaty of Maastricht with the idea of the Single Market complimented by the 'four freedoms': movement of goods, services, people and money (Fuchs & Dieter-Klingemann 19).

Nine Member States of the enlarged European Community defined European identity for the first time at the Copenhagen European Summit in 1973:

Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. (...) The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the
increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism (“Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, No 12. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities”). That summit was a first attempt at defining the notion of European identity, but it included the option of constant evolution of the identity, as the nine member states mention: United Europe was under construction. Checkel and Katzenstein argue that “there is no one European identity, just as there is no one Europe” (European Identity 213), while Friedman and Thiel remind us that “being European and belonging to the Union are not synonymous” (European Identity and Culture: Narratives of Transnational Belongings 23). Sassatelli additionally claims that the recent scholarly literature emerging in the 1980s should be called as the ‘new’ wave of studies, because it addresses the ‘invention’ of Europe by the EU ("Imagined Europe: The Shaping of a European Cultural Identity through EU Cultural Policy" 437). There seems to be agreement among these scholars that there is no one definition of European identity, and that it should not be primarily defined in the realms of the European Union. Instead the concept of European identity and belonging should focus on its origins of maintaining peace and focusing on what shares and not divides Europe in the post World War II era.

Scholarly literature often interchangeably describes the identity of the European Union and the European identity. While Europeans are inclined to emphasize their differences rather than the features that unite them (Hutchinson 43), the European Union focuses on promoting the unifying aspects of the collective identity. Such an approach is
reflected in the motto of the European Union: *United in diversity*. The motto, according to the European Commission, “signifies how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent's many different cultures, traditions and languages” (“EUROPA - The History of the European Union”). Curtis instead emphasizes the political aspect of the motto – “the EU’s motto, ‘United in Diversity,’ proclaims its desire to encompass the various economic, cultural, and social heritages of member states within a larger political-institutional framework” (525). Sassatelli also criticizes the EU’s motto as “unity and as diversity is simultaneously true and false, and thus European cultural identity can be seen as unity in diversity” (439).

While much of the literature on an EU identity focuses on an ongoing competition between national and EU identities, there is also scholarly focus on the extent of the two identities blending in with each other and becoming a proof for European integration (Cram 104). Schilde further argues that the role of the EU has become the main qualification of explaining European identity among scholars (652). However, before a conclusion can be made on the success of a European integration, there needs to be a clear definition of what constitutes EU identity and how it is measured (Cram 105). Smith further emphasized that the growing EU political community can help to reinforce national identities (153). Having described the origins of the European identity in the context of the development of the European Union, I will now move on to discussing how European identity as a collective identity that attempted to overcome national identities, which are also collective.
Defining a collective identity in the context of migration

The literature primarily addresses the European identity as a collective identity. Traditional European social models have been changing and the scale of these changes needs to be acknowledged by the policy makers, according to Michał Krzyżanowski. In his book *Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe*, he further challenges the concept of European identity, “that is constantly restructured, renewed and reshaped in social and historical processes” (Krzyżanowski 98). Krzyżanowski is not the only scholar that acknowledges the fluidity of identity. Garcia, in his work, recognizes collective identity as dynamic and claims that “identity as a problem manifests itself in situations of uncertainty” and that identity is what makes “us” different from “others” (Garcia 201). Such definition of identity allows the European nations to use the situation of uncertainty with the refugee influx and put forward the differences between the traditional European identity and the identity of refugees.

Fligstein similarly defines collective identities as an “idea that a group of people accept a fundamental and consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves. (...) Collective identity is also by definition about the construction of an ‘Other’ and is anchored in sets of conscious and unconscious meanings that people share” (127). Such a notion continued in the global discourse about migration and global economy with a slogan of “We (i.e. the Occident or ‘real Europe’) have to defend ‘Ourselves’ against ‘Them’ (i.e. the ‘Orient’: Roma, Jews, Muslims)‘” (Wodak & Boukala 89). Especially since the financial crisis of 2008, the debates about the European identity have shifted to “more traditional racialized cultural concerns and more recently, about economic security, leading to new distinctions between ‘Us’, the ‘real Europeans’, and
‘Them’, the ‘Others’ (Wodak & Boukala 87). The debate over whether Turkey should be able to join the European Union also complicates the relations between Europe and Islam and draws boundaries between “Europe” and the “other” by the populist European politicians (Checkel and Katzenstein 13). Triandafyllidou and Wodak also support the claim of identity being created through comparisons to another group, and thus establishing "in-groups" and "out-groups" (216), and argue that identities are “context dependent” (208). Howarth and Torfing, on the other hand, question studying identity only based on the known arguments of ‘Us’ versus the ‘Other’, “but more importantly other ‘we’s: because all people construct their self with the help of a complex constellation of collective identifications, these have to be articulated with each other” (38). Such an angle is an innovative approach to a collective identity and if it was to be used, maybe prejudices against Syrian refugees could be avoided in homogenous European states, including Poland.

European identity, just like a national identity, requires a common “story.” Fligstein bases his argument on the emergence of the European identity from the work of Karl Deustch and a theory that a national identity needs to be explained, “why everyone who lives within some geographic boundaries is part of a larger group, a group whose identity needs reinforcing by a state” (27). The “story” is spread through meeting other people and viewing them as a part of your own group and meeting in settings that have been previously organized and routinized. As such, the European identity story has not been told yet, as while there has been an increased movement of people within the EU borders, it happened predominantly among the more educated, richer individuals or businesses that experienced the EU's market and political integration project (Fligstein
The lack of the national ‘story’ around the European Union might be one of the reasons why Poles are so skeptical towards the European Union and do not identify with it, which leads to their hostility towards accepting refugees as a part of European solidarity to relieve other countries with overwhelming numbers of refugees, like Germany.

Since both national and European identity can be defined as a collective identity, Wodak and Boukala bring up two arguments of Europeans either putting nation first and then Europe, or not recognizing Europe at all in their identity (90). Fligstein brings up statistics to disprove their point of not including European as part of the Europeans’ identity, as “3.9% of people [who] live in Europe view themselves as Europeans exclusively while another 8.8% view themselves as Europeans and having some national identity. This means that only 12.7% of the people in Europe tend to view themselves as Europeans” (139). The 12.7% particularly defines the most privileged members of society, including white-collar people, educated people, and the youth. Fligstein claims that already the most privileged members of a European society have felt a part of the European project (140) and points at the lack of knowledge about the EU by ordinary citizens as one of the main reasons that caused scholars to try and understand why a European identity has been slow to emerge (Ibid.). While left-wing politics tend to view the EU as a good thing, the right-wing is more focused on the “nation” itself and is more EU-skeptical (Fligstein 141). Such is the case in Poland at the moment, with a right-wing Law and Justice Party being in charge of the Polish Parliament.

Looking at the demographics of people that feel European, it is clear that a complete abolition of internal EU borders that emerged with the Schengen convention in
the 90s did not equate with the notion of a borderless Europe and the European community within this territory. However, Fuchs & Dieter-Klingemann believe that it is actually the cultural diversity of the region and a difficulty to define the external borders of Europe that leads to creating a collective European identity, as borders become a “precondition for the cognitive constitution of an ‘us’ that distinguishes itself from ‘others’” (20). Such rhetoric has been used by the skeptical voices in Poland against refugees. Having looked at the European identity as a collective one, I will now look at the civic and cultural dimensions of a European identity.

The conversation on European identity has expanded beyond cultural differences of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’. The civic and cultural elements of a collective European identity have become intertwined as scholars have continually turned to the EU in attempts to define what it means to be European.

A civic aspect of the European identity, according to Bruter, is “the degree to which they feel that they are citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life” (1155). Wodak and Boukala bring up an argument that Europe’s identity is something that must be negotiated by its peoples and institutions (88). Moreover, an emphasis on the civic component lies in citizens identifying and supporting European integration as a political project, as “the EU has filled the definition of ‘Europe’ with the substance of a civic identity” (Schilde 655). To increase support for the European integration project, EU policymakers have used a common European identity in their political campaigns and policy implementation, and as such being ‘European’ has become an alternative for European Union (EU) citizens. Curtis reemphasizes the importance of establishing whether European identity actually
unites or divides, and questions if supranational identity is possible, as the European integration and international migration are evoking new identity debates (522). While the European integration project has increased interactions among various cultural groups, it also has intensified immigration and caused controversies among European parties and publics (Curtis 525).

Despite the political tensions, there are cultural events across the EU that underscore shared connections to Christianity, humanism, liberalism and free markets. Bruter defines the cultural component of the European identity as “individuals’ perceptions that fellow Europeans are closer to them than non-Europeans” (1156). Such an approach to cultural identity stresses the importance of recognizing that even diversity among Europeans can create a bond and regardless of the nature of the political systems that they support or are a part of, they focus on the idea of shared European heritage. Symbols of the European Union, including a flag, an anthem, and a creation of the ‘European City of Culture’ (EEC), are initiatives with the purpose of creating a sense of common belonging (Sassatelli 436). Sassatelli defines the EEC as a “salient example of the attempts at awakening a European consciousness by diffusing its symbols, while respecting the contents of national and local cultures” (436). Projects such as the EEC prove that legal and economic integration alone will not create a unified Europe.

John Hutchinson also exposes the lack of community in the European Union and the insufficiency of only using the political project for further integration. His claim that nations have been developed already having a sense of European belonging alongside a local culture, and that they participated in the creation of European civilization (42), is an ethnosymbolist argument. He also questions: “Can Europe rely on institutional brokering
and conjured rhetoric of common interest, or will the very expansion of the EU increasingly expose its empty heart?” (48). Hutchinson therefore points at the importance of acknowledging the history of Europe filled with conflicts instead of further pursuing a project of integration only based on political grounds (42).

The subsequent section of this literature review will chronologically trace academics’ analysis of Central and Eastern European states adopting European identity. This will provide a necessary framework for a latter discussion of Polish national identity within the context of the refugee crisis, and how Poles have interacted with a growing sense of European identity and solidarity.

European identity within the context of Central and Eastern Europe

The idea of coming ‘back to Europe’ was a significant aspect of the accession discourse for many Central and Eastern European states that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. The EU was also intentional and strategic in bringing the union ‘closer to the people’ through engaging citizens in the European project (Cram 106). Kundera, in his article *The Tragedy of Central Europe* written at the beginning of the 1980s, when the Solidarity movement started in Poland, brings back that notion: ‘To die for one's country and for Europe’—“that is a phrase that could not be thought in Moscow or Leningrad; it is precisely the phrase that could be thought in Budapest or Warsaw” (1). Moreover, he goes further to claim that for Central Europeans, the meaning of the word “Europe” was not associated with geography, but it became a synonym of the word “West”. Following 1945, the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians and the Slovaks felt “turbulent and fragmented” (Kundera 5), as neighboring between the Germans and the Russians was a struggle to survive and to preserve their identity. The Polish anthem even
starts with the verse: "Poland has not yet perished…." Kundera questions what is uniting Europe based on, whether it is the marketplace, mass media, and politics, or the principle of tolerance, and respect for the beliefs and ideas of other people (9).

Since the fall of communism in multiple Eastern and Central European countries, the European integration is given a great importance by the political elites, as there is the need “to support democratic statehood and economic reconstruction” (Batt 35). A further analysis of how public opinion perceives the European identification among the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe before their accession to the EU, is offered in Schilde’s article *Who are the Europeans? European Identity Outside of European Integration*. Schilde analysed the results of one of the Eurobarometer surveys, in which the ‘candidate countries’ were asked about an individual’s relative identification with their nation-state and Europe. The results showed that the new member countries defined themselves being European in one way or other more often that the old member states (Schilde 651). I will argue that such is not the case now, when the Eastern and Central European states are refusing to show a European solidarity and accept the refugee quota suggested by the European Commission.

Facing the post-Communist reality, Eastern and Central Europeans felt the need to have unproblematic identities, according to Galasińska, “the pressure on identities comes from the need to position oneself in relation to the transformations themselves, what they stand for and, significantly, what they are a break from” (205). Galasińska’s definition applies to Poland’s attachment to homogeneity; although openness to visitors in Poland is the postulated value, in reality Poland is “Europe's least ethnically diverse country, where

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2 Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission
little just 0.3 percent of the population holds a foreign passport” (Eriksson).

Krzyżanowski would agree with Galasińska’s argument on unproblematic identities, as he claims that Polish political discourse has expanded to include references to Europe and the European Union as frequently as references to Poland, which has led to “creating new ways of perceiving and conceiving of the nation state” (110). Krzyżanowski claims that adjustments had to be made while describing national discourse in the context of a new supranational identity in the form of a European Union. However, since Poland joined the European Union, they have been selective about which practices are to be transformed. Unfortunately, the level of xenophobia has decreased less than expected, especially in connection with the further progress of the democratic transition and regulations, and practices in relation to immigrants within the EU harmonized standards.

Before 2004, Polish political elites often focused on Europe’s Christian roots, and as such an ethno-religious conception of Europe is more dominant in Poland than a republican conception of Europe (Medrano 96). Pope John Paul II “wanted Poland not simply to rejoin Europe, but to rejuvenate a Christian Europe” (Checkel and Katzenstein 15). Poland and other Central European countries’ concern with European Christian roots is reflected in their prioritizing of the future of national sovereignty and cultural diversity in Europe. That view differed from other Western European countries’ prioritizing economic prosperity and democracy (Medrano 97). Facing the refugee influx and the rise of populism in many Western European countries, the argument of a Christian Europe has been a reoccurring theme throughout political campaigns. Checkel and Katzenstein further argue that a vision of Polish Catholicism and reintroducing religion into Europe is more powerful than a vision of a European integration movement supported by the old
EU members (215). Law and Justice especially propagate this vision in its political agenda.

For the old members of the EU, the accession of many Central and Eastern European states in 2004 and 2007 led to perceiving migration as more controversial, "as large numbers of skilled and unskilled workers from new East European member states have started making use of the freedom of movement allowed them by the integration process. Thus, integration has paradoxically contributed to reactivating a number of 'national' reflexes in the attempt to provide social protection for local populations" (Castiglione 37). Castiglione would agree with Medrano’s argument of an ethno-religious conception of Europe being prioritized in Poland, as he claims that “in fact, for many of these countries, joining the EU was meant as an assertion of national sovereignty, something that they may not be prepared to relinquish too readily by diluting it with the larger confines of the European Union” (37). He also brings up two perspectives on the EU, the first one a traditionalist vision that “sees the European Union as a nation writ large; and a post-national conception that sees the EU as a new form of state” (32). The emphasis on the continuity of Judeo-Christianity in the culture of Europe is associated with Europe “as having a supranational cultural identity that cultivates a sense of belonging among Europeans on the basis of common values, culture and ‘banal nationalism’” (Wodak & Boukala 105). The supranational identity defined above once again reinforces the exclusionary approach to incoming refugees outside of Europe.

Conclusion

Having provided a scholarly overview of nationalism and European identity, it is worth looking back at Poland’s changing demographics. It was only after the Second
World War that the Polish nation became one of the most homogenous in Europe. The change in the demographics reflects the importance of ethnicity in the Polish case. Through applying Smith’s theories on nations and nationalism, I will be able to see which actors in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants see the role of ethnicity as a crucial element in nationalism. Nowadays the youth supporting a nationalist Law and Justice party is claiming that for 20 years Poland was pushed to change the national culture to reach so-called ‘European standards,’ but this point of view changed — “people understand that we can be different, and that’s OK” (Davies). The youth refers to the post-Communist years of Polish efforts to join the European Union and thereafter adjusting laws to fit the EU regulations. Unfortunately, such idea of being different adopted by the Polish youth is only applied in the case of Poland not becoming a part of Western Europe, meaning too liberal. Such a reference to ‘European standards’ had to be understood through an analysis of a scholarly literature on the European identity, because of the complexity of a construction of a collective European identity. Since there is no one definition of what it means to be European, for the purpose of this thesis the definition of a European identity solidarity will be provided in Chapter 4 when discussing various actors’ approach to these concepts and how they have used it in an ongoing debate on inclusion and exclusion of migrants.

The analysis of these two concepts of nationalism and European identity provides a window into the next chapter on the development of Polish nationalism and the usage of these concepts in the discussion of not welcoming Syrian refugees into Poland. In order to understand Poles’ protectiveness of their both territory and nation, one needs to understand how many times these were threatened in the past. Therefore, I will provide a
historical background on the rise of nationalism originating in the partitions of Poland at the end of eighteenth century.
Chapter 2: The origins of Polish nationalism and its role in the Polish perception of social inclusion and exclusion

Introduction

Considering Poland’s conservative Law and Justice party’s victory in the 2015 elections to the Polish Sejm and Senate with a Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant and nationalistic campaign, it is crucial to recognize the meaning of nationalism for the Poles. The understanding of Polish nationalism will further explain some of the reasons behind the seeming contradiction in the Polish positions regarding the standards for legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants. The Poles, having lost their land for 123 years, perceive nationalism differently to what other nations do. In Polish *nacjonalizm* is a much more narrow term than the Anglo-Saxophone equivalent, as the Polish definition mostly refers to ethno-nationalism and includes within itself connotations to racism and xenophobia (Pankowski 8). Before the partitions the definition of a Pole was open to interpretation due to the multinational demographics of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. That approach to nationalism changed as it came as a response to the occupying forces’ policy of fighting the culture and identity of Poland during partitions, as “only, as a result of Russification after the January rising, and of Bismarck’s Germanization, was Polishness -the language, the ethnic substance and the absolute symbiosis with Catholicism - perceived as a major pillar essential to the Polish character that must be defended” (Pankowski, 25). Pankowski argues that nationalism became automatically correlated with Catholicism and became a cornerstone of the Polish
identity. The concept of Polishness carried through to the ideologies represented on the political stage at the beginning of the twentieth century.

