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The Sovereign Ideal: Views of Rome in Athenian Inscriptions

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Chapter 1: Introduction

At the peak of Athenian influence in the fifth century BCE its envoys addressed independent states in the same terms that the defeated Athens would later describe Rome.¹ The course of events that led to the effective annexation of Athens in 27 BCE illustrates the gradual erosion of Athenian authority in easy contrast to the ascent of Rome; and yet, the rhetorical evidence that survives for us in the literary and epigraphic record reveals no such decline.² Instead, the Athenians defended their identity as an independent actor and received considerable material benefits from the Romans through the careful cultivation of their image in the profitable guise of friendship.³ The means of this representation was a small number of terms that had long held a role in the Pan-Hellenic discourse, and which the Roman Republic readily adopted after its emergence as a significant actor after 214 BCE.⁴ A crucial difference remained, however, in each actor’s treatment of these same terms’ relationship to ideas of jurisdiction; for, in adopting the language of Hellenistic diplomacy Roman politicians conflated its principle terms with Latin concepts that apply equally to sovereign and subject states. This dissonance created a space where the Athenians could benefit in tangible ways from the moral force of these terms, which they shared with the Romans, while, at the same time, representing themselves as a sovereign state through language that could mean anything and the opposite to a Roman audience.

¹ All translations are my own work unless otherwise noted. The principle terms of analysis in this study are συμμαχία, φιλία, societas, and amicitia. I will interpret each of these terms at considerable length; however, as preliminary definitions I will label φιλία (“philia”) and amicitia as friendship, συμμαχία (“symmachia”) as military alliance, and societas as partnership. Both φιλία and συμμαχία (“ξυμμαχία” in fifth century Attic dialect) feature prominently in the Thucydidean register: John R. Wilson, “Shifting and Permanent Philia in Thucydidès,” Greece and Rome 36, no. 2 (1989): 147-151.

² The approximate date of Athens’ incorporation into the Roman Empire is almost impossible to establish. Considerable portions of Greece fell under the jurisdiction of the Roman governor of Macedonia in 146 BCE, and the regions excluded from this contributed to the formation of the province of Achaia during Augustus’ provincial reforms in 29 BCE. Certain cities including Athens retained the title of free cities (“liberae civitates”) throughout the Roman period, but this title was nominal and did not restrain Roman magistrates from interfering with the internal politics of free cities almost at will: James H. Oliver, “Roman Emperors and Athens,” Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 30 (1981): 413-416.


From the middle of the second century BCE, Athenian inscriptions frequently describe the Romans as friends and allies ("φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι") of the Athenian people, and continue to include these epithets in decrees of state until the conclusion of the first century BCE.\(^5\) That these terms endured over the course of this period is at first surprising in light of the rapid changes that the burgeoning Roman hegemony affected on the political situation of the Athenians and their state. While the Romans were only an intermittent participant in the politics of the eastern Mediterranean in the mid-second century, their involvement increased steadily toward the establishment of direct rule over territories within the vicinity of Athens. Considering these events, and also the limited flexibility belonging to a minor state such as Athens, the question arises as to whether the terms friendship and alliance ("φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι") are accurate descriptors for the Athenians’ relationship with Rome. Generations of scholars have responded to the negative, taking the view that this language was, from the view of Romans, at its best empty rhetoric and at its worst part of a broader euphemism that hid the nature of Roman imperialism. The principle objective of this paper will be to argue to the contrary through an examination of these terms and their relevance to the diplomatic activities of the Athenian state; for, I shall argue, the Athenians chose to include the language of friendship and alliance because these words were part of a highly normative discourse that could and did positively benefit their state in its relationship with Rome.

Such an emphasis on language is also necessary because of this study’s adoption of a theoretical framework based around International Relations (IR) Constructivism. The basic claim of the Constructivist school is that the language and ideas that inform the interactions of states are social constructs. The potency of an idea is not its \textit{a priori} truth, but that an actor holds it to be true, and that the use of this idea, reified through use, can have a constitutive effect on the fate of actor and system. This calls for an especially careful treatment of linguistic evidence in the case of Greco-Roman antiquity because of the special relationship between our source materials and the internal logic of actors. To return

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\(^5\) IG II\(^2\) 1000, IG II\(^2\) 992, IG II\(^2\) 977, IG II\(^2\) 1004, IG II\(^2\) 1039, IG II\(^2\) 1042, IG II\(^2\) 1008 and IG II\(^2\) 1028. IG II\(^2\) 1000 is the first inscription of this type to use the adjective ρώμαιοι ("Romans").
to an earlier example, we know a fair amount about the actions of Athenian diplomats from the narrative accounts of Polybius and Livy. These are valuable sources for establishing historical facts and the basic course of events, but also stand as a medium between us and the actors the historians describe. Because of this, it is impossible to separate the language of Athenian actors from that of the historian without the assistance of external sources. Inscriptions are especially suitable for this task because we can say, with some confidence, that a particular inscription is the product of a specific time and actor. Through the analysis of this evidence alongside concordant passages from the historians we can develop some idea of how the Athenian elite represented itself, and how this language helped to shape events.

It was possible for the Athenian elite to conduct this campaign of self-representation with effect because the language that they used had considerable overlap with the political vocabulary of Latin. The question of the extent to which Greek and Roman actors shared their discursive norms is a complicated one but we can say with confidence that each term had a consistent translation in the other language. For instance, the Ancient Greek word for alliance ("συμμαχία") translates into Latin as societas. We know this because Livy, writing in Latin, used Polybius’ Greek narrative as a primary source, and those sections that closely follow Polybius translate συμμαχία as societas. For instance, the forty-second book of Livy draws upon Polybius to describe the termination of an alliance between the Boeotian cities and the Kingdom of Macedon. After the Boeotians decided to conclude this pact Livy tells us that “…they ordered for the exiles to be restored and condemned the authors of the regal societas.” The matching passage of Polybius reports that “…they cast out the men in the party of Neon and Hippias… these were the men who conducted the policy of συμμαχία.” The common feature of these passages is that they both depict the elimination of the pro-Macedonian faction in Boeotia because of their foreign policies.

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7 Livy 42.44.1: “…ante omnia exules restituit iusserunt et auctores regiae societatis… damnarunt.”

8 Polybius 27.1.11: "μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νέιαν καὶ τὸν Ἰππίαν ἐξέβαλον, συναφέντες ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας αὐτῶν καὶ κελεύοντες αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀπολογεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν διωκομημένων: οὗτοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ τὰ περὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν οἰκονομήσαντες…”
respectively called συμμαχία and societas. Because of the close relationship between the texts of Livy and Polybius, we can safely conclude that these terms refer to each other; however, an important objective of this study will be to show that this reference falls short of interchangeability.

Instead, I will argue for a bipartite reading of the Greek and Latin conceptions of friendship and alliance between states. The language of Greco-Roman diplomacy was, in the first place, moral and bound to powerful social norms. While each culture had terms to describe institutionalized relationships between states, these appear with far less frequency in treaties and historical documents than moralizing terms like liberty and friendship. This language appears highly irregular when one considers the brutal and strongly hierarchical nature of the Greco-Roman state system, but it is a fundamental claim of the Constructivist thesis for classical antiquity that this language was more than mere euphemism.\(^9\) The strength of this language was that it established and reified norms that then had concrete effects on the decisions and outcomes for contemporary actors, and these effects were possible because both Greek and Roman politicians understood and exploited their normative force. On the other hand, these terms also encompassed a range of formal meaning that existed only on the Greek side of this exchange. The Roman Republic, in its advance into the Greek east, forged a network of primarily informal relationships with Greek states, and the language it equated to Greek diplomatic institutions lacked formal meaning for them. Previous studies of Greco-Roman international relations have focused on the extent to which this might have misled or harmed the interests of Greek states.\(^10\) This study will instead follow the claim that no such confusion existed, and that the dissonance between these terms was in fact beneficial to Greek states: even if they did not possess a formal relationship with Rome, the ability to claim this was meaningful.

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The objective of the following chapter will be to situate this discourse in the context of the ongoing debate between the International Relations (IR) Constructivist and Realist theses for Greco-Roman international relations. In contrast to Constructivism, which emphasizes the “unit level” characteristics of actors and the constitutive effect of normative language, the Realist school argues that “system level” factors predicate the decisions of actors and change within the international system.\(^\text{11}\) According to Realist scholars, the state system is essentially anarchic, and the fear of aggressive action from other states in the absence of a reliable supranational authority pushes states to engage in “self-help.”\(^\text{12}\) Because of the existential stakes of international politics, the “Realist” state has to view its neighbors as potentially hostile and from there must itself behave aggressively to forestall threats. With respect to the modern epoch, the Constructivist critique of this claim is that the Realist state system is, itself, a reified idea, and that states only act in this manner because they accept the construct of Realism.\(^\text{13}\)

In recent years, this debate has spilled over into the scholarship on Greco-Roman international relations through the debate between Arthur Eckstein, an avowed Realist, and the Constructivist scholar Paul Burton.\(^\text{14}\) The central point of contention in this debate is the question of whether there existed, in antiquity, an international institution or cultural \textit{habitus} that, through its normative force, influenced actors to behave in a manner distinct from the \textit{machtpolitik} and fear-based aggression of Eckstein’s Realist thesis.\(^\text{15}\) The intent of this study is to show, through the case study of Athens, that informal norms did shape the Greco-Roman state system and, as Alexander Wendt wrote, “Anarchy is what States make of it.”\(^\text{16}\)


The third chapter of this study will begin to describe the “raw materials” that the Athenians used to represent themselves in their inscriptions and diplomacy through a consideration of the concept of alliance in the Greco-Roman world. This will begin with an analysis of the claim of Holleaux and his successors that the Roman Republic avoided contracting formal alliances in the Greek east until a period after its ascent to hegemonic power. It will then proceed to demonstrate that even if the Romans did avoid the creation of formal pacts, supplying instead the informal societas, they did possess a term for formal alliance (“foedus”) that they used extensively on the Italian peninsula. Per the Latin usage, states that possessed a foedus had a claim, enshrined in religious sanction, to their partners’ enactment of treaty rights. From there, the section will conclude with the argument that the word societas encompasses a range of informal meanings to include temporary contract, social bond, and informal pact. In contrast to these wholly informal meanings, its Ancient Greek counterpart (“συμμαχία”), which appears frequently in Athenian inscriptions, was, in effect, an institution of Greek diplomacy and possessed a formal meaning with consistent parameters. One of the central prerequisites of this institution in its Ancient Greek usage, as we shall see, is the assumption that only sovereign actors could participate in alliance relations. The ability to lay claim to this relationship, which remained open because of the Romans’ broad understanding of συμμαχία as societas, was a powerful tool for Athenians, who could thus claim in their inscriptions the propagandistic effect of a Roman alliance even if they could not expect Roman arms.

The fourth chapter will continue to analyze the rhetorical potential of the language of Athenian inscriptions through a consideration of the normative force of international friendship. State and individual actors in the Greco-Roman world describe their foreign connections as friends with great regularity in our sources. It is easy to dismiss this language off the cuff because of the self-evident breach between the hegemonic power politics of antiquity and modern conceptions of equitable friendship. This study will instead take the view that international friendship is an unstable and inherently unequal

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17 I borrow the notion of “raw materials” as an ontological tool from Professor Andrew Latham.
relationship based around constant exchanges of service and affirmations of friendship. Friendship in antiquity, as it does today, rested on normative claims to equality, and even if this was not \textit{de facto} the case, the claim that it was allowed lesser states to engage with the Roman power on a stronger footing. The foundational block of this relationship was the good faith of each party ("\textit{fides}" in Latin, "\textit{πίστις}" in Greek), the preservation of which provided lesser states with considerable leeway for independent action. The body of the chapter will develop an account of the normative force of international friendship through a close reading of a number of episodes in the historical register where the fact of past or present friendship was a determining factor in the outcome of events. It will argue further that this influence represents a breach in the Realist claim that discursive norms were an irrelevant or aesthetic feature of Greco-Roman international politics. In fact, they were often the most powerful tool that Greek states had.

The fifth and final chapter of this study will take the concepts developed in the preceding chapters and apply them to the case study of the relationship between the Athenian and Roman states from its inception to the termination of Athens as a sovereign state during the provincial reorganization of Augustus. In doing so, it will argue that the principles of \textit{friendship} and \textit{alliance} present in Athenian inscriptions are typical of the diplomatic behavior that the Athenians used with great success to guide their state through the period of Rome’s encroachment into the Greek east. Beginning with a discussion of the textual problems that plague our ability to define the Athenians’ early relationship with Rome, it will proceed to describe the behavior of the Athenians toward the Romans as their friendship developed from first contact to mutual benefice. In particular, this section will focus on the extent to which the utility of each partner flavored their behavior and the outcome of events. It will be argued from this that the Athenians adherence to this mode of behavior played a substantial role in the success of their state in a period of the mid-second century BCE when other actors were faltering in their relationship with Rome. The remainder of the chapter will concern the gradual dissipation of Athenian sovereignty in response to the Roman imperial encroachment, but will at the same time argue that the Athenians continued to use political language in concert with cultural norms to tangible effect in their relationship with Rome.
It was the eventual fate of the Athenian people, as it was for so many others, to fall beneath the imperial tide of the Roman Republic. By the conclusion of the first century BCE, The Athenians had suffered four sieges at the hands of Roman commanders, and would, in the words of Appian, participate in the Roman civil wars out of a desire to “…decide the mastery of the Romans.”\textsuperscript{19} The road has been long, and many great states had fallen, but Athens remained: a product of discourse that preserved its status until the day that it finally, without note or proclamation, slipped into servitude.

Chapter 2 – Theoretical Context: Constructivism and Realism

In the final decades of the second century BCE the Achaean politician and scholar Polybius began his Histories with the express intent of documenting how, from humble origins, the Roman Republic had come to dominate the Mediterranean World.\textsuperscript{20} This same mission has drawn the interest of scholars since the Renaissance humanists, and from those beginnings has developed in step with theories of the state and International Relations. In the current century, the influence of Political Science has become even more pronounced with the deliberate application of modern theories of International Relations to the Greco-Roman system, beginning with Eckstein’s introduction of International Relations (IR) Realism in 2009.\textsuperscript{21} The foundational argument of (IR) Realism is that uncertainty and fear are the primary motivating factors for actors who, in the absence of any moderating institution, are compelled to pursue policies of aggressive self-help to ensure their security.\textsuperscript{22} While Eckstein’s characterization of the Greco-Roman state system as an \textit{anarchic disorder} is itself attractive, his treatment of (IR) Realism also creates a number of problems for the interpretation of historical events through its overemphasis on system-level factors. According to Realist scholars such as John J. Mearsheimer, the individual

\textsuperscript{19} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars}, 2.70.6: “And the Athenians took to the field, though each side ordered them not to harm their army, as they were sacred guardians of the gods, but despite this they took pleasure at the expectation of war, and to decide the mastery of the Romans.”
\textsuperscript{20} Polybius 1.1.5.
\textsuperscript{22} Kenneth N. Waltz, \textit{Man, the State, and War} (Columbia University Press, 1954): 159.
characteristics of states are a marginal feature in comparison to the systemic pressures that all states share as a determinant of behavior.\(^{23}\) If correct, the implication of this claim for the current study would be that the language the Athenian state used in relation to Roman power had little real world effect, and that instead they sunk and swam with the vicissitudes of great power politics.

The objective of the current chapter will be to present the argument that (IR) Realism is an inaccurate model for the description of the Greco-Roman system and to present as an alternative the competing theory of International Relations (IR) Constructivism. After a brief overview of Realist theory, I will turn to consider the problems that arise from Eckstein’s application of this model to the ancient world through a consideration of his narration of Rome’s conflicts in Illyria. In a sense, these problems are two sides of the same coin, and I will call them now the *unitary actor problem*. The first half of this problem is the tendency of Eckstein’s (IR) Realism to conflate the motivations of all state actors such that they interact with the international system in approximately the same way; the other side of the problem is that it logically follows that for an actor to engage in unitary behavior it must be composed of pieces that react to systemic factors with a uniform response. Following an analysis of these features through a number of historical episodes, the chapter will conclude with a consideration of the substantial benefits of International Relations (IR) Constructivism as a theoretical model that favors discourse and unit-level factors.

International Relations (IR) Realism, on the other hand, takes the view that all states exist in a single anarchic system characterized by chronic insecurity and, as a consequence, competition for hegemony.\(^{24}\) Its proponents argue further that classical Mediterranean states such as Athens and Rome existed under the constant threat of aggression from other polities and that in the absence of international law or a reliable enforcement agency were obliged to view their neighbors with the suspicion of hostile intent.\(^{25}\) For each state, the achievement of hegemonic power becomes the only reliable security

guarantee, and the state system therefore revolves around individual states’ pursuit of this aim, as Mearsheimer writes: 26

The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon – that is, the only great power in the system… Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition.

Mearsheimer makes a number of assumptions about the nature of the state system in this passage that make little sense in the content of the ancient world. Perhaps the most significant is the implication in the above quote that states cohabitate a single system. While the Roman Republic was aware of the Greek East from an early stage in its existence because of the Greek states of southern Italy, the Romans held no significant economic or political stake in the East until an advanced stage of their imperial advance. 27 The lack of such a stake, and the Romans’ preoccupation with closer threats, forestalled the apotheosis of a unified Greco-Roman state system until a later stage. 28 Mearsheimer’s second claim, which follows from the first, is that states will react to systemic pressures and the pursuit of hegemony in a uniform manner.

