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The Social Evolution of War and Transformation in Political Organization

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The Social Evolution of War
and Transformation in Political Organization

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Honors Thesis

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ABSTRACT

Until recently, international relations theory has treated the territorial state as a transhistorical constant. The post-positivist turn, however, revives the question of the state’s origins and future sustainability. By drawing together the contributions of historical sociologists and social theorists of war, this thesis provides a model for change in political organization stemming from foundational transformations in warfare. This model considers not only warfighting practices, but the social and broader historical context in which war is embedded. Through analysis of the feudal and modern cases, I demonstrate why warfare is the best lens through which to evaluate change in political organization.
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INTRODUCTION

For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather.

-Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*

*The body politic, as well as the human body, begins to die as soon as it is born, and carries in itself the causes of its destruction.*

-Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*

*On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero.*

-Chuck Palahniuk, *Fight Club*

The conduct of war and peace, polities and their politics, is a story of deep and dramatic change. What history strongly suggests yet is loath to argue, however, is that every epoch has an expiration date. The easy decree that we have reached the end of history, that our current form of politics will reign eternal, can be seen across time and space, from Thomas More’s 1509 description of the coronation of King Henry as the “the everlasting glory of our time”, with a sovereign who will bring about a “golden age”, to John Donne’s 1626 proclamation that “I was borne in the last age of the world”, to G.W.F. Hegel’s 1806 statement that Napoleon’s victory at the Battle of Jena constituted a dialectical overcoming and the end of history, and finally to Francis Fukuyama’s 1991 argument that liberal democracy constitutes the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution”.

From inside a given historical epoch, it is difficult to see the vast revolution potentially lurking behind each technological innovation and every social or tactical shift. As we examine the patterns of massive change in political organization across time.

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1 These quotes come from, in order, Walker (2005, 9); Silver (1998, 55); Kojeve (1969, 44) and Fukuyama (1991, xi).
and space, two questions immediately come to mind. Why does political organization suddenly restructure itself around a new form of order? What is the course of such a development?

The answers to these two fundamental questions in the literature have largely centered around two ontologically divided fields of inquiry. The first focuses on the material aims and drives of political organization; namely, how the state attempts to secure resources and maximize its relative power vis-à-vis other actors. The second focuses on the ideational realm, with social determinations and ideal visions of the world constituting the basis for political organization. What is absent in both of these accounts, however, is a transhistorical ontological bridge to join the objects of both studies. It is my contention that war, understood beyond the direct conduct of combat operations as a social and historical phenomenon, provides an essential bridge between ideational and material approaches. As a result, I contend that any theory of change aimed at bridging this ontological gap ought to use a broad concept of warfare as the central theoretical principle. While we cannot trace a determinate path of political development across time and space, we can theorize a developmental relationship between the transition to new modes of warfare and the subsequent rise of new political units. Using Fernand Braudel’s three temporal spheres as a conceptual template, I set Robert Gilpin’s ‘interaction change’, ‘systemic change’ and ‘systems change’ against Andrew Latham’s ‘warfighting paradigm’, ‘social mode of warfare’, and ‘historical structure of war’. With each situated change in warfare, I argue for a necessary change in political organization at the same temporal level, and the possibility for political transformation at the next, more foundational, temporal speed.

Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the broad literature on state formation and political transformation. I begin with an examination of the political scientific literature on state formation, beginning with the school of thought centered on the anarchy problematique,
considering both neorealist approaches and critical anarchy-centered scholarship. I then move to a discussion of the Constructivist school, beginning with more general models of social epistemology and finishing with Hall’s specific social developmental model. Finally, I consider neo-Marxist international relations scholarship, conceptually unpacking approaches concerning the social division of labor and social property relations. The discussion then shifts to three approaches grounded in the historical sociological tradition. I start by analyzing the commercialization model, in both its causally determinate and indeterminate varieties. Analysis then shifts to the geopolitical competition model, which emphasizes the role of the technologies of war on the development of states and capitalism. Finally, I examine Martin Shaw’s globality thesis, which focuses on the role of global revolution and the transformation towards a global consciousness. I conclude by arguing that the literature at large suffers from three major problems—an overdetermination of change in variables that can never obtain universal historical veracity, an inability to identify and account for the antagonisms underpinning political transformation, and an inadequate account of warfare as a unique social phenomenon.

Chapter 2 attempts to rectify these theoretical errors by establishing the fundamental basis for my theoretical model. To that end, I establish the ontological, epistemological, and methodological elements of my thesis in some detail. The chapter begins by explicating the ontological basis of my theory, both elucidating the dual objects of inquiry (war and political organization) and establishing how I will situate their change vis-à-vis other fundamental actors and processes. I then establish the epistemological basis of my theory, laying out the conceptual and definitional basis for the state, war, and revolution. Third, I lay out the foundational methodology of my theory, drawing connections between Gilpin three modes of political transformation and Latham’s three modes of warfare, establishing the two modalities of change
that motivate my thesis. Finally, I answer potential criticisms of my method and demonstrate why an analysis of warfare provides the best avenue to analyze political transformation.

Chapter 3 launches a plausibility probe of my thesis focusing on two broad cases, one historical and one contemporary, in order to both demonstrate the applicability of my thesis broadly and to elucidate the implications that changes in the modality of warfare have on political organization both within and across temporal layers. I begin by looking at changes in the feudal warfighting paradigm; specifically, the technological developments related to the emergence of gunpowder, mobile capital ships and the artillery fortress and the tactical development toward an infantry-driven force posture. These innovations are then developmentally linked to transformation in interaction strategies pursued by different polities and change within the systemic organization of political actors across the continent. Next, I examine how the feudal transition away from ad hoc military structures towards standing forces is indicative of a shift in the social mode of warfare, investigating the interconnections between this transformation and the subsequent reorganization of the systemic balance of power. Finally, I examine whether this social shift altered the very nature of the European system of political organization and the implications such a transition potentially posed for the broader political system.

Moving on the modern context of war and political organization, I begin by analyzing the revolution in military technology away from high-yield weaponry toward crude and inexpensive small arms and explosives. I then focus on the consequences this shift in the warfighting paradigm has had on interaction strategies, specifically examining the rise of non-state actors and their integration into diplomatic channels. Moving to the consequences entailed by such a shift for the systemic balance of power, I argue that military devolution poses major hazards to the
continued exercise of global power. Next, I examine the consequences of the shift in the conduct of war on the social mode of warfare, arguing that within the new war paradigm, violence is no longer constituted around states but rather around identity groups. I then transition to an investigation of the consequences of this downward shift in the social mode of warfare on the systemic balance of power and the global system as a whole. Finally, I examine the possibilities for a neomedieval transition to account for the changing nature of warfare.
CHAPTER 1

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

OVERVIEW

Treating the state as the contingent product of political organization in one particular juncture of history—as opposed to a universal concept within the structure of international politics—has only recently become a relevant question within the discipline of political science. International Relations theory as a whole, owing in large part to the conceptual hegemony of neo-realism, tended to focus heavily on questions of structure and largely ignored questions of agency and history. Exceptions certainly existed, most notably in the studies conducted by scholars of historical sociology, with other important contributions coming from students of Marxism and World-Systems theory. The mainstream political scientific discourse on the state as an object of analysis, however, treated it merely as the primary unit type within international politics, with no meaningful discussion of how it got there or why it should be expected to remain. With the post-positivist challenge to neorealism’s hold on the field and the perception that the state’s role as the primary form of political organization may be in question, a number of theoretical approaches have been advanced to explain the rise of the state and what changes we might expect in political organization in the near future.

I begin with an examination of the theories of political organization that center on the anarchy problematique. Here I move from Kenneth Waltz’s understanding of the state as a pre-configured variable within the larger structure of international relations, to Robert Gilpin’s attempt to historicize realism through the creation of a structural systems theory, to Daniel Deudney’s discussion of violence interdependence and the necessity of evolutionary political organization, and finally to Alexander Wendt’s teleological argument for the necessity of a
global state. Second, I move to an examination of theories of political organization stemming from a social constructivist perspective, beginning with John Ruggie’s analysis of social epistemes, continuing with Christian Reus-Smit’s understanding of purposive and configurative change, and concluding with an inspection of Rodney Bruce Hall’s argument for societal collective identity. Third, I examine the neo-Marxist theories of political organization, opening with Justin Rosenberg’s argument that different modes of production produce different modes of political organization, with the modern state understood as a consequence of the rise of capitalism, and closing with Benno Teschke’s contention that the rise of capitalism necessitated transformation in social property relations, which in turn produced the subject of political economy. Fourth, I examine two commercialization models: the first advanced by Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, which argues that a functioning world-economy created the state through the demands of trade and necessity of a dominant core model, and the second provided by Hendrik Spruyt, which argues the varying impact of trade on different European regions created distinct social alliances that in turn resulted in new and unique forms of political organization. Fifth, I examine the Weberian geopolitical competition models advanced by Charles Tilly, in which war made the state and the state made war, and Michael Mann, in which the competition between competing feudal holdings and subsequent resource demands drove not only state formation, but also the rise of capitalism itself. Finally, I move to Martin Shaw’s attempt to synthesize many of these concepts around his vision of emergent globality and the subsequent transformations in military, economic, political, and social relations. I conclude by arguing that these models lack a compelling account for the coterminous rise of the territorial state and the monopoly on legitimate violence, and call for a new theory that understands
transformation in the material and social conditions of war as the essential impetus behind change in political organization.

THE ANARCHY PROBLEMATIC

In his work *Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth Waltz lays out the groundwork for a systemic theory of international relations. Specifically, Waltz attempts to create a coherent and testable scientific system centered on the fundamental “ordering principle” of anarchy, or the lack of any meaningful authority capable of enforcing a collective set of rules on the totality of political actors (Waltz 1979, 88). Agents on the international stage, of which Waltz only finds states to be meaningful, are “functionally undifferentiated” and are only distinguished in terms of their capabilities (Waltz 1979, 97). The only two logics that can ever obtain on a structural level are anarchy and hierarchy—consequently, because Waltz believes that hierarchy in international politics is impossible to achieve, anarchy is and always has been the dominant structuring element in the interactions between political communities. The only changes that one can observe in the international system consist in the number and position of the Great Powers—the fundamental anarchic logic underpinning international relations is eternal and unchangeable. “The logic of anarchy obtains whether the system is composed of tribes, nations, oligopolistic firms, or street gangs” (Waltz 1990, 37). While the predominant political unit type matters to Waltz, as the way an anarchic system works depends on the constitution of its actors, transformations in unit type are outside of the scope of neorealism, which only concerns itself

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2 See Mearshimer (2001, 2007) for a similar defense of anarchy as the sole organizing principle among undifferentiated units.

3 Krasner (1993, 1995, 1999) makes a similar argument regarding the eternal nature of anarchy as an ordering principle, but differs with Waltz on the basis of anarchic order. Krasner argues that since the rules of territorial sovereignty that supposedly underpin the international system have been frequently disregarded, we should look past this “sovereign illusion” and view rulers’ desire to rule as the fundamental and trans-historical root of anarchy.
with the functioning of the status quo international system. Neorealism’s predictions are made exclusively in terms of its presumptive unit type, the state, under the logic of anarchy. Instead of being a weakness, however, Waltz uses this seeming limitation to preempt any criticism of neorealism as an incomplete theory: “Theories must be evaluated in terms of what they claim to explain” (Waltz 1979, 118). Focusing on the macro-level predictive capability of neorealism, Waltz completely disregards any criticism that his theory of international politics precludes examination of either agency or history in global politics.