This chapter will examine the evolution of Polish nationalism and Polish identity, providing background information on the partitions and the situation of the Polish population during the Second World War, discussing the increase in the role of the Catholic Church during communist years, and defining the constant presence of an oppressor as the main factor leading to the increase in ethno-nationalism. A great deal of this chapter will be given to two different paths to independence. The first approach to gaining independence undertaken by Roman Dmowski, a founder of the right-wing National Democracy, focused on imposing homogeneity and emphasizing religion, while the second one by Józef Piłsudski believed that the role of Catholic Church does not need to exclude cultural diversity. While providing an analysis of what role nationalism played in the discussion of refugees in Poland and the response of Polish authorities to the usage of anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric used by the Leave campaign during the Brexit vote, I will refer back to the historical precedents, principles and norms discussed here. Finally, this chapter will conclude with defining the role of Solidarity movement and the Catholic Church in Polish nationalism and formation of a current Polish identity.

Partitions

Polish history of the border instability and fear of its neighbors takes its peak at the end of the eighteenth century. The first partition in 1772 was an attempt by Poland’s neighboring states (Russia, Prussia and Austria) to modify Polish state organization, but in reality it was a way to expand their borders at the expense of a weaker Poland (“Partitions of Poland”). Before 1772, Polish nationalism, mostly associated with the
Polish nobility, was open to a broad interpretation of "being a Pole", following "natione Polonus, gente Ruthenus, origine Judaeus"\(^3\) (Törnquist-Plewa 194). As a result of the first partition, Polish nationalism started to shift towards an idea of a more ethnically homogenous society, and as Poland’s stability and independence were brought into question, a clear image of oppressors appeared (Barbour and Carmichael 195).

The second partition of Poland was the takeover of Polish territories, this time only by Russia and Prussia (as Austria was occupied by a war with France) in January 1793. The invaders this time referred to the alleged revolutionary threat from Poland as a justification for the annexation. This time the partition was not only political, but also economic. Industrial production was destroyed, urban economy was in a state of decay, food prices increased. Such circumstances led to the Kosciuszko Uprising in 1794, an unsuccessful attempt by the Poles to get their territories back ("Partitions of Poland").

Throughout the period of partitions, Poles initiated many more failed uprisings, but were triumphant at involving not only the Polish nobility, but also peasantry and clergy. Such mobilization helped to increase the sense of a national idea among the Poles.

The third partition was the ultimate annexation of Polish territory by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1795. After more than 800 years of existence, Poland was wiped off the map, but the nation, language and tradition remained. During the partitions, both Russia and Prussia sought to denationalize the Poles through gradual imposition of respective languages, culture, art and customs. The lack of basic civil liberties and the absence of Polish institutions in the areas annexed by Russia and Prussia made it difficult to defend the Poles against Russification and Germanization (Bell-Fialkoff 114). As such, the Catholic Church became the mainstay of Polishness. The Church was a determinant

\(^3\) Eng. “Polish by nationality, of the Ruthenian people, and of Jewish origin”
of nationality and cultural self-awareness, and an even stronger tie between Polish national consciousness and a Catholic religious identity occurred.

Dabrowski’s definition of a Pole emphasizes the importance of partitions “cognizant of the past, to recognize the existence of a community shaped by a common history, culture, language, and faith (or some combination of the above) that the partitioning powers would have been happy to see disappear” (73). The beginning of the nineteenth century in Poland marked the fight for independence by Polish patriots that believed freedom for everyone, not just for the ethnic Poles (Porter 5). Since Poland’s territory ceased to exist, Polish patriots participated in various revolutionary movements in Europe and the Americas, with the motto “For Our Freedom and Yours” (Zamoyski). Adam Mickiewicz, considered the greatest poet of Polish Romanticism, used this movement as a way to convince his fellow Poles that Poland would gain its independence back through its martyrdom. The definition of a nation from the early nineteenth century focused on the “national spirit” and “national ideal,” and while nationalism became a politicized ideology, it did not play a huge part in the lives of everyday Poles and their association with Polishness (Porter 7).

After the Third Partition, an emigration of soldiers and officers from Poland to Italy and France took place, and eventually Polish Legions were organized in Italy with Napoleon’s help. The text of the “Song of the Polish Legions in Italy”, bearing the title Mazurek Dąbrowskiego, was written in the town of Reggio Emilia (near Bologna), in what was then the Republic of Lombardy (Italy) by Joseph Rufin Wybicki - a poet, playwright, composer, a co-organizer of the Polish Legions of General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski. It was written to celebrate the farewell ceremony leaving Reggio legionnaires
and that’s where it was sung for the first time. The first sentence of the anthem reinforced the idea of a nation being associated with those who called themselves Polish, as it said: as long as Poles were alive, Poland would continue to exist ("Brief History of the Polish National Anthem"). Even though statehood was not an official part of Polish nationalism, the Polish nation was not complete as long as it resided with Poles who remained in the emigration. Brian Porter, an author of *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland*, argues that “this style of reasoning worked both ways: it allowed people to see themselves as Poles even when there was no Poland on the map, and then it turned this argument around so as to aspire (or justify) their efforts to redraw the map” (18). Porter further describes the roles that both Romanticism and Positivism played in developing the nationalistic ideology.

The vision of Poland developed by Romanticism was utopian and unrealistic. While Polish Romantics aspired for Poland to be the “Christ of nations,” and a nation based on “social equity and spiritual salvation”, instead the discourse was still limited only to Polish intelligentsia (Porter 29). On the other hand, Polish Positivists saw the method of maintaining Polish identity not in the uprisings, but in constructive patriotism. The followers of Positivism argued that if Poland was to regain its independence, it was to be done in a gradual way, through grassroots work: a collective effort of the whole society to create a basic physical infrastructure, education and improvement of living conditions of the masses. The Positivists’ concrete approach to regaining independence set the stage for “solidifying cultural boundaries“ (Porter 57). Not only did they emphasize Poland’s cultural boundaries, but also the Positivists believed in Poland’s superiority over Russians. They claimed that such dominance came from “its cultural and
economic proximity to “the West,” understood here as the “civilized” and “modern” world (i.e. France and England, but not Germany). Poland was no longer the martyr or even the missionary; it was now (liberal) “Europe” confronting the (autocratic and conservative) “East” (Porter 74). The different perspectives developed by Romanticism and Positivism influenced the way Dmowski and Piłsudski developed their ideas about nationalism.

Dmowski vs. Piłsudski

When speaking about the history of twentieth-century Poland, it is impossible to ignore the names of Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski. Piłsudski was a founder of the Polish Legions, Chief of State of the Second Republic of Poland in 1918-22, two-time Prime Minister; and had a decisive influence on the shape of the internal and foreign policy of the Second Republic. Dmowski was a politician, Polish independence activist, co-founder of the National Democratic Party and the main ideologist of a Polish nationalism. Piłsudski’s socialism and Dmowski’s National Democracy were two completely incompatible visions of Polish reconstruction, but both were essential when striving for Polish independence. Piłsudski, the son of an 1863 insurgent was raised by his mother Mary with insurrectionary ideas and inherited the tradition of rebellion and resistance against the Russian invaders from his family home (Dabrowski 75). He used the 1863 January Uprising as a propaganda tool to create a revolutionary tradition and to push for his socialist agenda (Dabrowski 77). The works of three authors of Polish romantic literature largely shaped Piłsudski’s views: Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki and Zygmunt Krasiński (Dabrowski 76), as their writings glorified the Polish pursuit of
independence (79). Piłsudski emphasized the martyr role of Poland and the history of being surrounded by two of the greatest oppressors at that time:

The entire history of the Polish nation - both in the past century and now - is the history of the most wild license and oppression from one side, and heroic battle from the other side. Each generation exerted its forces in order to free itself from the heavy and disreputable yoke. Polish insurrections exploded one after the other and were separated only by persistent years of preparatory work (Piłsudski 79).

Piłsudski’s view on the Polish insurrections and sacrifices for independence came from his belief that Poland “would rise again like the proverbial phoenix from the ashes” (Dabrowski 83). Furthermore, Piłsudski’s policy defended a multicultural vision of Poland against Dmowski’s nationalism. With his emphasis on cultural diversity, Pilsudski also highly valued the Catholic Church, Polish history, morality, ethics and political responsibility.

The main opponent of Piłsudski, Dmowski and his right-wing political movement the National Democrats did not embrace Piłsudski’s “struggle for survival” as part of their ideology, but instead “constructed high walls of exclusion around the Polish nation, with solidarity and authority inside and hatred and violence outside” (Porter 158). Those walls of exclusion partially originated out of Positivism in Poland, a movement that emerged after the 1863 January Uprising, and with their narrow ethnolinguistic borders that “prevented Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Jews from identifying with the Polish cause” (Porter 190). Moreover, the Polish nation that Dmowski envisioned was supposed to be able to impose homogeneity (Porter 192). Dmowski defined Polishness by ethnicity,
language, and religion (Dabrowski 108). Disregarding the social class, the meaning of what to be a Pole encompassed an entire ethnolinguistic community (Porter 189):

I am a Pole - that means that I belong to the Polish nation on its entire territory and throughout the entire time of its existence… this means that I feel my own tight connection with all of Poland: with the present… with the past… with the future [Poland] finally, regardless of whether it will waste the work of earlier generations or secure its own state or attain status within the first row of nations. All that is Polish is mine: I cannot renounce anything. I may be proud of what is great in Poland, but I must also accept the humility that falls on a nation for what is bad in it” (Dmowski 27)

Dmowski also wanted to identify the factors that led to Poland’s downfall, mostly pointing at the lack of support for the clear national interest (Dabrowski 87). He criticized Piłsudski’s fatalism and insurrection approach to Polish history, as he believed that Poland failed because it “became derailed in its development” (Dmowski 74). Dmowski saw the aggressive Germanization of Polish territories as the major threat to Polish culture and saw the hope for Polish autonomy in alliance with Russia. Dmowski’s ideology claimed that “Catholicism is not an addition to Polishness, colouring it in some way, but is a part of its essence, in large measure it defines its essence. The attempt to separate Catholicism from Polishness, to separate the nation from religion and from the Church, is a destruction of the very essence of the nation” (Pankowski 24). Dmowski believed that the reasons Poland had failed in the past came from its “religious toleration, ethnic equality, and humanist tradition” (Pankowski 26). However, historically, Poland was a nation of many nationalities, and the census of 1921 shows 30.8% of the
population consisted of ethnic minorities, compared with 0.2% in 2011 ("Przynależność narodowo-etniczna ludności – wyniki spisu ludności i mieszkań 2011"). Having looked at two different approaches to nationalism, two ways to independence, I will now move on to looking at the role of nationalism during World War I and World War II.

World War I and World War II

After years of uprising and resisting Russification and Germanification, the “Great War” that broke out in 1914 opened up the possibility of gaining back independence. Even though Poland as a state did not participate in the war, Poles participated in the battles, either for the Prussian, Russian or Austro-Hungarian army, depending on where they lived. From the first months of the Great War, the Poles began to revive various political and independence organizations, as well as paramilitary formations, in the territories of the former Polish state. In December 1916, Tsar Nicholas II announced his intention to create a free Polish state (Croll 20). Although it was played purely for propaganda purposes, to encourage the Polish population to fight against the Germans, it was also a signal that the Polish issue had not been forgotten. In January 1917, US President Woodrow Wilson officially suggested that the creation of an independent Polish state must be part of the new postwar order (“8 Stycznia 1918 r. Prezydent Wilson Zapowiada Utworzenie Niezawisłego Państwa Polskiego”).

Poland finally managed to return to the world map in the autumn of 1918, when an increasingly unfavorable to the Germans situation on the fronts and problems with maintaining control over areas inhabited by Poles increased the chances of gaining independence. On November 11, 1918, Józef Pilsudski, the leader of the Polish Legions,
was appointed Commander in Chief of Polish forces by the Regency Council and was entrusted with creating a national government for the newly independent country. On that very day, he proclaimed an independent Polish state - the Second Republic of Poland. After years of fighting for her borders, Poland ended up between two aggressors once more during World War II - Russia and Germany. Przel brings up Bocheński’s argument from *The History of Foolishness in Poland* that “Poland’s string of tragedies stemmed from its delusions of grandeur, messianism, and overestimation of its importance within the international system. In his opinion, Poland’s security lay in an alliance with one of its powerful neighbors - Russia or Germany” (Przel 80). One needs to understand how many times the Polish territory was threatened in the past to understand Poles’ protectiveness of their state and attachment to its language, religion and ethnicity.

After gaining their independence back, Poles created the Second Polish Republic that existed until 1945. During the formation of the Polish statehood in the Second Republic an important issue involved the borders of the future state. In Poland, there were two approaches to the future borders - the program of incorporation and a federal one. The National Democracy advocated designation of a territory on the basis of nationality, while Pilsudski advocated for a federal program, referring to the Polish union of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Snyder 64). Another concern regarding the future of the Second Republic was the way it was going to be ruled. The system power until 1926 in the Second Republic was as a democratic republic with a multi-party parliamentary cabinet system. However, after the coup d’état in May 1926 the state system was modified and turned into a presidential-autocratic system (Plach 158). Despite the fact that in the interwar period, nationalist ideology began to be identified mainly with the
movement of right-wing tendencies, one can distinguish formations connecting the
demands of nationalist and left-wing, and even anti-fascist groups.

World War II interrupted the activities of most of the existing nationalist parties
and their activists took an active struggle against the occupier. Prizel argues that World
War II was a “national war”, as the struggle for independence truly led to Polish society
“embodying a collective experience” (75). In contrast to other countries occupied by the
Third Reich, Poland had various nationalist groups that acted as resistance to the Nazis,
including a totalitarian-oriented National-Radical Camp and the Lizard Union that was
eventually transformed into the National Armed Forces along with various members of
the post-national-democratic National Military Organization. The National Armed Forces
not only fought the Nazi and Soviet invaders, but also “Polish communist partisans from
the People’s Army, as well as socialists, liberals, democrats and ethnic minorities”
(Konopka 43). After the end of World War II some members of National Armed Forces
continued a guerilla struggle against the communist authorities, but many were arrested
and sentenced to death (Konopka 43). Having described some of the major nationalist
resistance movements during World War II, I will move on to describing the meaning of
nationalism during the communist years in Poland.

Communist years in Poland

Communism in Poland can be traced back to the end of nineteenth century with a
formation of the first communist party. The true significance of the party occurred at the
conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, when it was decided that the communist
regime was to be implemented in Poland. The first years of communism reflect
nationalist policies aimed at securing homogeneity in Poland. PZPR (The Polish United Workers' Party) formulated these policies, however, in a “flexible” manner to respond to the needs of the party in various situations (Fleming 67). As the Communist authorities undertook more drastic anti-religious and anti-Church actions, a slow opposition to the regime started to occur. The first legal strike took place June 1956, when workers in Poznan started protesting and demanding improved living conditions as well as liberalization of the political system (Garton 18). At that time, in the mid-1950s there was a pattern in Central and Eastern European states of nationalistic slogans instead of the communist ones. Władysław Gomułka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, used such a nationalistic ideology in order to save communism in Poland (Zuzowski 37). By opposing Soviet authorities in 1956 and promoting Lenin’s nationalistic policy, Gomułka received support from all social groups, including Catholics and émigrés. He stated that “the most characteristic feature of the Polish nation is its sensitivity to its independence” (Halecki 355), for example for Poland’s thousandth anniversary of Christianity in 1960 Gomułka turned this religious event into a political one.

According to Minkenberg, all socialist states emphasized national issues and brought up national identities to compensate for the weakening of the state (Minkenberg 38). Zuzowski also argues that the communist ideology was too weak to stand on its own in Poland, and instead it should have been coupled with a nationalist ideology. He further concludes that PPS (eng. Polish Socialist Party) considered socialist ideas and the struggle for national sovereignty as complimentary (35).
In the mid-1960s, Polish intellectuals recognized that Poland had a new role on the international stage and that the communist authorities rejected the idea of a Polish nation being a martyr. Instead, Poles had to develop a new identity, an East-Central European identity, which arose from acknowledging the fact that “their freedom could come only with the democratization of their immediate neighbors” (Prizel 94). The authorities’ continued oppressions, and a process of tightening repression and increasing censorship activity led to a students’ strike in March 1968 against the implemented policies (Garton 18). The communist authorities, however, continued to use nationalism for their benefits. Shortly after coming to power, Gierek decided to rebuild the Royal Palace in Warsaw that was destroyed by the Nazis during World War II in order to receive support from the masses. Such a move increased his popularity, however his attempt to change the 1952 Constitution, including clauses of a strong fraternal bond between Poland and the Soviet Union, proved that “the use of communism in the service against nationalism proved dangerous to the Polish regime” (Zuzowski 38).

The sense of nationalism was stronger in Poland than a feeling of “a supposed brotherhood of communist nations including members of the Warsaw Pact and countries like Cuba struggling in the revolutionary cause” (Zamoyski). Poles could not forget the crimes committed by the USSR during World War II, especially the denial of the Katyn Massacre of 1940, the murder of thousands of Polish officers at Katyń by the Soviet soldiers. The superiority that the Poles felt over the Russians in intelligence, industry and communication, described by Czesław Miłosz, whose poetry addressed religion and ambitions to rebuild the permanent values of European culture, conscience and faith, was
another factor that contributed to hostility towards the imposition of Russian culture during communism in Poland (Prizel 83).