The systemic application of these claims to the Greco-Roman system forces motivations upon the state that juxtapose poorly with the overall process of the Roman Republic’s imperial advance. In his work Rome Enters the Greek East, Arthur M. Eckstein attempted to describe the first fifty years of Greco-Roman engagement through an (IR) Realist theoretical framework. 29 Eckstein’s basic contention in this work was that the Roman Republic experienced the same systemic pressures as Greek states, and that its reactions were normal in that system. 30 He claims further that the rapid ascent of the Roman Republic to the status of system hegemon was primarily possible because of the collapse of the balance of power.

27 See note 82 on Holleaux.
28 Brian McGing, Polybius’ Histories (Oxford University Press, 2010): 19. McGing remarks that the flow of history converges into one narrative for Polybius after his recounting of the Council of Naupactus at the end of Book 5. This event occurred in 217 BCE.
30 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, 9-10.
between the Hellenistic monarchies after the death of Ptolemy IV of Egypt in 204 BCE. A benefit of this form of analysis is that it resists the urge to assign inevitability to the rise of Rome, and instead construes all states as rational actors attempting to locate and exploit advantage. For example, it is a well-known point of Roman history that the legions first crossed the Adriatic in 229 BCE because the piratical ventures of the Ardiaei had escalated to the point of threatening Roman maritime interests. Eckstein’s (IR) Realist account acknowledges this factor, but also points out that the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues were engaged in warfare with the Ardiaei at the same time. This is because the Ardiaei represented a broader threat to the stability of the Adriatic region, and their aggression necessitated the reactions of a number of state-actors on the basis of their individual concerns. Eckstein’s concern for the interactions of a diverse range of actors, and his aspersion of Roman particularism in this episode, is well taken, but his account begins to suffer when, in keeping with (IR) Realism, he attempts to describe the behavior of these actors in terms of their system-level influences.

In his account of the First Illyrian War (229-228 BCE), Eckstein acknowledges that different immediate causes drove the Roman Senate and the Greek Leagues into conflict with the Ardiaean Kingdom. The Roman Senate faced the threat of a coherent Illyrian Kingdom emerging opposite the Italian peninsula and, closer at hand, had to look to the regional trade interests of its south Italian allies. The Greek Leagues encountered threats to their territory and spheres of influence from Ardiaean raids against the Peloponnesus and expansion at the expense of the Kingdom of Epirus. While these threats are similar in the nature of their vector, they appear in dissimilar contexts. The Greek Leagues, for example, had to deal with the Ardiaei Kingdom in the context of a wider power struggle with Antigonid Macedon, and the death throes of the Epirot Kingdom signaled the end of an effective barrier to the incursions of

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33 Polybius 2.8.3; Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, 33-36.
aggressive migratory peoples from the continental interior.\textsuperscript{34} The actions of the Ardiaei were a proximate cause, therefore, for both the Roman Republic and the Greek Leagues of Aetolia and Achaea; however, a distinct set of circumstances for each state transformed this first cause into a justification for aggression. Eckstein, in his account, chooses instead to emphasize system-level influences that he maintains affected the Roman Republic and Greek Leagues in an essentially uniform manner.\textsuperscript{35}

…strong pressures existed on any powerful state to answer pleas for help positively: refusal to help might be seen as indicating geopolitical or military weakness- a dangerous step in an anarchy- as well as a signal to some other power that it could take one's place in a possibly significant region… the Roman Senate, in responding to appeals arising from the greatly intensifying Illyrian attacks, was thus acting and taking risks within the logic of the anarchic system in which it existed… the Aetolian League and the Achaean League acted similarly…

Eckstein claims that the Roman Republic and the Greek Leagues held an equal concern for asserting their authority as powerful states in the eastern Mediterranean. According to the “logic of the anarchic system” to which Eckstein refers, powerful states will intervene in conflict areas to consolidate and confirm their status as dominant states, and inaction creates the potential for the success of competitors.

The principle problem with a preference for system-level factors in descriptions of the Greco-Roman system is the tendency stemming from this to assign similar characteristics to individual actors. According to Realist scholars, state-actors, because they share the common goal of hegemony and the fear of extermination, come to resemble one another from these factors, as Kenneth Waltz writes, “competition produces a tendency toward sameness of competitors.”\textsuperscript{36} Whether or not this statement is true of the information age lies beyond the scope of this study, but its application to Eckstein’s example of the First Illyrian War is immediately problematic. I share the belief of Classics scholars such as Robert Morstein-Marx, Erich Gruen, and Maurice Holleaux that the Roman Senate did not commit itself in the

\textsuperscript{34} Appian, \textit{Illyrian Wars} 7.2-3; Polybius 2.5.1. Increased raiding concentrated on historical Illyrian targets at Elis and Messenia in the Peloponnesse; in a non-Polybian account, Justin 28.2.14.

\textsuperscript{35} Eckstein, \textit{Roman Enters the Greek East}, 38.

Greek East until late in the Republican period. It is particularly true of the period before the second century BCE that the Romans simply possessed greater concerns than participation in the Greek East. At the same time that the Romans first engaged in eastern politics, Hannibal of Carthage threatened the Italian heartland, and Gallic tribes continued to pose a serious threat in the Po river valley. Competition may produce similarity in competitors, but the Romans had not yet chosen to compete. Instead, the Roman Senate participated in the Illyrian Crisis on the basis of its unique concerns and, when these had been resolved, returned to the Italian peninsula without any thought or care for the resulting vacuum.

The nature of the Roman Senate as an actor brings up the second problem with Eckstein’s (IR) Realist model, which is the tendency to treat the state as a unitary actor. This arises from the necessity of dismissing the ideological and practical differences of government factions and the individual as subordinate factors to the self-aggrandizing behavior of the state. Imagine, for example, a state that includes two dominant political factions with opposing foreign policy plans; perhaps one of these plans is the self-destructive project of a demagogue. Nevertheless, if we say that the primary influence on this state’s behavior is a cold assessment of its security situation then we will have to plane out these internal differences in order to create the conditions for a unitary response. This claim is especially difficult to apply as an attribute to the Roman Senate because of the level of independence that individual Roman senators had in the creation of foreign policy. After assuming a magistracy, which was itself acquired in large part through personal and familial authority, there was little incentive for a senator to treat his post in a manner similar to his predecessor. The life of a Roman politician was an extremely expensive affair, and, as we see especially in the late Republican period, a tenure as a magistrate in the provinces was often

38 Strabo 5.1.6: The Boii, after their alliance with Hannibal in the Second Punic War, continued to represent a nuisance until the Romans forced their migration to an area contiguous with ancient Illyria; Livy 34.48: Livy states that some of his sources believed that Scipio ravaged the lands of the Boii and the Ligurians at the time of the Second Macedonian War. Whether or not this actually occurred, that Livy considers it a plausible option implies that he could understand northern Italian peoples as a military threat in the second century BCE.
the best opportunity to recoup losses while at the same time contributing to his personal reputation. This happened in some cases through the ruinous taxation of provincial populations, but also commonly led to unprovoked warfare against neighboring peoples. For instance, some scholars believe that M. Licinius Crassus, living in the first century BCE, desired the governorship of Syria and his subsequent war with the Parthians because of the mounting inequality of his personal prestige compared to his partners in the First Triumvirate. In the Roman Republic, there was no constitutional check against the interpretation of Rome’s foreign affairs through the interest of private individuals, and without this it was impossible for the state to behave as a unitary actor: the self-aggrandizing action of individuals contra the public interest may well have had a greater influence on Roman history than the unitary self-aggrandizement of the state itself.

The bottom line of all this is that the (IR) Realist paradigm is unsuitable for the study of Greco-Roman antiquity because it forces a uniformity upon the motivations and disposition of states that is demonstrably absent. Nevertheless, we can retain some of the attractive features of Realism, such as its description of the state system as an anarchic disorder, if we consider it through the lens of the competing theory of International Relations (IR) Constructivism. Alexander Wendt, a prominent Constructivist, describes Realism as a theory that privileges structure over process. (IR) Constructivism, on the other hand, maintains that individual states participate in the international system on the basis of meanings and understandings of relationships that they develop for themselves, as Wendt writes:

The distribution of power may always affect states’ calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the “distribution of knowledge,” that constitutes their conception of self and other.

Constructivism stresses the point that states will begin and develop their relationships with an uneven balance of knowledge. This balance is uneven because states inform their interactions with one another on the basis of differing historical and ideological traditions. From this point, the international system itself

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42 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 397.
is a social construction based around the imperfect knowledge of its constituent units. The Realist perspective is inadequate in this regard because of its theoretical reliance on a uniformity of discourse. This uniformity assumes that the interactions of states within a system will come to mirror one another, and that this standard discourse will, with time, dominate preexisting systems of meaning. The problem with this when considering the Greco-Roman world is that state-actors occupied wildly different postings on the distribution of knowledge. Greeks and Romans possessed varying levels of information about one another, and drew upon different fields of historical and cultural example when attempting to frame their behavior to meet new challenges.

The ultimate stake in this project’s adoption of (IR) Constructivism as a theoretical framework is the relevance of the individual characteristics of a small state such as Athens to the creation of tangible political realities. Throughout their involvement with agents of the Roman Republic, the Athenians engaged in a consistent program of diplomacy that held as its apparent object the cultivation of their state, in the eyes of the Romans, as a friend and partner in the often volatile conditions of the East. The effectiveness of this effort assumes the ability of language to influence actors to make decisions that exceed or contradict the behavior that we would expect from them if solely concerned with preservation. The objective of the chapters to come will be to show precisely this.

Chapter 3 – Greek and Roman Concepts of Alliance and Obligation

When the Romans first began to participate in the politics of the Greek East at the conclusion of the third century BCE, they entered a state system vastly different from that of their Italian experience. In contrast to the unchallenged supremacy of Rome on the Italian peninsula, a diverse collection of polities controlled the levers of power in the eastern Mediterranean basin. The chief characteristic of the system that emerged from this distribution of power was the endemic warfare that marks the Hellenistic Age as a near perfect exemplar of the anarchic disorder; however, the simultaneous development of sophisticated diplomatic procedures forestalls this title. During this period, the diplomats and politicians of Greek states
made use of a diplomatic language that possessed a high degree of normative meaning and that could, when properly employed, moderate the violent conditions of the time. When the Romans arrived in the Greek East, they understood the language of Greek political actors through the lens of parallel terms in the Latin language, and on the short term this condition was beneficial to both Greek and Roman. In the Greek language, the word for alliance (“συμμαχία”) was a technical category for a relationship of mutual obligation between two actors that possessed at least internal sovereignty. While there did exist a term for treaty (“foedus”) in the Latin language, the Romans instead used the word for partnership (“societas”) to translate the Greek term for alliance (“συμμαχία”). This distinction benefitted Greek actors because they were able to make use of the propagandistic value of naming themselves a Roman ally even if they lacked the formal grant of a treaty (“foedus”). At the same time, Romans were able to benefit from the normative expectations of alliance (“συμμαχία”) without taking on real obligations to foreign powers.

The objective of the current chapter is to summarize the distinction between Greek and Roman conceptions of alliance and, in doing so, to begin to explain the utility of the word alliance (“συμμαχία”) as a motif of Athenian inscriptions. I will make this argument through an analysis of the literary use of each term, and will, wherever possible, confirm the definitions that I reach with reference to secondary authors. The first section of this analysis will deal with the Greek term for alliance (“συμμαχία”), and will seek to define the term as a technical descriptor that assigns definite obligations to the contracting parties. After that, I will argue that while the term is often applied to relationships between unequal actors, it is a fundamental characteristic of alliance (“συμμαχία”) that each party retain its own internal sovereignty. In contrast to these features, the Latin term for partnership (“societas”) describes informal relationships such as the moral bond of political confederates and the social contract between citizens. The common feature of all partnerships (“societates”), as I shall argue through a review of the primary source record, is that they are essentially a moral institution, and therefore only persist as long as the good faith of either party.

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After this, I will then conclude with a consideration of the utility of alliance (“συμμαχία”) for the Athenians, and will argue that the discontinuity of this term with the Latin created more opportunity than detriment.

Perhaps the most sophisticated discussion of the alliance (“συμμαχία”) to appear in an ancient author is that which accompanies Thucydides’ narration of the events preceding the Peloponnesian War. At this juncture, Thucydides tells us that the Athenian assembly has convened to discuss the possibility of beginning a formal diplomatic relationship with the island of Corcyra. The immediate issue that faces the assembled Athenians is that the Corcyrans hope to begin a very particular relationship, the alliance (“συμμαχία”), which would oblige them to engage in warfare with Corcyra’s enemies. This is a request with far-reaching implications for the Athenians, as at that time the Corcyrans were engaged in a protracted struggle with Corinth, itself a member of the Peloponnesian League. Because of this, the Athenians of Thucydides’ account have to weigh the fact that an alliance (“συμμαχία”) could provoke a more serious struggle with Sparta and the states of the Peloponness. This was too great a risk for the Athenians, who chose instead to join themselves to Corcyra in a strictly defensive alliance (“ἐπιμαχία”). By placing this decision in the mouth of his characters, Thucydides provides the reader with a negative definition of the full alliance (“συμμαχία”): it is a form of military alliance that creates a binding and reciprocal obligation between two actors to participate in offensive and defensive. The final form of this relationship is a connection so close that, as Thucydides wrote, the contracting states “…reckon the same friends and enemies.” It is clear, therefore, that the alliance (“συμμαχία”) of Thucydides’ day in the fifth century BCE was a diplomatic relationship with the technical implication of creating obligation between actors; however, it remains to be seen whether this definition stood the test of time.

44 Thucydides 1.44: “Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δίς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἢσσον τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέχαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραῖοι εὐμμαχίαν…”
46 Thucydides 1.44: “…ἐπιμαχίαν δὲ ἐποίησαν τῇ ἄλλῃ λόγῳ…”
47 Thucydides 1.44: “…ὁστε τοὺς αὐτούς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν…”. 
There is good reason to think that Greek actors would have developed a cynical view of the alliance ("συμμαχία") as an instrument for the control of lesser regional actors in the Hellenistic period. After Philip III of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great, defeated a confederation of free Greek states including the Athenians at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE, he compelled the defeated to join the League of Corinth.\textsuperscript{48} The purpose of the League of Corinth was, in effect, to serve an administrative role in the establishment of a Macedonian hegemony over Greece proper. It accomplished this through the prescription of a number of obligations to each member state, as Diodorus wrote: “…Philip set the number of soldiers for each city to contribute to the alliance ("συμμαχία"), and returned to Macedonia.”\textsuperscript{49} The immediate distinction between the sort of alliance enshrined in the League of Corinth and that contemplated between the Athenians and the Corcyrans is the status of the actors. Unlike the Thucydidean scenario, the member states of the League of Corinth were clear subjects to the Macedonian crown; however, I will argue that a crucial attribute underpinning the ability of these states to participate in alliance ("συμμαχία") is the fact that they retained some measure of internal sovereignty.

It was often the case in the ancient world that vast discrepancies existed between the relative power of alliance partners, but even the most marginal states were able to benefit from institutions of diplomacy such as the alliance provided that they maintained this internal sovereignty. The geographer Strabo provides an important example of the standards for this status when he pauses in his description of Anatolia to discuss the history of a confederation of Lycian-Greek cities. According to Strabo, these cities had previously conducted an independent foreign policy, but had ceased to do so under the Romans:

In earlier times [the Lycian assembly] would deliberate about war and peace and alliance ("συμμαχίας"), but now they naturally do not do so, since these matters necessarily lie in the power of the Romans, except, perhaps, when the Romans should give them permission or it should be for their benefit.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{49} Diodorus 16.89.3.
\textsuperscript{50} Strabo 14.3.
The decision on the part of the Lycian-Greeks to discontinue an independent foreign policy had nothing to do with the fact that the Romans were a greater power, but instead relates to the capacity of those cities to pass the final judgment on their own affairs. When this ability was delegated to the Romans, the status of the Lycian state fell below the necessary threshold to conduct diplomatic activities such as the alliance. It might appear at first that this befell the Lycians merely because a more powerful state engulfed them, but Strabo makes it clear in a later episode that institutions such as the alliance prevented this. According to Strabo, the Romans refused to intervene in the internal affairs of Cappadocia because they had a pre-existing alliance.\(^{51}\) The Cappadocians were, of course, a marginal actor in contemporary politics, but Strabo maintains that their state’s capacity to maintain the institution of alliance excluded Roman interference. After taking all of this into account, we can again establish a definition of the alliance ("συμμαχία") as a technical institution of Greek diplomacy that was predicated upon the internal sovereignty of either actor.

In addition to this, the Greek alliance ("συμμαχία") also established a sense of obligation between partners that ran in both directions and existed regardless of their relative power or authority. Diodorus provides an example of exactly this in his narration of Alexander the Great’s eastern campaigns, when he writes that “…Alexander forced Sasibisare to carry out his orders after he struck down the King, who was found wanting in his alliance ("συμμαχία") with Porus.”\(^{52}\) It is interesting to note that the alliance in this passage exists as a relationship between two clients of the hegemon, Alexander the Great. The fact that Alexander’s power outstrips that of Sasibisare and Porus is itself insignificant in this episode. What does matter is that Sasibisare was unable to fulfill his obligation to Porus, an obligation that could only exist because he was responsible for his actions and therefore able to participate in alliance ("συμμαχία").

As we saw in Thucydides’ description of the Athenians’ defensive alliance with Corecyra, the possibility that an alliance ("συμμαχία") could create undesired obligations to other actors was both an

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\(^{51}\) Strabo 12.1.11.