Waltz’s blatant dismissal of counter-arguments against neorealism demonstrates his theory’s inadequacy to provide any meaningful account of political transformation, either in the past or in the future. Richard Ned Lebow has argued that Waltz’s attempt to create a seemingly scientific theory has “denuded […] realism of its complexity and subtlety” and represents “a parody of science” that “more closely resembles an unfalsifiable ideology” (Lebow 2007, 53).

Neorealism requires an inside and an outside for its vision of the world to hold true—there must be a domestic, hierarchical sphere against which the anarchic international sphere operates. As an examination of feudal Europe demonstrates, however, the cross-cutting and overlapping spheres of authority in pre-sovereign Europe represent neither neorealism’s vision of anarchy or hierarchy. A wide variety of political authorities held sway, from kings, to religious officials, to town governments, and none of them held anything close to a monopoly of violence, not to mention there was no universal basis for authority (Spruyt 1994, 12). There certainly was nothing resembling the territorial state, with fixed borders and a homogenous identity. The national/international divide upon which the fundamental tenets of neorealism rest simply did not exist. Neorealism specifically, and theories of anarchy more generally, are theoretically insufficient to account for such a political arrangement. Conflating anarchy with history is
nothing but an empty tautology. Instead of imposing the order of anarchy as a transhistorical given, we must examine the historical mode that gave rise to anarchy and its structural companion, the sovereign state.

Attempting to restore the missing historical dimension to the (neo)realist research program, Robert Gilpin’s *War and Change in International Politics* tries to answer the question of international change through a structural systems theory.\(^4\) Traditional models of political change have tended to fall into one of two camps: the liberal-democratic belief that change is an incremental process towards a peaceful institutional goal, and the Hegelian-Marxist belief that change comes in violent political upheavals aimed at resolving contradictions within the system. Gilpin argues that within the international system, both of these effects can be seen, with frequently implemented incremental change occasionally marked by major ‘economic, technological, or military developments’ that cause an immediate, often violent fracturing in the global political order (Gilpin 1981, 46). The response to these newly developing challenges to the predominant social actors and practices within the global order creates the possibility of revolutionary change and the rapid creation of a new social reality.

To further differentiate change in the international system, Gilpin theorizes three distinct forms of change, which operate at different fundamental levels and speeds (Gilpin 1981, 41). The first is the slowest and most rare form of change, what Gilpin calls ‘systems change’, in which the fundamental nature of the international system itself changes. For Gilpin, this means a change in the dominant unit type in the international system—he cites empires, nation-states, and multinational corporations as three examples of dominant units within different historical periods. The second is ‘systemic change,’ which reflects a shift in the distribution of power.

\(^4\) A similar attempt to historicize neorealism can be seen in Kaufman (1997). Instead of theorizing change in a tiered method like Gilpin, Kaufman views history in broad strokes where the anarchy problematique actively promotes consolidation while economic interdependence, unit identity and administrative technology counteract such a drive.
within a system, but maintains the overriding logic and order within the international system. This form of change occurs regularly over a longer period of time and would include the rise and fall of empires and great powers through hegemonic war. The final form is what Gilpin calls ‘interaction change’, or a modification in practices and policies at the international level. This form of change fundamentally alters diplomatic strategies and relations between political actors and happens quite frequently. Change at the interactional level is thus incremental, because it doesn’t seek to change the fundamental political order, while change at the systemic and systems level is revolutionary because they seek to change the very constitution of the system as a whole (either by changing the dominant actors within a system or changing the very unit that constitutes an actor). These changes operate under a rational choice model where all actors attempt to minimize the costs of political organization and maximize their capabilities in the international sphere. The revival of trade and the Military Revolution in feudal Europe set the stage for political concentration and territorial sovereignty. The nation-state thus became the predominant model of political organization because it “was the most efficient form of political organization for the set of environmental conditions that developed in early modern Europe” (Gilpin 1981, 116).

Although Gilpin’s theory attempts to bring the historical dimension back in to the realist account of international politics, it also brings in the same universal imposition of its principles that doomed neorealism as a viable account for change in the global system. Echoing Waltz, Gilpin ultimately concludes that “the nature of international relations has not changed fundamentally over the millennia” (Gilpin 1981, 211). As a result, Gilpin’s theory of change reflects the same inability to explain the historical continuity between the crisis in feudal political organization and the emergence of the territorial state (Teschke 2003, 20; Spruyt 1994). The
lack of any sort of constitutive basis within Gilpin’s theory is unfortunate—not only does the
treat systems change as a result of seemingly random and largely coincidental events, but
it also cannot account for the variety of political outcomes in different European regions. As
Benno Teschke argues, Gilpin’s assertion of a clear winner of the competitive pressures of the
international order cannot be reconciled with the historical record of both variegated political
forms in “the Dutch oligarchic merchant republic, the post-1688 British constitutional monarchy,
the Swiss Federation, the German confederate Empire, and the Polish aristocratic republic” and
the theory-defying examples of “the failure of certain polities, like Burgundy” alongside the
success of smaller polities “like the German mini-absolutisms” (Teschke 2003, 22). A final
objection to this theoretical perspective argues that despite setting out a framework for research
into the function of systems change, Gilpin retreats into the comfortable study of hegemonic
balance and distribution of capabilities. While Gilpin’s attempt at a systemic theory begins to
move in the right direction, his inability to make a clean break with the dogmatism of neorealism
renders his approach insufficient to properly theorize state formation.

Daniel Deudney’s recent work _Bounding Power_ attempts to shore up the historical
inadequacy of in the prior realist attempts to theorize political organization. Where Waltzian
neorealism attempts to provide an account of global politics centered on a single governing
factor, the anarchy problematique, for Deudney the question of what constitutes the fundamental
source of tension internationally cannot be reduced to a single variable. Instead, Deudney
identifies two interrelated governing principles within international politics—the ‘anarchy-
interdependence problematique’ and the ‘hierarchy-restraint problematique’. The anarchy-
interdependence problematique refers to the “relationship between variations in material context,
the scope of security compatible anarchy, and the scope of authoritative government necessary
for security” (Deudney 2007, 28). While this approach includes the neorealist understanding of the anarchy problematique, it extends beyond realism’s limited vision of security as only explicable through analysis of the distribution of power and instead orients its program around the concept of interdependence. The hierarchy-restraint problematique, by contrast, exists completely outside of realism’s theoretical purview, referring to the “relationship between variations in the size of government needed and variations in the security viability and types of hierarchical and republican government” (Deudney 2007, 30). The insight here is that because governments have often been the source of death and destruction, hierarchy itself can provide a potential security risk as dangerous as that of anarchy.

This bifurcation of ordering principles within international politics allows Deudney to unite the question of political organization with the variable of ‘violence-interdependence’, or “the capacity of actors to do violent harm to one another” (Deudney 2007, 35). Deudney contends that when violence-interdependence is absent, government itself is unnecessary and even impossible, while when violence-interdependence is intense and threatens individual or collective survival, hierarchical political forms become a necessity. For all intensities in between, government is possible but not necessary, because survival is not at risk. In this fashion, Deudney theorizes the difference between first anarchy (the state-of-nature in which the intensity of violence-interdependence and threat to individual survival demanded the creation of hierarchical polities) and second anarchy (the state-of-war that exists between states but doesn’t threaten their survival, thus making hierarchy unnecessary). 5 With advances in technology rendering warfare more and more deadly, however, the necessity of ever-larger hierarchical structures becomes a virtual necessity. Deudney traces the technological evolution of war over

5 This argument relies on Deudney’s paraphrasing of Hobbes. Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’ is a necessary corollary to life otherwise made “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” by the constant war of nature (Hobbes 1985, 186).
four epochs: the pre-modern period, the early-modern period, the industrial period, and the nuclear period (Deudney 2007, 37-8). As technology progresses, hierarchical political organization must continually widen its territorial scope in order to protect against the increased intensity of violence-interdependence entailed by each subsequent epoch. As we reach the nuclear period, the very survival of states is called into question, which Deudney claims provides a basis for the creation of global hierarchies culminating in some form of Nuclear One-Worldism to stave off the risks of nuclear annihilation.

While this theoretical framework is argued for in new language, the underlying conceptual framework draws very heavily on the principles of neorealism. As Anastasia Xenias argues, “it is unclear how […] global-industrial material context is substantially different from relative capabilities, just how physiopolitics is distinct from geopolitics, […] or why hierarchy restraint is anything but a balance of power” (Xenias 2007, 698). The republican security theory Deudney claims to elucidate seems to be nothing more than neorealism in a new guise, which ties his argument back to a conceptual language inadequate to the task of describing systems-level political transformation. Deudney’s theory does substantively advance past neorealism in one sense, however, by identifying the increasing destructiveness of military technology as the driver of change in international political organization. This argument’s heuristic value, however, is undermined by its unilinear determinism. Deudney’s argument presumes that the advancement of military technology, and the subsequent political forms it engenders, occurs exclusively in an evolutionary fashion toward more and more destructive weaponry. While this

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6 The basis of this argument can be found in Herz (1957), which argues that the role of state territorial integrity was to maintain a “hard shell” of protection against external threat. The nuclear age rendered this protective strategy functionally meaningless, which Herz concludes creates an incentive to move away traditional territorial state models. For an intriguing rebuttal, see Harknett (1996), who argues that the dissuasive power of nuclear weapons constitutes a “soft-shell territoriality” which maintains the state as the guarantor of security through deterrence.

7 The discussion of nuclear one-worldism is a holdover from Deudney (1995, 1997) where he uses the standard Waltzian understanding of anarchy to argue for political consolidation. This continuity in thought seems to enhance the argument that Deudney’s republican security theory disguises and reproduces neorealist ideology.
model is true in some contexts, particularly in the military development of advanced Western
dates, the actual use of military technology in the contemporary context seems to follow a
devolutionary pattern, with small arms and munitions supplanting larger and more destructive
weaponry, even in wars fought by those states possessing highly destructive military capabilities.
This gap poses a major problem for Deudney’s theory—while he seems, in an argument echoing
Fukuyama, to be proposing the end of military history, the predominant military technology in
the contemporary context is quite technologically crude. The underdevelopment of any
comprehensive social understanding of warfare in favor of a unilinear narrative of advances in
destructive capability renders Deudney’s theory of political organization both artificial and
ahistorical.

If Deudney’s argument is implicitly teleological, Alexander Wendt’s “Why a World State
is Inevitable” is quite explicit in its advancement of a teleological method. Drawing on the work
of self-organization theorists, Wendt argues that order does not emerge merely through the
“mechanism of mutation-selection-retention, but also ‘spontaneously’ from the channeling of
system dynamics by structural boundary conditions toward particular end-states” (Wendt 2003,
492). These boundary conditions manifest in both a bottom-up and a top-down fashion. The
bottom-up process, which Wendt calls upward causation, is seen when the reactions of individual
actors to local stimuli cumulatively self-organize into a coherent structure (e.g., the reactions of
states to local threats becoming systematized in the balance of power system). The top-down
process, which Wendt calls downward causation, consists of the boundary conditions that act to
maintain the function of a system by punishing those actors who threaten to destabilize its
operation (e.g., the ability of anarchy to ‘select’ those actors who balance power and eliminate
those who don’t). Instead of merely providing a constrained environment for the random
development of actors within it, however, Wendt argues that these systems necessarily have an end-point toward which development is directed, a stable attractor around which the system can become self-perpetuating. The evolution toward such a final cause is uneven and nonlinear, but static boundary constraints necessarily push systemic organization toward a pre-given end.