Following many protests, the most significant one of the 1980 Gdańsk Shipyard strike led by Lech Wałęsa, was a compromise between the strikers and authorities, which concerned the allocation of basic labor right, including the right to form trade unions, the restrictions of censorship, the release of political prisoners and improvement of the economic and social situation of citizens (Garton 43). The result of the August strikes was to transform the strike committees into an Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity".

Concerned by the growing membership of the Solidarity movement, the communist authorities introduced a martial law and created the Military Council of National Salvation on December 13, 1981. General Wojciech Jaruzelski outlawed "Solidarity," interned its active members and other persons hostile to power, the country introduced a curfew. Another example of the use of nationalistic ideas during the communist regime can be seen in the speech of the last communist leader of Poland announcing martial law in Poland in 1981. The language that Jaruzelski used during that speech appealed to the patriotic sentiments instead of the Marxist ideology (Zuzowski 38). Another move by Jaruzelski included displaying in public a painting depicting Poles defeating the Russian army in a battle at the end of the eighteenth century, a painting that has been kept in isolation for forty years (Ibid.). Such examples prove that nationalism has the capacity to stabilize and reinforce the communist regime (Zuzowski 39).

The creation and the rise of the Solidarity movement eventually led to the Round Table Negotiations in 1989, during which the Communist government and Solidarity
agreed on a compromise program of evolutionary political and economic system of Poland, such as legalization of "Solidarity", the introduction of political pluralism, freedom of expression and judicial independence (Welsh 384). Even though Solidarity was founded as an association of independent trade unions, it became a social movement that toppled communism and changed the face of Europe. Solidarity was a successful actor making a political revolution without bloodshed; an example that was followed by all the countries of the Eastern Bloc, and as such has unprecedented importance in modern European history.

Solidarity movement post ‘89 elections

At the beginning of a new democratic rule, Solidarity needed to take control of a new constitution and implement new policies, such as Leszek Balcerowicz's liberalization and stabilization program. However, ”by 1991 Solidarity's support for economic reform began to deteriorate rapidly. Escalating pressures from the rank and file and competing trade unions, in addition to mounting conflicts within the labor-party alliance, motivated Solidarity to alter its strategy to that of tactical opposition” (Tafel 322). In the 90s, for example, the weakening of Solidarity’s influence progressed due to members taking spots in the national government and to the newly created political parties of the former Solidarity leaders, activists and counselors.

Even though “Solidarity” was a left-wing movement, some radical right-wing organizations emerged out of it. One example is the continuation of All-Polish Youth originally started in 1922 as an academic youth group of the first nationalist party in

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4 Balcerowicz is a Polish politician and economist, a representative of monetarism school of thought. As the Minister of Finance (during 1989-1991) he was responsible for the transformation of the Polish economy from the socialist planned to a social market one.
independent Poland, Popular-National Union (PNU), and has been reactivated since 1989 by a grandson of one of the original All-Polish Youth members Jędrzej Giertych. The organization shifted from anti-Semitism in the 1920s to demonstrations against abortion, LGBT rights, pornography, ethnic minorities, foreign capital and anti-Catholic cultural events (Konopka 42). The PNU became the youth division of a newly formulated party League of Polish Families, that gathered the most conservative post-Solidarity politicians, as well as other nationalists unrelated to the union (Konopka 47).

In the parliamentary elections in September 1993, "Solidarity" did not enter the Parliament, only a few representatives entered the Senate. However, in the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish People’s Party (1993-1997) "Solidarity" gradually regained influence in society. These elections marked the beginning of realizing that Solidarity would not be playing a major role in the political transformation of the country past the totalitarian regime of Jaruzelski (Ramet 103).

Solidarity, facing inner conflicts and ineffectiveness, led to a conservative faction taking a stand with its support for the active presence of the Roman Catholic Church on the political scene and anti-abortion laws, and the even more radical faction led by Zygmunt Wrzodak displaying its xenophobic and anti-Semitic views. In 1996, the conservative faction under the leadership of Marian Krzaklewski formed a political coalition called Solidarity Electoral Action. They described their views as Christian, right-wing, patriotic, anti-communist, and were successful in the 1997 elections (Konopka 46).

The idea of a social movement fighting for the rights of ordinary citizens, just like the original Solidarity, came back in 1997. The Union created an initiative of the
compound Electoral Action "Solidarity," which brought together 50 smaller opposition
groups derived from the Solidarity social movement of the 80s; it won the elections in
September 1997 and formed a government in coalition (Ramet 107). However, in 2001
the ruling party did not submit any candidate for parliament. Solidarity changed its
leadership and decided to separate from politics and devote itself to union activities,
which was, after all, its original mission. In the end, Solidarity decided to stay away from
politics and go back to being a labor union.

The role of the Catholic Church

While nowadays it is easy to parallel Polish nationalism with Roman Catholicism,
the interests of the Church have not always meant the interests of the Polish nation. In
particular, when Poland ceased to exist on the map after three partitions, the Polish
Church supported the nationalist and independence movements, only with the approval of
the Vatican. Such tension disappeared; however, during World War II, the Church shared
the general suffering of the Polish nation (Byrnes 435). Since the Nazis murdered many
bishops and priests, the survivors associated the Church with resistance to the Nazi
occupation (Ibid.). Such association went even further as to the Church’s belief that
“Poland’s suffering and serial dismemberment would be followed by national rebirth and
international Christian renewal” (Byrnes 436). The Polish Church believed that defending
religion would be best for Poland’s future and its independence from the communist
state.

The Catholic Church portrayed itself as a mediator between Polish society and the
communist authorities, and reinforced its position as the guardian of Poland’s national
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identity (Prizel 90). Furthermore, the first Polish Pope, John Paul II, played a major role in the fall of communism and Poland played a major role as “a champion of the freedoms and national rights of Poland’s neighbors” (Prizel 100). When he visited Warsaw for his pilgrimage in 1979, he simply said: “Do not be afraid”, and later prayed: “Let your Spirit descend and change the image of the land … this land” and encouraged the Poles to peacefully fight for their independence, to tackle communism. He further addressed the need to understand the origins of a Polish nation through religion by saying “it is impossible without Christ to understand this nation with its past so full of splendour and also of terrible difficulties” (“2 June 1979, Warsaw | John Paul II”). The election of John Paul II in 1978 and the pilgrimage the year after only reinforced the Poles in their belief that Polish land was the “Christ of Nations” opposing “atheistic Communism” (Szporer 115).

The communist authorities started to realize that the Pope might be a threat that could undermine their regime, as in 1981 an assassination attempt took place. Two shots were fired at the Holy Father by Ali Agca, an assassin hired by the Bulgarian communist secret police at the orders of the KGB (“What was Pope John Paul II’s role in the fall of the Soviet Union?”). The Pope’s role in tackling communism, however, did not stop in 1989; it continued with a vision of Poland’s role in creating a new era of Christian union in Europe. As such, he warned his fellow Poles “not to turn their backs on their heritage of Catholicism, and not to surrender their national evangelical mission” (Byrnes 439).

The Catholic Church also closely allied with the Solidarity movement. Through the use of religious symbols and rituals such as “the Mass for the Nation” they partook in the union’s struggle for freedom and human rights (Szporer 115). Many priests were
closely involved with the union’s movement, such as Jerzy Popieluszko, who during strikes was called to celebrate Mass in Warsaw Steelworks. After the imposition of martial law in 1981, Popieluszko organized numerous charitable activities, participated in trials of those who were arrested for resisting a martial law, and organized various distribution of gifts that were imported from abroad (“Jerzy Popieluszko”). During the martial law, Popieluszko was repeatedly accused by the communist authorities of involvement in political activities, and became the focus of the operational activities of the Polish Security Service. On October 19, 1984 he was murdered by Security Service agents (Ibid.).

The Polish Church saw democracy as an opportunity to increase its authority after decades of persecution by the communist regime, according to Meyer Resende. The Church was successful at identifying the Polish national survival with Catholicism and portrayed itself as “a protector of the nation against foreign assault” (xiv). Since the Polish Catholic Church viewed themselves as central agents in the political transition, they kept being politically involved. During the presidential elections of November 1995, the Polish bishops expressed their disapproval of the candidates that were former communists, and instead issued a letter to the faithful calling on them to vote for candidates “who will defend ethical and evangelical values” (Ramet 106). Furthermore, influential Polish primate Glemp called the victory of Aleksander Kwaśniewski over Lech Wałęsa the “moral sickness of society,” and claimed that only theocracy could resolve this secularization of politics (Ramet 107). The Church not only promoted certain candidates over others, but claimed a right to veto certain decisions of the Polish
population, such as supporting an attempt to liberalize the abortion law in 1996. In some ways, the Polish Church viewed itself as a kind of “nation-forming Church” (Ramet 108).

Meyer Resende argues that the decision of the Polish Catholic hierarchies to mobilize National Catholicism as a political identity in the early years of democracy had a lasting impact on the shape of the right wing and also on the skepticism towards the European integration. The intervention of the Church led to “a symbiotic relation between religion and nationalism, thus contributing to the deepening of the socio-cultural divide” (Meyer Resende, 4). Although according to the Polish Constitution of 1997, public authorities should maintain impartiality in matters of religious or philosophical beliefs, ensuring their freedom of expression in public life; the current government is tightening its relationship with the country’s powerful Roman Catholic Church and is basing their new laws on the opinions of the Church. While analyzing the roots of hostility towards Syrian refugees, I will reflect upon such a powerful symbiosis in the next chapter.

Conclusion

The history of Polish nationalism and Polish identity has been heavily influenced by its geographical location and fear of border stability between two of the most aggressive nations in the 20th century: Germany and Russia. During the ultimate loss of independence at the end of 18th century and the constant fight against Germanification and Russification, Polish nationalism was heavily based on the elites. However, the shift in the perception of nationalism took place when the fight for independence became more realistic and the elites realized they needed to convey the idea of a nation to everyone in order to gain support for the common cause of getting Polish independence back. While
the two individuals that played a significant role in Polish path to independence, Dmowski and Piłsudski, differed in their views on how homogenous newly created Poland should be, Piłsudski was the one that was in charge of the Second Republic. Gaining back the Polish land did not mean regaining the full control over the state, as World War II and the introduction of the communist system yet again proved that their sovereignty is unstable. Feeling the vulnerability, Poles needed to place emphasis on maintaining their society homogenous in religion, ethnicity and language. Religion, however, is the element of Polish identity that has been developed the strongest, as it was a strong element of resistance against communist authorities. Having provided a brief history of the development of Polish nationalism, in the next chapter I will introduce Poland and both in-migration and out-migration in the context of the European Union.
Chapter 3: Poland and migration in the context of the European Union

Introduction

Having provided the historical timeline of Polish nationalism and a creation of Polish identity, in this chapter I will address Poland and both in-migration and out-migration in the context of the European Union. In order to explain the Polish positions on the seeming contradiction regarding the standards for legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants, I will discuss the history of out-migration of Poles to the UK and the recent in-migration of refugees to Poland. While looking at the out-migration, I will go back to the World War II era to explain a long-lasting connection between the Polish and British governments and civil societies, and move on chronologically up to the Brexit campaign and the use of anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric by the Leave camp. The analysis of the in-migration to Poland will start with the brief introduction to migration policies in Poland within the framework of the EU, and move on to explaining the refugee crisis and the Polish response to the refugee crisis. This chapter will serve as a background chapter on Poland and migration patterns in order to later delve in the following Chapter into a more specific analysis of actors and their arguments while referring to questions on how the Polish diaspora affected Polish perception of inclusion and exclusion, what other principles, norms and historical precedents might have been employed by different actors, and what seems to be driving these positions.

Out-migration of Poles to the UK

Poles’ peak of emigration took place between the mid-nineteenth century until the outbreak of World War I, as about three and a half million Poles lived in exile that meant
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every sixth Pole lived outside the historical borders of the country (“Polacy też byli uchodźcami”). When World War II ended, more than one and a half million of Poles were living in Western Europe. Half of them immediately decided to return to their homeland. The others chose further emigration, as they could not imagine returning to their motherland dependent on the Soviet Union. The main hub of Polish immigrants in Europe at the time was the United Kingdom, where the Polish government-in-exile resided from 1940 to 1990. Alongside the government, there were Polish shops, newspapers, churches, theaters, schools and colleges (“Polacy też byli uchodźcami”). Furthermore, since Poles played a big part in the war effort on the British side, “the 1947 Polish Resettlement Act offered British citizenship to more than 200,000 Poles, after some 6,000 members of the Polish air force helped win the Battle of Britain against the Nazis” (Lowe).

The Polish communist authorities’ migration policies of isolation included time restrictions on issuing passports and visas allowing exiting the country. As a result of such harsh regulations, the main destinations of emigration for Poles became Germany and the United States. While Germany accepted Poles that had proof of their German citizenship, the United States easily granted refugee status for Poles escaping a communist regime (Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak). The collapse of communism in 1989 interrupted the regular emigration routes and another great emigration took place when Poland accessed the EU in 2004.

After its accession, Poland still had a limited access to twelve of the existing EU Member States that maintained severe restrictions on the migration. The exceptions

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5 Germany had a very lenient policy up until 1991 regarding a proof of ancestry (Aussiedler), as any document showing German background was accepted.
included: the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden (Owen, Fihel and Green 2). As a result, the vast majority of Poles seeking jobs in the European Union left to the UK or Ireland. Since 2004, the number of Poles in Britain has grown from almost 100,000 to 831,000, largely as a result of “immigrant-friendly policies under Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair” (Lowe). Britain was an attractive destination for Poles, as they knew English and were looking forward to higher wages in sectors like construction and hospitality (Ibid.).

![Figure 2. Main Destinations for Polish Labor Migration before and after EU Accession as a Percentage of All Emigration](image)

Source: Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak

Furthermore, a study conducted by the researchers from the University of Warsaw showed that 63% of respondents pointed at the possibility of finding a well-paid job as a main response to emigrate to the UK\(^6\). The desire to study or deepen the knowledge of the language was indicated by 46% of respondents, and the political and economic situation in Poland by 44% (Milewski and Ruszczak-Żbikowska 10). The majority of the respondents included people aged up to 24 years, students, and people with higher education. These respondents, when asked about the reasons why they decided to leave

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\(^6\) The online survey was taken by users of over 80 thousand Polish websites residing abroad at the moment of conducting the survey. The sample selection was random.
Poland, pointed at their interest in the world, the opportunity to deepen the knowledge of the language or to study in one of the British universities, as well as the desire for new experiences (Ibid. 11). The second distinct group of respondents, the largest one, was looking for a better future abroad, regardless of age, education or professional situation before leaving the country. They pointed at "better wages, poor economic policy in Poland, the lack of career opportunities, a better prospect for the future life," as the reasons to migrate to the UK. People over 35 years old, people without prior employment, but also people who had their own business in Poland mostly left because of their parents’ or partners’ in life decision to leave or due to the lack of job opportunities in their respective profession in Poland (Ibid. 12). As proof of the rise in Polish population in the UK since 2004, the following graph shows that the largest language group other than English was Polish.

Having looked at the migration patterns of Poles to the UK, I will now introduce Brexit and the rhetoric of the Leave campaign. Brexit is a common name for the process of the UK leaving structures of the European Union, initiated by referendum in June 2016. The referendum, which was not binding for the British government, resulted in 51.89% votes in favor of leaving the EU. While the Leave camp focused on economics, “the emotional case for Brexit was heavily influenced by immigration” (Lee). Since the 2008 financial crisis, Britain (not a member of the Eurozone) suffered the consequences of the Eurozone crisis and workers from “Eurozone countries such as Ireland, Italy, and Lithuania (as well as EU countries like Poland and Romania that have not yet joined the common currency) have flocked to the UK in search of work” (Lee). Many tabloids during the campaign also focused on the increased influx of Eastern European migrants. Moreover, while in 2014/15 the UK was one of 10 member states who pay more into the EU budget than they receive, Poland was the largest beneficiary (Hunt and Wheeler).

After the Brexit vote, a number of cards saying “Leave the EU/No more Polish vermin” in both English and Polish were found outside St Peter’s School in Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire by teaching assistants and students (Lyons). Slogans such as “Welcome to a new England!” appeared in a street lined with Eastern European shops (Freytas-Tamura). Another incident included a death of Arkadiusz Jozwik, a 40-year-old meat factory worker, who was attacked by a group of young boys and girls after hearing him speak Polish (Bilefsky). The increase of incidents of hate crime aimed at the UK’s Polish community comes with a response from Poles living in the UK. Many of them, having been in the UK for many years, were shocked and saddened by these incidents: "There are so many different nations and skin colours [in the UK] and I've never read so many
bad stories about them as about Poles. It's impossible that we Poles are so bad and everybody else is awesome and great. We all are people and you can't put all the blame on one nation" (Benke).

Keeping the long-lasting relationship between Poland and the UK, Prime Minister of the UK, Theresa May condemned the xenophobic attacks that took place in the UK shortly after the referendum, and emphasized that “crimes motivated by hatred against any communities, races or religions can not take place in British society” (Lusher). May also said that “Poles living in the U.K. continue to be welcomed and we value the contribution they make to our country” (Kroet).

After describing the out-migration of Poland to the UK, I will now move on to discussing migration policies in Poland within the framework of the EU in order to further understand the legal framework of laws in Poland regarding not only out-migration, but also in-migration. This framework will open a further analysis of the situation of immigrants to Poland.

