5-5-2009

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Competing Visions of a Green World Order: Transatlantic Tensions over Environmental Governance

Momchil Jelev

We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive. Albert Einstein

I think the environment should be put in the category of our national security. Defense of our resources is just as important as defense abroad. Otherwise what is there to defend?

Robert Redford, Yosemite National Park dedication, 1985

I. Introduction

The literature on environmental citizenship has established that fundamental changes in human consciousness and a restructuring of political institutions are necessary for a truly global environmental reform to take place. Not only do political actors need to reformulate the agenda of nation-states and civil society groups but, even more importantly, individuals need to reach a new level of connectivity to their peers around the globe, not just through ideas, but also through genuine solidarity. The literature points to different avenues for achieving this, without a clear argument of where the global leadership on the issue lies, as well as what ought to be done concurrently on the institutional and personal level.

In trying to present a possible answer to this theoretical limitation, I focus on two entities that have been largely responsible for the establishment and growth of the environmental movement and for putting the issue itself on the global agenda. One calls itself a state and the other is anything but a cohesive political entity in the Westphalian tradition. Moreover, because we talk about the environment, an issue that calls for the leadership of developed countries, looking at the two most powerful among them is critical. The United States of America and the European Union (EU) together comprise less than a sixth of the world population. Yet together they account for more than two-thirds of the
global GDP. They also contribute almost half of the current environmental degradation in the world, not even accounting for the historic harm that their rapid industrialization has left to future generations. This is why looking comparatively at the United States and the EU within the context of the environment is the most convenient vantage point for a meaningful discussion of what environmental citizenship means and entails, and what it should be in order to succeed. This will provide valuable lessons not only for America but for the world as a whole, as the ramifications of the issue are undeniably global.

II. Central Premises and Main Argument

Two premises support my main argument. First, I argue that true global citizenship is exercised by those who think beyond the notions of geopolitics and through the lens of biosphere politics. Saving our biosphere is a common problem for all countries and by far transcends immediate geopolitical concerns. This fundamental shift in understanding is critical both for institutions and for citizens. Achieving it represents what Sigmund Freud calls the “third stage of human consciousness,” a connection with nature, rather than an adversarial relationship with it, which is also fostered by a sense of global empathy with peoples in places far away from one’s home and country. In an illustration of the need for a paradigm shift on the individual and institutional levels, I examine the extent to which the United States and Europe have moved towards biosphere politics, the quintessential question for all countries at the present time.

Second, I view environmental citizenship (often construed as a bottom-up phenomenon) as profoundly grounded in and dependent upon leadership (often misconceived merely as a top-down process). It is important to understand that citizenship cannot be divorced from leadership because no social, political, or economic movement of any considerable proportion in the entire history of humanity has been devoid of guiding vision and agency. Citizenship derives its operational power from individuals (or institutions, or states) with ideas and purpose that are able to reach a convergence point between an objective and an existing structural circumstance. Only in this way are they able to drive others (whether with a bottom-up or top-down approach) to push boundaries and take action on issues that go against existing political, economic, or cultural conditions. Thus, I understand leadership as an exemplary model of institutional vision and action that dem-
onstrates civic ambition and dedication, and inspires other peoples and nations. This, in fact, is the fault line along which the U.S. and Europe diverge. Recognizing the validity of these preliminary premises is at the core of this essay’s claims.

My main argument is twofold. First, the European Union has emerged as the global environmental leader in terms of institutional willingness to act and depth of fundamental individual and collective values. America ought to follow and adopt some of the ideas promoted by Brussels because both Washington and environmental activists have failed to articulate and implement a broad vision for our common biosphere. The question, then, becomes how this divergence in environmental policy has emerged, particularly between two political entities so close in history, values, and principles. To answer this question, I look at the historical, institutional, and cultural fault lines that have shaped the European and American worldviews.