Wendt argues that the boundary conditions controlling the international system consist of the standard variable of material conflict and the more uncommon Hegelian concept of recognition. The material argument advanced by Wendt draws heavily on Deudney’s claim that the threat nuclear weapons pose to state survival necessitate the creation of global hierarchy. For Wendt, however, a purely materialist account like Deudney’s presumes that individuals and actors retain static identities as rational, self-interested maximizers both prior to and after the creation of a global state. To challenge this conception, Wendt complicates the discussion of interstate anarchy: “I agree that people want security. However, I think they also want recognition, which means that the logic of anarchy is also about a struggle for recognition” (Wendt 2003, 510). It is Wendt’s contention that subjectivity and identity are rooted in recognition of the Self by the Other—in this way “…subjectivity depends on inter-subjectivity” (Wendt 2003, 511). Wendt’s theory does not assume the primacy of the desire for recognition within state formation, but maintains it to be as important a constitutive factor as material security. Because political subjectivity and identity are conceived of as exclusive groupings, individuals encounter each other from pre-determined identity boundaries, and thus “…outsiders are denied rights and may even be killed not because of what they have done as individuals, but simply because they are members of a different group” (Wendt 2003, 515). As a result, social groups attempt to achieve corporate recognition vis-à-vis other groups in order to secure the subjectivity of their collective identity as well as the subjectivity of all constituent group
members. Based on this theory of recognition, Wendt concludes that the only stable systemic end-state possessing universal recognition lies in a monopoly of legitimate violence held by an inevitable global state.  

Although Wendt attempts to argue otherwise, it is nearly impossible to falsify the argument that a global state represents the stable end-point of political organization. Stating that human political organization has trended towards consolidation or that computational models and existing states demonstrate a consistent developmental path does not provide the necessary evidence that the current historical juncture is at all indicative of any predictive end state. If systemic selection does not follow a direct and linear path towards a fixed-point attractor, it seems to be an unwise leap of faith to suggest that we can see the end from inside the system. To extend this point, how can one even ascertain what the boundary conditions of the system are? Wendt’s quick and uncritical adoption of anarchy as part of the essential character of the international system reflects the worst ahistorical tendencies within the neorealist tradition. Although Wendt attempts to argue that the boundary conditions of anarchy leave open the possibility for individual action, it seems clear from his conclusion that the system must culminate in an all-encompassing global state. How can such a theory deal with groups that constitute their identities against that of a specific Other? Should we expect generations of accumulated knowledge and belief to just wash away against the tide of inevitability? Is the entire historical record irrelevant in the face of this theory? Wendt’s world state hypothesis is at once too deterministic, too myopic, and too ahistorical to provide a meaningful motivating theory for political organization.

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8 For a good review of the current scholarship on global state formation, see Craig (2003) and Lu (2006). For a critique arguing the global state argument is based on a bad systems theory, see Taylor (1996).
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

In response to the preoccupation of scholars of the anarchy problematique with the universality of material competition, the social constructivist school identifies the central motivation behind political organization as a consequence of underlying social forces. In an article entitled “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis”, John Ruggie elucidates the constructivist position on the inadequacy of such a materially-centered approach. For Ruggie, although Waltz’s conceptual schema makes a valiant attempt to resolve the perennial question of how to systematize international relations, the neorealist project’s claim to universality flies in the face of history. “[T]he difference between [anarchy] and the modern international system cannot simply be attributed to differences in the distribution of capabilities among their constituent units. To do so would be historically inaccurate, and nonsensical besides” (Ruggie 1986, 142). The radically different patterns of competition and cooperation in different geopolitical regions call into question the asserted transhistorical applicability of the rules of the anarchical system. Instead of accepting the conclusion that we must schematize and historicize change in international politics under the framework of anarchy, Ruggie argues that we must focus on non-systemic causes of change and calls for an examination of the broader social forces that create and recreate geopolitics.

The organizing principle of Ruggie’s new investigation is the ‘social episteme’, which he defines as the prevailing configuration of constituent elements within a given social order. Transformation in political organization does not stem from changes in the material condition of

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9 For related arguments, see Bull (1977); Onuf (1989); Ruggie (1998b); and Wendt (1987, 1992, 1999).
10 Supplementing this analysis, Hobson and Sharman (2005) argue that not only is anarchy’s scope geographically limited, but presupposing its universality ignores the historical dimension of extant hierarchy on the international stage, specifically in non-sovereign imperial structures.
11 That this term is borrowed from Foucault (1970) is intriguing. The Order of Things argues not only that we should problematize the unconscious order (economic, political, social) around which the world operates; but that we should also problematize the tools we use to study it. Ruggie’s operationalization of “social episteme” seems to achieve the opposite effect.
states; instead, transformation emerges from a fundamental change in the “mental equipment that people drew upon in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community itself” (Ruggie 1993, 157). Ruggie argues that the transition between the feudal and sovereign systems of order was undergirded by a revolution in political doctrine and metaphysics. Citing contemporaneous transformation in linguistics, art, and interpersonal sensibilities, the transition to the inter-state system can only be understood as a consequence of a Renaissance shift in the social epistemology of the subject (Ruggie 1993, 158-9). Ruggie thus understands the emergence of territorial sovereignty as the consequence of understanding the spatial organization of politics through a single-point, egocentric perspective. These changes did not, and quite simply could not, occur in a social vacuum. The constitution of a new dominant unit in international politics required a new inter-subjective order involving “the mutual recognition of the new constitutive principle of sovereignty” (Ruggie 1993, 162). While it is possible to account for changes within political organization through a purely material analysis, Ruggie argues that changes to political organization require fundamental social transformations that anarchy-centric approaches fail to account for.

While Ruggie’s broader social account of change in international politics provides a reasonable explanation for many of the theoretical voids in the anarchical account, the immensity of such a project threatens to drown any explanatory insights in a sea of inter-subjective variables. At no point does Ruggie describe how we can operationalize an account of political transformation from the nebulous concept of social epistemes. Additionally, if structure is primarily a function of social practice as opposed to material reality, then all theory is merely reactionary and descriptive, or at the very least incomplete, as social agents can constantly reinterpret and reconstruct the international system. Ruggie would likely respond to these
criticisms by arguing that when discussing transformation in political organization, we cannot isolate precise cause-and-effect relations and instead should adopt a model of causal indeterminacy. Acceptance of non-causal theory, however, reveals two major problems with a focus on social epistemology. First, an indeterminate account under-theorizes systems change because it cannot describe the antagonisms driving it. As Teschke argues, it would be naïve to understand radical change in political order as “a series of intersubjective negotiations and agreements among political elites, be they domestic in origin or the result of a chain of international peace congresses” (Teschke 2003, 31). Instead, fundamental transformations in political organization must be understood as the result of conflictual, often violent, social relations. Understanding the source of these antagonisms should be one of the primary goals of a theory of change in political organization. Second, this ‘indeterminate account’ paradoxically over-determines political change as a direct transition from the breakdown of the old order to a stable and fulfilled new order within the next social episteme; in this case, the direct transition from feudalism to the modern state system. What this explanation ignores, however, are the many transitional forms of political order that bridge the gap between the former status quo and the eventual stable end-result of systems change. There is no coronation for the successor to the old political system—instead, aspirants to the role of dominant political organizational type square off until one unit type emerges as most capable within the newly established order. While Ruggie is correct to point out the inadequacy of the anarchical account and the need for a social element to systems change, his reliance on the nebulous concept of social epistemes renders his theory insufficient.

In an attempt to compensate for the theoretical inadequacy of the social episteme, Christian Reus-Smit’s *The Moral Purpose of the State* identifies the root of sovereign
organization not in rational egoism, but rather in social legitimation. For Reus-Smit, the standard Constructivist approach to political organization massively oversimplifies both the deep constitutive values that underpin the social identity of the state and the principles of legitimacy that underpin international social organization. Consequently, he introduces the concept of ‘constitutional structures’ to refer to “the social identity of the state and the basic parameters of rightful state action” (Reus-Smit 1999, 26). Sovereignty is not self-referential and alone it can never provide a sufficient account of international politics. Instead, Reus-Smit argues we must situate the sovereign state system as a dependent variable within constitutional structures indicative of larger social metavalues. Since sovereignty can provide neither a functional nor a justificatory account of state action, arguments for specific courses of action require recourse to a set of shared inter-subjective values. In addition to this “moral purpose of the state” and Ruggie’s principle of actor differentiation, Reus-Smit identifies norms of “pure procedural justice” as a third normative element sustaining international constitutional structures (Reus-Smit 1999, 31-32). This concept of justice doesn’t dictate any determinate course of action, instead prescribing an ideal procedure for collective action and the resolution of conflict.

Reus-Smit’s focus on constitutional structures strongly suggests an alternative theory for fundamental political transformation. If constitutional structures and the moral fabric of state subjectivity have a direct and causal role in selecting the predominant unit within international order, the primary source of systems change must be understood in terms of these structural metavalues. This theoretical move adds a layer of complexity that even Deudney’s nuanced vision cannot account for—beyond anarchy and hierarchy, constitutional theory allows us to see the historical and normative narratives that underpin a given system of order. Reus-Smit argues that changes to constitutional structures manifest themselves as either ‘purposive change’, a shift
in the moral purpose of the state, or ‘configurative change’, which includes not only a shift in moral purpose but also fundamental transformation in the organizational and differentiating properties of the system itself (Reus-Smit 1999, 164). It’s not enough to ask whether anarchy or sovereignty is waning or waxing without an examination of the constitutional structures that provide the content to fill out the historically specific form of political organization.

While Reus-Smit’s view claims to provide a framework capable of organizing the social panoply described by Ruggie, his argument falls prey to many of the same indicts as the social epistemic approach. Specifically, while Reus-Smit’s argument claims to have a causal element, he can never identify the fundamental sources of antagonism that drive political transformation. This becomes especially evident when we attempt to account for war within Reus-Smit’s model. Because of its emphasis on cooperative social institutions, Reus-Smit’s theory glosses over actual periods of war to primarily address subsequent periods of treaty writing, leading Jennifer Sterling-Folker to wonder: “If the state’s internal meta-moral purposes produce cooperative institutions at the interstate level, then why does interstate war even occur?” (Sterling-Folker 1999, 265). Just as cooperative practices emerge as the consequence of a given social context, war must also be understood as the product of intensive social conditioning. Different states embedded in different social and historical modes conduct war very differently. The lack of any substantive social theory of war makes Reus-Smit’s theory seem incoherent, or at the very least incomplete.

Moving from considerations of methodology to ontology, Reus-Smit overdetermines the transition between historical modes of political order along rigid “before and after” lines. This is especially evident in his attempt to differentiate purposive from configurative change. Reus-Smit’s argument (change between feudal and absolutist forms of political organization...
represented a fundamental shift in international unit-type differentiation while transformation between absolutist and modern forms maintained static unit-type differences) lacks any substantive warrant beyond recitation of artificially rigid temporal boundaries. Even if we can ascertain a strict demarcation between moral purposes in these epochs, attempts to synthesize change at the ideational and constitutional level fail to address a historical record full of competing organizational models.\textsuperscript{12} While Reus-Smit’s text seems to provide a compelling new account of socially-driven systems change, its methodological failure to understand war socially and its ahistorical ontological division between constitutional epochs demonstrate the need for a more consistent model.