Migration policy in Poland within the framework of the EU

Polish elites and policy-makers frame immigration as “an irreversible consequence of democratization, capitalism and European integration, and thus part of Poland’s inevitable future” (Kicinger, Weinar and Gómy 192). Keeping that in mind, they also realize that in order to prevent negative consequences of immigration, such as “exclusion, marginalization, racism and xenophobia”, they need to maintain the status quo (Ibid.). As such, Poland since 1951, has been adopting various international laws regarding their migration policy.
Poland is a signatory of the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Before 1991, when Poland amended the 1963 Aliens Act, only communists escaping Greece’s junta regime and Pinochet’s regime in Chile received asylum in Poland. Since the late 1990s, Poland has been experiencing a steadily increasing number of refugee applications from various countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa, the majority of applications coming from Russians, most of them from the war-torn region of Chechnya (Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak). Between 1992 and 2009, only 2.5% of all applications received refugee status. Poland further expanded options for asylum seekers, as they introduced additional forms of humanitarian protection: "subsidiary-protection status" and "tolerated status." Subsidiary-protection status is “for those who do not fulfill the requirements for becoming a refugee but who would be endangered upon return to their countries”, while tolerated status is “granted in some cases when the person has been rejected for refugee or subsidiary-protection status” (Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak). Under these statuses, people are allowed to work and have access to health insurance and free education, and can eventually apply for permanent residence. Article 56 of the 1997 Polish Constitution says that “foreigners shall have a right of asylum in the Republic of Poland in accordance with principles specified by statute; and foreigners who, in the Republic of Poland, seek protection from persecution, may be granted the status of a refugee in accordance with international agreements to which the Republic of Poland is a party” (“The Constitution of the Republic of Poland”).

Since May 1, 2004, Poland has been using Council Regulation No 343/2003 / EC of 18 February 2003 that “establishes criteria and mechanisms for determining the
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third party - the so-called Dublin II Regulation” (“Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003”). On the basis of this regulation, Poland is obliged to accept into its territory and process applications for refugee status for both foreigners who have made a request for refugee status in Poland, and who were then detained in the territory of other EU Member States (in connection with the submission of a further application for refugee status in another country or in other circumstances), as well as persons who have submitted such an application in another Member State of the EU, but Poland was the first Member State to which they arrived (Kaczmarczyk, Anacka, Fihel and Stefańska 62).

While Polish law is generally consistent with human rights obligation, there are, however, a few regulations that may lead to human rights violations. The compliance of Polish legislation with “the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence,” as embodied in Article 8 of the ECHR, may be problematic, as the right to family reunification under Polish law is limited to members of the nuclear family: the spouse and minor children of the sponsor and/or the spouse, as required under Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification (Adam and Devillard 420). Polish law does not allow family reunification of relatives in the direct ascending line, adult unemployed children, or unemployed or registered partners (where the decision is left to the Member States). Such persons can apply for a residence permit for a specified period of time under the general clause, which allows for the granting of a permit when there are other important reasons justifying the foreigner’s stay in Poland for more than three months (Ibid.).

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7 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification
According to Article 27 of Directive 2004/58/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, the only conditions which allow the limitation of the right to enter and stay are reasons of public policy, public security and public health. These provisions of the Directive have not been fully implemented into the act amending the Act on the Entry into, Residence in and Exit from the Republic of Poland of Nationals of the European Union Member States and their Family Members (Adam and Devillard 429). The newly introduced Act on Aliens of 2003 was detailed on matters of “the rules on border crossing, on the issuance of visas, residence permits and Polish travel or identity documents to foreigners, on keeping foreigners in guarded detention centres or under arrest, on registering and tracking foreigners and so on” (Kicinger, Weinar and Górny 188).

The specific geographical location of Poland as a country bordering both former Soviet States and Schengen countries influenced Polish migration policies. Since the EU accession, Poland has observed very dynamic economic growth, which is connected among other things with the opening of EU markets for Poles. This enabled not only the free movement of goods, both imported and exported, but also gave the opportunity to leave the country for work purposes for many of Poles (Wolchik and Curry 188). These new migration flows, together with positive trends in the Polish economy, led to significant changes in the labour market, revealing a lack of workers in Poland, especially in agricultural and construction work. As a reaction to this situation, Polish authorities undertook various activities, including the 2006 regulation on seasonal work (Adam and Devillard 430).
Unfortunately, Poland still does not have a comprehensive integration system, but mostly focuses on returning Polish emigrants, known as repatriates. Poland’s small immigration community includes citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Vietnam, Armenia, Russia and Moldova. At the beginning of the 1990s, the first integration programs were targeted at refugees from the former Yugoslavia, but only in 1996 was the concept of integration introduced into the legislation (Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak). Since then, especially the Civic Platform’s government proved itself to be supportive of NGOs, such as Polish Humanitarian Action and the Polish Red Cross, that help refugees. Additionally, money provided from the EU since 2008 allowed integration work in Poland to move forward.

Participation in the programs of resettlement and the readiness to develop international cooperation on refugee issues would be an important signal of Polish solidarity with other EU Member States. Taking into the account the dynamics of migration and the fact that Poland is a country with one of the longest external borders of the European Union, the possibility that it may need future assistance from other EU members in solving such problems should not be excluded. In addition, the experience gained from such cooperation may prove useful when working on a model of integration of foreigners in Poland. Participation in these programs of resettlement and relocation was enabled thanks to July 2011 Amendments to the Act on providing foreigners with protection within the territory of the Republic of Poland, “which made possible relocation to Poland refugees from the other European Union member states and resettlement from third countries to Poland foreigners recognized as refugees by the UNHCR” (“Poland’s Migration Policy – Current State of Play and Further Actions” 68).
Refugee crisis and the EU

The European migration crisis refers to the rapid increase in the number of migrants traveling to Europe, often via the Mediterranean Sea - usually by small ships or rafts operated by smugglers - in order to obtain asylum. Although the number of migrants has been growing for several years now, the beginning of the crisis is considered to be 2015, in which EU countries received a record number of 1.2 million applications for asylum. This increase is a result of the outbreak of civil war in Syria, from which more than 4.8 million people escaped - according to data from March 2016. In 2015, the number of forced migrants exceeded 60 million, including 20 million refugees and internally displaced persons and around 86% of them live in or come from developing countries as of 2014 (Edwards). According to the UNHCR, among the migrants who have arrived in Europe in 2015 were primarily Syrians (49%), Afghans (21%) and Iraqis (8%). The EU countries that received the most asylum applications were Germany (476,000 applications), Sweden, Austria and Hungary (“Asylum Statistics”).

One of the causes of the migration crisis is not only the situation in Africa and the Middle East, but also the failure of the European Union to generate a common immigration policy of the European Union. Since 1999, a common asylum system has been on the European Union’s agenda. As a result, the European Union has adopted the Dublin Convention (1990) and then its amendments (in 2003 and 2014) that determine which country is responsible for the conduct of the proceedings for refugee status. Additionally, the EU has a common computer system called Eurodac, which includes a database that would prevent the submission of applications for refugee status in several countries, which in turn allows for the repatriation of persons committing such practices.
to the countries of first contact ("Identification of Applicants (EURODAC)"). In spite of the attempts to create a common asylum system between the EU countries, there are still significant differences among the member states both in terms of protection of refugees, as well as on the conditions for their reception. These differences stem mostly from the economic situation of individual countries, but also with the number of migrants coming to certain countries.

Since the European Union member states are not able to handle the crisis individually, there is a need for a common plan. Unfortunately, the migrant crisis provided a fertile ground for a lot of xenophobic voices to arise, making it difficult to find a common ground. Additionally, there are two extreme approaches to the migrant crisis: on one hand, Germany’s “open doors” approach, and on the other end Hungary’s Viktor Orban’s religious-nationalist, anti-immigrant rhetoric (Garavoglia). Poland’s view is similar to that of Hungary, as it seems that protecting their religious homogeneity is more important that dealing with Europe’s migrant crisis (Ibid.).

When the European Commission came up with the refugee quota solution in 2015, they did not anticipate that some member states would reject that solution, including Poland. Since the European Union has no mechanisms that would allow it to enforce its legislation on the member states (Gashi 3), Poland refused to accept refugees and faced no consequences for violating the UN 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees, which bans racial and religious discrimination. In May this year, seeing the reluctance of particularly Central and Eastern European countries, the bloc's executive body started to plan a sanction of €250,000 (£200,000; $290,000) for each person they reject ("Migrant Crisis: EU Plans Penalties for Refusing Asylum Seekers"). Such a proposal was not taken
seriously, even though technically Poland could face a fine of at least €1.75bn if the proposal goes through for refusing to take 7,000 asylum seekers. Current Prime Minister of Poland Beata Szydło before the 2015 elections announced that the EU decision about the refugee quota was a scandal, and further claimed that “it was adopted against national security and without the agreement of the Polish people” (Rettman). Both Orban and Szydło “have ferociously defended their citizens’ rights to live and work across the EU while refusing EU requests to take in a quota of refugees” (Matthijs 93). In response to such skeptical voices, as the Prime Minister of Poland, EU Commissioner Juncker in his annual State of the Union speech, when addressing the European Parliament, said: “Never before have I seen such little common ground between our member states, so few areas where they agree to work together; (...) Never before have I seen national governments so weakened by the forces of populism and paralyzed by the risk of defeat in the next elections” (Herszenhorn). Moreover, the President of the European Parliament from 2012 to 2017, Martin Schulz, emphasized that “global problems cannot be solved by nationalism” (Stachnio).

The leaders of the 27 EU member countries met in Bratislava in September 2016 to reflect and plan the further development of the EU with 27 member countries without the UK. Facing not only the aftermath of Brexit, but also the migration crisis, the objectives regarding migration and external borders included a goal “to further bring down the number of irregular migrants, to ensure full control of our external borders and get back to Schengen, broaden EU consensus on long term migration policy and apply the principles of responsibility and solidarity” (“Informal Meeting of the 27 Heads of State or Government, 16/09/2016”). The measures to meet these objectives included a
full commitment to implementing the March 18 EU-Turkey deal\(^8\) as well as continued support to the countries of the Western Balkans and to other frontline States (Ibid.)

Having understood a broader concept of the refugee crisis in the EU, the following section will look at the Polish response to the refugee crisis.

**Polish response to the refugee crisis**

In 2016, refugee status in Poland was received by only 42 people, including 21 Syrian citizens, as well as Egyptian, Chinese, Iraqi, Russia and Ugandan citizens, according to information from the Polish Office for Foreigners. More than 5.5 thousand people made requests, and citizens from these three countries submitted 91% of the applications: Russia (69%), Tajikistan (11%), and Ukraine (11%) (“Poland and Refugees: Some People Are More Welcome than Others”). According to the Polish Office for Foreigners, slightly more than 12,000 foreigners submitted applications for international protection in 2016, in addition to those applying for refugee status. The vast majority of cases - nearly 80% were canceled and only 390 people met the conditions for granting a form of protection. In addition, 177 foreigners received permission to stay for humanitarian reasons (“Podsumowanie: Ochrona Międzynarodowa w 2016 Roku”). In Poland, according to the Geneva Convention, a person is given refugee status, if due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, that person cannot enjoy the protection of their own country. The Office for Foreigners emphasized that despite an

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\(^8\) The deal meant that while one Syrian refugee on the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey, one Syrian asylum seeker from Turkey will be resettled in Europe.
increase of Syrian refugees in Europe, the demographics of applicants for international protection are still filed by mostly citizens of Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine.

While there is a general reluctance to accept refugees in Poland, the disapproval of taking in refugees from the Middle East and Africa has significantly increased. According to the Polish Public Opinion Research Center, currently only 33% of Poles think that at least temporarily Poland should accept refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts, and 61% believe that Poland should not even accept them. Only every fourth respondent accepts the relocation of some of these refugees in Poland, while 71% are against. In the last seven months, the number of Poles who share the opinion that the migration crisis could lead to the disintegration of the European Union increased up to 58% (Leszczyński). Statistical analysis indicates that the differences among those surveyed whether to accept refugees coming from countries affected by armed conflict come from the surveyed people’s opinion on how realistic is a threat of terrorism in Poland. Those who are opposed to accepting refugees believe that there is a real threat of terrorism in Poland, while those for accepting refugees think that such opinion is
exaggerated. The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium have boosted anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe, and “in eight of the 10 European nations surveyed, more than 50 percent of people said they felt that incoming refugees increased the likelihood of terrorism in their country” (Foster).

One of the problems haunting Poland includes its protection over the national borders. As a result, a majority of Poles favors a restricted immigration policy. Only 6 percent believe that immigration should not be restricted at all, 27.7 percent think that immigrant should “come as long as there are jobs available,” 51.4 percent are in favor of introducing strict limits on the number of immigrants and 14.9 percent want to prohibit immigration completely (Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka 219).

Younger people (from 18 to 44 years of age) more often than older have a negative attitude to the reception of refugees. It should be noted, however, that the opposition to granting refugees asylum in Poland dominates in all age groups and acceptance of their permanent settlement is declared occasionally. Residents of cities over 500,000 people are the most likely to provide shelter to refugees until they can return to their country of origin, and also in allowing them to permanently settle in. In addition, the smaller the town, the more opponents there are to the reception of refugees (“Stosunek Polaków Do Uchodźców”).

Against accepting refugees are mostly respondents who voted for Kukiz’15 (79 %) and Law and Justice (66 %) in parliamentary elections. The greatest support for the adoption of refugees in Poland comes from an electorate of Modern and Party Together (Leśniewicz). Having looked at the correlation of the electorate and the party agenda
regarding the reception of refugees, in the following chapter I will provide a close
analysis of the elite response.

Conclusion

Poles for centuries emigrated for economic and security reasons, but Poland itself
was never an attractive destination for immigrants. Taking into consideration the patterns
of Polish migration to the UK since the early 20th century and especially the influx of
Polish immigrants since Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004, Poland wants to maintain
a strong cooperation with the UK despite the rise of xenophobia during and after the
Brexit referendum towards the Poles. Ryszard Czarnecki, Vice-President of the European
Parliament, emphasized that the UK will continue to be “a very important economic
partner, military partner in NATO, and a political partner for Poland,” and as such there
have been many initiatives, not only political, but also civil ones bringing together
scientists, people of culture and art, journalists, social workers, NGO activists to “build
bridges at a time when it is most needed” (Bielecki). On the other side of out-migration,
there is the influx of refugees coming to Europe, including Poland. Looking however at
the responses of the Polish government and the local level movements, there is an
overarching hostility towards refugees. In the following chapter, I will analyse different
actors’ arguments in the Polish debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants.
Chapter 4: An analysis of the Polish perception of social inclusion and exclusion of migrants

Introduction

This chapter will provide an analysis of Polish perception of social inclusion and exclusion of migrants in the context of Polish hostility to the refugee crisis and justifying the idea of borderless Europe after the Brexit referendum. There are several prominent actors in the debate: the political elites (the Law and Justice Party, and surveyed politicians), the Catholic Church, media (state-controlled and Radio Maryja), local level movements (far-right political movements, an organization United Against Racism, and the City of Gdańsk), and the public opinion. I argue that these actors are using the value of solidarity, but defining it differently because of the collective identities that they prioritize. Two sides to the debate vary in their approaches to nationalism, xenophobia and the European community. When analyzing the different answers to whom these actors believe they owe solidarity to, the above concepts will be used to organize the chapter.

To understand how the mentioned arguments overlap and are used, it is important to look at the demographics of Poland. In 2011, the number of people baptized by the Polish Catholic Church accounted for 86.66% of the Polish population, and, according to CBOS, 57% of Poles trusts the Catholic Church. The homogeneity of Polish society is not only reflected in religion, but also in that more than 96% of the country claims Polish ethnicity and 98.2% speak Polish ("The World Factbook: POLAND"). When Poland joined the EU in 2004, as any other nation, was asked to pledge support to European
values, including rejection of xenophobia. Xenophobia in Poland is reflected in an attitude of rejection and alienation, based on the conviction of unacceptable differences between the object of knowledge (in this case incoming refugees) or the lack of desire to obtain the knowledge on the refugees. Xenophobia also relates to misunderstanding and anxiety in relation to refugees, depreciation and negative feelings toward them, combined with display of negative characteristics and subsidiary status of these objects. With growing negative sentiments towards immigrants in the UK, which eventually led to Brexit, Poles were one of the targeted groups of possible hate crimes and are facing xenophobia themselves.

In order to understand what seems to be driving these positions and arguments, in addition to the literature on nationalism and European identity, I will use psychological literature that explores topics of aggression and hostility between individuals and groups that are elements of nationalism and xenophobia. The texts that I will draw from throughout my analysis include: Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley’s *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder*, Erich Fromm’s *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, Willard Gaylin’s *Hatred: The Psychological Descent into Violence*, Alexander Laban Hinton’s *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide*, and Philip Zimbardo’s *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*. All of these authors draw upon real life events, psychological experiments, but also historical events to explain their understanding of aggression and hostility.

Throughout this chapter some of the more prevalent definitions that will explain how Poles perceive social inclusion and exclusion of migrants include: group identification, narcissism, fear of pollution and bigotry. Since the topic is very recent, a lot of the
evidence I provide in this analysis comes from media and political speeches. To get a deeper insight into the political elites’ minds, I will also include answers to a survey that I sent out to Polish politicians.