Secondly, from a normative perspective, America ought to transition to becoming a “Green state,” not only on the institutional but also on the personal level.3 Citizens should understand how critical a “biosphere mentality” is, and institutions ought to accept the issue as the central existential challenge to our world. In addition, both governments and citizens ought to move beyond the concept of the state as the field of environmental action and nurture a sense of global empathy and compassion, not only for others today, but also for the future generations that will inherit the environmental challenge. Global empathy instead of self-interest, interrelatedness instead of entrenchment, inclusiveness instead of suspicion, and constructive dialogue instead of intractable negation are some of the assets of the European leadership model. When coupled with American creativity, innovation, and personal responsibility, these represent the intersection between vision and action that the environmental movement across the world vitally needs. The EU is ahead in achieving these Green state principles, but often struggles with poor implementation and translation of rhetoric into action.

The essay is divided into three parts. I first examine the paths that have led the U.S. and Europe in different directions on the environmental question. Here, history reveals the various markers of difference. Second, I critically analyze the European and American experiences in environmental leadership, highlighting the institutional and cultural disparities between the two, as well as the roots of Europe’s comparative advantage. At the same time, I also pay attention to the limitations
of the European model. Last, I look into the future and try to offer some normative ideas about ways in which America could become a Green state, espousing a hybrid vision of environmental citizenship that transcends the familiar national borders and borrows from the European experience.

III. Historical Canvass

It is important to understand that among the major global challenges of the current moment, environmental consciousness is one of the latest arrivals. Hence, it is still far from being completely accepted and understood. The issue (re)emerged in the 1960s and was first addressed by the United States. America began to understand the human impact on the environment and the dire effects the problem could have in the long run. Even though in the U.S. the environmental movement and the federal institutions are separate entities, they are fundamentally interdependent and initially moved on parallel tracks *vis-à-vis* the main environmental questions. For example, in the 1960s and ’70s, activists and public opinion pressured government to pass a number of vital laws, including the Clean Water and Air acts, as well as legislation related to preserving wildlife and preventing deforestation. Environmental issues were largely nonpartisan and there were bipartisan agreements on the principal challenges. State policy began to focus on ways to reduce consumption and limit carbon emissions, thus slowing the process of degradation and preserving biodiversity. The U.S. led global efforts on the issue, assisting in the organization of the first international environmental summit in Stockholm in 1972, under the auspices of the United Nations.

However, in the 1980s and 1990s, these policies were gradually abandoned and a period of retrenchment followed because America was once again concerned with its own economic growth (as a result of the recessions of the 1980s). On one hand, activists became complacent and arrogant after the early successes in the previous decades. On the other hand, institutions were no longer obliged to respond to public pressure on the environment, especially in the face of the immediate economic problems. The White House was hardly focusing on the environment, since productivity, job creation, and income were on the top of the agenda. The new Republican socio-economic coalition focused on economic conservatism and emphasized the omnipotence of the market in solving economic problems. The old belief that con-
cern for the environment and economic growth are mutually exclusive resurfaced in official rhetoric. Throughout the 1990s, President Clinton tried to address the issue domestically and through international multilateral institutions, but animosity in Congress thwarted most of his initiatives and, as Shellenberger and Nordhaus explain, the environmental movement was relegated to merely another public interest group in D.C.  

This brief period of renewed concern abated with the election of President George W. Bush in 2000. As a traditional conservative, he was not only primarily focused on sustaining the economic power of the U.S., but overall the environment failed to seriously enter the Republican agenda. At the same time, the events of 9/11 fundamentally shifted U.S. policy interests and created a new period of retrenchment on the issue, coupled with animosity toward traditional European allies and international organizations, especially within the context of the Iraq war. Hence, institutional leadership at the highest level is still lacking from the world’s leading economy and most significant military power.