\(^{52}\) Diodorus 17.90.4: “ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος τὸν ὑπερηφάντα τῆς τοῦ Πώρου συμμαχίας βασιλέα ὄνομα Σασιβισάρην καταπληξίμησεν ἡνάγκασε ποιεῖν τὸ προστατόμενον…”
integral feature of the alliance and a substantial concern for contracting parties. This same concern arises in the Greek historian and biographer Plutarch’s description of Cato the Elder’s campaigns against the native peoples of Spain. Before he ascended to his greatest celebrity as a senior statesman, Cato served for a term as governor of the consular province of Hispania Citerior. Now, the three provinces of Hispania were, and would be for some time, the scene of considerable local resistance to Roman rule, and Cato’s consulship was unexceptional in this regard. According to Plutarch, a tribal group from the uncontrolled interior invaded Cato’s province soon after his arrival in the region, and facing this threat with limited resources he chose to enter an alliance (“συμμαχία”) with a local Celtiberian tribe to prevent the utter destruction of his garrison. In Plutarch’s account, the immediate concern of Cato’s subordinates, upon hearing that he intends to enter this pact, is that it will create an inconvenient obligation for the Romans after their victory. Plutarch has Cato, answering this concern, state that “…there was nothing terrible in it; should they be victorious, they could pay the price with the spoils taken from the enemy, and not out of their own purse. Whereas, should they fall, there would be nobody left either to pay or ask the price.” Plutarch’s Cato confirms that his creation of an alliance has created an obligation to benefit the Celtiberians, and he is only able to deflect the concern that this provokes for his subordinates by pointing out that, in any case, the problem isn’t theirs to deal with.

Plutarch is a late source, but this episode emphasizes some of the continuities that persisted in the meaning of alliance (“συμμαχία”) to a Greek audience through the period under consideration in this study and beyond. As we saw at the beginning of this section with Athens and Corcyra, the alliance was a relationship with technical parameters and a set sense of obligation, and it was this same set of attributes that informed the behavior of Cato’s subordinates in Plutarch’s account. It is clear, furthermore, that the Celtiberians exist in some sense outside of the capacity of Roman governance to compel their assistance

53 Plutarch, Cato the Elder 10.1.1.
54 Plutarch, Sertorius 6.4: The Marian holdout Sertorius encountered Iberian resistance almost a century later.
55 Plutarch, Cato the Elder 10.1.2-3.
even in a time of the greatest necessity. This is because the Celtiberians were *de facto* an independent people, and it was this independence, as we saw also with the Lycian-Greeks, that made the alliance an appropriate description of their behavior for a Greek historian such as Plutarch. For all these reasons, the alliance ("συμμαχία") was a powerful idea in the eyes of a Greek audience. It was unclear in the case of Rome whether the obligations that the word stood for would come to fruition, but the idea that they might was rooted in the word and becomes a factor in and of itself.

In fact, the Romans felt no obligations to the states that they joined in alliance ("συμμαχία") because they understood this term in translation through their own concept of partnership ("societas"). In contrast to the Greek alliance, the partnership was an informal connection that described connections such as the precarious allegiance of political allies and also the most malleable form of contract in Roman law. This preliminary definition corresponds to a general reevaluation of the term that began with the labors of the scholars behind the monumental *Thesaurus Lingua Latinae*. Prior to this revision, scholars generally understood the word *societas*, which I have translated as *partnership*, to share an etymology with the verb *sequi*, which means “to follow.” If that had been a correct etymology, it would have fit comfortably with the popular conception of the most famous *societas*, that between Rome and its Italian clients; however, it would have been less comfortable as a descriptor for the second triumvirate in Suetonius. The revised account of the *Thesaurus Lingua Latinae* shifts this etymology of the term from the root “to follow” to a separate proto-Indo-European stem meaning “friend.” This shifts the assertion of Suetonius’ that a partnership ("societas") existed between the triumvirs from uncertain hierarchy to informal pact, and also, as I shall now argue, agrees with the use of the word in the historical record more generally.

The common appearance of the word partnership ("societas") as a description of the relationship between actors in Livy’s historical works of the first century BCE has contributed a great deal to the view

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57 R. M. Ogilvie, a review of “Untersuchungen zu den lateinischen Begriffen Socius und Societas,” *The Classical Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1970) 209-211. “Socius is to be associated not with sequor and related I.E. words, which imply a degree of dependence, but with Sanskrit sakhi-and the meaning should be ‘a friend.’”

58 Suetonius, *Divus Augustus* 13.1: “[Augustus] conducted his beginnings in the partnership ("societas") of Antonius and Lepidus, and also the Philippian War, though he was sickly and weak.”
that it signifies a formal relationship such as the Greek alliance (“συμμαχία”); however, the term’s earliest appearance in the corpus points instead to its quality as a status preliminary to such a formal connection. This appearance occurs during Livy’s narration of the events surrounding the legendary foundation of Rome in 753 BCE when, according to the historian, an eclectic band of vagrants and herdsmen were the sole inhabitants of the city itself. While in other respects their future prospects seemed promising, the Romans faced a significant demographic problem in the complete lack of a female population:

Already the Roman community was so vibrant that it was the equal in warfare to any of the neighboring states, but a great scarcity of women was about to leave barren a generation of men, for whom there was neither the hope of a household nor the union of offspring with the neighboring peoples. From this, and with the council of the fathers, Romulus sent envoys all around to the neighboring peoples, so that they might seek out partnership (“societatem”) and intermarriage (“conubium”) with a new people.\(^59\)

The use of the word intermarriage (“conubium”) alongside partnership in this passage sheds some light on the significance of partnership in Livy’s narration. According to Gaius, the word “conubium” refers to a status where “… [it] comes about that children follow the condition of the father.”\(^60\) The interest of Livy’s Romans in this passage is, therefore, the creation of a partnership for the sake of their posterity, but the events to follow discourage us from completely disassociating partnership from more formal processes. In a famous episode, the Romans, rebuffed in their previous effort to secure wives, steal them from the neighboring Sabines.\(^61\) After a violent confrontation between the men of each community, the realization that the nuptials and pregnancies of the kidnapped women have already merged their communities leads to the creation of a more formal connection, but this is not the partnership (“societas”) first pursued. Instead, the Romans and the Sabines create a treaty (“foedus”), which we shall encounter repeatedly in this study as a more approximate analog to the alliance (“συμμαχία”) than the informal partnership.

For a Roman audience, the treaty (“foedus”) represented precisely the formal qualities that were lacking in the partnership. As Gladhill has argued in a recent work, the concept of the treaty (“foedus”)  

\(^59\) Livy 1.9.1-2.  
\(^60\) Gaius 1.56.  
\(^61\) Justin 43.3.2.
fulfilled a substantial role in the Roman imagination toward the connections that underpinned compacts ranging from those between political actors to the physical ties that drive the cosmic order. As a political act, the treaty (“foedus”) began for Romans when Jupiter provided his sanction through the ceremonial rites of the fetial priests. This origin instilled a reverence for the particular responsibilities that each treaty (“foedus”) described, and the Romans felt, as a matter of course, that it was their obligation to observe these sanctions out of a sense of religious dread. That this created such a sense of obligation in the international space becomes clear in an episode from the later historian Eutropius, who describes the events that followed from the commander Mancinus’ creation of an undesirable treaty:

…Hostilius Mancinus, consul for the second time, made an infamous peace with the Numantines, which the people and Senate ordered to be broken, and they also ordered that Mancinus himself be handed over to the enemy, so that in his person, which they reckoned the author of the treaty (“foederis”), they might vindicate the slight of a broken treaty (“foederis”).

According to Eutropius, C. Hostilius Mancinus created a treaty (“foedus”) that contradicted the intent of the Roman Senate in their dealings with the Numantines, but the senators were unable to simply disregard the treaty because of the solemnity of that compact: they instead attempt to circumvent the problem. This implicitly confirms the reading that the creation of a treaty (“foedus”) established inviolable obligations when Eutropius tells us that the senatorial fathers chose the extreme course of abrogating responsibility away from the Roman Republic to the person of Mancinus. With respect to the previous episode concerning the Sabine women, it becomes clear that the creation of a treaty (“foedus”) represented an escalation in that relationship to a level of formal obligation missing in the partnership (“societas”).

Other descriptions of partnership (“societas”) in Livy confirm its preliminary character while also reinforcing the term’s definition as an informal connection. The creation of a pact between the Romans and the Numidiman King Syphax found in the twenty-fourth book of Livy is one example of this. At this

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63 F. W. Walbank, “Roman Declaration of War in the Third and Second Centuries,” *Classical Philology*, Vol. 44 (1949): 18. Prior to the period of expansion, the ability to declare war had rested on the authority of the fetial priests, but in the mid-third century BCE this responsibility shifted toward senatorial legates.
64 Eutropius 4.17.2.
juncture, the Romans hope to secure an agreement for Syphax to sustain his current conflict with the Carthaginians. When the Roman legation offers the creation of a diplomatic compact to Syphax, Livy describes this relationship as a friendship and partnership (“amicitiam societatemque”). After some consideration, Syphax determines to reject this initial proposal, and instead demands to swear a formal oath in the presence of the Romans’ commander. This first proposal to enter a partnership (“societas”) was insufficient for Syphax because it provided too little assurance that the Romans would provide him with support, and instead he wants to enter into a relationship that Livy calls a treaty (“foedus”). It is possible that the Romans mislead the Numidian King in this instance, as Livy tells us that Syphax received nothing from this treaty “…beyond the name.” There are a number of possible explanations for this. As we saw in the case of C. Hostilius Mancinus, the Roman Senate displayed little hesitation in disassociating itself from the undesirable actions of its magistrates. It is also possible that the Romans were able to avoid the fulfillment of their obligations indefinitely provided that they did not deny them as Rome’s relationship with the Numantines demanded. In any case, Livy makes it clear that the preliminary offer of friendship and partnership (“amicitiam societatemque”) was too weak for Syphax, and suggests in his narration that it was reasonable to assume a stronger relationship in the institution of the treaty.

The Roman legal tradition also depicts the partnership (“societas”) as a weak and variable instrument. At the time that Gaius wrote his legal commentaries in the first century CE there were three forms of contract enshrined in Roman law, those being emptio venditio, locatio conductio, and societas.

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65 Livy 24.48.1: “…in the same year, Publius and Gaius Cornelius, because the state of affairs in Hispania was favorable, and because they were receiving many and old partners, and gaining fresh ones, also extended hope into Africa. Syphax was king of the Numidians, suddenly made an enemy to the Carthaginians; they (Publius and Cornelius) sent three centurion envoys to him so that they might promise and make with him friendship and partnership.”
66 Livy 27.17.6.
67 Livy 27.18.8.
68 M. H. Crawford, “Foedus and Sponsio,” Papers of the British School at Rome 41 (1973): 2-3; Livy 24.49.2: “…that Syphax was able to possess nothing beyond the name from the Roman treaty…” This passage points to an interesting discontinuity in the use of foedus in Livy: the foedus was generally and theoretically perpetual, and yet here the word is found three books prior to Scipio creating a foedus with Syphax in Book 27. The answer to this lies, perhaps, in the fact that the foedus of 24 is placed in the mouth of Syphax’ rival Gala, while that of 27 is in Livy’s own voice.
Out of these, the partnership was the most temporary in length and the most malleable in its restrictions, as Gaius wrote: “…partnership ("societas") persists up to this point; that is, so long as [the partners] had continued in the same sense; but at such a time when someone will have renounced the partnership, it is dissolved.” Romans who participated in a legal partnership could abandon this relationship at any point. Gaius does provide the single provision that a Roman could not conclude a partnership in order to alienate his partner from the profits of their mutual labor, but this is a narrow cordon indeed. Gaius’ description of the legal partnership ("societas") emphasizes its nature as a temporary contract subject to rapid changes of condition. Unlike the treaty ("foedus"), which in some instances bound parties to its sanctions regardless of their interests, the partnership ("societas") was a far more flexible instrument.

In addition to its application to international politics and legal contracts, Roman authors also used the informal breadth of partnership ("societas") to describe the social bond between friends and family. The historian Florus, writing in the second century CE during the reign of Hadrian, emphasizes this informality and a corresponding preference for the word treaty ("foedus") when describing formal relationships. Florus uses the word partnership four times throughout his brief rendition of Roman history, and when he does so it is always to describe a temporary relationship of little obligation, such as that which existed between the members of the first triumvirate:

…at a time when each man was advancing in his own glory with shared resources, Caesar invaded Gaul, Crassus invaded Asia, and Pompey invaded Spain; three great armies, and in these the power of the world was held in the partnership ("societate") of the three leading men. That deplorable domination dragged on for ten years due to their reliance, and because they were possessed of mutual fear.

The relationship that existed between the triumvirs was a partnership, and, according to Florus, this was a volatile association. As only the precarious bonds of fear and necessity drew the triumvirs into alignment, their relationship was weak and prone to rupture. Since there was no legal obligation between the triumvirs, Florus is able to appropriately describe it as the most informal of relationships: the partnership.

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69 Gaius 2.152.
70 Florus 2.13.16. The word societas also appears at 1.24.5 and 2.13.1.
Following the death of Crassus at Carrhae in 53 BCE, the partnership between Pompeius Magnus and Julius Caesar fell under mounting pressure as the prerogatives of each man drove them to conflict. According to Florus, the only thing that could still contain this impending breach was the marriage of Pompeius to Caesar’s daughter: “… [Julia], bride to Pompeius, was preserving the concord of father-in-law and son-in-law through the treaty (“foederis”) of marriage.”\(^{71}\) When Julia soon died in childbirth, this eliminated the obligations and expectations of the marriage treaty between her father and husband. As we know from the earlier passage, a partnership (“societas”) existed between Pompeius Magnus and Caesar, but that relationship alone lacked the force to preserve the peace. A similar association appears when Florus describes the rationale of Octavian Augustus for entering the second triumvirate with the remark “…it was necessary to come into the partnership (“societatem”) of the crucelst treaty (“foederis”).”\(^{72}\) In this instance, partnership describes the overarching relationship that the binding treaty exists within. Overall, the word treaty (“foedus”) appears thirty-four times in Florus, and when that author wishes to describe formal compacts and treaties between states it is without question to this word that he turns.

The distinction between the treaty (“foedus”) and the partnership (“societas”) lies in the degree of obligation that each concept implies for the contracting parties. As we saw with the concerns of Syphax and the legal commentary of Gaius, partnership was, for a Roman audience, a relationship that exacted loose and often ill-defined obligations on partners. In contrast, the treaty (“foedus”) bound two or more parties to an expressed set of obligations that could play a substantial role in informing their decisions and capacity for action. It is all the more surprising, therefore, that the Romans almost never described their connections with Greek states as treaties. Indeed, it would seem that the treaty (“foedus”) was a closer approximation to the expectations of the Greek alliance (“συμμαχία”) than the concept of partnership, and yet it is partnership (“societas”) that the Romans used as a corollary to Greek alliance in translation. The

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\(^{71}\) Florus 2.13.17.  
\(^{72}\) Florus 2.16.6.
A precise rationale for this misnomer has been the subject of endless debate, and is ultimately unanswerable, but we can discuss with greater confidence the effect that this had on the discourse of Hellenistic states.

According to I Maccabees, the Jewish people under their leader Judas Maccabee entered into an alliance (“συμμαχία”) with the Romans in the midst of a rebellion against their overlord Antiochus IV. The author of I Maccabees provides the reason for this decision as the fact that “…Judas heard… whoever entered friendship (“φιλία”) with [the Romans] stood with them, and also because they were powerful.” The fidelity that the Romans have demonstrated to their friends and allies in the past also receives emphasis with the remark that “… [the Romans] preserved friendship with their allies and those who were taking security among them… whoever heard their name was fearing them.” Now, it seems doubtful that the nascent Jewish state, locked in an existential struggle with Antiochus IV Epiphanes, could expect to receive material assistance from the Roman Republic. Some time ago, Sara Mandell posed the question “Did the Maccabees believe that they had a valid treaty with Rome?” Mandell’s conclusion was that they did believe this because of the mistaken assumption that their alliance (“συμμαχία”) was equivalent to the Roman alliance (“foedus”), when in fact they possessed only an informal partnership (“societas”). This claim that the Maccabees failed to grasp the language of Roman diplomacy at such a fundamental level is unnecessary. Mandell’s argument falls into the trap of assuming that the Maccabees considered a Roman alliance important because of the realization of what it signifies, the arrival of Roman legions, instead of the capacity of language to benefit the Maccabees in and of itself. This latter message is, in fact, the one that carries through the text, which devotes considerable space to describing the psychological effect of Roman power without any mention of the physical benefits of

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73 1 Maccabees 12.3.
74 1 Maccabees 8.1: “καὶ ἤκουσεν Ἰουδας τὸ ἱδρύμα τῶν Ρωμαίων ὅτι εἰσὶν δυνατοὶ ἰσχύς καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐδοκοῦσιν ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς προσκυνημένοις αὐτοῖς καὶ δοσὶ ἐν προσέλθωσιν αὐτοῖς ἱστώσιν αὐτοίς φιλίαν καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶ δυνατοί…”
75 1 Maccabees 8.12 “καὶ κατεκράτησαν τῶν βασιλέων τῶν ἑγγύς καὶ τῶν μακράν καὶ δοσὶ ἦκουν τὸ ἱδρύμα αὐτῶν ἐφοβοῦντο ἀπ’ αὐτῶν…”
77 Sara R. Mandell, “Did the Maccabees Believe That They Had a Valid Treaty with Rome?” 203.
alliance. The situation was dire, and the Maccabees had learned that in a volatile world the idea of a Roman alliance could be the strongest deterrent to the aggression of the Seleucid monarchy.