Political elites

*Law and Justice*

Some of the main outspoken actors on both the topic of refugees and Brexit are the political elites. The Kaczyński twins, Lech and Jarosław, founded the Law and Justice party in 2001 and based their programme on a very conservative agenda (Traub). The party adopted a nationalist discourse into the tradition of introverted National Catholicism, describing “Poland as a centuries-old nation surviving threats of Russian and German enemies and inextricably bound to Catholicism” (Meyer Resende, 70). The party won the 2005 Parliamentary election, while Lech Kaczyński won the presidency. Jarosław served as Prime Minister, before calling elections in 2007, in which the party came second to Civic Platform. After eight years of center-right rule by Civic Platform, Law and Justice returned to power (Traub). In the presidential elections in 2015, Andrzej Duda (Member of the European Parliament at the time) defeated the incumbent president Bronislaw Komorowski (a nonpartisan candidate, but officially supported by Civic Platform). In November of the same year, in the parliamentary elections, Law and Justice received 37.58% of the vote, winning the majority of the seats in the Sejm and 61 seats in the Senate (Traub). Winning the majority of the votes means that Law and Justice did not need to create coalition with another party and had an absolute vote on all legislations both in the Sejm and the Senate. While the Sejm has as many as 460 members, the Senate
of the Republic of Poland consists of only 100 senators. The Constitution of Poland clearly defines the tasks of the Sejm and the Senate in Article 95 (1), “the Sejm and the Senate are mentioned as bodies exercising legislative power, i.e. lawmaking bodies,” and Article 95 (2) says that the Sejm also exercises control over the activities of the Council of Ministers, which is an executive body. The Senate further has the opportunity to draft laws, but also deals with the opinions of statutes and has the power to appoint some representatives of state power.

Before PiS came to power in 2015, the pro-European Civic Platform party that ruled in Poland before the refugee crisis stood by Angela Merkel during the 2008 Eurocrisis\(^{10}\) and her governance reforms in the Eurozone. Merkel in turn delivered sanctions against Russia, as Poland was fearful of any repeat of Russia’s invasion after the annexation of Crimea (Osborne). Poland then promised to take in 7,000 refugees last fall. In 2015, out of the 12,000 asylum seekers that arrived in Poland mostly from Chechnya, Ukraine and Georgia, as noted previously, “only 340 were granted full protection status, and 150 received subsidiary protection” (Bienvenu). Such numbers indicate that the EU refugee crisis has not affected Polish borders, especially in comparison to the one million refugees arriving in Germany (Ibid.). Moreover, looking at the already small numbers of admitted asylum seekers, Poland promised to take just 100 Syrian refugees between 2016 and 2020 (Leszczyński). The agreement to such a small amount of refugees over a course of four years can be reflected in Law and Justice’s economic argument.

\(^{10}\) Angela Merkel’s strict austerity measures were unpopular among the European Union community
While millions of Poles during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries emigrated due to economic conditions, Polish politicians from Law and Justice were presenting an argument that refugees are actually economic migrants and they would take Poles’ jobs away and influence the economic situation in Poland. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski further argued that “Poland is not obliged to accept labor immigrants because we [Poland] are the supplier of millions of emigrants for Europe” (“Waszczykowski: Polska nie zmieni zobowiązań wobec uchodźców”). Waszczykowski in many of his speeches interchangeably would use ‘refugees’ and ‘economic migrants,’ while relating to refugees escaping war and looking for asylum. Furthermore, the argument of how Poland itself provides labor migrants to Western Europe is evidence to why PiS would defend Polish out-migration to the UK.

On the other hand, some of the reactions that Poles have been sharing regarding Brexit vote have referred to the lost opportunity of a better future and better salaries: “Many Poles are frustrated that one door to opportunity may close for them” (Hjelmgaard). Some of the political elites are happy with the Brexit decision, as they believe that the return of Poles from the UK is in the economic interest of Poland. According to Prime Minister Szydło, “Brexit is also a chance to attract Polish emigrants back. We do not want to be the country from which people emigrate, but the one they are willing to return. We want to create a thriving business environment that allows repatriates to be employed” (“Premier Szydło ws. Brexitu: to krytyczny moment dla całej Unii Europejskiej”).

PiS’s politicians through their economic reasoning behind defending Polish out-migration in the UK and denying a possibility of an in-migration to refugees are showing
that they are prioritizing a collective group of fellow Polish compatriots abroad. At the same time, they see an opportunity in portraying themselves as the ones in solidarity with migrants in the UK in order to attract Polish emigrants back. Such prioritizing of a group is an evidence of PiS being on the ethno-nationalist side of the debate. Having looked at the economic reasons employed by PiS, I will now further explore the related ethno-nationalist argument.

**Nationalism**

After many years of reviving the country and building it to be a model of a democratic, economically prosperous state, Poles were faced with the challenge of a new, alien population coming to its borders – refugees. To understand how one of the existential needs is used here as one of the explanations to such behavior, I will now introduce Erich Fromm. Fromm is an author of *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* and argues that existential needs are “rooted in the very conditions of human existence. They are shared by all men, and their fulfillment is as necessary for man’s remaining sane as the fulfillment of organic drives is necessary for his remaining alive. But each of these needs can be satisfied in different ways, which vary according to the differences of his social condition,” (226) and these needs include: rootedness, relatedness, transcendence, sense of identity, and frame of orientation. His analysis of rootedness as one of the existential needs can be applied to the Poles: “Man, aware of his separateness, needs to find new ties with his fellowman; his very sanity depends on it. Without strong affective ties to the world, he would suffer from utter isolation and lostness” (Fromm 262). PiS politicians are proving how they fear that if Poland does not remain homogenous, it might result in violence originating from the incoming Syrian refugees. The Polish
political elites used such a fear in the past, during Polish partitions. Resistance to not only a territorial threat, but also Russification and Germanification, allowed them to strengthen the sense of a Polish community, of a Polish nation. And while the PiS government announced that in the case of Brexit the rights of Polish immigrants in the UK are not negotiable, the migration regulations implemented by the UK may be quite different. In the end, British politicians during Brexit negotiations with EU may use a similar rhetoric as PiS: we are a sovereign nation and we do not want immigrants coming to our country.

Pride in the lack of multiculturalism in Poland was reflected in PiS politicians’ responses to terrorist attacks that occurred in France in 2016. After the Nice attack in the summer of 2016, when a Tunisian resident of France deliberately drove into crowds celebrating Bastille Day and killed 86 people, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs said, “it was a consequence of multi-cultural policies” ("ZAMACH W NICEI. Błaszczyk Już Znalazł Współwinnych Ataku: To Poprawność Polityczna I Szefowa Dyplomacji UE"). He added that France was in a much more difficult situation than Poland and that Poland would have been in a similar situation, if not for a change of government. Further, he placed the basis of European values and our culture in Christianity. (“Błaszczyk: Polska znalazła się w takiej sytuacji, jak Francja, gdyby nie zmiana rządu”). This was possible thanks to an already existent resistance to immigration in Poland. Even though refugees have been settling in Poland since the 1990s, there has been no support offered for integration of the new members of Polish society (Bienvenu). I argue that such a mindset can be explained by Gaylin’s concept of group identification that can be traced again back to the partitions of Poland, to the moment when Poland lost its land for 123 years.
Group identification “often depends upon the existence of an other, and outside, nonbelonging population. By setting an alien population outside the normal community, the leaders lay the groundwork for possible stigmatization and demonization of the other” (163). Germany and Russia were the alien populations since the end of the eighteenth century, as they were the main aggressors during the partitions and the Second World War. Now it’s the incoming refugees that the PiS politicians view as the alien population. The ethno-nationalist PiS’s politicians do not see any reason for solidarity with outsiders who are not Christian Europeans.

The lack of openness to new cultures and new religions coming to Poland is reflected in Polish President Andrzej Duda’s statements as well. Duda coming from the Law and Justice Party describes the Christian Syrian refugees that were accepted in Poland as “culturally close to us,” while at the same time the Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski still has his doubts, by saying “there is some hope they will assimilate in Poland” (Gebert). Michael Ignatieff describes “nationalism as a form of ‘narcissism,’ or completely absorbing self-love, in which minor differences between peoples are glorified into major ones in order to solidify national boundaries and strengthen national solidarity; this implies belittling the ‘other’ who does not share these traits” (Chirot and McCauley 88). Duda and Waszczykowski reflect Ignatieff’s portrayal of nationalism in the mentioned statements, as despite Syrians being Christians, there is still a voice of resentment towards their acceptance in the Polish society. Duda’s exclusionary language is also expressed in his speech at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants on September 19, 2016. Duda claimed that “it is the duty of the international community to eliminate the real causes of refugee crisis, meaning conflicts, and restoring
the rights of every human being to live in their own country” (“Wystąpienie Andrzeja Dudy podczas 71. sesji ZO ONZ”). In his language he is pointing at how refugees should come back to their own countries, as his party’s position on the topic has been openly anti-refugee. Such loud and conspicuous statements on the supposed threat posed by Syrian refugees coming from leading politicians are an evidence of a nationalist agenda.

The ethno-nationalist agenda and PiS’s arguments in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants are deeply historically enrooted in Polish history of resistance to not only a territorial threat, but also a threat to Polish culture and language, especially during the times of partitions and Second World War. Since the arguments of nationalism, and Islamophobia and xenophobia tend to overlap while used, I will now move on to provide evidence of the xenophobic behaviors and speeches of PiS politicians.

**Islamophobia and Xenophobia**

Law and Justice politicians knew that Poles felt threatened by immigrants and further implemented the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Buchowski on Poland argues that “together, in a xenophobic spirit, they reject everything which does not correspond to the broadly understood image of Polishness with Christianity at its core. In this constellation Islam is an arch-enemy, a fatal threat to the native tradition” (62). Such a narrative of traditions, Christianity and Polishness leads to racism and xenophobia perpetually re-emerging and “Poles’ approach towards fellow citizens whose ethnic identity is other than Polish, and religions other than Catholicism, is a fundamental issue for the constitution of social life” (Buchowski 53). Buchowski in his analysis of Islamophobia in Poland hits the core argument used by the PiS’s politicians. PiS is
exercising their solidarity towards their fellow Catholic Poles, and since Muslims do not share their ethnicity or religion, therefore they are not a part of their group, and they do not feel solidarity with them.\footnote{Muslim migrants in Poland are not a new phenomenon. Poland has had Muslim residents for more than 600 years now – \textit{Polish Tatars}. Polish Tatars, the descendants of Mongolian tribes, arrived in Poland in the fourteenth century. They claim that historically they belong in Poland, but religiously they are a part of the worldwide Muslim community (Janicki 10). They stress the importance of the integration of three identities of being a Tatar, Muslim and Polish without limiting the importance of any of them (Cieslik and Verkuyten 91). Such a three-dimensional identity reflects that it is possible to feel Polish and Muslim at the same time, and that being Polish does not necessarily equal to being Catholic. Polish Tatars do not expose their religious differences, which may help explain why there is no conflict or tensions between population groups or individual members. They do not complain about any discrimination or ill-treatment by the state or local governments; they are even allowed to build houses of prayer. Furthermore, the religious practices are playing less of a role among the young generation of Polish Tatars. An increasingly narrower group of people exercises care over the mosques, and the folk band members consist mostly of elderly people since the youth is not particularly drawn to them. In Muslim municipality of Gorzów the Tatar tradition plays almost no role, and religious practices do not occur. Only in the eastern part of Poland, in Bialystok, because of the relatively large size of the group of Tatar, and in Gdansk, because of newly built temples, religious practices are regular. Forecasts for the future are therefore not too optimistic, as the majority of academics studying Polish Tatars believe that over time the full assimilation of this group will take place (Janicki 11).}

The categorization of the incoming refugees, “can be based on both concrete and abstract commonalities ranging from directly observable traits such as skin color, physiognomy, and stature to abstract characteristics such as class, ideology, residence, and culture” (Chirot and McCauley 82). As mentioned before, the Polish government has been emphasizing the rare cases of France’s Muslims that became terrorists and blaming the culture of “tolerance and political correctness” for the recent terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe. Furthermore, Poland’s government at the beginning of 2017 refused to welcome ten Syrian orphans from Aleppo, claiming that since they grew up in Syria it is “impossible to determine the children's identity and eliminate a terrorist threat” (“Polish Government Calls Aleppo Orphans 'Terrorist Threat'.”). Such stereotyping can be further analysed through Chirot and McCauley’s definition of essence as:
the common denominator of “biology” and “spirit,” the conceptually
primitive notion that lies beneath both. (...) Cultural groups, in particular,
may be understood in terms of essence because of the conceptual
economies that result from assuming that the eccentricities (by in-group
standards) of one member of another culture are likely to be repeated in
most other members of the same culture” (84).

Essentializing the out-group means that all of the members of the group have
something bad about them. Hearing a former Minister of Justice saying, “Muslims spread
terrorism” (Gebert) and portraying refugees in a starkly negative light has significantly
influenced Poles, as they began to believe what they hear from both the politicians and
the media, which plays an important role in fomenting fear of refugees. Such fear was
reflected in the 2015 elections, and is constantly present in anti-refugee demonstrations
and refusal to accept any refugees in Poland.

Poles taking pride in being a Christian nation for hundreds of years are seeing
incoming refugees from Muslim majority countries as a threat to their stability and
nationhood. PiS’s politicians in their Islamophobic rhetoric refuse to show solidarity to a
collective group that is not Christian. Having looked at the Islamophobic argument used
by PiS, I will now proceed to analyse how the Law and Justice Party is exercising their
notion of solidarity regarding the European Union community.

**Euroscepticism**

Looking back at Poland, it used to be more ethnically diverse during the interwar
period, but after the Second World War the Polish nation became one of the most
homogenous ones in Europe after “the extermination of Jews and the post-war redrawing
of its frontiers” (Kochanski xvii). Such homogeneity is currently being protected by the Polish youth, as the ones supporting Law and Justice are claiming that “for 20 years Poland was pushed to change the national culture to reach so-called ‘European standards,’ but this point of view has completely collapsed — people understand that we can be different, and that’s OK” (Davies). Unfortunately, acceptance of difference by the Polish youth is only applied in the case of Poland not becoming a part of Western Europe, meaning too liberal. Tolerance for difference is not however applied to incoming refugees to the homogenous Polish society.

The victory of PiS in parliamentary elections is evidence for Prime Minister David Cameron’s argument “that EU is at risk of overreaching itself and that it needs to be reformed to become more accountable to its citizens” (Swidlicki). PiS politicians also share Cameron’s vision of placing nation states within the EU first over the pro-integration approach promoted by France and Germany. Additionally, Poland as a non-euro member state, allies with the UK in an aspect of achieving a “a more flexible EU with differing levels of integration, including safeguards for non-euro member states” (Swidlicki). Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the UK and Poland share a “common perception of European problems” (Cienski). Polish government is exercising solidarity with the UK’s decision on leaving the EU, as they realize the need to maintain good relations with a country that hosts thousands of Poles, whose rights are uncertain in the post-Brexit context.

On the other hand, Eugeniusz Smolar, a foreign policy expert with the Warsaw-based Center for International Relations, said that “Poland’s place in the EU will be affected by Brexit and its role in the EU will be even smaller” (Cienski). If Poland wants
to be still a significant actor in the EU, they need to accept their quota of migrants, as this year “Germany, France and up to 21 other countries will give an ultimatum to Hungary and Poland” (Waterfield). Some experts also claim that Poland would benefit from the UK leaving the EU, as they believe that some Polish workers would return home in large numbers with their new skills and they would benefit Polish economy (Gera).

Poland in its history throughout the period of transitions has been dependent on the international actors, mostly the Western powers. Such dependency was needed to gain independence in 1918 and yet again in 2004 when accessing the European Union. However now, according to Law and Justice Party, Poland does not need to be dependent on Merkel’s Germany or Hollande’s France, and as a political party, it further promotes Euroscepticism among Poles, Since Poland has a history of being a victim stuck in between aggressors, mainly Russia and Germany, I argue that they are particularly protective of their nation and therefore essentialize incomers, in this case the Syrian refugees.

PiS politicians, however, seem to have forgotten that the Western countries that they are trying to separate themselves from once offered protection to Poles, who were escaping Poland either due to wars, or the Communist regime. Furthermore, when referring to the latest terrorist attack in London in 2017, Prime Minster Beata Szydło managed to connect the terrorist attack to the EU refugee policy (“Polish PM draws link between London attack and EU migrant policy”). PiS is leading a tactic of separation, as they are blaming EU for security issues throughout Europe, and are refusing to accept their responsibilities as a Member State, regarding the refugee quota. PiS only showed solidarity to an equally Eurosceptic Britain, not the other states, who are trying to save
the European Union in the midst of a very difficult rime for the EU. Finally, in the following section I will frame the notion of solidarity to the historical Solidarity movement of the 1980s.

_Solidarity_

The Poles seem to forget that they were on the other side of fear, just like the Syrian refugees are now. In the 1980s, when Solidarity was protesting against a Communist regime, over a million people escaped Poland, and were well received and accepted in Western societies. Moreover, the acceptance of the Polish diaspora is reflected in the fundamental human need to belong, according to Zimbardo (230). He further argues that the “need for stimulation triggers explorations and adventurous risk taking, but it can also make us vulnerable to boredom when we are placed in a static setting” (230). Such can be one of the approaches of why Polish authorities impetuously reacted to the “refugee crisis”. Looking at Polish post-communist history, Poland was occupied with fulfilling requirements in order to become a member of the European Union, which took place in 2004. Ever since then, Poland has faced a rather stoic growth, only focusing on the economic development, not about potential security threats up until 2014 when European community especially had to step up as a unity to address the influx of asylum seekers on their borders.