Meanwhile, the fledgling European Union, established with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, was never seriously considering the issue of the environment, especially because it was within the powers of various member states and could not be addressed as a Union concern. It was not until the 1987 Single European Act that the institutional makeup of the EU was sufficiently altered to allow for environmental policy to be articulated entirely on the Union level. As a result, the EU began to formulate a common environmental policy, which was removed from national control through the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.

Particularly since Maastricht, the EU has voiced its strong support for the principle of sustainable development, both domestically and internationally, even though reluctance vis-à-vis new environmental policies followed periods of European internal struggles. Most recently, the Union articulated a comprehensive climate and energy policy as a response to growing concerns about climate change. The ambitious agenda includes cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, producing 20% of necessary energy from renewable resources, and increasing energy efficiency by 20%, all by 2020. The proposal has been opposed by national industries and environmental activists alike; the former see it as too interventionist and the latter as insufficiently ambitious. Nevertheless, in the words of Commission President Manuel Barroso, this is “the most far reaching set of legislative proposals to be made by the
European Commission in many years.” He continues, “[Europe] will show how a modern economy can be designed to meet the challenge. This is sustainable development in action.” This is what a bold yet reasonable vision for the future looks like, and its implementation is likely because it also takes into account economic and political constraints.

Abroad, under the influence of increasingly conclusive information about climate change, the Union has pushed for multilateral agreements on cutting greenhouse emissions through concrete limits and timetables at each international environmental summit. Even though the single voice of the EU on global environmental issues is a function of its internal cohesion as a political entity, the Commission has managed to articulate a single European position on issues like climate change, biodiversity, and hazardous waste. (This does not preclude the existence of elaborate national environmental policies in various member states, which are, however, coordinated with the central authorities in Brussels.)

The EU resolve has often been blocked by American skepticism and reluctance to engage in regulation for fear of serious economic costs. Overall, the adversarial relationship between the two economic giants has revealed a deep division, which has been conditioned by both institutional and cultural underpinnings. While the EU has remained an advocate for sustainable development and a commitment primarily by developed countries to cut greenhouse emissions, the U.S. has continued to oppose any multilateral treaties that do not include the fast-growing developing states (primarily China and India) or seem to burden excessively (as determined by Washington policymakers) the American economy.

IV. Contrasting Perspectives on the Environment

A. Institutional Makeup

A comprehensive overview of American and European action on the environment demands a careful analysis of the different institutional structures of the two aspiring “Green Giants.” The decision-making mechanisms on each side of the Atlantic have strongly conditioned the environmental agenda both in terms of rhetoric and action. While both are considered dynamic political entities, the European Union has undergone a much more intensive and accelerated transformation in the past sixty years. The EU is not a “superstate,” and has a limited
mandate over policies outside the purview of its member states. In fact, the entire European project has been the result of multilateral negotiations and bargaining, resulting in significant pooling of sovereignty between a diverse group of nations (already 27). In contrast, the U.S., though also a relatively recent political project, is a single nation-state that has clear guiding principles and powers at each level of government (federal, state, local) and is no longer in a state of flux in terms of its identity and institutional structure. This underlying difference between the EU and America leads to several concrete divergences in the conception and implementation of environmental policy.

First, the EU, by its own design, relies much more heavily than the U.S. on international organizations and multilateral avenues for solving global issues. Contrastingly, the notions of freedom, sovereignty, and independence are deeply rooted in the U.S., which condition the country’s uneasiness when acting in concert with other states in the international arena. This difference partially justifies the fundamental disagreements between Europeans and Americans over global environmental policy and any multilateral binding agreement. Examples of these stretch back to the Rio Conference in 1992 and have continued through the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, reaching the recent tensions at the 2007 Global Summit in Bali. At each of these fora, the U.S. has remained reticent about concrete commitments, reluctant to accept timelines or requirements for cutting greenhouse emissions.