One of the exceptional features of the Athenians at the start of the second century BCE is that they demonstrated an understanding of the practical benefits of this exact idea from an early stage. The Athenians, as we shall see in chapter 5, almost certainly lacked a formal treaty ("foedus") with Rome throughout the period under consideration. Nevertheless, the Athenians erected dozens of monuments over the course of the century preceding their incorporation into the province of Achaia (27 BCE) that described their alliance ("συμμαχία") with the Romans. For a Greek audience, this term implied a formal connection between Athens and Rome and the assurance that the Romans would ensure the security of the lesser state. This was not the case for the Romans, who would have interpreted this relationship through the concept of informal partnership ("societas"); however, the distinction benefitted both parties. The Athenians were able to claim the idea of Roman alliance and everything that this implied for their strategic situation while, at the same time, the Romans were able to nurture a friendship with the Athenians while still maintaining a noncommittal policy toward the Greek East. It was in this way, with the appearance of benefit for all, that the first seeds of subjugation swept east.

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78 1 Maccabees 8.1 (Military reputation of the Romans); 8.3-4 (Reputation of Roman’s as careful military planners); 8.5-6 (Roman defeat of Hellenistic monarchs); 8.13 (Capacity of the Roman to make and ruin monarchs).
Chapter 4: Greek and Roman International Friendship

In recent years, the concept of “friendship” has undergone considerable reassessment as a structural component of both interpersonal and interstate relationship in antiquity. The terms for friendship, amicitia and φιλία, are among the most frequent descriptors of Greco-Roman interstate relationships; however, scholars have tended in the past to dismiss the importance of the term on the basis of legalistic readings of the source materials. This view follows the assumption that friendship is an equal affair and, as such, its appearance as a connection between unequal states such as the Roman Republic and Athens comes to resemble a transparent euphemism. It was, as Burton writes, for this reason that early theorists of Greco-Roman International Relations landed upon clientship as a “more precise social analogue than [friendship].” The immediate error of this choice lies with its preference for the perceived accuracy of a term in the eyes of modern scholars over the efficacy of language itself. Despite the evident disparity between the highly asymmetrical Mediterranean state system and the ideal of friendship as an equal relationship, the latter, as we shall see, persisted as a norm of interstate relations at least until the end of the period under consideration. This had little to do with any misconceptions about

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79 Earlier accounts tend to describe friendship as either one level in a formal categorization of Roman diplomatic contacts or as a euphemism for relationships of direct asymmetry. The prior stems from the categories of Theodore Mommsen, for which see: Louise E. Mattheai, “On the Classification of Roman Allies,” *The Classical Quarterly* 1 (1907): 184. A more recent offspring of this paradigm is Sherwin-White’s claim that “Amicitia by itself was at most a transitional stage between open enmity or the absence of any previous relationship... and the regulated status of amicus et socius.” See: A. Sherwin White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C. to A.D. 1*, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1984): 64. The latter claim, that international friendship was largely euphemism, stems from Badian: Ernst Badian, *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.)*, (Oxford University Press, 1958): 42. Burton has accused both traditions of excessive formalism and a resemblance to International Relations (IR) Realism, and argues instead for a Constructivist account: Paul J. Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy in the Middle Republic (356-143 BC)*, (Cambridge University Press, 2011): esp. 15-27. Konstan has likewise argued for the significance of friendship as a motif in Greek and Roman political life: David Konstan, “Greek Friendship,” *The American Journal of Philology* 117 (1996): 75.

80 Gruen summarizes the typical claim that amicitia was a euphemistic title for Rome’s imperial relationships: “In short, the device served as a cynical instrument, a means to establish and expand Roman supremacy, a principal channel of Roman imperialism.” Erich Gruen, *The Hellenistic World*, 53-54. Harris adds to the initial claim the point that the titles socii and amici were applied to both provincial and foreign peoples, but does not account for the considerations of non-Roman parties: W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, 135-136.

81 Burton, *Friendship and Empire*, 4.
the balance of power relations, but instead reflects the capacity of the language of friendship to affect actors and the overall course of events.

The objective of the present chapter will be the twofold task of developing the concept of international friendship with due attention to ongoing debates in the scholarship while also conducting a systematic review of amicitia and φιλία as they appear in our sources. As we shall see, a fundamental component of the friendship of Greco-Roman states is the employment of gift-exchange and misrecognition strategies to preserve the appearance of equality. This dynamic was necessary because of an inherent tension between the utility of friendship and claims to equality between friends. The enactment of this discourse was desirable, in the end, because it allowed the lesser party to accrue concrete benefits under the guise of equality while the senior partner, the Roman Republic, was able to maintain its leading position in the Mediterranean state system without accumulating obligations.\(^{82}\) The first section of this chapter will consider the connection between friendship and obligation through a brief consideration of the Latin concept of fides (“good faith”), and from there will turn to the subject of gift exchange as a diplomatic strategy and bulwark of Greco-Roman friendship. This will lead to the body of the present chapter, which will consider distinctions between Greek and Roman conceptions of friendship through an analysis of friendship language in their respective historiographic traditions. In doing so, I shall argue that while, in the first place, Greek and Roman authors shared a notion of equal interstate friendship, the Roman variant ultimately militates toward an asymmetry absent in the Greek.

In making this argument I will frequently refer to definitions and examples drawn from the philosophical works of Cicero and Seneca. This may appear problematic at first, for it seems plausible that friendship as an institution of international relations could evolve on a trajectory distinct from the literary tradition of the elite; however, there exists an intrinsic connection between interpersonal and interstate friendship in the Roman tradition. Throughout the Republican period, the Roman government

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\(^{82}\) Holleaux is the original proponent of the thesis that Rome was a disinterested participant in the Greek world until a late stage, for which see: Maurice Holleaux, “Philip Against the Romans,” In The Cambridge Ancient History vol. VIII, (Cambridge University Press, 1930): 136-137.
maintained a number of lists enumerating its foreign contacts entitled the *formula amicorum* ("list of friends"). Our knowledge of the precise identity of this register remains complicated as a result of the paucity of evidence and the ongoing dispute as to whether it was distinct from other registers, such as the *formula sociorum*, but what we can say without controversy is telling. In the year 78 BCE, during the consulship of Q. Lutatius Catulus and M. Aemelius Lepidus, the Roman Senate issued a decree conferring the title of *amicus* ("friends") on three Greek naval officers through their enrollment in *amicorum formula*. The historian Appian claims that six years earlier, in 84 BCE, the Roman general L. Cornelius Sulla inscribed ("ἀνέγραφε") the peoples of Ilium, Chios, Lycia, Rhodes and Magnesia as friends of the Roman people. This is almost certainly the same register that bore the names of the Greek officers, which means that the list treated together the friendship of both men and states.

It is with good reason, therefore, that we can proceed with the understanding that there was, for a Roman audience, an innate connection between the *amicitia* of individuals and that of states. The essence of this nomenclature was, in the words of Erich Gruen, "a description of the relationship, not a tool which allowed Rome to make claims or lay obligations." It is axiomatic of friendship, furthermore, that its only foundation is the good faith of each partner, as Cicero wrote: "...good faith, moreover, is the foundation of the stability and constancy which we seek in friendship; for, nothing is stable which is faithless." Friendship, whether of the international or interpersonal variety, begins with a leap of faith on the part of each potential friend. The creation of true intimacy mandates the exposure of a level of the self

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83 During the Republican period the Senate possessed the ultimate authority to confer the titles *socius* and *amicus* to foreign rulers. Magistrates in the provinces did assign the title, but in theory this action required the subsequent confirmation of the Senate: David C. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King*, (St. Martin’s Press, 1984): 24-25; the spelling *amicorum* instead of the expected *amicorum* reflects the tendency in Latin inscriptions to record long sound values as diphthongs rather than long vowels.

84 According to Bowman, the *formula amicorum* was a development from an earlier *formula sociorum*. The purpose of both lists was to identify delegations entitled to a formal reception and lodging in Rome: Deny A. Bowman, “The *Formula Sociorum* in the Second and First Centuries B.C.,” *The Classical Journal* 85, no.4 (1990): 335.


87 Burton, *Friendship and Empire*, 83.


89 Cicero, *de Amicitia* 65.
that is vulnerable in the most basic sense, and the only obstacle to the exploitation of this vulnerability is, indeed, the *fides* of the opposite party. Roman conventions governing the inception of one form of international friendship mirror this procedure.\(^90\) In circumstances when a sovereign state surrenders itself to representatives of the Roman Republic, our sources frequently describe the act as entering *in fidem populi Romani*.\(^91\) The significance of this act was that the surrendering state placed itself completely at the mercy of the other party, which was expected to dispense a fair judgment in response.\(^92\)

The abortive surrender of the Aetolian League to the Roman consul M.‘ Acilius Glabrio in 191 BCE is the *locus classicus* for the assumption of absolute control through surrender *in fidem*. At this juncture, the Aetolian League had embarked upon a disastrous war with the Roman Republic alongside the Seleucid Empire.\(^93\) The relationship between the Aetolian League and the Roman Republic began in 211 BCE, when the two parties formalized a *foedus* (“treaty”) in the interest of together opposing their mutual enemy, Philip V of Macedon.\(^94\) Over the course of the succeeding years, this bond survived a number of challenges, not least of which was the Aetolians’ violation of the Roman *foedus* through their pursuit of a unilateral peace agreement with Philip V in 205 BCE.\(^95\) The true break occurred, however, in the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War (200-197 BCE), when the Romans elected to retain the “fetters of Greece,” the fortress cities of Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias.\(^96\) This factor, alongside the

\(^90\) Burton, *Friendship and Empire*, 79. Burton divides the paths for the inception of international friendship into those formed through (1) military cooperation, (2) diplomacy, (3) voluntary surrender, and (4) surrender under duress. The latter routes are both forms of *deditio*; these largely correspond to the categories of Gruen, who described the international friendships of Rome as beginning through military cooperation or the cessation of hostilities, see: Gruen, *The Hellenistic World*, 86.

\(^91\) Examples include the surrender of Jerusalem to Pompey Magnus (Eutropius 6.14.9), Nabis of Sparta’s surrender to the consul T. Quinctius (Livy 34.35), and the voluntary surrender of the Remi to Caesar (*The Gallic Wars*, 2.3.2).\(^92\) Paul J. Burton, “Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Surrender during the Roman Republic: A Constructivist View,” *The International History Review* 31 (2009): 245.


\(^96\) Polybius 18.45.5-6; the “fetters of Greece” were the most significant fortresses in the network of garrisons that the Antigonids had maintained in southern Greece since the early decades of the third century BCE. The utility of these sites was that their geographical distribution allowed the Antigonids to control access and communications into and throughout Greece at the relatively token cost of maintaining mercenary troops, see: Winthrop Lindsay Adams, “Alexander’s Successors to 221 BC,” in *A Companion to Ancient Macedon*, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 221.
failure of the Aetolians to satisfy their goals for territorial acquisitions in the preceding conflict, led their leadership to an alliance with the Seleucid Empire in coalition against the Roman Republic. The Seleucid dynasty, Antiochus III, failed to live up to the expectations of the Aetolians, who soon found themselves in the position of seeking a conclusion to hostilities. In the Livian account, the leader of the subsequent Aetolian legation consigns the fate of his state to the Roman Republic, stating that “…the Aetolians hand over themselves and all their affairs to the faith of the Roman people.” The response of the Roman envoy, “…consider most carefully, Aetolians, that you would surrender thus,” foreshadows the significance of the surrender in fidem for a Roman audience: it is more than rhetoric, and indicates the placement of the subordinate party fully at the mercy of the conqueror. As we shall see in the Greek sections of the analysis, moralizing language will often accompany the Hellenistic diplomatic vocabulary; however, this seems to have lacked an immediate connection with the power dynamic of two parties as, in fact, Livy places in the mouth of the Greek spokesman when the enactment of Roman good faith lands him in chains: “…we handed ourselves over into your faith, and not into slavery.”

The episode considered above concludes with the relegation of the Aetolian peoples to the position, uncommon for this period, of unambiguous subordination to the Roman Republic, but this does not seem to have been the norm. According to Eutropius, the Roman invasion of Sicily in 263 BCE provoked the preemptive surrender of fifty-two cities, which were received into the good faith of Rome (“in fidem acceptae”). The ramifications of this surrender for the sovereignty of these cities remain a point of controversy. According to Cicero, less than ten Sicilian city-states possessed formal relations with the Roman Republic in the first century BCE, as he writes: “There are two states with treaties…Mamertina and Tauromena, beyond these there are five states, free and immune from taxation, without

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97 The Aetolian League sought the control of a number of cities in Thessaly, see: Walbank, *The Hellenistic World*, 237; the Roman-Aetolian treaty of 211 BCE guaranteed for the Aetolians the ownership of any captured cities. 98 Livy 36.27.1. 99 Livy 36.28.1. 100 Livy 36.28.2. 101 Livy 36.28.3 102 Eutropius 2.19.2; Diodorus 23.4.1 lists the number of cities at sixty-seven; Burton, *Friendship and Empire*, 142.
For Badian, this was a principle argument for the moral basis of Roman international contact as an expansion of the domestic institution of the client-patron relationship. However, as Burton has pointed out, this assessment fails to account for the language of our sources, which overwhelmingly employ the language of friendship to describe the Roman Republic’s extra-legal relationships with foreign states. Cicero, speaking of the fate of the Sicilian city-states in his Second Verrines, states “…and so we accepted the Sicilian states into friendship and good faith with the result that they were in possession of the same law to which they had been accustomed, that is, in the same condition.” Instead of taking on the status of Roman clients, one of abject subordination in the Roman imagination, the Sicilian city-states pass from surrender to the privileged status of friendship.

It is easy to understand why Badian saw something of the client in the institution of international friendship if, following a commendable instinct, we find it difficult to call friendship an unequal game; however, it is the sobering truth that international friendship is unable to perpetuate without inequity. When two friends engage with one another, there is always a temporal lag between the provision of kindness or favors on the part of one friend and reciprocation from the other. This dynamic creates a state of affairs where one friend stands in a position of moral superiority, as Burton writes: “…asymmetries can never be smoothed out of friendship: at any given point… one friend is always in the position of having (over)benefitted the other, while the other is… in the subordinate position of having to reciprocate.” This paradigm allows us to shed some light on a number of instances in Greco-Roman history when friends of the Roman Republic were able to, so to say, punch above their weight on account of friendship. In the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War (171-168 BCE), agents of the Roman

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103 Cicero, *In Verrem* 2.3.13.
104 Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 42.
106 Cicero, *In Verrem* 2.3.12.
North  |  35

Republic rewarded their friends, in this case the people of Athens, with the sovereign control of the significant trading center on Delos.\textsuperscript{109} The Athenians had, over the years preceding this grant, provided the Roman Republic with a range of services including the repeated use of their harbor at the Piraeus, the intervention of Athenian legations on behalf of Rome, and military aid.\textsuperscript{110} Following this, an IR Realist account would find some difficulty in addressing the necessity of rewarding tiny Athens within an inherently self-interested anarchic disorder. Such a description would be incomprehensible. The basis for the Roman Republic’s reward of Delos to Athens had little structure other than the good faith of friendship which, as Cicero comments, “…should correspond equally to their benevolence toward us.”\textsuperscript{111}

The existence of friendship between two parties could, in a similar strain, sometimes justify the provision of favorable treatment to states that maintained good faith. In the aftermath of the Aetolian conflict, which I discussed above, a commission of Roman senators orchestrated a settlement of Asian cities formerly belonging to the domain of Antiochus III, as Polybius reports:

However many of the autonomous cities originally paid tribute to Antiochus, but thereafter maintained good faith (“πίστιν”) toward the Romans, these [the Romans] exempted from tribute… and if some, absent from the friendship of the Romans, were fighting alongside Antiochus, these [the Romans] commanded to hand over to Eumenes the tribute previously given to Antiochus.\textsuperscript{112}

The dynamic at work in the passage above is remarkable in both its simplicity and adherence to the norms of friendship as an institution of international relations in the ancient world. We know nothing about the identity of the cities under discussion, aside from their location to the west of the Taurus Mountains, but it is fair to presume that whatever relationship they possessed with Rome was extra-legal.\textsuperscript{113} Taking this into account, the only foundation of these friendships was the good faith of each party, which obliged the Anatolian city-states to turn their backs on Antiochus in favor of their Roman friends. The realization of

\textsuperscript{110} Provision of assistance (Livy 43.6.1); similarity of purpose in diplomacy (Polybius 28.20.1); for a synopsis of Roman usage of the Piraeus in the second century BCE see: Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Antony, 203.
\textsuperscript{111} Cicero, de Amicitia 56.2.
\textsuperscript{112} Polybius 21.46.2-3.
\textsuperscript{113} For discussion see: Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 542-543.
this discourse, that is to say actions undertaken in fulfillment of the normative expectations of friendship, had a genuine impact on the fate of these cities and the systems they comprised. The Anatolian cities acted in good faith, and the Republic reciprocated with exemption from direct rule and from taxation.

In some cases, the remembrance of an old friendship could protect a state from retribution despite the choice of its leading citizens to align themselves against Roman arms. Massalia, a Greek colony founded on the site of modern Marseille in the seventh century BCE, is one such example. According to the traditions of the Romans, their relationship with Massalia began in the fourth century, when the Greeks are said to have provided Rome with relief in the aftermath of the Gallic sack of 393 BCE. Over the course of the next centuries, the Massalians entrenched themselves further as a friend of the Roman Republic through their guardianship over the alpine passes into Cisalpine Gaul, as Strabo reports: “… [the Massalians] held out against the barbarians and acquired the Roman friendship: themselves being useful they enacted many things [for the Romans] and [the Romans] took upon themselves the enrichment [of the Massalians].” According to Strabo, therefore, the basis of the Massalian-Roman friendship in the Republican period was an informal exchange of services.