A final theory of change in political organization rooted in a social constructivist vision of the world can be found in Rodney Bruce Hall’s *National Collective Identity*. Where Ruggie and Reus-Smit’s insight for the most part comes at the expense of causal examination, Hall attempts to synthesize social practice into a causal framework. Hall’s vision of the relationship between changes in collective identity and changes in the international system can be synthesized into the following series:

\[ \Delta \text{(co-constituted individual / collective identity)} \rightarrow \Delta \text{legitimating principles} \rightarrow \Delta \text{institutions} \rightarrow \Delta \text{domestic \\& international norms/rules/principles} \rightarrow \Delta \text{system} \text{ (Hall 2007, 21).} \]

Hall argues that the prime mover behind change in political organization is change in the constitutive relationship between individual and collective identity. Each historically-constituted identity form privileges certain institutional norms and practices. When changes to the fundamental identity of actors within a given international order occur, the very constitution of a legitimate relationship between structure and agency is similarly challenged. Consequently, the

\textsuperscript{12} The examples given by Teschke (2003) on page 15 are only a few of the historically competitive forms of political organization. For more, see Spruyt (1994) and Van Creveld (1999).
institutional form through which identity is expressed to other societal groups must also evolve to meet these new criteria of legitimacy. “That which constitutes an appropriate institutional vehicle through which society may take social action is strongly conditioned by which form of polity the society considers itself to be” (Hall 1999, 30, emphasis in original). It is here that we see fundamental changes in political organization, with Hall arguing for the transition between dynastic-sovereign, territorial-sovereign, and national-sovereign forms of institutional political order. New norms, rules and organizing principles concerning socio-political, socio-economic, inter-societal, and security variables spill out of these new institutions, finally manifesting in a holistic systems change (Hall 1999, 29-30). By fusing a constitutive approach to individual and collective identity with a causal understanding of institutional transformation, Hall appears to neatly sidestep the criticisms levied against Ruggie and Reus-Smit.

Hall’s very ability to sidestep and dismiss virtually all the criticisms leveled against the social epistemic and constitutional structural theories of political transformation, however, should give us pause. A large portion of Hall’s wriggle room is undoubtedly due to his nebulous concept of societal collective identity. At no point in the text does Hall hammer out the precise contours of what characteristics define collective identity. Furthermore, there is no substantive theoretical basis on which to understand the fundamental transformation of individual and collective identity. As Mlada Bukanovsky convincingly argues, the definitional looseness of these concepts “gives him the freedom to tell a rich story about nationalism, but there is some sacrifice of conceptual rigor insofar as the forces that crystallized nationalism are ‘complex and historically contingent’” (Bukanovsky 2000, 240). A second concern lies with Hall’s inability to explain how the transformation in social identity operates. Specifically, why do certain visions of individual and collective identity win out? Why do certain legitimating and organizing
principles become dominant? Hall concedes that collective identity formation is an inherently contested process, which means any theorization under his rubric is inevitably bound up with whatever social identity the theorist chooses as a starting point. Absent some principle of evaluation, Hall’s argument is less theoretical and more descriptive. Finally, and in the same way that Reus-Smit’s constitutional theory struggles with the reality of conflict, Hall’s theory has some difficulty dealing with the relationship between social identity and war. While the causal theory Hall describes has the potential to account for changes in the macro-historical conduct of war (those fundamental and constitutive antagonisms motivating conflict), it struggles to account for the role of war as a co-constitutive social phenomenon. Changes in the technology or social organization of war neither stem from transformation in social identity nor necessitate any change in actor identity. In not treating war as a social type except at the broadest historical level, Hall’s theory excludes any consideration of warfighting practices or societal modes of war in a political theory of transformation. Hall’s restoration of the causal dimension to systems change theory is a necessary corrective to Ruggie and Reus-Smit’s analysis, but the conceptual fuzziness of societal collective identity and its subsequent inability to account for war’s social function outside of broad historical structures demonstrate the need to focus on a different constitutive variable.

NEO-MARXISM

Instead of focusing on anarchy or social identity as the predominant constitutive variable behind transformation in political order, the Neo-Marxist school attempts to historicize the central role of production in the creation and recreation of distinct polities. Justin Rosenberg’s ground-

13 In the language of Chapter 2, Hall’s theory can account for changes in the historical structure of war, but cannot account for changes in either the warfighting paradigm or the social mode of warfare.
breaking text *Empire of Civil Society* represents the first real attempt to synthesize this move into a coherent theory. Rosenberg begins with a proposition familiar to Marxist analyses of international relations, namely that political organization is a subsidiary effect of market dynamics. Consequently, change in political organization, including attendant patterns of competition and coercion, is a consequence of change in the social division of labor (Rosenberg 1994, 6). This mimetic relationship is established through analysis of the Greek polis, the Italian city-state, the early modern empire, and the modern sovereign state. Each form of political organization is argued to be bound up with and necessarily follow from a historically-specific, structural mode of production. Where Rosenberg breaks with the orthodox Marxist tradition and provides a radical new way to analyze this developmental relationship, however, is in his treatment of the connection between the development of capitalism and the logic of sovereignty. With capitalism’s explicit devolution of economic rationality to an ‘invisible hand’ outside of the realm of government, politics is for the first time able to emerge as more than mere market maintenance. The balance of power within anarchy, which realists have taken as a transhistorical condition affecting all forms of political organization, only emerges in Rosenberg’s account when economic and political rationality are externalized from direct political administration to a broadly-understood anarchical system. In this fashion, “the balance of power is not just like the invisible hand. It is its other half, the equivalent in the public political realm of the alienated social form of the invisible hand in the private political realm of ‘the economy’” (Rosenberg 1994, 139, emphasis in original). Capitalism, the sovereign territorial state, and the modern state system all operated together as autonomous realms birthed in large part as a consequence of capitalism’s division of societal practices into public and private spheres.
Rosenberg’s argument, while revolutionary, has a few theoretical difficulties as a consequence of its structural Marxist roots. While Rosenberg’s theory tends to treat the transition between different modes of production and political systems as direct and linear, he also acknowledges that political transition was an uneven, long-term process. Consequently, Rosenberg’s theory has difficulty with the macro-historical questions of transition. Where, when and how does capitalism and the modern-state system emerge? How can we reconcile such an account with the long-term transition between political forms? In an attempt to smooth out these discontinuities and provide a consistent theoretical account, Benno Teschke’s *The Myth of 1648* endeavors to reconcile a non-deterministic account of political development with a social theory based in production. The critical step taken by Teschke is to recognize that any transition in holistic geopolitical order depends on a logically prior transformation in the constituent elements of such an order. For Teschke, the fundamental connection between political agents is found in social property relations, which mediate differences between classes in a given historical order (Teschke 2003, 7). Political institutions are created and maintained in an attempt to fix social property relations with enforceable rules and norms for legitimate conduct. These strategies of reproduction, because of their consistency, form the basis for domestic and international political order. As fundamental challenges to a given mode of social property relations emerge, political order is reconstituted around newly formed property regimes. To demonstrate the historical basis of his thesis, Teschke traces the transition in social property relations and the attendant shift in political organization from feudal lordship, to absolutism and fragmented sovereignty, and finally to the set of social relations in England that allowed for the emergence of the modern state. The consequence of Teschke’s shift is precisely that no transition in economic or political order is taken for granted. The development of capitalism, unlike in Rosenberg’s account, is not
read as a fundamental break with all prior forms of political organization. Instead, Teschke holds it should be viewed as just another element within the historical continuum, albeit one that gave rise to the modern, territorial-sovereign state.

While the neo-Marxist account provides a powerful and sweeping critique of international relations scholarship on the state, it quickly becomes mired in some of the problems it claims to resolve. Richard Mansbach argues that while Teschke’s (and to a lesser extent Rosenberg’s) account provides a trenchant argument in favor of abandoning deterministic periodization; it ends up recreating the very same determinism around social property relations (Mansbach 2003, 2). Factors like nationalism, democracy, and religion are left completely out of the account. Also absent from this neo-Marxist theory is any systematic account of the constitutive role of war in the transition from one political order to another. Rosenberg doesn’t address this concern whatsoever, instead focusing on underlying economic causes and treating war as a symptom. Such an analysis, however, ignores the role militaries played in determining the success or failure of a given polity. It has never been enough to provide a good economic model—absent a capable military, social groups and their governments have been eliminated throughout history. Teschke provides a much more nuanced account of the constitutive phenomenon of war. Arguing that war-making was the dominant form of rationality for the feudalist lordship, consequent “military innovations based upon systematic investment in the means of violence were spectacular throughout the Middle Ages and beyond” (Teschke 2003, 61). This argument, however, seems to undermine Teschke’s belief that the fundamental basis of political order is social property relations and not warfare. In many ways, Teschke’s argument here belies Frank Parkin’s assertion that “inside every neo-Marxist there seems to be a Weberian struggling to get out” (Parkin 1979, 25). While this account of warfare better addresses its
function in political transformation than does Rosenberg’s, it still treats war as a contingent, unnecessary variable in social organization. The existence of war throughout history, however, seems to militate against such an assertion. Additionally, despite Teschke’s argument that the problem with neo-Weberian analysis is that it lacks a social theory of war, his conceptual linkage between feudal rationality and warfare only operates at the level of technological and tactical innovation. It does not and cannot address the role of war as a structuring element behind social or historical processes, opting instead for a more general theory of social property relations. As advocates of the geopolitical competition model will argue, while it’s possible to derive social property relations from an account of war, it is theoretically untenable to reverse that causal chain. While the neo-Marxist vision of change in political organization does a fantastic job critiquing the assumptions of the different accounts put forth by scholars of international relations, it struggles to account for non-economic variables in the transition from one state to another, especially the constitutive role of war.

COMMERCIALIZATION MODEL

Moving out of the field of political science and into the historical sociological school of inquiry, we find a broad literature with just as much to say concerning the origin and future direction of the state as does the international relations corpus. One particular field of historical sociology, commonly grouped together as the ‘commercialization model’, emphasizes the role of commerce and trade in political transformation. A foundational text in this light is Fernand Braudel’s *On History*, which in turn provides the insight underpinning Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-Systems
Braudel argues that history should be understood through three temporal analytic modes (Braudel 1982, 28-9). The first, which he calls \( \text{l’histoire événmentielle} \) or the continuously changing context of individual and micro-level undertakings, is concerned with the actions and interactions of individuals. Changes on this scale happen often and quite rapidly—this is journalistic time. The second, which Braudel calls \( \text{conjoncture} \), represents structural history including economic and political shifts. In this context, history is viewed episodically and is measured in decades, with “Romanticism, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, [and] World War II” as typical examples (Braudel 1993, 34). The final pace of history presented by Braudel is the \( \text{longue durée} \), or the deeply embedded, long-term historical factors that seem to embedded individuals as eternal and unchanging elements within the world. It is in the \( \text{longue durée} \) that we see the potential for systems level change, in that this type of history relies on a consistent unit type to form the underlying structure of political order.