Second, the European Union has included the principle of sustainable development within its official policies, requiring a number of sectors—from transport and agriculture to industry and tourism—to adopt it in their practices. In this way, the EU has been constantly involved in the direct implementation of environmental policy, often interfering in the workings of the market. As Knill argues, “EU environmental policy is much more than an ad hoc collection of individual measures.” There is, he claims, an underlying policy on the environment rooted in common European cultural and historic values (as will become clear in the following section). Contrastingly, the U.S. has tended to rely more on market forces than strong regulation. This has not only been a product of the beliefs of particular presidents—Reagan and Bush (father and son)—but it is an idea that reflects the very essence of the American spirit of independence and self-reliance. This has prevented Washington from articulating a bold and broad environmental vision that translates into particular policy implementation.
Third, partisan divisions over the environment are much more acute in America than in Europe. This largely stems from the absence of a clear consensus on the issue among all levels of government. Republicans have become increasingly conservative on the topic, refusing to allow for environmental regulation and claiming that it would reduce the competitiveness and strength of the U.S. economy. At the same time, the past twenty years have seen only a single brief period (1993–1994) when the same party had control of both the legislative and executive branches. This has made it harder to promote international and domestic environmental initiatives, which have to pass through the U.S. Senate with a wide majority, a feat often impossible to achieve. There is no such issue on the other side of the Atlantic, where the environment has been accepted as a priority by all parties and leaders in the Union. The topic has unified the European Parliament, forcing the European Commission to seriously engage the issue and propose concrete solutions, while working in concert with the non-governmental sector. Meanwhile, the majority of civil society profoundly supports action on the environment, pushing both NGOs and governments to act both on a national and continental level.¹⁰

This also explains the fourth major institutional difference. In Europe, the NGO sector is much more tightly related to the government than in America. In fact, NGOs in Brussels are granted consultancy status and are directly subsidized by the European Commission. In this way, a major part of civil society is strongly supported by government and works closely with it, while retaining independence and a strong voice for lobbying and protection of various interests. This is particularly true for environmental NGOs. The European Environmental Bureau, an umbrella of more than 160 environmental NGOs, has been created and directly subsidized by the European Commission.¹¹ This notwithstanding, proposals and policy are also crafted by more traditional transnational actors, such as the European Environmental Advisory Councils. In contrast, the United States relies on a clear separation between government and NGOs to the extent that the latter are not only perceived as external forces in Washington but are often engaged in an adversarial relationship with government, whether it is the legislative or the executive branch.

Finally, activists in the U.S. have pointed out the arrogance and complacency that ensued among environmentalists after the initial legislative victories in the 1970s. Their focus on specific issue areas is too narrow and falls prey to stronger lobbies and special interests in Wash-
in the last twenty years the U.S. has not passed a single piece of domestic or international legislation of significant consequence (similar to the Clean Air or Clean Water Acts of the 1970s) that provides a step forward in seriously tackling the environmental challenge. Hence, they see the need for a fundamental paradigmatic shift in the mentality of American activists and, as a result, in their messages and actions, in order to make citizens and institutions alike realize the full scope of the existential threat of environmental degradation. While some changes in citizen action have appeared since Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ 2005 article, the change in rhetoric has not percolated through the entire civil society or the main institutional stakeholders.

In this context, the institutions of the EU, while still fragile, have overtaken the U.S. in global environmental leadership. This is manifested in rhetoric on sustainable development, internal political consensus about the importance of the environment, and efforts to articulate a new environmental agenda both among the member states and globally. Europe’s example is an appropriate model for America if it seeks to reclaim its central position in the global environmental conversation. Certainly the U.S. is essential for addressing global warming due to its sheer size and impact, but it is no longer the power that shapes the principles and agenda behind environmental reform. A look across
the Atlantic could give Washington a clue as to how it could regain a more positive discourse and attention to the environment globally but also in the domestic arena. However, an explanation of the growing gap between European and American leadership is also grounded in the cultural underpinnings of both societies.