The Massalians, so far as we can say from our sources, were not bound to a formal relationship of reciprocating obligation with the Romans, such as the foedus; however, they did possess the Roman friendship, and this language did concretely affect the state of the city. Thus in the year 218 BCE, according to Livy, it was the Massalians who first warned the Romans that Hannibal had crossed the Alps, and in return received affirmation of their sovereign jurisdiction at the conflict’s end. A potential break in this friendship occurred when, in 49 BCE, the Massalians sided with the faction of Pompeius

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114 Justin 43.9; Justin goes on to make the claim that the Romans bound themselves to the Massalians with an equal treaty (“foedus aequo iure percussum”), but there is little reason to believe this. As Gruen points out, Justin also claims that a foedus has existed from the foundation of both cities (43.5.3); Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 65.
115 Strabo 4.1.5.7.
Magnus against Julius Caesar, but the victorious Caesar chose to spare the Massalians the loss of their ancient sovereignty on account of old friendship, as Strabo reports:

…Caesar and those ruling after him acted with moderation towards the mistakes that occurred in the city, being mindful of its friendship ("φιλίας"), and preserve the self-governance which the city held from its origin. The result of this was that [the Massalians] did not answer to the officials sent into the province.\(^{117}\)

There is a complete absence in this passage of any mention of the infringement of treaties on the part of the Massalians or other legalistic statements that we might expect. It is true, on the other hand, that Strabo is a geographer, not a seasoned politician; however, there is little reason to suspect that he would have missed the rhetoric of broken treaties, had it existed. Instead, Strabo tells his audience only of “mistakes” and “old friendship,” which is perfectly fitting, for it was merely the responsibilities of a friend that led Massalia to this debacle and its consequences.

The use of such moralizing language in diplomatic texts significantly precedes the arrival of Romans in the Greek East, and in those texts is closely linked with the issue of sovereignty. This surfaces in the Athenian epigraphic record in the period before the Macedonian domination with simple phrases like “…let the friendship and alliance be defended,”\(^{118}\) and often accompanies statements of oath or ritual, as in “…the Athenians have enacted the friendship and oaths, which the King [of Persia] and the Athenians swore.”\(^{119}\) This pattern of expression comes to a halt after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE, from which point the Athenians exchanged their sovereignty for a series of Macedonian garrisons. Typical of this period, instead of the language of friendship and oaths, is an emphasis on a relationship of benefaction between the city and Macedonian rule. For instance, an inscription from after 276 BCE describes Antigonus II Gonatas as “savior of the Hellenes,” and, in the same document, announces the reward of a gold crown to the local Macedonian commander on account of his “benefaction” and “honor-

\(^{117}\) Strabo 4.1.5.16.  
\(^{118}\) IG II\(^2\) 149.  
\(^{119}\) IG II\(^2\) 35.
loving.”

When, in 266/5 BCE, the Athenians revolted against Antigonid rule, we see a return to the standard template:

After the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and the allies of each established a friendship and common alliance, together they conducted many glorious feats against those enslaving the cities… and they furnished liberty for the other Greeks…

Following the defeat of this insurrection, which followed in short order, the epigraphic record reveals the return of the Macedonian garrison, the commander of which duly “…took from the King the commission for the election of magistrates…” without any mention of oath or friendship.

It is appropriate at this juncture to make a distinction between equality and sovereignty. In the previous body of epigraphic evidence, the Athenian state ceases to publish inscriptions featuring a particular set of terms after its loss of sovereignty. As is evident from the Macedonian’s interference with the election, the Athenians lacked the absolute authority to enforce policy within Athens during this period. Consider, in turn, the value that one of these terms, friendship, held for the Massalians in a scenario of very clear asymmetry. It seems clear, therefore, that the Athenians broke from the traditional diplomatic language of friendship in the third century BCE on account of a loss of sovereign jurisdiction, and not merely because the Macedonians were the greater power. Indeed, the power of friendship as a mode of rhetoric seems often to have been a buttress for the weaker friend, so Dio Cassius tells us that Ptolemy of Egypt sought the friendship of Rome to reinforce his deteriorating control over the internal politics of his own land.

In the process of this, Roman friends were able to maintain the dignity of a sovereign state because of the reciprocal nature of friendship norms, which could, in the language of Burton, place the de

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120 IG II² 677; Janice J. Gabbert, Antigonus II Gonatas: A political Biography, (Routledge, 1997): 27. Gabbert dates this inscription to around 277/76 BCE because of Antigonus’ epithet “the savior,” which he assumed only after his victory over the Gauls in 277, and because the inscription refers directly to the garrison commander’s participation in that contest “…against the barbarians on behalf of Greek safety.”

121 IG II² 687.

122 IG II² 1225; Stephen V. Tracy, Athens and Macedon: Attic Letter Cutters of 300 to 229 B.C., (University of California Press, 2003): 24. The Athenians effaced most references to the Antigonids in their inscriptions during the spring of 200 BCE. This inscription, with the name Antigonus (Ἀντιγόνος) evident, is a rare survivor.

facto weaker party in a position of moral superiority over the Romans. This dynamic provided over-
benefitting states with the leeway to undertake considerable independent action and even, in some cases,
contradict Roman policy decisions without incurring damage to the friendship. So, for instance, Attalus of
Pergamum, a friend of Rome since 209/8 BCE, could the next year undermine Roman efforts to prosecute
the first Macedonian War through the withdraw of his own forces, as Livy reports, “…thereafter, when
the news had arrived that Prusias, King of Bithynia, had crossed over the borders of his kingdom,
[Attalus] returned to Asia.” In a moment of editorial bitterness, Livy follows this narrative segment
with the report that Attalus had departed “…with Roman efforts and the Aetolian war neglected.” This
irritation owes its source, in all probability, to the reliance that the Romans had on local allies to conduct
their eastern wars while their own resources remained in the western Mediterranean to face Carthage.
Livy’s view is one of retrospect; however, there is little reason to think that the inconvenience posed by
the Pergamene withdraw would have failed to arouse similar annoyance from contemporary Romans.
What is striking, therefore, is how little Attalus’ decision affected his subsequent relations with the
Roman Republic. At the Treaty of Phoenice (205 BCE), Roman envoys confirmed Attalus’ possession of
the island of Aegina and his status as a friend of Rome. Within the year, a Roman legation travelled to
Pergamum to retrieve a cult object, the Magna Mater, which Livy claims they had high hopes to obtain on
account of the friendship pact undertaken in the preceding war. This friendship grew further under
Attalus’ successor, Eumenes II, who receive suzerainty over substantial portions of Antiochus III’s
former realm in 188 BCE in the Treaty of Apamea. As this summary of the Roman-Pergamene

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125 Livy 28.7.10.
126 Livy 28.7.10.
127 So absent was Rome that Arthur Eckstein has characterized the conflict as “…the war fought in European Greece
between the Aetolian League and its allies, and Phillip V of Macedon and his allies,” see: Arthur Eckstein, “Greek
129 Polybius 21.45.2.
friendship illustrates, Roman friends were able to maintain considerable independence of action and internal sovereignty if they sustained norms of friendship.

In contrast, Greco-Roman sources often portray the breakdown or dissolution of interstate contact as a failure of friendship. Later in the second century BCE, in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War (171-168 BCE), a Rhodian embassy arrived in Rome to propose mediation. Unfortunately for the Rhodians, the Romans had just learned of their victory over Macedon at the Battle of Pydna, and therefore understood the Rhodians' arrival as a gesture in favor of Macedon. Public favor shifted against the Rhodians in due course, and though they avoided war, which the Romans contemplated, the situation did result in their loss of substantial territories in Asia Minor, as Polybius reports: “…it was necessary that Caria and Lycia and all those be at liberty which [the Senate] allotted to the Rhodians after the Antiochean War.”

131 The condemnation that precedes this in Polybius is overwhelmingly moral, with the historian claiming that “…the sense [of the Senate’s] answer was that, if not for a few of their own friends, and especially through their own action, [the Rhodians] would have known well and correctly that which was fitting for them to incur.”

132 The distinction between this and the previous example when, true enough, Attalus abandoned a Roman war, is that the Rhodians violated the normative requirements of friendship and Attalus did not. Where in Attalus’ case he was able to present his withdraw as necessary to defend Pergamum, the Rhodians’ own contradiction of Roman aims appeared self-serving, as Livy writes: “…if there had been a concern, of the sort which was feigned, then envoys ought to have been sent when Perseus [of Macedon]… was besieging the other cities.”

133 The disruption of the Roman-Rhodian relationship appears, therefore, in both the Roman and Greek traditions as a failure of friendship norms, and correspondingly leads to a tangible decrease in the territorial space of Rhodes.

The expectation on the part of our sources, so evident in Livy, that Roman friends should justify their status as friends through the exchange of services is especially clear in the text of Sallust’s The

131 Polybius 30.5.12.
132 Polybius 30.4.9.
133 Livy 45.3.7.
Jugurthine War. Indeed, it becomes clear that the provision of services to Rome is, in the eyes of Sallust, both a condition for the commencement of friendship and the principle source of its perpetuity. When Bocchus I, the King of Mauretania and confederate of Rome’s enemy, Jugurtha, seeks to switch sides and acquire the Roman friendship, Sallust places the following words in the mouth of the Roman official L. Cornelius Sulla:

… [Sulla] disclosed to [Bocchus]… that the Roman Senate and people… are not soon to consider [him] in their grace… that something should be done for [Rome] which would seem to have benefitted them more than his own interests… that it would be easy, because he was in possession of the plans of Jugurtha, [and] that he would be owed much for this, namely their friendship… 134

The friendship of the Roman State, therefore, is closely connected to the utility of its friends, who themselves participate in the friendship because they receive concrete rewards for their service. Sulla promises Bocchus, for instance, “that part of Numidia, which he was seeking.” 135 Elsewhere in Sallust’s account, he describes the military assistance of Masinissa, a King of the Numidians “accepted into friendship by P. Scipio,” as earning him numerous territorial acquisitions after the conflicts’ end. 136 This reward served the dual purpose, according to Sallust, of rewarding Masinissa and also ensuring that “…the friendship of Masinissa remained good and honorable for us.” 137 Such a friendship is clearly at the discretion of Roman actors at this rather late stage in Rome’s advance to hegemony, but remains notable for the value it retains in the hands of lesser actors.

This trend toward the assertion, on the part of Rome, of its status as the senior partner within international friendships corresponds with an increasing tendency, in Latin sources, to describe these relationships as an act of compulsion toward the lesser party. In the Res Gestae Divi Augusti, an account of Augustus’ accomplishments as the leading man in Rome, the author mentions that “…I compelled the Parthians to return the equipment and banners of three Roman armies to me and, as supplicants, to seek
the friendship of the Roman people."\(^{138}\) The corresponding passage of Eutropius adds that the Parthians handed over hostages to Augustus at this time, although this may just as well have been a desire to remove those individuals from the internecine feuding of the Parthian court.\(^{139}\) In either case, it is clear from the language of the passage that friendship, in the view of imperial policy, was something that could be impressed upon a lesser party. It is, perhaps, further evidence for a shift toward “harsher” friendship language that the Greek text of the \textit{Res Gestae} reads in this place “…I compelled the Parthians to return the equipment and banners of three Roman armies to me and, as supplicants, \textit{to consider worthy} the friendship of the Roman people.”\(^{140}\) It is fairly typical in the \textit{Res Gestae} for the Greek version to tone down the more aggressive language of its Latin counterpart.\(^{141}\) That this occurs in this place, with regard to friendship, could reflect a sensitivity on the part of the Romans that their relationships with Greek city-states within the empire were still often expressed as friendships. This connection, as I hope we have seen by now, was tied to patterns of moralizing discourse and modes of reciprocation intrinsically linked to the good faith and intent of either party. Compulsion simply does not match this.

Over the course of this chapter, we have considered the facility of international friendship, and particularly its discursive norms, to affect the behavior of classical actors per the view of our sources. These connections existed in a state system that grew increasingly asymmetrical as the Roman Republic displaced all other major actors during the long second century BCE. For the most part, the importance of extra-legal connections for lesser states relates directly to their increasing dependence on the good faith of the hegemon, the Roman Republic. This friendship allowed the Anatolian statelets to preserve their autonomy in the aftermath of the Treaty of Apamea (188 BCE), and the Massalians briefly averted their annexation to the province of Transalpine Gaul on account of old friendship. Furthermore, Roman friends

\(^{138}\) \textit{Res Gestae} 29.2.

\(^{139}\) Eutropius 7.9.3.

\(^{140}\) \textit{Res Gestae} 29.2 “Πάρθους τριῶν στρατευμάτων Ῥωμαίων σκῦλα καὶ σημέας ἀποδοῦναι ἐμὶ ἱκέτας τε φιλίαν ὁμοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἔξωσα καὶ ἅνάγκασα.”

\(^{141}\) David N. Wigtil, “The Translator of the Greek Res Gestae of Augustus,” The American Journal of Philology vol. 103 (1982): 192. Wigtil categorizes the variances of the Greek \textit{Res Gestae} as (1) the simplification of all Roman monetary terms to δηνάριον, (2) elevation of Augustus and a correspondingly lesser role for the Roman people, (3) Hellenization of religious, ethnic, and geographic terms, (4) occasional omission, and (5) blatant mistranslations.
obtained tangible benefits when they matched the expectations of friendship, such as Massinisa’s territorial gains after the Jugurthine War, and could even, at least in an early period, follow an independent policy so long as it adhered to the normative expectations of friendship, as with Attalus. In these ways, therefore, lesser states in the Mediterranean World were able to assert their agency and, in doing so, preserve some measure of internal control and independent policy. Let us now turn to Athens.

Chapter 5: Friendship, Alliance, and Atheno-Roman Diplomacy

The emergence of the Roman Republic as the undisputed master of the Mediterranean state system affected a gradual transformation in its representation in Athenian inscriptions. From the middle of the second century BCE, inscriptions erected in Athens describe the conduct of sacrifices “…for the Roman allies.”142 This first mention arrives at the conclusion of a sixty-year period of cooperation that equipped the Athenian state with a level of influence and wealth unknown to it since the fourth century BCE.143 Behind this revival was the Athenian state’s cultivation of its own image as a faithful Roman friend and, as such, its deployment of a range of moral language that reinforced this portrayal. Over time, the Athenians benefitted from their construction of this identity because the normative patterns of their friendship with Rome led to rewards that vastly outstripped the Athenians’ geopolitical importance. Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapters, the primary terms operative in Athenian diplomacy, alliance and friendship (“συμμαχία καὶ φιλία”), are only appropriate for actors that possess at least a limited sovereignty. The language of Athenian inscriptions which prompted this study, therefore, reflects one aspect of a wider discourse that empowered the Athenians to claim an independent identity while at the same time benefitting substantially from the realization of the diplomatic relationship that this language asserts. Even so, the position of Athens underwent substantial change as Roman dominance developed towards the city’s effective incorporation into the province of Achaea in 27 BCE, a

142 IG II2 1000 is the earliest apparent example of the inclusion of the adjective Ρώμαιοι (“Romans”) as one of the parties listed in the dative case to whom the Athenian ephebes conducted sacrifices.
143 That is, since Philip of Macedon’s defeat of Athens at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE.
transformation which the historiographic and epigraphic records record through an increasing emphasis on the cultural prestige of Athens rather than its status as a political actor.

The objective of the current chapter will be to demonstrate the utility of rhetoric as a strategic tool for the Athenian state, and in particular to highlight the substantial influence of the terms developed in the previous chapters. This discussion will unfold, in broad outline, over a period stretching from the inception of Atheno-Roman contact in 228 BCE to the effect termination of Athens’ status as a sovereign state in around 27 BCE. The principal evidence employed in this argument will rest on a combination of passages from the ancient historians and inscriptions published and displayed in Attica within the time frame of this study. While the bulk of the narrative evidence will derive from the historians, the epigraphic evidence nevertheless plays a crucial role as it is the existence of these sources that allows us to ascertain the extent to which the language prescribed to Athenians in the historians reflects the actual diplomacy of the Athenian state. Taken together, the historiographic and epigraphic evidence will allow us to delineate developments in the relationship between the Athenian and Roman states, which will correspond in this study to two periods detailing the height and decline of this association.

It is possible to make a connection between the rhetoric of Athenian diplomats as they appear in the ancient historians and the discursive behavior of actual Athenians because of the appearance of the same language of friendship and alliance in both historical and epigraphic sources. Of particular use in establishing this fact with regards to Athens is a particular tradition of inscriptions relating to the Ephebes, a corps of young Athenians enrolled in the service of the state. One common feature of these inscriptions is the appearance of phrases including the words alliance (“συμμαχία”), friendship (“φιλία”), and the adjectival variations of each. In total, this body of evidence comprises eight substantial

144 Achaea, the jurisdiction of southern Greece that encompassed Athens under the emperors, certainly held a Roman governor before 27 BCE, as we know that Cicero’s correspondent S. Sulpicius Rufus held the post in 46 BCE, for which see: Andrew Lintott, *Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration* (Routledge, 1993): 66; however, this arrangement seems to have been relatively ad hoc until Augustus’ reorganization of the provinces in 27 BCE, which formally established Achaea as a senatorial province distinct from Macedonia, see: E. J. Owens, “Increasing Roman Domination of Greece in the Years 48-27 B.C.” *Latomus* 35 (1976): 718-719.
inscriptions spanning an eighty year period beginning in the mid-second century BCE. While this data is, on its own, too small a sample to substantiate claims about change over time in Athenian rhetoric, the production of such inscriptions throughout the period under consideration does instill confidence in the language of the historians and therefore improves our ability to study the Athenians as an actor through that medium.