Analyzing history through different temporal patterns of transition, however, does not preclude Braudel and Wallerstein’s theory from identifying a singular structural base upon which all other historical considerations are dependent. This prime mover is termed by Braudel the ‘\( \text{Weltwirtschaft} \)’ (‘world-economy’), the “economically autonomous section of the planet able to provide for most of its own needs, a section to which its internal links and exchanges give a certain organic unity” (Braudel 1992, 22). The world-economy represents the totality of structured interactions in both trade and geopolitics that exist between polities in a given historical order. Each manifestation of the world-economy (which Wallerstein alternatively

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14 Chase-Dunn and Podobnik (1995) provide an interesting corollary. They conclude, based on a world-systems analysis, that political transition is a function of necessary struggle and predict the next transition, possibly to a global state, around 2020.

15 Although the argument is first presented in Braudel (1972) and is further clarified in Braudel (1993), \textit{On History} gives us the conceptual language that constitutes the basis for both the broader, more metaphorical argument found in the earlier text and the more narrowly conceived research agenda found in Braudel’s later work.
describes as the world-system) presents a tripartite order with a dominant and prosperous core, a largely acquiescent semi-periphery, and an impoverished and highly dependent periphery. These distinctions are maintained in hierarchical fashion by the asymmetries found between polities in both their ability to materially produce goods and services and their ability to shape the ideational context in which distributional inequities are legitimized. State formation, consolidation, and transformation emerge out of this hierarchical divide—the form of political organization adopted by polities was a direct effect of their position within the world-system (Wallerstein 2004, 16). The Braudel-Wallerstein model of political organization argues that the state (or really any form of political organization) cannot be viewed in any context other than its relation to trade. Both the strength and form of a state are determined entirely by its position in the world-economy:

At the center of the world-economy, one always finds an exceptional state, strong, aggressive and privileged, dynamic, simultaneously feared and admired. […] How could these central governments fail to be strong? […] [Arguments to the contrary] overlook the inevitable: as if the central position itself could fail to create and demand effective government, as if government and society could fail to form an indivisible whole, and as if money could fail to create both social discipline and an extraordinary capacity for action (Braudel 1992, 51).

To understand the consequences of political organization, then, we must examine the interactions between the core and the periphery in a given world-economy. Braudel and Wallerstein cite the transition from feudalism to capitalism as one transition in the longue durée of the world-economy. What remains static in this theorization, however, is precisely the inevitably constituted nature of economic inequality. “Slavery, serfdom, and wage-labour are historically and socially different solutions to a universal problem, which remains fundamentally the same” (Braudel 1992, 63).

Braudel and Wallerstein’s theory of the state and political organization appears in many ways to be a transverse mirror of the neorealist argument. Where Braudel’s historical framework
tells us we must understand history through a number of different temporal forms of transformation, the argument for a universal world-economy contends that international markets constitute a static dimension for polities and their politics. “In other words, capitalism is not regarded as a qualitative, potentially reversible transformation of social relations, but simply a gradual quantitative expansion of the market since time immemorial (Teschke 2003, 137). Any and all critiques of the neorealist argument that anarchy is a necessary and timeless structuring element in global politics can be levied against this similar assertion of the universality of market dynamics. Braudel and Wallerstein might respond that unlike neorealism, which is impoverished precisely because of its lack of a historical dimension, a world-systems analysis is explicitly grounded in history and thus doesn’t fall into any of these critiques. Historical inquiry into the formation of the state, however, would seem to disprove this argument. The Braudel-Wallerstein model, in arguing for the transhistorical constancy of core-periphery relations, accounts for the rise of the modern state as part of an inevitable march of the market. As Hendrik Spruyt argues, however, there was “nothing inevitable about the emergence of the sovereign, territorial state” (Spruyt 1994, 18). Braudel and Wallerstein have no way to account for the wide variety of political formations in early modern Europe, or why certain social and political variables led to the creation of very different polities. In positing a wholly determinate system, the theory advanced by Braudel and Wallerstein is unable to explain why changes in political organization emerge or why some unit types flourish while others fail.

Arguing that Braudel and Wallerstein’s theory lacks the necessary theoretical nuance to account for transformation in political organization, Spruyt advances a much more complex and contingent version of the commercialization model. While historians of the state like Braudel are happy to ascribe the evolution of centralized, territorial authority in terms of a logical
progression from feudalism to the state system, such an account ignores the multiplicity of political forms that arose after the collapse of feudal authority. Instead, the historian “must […] first […] explain not merely why states superseded feudal organization but why a variety of alternatives emerged following feudalism. We need, secondly, to account for the superiority of the state vis-à-vis these alternatives” (Spruyt 1994, 18). Spruyt argues that instead of a logical, unilinear theory of political evolution, we should embrace a theory of rapid and massive change, or “…a dramatic shift along several dimensions simultaneously in response to a powerful environmental change” (Spruyt 1994, 7). Spruyt attempts to do this by setting the Braudelian model of multiple temporal perspectives against Gilpin’s model of change in international organization. This insight allows us to see the similarities between Gilpin’s three modes of change and Braudel’s temporal map, with the l’histoire evenementielle manifesting itself as Gilpin’s rapid interaction changes, conjunctures reflecting the speed of systemic change, and the longue durée indicating the scale upon which systems change operates.

As useful as placing Gilpin’s types of change against Braudel’s temporal layers is, Spruyt argues that theory still struggles to account for the rapidity and infrequency of system-level change. Consequently, Spruyt brings in another outside theory—Stephen Jay Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium. Instead of viewing evolution as a process that either moved in a unilinear fashion replacing one species with another or a continual process adding more and more species, Gould argues that evolution “…is adaptation to changing environments, not progress” (Spruyt 1994, 24). Faced with a massive environmental change, species are forced to make rapid progress toward a new evolutionary stage, which in turn creates a new stage of natural selection. Such an understanding of evolution fixes the flaws of prior unilinear versions of the theory in that it does not put any stock into necessity or predictability, but instead theorizes
evolution as a purely responsive mechanism. Such a theory provides an excellent metaphor for understanding system-level transformation in political organization. When we analyze a period of massive systemic changes, whether it be in the feudal to state transition or the period of global uncertainty of today, looking at the emergent competing political forms and tracing them back to the environmental change that caused them allows us to tell a story of how change is happening and what we can expect going forward.

In a similar, more context-driven light than Braudel and Wallerstein, Spruyt sees the environmental change driving transformation in political organization as a consequence of “the expansion of trade […] during the High Middle Ages” (Spruyt 1994, 25). This expansion of markets, however, cannot be seen as a pan-European phenomenon, but instead must be understood as situated in regional networks. Where the strength of the French monarchy vis-à-vis the peasantry allowed for the institution of central taxation and rationalized commerce in an absolutist, sovereign polity that would lead to the modern state, the German and Italian models emerged from entirely different economic and social realities. The German model of political organization, owing to a general rapprochement between the nobility and the monarchy, was explicitly extraterritorial and coalesced around a city-league model exemplified by the Hansa. The Italian model, as a consequence of systemic failure to assert central territorial control and the effect of German imperial policy, organized locally around strong urban leaders into city-states. The rapid and contemporaneous emergence of these three models established a pattern of institutional competition that continued for centuries and ultimately culminated with the success of the sovereign state.

While Spruyt’s synthesis of much of the most valuable insight from previous scholars into a meta-theoretical argument for change is at once persuasive and extremely useful, his
commercialization argument does not provide a sufficient cause to account for political
transformation. In a similar matter to Wallerstein and Braudel’s formulation of the commercial
transition, Spruyt assumes that the expansion of trade constituted a shock to feudal political
organization. Teschke, however, contends that town commerce was “indeed economically
internal to feudalism” (Teschke 2003, 35). This embeddedness of economic gains to the feudal
economy calls into question Spruyt’s argument that the massive expansion of the market
provides the environmental change necessary for the development of new political models. In
addition, Spruyt’s set of three institutional models (sovereign territorial state, city-states, and
city-leagues) massively understates the amount of polities that not only existed at the time of the
shock, but in many ways continued their rule uninterrupted for centuries. The Holy Roman
Empire, for instance, “combined decentralized semi-autonomous actors under an imperial
umbrella and survived until 1806” (Teschke 2003, 37). The continued existence of these
alternative forms of political organization tends to suggest that the institutional competition
Spruyt suggests should not be understood as a function of market rationality and competition.
Finally, and most crucially, Spruyt’s model has major difficulties with the violence-driven nature
of medieval geopolitics. Interactions among polities were mostly structured around the
institution of war—both the signing of treaties and consummation of alliances are a consequence
of a military-centric mode of thought. Spruyt would likely to respond to this criticism by
restating the argument he makes against Charles Tilly. While he views war as an important
dimension to be considered in any history of political organization, Spruyt argues that war is not
adequate to account for differences in institutional forms and the continued existence of non-
military powers. This argument, however, completely misses the point. While the effectiveness
of a country in war may not be an adequate basis around which to understand political
organization, understanding changes in social organization as structured around the fundamental institution of warfare can explain institutional differentiation while accounting for violence-interdependence in the international context. The complete inability of Spruyt’s theory to provide any account for the socially-constitutive dimension of war is a major shortcoming.

**GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION MODEL**

Against the commercialization model, a strongly contrasting historical sociological theory of state formation is presented by advocates of the geopolitical competition model. Exemplifying this school of thought is Charles Tilly’s *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Instead of evaluating new rationalities in markets and trading regimes as the prime mover of change in political organization, Tilly argues that “[w]ithin limits set by the demands and rewards of other states, extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central organizational structure of states” (Tilly 1992, 15). Tilly’s argument stems from two fundamental dilemmas. The first is that success in war requires positive administration over more territories and peoples. Subsequently, larger polities and their administrative duties divert the focus away from war towards governance. The second dilemma is that maintaining the ability to conduct war requires ever increasing extraction of resources, which in turn requires the creation of political infrastructure. This newly created infrastructure, however, quickly moves beyond military interests and actually alters the character and checks the intensity of war. State formation specifically, and political organization in general, should be understood as an attempt to maximize this nexus between the means of coercion and the extraction of resources required to maintain those very means. Tilly succinctly establishes the relationship between these modes of administration, state and city growth, and state form in the following chart (Tilly 1992, 27):

For similar arguments to this thesis, see Porter (1994), Ertman (1997), and Bobbitt (2002).
Tilly begins with the feudal transition, arguing that the central unifying character behind European political transformation was a direct effect of polities attempting to maximize coercion and extraction within their authority:

Europeans followed a standard war-provoking logic: everyone who controlled substantial coercive means tried to maintain a secure area within which he could enjoy the returns from coercion, plus a fortified buffer zone, possibly run at a loss, to protect the secure area. […] When that operation succeeded for a while, the buffer zone turned into a secure area, which encouraged the wielder of coercion to acquire a new buffer zone surrounding the old. So long as adjacent powers were pursuing the same logic, war resulted (Tilly 1992, 70-1).