B. Culture and Values

Scholars agree that the U.S. and Europe’s environmental policies, previously aligned in principle and approach, have recently diverged. This has also been reflected in the citizens’ awareness and responses to the problem. Indeed, Americans and Europeans tend to perceive the environmental questions differently, and the roots of this often-unexpected reality are grounded in deep historical and cultural disparities. They help in understanding both the institutional divergence outlined earlier, as well as the asymmetry of awareness and action among citizens. Granted, the generalizations that I will make in this section cannot be applied universally, but I argue that their validity is nonetheless significant.

When looking at environmental citizenship in the United States, it is critical to discuss elements of the American psyche, in particular the frontier mentality that still defines the country and the ideas of individualism and consumption. When the first European settlers arrived in the New World, they discovered a harsh landscape and insecurity due to natural (and human) threats, but a great potential for wealth along with the great danger for survival and subsistence. In a land where brutish lifestyle and draconian action and sacrifice defined one’s existence and success, the individual was put in opposition to native inhabitants and the forces of nature, which could easily destroy him on the frontier. Bringing with them the tenets of the Enlightenment, many of the European settlers who first moved to the U.S. applied the idea of domination over the unruly natural world as a determinant of one’s personality and one’s concrete chances for survival and progress. Overall, the frontier mentality has deep roots in every aspect of American culture and institutions and provides perhaps the biggest marker of difference between the Europeans who stayed and those who left for the New World.

Closely tied to this idea, individualism stems from the teachings of Luther and Calvin in Europe, but it truly expanded in meaning in the lands of the New World. One’s self is defined not only by one’s per-
sonal relationship to God, but also by one's autonomy and mobility, which embody the “go-it-alone” mentality of the frontier. It is important to understand that there is nothing natural in this quintessentially American characteristic. It was partly shaped by the religious and cultural particularities of the European settlers. Then it was conditioned by the harsh existence in the new land, which required qualities such as independence, persistence, and a clear sense of “mine versus thine” in an uncertain and adversarial world. Thus, the teachings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke took much deeper root in the U.S. than in Europe and have proven resistant to change ever since.14

Consumerism is also deeply embedded in the American tradition. Its roots go back to both the particular tenets of Protestantism and the immediate reality in the New World, but its full impact followed the expansion of industrialization and market capitalism. Americans are the biggest consumers of natural resources in the world. The U.S. uses up more than one-third of the Earth’s energy even though it has only 5% of the world population. The implications of such irresponsible consumption have been far-reaching, but its intimate relationship to the American “way of life” has discouraged a popular drive for environmental reforms. It is clear that changes at the institutional level are necessary but insufficient for the U.S. to reduce its energy consumption and foster true environmental citizenship as long as consumption levels in society remain so high. This demonstrates the critical importance of personal choice and action, the essence of true global citizenship.

Contrastingly, Europe has managed to carry out a paradigm shift of policies, implementing regulations using neoliberal strategies that target sustainable development. It has also educated aware and involved citizens that predominantly consider the environment a central concern for the continent and beyond. Brussels is unified behind the concept of ecological modernization—that the environment and the economy are not engaged in a zero-sum relationship, but rather growth and development can be achieved while preserving high environmental standards.15 This concept is still questioned in the U.S., thus limiting the power of the environmental message. This has put the EU into a position of leadership globally, offering a model of growth that has the environment as its central concern and a notion of morality that perceives that all humans are part of a common biosphere with no regard to borders and difference.

For Europeans the principles of inclusiveness, the primacy of human rights, and a level of market restraint at the expense of individual
freedom are central. The importance of collective responsibility and compassion towards the other trump the focus on individualism and competition. One’s existence is profoundly grounded in one’s relationship to others within a large social network that provides more equality and more interdependence than exhibited in the U.S. This is reflected not only in the European social model but also in the personal relationships of assistance and solidarity among Europeans of different backgrounds. Hence, the respect for the environment is also deeper, as the citizen’s mentality is concerned with the welfare and interests of others, and those are intimately tied to the environment. Moreover, when discussing growth and progress, the EU, much more than the U.S., tends to refer to the ideas of sustainable development and a responsible use of resources. Research into alternative energy sources has received a warmer welcome than in Washington. Fifty-six percent of Europeans say “it is necessary to fundamentally change our way of life and development if we want to halt the deterioration of the environment.” This shows a clear commitment on the civil society level to a vision of the indivisibility of the Earth and the transnational nature of the issue.