Before proceeding into the first section of the analysis, it is appropriate to first review the definitions of the primary terms discussed in chapters three and four. The word alliance (“συμμαχία”) corresponds to a relationship of reciprocal obligation between two actors and is expressly restricted to sovereign actors. This condition permits a high degree of asymmetry between the contracting parties, as we saw with its application to Alexander the Great’s lieutenants, but requires that the lesser party retain an independent decision-making capacity. So, for instance, the Lycian-Greeks of Strabo’s account felt that they lacked the authority to enact alliance (“συμμαχία”) because they lacked even the appearance of judgment in their affairs – the Romans possessed that. The corresponding Roman concept of societas lacked both the formal quality of συμμαχία as a technical descriptor for alliance and the latter’s inapplicability to actors without de facto sovereignty. The second principle term of this analysis, friendship (“φιλία”), relates to a wider system of heavily moralizing discursive norms that played a significant constitutive role in the ancient Mediterranean world. International friendship carried with it the expectation of the fidelity and utility of each friend, and when this relationship was healthy it followed that friends would benefit one another. In line with this, the passages to follow will reflect the attempts on the part of the Athenian state to construct itself in the profitable guise of friend to Rome.

The Inception of Atheno-Roman Friendship

The earliest known interactions between Athenian and Roman magistrates occurred through a series of diplomatic exchanges at the conclusion of the third century BCE which, though complicated by

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145 IG II^2^ 1000, IG II^2^ 992, IG II^2^ 977, IG II^2^ 1004, IG II^2^ 1039, IG II^2^ 1042, IG II^2^ 1008, and IG II^2^ 1028.
146 See Chapter 3.
textual interpolations in the historiographic tradition, nevertheless speak to the normativity of Atheno-Roman friendship. Roman officials passed through Athens on at least one occasion in the 220s BCE, but the purpose of this visit was only to convey news of Rome’s victory in the Illyrian War (229 BCE). For the first true diplomatic exchange between Athenians and Romans, we must turn instead to the events leading up to the Second Macedonian War (200 – 197 BCE), but the evidence of our sources complicates this claim. As we saw in the first chapter, the historical tradition of Polybius and Livy reveals the presence of Athens as a party on the Roman side in the Treaty of Phoenice (205 CE). Scholars now agree for the most part that a historian of the first century BCE, Valerius Antias, inserted the names of Athens and Ilium. The reason for this was to provide a moral justification for Roman intervention across the Adriatic five years later, as Balsdon remarks, “… [the] purpose can only have been to lend substance to the claim that Rome was bound by solemn obligations contracted in 205 to come to the aid of her Greek allies in 200.” If we take this to be correct, as I do, and accept that an ahistorical account of the events of 205 BCE has marred our evidence for the first true interaction between Athenian and Roman in 200 BCE, then we should also treat that evidence as historically suspect. For this reason the evidence lacks explanatory power for the events of 200 BCE; however, the implications are useful: it is clear that later Roman historians considered the informal and moral association of Rome and Athens to be a strong justification for intervention.

The supposed relationship between Athens and Rome in 200 BCE has precisely these characteristics in the Livian narrative, but first some background is in order. According to Livy, the Athenians planted the first seeds of the Second Macedonian War (200 – 197 BCE) when they executed a number of aristocratic youths from Acarnania. The charge was participation in the Eleusinian Mysteries without undergoing the solemn rites, and the consequence was the embitterment of the Acarnanians’ ally,

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147 Polybius 2.12.8.
151 Livy 31.14.5.
Philip of Macedon. Within a short time, Philip dispatched a military force to ravage the fields of Attica.\textsuperscript{152} It was, as Livy remarks, “a hardly worthy cause.”\textsuperscript{153} The Athenians stood little chance in a contest with Antigonid Macedon, and in the Livian account they appeal to Egypt and Rome for assistance.\textsuperscript{154} In the case of Rome, the Athenians seem to have made their appeal without any claim to a formal treaty. In fact, Livy presents the Roman Senate as making its decision to help only in response to the “prayers of the Athenians.”\textsuperscript{155} This claim corresponds with and is dependent upon the historical interpolations that we discussed above, and the reason for this is that the ahistorical interpolation of 205 BCE enshrined Athens in an informal compact, not a formal treaty.\textsuperscript{156} As we observed in the previous chapter, informal relationships of friendship were extremely normative in the Greco-Roman world, and could at times substantially influence the behavior of actors. If it is correct that later historians altered portions of the Polybo-Livian tradition concerning Atheno-Roman contact, the point to take away from this is more so the particular way that the interlopers construed this lie than the fact of the lie itself. When considering the theory that an interpolation did occur, it is worth noting that there are a variety of ways that Roman editors could have presented the supposed relationship between Rome and Athens, and that of these they selected moral obligation to Athens to justify their state’s intervention in 200 BCE. In this sense, therefore, the Livian account at least provides us with some idea of contemporary norms through its emphasis on the rhetorical power of moral obligation.

In considering the antiquity of the Romans’ friendship with the Athenians it is important to emphasize that the diplomatic existence of the Athenians preceded the arrival of Romans, and as such their state possessed and maintained significant relationships with other actors. At the beginning of the

\textsuperscript{152} Livy 31.14.7.
\textsuperscript{153} Livy 31.14.4.
\textsuperscript{154} Fragments of Polybius (16.26.1-8 esp.) lack the narrative regarding the Acarnanian youths and instead place the cause for the Athenians’ involvement opposite Macedon on the intervention of Attalus of Pergamum; an account of the arrival of Egyptian envoys before the Roman Senate to report depredations against Athens appears at Livy 31.9.1.
\textsuperscript{155} Livy 31.1.10.
third century BCE the Athenians had only just begun to show a serious interest in developing a relationship with the Roman Republic. Over the preceding century, the Athenians had looked instead to Ptolemaic Egypt as their guardian and benefactor.\(^{157}\) The death of Ptolemy IV in 204 BCE and the weak regency of Ptolemy V undermined the capacity of the Egyptian kingdom to help even itself, prompting what Arthur Eckstein has called a “power transition crisis” in the Mediterranean state system.\(^{158}\) The immediate implication of this was to propel the other major Hellenistic monarchies onto a collision course with Rome.\(^{159}\) On the local level, the decline of Ptolemaic Egypt represented the gradual loss of the Athenians’ primary security partner.\(^{160}\) The Romans would eventually assume this role, but did so only gradually over the decades leading up to the Third Macedonian War (171 – 168 BCE). Significantly, it would do so without displacing the Athenians’ other patrons and security partners in the process.

With the exception of the faltering Egyptian monarchy, the most important of these contacts was the Kingdom of Pergamum in Asia Minor. The reigning Attalid house was a frequent financier of public works projects such as the stoas of Attalus and Eumenes at the base of the Acropolis, and was a reliable source of aid to the Athenians in the same conflict that first brought them before the Roman Senate.\(^{161}\) The importance of this connection to the Athenian eye is evident in one of the first Athenian inscriptions to reference the Romans, which reads as follows:\(^{162}\)

Σάτυρος Σατύρος ἐκ Κολ[ων]οῦ ἐπει-δή Καλλιφάνης Ἠρωμάριος στρατευόμε- νος μετὰ ἑωμαί[ον] καὶ τὸν [τ]οῦ βασιλέ-ως Ἐ[ὔ]μενους ἀδελφῶν Ἀττάλου καὶ Saturas son of Saturos from Kolon spoke:

Since Kalliphanes of Phyle fought as an auxiliary alongside the Romans and the brothers of King Eumenes, Attalus and Athenaius,

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\(^{157}\) Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 178.


Ἀθηναῖον καὶ χρήσιμον ἐαυτὸν παρα- and desired to make himself of service
σκευάζειν βουλόμενος τῇ πατρίδι to the fatherland, //
συμπ[α]ρ[η]ν τῇ γενομένην [ν]ίκην Ρωμαίος he was present at the victory for the Romans
ἐμ Μα[κ]εδ[ο]ν… in Macedonia…

The purpose of this inscription *prima facie* is to announce the award of various honors to Kalliphanes, an Athenian present at the Battle of Pydna in 168 BCE, but it also preserves a space for the recognition of the Athenians’ co-belligerents.¹⁶³ The victory at Pydna was, ultimately, a Roman achievement, so it is unsurprising that the inscription mentions the Romans and emphasizes their status as victors. More interesting is the inclusion of Attalus and Athenaius, brothers to the king of Pergamum. Because the Pergamene contribution to the battle was likely marginal it makes more sense to consider the diplomatic value of their inclusion than the necessity of doing so.¹⁶⁴ Through the inclusion of the Attalid brothers in the above decree, the Athenians could emphasize their connection with Pergamum even as they honor the Roman Republic.

The contribution of the Athenians themselves to Pydna was just as marginal as that of the Attalids, but this fact reflects the dynamics of the incipient Atheno-Roman friendship more than any distance in their relationship. At the start of the conflict, the Athenians offered a substantial contingent of men and vessels to the Roman Senate, as Livy reports: “…the Athenians were introduced first; they explained that they had dispatched what they possessed of ships and men.” The Roman magistrate in Greece at the start of the war (171 BCE), P. Licinius Crassus, had rejected the Athenian offer and instead commanded (“*imperasse*”) them to provide a substantial quantity of grain.¹⁶⁵ It is certain that the Romans permitted other Greek states to send them contingents of men and ships, so the reason for this rejection

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¹⁶³ The inscription exhibits significant effacement around the names of the Pergamene dynasts, Attalus and Athenaius. The text of Meritt, which I have utilized in this study, was the first to firmly establish these names on the basis of Wagner’s photographs: Benjamin D. Meritt, “Greek Inscriptions,” *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 5 (1936): 429.
¹⁶⁴ Livy 44.21.7-8 lists the strength of Roman allies in Greece prior to Pydna at 10,000 foot and 800 horse. Meanwhile, we hear before this that Eumenes has contributed 20 vessels at 44.11.2 and the only allied contingents mentioned in the narrative of the battle itself are the Italian allies.
¹⁶⁵ Livy 43.6.2.
must fall to some other feature of the Athenian state.\textsuperscript{166} Equally certain is our ability to exclude the vigor of Athenian agriculture from a list of possible factors, as they had relied upon cereal imports from the Black Sea region since the fifth century BCE.\textsuperscript{167} Instead, the reason seems to fall to either the Athenians’ feeble military strength or to a terse moment on the part of Crassus. The Athenians responded to the Roman command in a manner more befitting the dynamics we considered in chapter four, informing the Senate that they had fulfilled the command and “…although they were farming barren land… so they might not seem wanting in their duty (“officio”)… are prepared to provide more.”\textsuperscript{168} Of course, we can imagine that the Athenians were only able to fulfill the first demand with great difficulty; the point here is a moral one. It is a mark of international friendship that each partner maintains the appearance of utility, this is the duty (“officio”) that Livy mentions. The Athenians were unable to participate in the Battle of Pydna for reasons that are lost to us, but their reaction to this rejection approximates the cycles of international friendship and, it turns out, so does the next Roman response to this chain of interactions.

In the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War, many established friends of the Roman Republic faced a substantial backlash owing to their failure to meet the expectations of friendship. The Rhodians lost their sovereignty over parts of Asia Minor because of duplicitous exchanges with Macedon, and Eumenes II of Pergamum most likely lost his claim to several territories in Asia Minor on a similar charge.\textsuperscript{169} Athenians, on the other hand, benefitted substantially from the careful attentions that they paid to their Roman alliance during the Third Macedonian War. Most important of these benefits was sovereignty over the significant trading center on Delos, which Strabo later claimed could process ten-
thousand slaves each day.\footnote{Strabo 14.5.2.} There has been some amount of dispute in the scholarship over the significance of this award. This is in large part because the Romans, in bequeathing Delos to Athens, stipulated that the island remain tariff free.\footnote{Erich Gruen, “Rome and Rhodes in the Second Century B.C.: A Historiographical Inquiry,” \textit{The Classical Quarterly}, Vol. 25 (1975): 72.} The immediate purpose for this was likely to punish the Rhodians, who experienced an eighty-five percent loss in revenue as a result, but Delos’ tariff free status may also have affected Athens.\footnote{Habicht, \textit{Athens from Alexander to Antony}, 218. According to Habicht, Rhodes’ income from harbor fees dropped from 1,000,000 to 150,000 drachmae per year after the declaration of Delos’ free port status.} The argument for this charge is that the Athenian economy was heavily reliant upon the tariffs imposed upon commercial vessels at its own port facilities, and that the Roman ruling would force the Athenians to drop their tariffs to remain competitive.\footnote{Eleanor G. Huzar, “Roman-Egyptian Relations in Delos,” \textit{The Classical Journal}, Vol. 57 (1962): 171. Huzar points out that the Romans eliminated Delos’ former shipping tariff of two percent and that the Athenians, because they were economically reliant on their port at the Piraeus, would have adjusted their own tariff to remain competitive. Huzar goes too far, however, with the suggestion that “…Athens received no revenues from the free Delos, and merely had to pay, without compensation, for the organization of the island.” Two points confound Huzar’s claim that Delos was an overwhelmingly negative acquisition for the Athenians: (1) the chief magistrates of the Athenian state after 168 BCE quite often had a career connection to Delos. Specifically, they had frequently held lesser positions on Delos before gaining the archonship in Athens proper: S. V. Tracy, “Athens in 100 B.C.” \textit{Harvard Studies in Classical Philology}, Vol. 83 (1979): 219. (2) The fact that the Athenians were among the only Greek states minting coins at the end of the second century BCE: (Tracy, 1979): 231.} We have insufficient evidence to rule on whether or not this occurred, but it is possible to reject the thesis that the acquisition of Delos negatively impacted Athenian finances. Since the fifth century BCE, the silver mines of Laureium had been a major bulwark for Athens’ treasury; however, those mines were starting to dry up.\footnote{Tracy, “Athens in 100 B.C.” 232. Tracy, on the basis of Strabo 9.1.23, points out (n.71) that “even the slag heaps had been exhausted” by the first century BCE.} With the acquisition of Delos, the Athenians acquired substantial silver reserves and began to mint a new series of tetradrachm currency, which became the dominant currency in circulation until the denarius overtook it in the first century BCE.\footnote{Graham Shipley, \textit{The Greek World After Alexander: 323 – 30 BC},” (Routledge, 2000): 382.} The Athenians, despite the initially harsh reaction of Licinius Crassus in 171 BCE, stuck to patterns of friendship exchange and ultimately came out ahead in a period when less careful Roman friends experienced serious reversals.
The claim in Livy’s account that Crassus “commanded” the Athenians to furnish the Roman legions with grain brings us to the further question of whether, in this early stage, we should regard Athens as a client state with implicit obligations to meet Roman demands. Badian argued in *Foreign Clientelae* that it is characteristic of the Roman client to follow the judgment of his patron.\(^{176}\) Cicero likewise describes Roman aristocrats’ fear of falling under the obligation of a benefactor as his client.\(^{177}\) It is significant, therefore, that the Athenian state pursued a foreign policy that sometimes stands in contrast to the trends of the Roman Senate’s policies. So, for instance, the Athenians choose to emphasize their relationship with the Attalid dynasty in 168 BCE while at the same time the Senate displayed its disfavor toward the Attalids with their denial of territorial grants. Earlier, in 191 BCE, the Roman Senate was intent on inflicting an especially severe punishment upon the Aetolian League, but Polybius tells us that the senators changed their minds “…because the Rhodians and Athenians thought it correct.”\(^{178}\) Livy, who is closely following Polybius in this episode, further reinforces the importance of Athens’ and Rhodes’ moral authority with his claim that the Aetolians had solicited their help because “…their pleadings (“preces”) might gain an easier entrance because of the stature (“auctoritatem”) of those states.”\(^{179}\) This moral authority stands in contrast to the position of the Aetolians, whose situation Livy characterizes as a breach in the good faith (“fide”) of their partnership (“societatis”) with Rome.\(^{180}\) The solution for the plight of one state, the Aetolian League, which has violated friendship norms, is to appeal to the moral authority of two states that had to this time excelled in that relationship. Significantly, the event indicates the capacity of Roman friends to take a stand on issues contra senatorial opinion and succeed.

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\(^{176}\) Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 11.

\(^{177}\) Cicero, *de Officiis* 2.69.4 “…and they would also suspect that something is demanded or expected from themselves; truly, they consider that for themselves to experience patronage or be called clients is the appearance of death.”

\(^{178}\) Polybius 21.31.5 “…τὸν δὲ Ῥοδίων καὶ τὸν Ἄθηναιον ἀξιούντεν…”

\(^{179}\) Livy 38.3.8.

\(^{180}\) Livy 38.10.4.
The Athenian acquisition of Delos and a number of other Mediterranean islands was a benefit of their friendship with the Roman Republic, but the future of Delos as an Athenian subject was intertwined with the interests of the island’s substantial Italian mercantile community. Because of this, Roman magistrates frequently interfered to pass judgment on the island’s affairs; however, the diplomatic procedures that mediated this interference allowed the Athenians to preserve the appearance of sovereignty. This exchange began, as the Polybian account proceeds, when an Athenian embassy to the Roman Senate made a case for Delos and other Macedonian possessions as their share of the spoils in 168 BCE. The basis of the Athenian argument was the antiquity of their claim, as is evident from an inscription of the first century BCE purporting to list the island’s gymnasiarchs “…from the time when the people recovered the island through the Romans.” Despite this “recovery,” the Romans seem to have been aware that the island had been theirs to give, as in an inscription of the mid-second century BCE, which preserves the Athenian response to a judgment that the Roman Senate made concerning Delos.