While this logic could operate in the diffuse fashion of feudalism before the gunpowder revolution, Tilly argues that the vast expense required to maintain a trained and equipped military armed with cannons and firearms far outstripped the limited financial means of feudal lords and their narrow principalities. Consequently, political organization began to move towards large, sovereign, and reified forms of political organization best able to maximize coercion and extraction within their borders. As we’ve moved into the post-World War II environment, where the European state system has become the de facto global system and borders have largely become static worldwide, Tilly argues that the role of militaries within
states has become even more pervasive. More powerful, specialized states are likely to reach beneficial economic and security relationships with smaller states instead of militarily incorporating their territory. When combined with the increasingly destructive power of nuclear arms and other advanced weapons systems, the very nature of war has shifted. Wars remain incredibly brutal, but have largely stopped being fought over borders and have instead taken on the form of lethal civil conflicts, often involving mass slaughter and genocide. “Armies […] concentrate increasingly on repression of civilian populations, combat of insurgents, and seizures of power. As a consequence, governments become more unstable as their borders become more secure” (Tilly 1992, 203). Tilly argues that the states that have emerged in the Third World since World War II have tended to follow coercion-intensive paths relying heavily on the repressive military forces left behind after European colonialism. These militaries have become resistant to civilian power, and as of Tilly’s writing rule approximately 40 percent of the world’s states were living under direct military rule. Consequently, Tilly worries of “…the risk that a war in the Third World will involve nuclear arms or lead to a great power confrontation” (Tilly 1992, 217).

As a corollary to Tilly’s work, and one that in some ways surpasses it, Michael Mann’s version of the geopolitical competition model in The Sources of Social Power gives an account of European political ascendancy that attempts to reconcile the developmental relationship between capitalism, the modern state, and the international state system. Mann identifies three distinct phases of political development that eventually coalesced into the modern state and the modern state-system. The first is a general cultural and economic unification that occurred in Europe throughout the late feudal period, in which the expansions of trade and Christendom

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17 Atzili (2007) similarly argues that the largely fixed territorial status in the modern geopolitical order makes weak states weaker and more prone to violence by eliminating the external threat that would otherwise provide the main impetus for state building.
provided a fertile ground for mutually interacting power networks aimed at the creation of wealth. The fact that all of these variables coalesced at once is seen by Mann as a giant coincidence, but the single unifying developmental relation that he argues is unique to European development was the broad cultural influence and subjective appeal of Christianity. “Although the power structures of Rome are an essential background for understanding, say, the origins of the manor, and those of Germany for understanding vassalage, Christianity’s origins were somewhat interstitial to both” (Mann 1986, 505). The second phase of development relies on another set of coincidences, this time environmental. The combination of propitious growing conditions and trade routes increased agricultural and commercial development, while the rise of Islam to the east blocked outward expansion. The combination of these economic and geographical pressures with the Military Revolution led to the emergence of a new political spectrum—from diffuse feudalism emerged a “simpler, modern form: a multistate capitalist civilization” (Mann 1986, 510). Echoing Tilly’s argument, the final stage is the development of conflictual relations as military relations required ever more resource extraction and competition over a relatively limited resource base. Where Tilly’s account is non-deterministic, emphasizing the variety of political forms that emerged around balancing extraction and coercion, Mann’s account argues that each of these emerging polities responded to the same political realities in functionally the exact same way. Mann’s greatest theoretical insight, however, is found in his remapping of the relationship between capitalism and warfare. While the standard account of this link views warfare as a subsidiary effect of capitalist and statist relations, Mann reverses this chain of causality, arguing that the necessities of military organization made extraction-intensive methods necessary and drove the historical development of both territoriality and capitalism itself (Mann 1986, 454).

18 For a more detailed treatment of this causal reversal, see Mann (1988a, 1988b). For critiques of this
While the geopolitical competition model advanced by Tilly and Mann provides a powerful account for evolution in political organization as a consequence of war, there are a few conceptual problems with its theoretical corpus. First, Mann’s model is too deterministic, and cannot account for differentiation in polities or their politics, opting instead for a sweeping account of pan-European social conditions. Attempting to lump together all of the various post-feudal polities under a single structuring vision risks recreating all of the problems of the commercialization model isolated in the previous section. Tilly’s account, however, takes the necessary step out of this determinism to suggest a wide variety of political options that competed for ideological preeminence on the post-feudal stage. Two main critiques of this approach emerge from the literature. The first critique, advanced by Spruyt, is that actors possessing greater military capability were often outperformed by actors with less of a material base. The example Spruyt gives to substantiate this argument is the political success of the materially-lacking French Capetian kings and the failure of the militarily powerful duke of Normandy (Spruyt 1994, 31). A second critique, advanced by Teschke, is that the geopolitical competition model lacks a causal element. Specifically, “the geopolitical competition literature does not explain why the mere fact of territorial contiguity necessarily entails competition” (Teschke 2003, 123). Both of these problems can be summed up in Teschke’s argument that the geopolitical competition model lacks any social theory of war. Both Tilly and Mann treat war as a contingent effect of technology and tactics, never considering the effect war has on domestic policies and audiences, not to mention the historical aspect of warfare. Without a substantial theorization of the predominant social mode of warfare, we are left with “an anthropologically questionable idea of man as a natural power-maximizer or a psychologizing rational-choice model” (Teschke 2003, 123). Neither of these options is sufficiently explanatory, which is why reformulation, see Teschke (2003) and Bonney (1995)
any account of political organization through warfare must account for more than the what and how of war, and bring in the question of why.

**GLOBALITY**

Martin Shaw’s *Theory of the Global State* attempts to synthesize the most valuable elements contained in the models of systems change elucidated above into a comprehensive account of the underlying forces behind global revolution. Shaw brackets out three visions of transformation in contemporary social and international relations theory; specifically, the conditions variously described as postmodernity, globalization, or the post-Cold War world (Shaw 2000a, 2-4). These narratives of transformation, however, are fundamentally incomplete insofar as they isolate a predominant cause of change and ignore the integration of political, military, social and economic relations into an emergent global consciousness. Shaw argues that the problem with contemporary formulations of emergent global behavior is that they presume both too much and too little. On the one hand, accounts of global transformation that are unintentional and mechanistic necessarily overdetermine change by denying human agency. “Globality is not the result of a global teleology or a global spirit. It is, however, the outcome of the conscious and intentional actions of many individual and collective human actors” (Shaw 2000a, 17). In a world of emergent global institutions, we can no longer view the economic, political, or social as autonomous spheres in a direct cause and effect relationship with one another. Instead, Shaw argues we must recognize their increasingly overlapping and interconnected character. If the predominant structural relationship is too stratified and determinate, the basis on which contemporary scholars understand the global is grossly underdeveloped. Debates about global trade and transnational institutions are impoverished precisely because they lack any historical
character or context. Put more plainly, contemporary scholars of globalization, postmodernism or the post-Cold War world cannot adequately distinguish a system of integrating nation-states from previous arrangements organized around sovereign, imperial, and national societal borders.

Shaw’s thesis is an attempt to fill this conceptual lacuna by adequately theorizing and historicizing the contemporary transformation of political organization around three central concepts. Because the three major accounts for contemporary political transformation are all trapped in the methodologies, epistemologies, and ontologies of their respective fields, Shaw calls for a new, broad-based theory to account for the transformation to global consciousness. He terms this emergent phenomenon the ‘global revolution’, which he distinguishes from traditional visions of social revolutions in a number of ways. While it is not bound up with territoriality or nationality, it similarly doesn’t begin from any universal political demand. Instead, while the “global revolution involves a transformation of social relations in general, […] at its heart are key upheavals in relations between political and military power. […] It is the connection between wider social and more narrowly political processes that give the changes of our times their distinctively revolutionary character” (Shaw 2000a, 8). If the global revolution is the mode by which we’re moving into a global era, Shaw terms the new ideological rationality driving it as ‘globality’. Put simply, globality is the social condition in which things are seen as global, and it represents a fundamental break with the social forms of modernity. The global in this context is more than just a way to understand time and space. Shaw sees in the transition to globality the very real possibility of a common, all-inclusive consciousness of human society—an actualization of the global village.

The realization of globality in political form is found in what Shaw terms the ‘global state’. The dominance of the Western state model has led to increasing global institutional and
ideational integration into what Shaw terms variously as ‘the Western bloc-state’, the “internationalized Western conglomerate”, and “Western-global state structures” (Shaw 2000a, 252, 265; 269). Shaw argues that the likely conclusion to the current global revolution is a series of violent conflicts eventually culminating in the realization of worldwide global institutionalism and the development of a truly global consciousness. This vision of the global state is distinct from Wendt’s theory, however, because Shaw is careful to argue that there is nothing certain in this transition. Just as easily as the project toward integration at the global layer could buckle under the weight of culture, religion and nationality, Shaw concludes that the Western state itself could potentially fracture and cease to be the predominant unit type in political order (Shaw 2000a, 255-6; 269). Ultimately, however, Shaw concludes that although process is likely to be slow and uneven, the spread of institutions globally and subsequent realization of a global-democratic ideal is virtually a foregone conclusion.19

Although Shaw’s argument makes a valiant effort to synthesize the various methods and approaches to change in political organization, in many ways it unconsciously repeats the errors it identifies in the extant literature. First of all, after offering a trenchant critique of the focus on nationality and internationality in a world where global forces are changing the very nature of political, economic, social and ideological interaction, his conclusion draws on the very statist method that he critiques. Shaw even goes so far as to claim at the end of his chapter on history and agency that the “tendency of revolutions to encourage the growth of the state may be a general law” (Shaw 2000a, 170). Through these arguments, Shaw comes closer to Waltz or Wendt’s structural determinism than real historical inquiry. Instead of identifying the territorial

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19 Shaw argues that the consequences of inaction will only become more and more dire, on the one hand preventing responses to poverty and human rights violations (Shaw 2000b, 19-20) and on the other hand potentially leading to genocidal or even nuclear conflicts (Shaw 2001, 647). While it requires repeated crisis to move towards global institutionalism, Shaw’s vision of the future strongly suggests the world will get much worse before it gets better.
state as a relatively recent product of history in the context of human social organization, Shaw ontologizes it as a general structuring principle within international relations. Similarly, although early on in the text Shaw argues that the military-political transformation played a profound and constitutive role in activating the global revolution, war as the prime mover falls by the wayside in favor of an analysis of the motivating value of the global democratic project. Instead of focusing on the role of conflict in political transformation, which has the potential to methodologically account for different historical periods, Shaw decides to argue for the global revolution as historically discontinuous and ‘unique’. Unlike warfare, however, democracy is a historically-localized, non-natural part of a wide variety of political forms. Shaw’s conclusion sounds positively Fukuyaman at the end when he concludes that after many struggles, we will see the emergence of a global democratic state representing “some kind of interim conclusion” to transformation in political organization (Shaw 2000a, 269). This “normative and ideological” position ignores the periphery, scapegoats and maligns communism, and ignores the constitutive role of Western colonialism and imperialism (Robinson 2000, 1046). Shaw’s synthesis of the current literature in the context of the changing politics of globalization and argument for its methodological inadequacy can be at times profound, but the conclusions he draws from this unique starting point largely fly in the face of the methodological consistency he establishes at the outset.