Values promoted by the Law and Justice Party that led to their victory in the Parliamentary elections can be classified as group narcissism: “expression of patriotism, faith and loyalty” (Fromm 230). Group narcissism also holds the two important functions of “furthering the solidarity and cohesion of the group”, as well as “an element giving satisfaction to the members of the group and particularly to those who have few other
reasons to feel proud and worthwhile” (230). Such group narcissism is reflected in a
notion that “the question of a crisis of solidarity can be posed differently with respect to
Central and Eastern Europe, countries that have only recently joined the EU and for
whom Europeanization has often been connected with the recovery of national
sovereignty“ (Delanty 681). PiS in order to maintain the cohesion of their nationalist
group chose to further the solidarity with fellow Poles and fellow Christians, not with
new populations that are coming in to Europe.

Law and Justice in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants are
defining the value of solidarity according to the collective identities that they prioritize:
Polish migrants in the UK, but also they show their support to the Eurosceptic British
government. PiS’s approach to whom they owe solidarity is historically enrooted in
Polish history of partitions, border instability and dependency on other countries when
regaining back their independence. PiS’s protection of the Polish nation and thus owing
solidarity only to Poles comes from their ethno-nationalist agenda, their xenophobic and
islamophobic approaches to even a possibility of welcoming refugees in Poland, as well
as their Euroscepticism to even a possibility of a supranational European identity. In the
next section, I will now look at how powerful an individual can be on a political stage
and how his views influence a further audience’s opinion on solidarity and standards for
legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants.

Jarosław Kaczyński

Jarosław Kaczyński has been at the forefront of the Law and Justice Party, even
though he officially does not hold any major positions; instead, he delegated both the
position of the Prime Minister and the President to younger members of PiS. Despite not
having an official government position, nobody doubts that he is the one that runs Poland, as, for example he still holds meetings with other countries’ leaders including Theresa May and Victor Orban, and is the official leader of the Law and Justice Party. It is crucial though to understand Kaczyński as an individual, due to his strong position on the political stage and outspokenness on the topic of refugees. Therefore he will be presented as one of the actors present in the Polish debate on standards for legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants.

**Solidarity**

Kaczyński’s approach to moral issues is derived from a political agenda based on "moral cleansing" of the Polish nation by cutting them off from the legacy of the communist regime, and increase in discipline through stricter laws (Reszczyński 106). As a leader of PiS, Kaczyński cultivated new national heroes, such as the “cursed soldiers” who resisted the Soviet-backed communist regime after the war and who have been traditionally celebrated by the far-right as embodying a bloodier tradition of national resistance (Hartman). The focus on cursed soldiers “helps them [PiS] discredit the traditional historic narrative that Poland regained its independence in 1989 thanks to the Solidarity labor union and tedious talks with the communist government” (Davies). Law and Justice is disempowering not only to the idea of solidarity in regards to refugees, but also to the idea of Solidarity as a movement that tackled the Communist regime. Kaczyński’s idea of whom he owes solidarity to is historically enrooted in owing, according to him, forgotten honor and praise to the forgotten soldiers. Additionally,
Kaczyński’s idea of solidarity is very limited to Poland, due to his lack of experience on an international political stage.

**Euroscepticism**

Kaczyński has very narrow-minded experiences regarding an international arena, as he never traveled abroad except for one holiday in the 1960s to visit cousins in Odessa in Ukraine. He also speaks no foreign language and is reluctant to use technology (Cienski). Furthermore, Jaroslaw, who was the Prime Minister in 2005-2007, is not afraid of telling the EU to mind its own business, for example when PiS was accused of destroying “oversight of government activity” when appointing a new President for the Constitutional Tribunal (Davies). Kaczyński also claims that “Donald Tusk\(^\text{12}\) bears direct responsibility for Brexit and should disappear from European policy, but it also applies to the whole of the European Commission in its current composition” (“Kaczyński: Tusk Ponosi Odpowiedzialność Za Brexit i Powinien Zniknąć”). Kaczyński’s personal vendetta against Tusk is overshadowing his ability to show full solidarity to the European Union institutions; instead he is further advocating that “In Europe, national considerations are decisive and Europe needs to be unified in a way that take this into account” (“Jarosław Kaczyński o Brexicie: Potrzebny Jest Nowy Traktat Europejski.”).

**Nationalism**

Kaczyński is the continuation of Dmowski’s ideology of unity between the Polish state and the Catholic Church, as he constantly emphasizes that there is “no Poland

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\(^{12}\) Tusk was a leader of the Civic Platform Party and Prime Minister of Poland in 2007-2014 before he got elected President of the European Council
without the Church” (Baliszewski). Kaczyński hopes to take Poland back to the past defined by family and religious values. Jarosław Kaczyński is classified as a bigot, according to Willard Gaylin’s definition, who in his book Hatred offers a reader a way to better understand many of the problems of human psyche. A bigot is “strongly partial to one’s own group, religion, race, or politics and is intolerant of those who differ. (…) The bigot will support legislation and social conditions that deprive the minority of its autonomy and its right to be respected” (26). Gaylin goes even further, arguing that bigotry can easily turn into hatred when the bigot becomes obsessively preoccupied with the target group. Kaczyński made the promise of accepting absolutely no refugees central to the PiS campaign, warning that refugees might carry parasites and “diseases that are highly dangerous and have not been seen in Europe for a long time” (Traub). The Law and Justice politicians have commonly used such a language.

Kaczyński’s favoritism can also be analysed through Fromm’s notion of narcissism, that is a feeling or a way of experiencing the reality in which only a person, his body, needs, feelings, everyone and everything connected with it are real, and the rest is just intellectually recognized, without affect (231). Narcissistic persons are not able to perceive the situation or others as separate from that of their own; they are characterized by a complete lack of interest in the external world (227). I argue that group narcissism has become more prevalent thanks to the twin brothers Kaczynski whose “object is not the individual but the group to which he belongs,” and Fromm defines it as “one of the most important sources of human aggression” (231). Thanks to Jaroslaw’s initiatives, cities, towns and villages contain the sculpture of Lech Kaczyński, the Greatest President of All Time (the title of "greatest Pole in history" is no longer reserved for John Paul II).
School events and Olympic sports are being organized in honor of Lech Kaczyński and zealous teachers are asking students to write essays in which they need to justify why Lech Kaczyński was a great president (Temu).

Kaczyński’s focus on his own group in his politics, from as close-up as his brother to more broadly his entire PiS party, is evidence to Kaczyński being on the illiberal and ethno-nationalist side of the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants. His view on solidarity comes from history, that includes praising “cursed soldiers,” promoting deeply enrooted Christian values in Poland, as well as his personal history of minimum international experience. Having focused on Law and Justice in the first two sections, I will now move on to analyzing my survey respondents from various political parties.

Survey respondents

An original part of my research included reaching out to Polish Members of the European Parliament and Members of the Sejm. The six questions asked in a survey were open-ended as they allowed politicians to express their full opinion on the topic (see Appendix 1). Furthermore, the order of questions was not random, as it moved from identifying by politicians general priorities and challenges of the European Union at the moment, then asking their opinion on the possible inclusion of Syrian refugees in Poland, their opinion on what role the use of anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric played in the Leave campaign during the Brexit vote, and finally defining European solidarity taking into considerations their answers to the previous questions.
The survey was sent to 511 politicians from different political affiliations (51 politicians at the European Parliament and 460 at the Sejm).\textsuperscript{13} I received ten responses: five from members of Law and Justice: Marcin Porzucek, Wojciech Zubowski, Jarosław Sellin, Marek Zagórski, Jan Mosiński; one from the Congress of the New Right: Robert Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz; one from Polish People’s Party: Jarosław Kalinowski; two from Civic Platform: Marcin Święcicki, Paweł Suski; and one from the Union of European Democrats: Jacek Protasiewicz.\textsuperscript{14} Out of the mentioned parties, Law and Justice and Congress of the New Right are both right-wing parties; and Civic Platform, the Union of European Democrats, and Polish People’s Party are politically in the centre.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Nationalism}

To further understand the Polish political elites’ perception on legitimate standards regarding social inclusion and exclusion of migrants, I wanted to find out what my respondents thought regarding the use of anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric played in the Leave campaign during the Brexit campaign, and whether they defended Polish out-migration to the UK. The overarching answer was that the campaign might have played a significant role in the vote. Robert Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz from the Congress of the New Right argues that defending your own country “against uncontrolled influx of immigrants is always justified, even if it applies to Poles” ("Email survey with Iwaszkiewicz"). Since the Congress of the New Right is on the far-right of the political spectrum this answer is not too surprising, even regarding the stance that Poles might be the immigrants whose influx needs to be controlled. Iwaszkiewicz as a representative of a nationalist party is

\textsuperscript{13} Survey questions provided in the Appendix.
\textsuperscript{14} An explanation of these parties on the Left-Right political spectrum provided in the Appendix.
\textsuperscript{15} The current poll of support for these parties provided in the Appendix.
reflecting exclusionary stance of view towards migrants overall, both Polish compatriots and refugees. On the other hand, Jan Mosiński from PiS defended Polish immigrants and said they are “not a problem for the British labor market” ("Email survey with Mosiński"). Similarly, Marek Zagórski from PiS on the Leave campaign said that “hatred often stems from ignorance. Poles in the course of that campaign were mixed up with nationalities that are not able to assimilate, do not respect, and even despise the host country in which they are located. I think, therefore, that the outcome of Brexit influenced more anti-immigrant rhetoric and thinking patterns” ("Email survey with Zagórski"). Zagórski in his answer is defending Polish-out migration and at the same time criticizes other nations that migrated to the UK. Moreover, Zagórski’s answer is in its way hypocritical, as PiS politicians were ignorant themselves, as mentioned earlier, they refused to take in Syrian children from Aleppo claiming they automatically were potential terrorists based on where they are from. The contrast between these answers and the fact that PiS respondent defends Polish migrants in the comes from the fact that PiS needs to maintain its electorate and Congress of the New Right that receives somewhat between 1-2% support.

Regarding Polish elites’ perception of possible inclusion of refugees, when asked if Poland was ready to welcome Syrian refugees, most of my respondents from PiS unsurprisingly said no. Marek Zagórski from PiS emphasizes that the migration crisis needs to be addressed at its source - the destabilization in the Middle East. He further claims that the idea that the quota allocation between EU countries gets the job done is the biggest lie in the context of solving the problem of refugees, and says that Poland is ready to support Christian families from Muslim countries. The last part of his answer is
what serves as the evidence for the nationalism argument, as he brings up the importance of religion in Poland and disregards the possibility of other religions’ presence in Poland.

My respondents’ answers, as expected, reflect the opinion of their respective political parties. PiS’s respondents in their nationalist answers show solidarity to émigré Poles currently residing in the UK, and show the lack of solidarity towards the incoming Syrian refugees. In the following section I will look at the use of Islamophobic and xenophobic patterns in my respondents’ answers.

*Islamophobia and Xenophobia*

The arguments of nationalism and xenophobia are closely interconnected in respondents’ answers. Respondents from Civic Platform Party believe that the anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric might have played a significant role in the Brexit vote. Paweł Suski claims that the “increased inflow of Poles in recent years was more visible in both the labor market and the everyday life of the British, and as such the anti-Polish sentiments in the campaign could have affected the outcome of the vote” (“Email survey with Suski”). Święcicki from the same political party also believes that the rhetoric was significant, similarly Prostasiewicz from the Union of European Democrats, who even calls the rhetoric “decisive, but not justified.” Through these answers the respondents acknowledge the xenophobic aspect of the Leave campaign partially directed at Poles. Kalinowski from Polish People’s Party points at how “the campaign itself was one big lie, which misled people,” (“Email survey with Kalinowski”) and how Poland was only one of the examples. There is a commonality among these politicians’ view to this topic of anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric, as both the Union of European Democrats and Civic
Platform are pro-European parties, on the centre of the political spectrum. On the other hand, Marek Zagórski from PiS expressed the strongest stance on the topic, as he said that “all cases of the wave of hatred towards the Poles should be strictly investigated and the perpetrators caught and severely punished” ("Email survey with Zagórski"). Furthermore, he points at the assimilation of Poles in the UK and their hard work that is visible in the British GDP.

Pro-EU parties, including Civic Platform, the Union of European Democrats and Polish People’s Party are showing solidarity to Syrian refugees, and at the same time reject xenophobic and nationalist voices promoting exclusion of migrants (Leave campaign during Brexit advocating against Polish migrants). On the other hand, PiS’s politicians acknowledge xenophobia directed at their fellow compatriots, but would not acknowledge their anti-refugee stance as xenophobic. In the following section, I will further analyze my respondents’ answers in regards to their perception on migration and the context of the European Union.

_Euroscepticism_

In order to understand the respondents’ approach to the topic of in- and out-migration, the first question I asked was about what priorities and challenges the European Union was facing. Among the main challenges in front of the European Union, the surveyed politicians most often pointed at the “wave of immigrants.” Jan Mosiński, a member of Sejm from PiS, claims that what is associated with that problem is “the willingness of the EU to impose refugees quota that individual countries have to accept. Therefore, the challenge for the EU is to find a more versatile instrument halting
immigrants and their relocation” ("Email survey with Mosiński"). Two other politicians from PiS point at stopping mass migration from Islamic countries, but also indicate the need for protection against neo imperialist-policy of Russia (Jarosław Sellin) and the war of Ukraine (Wojciech Zubowski). Marek Zagórksi, also from PiS, claims that “the two biggest crises in the history of the EU: the economic and identity crisis, as well as the security risk associated with the journey of the peoples - the flood of refugees to Europe led to both Brexit and the rise in terrorism” ("Email survey with Zagórksi"). A representative of the Congress of the New Right, a socially conservative and radically Eurosceptic political party in Poland, along with the uncontrolled influx of immigrants, pointed at excessive bureaucracy, a complex fiscal system and excessive legislation as the challenges facing the EU ("Email survey with Iwaszkiewicz"). The commonality among these right-wing respondents pointing at the security issues is evidence of these parties Euroscepticism and the lack of faith in the European community being able to provide security for all member states.

On the other hand of Eurosceptics, the representatives of Civic Platform, Polish People’s Party and the Union of European Democrats, acknowledge the need to fight populism and radicalism, and to strengthen the internal collaboration of the EU. Paweł Suski, a member of Sejm from Civic Platform, argues that the priority at the moment is “taking care of the unity of the EU, persuading the population that the fashion for populism is childish and shortsighted, and that populism encourages nationalist movements and calls the demons of the past” ("Email survey with Suski"). The biggest challenge, meanwhile, is “to prevent the disintegration of the EU and internal isolationism, further weakening the imperialist tendencies of Putin” (Ibid.).
The two different approaches to the European Union can be seen in Zagórski’s answer to the question on the current priorities of the EU, as he distinguishes between the followers of the creation of the so-called "the European Union of the United States," and a more sceptical camp for which he belongs, which aims to maintain a strong association of the countries in the European Union, but at the same time preserve cultural and religious identity of nation states ("Email survey with Zagórski").

To further understand where Zagórski’s answer comes from and Law and Justice’s agenda, it is crucial to mention Chirot and McCauley’s argument that, “virtually no nation or ethnic group is ‘pure.’ Migration, acculturation, conquest, and secession together guarantee that membership in such groups is not fixed but fluctuates over time” (82). Eurosceptic parties and therefore respondents of my survey would not support the above argument of fluctuating membership. They believe that national solidarity is stronger than European solidarity and such is reflected in their stance in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants. On the other hand, pro-EU political parties currently see populism as one of the biggest threats to the European integration and instead are on the liberal, open, and cosmopolitan side of the debate. In the next section, I will further analyse both sides’ understanding of the notion of solidarity.

Solidarity

When defining European solidarity, my respondents, regardless the political party, point at cooperation and thoughtful helping. Marcin Święcicki of the Civic Platform directly linked the concept of European solidarity to the refugee crisis, as he mentioned that the European solidarity should refer to “including assistance to countries to which
significant amounts of refugees are coming” ("Email survey with Święcicki").

Święcicki’s answer on solidarity is related to his answer on Polish readiness to accept Syrian refugees, as he said that “the Church, some parishes, Caritas, some cities, non-governmental organizations, individuals and even government refugee centers would be ready, but the government does not agree” (Ibid.) Święcicki is criticizing PiS for refusing to accept refugees. He is a member of Civic Platform that agreed to the assigned by the EU refugee quota, but partially as a result of that decision lost the 2015 Parliamentary elections.

Similarly, Protasiewicz, from the Union of European Democrats defines solidarity in the context of the refugee crisis, as he says that “if refugees are coming to rich countries, the rest must help them, either by taking some refugees, or by paying rich countries of the EU to maintain the refugees” ("Email survey with Protasiewicz"). He also points at the fact that “the reconstruction of countries of Eastern Europe after communism would not have been possible without money from the EU” (Ibid.). Protasiewicz also states that Poland is not ready mentally, but is ready financially and organizationally. Protasiewicz’s answer on Solidarity is hopeful evidence that not all Polish politicians forgot that Poland received help multiple times in the past and should return that help, now that it is a prosperous, democratic country.

Jarosław Kalinowski from Polish People’s Party defined European Solidarity as a “mutual assistance and trust; working together for the good of EU citizens; respect for the fundamental values on which the Union was built” ("Email survey with Kalinowski"). Kalinowski also said that Poland is ready for Syrian refugees, as “either we are members of the EU and the promoters of solidarity or not. You can not partially participate in the
Community” (Ibid.). Similar view on Solidarity shares Paweł Suski: “Today, European solidarity takes on a different value. Once developed countries of the EU have adopted the principle of balancing regions, so that we are still the largest recipient of aid. Now the biggest challenge is to preserve the unity, ensure the safety and cope with the economic crisis” ” ("Email survey with Suski"). He reminds us how “refugees are a scare on the electorate, the terrorist threat wins the elections. Developing a belief that every Arab is a terrorist was enough to make most Poles deny the opportunity to accept any refugees” (Ibid.).