The General to Charmides, [Governor] of Delos, Greetings: After the exchange of rather a few words in the council concerning the decree which Demetrius bore from Rome concerning the Sarapeion affair, it was judged best to not prevent that man from opening and servicing the shrine as before.

The point of contention in this episode is the status of the shrine of Sarapis on Delos, which the Athenians had attempted to close. Representatives of the cult appealed this decision to the Roman Senate, which decided in their favor and forwarded its position to the Athenians. We possess the first half of this text, which simply states “…concerning the matters that Demetrius spoke of… it is permitted for that man to

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181 Tenney Frank, “Commercialism and Roman Territorial Expansion,” The Classical Journal 5, no. 3 (1910): 103. The Italian merchant community on Delos primarily included non-Roman citizens until the Gracchan period (late second century BCE), at which point Romans began to predominate.
182 Polybius 30.20.1.
183 ID 2589 ὁ δῆμος διὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀνακτήσατο // τὴν νήσον…
184 ID 1510.
185 Huzar, “Roman-Egyptian Relations in Delos,” 173-4. Huzar dates ID 1510 to 164 BCE, and suggests that Athenian ill will toward the cult of Sarapis must relate more so to quarreling than intolerance. The reason for this falls to the Athenians’ generally positive relationship with the Ptolemies: they had no clear reason for an anti-Egyptian stance. More recently, Habicht has agreed with Huzar’s assessment, noting that the Athenians introduced Sarapis “…as official cult of the state…” around 200 BCE: Habicht, “Athens and the Ptolemies,” 76.
service the shrine of Sarapis on Delos.”

Diplomatically, this message falls short of using any language to the effect that the Senate was ordering the Athenians to rescind the closure, but it is nevertheless clear that this is the intent of the exchange. In their message to Charmides, inscribed above a copy of the senatorial decree, the Athenians are careful to stress the view that they debate the issue with “…the exchange of rather a few words…” and decided to heed Rome’s advice of their own volition.

Representatives of the Roman Republic were, in this period, mostly consistent in their efforts to extend such courtesies to Greek States, and, again, this discourse could hold a greater significance than mere euphemism for those who maintained a balanced relationship with the Romans. At roughly the same time as the Sarapis affair, in the 150s BCE, Athenians participated on the side of Ptolemy VI in one of the Egyptian Kingdom’s endless civil wars. Significantly, the Roman Senate had given its support to another contender for the throne, Ptolemy VIII Physcon. As we have seen, the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War and the acquisition of Delos represented a high point in the Atheno-Roman relationship. According to the trends of international friendship discussed in chapter four, the Athenians were at some liberty to undertake independent action as a beneficial friend to Rome; however, the preservation of this balance called for a compensating act to favor Roman interests. That this was the case is evident from the latent concerns in an inscription that Ptolemy VI Philometor had erected on Delos after his Athenian-backed victory, which reads “…King Ptolemy… pious and the most cultured of men… established a friendship (“φιλίαν”) and peace, in doing so consulting the oracles… and… especially desiring to please…

186 ID 1510 The Senatus Consultum consists of lines 15-37. I quote specifically lines 23-27: “…περὶ ὧν Δημήτριος // Ἦρηνιδὸς λόγους ἔποιήσατο // διὰ τὸ ὅ ὐ Δήλωι ἱερὸν Σαρᾶ // πίδος αὐτὸι θεραπεύειν ἐ // ἔξει…”
187 ID 1518 honors “…those who fought alongside ("συμμαχήσαντες") King Ptolemy on Cyprus…”; Peter Green, Alexander to Actium, (University of California Press, 1990): 442-443. The Egyptian monarchy, in a prelude to the internecine feuding that would plague it until its death with Cleopatra, was divided between Ptolemy VI Philometor, Ptolemy VIII Physcon, and their sister Cleopatra II. Philometor, who must be the Ptolemy of ID 1518, fled to Cyprus around 163 BCE. Philometor eventually regained the monarchical power and died in 145 BCE.
188 Joseph Ward Swain, “Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt,” Classical Philology, Vol. 39 (1944): 86. Swain provides an interesting clue relating to the Roman’s preference for Ptolemy Physcon in his argument that Philometor’s pan-Grecian and pro-Antiochean views were effectively anti-Roman in the period following the day of Eleusis; Green (Alexander to Actium, 443) suggests that senatorial support of Philometor, and especially that of Cato, had to do with moral conservatism; Gruen collects the evidence (The Hellenistic World, 707) and sees little Roman interest.
189 Burton, Friendship and Empire, 223.
the Romans.”

Taken from the Ptolemaic perspective, therefore, it is clear that success contrary to the wishes of the Roman Senate prompted some nervous tension and, in this instance, Ptolemy VI began to move toward healing the breach by emphasizing the authority of the Romans. As per usual, this tendency expresses itself in the moral language of pleasure and fulfillment rather than a more legal register. For the Athenians, a similar compensation for subversive behavior occurred through their subsequent participation in the Achaean War (146 BCE) and, as Habicht notes, the contribution of five triremes for the campaign against Carthage.

While the Ptolemaic connection of the previous example lays a clear emphasis on the position of the Roman Republic as the chief power in the Mediterranean system, it also illustrates the vibrancy of the connections between lesser actors and their capacity to pursue independent policies. It is important to keep in mind that the Romans only established themselves permanently in the Greek East in 146 BCE, with the creation of the province of Macedonia. Greek states, including Athens, were prolific in the dispatch of embassies to Rome; however, these met with varied success, and, as Erskine reflects “…initially different images of Rome would have been generated highlighting different aspects of this new power.” The Athenians in particular understood the importance of the Roman Republic from an early stage and began to cultivate the Romans in the language of international friendship, but at the same time they maintained a diversity of foreign relations and fell short of emphasizing Rome as what we might call a “best friend.”

**Atheno-Roman Friendship and the Decline of the Athenian State**

The system of foreign contacts that the Athenian state maintained fell into a steady decline in the latter half of the second century BCE alongside the collapse of most of its non-Roman partners. From the

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beginning of the third century BCE, the most significant actors surrounding Athens were the Achaean League and a number of Macedonian garrisons.\textsuperscript{194} The latter ceased to be a factor in 197 BCE, when T. Quinctius Flamininus compelled Philip V of Macedon to surrender his remaining possessions in Greece proper.\textsuperscript{195} This settlement precipitated a series of events that led to the destruction of the Macedonian Kingdom (168 BCE), the division of its former holdings into four republics under Roman supervision, and, following the revolt of Andriscos, the designation of Macedonia as a Roman province (146 BCE).\textsuperscript{196}

The final conflict with an independent Macedon coincided with the Achaean War and, tangentially, the Roman destruction of Carthage in North Africa.\textsuperscript{197} Substantial portions of the former Achaean League then fell under the administrative jurisdiction of the Roman provincial government, bringing the physical influence of Roman power within a day’s ride of Athens.\textsuperscript{198} To add to this sharp decline in significant actors, the final Attalid King of Pergamum, Attalus III, bequeathed his lands to the Romans upon his death in 133 BCE.\textsuperscript{199} The result of all this is that in the space of twenty years the regional dominance of the area around Athens transitioned from the hands of several medium-sized powers to the direct rule of Roman governors. Even so, the Athenians were cautious political operators, and changes to reflect the new status quo were slow.

This period is also notable for the first stirrings of a cultural rather than strictly political exchange between Athens and the Roman Republic. Connections between the senatorial elite and the Athenian community were to become a substantial influence in the next century, and the seeds for this had already sprung.\textsuperscript{200} An ephebic inscription of 116/115 BCE displays the name Gnaeus the Roman (“Γναῖος...
Within a roster also featuring cadets from Laodicea, Antiochia, and Attica. Athens had become a popular center of education for the aristocracies of the Greek world in the previous century, and here, at the conclusion of the second, we begin to observe Romans drawn to the same appeal. Underlying this change is the increasing necessity for the Athenians to utilize their cultural prestige as a political tool, for as Rosillo-Lopez remarks, “The past… offered the aristocracy social worth and political legitimacy in the present; it also helped them to preserve its status and functional role.” The governing class of the Athenian state found itself increasingly unable to participate in a relationship of power-utility with the Roman Republic as the locus of Roman power shifted east. In the past, the Athenians had developed an effective and reciprocating international friendship with the Romans under circumstances when they could provide them with significant services. Until 146 BCE, Roman fleets relied on Athenian harbor facilities in each successive conflict, and Athenian diplomats often stood for Roman interests in Hellenic assemblies. After this date, however, the Romans possessed their own facilities, and had established bi-lateral relationships with all significant actors, precluding Athenian assistance. Rosillo-Lopez is correct, therefore, in the assessment that increasing Roman hegemony called for changes in the diplomatic modus of a Greek state such as Athens.

The Athenians increasingly turned to cultural prestige as an instrument of diplomacy, but this existed in coordination with previous modes of discourse rather than displacing them. This is in opposition to the claim of Rosillo-Lopez, who states that the Senate of the third century BCE “…would

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201 IG II² 1009 line 107.
202 A period of study at Athens was already a prominent feature of the liberal education of Greek aristocrats at the start of the third century, as Gabbert remarks: “By the late fourth century BC, Athens had already become the “university town” it would remain for centuries.” (Antigonus II Gonatas, 4-5); in the next century, Antiochus IV Epiphanes studied in Athens and received honorific magistracies, for which see: Edwyn Bevan, The House of Seleucus, Vol. 2 (Ares Publishers, 1902): 126.
204 See note 110 in chapter 4.
205 The Romans had contracted a formal alliance with Rhodes after Pydna (Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 39), had established contact with the Seleucid Empire in 188 BCE after the Antiochean War (Polybius 21.45.1), and retained a friendship pact with the Pergamene kingdom (Polybius 21.20.1).
concede… to the Greeks because Rome needed their support… The [later] loss of Greek political power… allowed Greeks to be associated more with the past than the present.” This argument conflates the related dichotomies of cultural and political transitions. It assumes that because the Greeks’ lacked de facto political power in the later second century BCE they also lacked the capacity to engage in a discourse structured around the political. On a deeper level, it assumes that political rhetoric will match abstract political realities. Instead, as we saw in the previous chapters, Greek political rhetoric could accommodate itself to stark asymmetries. Rosillo-Lopez is correct that Greek states found themselves in the position of seeking and defining new strategies, but these supplemented the still potent language of tradition. So, for example, the Athenians continued to publish decrees discussing their states friendships and alliances until the end of its tenure as a sovereign state. In some cases, the emergence of cultural rhetoric appears alongside more traditional ideas of political friendship. For instance, an inscription on Delos dating to the period around 116/115 BCE – precisely the year that Gnaeus joined the ephebes in Athens – refers to the author’s kinship (“συγγενής”) and dear friendship (“προσφιλές”) with Ptolemy of Egypt. This immediately follows a line that describes the Egyptian kingdom as a bulwark or defense (“ἐρυμα”), and precedes a dedication to the Roman consuls. The succeeding lines suffer from a high degree of fragmentation, but the phrase “of the Trojans and the Danaans” (“Τρώων καὶ Δαναῶν”) is legible. The Romans maintained a popular myth that they were the descendants of Aeneas’ band of Trojan exiles, and on this basis it is possible that the appearance of these words reflects an attempt on the part of the inscriptions’ author to cater to cultural sentiment.

The behavior of the Athenians, and specifically their attempts to placate the Roman power, reflects the situation of a small state operating under an increasingly central hegemonic power while at the same time maximizing its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy. The Athenians did maintain

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207 IG II 1042: “…φιλοφιλεῖ καὶ συντηρεῖ τῇ βουλής καὶ…” // [τοῦ δήμου καὶ παιδῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν φίλῶν…”; IG II 1028: “…τοῖς συμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς εὐφράγεταις τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαίως…”
208 ID 1533.
such a policy, but it existed within the confines of their relationship with Rome and, as such, came over time to comprise relationships of benefaction with Roman client states, such as Ptolemaic Egypt, and local Greek affairs. This latter case falls well in line with the Roman habit of delegating interstate mediation to its regional partners.\footnote{Eckstein, “Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation,” \textit{Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte}, Bd. 37 (1988): 417. Eckstein makes an interesting distinction in this article between Roman attitudes towards arbitration and mediation: it would subject itself to the latter but not the prior, which delegated final decisions.} At the same time that this compression of independent political action occurred, the Athenians maintained the claim that they possessed a plurality of foreign “friends and allies.” With respect to the Romans, this speaks to the fact that normative friendship remained a worthwhile card for states that maintained the cycles of that relationship. Variations of the word for alliance continue in spite of the probable non-existence of an Atheno-Roman alliance because of the correspondence of the technically-obliging Greek alliance (“συμμάχια”) to the empty Roman partnership (“societas”). It is not that the Athenians lacked the ability to understand the dissonance between these terms, but that the misrecognition of this distinction favored their self-presentation.

The final stage of Athens’ existence as an independent state began with an assertion of that agency, and precipitated sixty years of terminal decline culminating in its final loss of sovereignty during the Roman civil wars of the first century BCE. Over this period, the Athenians participated in all of the civil wars that plagued the final years of the Roman Republic, and in doing so exhibited a catastrophic tendency to find them themselves on the losing side.\footnote{The Athenians fought against the Romans on the side of Mithridates (Appian, \textit{The Mithridatic Wars}, 28); against Julius Caesar on the side of Pompeius Magnus (Caesar, \textit{de Bello Civile}, 3.3.1); against the Second Triumvirate on the side of Brutus and Cassius (Dio Cassius 47.20.4; Habicht (1997), 357).} Unlike the cities of the Achaean League in the previous century, the Athenians maintained their nominal independence after each siege on account of appeals to its antiquity and friendship to Rome. Because of this rhetoric, and the norms of Greco-Roman diplomacy that stood behind it, the Athenians were able to preserve a shadow of their independence in ready contrast to the fate of other minor actors. However, it is characteristic of this final stage that this independence is increasingly nominal in the context of the new unipolar system, and this change reflects
itself in a corresponding decline in the Athenians’ use of the language of a sovereign state in their decrees.

Ironically, the beginning of the end for the Athenian state sprang from an excess of popular authority. The city’s philosophers had begun to play a leading role in Athens’ diplomatic relations during the second century BCE, starting with the embassy of Carneades in 155 BCE.\textsuperscript{211} It is possible that the attachment of young Roman aristocrats to famous Athenian philosophers further increased their importance due to the proximity this provided to informal channels. As a result, it is less surprising than it might seem that a philosopher of the Peripatetic school led Athens into war against the Roman Republic in 88 BCE.\textsuperscript{212} Our sources contradict themselves as to the identity of this man, but G. R. Bugh has argued convincingly that there were in fact two philosopher-tyrants, Aristion and Athenion.\textsuperscript{213} The first took power as a leader of the city’s anti-Roman faction after the removal of the pro-Roman oligarchy that had controlled Athens over the previous decades. This uprising coincided with the invasion of Mithridates VI Eupator into the Roman provinces of Asia and Achaea.\textsuperscript{214}

The Athenians had begun their own stirrings against Rome in reaction to the eastern King’s actions, and in short order came into the friendship (“φιλίαν”) of the king.\textsuperscript{215} At the same time, the Athenians launched a naval expedition to recover their colony on Delos, which had chosen to remain faithful to the Romans at the conflicts’ start.\textsuperscript{216} This expedition was disastrously unsuccessful, but was followed soon after by the island’s successful capture at the hand of Mithridates’ admiral, Archelaus.\textsuperscript{217} At this point, Athenion disappears from the historical narrative, and our sources instead speak of Aristion, whom Appian considered the most loathsome of tyrants.\textsuperscript{218} This Aristion first arrived in Athens at the

\textsuperscript{211} Polybius 33.2.
\textsuperscript{214} Green, \textit{Alexander to Actium}, 558-562.
\textsuperscript{215} Appian, \textit{The Mithridatic Wars}, 28.3.
\textsuperscript{216} Bugh, “Athenion and Aristion of Athens,” 109.
\textsuperscript{217} Appian, \textit{The Mithridatic Wars}, 28.2.
\textsuperscript{218} Appian, \textit{The Mithridatic Wars}, 28.6.
head of a cavalry squadron escorting the treasures of Delos to Athens itself.\textsuperscript{219} It was not long thereafter that he found himself facing a siege opposite the Roman warlord and general L. Cornelius Sulla.\textsuperscript{220} The ensuing blockade was lengthy and ended with the breach of Athens’ north-west gate.\textsuperscript{221} After a brief attempt to seek refuge on the Acropolis, Aristion fell at the hands of Sulla’s legionaries. The siege had lasted for many months, entailed untold and forgotten deprivations for the city’s inhabitants, and it was still to face Sulla’s judgment.