CONCLUSION

Although the literature concerning transformation in political organization is both deep and broad, there appear to be three primary sources of conceptual tension that remain unresolved. First, to the extent that theories provide a universal basis for political transformation, they tend to
emphasize the effect of a single variable or theoretical perspective in a highly determinate fashion. Examples abound, from the dogged adherence by traditional and critical realist scholars to the structuring principle of anarchy, to the belief in the unchanging nature of market relations and the world-economy in Braudel and Wallerstein’s commercialization model, and even to the end of history democratic discourse implicit in Shaw’s theory of globality. Each of these theoretical models is problematic insofar as they fix the role of change to variables that can be demonstrated not to apply to certain historical polities and transformations. What almost all of the literature assumes as a fundamental, transhistorical element to political order, however, is conflict and warfare. Second, while much of the literature is able to justify its applicability to previous transformations in political order, these reconciliations rely on a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument and thus cannot identify the antagonisms that led to fundamental systemic transformation. One example of this logical fallacy is found in social constructivist accounts of political transformation, which paint a broad picture of transition in social epistemes but never identify any of the violent or antagonistic social relationships responsible for the birth of a new social language. Similarly, Spruyt’s account of systems change provides a powerful multi-linear account of how political transformation occurs with massive speciation events in response to system-wide crisis, but never adequately establishes the basis of such a crisis in either the specific feudal case or any generic sense. Finally, almost all of the theories provide an inadequate account of warfare, treating it as a subsidiary effect of the predominant method they isolate: for realists, anarchy; for social constructivists, the entire spectrum of social epistemology; for neo-Marxists, property relations; and for the commercialization model, core-periphery relations. Even the geopolitical competition model, which treats war as the structuring variable in political transformation, considers the institution of warfare less as a social
phenomenon and more as the result of technology and tactics. This oversimplification is what allows critics of warfare-driven models of political transformation to dismiss war as an interruption of social and political life rather than a fundamental social mode in and of itself.

Any theory of change in political organization that wants to maintain methodological coherence must have an explicit defense against the three objections listed above. It is my contention that that treating change in the social constitution of warfare as the fundamental driver behind transformation in political organization rectifies these theoretical missteps. First, organizing change around a social concept of warfare helps ease the tension between universality and historical change. Where approaches centering on anarchy and the world-economy treat their framework as existing outside of history and determining its direction, a social theory of warfare merely provides a skeletal outline that is then substantiated by the historical and societal context war is conducted in. Although war is a transhistorical constant, the conduct of war tactically, socially, and historically is drastically different across time. Second, where social epistemic and commercialization theories never really account for the fundamental antagonisms underpinning change, a social theory of warfare is explicitly aimed at resolving the contradictions in each historical moment through a variety of temporal perspectives. A traditional account of warfighting that only emphasizes the ‘what’ questions in the conduct of warfare, however, will be never able to reconcile systems change to its conflictual causes. Consequently, bringing in social and historical ‘why’ questions to an analysis of warfare is essential to unravel the oppositional forces and identities that underpin the drive to transform the global system. Finally, centering an account of political transformation on the institution of warfare better allows us to directly treat the often violent nature of change. While an analysis of war will never be able to account for all of the interlocking variables constituting international
order—economics, religion, culture, et cetera—it does provide a compelling account for the various historical modes of political organization and the numerous transformation to new forms of order. Warfare is the best lens through which to evaluate political transformation because it contains a rare balance between transhistorical applicability and historical specificity, material capabilities and social organization, structure and agency.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

OVERVIEW
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the literature concerning state formation suffers from three major problems—an overdetermination of change in variables that can never obtain universal historical veracity, an inability to identify and account for the antagonisms underpinning political transformation, and an inadequate account of warfare as a unique social phenomenon. This chapter will attempt to lay out a theoretical argument that avoids these pitfalls and provides a cogent narrative for the transformation of war and its subsequent effect on political organization. My fundamental argument is that while we cannot trace a unilinear, determinate path of political development across time and space, we can draw a developmental relationship between the transition to new modes of warfare and the subsequent rise of new political units. Using Braudel’s three temporal spheres as a conceptual template, I combine Gilpin’s three modes of political change with Andrew Latham’s ‘warfighting paradigm’, ‘social mode of warfare’, and ‘historical structure of war’. With each situated change in warfare, I argue for a necessary change in political organization at the same temporal level, and the possibility for political transformation at the next fundamental layer.

Traditional accounts of political transformation tend to divide material and ideational considerations into two distinct fields of inquiry, operating independently of each other with one acting upon the other in a determinate fashion. What these theories lack is any transhistorical means to bridge the gap between the substantive and the social. It is my contention that war, understood as more than a technological or tactical phenomenon, provides an essential bridge between such social and material considerations. Consequently, I argue that any approach that
hopes to bridge this ontological gap between material and social approaches ought to use war as the structuring theoretical principle. Before my theoretical model can be given any credence, however, a prior step must be taken to elucidate the ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations of my argument. This chapter begins with a direct ontological inquiry, in which I elucidate the dual objects of inquiry (war and political organization) and establish how I will situate their change vis-à-vis other fundamental actors and processes. I will then establish the epistemological basis of my theory, conceptually defining the state, war, and revolution. Third, I will lay out the foundational methodology of my theory, drawing connections between Gilpin three modes of political transformation and Latham’s three modes of warfare. Finally, I will answer potential criticisms of my method and demonstrate why an analysis of warfare provides the best avenue to analyze political transformation.

THE ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION

Examining the historical record, one is struck by the persistence of political conflict and violence. Indeed, social organization from the beginning of human interaction seems indelibly marked with a dimension concerning warfare and collective security.20 The classical scholars of political theory and the state, from Hobbes to Rousseau, Bodin to Grotius, all considered the conduct of warfare and political violence as an inherent element within political order. Despite the omnipresent effect of the institution of war on political organization, however, most modern scholars of state formation seem willing to bracket it off as a subsidiary response to some other fundamental cause or as an interruption of politics instead of their continuation. Understanding

20 Van Creveld (1999, 6-8) argues that while some isolated, primitive societies may have existed without the formal institution of war, instead focusing on ritualized clashes between individuals or no method of conflict at all, for most societies the raiding party and its institutionalized clashes with other cultures were a constitutive element to their lived history. For an overview on the prevalence of war prior to complex society, see LeBlanc (2007).
the ontological character of war, consequently, is an essential first step to situating its role as either a constitutive or dependent variable in political transformation. Any account of the nature of war can not help but begin with its most influential theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. Out of his many theoretical insights into the nature of warfare, I will isolate a few which bear most readily on the fundamental character of war and political transformation. For Clausewitz, war can be thought of in a trinitarian light consisting of primordial violence, the play of chance, and the subordination to policy-driven considerations (Clausewitz 2007, 30). This characteristic division of war emphasizes a few fundamental purposes of organized political violence that are crucial to war’s development as a substantive social phenomenon. First, although war to Clausewitz reflects an inherent passion for violence within a social body, it is not a process that can be divorced from policy. Instead, war becomes a properly social variable insofar as it represents another modality of political action—in the classical formulation “war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means” (Clausewitz 2007, 252). What the popular appropriation of this quote leaves out, however, is the explicit incorporation of warfare as another avenue of political action. War cannot and should not be read as discontinuous with politics in the traditional sense; instead, it should be understood as another avenue of political action. The effect of this move, according to Mary Kaldor, is that Clausewitz theorizes a mode of warfare analogous to the Marxist mode of production—a form of social practice and relations that is both constitutive and productive (Kaldor 1982).

The second essential theoretical insight in Clausewitz concerns the nature of change in the mode of warfare. Clausewitz isolates two fundamental visions of warfare—absolute war,

21 Van Creveld’s (1991a, 1991b) association of trinitarian war with the people, the army and the government misses the crux of Clausewitz’s argument by arguing for the primacy of a tripartite system Clausewitz argues is derivative of the trinity of war’s characteristics described above. For a detailed treatment of this argument, see Villacres and Bassford (1995).
22 See also Giddens (1985) for his discussion of warfare as a distinction constitutive factor within modernity.
which is an idealized model of complete and untrammeled violence that is never fully realized, and real war, which is the historically concretized form of warfare that tends toward absolute war but is always limited in attempts to achieve total destruction by frictional and political factors (Clausewitz 2007, 223-5). As Latham persuasively argues, Clausewitz’s concept of real war is further differentiated into an objective and subjective character. The objective character reflects aspects of war that are transhistorical and universal, “including its essence – ‘war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’ - and its elemental characteristics, which included ‘primordial violence’, ‘chance and probability’, the primacy of the political, the ‘fog of war’, and ‘friction’” . Contrasting this is the subjective, or transitory, character of war, which includes such elements as “weapons, tactics, the “art of war”, strategy and even the political context within which states fight wars” (Latham, forthcoming). The essential dimension of war for scholars interested in change in the social mode of warfare and political organization consequently lies in this non-reified, subjective context. Clausewitz, however, provides us with no theoretical scaffolding on which to conduct such an inquiry. Consequently, Latham’s work is an attempt to create a basic theoretical diction upon which such a research agenda may be established. Drawing on the Braudelian understanding of temporal layers elucidated in Chapter 1, Latham establishes a treatment of warfare that accounts for the uneven development across tactical, social and historical measures, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.23

The first constitutive variable, corresponding to Braudel’s l’histoire événmentielle or events time, is what Latham terms the ‘warfighting paradigm’. Put simply, the warfighting paradigm is the “specific configuration of military technologies, doctrines and organizational forms” that predominates at a given historical moment (Latham 2008, 120). Transformation in

23 While a rough sketch of these three temporal modes of war can be seen in Latham (2002), in which he attempts to apply a Braudelian method to the Revolution in Military Affairs, his later publications (2008, forthcoming) provide a much more nuanced and theoretically coherent treatment of these conceptual types.
the warfighting paradigm, however, cannot be reduced to a change in a single one of its constituent elements (respectively: military technological advances, evolution in operational concepts and doctrines, and organizational innovation). Instead, change in the warfighting paradigm constitutes a revolutionary transformation in the fundamental logics underpinning all of these elements and their relations to one another. While technology advances will almost assuredly play an essential role in driving this transition, it is important not to leave out the equally constitutive role of human agency aimed at improving battlefield effectiveness. The second constitutive vision of warfare, which operates at the level of conjoncture or episodic time, is what Latham describes as the ‘social mode of warfare’. Briefly stated, the social mode of warfare is defined as “the way in which a state-society complex organizes for and conducts war” (Latham 2008, 127). This mode of examining war is deeper and more foundational to the way war is conducted than the warfighting paradigm, looking to changes in the social, cultural, and technological forces that shape how society understands and orients itself toward war instead of

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24 Taken from Latham (forthcoming).
how it conducts it. Unlike the warfighting paradigm, the social mode of warfare operates both on and off the battlefield, functioning as a distinct societal logic during both war and peace; during conflict and after its resolution. The final constitutive account of warfare, operating at the level of the *longue durée* or epochal time, is what Latham describes as the ‘historical structure of war’, or “the prevailing configuration of social relations, ideas and institutions that define the basic nature of ‘war’ in any given world order” (Latham 2008, 128). This vision of warfare analyzes its most fundamental character, focusing on the constitutive antagonisms of world order (the violently-constituted conflictual relationships that form the possibility of violence), the political architecture of organized violence (the infrastructure of political violence, both in its material units and the structural matrix in which they are embedded) and the fundamental institution of war (the prevailing system of meaning containing the ontology, moral purpose and meaning of political violence). Each prevailing logic operates at its own speed, with the warfighting paradigm rapidly changing as technological and strategic innovation supplant and fuse with status quo methods of warmaking, the social mode of warfare changing more gradually, and the historical structure of war representing a deep foundation that from the perspective of a situated observer appears to represent the eternal nature of warfare.