In this context, Europe is ahead of the U.S. in claiming the moral high ground and reaching the “third level of consciousness” that Freud describes. After all, it is important to remember that the EU itself has largely emerged as the first transnational political network, transcending the traditional notions of politics and power embedded in the human psyche after Westphalia. It is a political system in which no single player dominates the network and everyone has the right to some input and a portion of the output. The challenge then remains for the new generation of Europeans to turn the moral principles that govern the EU into more concrete action. Unlike the American model of individualism and autonomy, which has resisted the challenges of the time regardless of the circumstances, the European political model and its foundations are fragile and have not been proven against internal and external challenges. Nevertheless, the moral potential for moving from inter-state power struggles (geopolitics) to inter-state cooperation in defense of our common natural resources (biosphere politics) now exists, and as Eckersley recognizes, the European Union gives us the hope that a true transnational democracy is possible as the major tool for generating environmental citizenship. He contends, “At present, the European Union represents perhaps the closest real world approximation of a green Kantian or post-Westphalian culture.” However, it
is uncertain how far such a culture is likely to spread internationally, where moral persuasion more often takes a back seat to coercion and self-interest in inter-state negotiations.

V. Waking up to the Reality

The analysis I offer here neither suggests that the United States is fundamentally flawed as a potential environmental leader nor does it seek to extol European excellence in tackling this issue. There are commendable characteristics in American culture and institutions as well as significant weaknesses in the European approach to decision-making. In fact, the U.S. culture of personal accountability and responsibility could be a helpful tool for developing personal ethics vis-à-vis the environment. Grounded in the Protestant tradition and one’s personal obligations before the afterlife, this has created an ethic of hard work and dedication to any enterprise. A sizable number of Americans have used these intrinsic values to advocate for environmental reform, galvanize the powers of civil society, and pressure policymakers to adopt the legislative measures to bring the U.S. back to leadership in the environmental arena. The challenge remains to change the mentality of the majority, people who still live in the previous level of consciousness, wherein the individual and national self-interest trump any consideration for a truly global ethics and empathy for people across the world. As Shellenberger and Nordhaus explain:

Environmentalists are in a culture war whether we like it or not. It’s a war over our core values as Americans and over our vision for the future, and it won’t be won by appealing to the rational consideration of our collective self-interest.²⁰

Moreover, the entrepreneurial spirit, innovation, and creativity that have transformed the U.S. into the strongest single economy in the world could be the tools for translating the vital mentality shift into concrete action. Shellenberger and Nordhaus use venture capitalists as a model that environmentalists ought to adopt because inaction is worse than action that has failed. While technology is unlikely to single-handedly resolve environmental degradation and stop global warming, when coupled with a particular worldview among citizens and governments, it can certainly move environmental citizenship to a new level of accomplishment on a global (rather than only a national)
level. This is where America’s comparative advantage lies and its potential for leadership resides.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that aside from its guiding moral principles, the EU environmental policy is primarily the result of functional logic. It is based not on some fundamental grand design, but rather on a number of actions that have coalesced into an increasingly comprehensive and independent policy field within the Union framework. This does not mean that the EU’s environmental policy is a fortuitous coincidence but recognizes that Brussels is not always concerned with the long term. Moreover, many European countries have a long way to go before they successfully complete the environmental modernization project, especially as former communist republics with lower environmental standards have entered the Union. Nevertheless, countries in Scandinavia and Western Europe have already set the benchmark, and Brussels is unlikely to let the newcomers dilute this common priority.