On the other hand, Jarosław Sellin from Law and Justice claims that “Europe must remember that Poland helps more than a million Ukrainians in its territory and does not demand their relocation to other countries under a false sense of solidarity” ” ("Email survey with Sellin"). Similarly, Iwaszkiewicz from the Congress of the New Right says that European solidarity is a myth. Zagórski from PiS claims that European solidarity has been popularized as an idyll, and further that “countries have their own interests and insisting that they are failing or they abandoned their implementation in the name of integration is just an illusion and it should be denied. There is of course nothing wrong in the implementation of national interests and solidarity should rely on the fact that their realization takes into account (which is possible) the interests of Member States, or at least that it won’t hurt their own vested interest” ("Email survey with Zagórski"). PiS has been vocal about reminding the EU that national interests are more important than interests of the EU, and has used that rhetoric to justify their refusal of the refugee quota.

My respondents perfectly reflect the two sides of the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants and value solidarity accordingly. Law and Justice government
needs to decide whether they will show solidarity to more than just Poles, as a representative of one of the six founding states of the EU said: “They will have to make a choice: are they in the European system or not? You cannot blackmail the EU, unity has a price” (Waterfield). Respondents from both PiS and Congress of the New Right treat European Solidarity as a myth. While respondents from centre and centre-left political parties understand that a membership in a European Union comes not only with benefits, but also with responsibilities. Having looked closely at various political elites, I will analyze the Church’s response to these issues, as the Catholic Church is widely present in the everyday life of Poles.

Church

Law and Justice Party has been treating the Catholic Church as a political tool which is supposed to mobilize the faithful-voters. At the same time, the Catholic Church receives unofficial financial benefits from PiS for renovating churches, building museums of religious thought and education projects (Makowski). Looking at such a close relationship between the Church and PiS, one would assume that the Church would take a similar stance on the topic of refugees. Instead, the Catholic Church acts in solidarity with refugees.

Solidarity

The value of solidarity exercised by the Church is historically deeply enrooted. The Polish Primate Archbishop Wojciech Polak spoke up on the topic of refugees and in an interview with the Catholic News Agency said that "we are called to recognize the face of Christ in the refugees, because he was once a stranger, and we welcomed him"
The Church in Poland since 2011 when the civil war broke out in Syria has continually been providing assistance to refugees from the Middle East. This is done mainly through Caritas Poland, Aid to the Church in Need, and local parishes (“Raport: Jak Kościół w Polsce Pomaga Uchodźcom?”).

Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz said that "in Poland we have many refugees, including 1.1 million people who fled the war-torn eastern Ukraine. They have been well received. There are also with us refugees from Syria who live in the diocese of Koszalin. Of course, there are not as many as in Germany, but the Polish Church is very open to immigrants” (“Polski Kościół otwarty na przyjmowanie uchodźców. Rząd twardo przeciw multi-kulti”). When the Cardinal referred to the refugees from Ukraine, he echoed the Prime Minister Szydło’s speech from the debate on the state of Polish democracy in the European Parliament when she claimed that in Poland there are over 1 million Ukrainian refugees. This statement has been verified by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Poland, who said that the refugees that Prime Minister Szydło spoke about are not actually refugees, they are “people who came and reside here legally, work, study, pay taxes and contribute to some extent to the development of the Polish economy. They are not refugees, they did not get that status and therefore do not receive any social assistance” (Ibid.). Such a statement from Prime Minister Szydło proves unfortunately that Poland has not actually been receiving many refugees, not even from Ukraine, as the Polish government claims. That does not, however, contradict the openness and words of solidarity coming from the Polish Catholic Church.

Additionally acting in solidarity, Caritas runs six Centers for Assistance to Migrants and Refugees, which annually provides assistance to approximately 2.7
thousand of refugees. Migrants and refugees receive their social and psychological support, subsidies for rental housing, assistance in the purchase of medicines for the chronically ill, educational support - subsidies to kindergartens and school textbooks. Centres also offer help with formalities related to legalization and career counseling (“Raport: jak Kościół w Polsce pomaga uchodźcom?”).

Polish Church also promotes European Solidarity though their response to the Brexit vote. Archbishop Gądecki said that “we respect the British decision, but we can not forget that unity is better than divisions, and European solidarity is the product of many generations” (“Abp Gądecki o Brexicie: ‘Ufamy, Że Jedność Narodów Europejskich Budowana Na Chrystusie Zwycięży’”). Furthermore, he argued that it is responsibility of Christians to build unity between people and nations, and that “we are convinced that this unity of Christ is the true source of hope for Europe and the world” (Ibid.). Such language is a positive alternative to Church’s regular ally – Law and Justice Party.

After analyzing Church’s response to both Brexit and the refugee crisis, I argue that despite the dominant Catholicism in Poland and a close symbiosis of the Polish Church with the ruling party, the Polish Church defines solidarity from deeply enrooted origins of Christianity. Through such definition, they are able to act in solidarity with both refugees, fellow Polish compatriots that emigrated, and the European community. On the other side of the positive response from local parishes and associations, there are religious and state-controlled media outlets promoting xenophobia and intolerance - another set of actors in this analysis.
Media

Media, by its choice of words or imagery, becomes the tool of creating discourse, and hence - the collective consciousness. Such is the case with state-controlled media’s construction of refugees in Poland, and creating an impact on the reception of refugees. As is often the case in the collective imagination, the way refugees are portrayed in the media can tell us a lot about the society in which the image is constructed, the ideas and values of the society. Law and Justice adopted media as a tool to control over state public radio and television, as according to a draft bill, the national media are supposed to “preserve national traditions, patriotic and human values,” to “counteract misrepresentations of Polish history,” as well as portray “family values” and “respect the Christian value system” (Cienski). Such nationalistic approach to media reflects PiS’s values, and further impacts media’s definition of solidarity in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants.

Islamophobia and Xenophobia

Religious media outlets such as Radio Maryja have become another voice promoting xenophobia and intolerance. Radio Maryja is a religious radio station with the largest coverage in Poland since 1991. Radio Maryja “became the quasi-official ideology of the Polish government, to many observers dismay and disbelief” (Pankowski 2). The Radio functions as an entity belonging to the Roman Catholic Church, but it has been criticized by the Vatican, local clergy and some Polish politicians (including Lech Wałęsa) for having its ideology based on stereotypes (“Poland: The controversy involving Radio Maryja”), and uses the frustration of people injured as a result of
political changes. Such a xenophobic role of the Radio, despite the mentioned above Church’s open position in solidarity with incoming refugees, shows some conflicting views despite being an entity of the Church. The Radio is the main voice promoting the ethno nationalist agenda of PiS. An example can be seen within the 24th Pilgrimage of the Radio Maryja Family to Jasna Gora, where Mr. Kaczynski addressed thousands of the faithful and Law and Justice politicians, stating that there is “no Poland without Church and knowing that everyone, even if they had no faith, they must accept it” (Baliszewski). All these messages of media and political elites are targeted at the voters, at the public. Radio Maryja provides another platform for PiS to express their agenda of solidarity only to fellow Christians and ethnic Poles.

The Radio Maryja’s 25th birthday celebration also included President Andrzej Duda’s speech, which reflects the fear of an alien population, deeply enrooted in Polish history. Duda emphasized that he wants to rebuild the community of Poles, and thanked Radio Maryja for being a manifestation of the modern, yet firmly embedded in tradition, faith and culture of the Polish approach to the social reality and “becoming a living example of civic mobilization of thousands of people around the idea of doing good and concern for public affairs” (“Andrzej Duda w Toruniu na 25-leciu Radia Maryja”). The combined efforts of the government, and Radio Maryja can be classified as fear of pollution, according to Chirot and McCauley. Chirot and McCauley in their book Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder examine the motives and offer possible psychological explanations that lie behind people committing genocide. One of the psychological explanations that they offer is fear of pollution that “is most acute when there is a sense that failure to ritually cleanse the social and natural
order will result in catastrophe or when terrible events have occurred and societies search for explanations, which they then find in their past failure to observe ritual purity” (39). Law and Justice has tried to steer the national debate and coverage of the issue in public media against people coming from the Middle East.

Another example of media creating a negative image of refugees is from a Polish magazine “W Sieci”. The edition from the 2nd of February 2016 showed a controversial image of a white woman dressed in a European Union flag being assaulted by three pairs of darker-skinned male hands, who wear both watches and chains on their wrists, with the headline: “The Islamic rape of Europe” ("W Sieci": Islamski gwalt na Europie). While the watches might signify the assumption that refugees seek a better economic situation rather than actual safety, the chains are a symbol of criminals and the animalistic perception of refugees; “the image of Syrian refugees has become both the object for hatred and a media for the surfacing of righteousness in the Western world” (Grišinas 75). Such a portrayal represents prejudice, according to Gaylin, defined as “an adverse judgment or opinion formed beforehand or without knowledge or examination” (23). Nowadays, prejudice is “more often used when the negative attributes ascribed to a person by virtue of his or her being a member of a disdained or despised group are highlighted” (23).

Having analysed the cover of “W Sieci”, I will address the headline that further investigated a series of alleged sexual assaults on hundreds of women in Cologne, Germany, on New Year’s Eve committed by refugees from North Africa. About 130 women filed reports with the police after the attacks, which took place on a large scale in Cologne, Hamburg and Stuttgart. The attackers surrounded the women, and molested,
insulted, and robbed them. Witnesses said that the attackers were young men "of Arab appearance". Immediately after the article’s publication, “W Sieci” was accused of being racist and islamophobic, and shamed for publicizing such an image of men of color. The magazine is an openly conservative media source and has supported Poland's PiS party that won a majority of seats in the Parliament in October’s general election, campaigning mainly on an anti-refugee platform, and that has urged tighter border restrictions. Philip Zimbardo, widely known for Stanford Prison Experiment, in his book *The Lucifer Effect* describes how good people might end up doing bad things. Zimbardo would classify the headline and the article in W Sieci as something that could shape the “meaning that people assign to various components of the situation that creates its social reality. Social reality is more than a situation’s physical features. It is the way actors view their situation, their current behavioral stage, which engages a variety of psychological processes” (221). Since Poles were not directly affected by the attacks during New Year’s Eve in Cologne, they may have assigned a meaning to this situation as something that could possibly happen in their own country. Furthermore, “W Sieci” created that situation into a bigger fear among the Polish population and fueled more Eurosceptic voices through using the imagery of the European Union flag.

Overall, the state-controlled media act with solidarity with PiS, meaning they represent their xenophobic and nationalist values against refugees. In order to look at a broader picture of how Poles perceive social inclusion and exclusion of migrants, I will look at the public opinion in Poland in the following section.
Public opinion

Two of the six questions addressed in my survey to politicians from the European Parliament and the Sejm asked whether the respondent’s view was similar to the public opinion. When responding to whether the politician’s view on the readiness of Poland to welcome Syrian refugees was similar to the public opinion, respondents mostly skipped the question. Only two respondents referred to the public opinion. The respondents might have skipped the question in order to maintain their support from the public and not speak out on the public opinion’s through politician’ answers. The only respondent to the question on public opinion was Jarosław Sellin from PiS who brought up research published by Chatham House on the opinion of the European nations on the reluctance toward mass migration from Islamic countries and claimed that his views reflect the views of the majority of Europeans, especially Poles ("Email survey with Sellin."). As a representative of PiS he continued a theme of anti-refugee outspokenness in his answer. On the other hand, Paweł Suski from Civic Platform, reinforced the dangers of the current policy conducted by PiS that come with the growing nationalist moods ("Email survey with Suski")

Regarding the question of whether the respondent’s opinion was similar to the one of public opinion, the politicians that claim that Poland is not ready to accept refugees think that the rest of the Polish population agrees. On the other hand, the politicians that would like for Poland to be ready to welcome refugees know that the rest of the country disagrees, looking at how PiS won the 2015 Parliamentary elections largely thanks to the anti-refugee campaign. As referenced in the previous chapter, only 6% of the Polish population believe that immigration should not be restricted at all.
According to stereotypical belief, PiS voters are elderly people and supporters of Civic Platform Party are young, educated and from the big city. The results of the post-election study by IPSOS\textsuperscript{16} for the European Parliament and local government show that the youngest group, of 18-25 years old, chose PiS, not PO. The youth blamed the ruling party for the bad situation in the labor market (Maliszewski). PO is a more popular option among the middle-age voters that like stability and security. PO in its political agenda relies on a sense of security, hence the PO success in elections during crises - economic (2011), or the war in Ukraine (2014). However, using this tactic for a long time can be dangerous, as over the years there is a growing need for reform and the party may suffer defeat in the elections, which PO did in 2015 (Ibid.). PiS is not only the first choice among the youngest voters, but also the oldest (60+). This is the electorate to whom the symbolic, patriotic politics of PiS appeals the most. Furthermore, they are sensitive to social promises and frequently vote in elections (Ibid.).

Regarding the education level and the choice of a party, the electorate has been consistent for the past few years. The lower the education level, the higher percentage of voters for PiS, while PO voters are more educated. It must be remembered that in 2013 36\% of respondents of a 2013 BKL\textsuperscript{17} study had secondary education, 29\% vocational and 19\% higher education. People with higher education are also more likely to vote than those of the secondary and vocational. It is common that PO is a metropolitan party, it prevails in major urban centers, but also is a leader among voters in small towns.

\textsuperscript{16} IPSOS is an international research group present in 84 countries around the world, specializing in marketing research, advertising, media, satisfaction and loyalty of consumers and opinion surveys.
\textsuperscript{17} BKL stands for the new Human Capital in Poland and it includes cross-sectional studies monitoring labour market.
Even though PiS is a leader in the countryside, the recent election results point at the increase for PiS in the cities.

Poles, despite choosing a Eurosceptic party of Law and Justice, still overwhelmingly back EU membership, but want a “greater degree of control over its development and direction” (Swidlicki). Since the fall of communism after gaining back their freedom, Poles feel very protective over not only their borders, but also over their values that are not dictated by the elites as they were in the eighteenth century, as before the Polish partitions the Polish gentry was the one that dictated the meaning of nationalism, described in Chapter 2. Similarly, the Brexit referendum in June 2016 that resulted with 51.89% votes in favor of leaving the EU was an anti-establishment vote. A Polish well-known film director, Agnieszka Holland, recognised the similarities between Law and Justice supporters and Brexit supporters: “They’re mainly white men who feel deprived of their power, their possessions, who’ve been the gods of the universe and now they’re not” (Connolly). Moreover, she claims that the Polish Right was very happy with Brexit vote results and compared it to “turkeys voting for Thanksgiving, because the Poles will be the first victims of Brexit,” as already one Polish man has been killed in Britain and several had been beaten (Ibid.).

Summarizing the public opinion and its position in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants, I argue that the more educated voters of the Civic Platform Party are more aware of the values of multinationalism, while PiS’s voters are more focused on exercising their solidarity with their collective identity and treat homogeneity in Poland as a “social glue.” In the last section, I will analyse the local level movements in order to represent a smaller scale approach to the topic of migration.
Local level movements

This last group of actors includes smaller scale movements, both pro-refugees and anti-refugees. I will analyse two types of demonstrations and an example of a solidarity city in the below section in order to further delve into how various groups value solidarity and how historically enrooted it is for them.

Far-right nationalist movements

Since Law and Justice came to power, Polish pseudo-football fans or “ultras” calmed down in their protests and openly xenophobic manifestations. Before the 2015 elections, during the past few celebrations of Polish Independence Day, tens of thousands of “ultras” and other nationalist groups would participate in a nationalist march that used to turn violent. An example of such a violent incident occurred on Independence Day in 2011, when nationalists “threw stones, trash bins, and flares at the police, and hurled various objects at the Russian Embassy while chanting offensive slogans” (Pankowski and Kormak 163). During the march they also were chanting slogans such as “Whole Poland, all white”; “Roman Dmowski, liberator of Poland”; “Tomorrow belongs to us – the nationalists”; and “Down with Brussels” (Ibid.). The slogans with Roman Dmowski on them are evidence that Poles value their history and address it, especially in uncertain times, such as the sudden influx of Syrian refugees. Pseudo-football fans would march in packs, wear their respective football clubs colors, but would let their football rivalry aside and instead they would unite and present themselves as “the front line of Poland's defence against invaders (read: refugees and Islam)” (Bish). Events such as the 2011

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18 Pseudo-fans consider themselves representatives of clubs (especially cities’ clubs), but what differs them from regular fans is their “attachment to clubs’ colours and symbols is often on the verge of nationalism and fanaticism similar to religious fundamentalism” (Sahaj 64).
March of Independence on the 11th of November remind us that the appeal to patriotism, national identity, and nationalism gathers a large crowd of young followers.

The March of Independence in 2012 resulted in 22 police officers getting injured and 176 people being detained. This time the chants included slogans, such as “Poland for Polish People, foreigners out!”; “Poland for the Polish, not for lefties” (Pankowski and Kormak 165). One of the consequences of these Marches of Independence and the rise of popularity of nationalist movements was a creation of a political party in 2012 - the National Movement (Polish: Ruch Narodowy), abbreviated to RN. The party values Christianity, family, patriotic education, and considers a nation as a proud and strong community. They understand sovereignty as a basic instrument for achieving national interests, and elites’ opinions should be independent from foreign influences. The National Movement further believes that the Polish nation has to be the only nation in Poland. Their official declaration ends with the following sentence: "That is why we will fight for Poland for the Poles - a proud, strong, prosperous and safe country". Such ideology is supported by almost 160,000 users on Facebook (Mazurkiewicz 234).