What happened next is the stage of considerable controversy, with some scholars opting to believe that Sulla imposed constitutional change on the Athenians while others argue the opposite. Arthur Keaveney, in support of the view that Sulla did enforce such a change, advances a common view with his statement that “…Unfortunately little is known… we may safely assume… it was designed… to put an end to that internal strife which had allowed tyrants to seize control of the city.”\textsuperscript{222} Keaveney is at the very least correct in his assessment of the paucity of the source materials, which amount to scattered references in Appian and Livy. The later account of Appian tells us that Sulla restored the city to its previous laws, while the Livian account claims that “… [Sulla returned to the city its liberty and those things which it had held.”\textsuperscript{223} According to Appian, this occurred only after Sulla pronounced that those who fought against him and their posterity were forever banned from holding office in Athens.\textsuperscript{224}

The Appian account in particular seems to suggest both infringements upon Athenian sovereignty after the siege and the preexistence of Roman influence on the Athenian constitution. Geagan, in support of this view, has pointed out that the Athenian state published lists of its annual magistrates with greater regularity following the Sullan sack.\textsuperscript{225} The direction of this argument is that Sulla forced the Athenians to keep better records to prevent the accumulation of power in the hands of tyrannical figures. This position

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{219} Appian, \textit{The Mithridatic Wars}, 28.4.
\item \textsuperscript{220} Appian, \textit{The Mithridatic Wars}, 30.3.
\item \textsuperscript{221} Camp, \textit{The Archaeology of Athens}, 184. The site of Sulla’s breach is quite close to the ancient agora.
\item \textsuperscript{222} Arthur Keaveney, \textit{Sulla: The Last Republican}, (Routledge, 2004): 124.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Appian, \textit{The Mithridatic Wars}, 39.4; Livy Periocha 84.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Appian, \textit{The Mithridatic Wars}, 39.5.
\end{itemize}
seems insufficient, however, when considering that the Athenians returned to oligarchic rule in 87 BCE, and has its detractors. Christian Habicht, to name one, rejects this view on the grounds that Roman intervention in the Athenian constitution was unnecessary to achieve Sulla’s aims, as he writes:

The Athenian constitution in force after Sulla’s defeat of the city need not necessarily have been imposed by Sulla. More probably, he would have had no need to intervene, for his victory returned to power the old elite who had always been loyal to Rome and who had been only temporarily displaced by the rule of the tyrants Athenion and Aristion.

Since the conclusion of the second century BCE, pro-Roman oligarchs had exercised the ultimate authority in Athens and, with the death of the tyrants and radical democrats in the Mithridatic War, the natural cycle of city-state politics returned an oligarchy to the stage.

Across the period when these events occurred, the epigraphic record reveals few changes in the Athenians’ self-representation of their state as an international actor. At the turn of the century, a decree of the ephebic type states that the cadets conducted an escort “for the Roman allies and benefactors of the people ("τοῖς συμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις τοῦ δῆμου Ῥωμαίοις").” With minor variation, this is the same form of address that the Athenians had begun to use for official references to Rome in 121/120 BCE. Further examples occur throughout the 90s, and, while we lack examples for the period following the Roman siege, the type returns in the 40s. Alongside the escort formula, which describes the Romans alternately as friends and allies, the record also reveals the continued existence of the formula referencing foreign contacts collectively. An example from between 83 and 78 BCE, in typical form, describes sacrifice on behalf of the collective friends and allies. The distinction between this claim and those of the previous century is that we no longer find these same terms as descriptors for the Athenians’ bi-lateral relationships. Instead, Athenian inscriptions of the first century that relate to specific foreign parties

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228 IG II² 1028.
229 IG II² 1042.
230 IG II² 1039.
describe them in the language of benefaction. In this manner, an inscription of the mid-century praises Antiochus I Theos of Commagene “on account of his virtue.”231 This type of honorific, which speaks of the virtue of an individual rather than the relationship between two actors, becomes progressively more common as, correspondingly, the traditional vocabulary of friendship and alliance begins to disappear from Athenian inscriptions.232 However, the Athenians still retained the use of this language in some of their domestic decrees, and in this use it was self-descriptive. This language persisted because, as an independent state, the Athenians could employ it, and further, because there was inherent value attached to this form of self-representation.

Over the decades leading up to the Roman civil wars of the mid-century, the Athenians struck an uneasy posture between independence and the undeniable authority of the Roman imperial presence. This culminated, briefly, with the actual loss of Athenian sovereignty in 58 BCE. In the background of the event was a plebiscite of the notorious Roman tribune Clodius Pulcher, who expanded the jurisdiction of the incoming governor of Macedonia, L. Calpurnius Piso, to encompass all of Achaea.233 Our primary source on this incident is Cicero, and he is an extremely partisan one, but the direction of his rhetoric applies itself directly to the status of Athens and must be considered. Cicero addresses Piso thus:234

You obtained a consular province with these limits, those which the law of your own desire had attained, and not the law of your son-in-law; for from the superb and most just law of Caesar the free people were wholly and truly free: however from this law which nobody beyond you and your colleague thought a law, all of Achaia, Thessaly, Athens, and the whole of Greece have been assigned to you.

In this passage, Cicero outright claims the assignment of Athens to the direct jurisdiction of a Roman magistrate, and also suggests that the city possessed its liberty prior to 58 BCE. Claude Eilers has made

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231 IG II² 3444.
232 Examples of honorific inscriptions for individual political actors from this period include IG II² 3427 (to Ariobarzanes Philoromaios and his wife, Athenaidos Philostorge), IG II² 3436 (to Juba, son of Juba), IG II² 3440 (to Herod Philoromaios), and IG II² 3445 (to Ptolemy, son of Juba, sprung from Ptolemy).
234 Cicero, in Pisonem, 16.2.
the suggestion that we should dismiss this passage as hyperbolic rhetoric.\textsuperscript{235} However, there is strong inscriptional evidence in support of the view that Roman magistrates transgressed the Athenian domestic jurisdiction in 58 BCE. Specifically, an inscription of that year erected in Latin on Delos prescribes that the island be free from taxation (“\textit{vecteigalibus leiberari}”).\textsuperscript{236} Put this in contrast to Roman interventions on Delos in the previous century, when the Roman Senate dealt with Delian affairs through the mediating factor of the Athenian government. The extension of the Macedonian province to encompass Athens expired with the tenure of Piso, and nominal independence returned to Athens, but the end was nigh.\textsuperscript{237}

When Sulla captured Athens in 87 BCE, Plutarch tells us that he chose to spare the survivors “…for the sake of the dead.”\textsuperscript{238} Of course, he was not referring to the dead then clustering the city’s streets, but instead to the ancient prestige of Athens. The same sentiment would save the Athenians later in the century, when the city fought alongside the Pompeian faction against Julius Caesar. We know something of Athens’ contributions in this conflict from Caesar’s own account, which states that “Pompeius assembled a great fleet from Asia, the Cycladic Islands… and Athens…”\textsuperscript{239} This register of naval allies overwhelmingly consists of communities that were part of Pompey’s massive network of informal clients.\textsuperscript{240} The Athenians would have likely had very little choice in making a contribution to the Pompeian fleet, but the impetus to do so would have more likely sprung from their relationship with Pompeius Magnus than from a piece of formal legislation such as the Clodian plebiscite. Later, in the process of defeating Pompeius, Caesar captured Athens, and the words that Appian places in his mouth echo those of Sulla forty years previously: “How many times will the reputation of your ancestors preserve you who have been destroyed by your own deeds?”\textsuperscript{241} The Athenians of the first century BCE

\begin{footnotes}
\item[235] Eilers, “Athens under the Lex Clodia,” 127.
\item[236] ID 1511.
\item[237] Habicht, \textit{Athens from Alexander to Antony}, 340.
\item[238] Plutarch, \textit{Life of Sulla}, 14.5.
\item[239] Caesar, \textit{de Bello Civile}, 3.3.1.
\item[241] Appian, \textit{The Civil War}, 2.88.1 “…καὶ Ἀθηναῖος αἰτήσας συγγνώμην ἐπεδίδου καὶ ἐπείπε: ἦποσάκις ὡμᾶς ὑπὸ σφόν αὐτῶν ἀπολλυμένους ἢ δόξα τῶν προγόνων περισσότερον…”
\end{footnotes}
had long emphasized just that reputation in their interactions with the outside world with the language of friendship, culture, and intellectualism. In these cases, the effect of that message was considerable leniency in a period of cataclysmic warfare and destruction.

The formal and final annexation of Athens to the Roman provincial system would not occur until 27 BCE, but the death of Athens as a sovereign state occurred in its own words during the civil wars. In chapter three, we considered Strabo’s claim that a confederation of Lycian-Greek cities ceased regulating alliances with other states because they had lost the final say in their affairs to the Romans. The point, in that instance, was not that the Romans had compelled them to this, but that it would be an inappropriate use of the alliance (“συμμαχία”) as an institution of diplomacy. Allies properly construed were the masters of their internal jurisdictions, and the loss of this deprived them of a credible claim to the title “ally.” During the Roman civil wars, the Athenians suffered repeated violations of that internal jurisdiction, their sovereignty, and correspondingly the term alliance disappears from their decrees. The Ephebic formula that had traditionally referenced friends, allies, and, occasionally, Romans, appears for the last time in the 40s BCE and, notably, honors the friends, the benefactors, and not a single ally.\(^{242}\) The Athenians had ceased to be masters of their own affairs, and as such it was inappropriate to describe themselves as possessing alliances.

At the same time, the Athenians continued to employ the rhetoric of friendship, benefaction, and cultural prestige with tangible effects on the city’s political situation. Just as the antiquity of Masillia’s friendship saved that city from destruction and terminal annexation, so also the Athenians’ informal relations with Romans and their Republic had a constitutive effect on political events. Although the Athenians still used this language, its frame of reference had begun to shift in the first century: the historian Appian remarks in his history of the civil wars that the Athenians fought on only to determine

\(^{242}\) IG II 1042: “ἐφ’ ὑγίείᾳ καὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ παιδῶν καὶ γυναῖκῶν καὶ τῶν φίλων”
the mastery of the Roman world.\textsuperscript{243} Language could still protect the Athenians, but its object had changed from maintaining Athens’ status as an international actor to determining its place in a world of Romans. The nature of Athenian rhetoric in relation to Roman power developed naturally and changed on its own conditions: the meaning of alliance (“\textit{συμμαχία}”) remained unchanged, and fell out of use when it became a misnomer. Throughout the period of Rome’s advance into the east, this language protected the Athenians and allowed them to exercise an authority disproportionate to their physical power or coercive potential. In the second century, the Athenians carefully cultivated the friendship of Rome and through this acquired Delos and numerous other islands in the Aegean. Twenty years prior to that, Athenian diplomats used their status as a Roman friend to secure leniency for the Aetolian League. Finally, in the first century, the memory of Athens, its friendship, and the image it cultivated saved the city from the fires of civil war. This rhetoric, which we see reflected in Athenian inscriptions, preserved the city through the last century of its freedom, and brought it securely to the start of a new age under the imperial rule of Rome.

\textbf{Chapter 6: Conclusion}

At the height of the fifth century BCE the Athenian Empire was fast becoming the most significant political actor in the eastern Mediterranean state system. While this potential collapsed with Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE), it remained one of the most powerful states in Greece until the Athenians’ defeat at the hands of Philip the Macedonian in 338 BCE. The period that followed this resembled in many ways the relationship that the Athenians were later to assume with the Romans under the empire, as Athenian politics came to center increasingly on individual relationships with the Macedonian warlord of the moment. With the recession of Macedonian influence in the later third century, the Athenians reasserted their status as an independent state in time to assume a prominent

\textsuperscript{243} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars}, 2.70.6 “And the Athenians also took to the field, though each side ordered them not to harm their army, as they were the sacred guardians of the gods, but despite this they took pleasure at the expectation of war, and to fight over the domination of the Romans.”
position as a friend and ally to the recently arrived Romans. This relationship benefitted the Athenians in no small part because of the ability that Athenian diplomats showed in navigating the normative expectations of contemporary diplomacy, as we see in the accounts of the historians. The language of the Athenians themselves further reinforces the impression, as the use of the terms friendship and alliance in inscriptions, when taken in concert with the historians, points to their efforts to represent themselves and their state in the best possible manner in the face of Roman domination. This method of diplomacy, and the positive self-representation that went with it, carried the Athenians safely through the volatile period that marked Rome’s entrance to the east, and only failed it during the first century BCE as Roman interests in the east evolved. Nevertheless, the memory of the relationship that the Athenians had with the Romans, and the extreme cultural prestige attached to Athens, enabled the Athenians to pass onward to the time of Imperial Rome.

The objective of this study has been to demonstrate the particular discursive norms that governed the relationship between Athens and the Roman Republic and, through this, to argue that this language had a constitutive effect on the fate of the Athenian state. Because the principal terms that are used to describe the Romans in Athenian inscriptions are alliance (“συμμαχία”) and friendship (“φιλία”), I selected these words and their variants as the primary units of analysis. In keeping with the intent to study Athenian inscriptions as part of a larger discourse, it was necessary to then expand this range to cover the parallel terms in the Latin language, which are partnership (“societas”) and friendship (“amicitia”). As we saw in chapter three, the ancients’ parallel treatment of the first set of terms was not entirely accurate; however, I have argued that this dissonance had a positive effect on the Athenians and their relations with the Roman Republic. An interesting question for further study is, given that a semantic gap did exist between alliance (“συμμαχία”) and partnership (“societas”), how did this distinction persist within a discourse that included functionally bi-lingual figures? Although in some situations, such as that of the Maccabees, the argument could be made that the author had little exposure to Roman diplomatic procedure, we can say with certainty that the Athenians observed the workings of Roman governance first
hand. I have attempted to provide a partial answer to this question in this study by showing what each party had to gain from the preservation of distinctions in their language for alliance and partnership. In essence, it enabled the Athenians to claim that they possessed a relationship of alliance with the Romans, which implied concrete obligations to a Greek audience, while the Romans were able to develop all of the benefits of a partnership ("societas") with the Athenians without accumulating real obligations. This worked for the Athenians because their interest in a relationship with the Romans lay at least as much with the idea of alliance as it did with the practical manifestations of alliance. Provided that other Greeks understood there to be an obliging alliance where there was in fact an informal partnership, the dissonant relationship that the Athenians maintained with the Romans had immense propagandistic value.

Of equal importance to Athenian diplomacy was the institution of friendship as a fundamental component of both ancient diplomacy and, more specifically, their relationship with the Romans. In chapter four, we considered the effect of friendship on a variety of actors through the narrative accounts of the historians. The Massalians, for instance, survived their decision to side with the Pompeian faction in the civil wars on account of the antiquity of their friendship with the Romans. We observed a similar dynamic in chapter five, when we considered the claims of Appian and Plutarch that the Roman warlords Sulla and Caesar both preserved Athens out of respect for the Athenians’ forebears. The language of these passages brings to light an interesting question in the context of this study because it seems clear in these instances that the Athenians’ cultural prestige, as opposed to their mastery of political rhetoric, has saved the day. In the previous chapter, we considered Rosillo-Lopez’ claim that there were two distinct periods of Greek self-representation to Roman power. This claim would partition Greek self-representation into an earlier period of political agency, in which Greek states represented themselves with the language and expectations of political actors, and a later stage, in which marginalized Greek states developed their discursive strategies around precisely the sort of cultural prestige that shielded the Athenians in the aforementioned. Despite this, I hold that the results of this study caution us against the sharp partition of Rosillo-Lopez. As we saw, the Athenians used the cultural prestige of philosophers such as Carneades
from an early stage while, conversely, they continue to describe themselves in their inscriptions with a political language relatively unchanged from that of Thucydides.

One of the major objectives of this project was to provide a case study in support of the International Relations (IR) Constructivist thesis for the ancient Mediterranean state system. The impetus for this was the concern on the part of the author that the claims of the competing (IR) Realist school, as exemplified in the work of Arthur Eckstein, represent a substantial and concerning challenge to our understanding of the Greco-Roman world. The basis of this concern is what I presented in chapter two as the *unitary actor problem*, one of the implications arising from (IR) Realism’s emphasis on system-level factors. This has the effect, as we have seen, of suggesting that the individual features of actors, discursive or otherwise, have a finite or non-existent capacity to influence the international system, which, according to Eckstein, revolves primarily around generalized security concerns. The story of this study has been of a small state with limited coercive potential, but also one with an exceptional ability to harness ideas to its favor. In some instances, such as in the closing moments of the first century BCE, this amounted to an appeal to a specific feature of the Athenian state, namely their historical prestige. In other moments, however, the Athenians appealed to a common set of expectations enshrined in the institutions of friendship, alliance, and the surrounding terms. The success that they, and other actors previously discussed, had in this endeavor points to both the existence of norms of international conduct in the ancient world and the capacity of those norms to constitute the behavior of actors. The Athenians survived to enter Roman subjugation not because of the cold realities of their world, but because of their ability to exercise normative diplomacy and cultural prestige in spite of those realities.

It is a dangerous proposition to diagnose the behavior of actors under any circumstance, and even more so for historians of the ancient world operating with a paucity of evidence derived for the most part from biased or misinformed elite sources. Because of this, I would avoid the claim that this study has fully achieved its objective of explaining the Athenians’ relationship with the Romans, which is, after all, impossible given the restrictions of our evidence. Instead, I would assert that this research points to
aspects of Athenian behavior that, while we can’t always explain their internal significance, had a substantial impact on the overall course of Athenian history. It is with some awe that I recognize that this research has attempted to shed light on an area of study that has undergone consideration and revision since the birth of the field, but it is also my hope that the reader will conclude with the view that we still have much to learn through fresh frameworks such as Constructivism. The chief claim of the (IR) Constructivist with respect to classical antiquity is a simple one: that the language and specific characteristics of even the smallest actors had the capacity to tangibly effect the system of states that they belonged to. It is often the case in the study of this period that we must follow the light of our sources, and this is a path that will often lead to Athens. This is, in fact, beneficial for the purposes of this study, for the voice that rings down this trail from the depths of antiquity is that of a small city in Attica that tried the test of time to its final reckoning with only ideas to carry it forward.
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