Notwithstanding the compelling and persuasive European environmental rhetoric, the reality remains that consumption and pollution levels in the EU are not significantly lower than in the U.S. Moreover, despite the success of environmental regulatory competition between European states, the implementation of these policies and their harmonization with EU-level principles has been notoriously inefficient. Indeed, the EU possesses a strong cultural and institutional connection to the issue of the environment, but there is still a stark discrepancy between rhetoric and action in terms of concrete reductions in emissions or moderation of personal consumption. This is what I call the “intent-action gap,” which reveals the oftentimes tremendous difference between European moral arguments and ambitions and concrete implementation and action. This ought to be tackled with the joint efforts of Brussels and civil society, borrowing some of the research and innovation that characterize the American experience. Nonetheless, as Vig and Faure assert, “the commitment to the idea of sustainable development is playing an important role in defining the identity of the EU, both internally and externally, and in legitimizing the entire European integration project.” They continue:

It also allows the EU [to lead] as a normative power (as opposed to military power) in international politics...a major difference with the US. Thus, despite limited policy achievements to date, it can be argued that
the declaratory values of the EU will put it on an increasingly divergent course with the US in the future.21

I would like to examine the last claim that Vig and Faure propose, which suggests a long path of divergence between the U.S. and the EU. In my view, this would be disastrous for the global environmental agenda. From a normative perspective, only convergence between the two cultural and governance models can lead to the formation of a viable vision for saving our environment.

VI. Space for Convergence: A Normative Perspective

At the conclusion of the essay, I will offer some normative ideas about the notion of environmental leadership as well as the particular ways in which it can be operationalized through a hybrid Euro-American approach, taking the best practices from each side of the Atlantic and perhaps once again bringing the United States back to the forefront of environmental policy and action. At the outset, I will reiterate that the issue at hand is not a national phenomenon and cannot be defined within the borders of a particular state. In fact, I would argue that in order to fully grasp the notion of a global vision for the environment and the conditions necessary for its integration into the human psyche, we need a new lens through which to look at some basic political concepts.

First, we ought to develop a new understanding of the state and human relations. Indeed, the familiar Westphalian paradigm that divides the world into closed nation-states, each pursuing its own political and economic interest, is no longer suitable to analyze intrinsically global challenges and gear leadership to biosphere politics. The environment is not divided into states; it does not obey artificial political or economic boundaries, nor does it reflect social inequalities. This is a problem for all humans, of every walk of life, every race, ethnicity, religion, and social class. This is an issue that is bigger than the petty, socially constructed differences that humans have cultivated amongst each other for thousands of years. This is an issue that ought to unite us, because there is no such thing as more worthy environments and less worthy ones, poorer or richer ones, black or white ones, Muslim or Christian ones. Instead, there is one environment and a single biosphere in which we all live. Thus, if we accept this basic premise, that the environment is at its core a transnational challenge that transcends
other differences between humans, then we have to discover a new political framework, different from the state, through which people can engage in true environmental citizenship.

As Eckersley argues, if states begin to cooperate within a new Kantian, post-Westphalian system, the chances for genuine environmental cooperation and multilateralism are greatly augmented.22 No longer can states afford to operate within the familiar Hobbesian paradigm of chaos, confrontation, and raw individual interest. In order to seriously tackle problems like climate change and global warming, a fundamental paradigm shift is necessary. I see a day when governments view their actions within a global context, and ordinary citizens develop a sense of profound empathy for other humans who are facing the same long-term challenges triggered by environmental degradation.