According to Rafał Pankowski, Polish sociologist and political scientist, nationalism in Poland provides a crucial cultural base for extremist right movements and “the diversity of traditions explains the variety of ideological repertoire available to nationalist political movement.” (10) Pawel Robert Kowal, a leader of a right-wing political party Poland Together, said that scapegoating of minorities by politicians had empowered hooligans. A week before the EU was to vote on their quota plan vote, thousands of Poles marched in cities across the country chanting “Today refugees, tomorrow terrorists!” and “Poland, free of Islam!” (Bachman).
The far-right nationalist movements are on the extreme side of the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants, as they prioritize only white, Catholic Poles and do not even consider including any other group in Poland.

*United Against Racism*

On the other side of the far-right nationalist movements, there are small grassroots coalitions originating to show their support and solidarity towards refugees. The coalition United Against Racism, which includes non-governmental organizations, religious and political groups, mainly from the left-wing, organized anti-racist demonstrations in multiple cities in Poland in connection with International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination established by the United Nations. Their message is to “show that not all people in Poland agree to promote intolerance based on race, national origin, orientation, or any otherness. We have a problem with racism in Poland, not only from ordinary citizens, but also with authorities that condone it” (Pięta). In Warsaw demonstrators carried banners with slogans, such as: "White Poland only in winter", "My homeland is the society", "Refugees welcome," and chanted: "Racism exiled, refugees are welcome," "We are all brothers and sisters" and "We want refugees, not nationalists" ("Chcemy uchodźców, nie narodowców. Protesty przeciw rasizmowi"). While the pro-refugee demonstrations gather only 50 or 100 people depending on a city the far-right nationalist movements’ protests involve thousands of supporters.

The difference in the numbers of gatherers at the pro-refugee demonstrations versus the protestors of March of Independence and other racist demonstrations point at the enrooted homogeneity and the lack of willingness to accept other cultures and
religions in Poland. However, the city of Gdańsk is another positive example of various
groups working together in order to make Gdańsk a friendly city to potential refugees.

**Gdańsk - solidarity city**

As a response to Law and Justice’s decision not to accept Syrian children in
Poland, the cities of Sopot and Gdańsk instead said they will join the action of a
temporary adoption of children from Syria who require treatment and rehabilitation.
Mayor of Gdańsk Paweł Adamowicz emphasized that “it is our moral and humanitarian
obligation” (Pietrzak), and that "we are also Catholics, and Jesus was the most famous
refugee. And now, for some bloody reason, we refuse to show solidarity" (Eriksson).
Unfortunately, not all politicians feel this way, as the leader of the Law and Justice in the
City Council of Gdansk considered this decision as an attempt to influence government
policy on migration (Ibid.). Furthermore, Gdańsk also experienced some anti-refugee
sentiments from its pseudo-football fans, who at a football match displayed banners with
a black man kneeling in front of a robed Ku Klux Klan character and another one
showing a picture of Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess (Smith).

Adamowicz aware of negative sentiments towards refugees and people’s fear of
terrorists says: “the terrorists are far more interested in the big European capitals than in
little Gdańsk” (Ibid.). Adamowicz’s goal is to make Gdańsk a refugee-friendly city and
create an integration model for the whole city. He has been doing so through engaging
various groups in the city, such as his biggest ally the Migrants’ Support Centre, as well
as the local Muslim League, the police and several private landlords. Adamowicz is
aware that his pro-immigration moves may cost him his job, and instead focuses on
defending positive European values. Another argument that the Mayor of Gdańsk relates
to Gdańsk’s past of Solidarity: “Gdańsk is used to upheaval and handles it well. Protest movements were born here in 1968, 1970 and 1976. In the spirit of freedom and liberty, Solidarity was born here in the 1980s because a group of special people – workers and intellectuals – met and trusted one another. We have a problem with trust today” (Ibid.). A city councillor sympathising with the left-wing party Razem supports Adamowicz: "We need to debunk this myth that we are too poor to help refugees, but we can only do that if the city fights against social exclusion of all citizens" (Eriksson).

The city of Gdańsk perception of solidarity is enrooted in the history of the origins of the Solidarity movement in Gdańsk itself. The example of this city is an accurate representation of how solidarity starts at home, as Adamowicz is starting integration policies in his city, instead of promoting nation-wide practices before having a concrete plan. Such a movement of welcoming possible refugees is a sign of hope that Poles’ anxieties about the clashes of civilizations might be overcome.

Conclusion

Having looked at the main actors that spoke up in the Polish debate on social inclusion, I argue that the more present side in the debate is the illiberal and ethno-nationalist side, because of the strong presence of the government and the way they utilized other actors as their tools. Among the political elites, the approach to the refugees is very hostile if you are from a right-wing political party, while centre and left parties are very open to social inclusion of new incomers. Similarly, the local level movements’ views of solidarity correspond to the views of the respective parties. The far-right political movements reduced a number of their violent manifestations since Law and Justice came to power. On the other hand, there have been initiatives organized by a
coalition United Against Racism showing that there are Poles who condemn racism promoted by the party in charge. Unfortunately, the authorities have been using certain media sources as a tool to propagate their ethno-nationalist agenda, including Radio Maryja station, owned by priests, who further act as a xenophobic voice. However, the Catholic Church has been acting in solidarity with refugees voices, gathering money to help refugees and coming up with various aid programs. The Catholic Church’s role in the debate proves how deeply historically enrooted their argument is, as it goes back to the origins of Christianity. All of the mentioned actors go back to various moments in Polish history, as it fits their agenda, in order to reinforce their notion on whom one should owe solidarity to.
Conclusion

The Polish Law and Justice party set the goal of “making Poland great again” through their ethno-nationalist agenda and hostility to refugees. Even though it would be easy to blame Poland for being xenophobic and intolerant, it is important to keep in mind the history of partitions and lost independence for 123 years. The history of oppression has led Poland to be protective of its homogenous nation and its borders. Law and Justice used that history in their political campaign based on Euroscepticism, conservatism of the Church and the belief in the sanctity of the family. Law and Justice however is not the only skeptical voice in the debate on Polish perception on social inclusion and exclusion. Their constituents, state-controlled media, and ultra-nationalism movements also share PiS’s views. Throughout this honors thesis, I referred to psychological literature, history of Poland and current events to explain Polish positions regarding the standards for legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants. Some of the most applicable theories from psychological literature regarded group narcissism and group identification, as Law and Justice puts a big emphasis on the Poles as one unit and the need to protect that unity through demonizing an alien population, in this case in-coming refugees. Another prevalent theory in this analysis was examining the bigotry of the leader of the Law and Justice party and how his position influenced the agenda and the support of the voters. Moreover, prejudice was visible in state-controlled media’s creation of the negative image of refugees in the past few years to promote the government’s position on the issue.

Even though there is an overall negative attitude towards refugees, the Catholic Church and the city of Gdansk have been acting as a voice of solidarity with refugees,
gathering money to help refugees and coming up with various aid programs. Along with some of the centre- and left-wing political parties supporting the EU quota system on distribution refugees, they believe in the European project and European solidarity.

Poland, as a nation is culturally rooted in ethnicity and religion, as described by Smith: “some collective religious sentiments can reinforce a sense of national identity, as we witness today in Ireland, Poland and Israel” (Myths and Memories of the Nation 229).

Throughout this thesis however we have seen different approaches to nationalism and how deeply in history it is rooted. While Law and Justice in their fear of an alien population relates back to the time of partitions, other actors, such as the Catholic Church and more centre-oriented political parties look more ahead towards the European Union.

I argue that the seeming contradiction in the Polish positions regarding the standards for legitimate inclusion and exclusion of migrants can be explained through these actors’ different usage of the value of solidarity because of the collective identities that they prioritize. There are two prevalent sides in the debate: one side is liberal, open, and cosmopolitan, the other is illiberal and ethno-nationalist. Pro-EU political parties, their electorate, local demonstrations against xenophobia and the Church represented the liberal side in the debate. Their approach to solidarity can be linked to historical roots of Piłsudski’s approach to Polish nationalism, to multicultural Poland, open to religions while at the same time respecting the historically grounded Christianity in Poles. Their position overall seems to be driven by a belief in solidarity to both the European community and incoming refugees and their rejection of xenophobic and nationalist voices. On the other hand, PiS, other right-wing parties, state-controlled media and far-right local nationalist movements represent a deeply historically enrooted argument of the
need to maintain homogenous Poland due to its vulnerable past of border instability, the threat of losing Polish language and Polish identity and reflect the continuation of Dmowski’s ideology of the need to remain exclusively homogenous. This side of the debate further represents the failure of the EU’s attempt to create solidarity and feeling of unity among all member states, since they would argue “the EU has not succeeded in developing a collective European identity that is in any way an alternative to national identity and the best that it can achieve is a nested identity that is compatible with national identity and in many cases is derivative of national identity” (Delanty 688).

The question of the European identity, solidarity and in general the question of the future of the European Union is currently at stake, not only in Poland. The Poles can point at their history when employing a nationalist and xenophobic argument; however, there are states in the European Union that don't have the same history but are responding quite similarly. For the purposes of this thesis I only focused on the Polish case. However if I was to hypothesize why other countries are excluding or want to exclude refugees from their states, there are multiple reasons: economics (unemployment level in the country, the recent implementation of the Euro currency or dealing with the consequences of the Eurocris), xenophobic (other countries for example in Central and Eastern Europe are equally homogenous to Poland), Euroscepticism (other countries have also expressed the dissatisfaction with a further integration of the European Union). Therefore, this thesis makes a unique contribution to literature on nationalist and European identity, as it looks at the perception of both in-migration and out-migration. Especially within the borderless EU the notion of the freedom of movement has been take for granted and has not been analysed in terms of how fellow countrymen might have
perceived the émigrés’ decision to leave their own country. While at the same time the same notion of borderless Europe caused the issues of security and made certain countries feel more insecure about their borders and might have influenced their protectiveness from refugees.

Poland, as one of the newer European Union members, has been particularly protective of remaining a racially homogeneous, Catholic nation. As a result, the incoming refugees have been portrayed as the “Other” from which Polish society needs to be saved. Poles, however, also started to be portrayed as the “Other” in the British society during the Brexit campaign. Poles are finding it hard to be excluded from a British society, they feel hurt by that vote. They feel entitled to be a part of a country of the European community. Such might be the distinction between the perception of Poles being excluded from one society, but at the same excluding refugees from their own society. Furthermore, “the onset of Brexit could hardly have come at a worse time for the country [Poland]. Its nationalist government is increasingly isolated in Brussels after trying to oust EU President Donald Tusk, a former Polish premier. At the same time, the country relies on EU investments to prevent the economy from slowing“ (Moskwa et al.). The Brexit vote affected the Polish debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants, as it pushes them to see hypocrisy behind their own rhetoric of excluding refugees, while at the same time being excluded from another society.

Ethnically driven Poles argue that Europe traditionally is a Christian continent and such should remain, and majority of the incoming refugees come from Muslim countries. Another explanation to Polish perception on social exclusion and inclusion might be reflected in an idea that diaspora is a form of exclusion as well. Some actors
present in the debate are excluding both refugees and Polish emigrants that left for the
UK from the Polish society. They believe that it is justified for a British government to
exclude EU citizens, including Poles, from their society since that’s their right. Similarly,
it was the Polish emigrants choice to leave Poland and look for a better future outside of
their motherland. The Polish accession to the European Union opened the doors to more
opportunities and more responsibilities.

Poles should acknowledge the fact that they were once immigrants and other
countries welcomed them as refugees. A reminder of such rhetoric could be seen in a
mural created by a Polish street artist Yola Kudela that featured Harlow (a town where a
40 year old Polish man was murdered by a 15 year old English boy, a case being
investigated as a hate crime) citizens. One version of the mural features words "we are all
in the same boat" (“Polish artist's murals encourage community cohesion in Harlow”).
The Polish government however has been consistently saying “no” to refugees, and
Poland is ceasing to be associated with the slogan "solidarity," after many years of that
notion being at the base of the image of Poland. Unfortunately, the attitude of the
political elites has been influencing the behavior of the public opinion, but also the
Ombudsman Office and the Board Guard officers. The visit to the transition station in
Terespol of the representatives of the Ombudsman Office showed that the Border Guard
officers do not allow mostly newcomers from the East to request protection in Poland.
Not only is it immoral behavior, but it's actually questioning the meaning of the whole
philosophy of protecting the rights of refugees enshrined in the Geneva Convention and
ratified by Poland in 1991 (Żyła).
Perhaps Poland forgot about what it means to be a member of the European Union community or the current government consciously made a decision to only receive benefits and ignore the responsibilities. The Eurosceptic argument reflects the idea that the EU is to blame for both Brexit and the refugee crisis. The push for European integration led to the rise of nationalism and populism among some members, including Poland and the UK.

Despite the skeptical voices of the European integration, I believe that the implications of this positioning reflect in the need for a EU common migration policy. Migration policy in accordance with the content of this idea is two-way: it includes emigration from the territory and immigration, that is the influx of people within its borders. Political elites however only notice the first aspect, while the other remains unnoticed. The existence and shaping of a common immigration policy is one of the most important issues currently discussed in the context of the future of the European Union. The current debate addresses the questions of how to lead the EU's foreign policy and how to ensure interior security of the citizens of the EU. Working out a common migration policy for the EU does not have formal obstacles; instead the barrier is rooted in centuries of the sense of state sovereignty and national interests.

The question that remains from this thesis is whether Poland is able to remind itself of the history of red bold letters on the white background - the Solidarity movement logo. The country that first tackled communism in the Central-Eastern European region, the country that dreamt of going back to Europe and has been the successful story of the post-communist state playing a big role in the European Union community. The country that turned its back on the EU community and refused to accept Syrian refugees in
Poland, that used xenophobic and nationalist arguments, pointing at the differences in religion and culture of the incoming refugees. If Poland wants to blame the UK for excluding Polish migrants, they need to understand that solidarity starts at home.

Ultimately, the scope of this research has been limited only to surveying Polish politicians, but through analyzing various media sources and literature it analysed various other actors present in the debate. However, in the future to extend this project, I would like to survey a representative, or rather representatives of each of the actor mentioned in the thesis. Furthermore, it is important to monitor how the support of the public opinion for a political party changes varying on the particular time, whether the issues of refugee crisis, or the rights of Polish migrants in the UK are being mentioned. Since the topic is so recent, news articles appear every day discussing these issues. More recently, since Theresa May triggered Article 50 on March 29, 2017 the negotiations between the UK and other EU member states are about to start. While the EU needs to stay united and strong in these negotiations, each member state has individual interests that they prioritized in the negotiations. For Poland, “two main Brexit concerns are people and money — in that order” (“What the EU27 wants from Brexit”). The Polish government knows that the UK was one of the larger donors, and is worried that the EU budget will be much smaller post-Brexit. The main priority however is the situation and the future rights of the Polish migrants in the UK. As the post-Brexit Europe is unfolding, the media and the governments have forgotten about the war in Syria and the incoming refugees. Especially, looking at Poland, the focus of Poles lies on their compatriots that emigrated to the UK, not the possible incomers to their country.
This thesis pointed to the barriers of a feasibility of a supranational European identity. However, the actors in the debate on social inclusion and exclusion of migrants that believe in owing solidarity to both Poland, but also a larger EU community, are the hopeful signs of a shifting identity that includes both a national and a European identity. This year the weekend after Poland's Constitution Day, there will be many festivals in various locations across the UK celebrating Polish immigrants, as Polish Ambassador to the UK said: "I hope this event will encourage Polish and British people to celebrate together because we should know each other better and the best way of integration is to know more about our neighbours," ("Poland to celebrate UK cultural ties as Brexit looms"). Understanding of positive values of a multinational, multicultural community is crucial for the Poles, as Brussels officials are asking Poland to show solidarity to incoming refugees and accept the EU refugee quota: “This is solidarity in action and a demonstration of responsibility. Now is the time for our Member States to deliver on their commitments and to intensify their efforts” ("Hungary & Poland must take in refugees or face Brussels' action – EU Commission"). The question that remains is whether Poland will decide to show solidarity to its fellow EU member states, and open up its notion of solidarity to other collective identities, including incoming refugees from the Middle East. The hope lies in Polish emigrant communities showing the value in immigration and therefore encouraging fellow countrymen to be more open-minded and to embrace the fact that solidarity does start at home.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Survey questions

The survey has been sent originally in Polish to all members of the European parliament and all members of the Sejm.

Survey questions:

Q1: What according to you are the priorities for the European Union at the moment?
What are the main challenges facing the European Union?

Q2: Knowing the outcome of the vote on the exit of Great Britain from the European Union, what role according to you did the use of anti-Polish immigrant rhetoric play in the Leave campaign? Do you think it was justified?

Q3: Do you think your view is similar to the public opinion?

Q4: Do you think that Poland is ready to welcome Syrian refugees?

Q5: Do you think your view is similar to the public opinion?

Q6: In light of how you answered previous questions, how would you define European solidarity? What values define solidarity?
## Appendix 2: The Left-Right Political Spectrum of Polish Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Left-Right Political Spectrum</th>
<th>Logo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>Centre-right to Right-wing</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="PiS Logo" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress of the New Right (KNP)</td>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Nowa Prawica Logo" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish People’s Party (PSL)</td>
<td>Centre-right</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="PSL Logo" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Centre</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kukiz’15</td>
<td>Right-wing</td>
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<td>Modern (Nowoczesna)</td>
<td>Centre</td>
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<td>Right-wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Razem</td>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Razem Logo" /></td>
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</table>
Appendix 3: Election poll from 30 March 2017

Source: “Sondaż Wybory: 30 Marca 2017 r. - Badanie Opinii.”
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