Second, it is necessary that there emerge a “hybrid” approach to environmental citizenship, grounded in the European values of inclusiveness, cooperation, and solidarity, but conditioned by the critical American attributes of personal accountability and responsibility. The commitment to sustainable development as well as the civil society and wide government support that exist in Europe ought to blend with the entrepreneurial, creative spirit of America. Market forces alone cannot solve the issue, but the European tradition of community, inclusiveness, and strong government involvement seem to be the appropriate counterparts of the American model, holding the potential to bring environmental citizenship to the fore of the international arena, not just through rhetoric, but also with concrete avenues for action. This will help America create a new environmental narrative grounded in empathy for the entire human race and our shared natural world.

The reality of environmental degradation demands that the entire world must be the guardian of our biosphere and no single continent can completely rectify the current situation. Hence, the complementarity of the American and European civic mentalities and government models is the most appropriate approach to fostering people’s global consciousness, individual responsibility and accountability, and the necessary leadership among politicians and civil society for the engagement in genuine and effective environmental citizenship. Such a well-balanced mechanism has the potential to deliver results and quickly attract the attention and commitment of the rest of the world.
VII. Conclusion

I have attempted to lay out a new vision of environmental citizenship by searching for a qualitatively different model of human mentality and leadership in transcending geopolitics and adopting biosphere politics as the modus operandi of the future. There are two underlying premises of the argument: (1) global citizenship requires a fundamental paradigmatic shift beyond geopolitics, and (2) environmental citizenship is inherently grounded in the notion of leadership. With this preliminary conceptual canvass in place, I offered a comparative study of the European and American environmental policies as they relate to the particular culture and institutions residing on each side of the ocean. Throughout the past decade, it has become evident that global leadership on environmental issues currently resides in Europe, a claim that the literature fails to make. However, it is also clear that the U.S. has lost its global leadership on the issue because it fails to articulate a coherent vision about the future grounded in fundamental values of human empathy and compassion and a harmonious relationship with nature. The fundamental difference between environmental activists and institutions on the two sides of the Atlantic stems from the deep historic and cultural markers that have shaped the American and European experience.

As a result, a new global consciousness among citizens and within institutions should be cultivated for the formation of genuine empathy that binds us on the issue of the environment. Moreover, there are important lessons that leaders in American government and civil society can extract from the European experience in terms of cultural and institutional particularities. Europe’s moral and cultural principles complement the U.S. culture of innovation and accountability. However, it will take leadership by individuals and groups to make this step and look beyond the domestic for clues on solving an intrinsically global problem.

In conclusion, I have tried to use what we already have as two of the most successful models of governance and civil consciousness to offer a new model of environmental citizenship and leadership that can have a global application. Granted, this is merely one view of an extremely complex and politically loaded issue. Yet, within the current mentality of nation-states, political and economic division, and entrenched individual allegiances, the environment cannot receive the attention and serious commitment it deserves only within national
borders. It must be on a global level. A new paradigm of political and personal identity ought to be coupled with a clear leadership vision among institutions and individuals in order to elevate the bits and pieces of environmental action and commitment that we have now into a genuine environmental citizenship and leadership for our common biosphere. For Americans, articulating and implementing this vision depends on a single look across the Atlantic.

Notes

10. In December 2007, Eurobarometer executed a survey about Europeans’ attitudes toward the issue of biodiversity. Almost seven out of ten people considered the loss of natural life as a very serious global problem and only 43% considered it a crucial domestic issue. Moreover, 61% saw the preservation of biodiversity as predominantly a moral issue. Sixty-seven percent said that they had personally made some efforts to preserve biodiversity, while more than half of the surveyed expressed willingness to do more. Once again, this illustrates the awareness and breadth of perspective among European citizens on environmental issues.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 72.
16. A November 2007 Eurobarometer survey shows that almost three-quarters of EU citizens believe that people from different cultures enrich their countries, and 83% agreed about the benefits of intercultural contacts.
19. Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” essay is considered one of the ideological foundations of the European Union. In a way, Kant provides a reply to Hobbes’ view of human interactions, stressing the possibility for perpetual peace grounded in cooperation, common interest, and mutual understanding by individuals (and states). Ibid., p. 251.