In a similar fashion to the transhistorical ontological existence of war in world order, political organization is something that exists across time and space as an indelible element of human social practice. Whether bound up with the positive administration of power as in Mann’s account or a necessary consequence of corporate social identity as in Van Creveld’s, what seems self-evident is the constitutive role that forms of political organization have played in the makeup of social bodies (Mann 1986, 6-8; Van Creveld 1999, 1-2). It is important, however, to take a step back and examine how societies exist and interact across a broad spectrum of
organizational practice and ideational belief. Instead of attempting to draw a fixed picture of social relations in this irreducible social totality, Robert Cox argues we should distinguish between concepts of ‘world order’ and ‘international order’. Drawing on Ibn Khaldun and Hedley Bull, Cox defines world order as “genuinely transhistorical. It refers to the order prevailing in all mankind, without prejudging the manner in which mankind is institutionalized” (Cox 1996, 149). World order represents the sum of all human actions and interactions – it is quite literally the social totality, those core elements of human existence that are absolutely essential. Contrasted with this perspective is one of international order, which refers to “a particular historically limited condition of institutionalization: [for example,] that of a system of nation states” (Cox 1996, 149). Any attempt to do comparative or transformational analysis of world order must necessarily focus not on world order itself, because of its static and eternal essence, but should focus instead on the articulation of specific spheres of social organization in their particular historical and institutional forms. If the object of inquiry is the change in political organization against the backdrop of fundamental world order, however, a specific model to ontologically distinguish forms of change over time is still required. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the application of Gilpin’s three modes of change to the Braudelian model of temporal layers provides an excellent framework through which to theorize change in political organization.\(^{25}\)

The first type of change in political organization, corresponding to the événmentielle, is what Gilpin terms interaction change. This form of change is relatively limited and occurs quite frequently, reflecting shifts in diplomatic posture and policy; actor interface and relations. Transformation in these interactional forms, while able to fundamentally alter the day-to-day

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\(^{25}\) Spruyt (1994) deftly elucidates Gilpin and Braudel’s arguments, but never takes the next logical step to synthesize their methods. I contend that this combination is essential to theorize change in international political organization.
Figure 2.2. The Temporal Layers of International Political Transformation.

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<tr>
<th>Temporal Perspective</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Key Structural Elements</th>
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<tr>
<td>Événmentielle</td>
<td>Interaction Change</td>
<td>1. Modifies international practices and policies</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Changes diplomatic strategies, actor relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conjoncture</td>
<td>Systemic Change</td>
<td>1. Shifts the distribution of power (hegemonic transition)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. Maintains the overriding logic and order within the system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Longue Durée</td>
<td>Systems Change</td>
<td>1. Alters the fundamental nature of the institutional order</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. Changes the dominant unit type</td>
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operations of a given form of political organization, has little effect on the structuring boundary conditions of the system itself. The second form of change, corresponding to the *conjoncture*, bears more readily on the structure of the system, albeit indirectly. In what Gilpin terms systemic change, the power relations between states are altered through hegemonic transition wars. The result of this leadership transition is the delegitimization of the ruling principles of the old hegemon and the creation of a new ruling consensus, which in turn opens space for changes in the operation of the system. What this sort of transition does not alter, however, are the underlying logics and structures that determine the privileged unit in international politics. Revolutionary challenges to these structural principles, which correspond to the *longue durée*, are the prerequisite for Gilpin’s third conceptual type, ‘systems change’. According to Gilpin, systems change is an extremely rare, non-cyclical process that fundamentally alters what constitutes the predominant actor-type in the international system. This kind of change is extremely rare precisely because it challenges what to embedded observers seems unchallengeable—the very mode of political organization under which each and every individual
subject operates. Just as subjects of feudal rule likely had great difficulty conceiving of their identity apart from parochial political structures, so too do subjects of the modern state have difficulty imagining identity absent state and national markers. While Gilpin provides the basis for a multi-causal model of change in political organization across temporal modes, he does so trapped in the conceptual schema of the anarchy problematique. Only by jettisoning the ahistorical baggage of neorealism and fusing his conceptual types with a Braudelian analysis are the radical implications of Gilpin’s multi-temporal model of change revealed.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION

No less important than establishing the objects of warfare and political organization or the world order against which they change is defining the language I use to theorize and describe them. As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith persuasively argue, inquiry into ontology is only possible after we determine an epistemic basis on which to divide up the ontological realm (Hollis and Smith 1996, 111-116). The first term I will conceptually unpack and analyze is the ‘state’. Of the three concepts this chapter will address, the state seems to be the least directly connected to my theoretical argument. Nothing could be further from the truth, however. Although my theoretical argument is generalized to changes in political organization across time and space, the historical and contemporary inquiries of Chapter 3 deal with the transformation into and the potential exit from the modern state and the modern state system. As a consequence, unraveling the meaning of the state is essential to my argument. What exactly the state entails on both a definitional and functional level has been a subject for debate throughout the history of historical sociology and international relations. Max Weber’s foundational definition of the state is premised on a central sovereign authority’s control over the means of legitimate, organized
violence within its territorial borders. Wendt capably sums up this basic Weberian definition of
the state as “an organization possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence
within a society” (Wendt 2003, 20-21). Wendt identifies four operative components within this
definition that must each be analyzed as distinct compositional elements comprising the state.
The first is the monopoly of force, defined by Wendt not merely in terms of the capability to
defend the state’s interests but rather as a unified and centrally controlled “common power” able
to sustain the given sociopolitical order. Wendt’s second operative term is legitimacy. This does
not necessarily entail equality and recognition for all members of a given state society, but
instead requires an acceptance of the state as a guarantor for society. Such a definition precludes
gangsters and warlords who nominally control the central means of authority but who are not
recognized by society at large as legitimate rulers. The third operative phrasing within Wendt is
sovereignty, which he conceptualizes in Schmittian terms as exclusive territorial authority, or the
unilateral ability to exclude and kill members of the community. The final operative measure of
Wendt’s definition is its existence as a corporate actor, meaning it acts with a single, consistent
identity in its dealings with other political forces and does not devolve authority in international
matters to sub-state actors.

As Martin Shaw argues, however, articulating the state in the terms established by Weber
assumes an ideal, bureaucratic type that does not adequately reflect modernity (Shaw 2000a,
43).26 In a corollary critique, Shaw illustrates that this vision of states is historically inconsistent
because it presumes the national/international divide as a sort of ontological prerequisite to any
political organization. As the example of the Hanseatic League demonstrates, we cannot create
convenient bundles of nationality within the state and distinguish them against a world of

26 Shaw argues the classical Weberian definition of the state actually goes a step beyond most appropriations of it
and assumes the existence of formalistic bureaucracies that are proven historically atypical by the work of Gramsci
and Foucault.
external difference. Michael Mann’s definition of the state provides an interesting corrective to these perceived shortcomings. While agreeing with much if not most of the analysis contained in Weber and Wendt, Mann makes his definition of the state much more contingent, arguing that “1. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel 2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a 3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises 4. some degree of authoritarian, binding rule making, backed up by some organized political force” (Mann 1993, 55). But while such a definition eliminates some deficiencies and limitations of the Weberian model, Mann goes too far and eliminates much of the heuristic value of Weber’s definition. While there is certainly some truth to the claims that the Weberian definition of the state is historically imperfect, it provides a much more analytical distinction between state and non-state actors. As Wendt persuasively argues, to accept Shaw and Mann’s call to eliminate the monopoly of violence requirement would eliminate any and all rigor from the definition of the state, long ago placing us in a de facto global state (Wendt 2003, 23). Accepting a less contingent definition, however, does not mean that the state always looked exactly like the ideal bureaucratic form described by Weber—instead, the four requirements that Wendt establishes can elucidate the boundary conditions for the modern state as a political form.

At this point it is worthwhile to take a step back and examine the concept of war in a similar definitional light. Shaw cites Clausewitz’s operational characterization of war as an act of force to get an enemy to submit to our will that has no escalatory limits until it is satisfied (Shaw 2000a, 60). If we accept that the practice of war occurs against the same social background as the practice of politics, with warfare’s preparation for conflict, acquisition of material, and military structure forming its own discrete social constellation, it no longer makes sense to conceptualize war as an interruption to normal social life. Instead, we should envision
outbreaks of conflict as the elevation of warfare’s particular mode of knowledge to a primary position in the social sphere more generally, with other realms like politics and economics taking a backseat to the logics of war. As Shaw argues, the extant conceptual confusion lies in the attempt to distinguish militarism as some form of social structure from war as an exceptional act that merely continues politics in another way. Shaw instead ascertains a dialectical paradox in warfare reflected in the divide between social and strategic analyses of it. Namely, while warfare is part of, and consequently cannot be analyzed outside of, the broad social processes which constitute the basic building blocks of social organization, its dynamics and constituent elements are unique and irreducible to any other aspect of society (Shaw 1988, 11). This tension between warfare and society goes beyond their mutual constitution—the fulfillment of the aims of war in an absolute sense means the death of the social body. The ends of war and society are inherently opposed. At the same time, however, war and society are inseparable, interactive human conditions that evolve alongside one another. In light of this contrast, Shaw argues that we must alter the very way we talk about the war-society relationship. There can be no analytical distinction in our grammar – “we are talking about the role of socialised warfare in a militarised economy and society” (Shaw 1988, 24, emphasis in original).

The third mobilizing term that must be elucidated is “revolution”. Implicit in my analysis of change across the temporal modes of warfare and political organization is the concept of a rapid, revolutionary transition. What exactly constitutes this revolution, however, is a matter of some debate. Leading theorist Theda Skocpol, in her work States and Social Revolutions, distinguishes between social revolutions and political revolutions. For Skocpol, social revolutions “…are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below” while political
revolutions “…transform state structures but not social structures, and […] are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict” (Skocpol 1979, 4). Political revolutions create major changes within the governmental system they occur in, but do not fundamentally alter the social scaffolding that the political framework as a whole rests upon. In many ways, this argument is analytically similar to the classical Marxist conception of base and superstructure, in which political revolutions may make large surface level changes, but still reflect largely the same social reality that existed prior to the political re-ordering. Social revolutions, then, are not merely re-orderings of the coordinates of social interaction, but instead actively transform the relationship between political order and society, challenging even the most fundamental connections between the two.

While the social and political revolutions Skocpol discusses provide an essential step towards a holistic theory of revolution, the exclusive focus on national and state-based revolution severely limits the scope of inquiry. As Shaw argues, most contemporary theories of revolution cannot account for the fact that the international system plays a constitutive role in the conduct of revolution. As a result, study of past revolutions is only half complete—while much scholarship has been dedicated to the impact of revolution at the national level and the international context against which revolution occurred, relatively little research has been conducted concerning the direct effect of revolution on the global political system. Fred Halliday, in his book *Revolution in World Politics*, attempts to account for this missing element by applying Skocpol’s principles to the international system. Arguing that all revolutions occur against an international background and possess (either implicitly or explicitly) international aims, Halliday concludes that the role of revolution on international structure is direct and constitutive. “The history of the international system is […] marked by a cycle of dissolution and recomposition, attendant on the

Contra Skocpol, Halliday argues that the impact of revolution far outstrips the effect on states and their policies – we must instead examine how revolution affects the very structure of the international system.

Perhaps the most valuable contribution made by Halliday is to problematize the very character of revolution as a static transformative process. There is no transhistorical character of revolution. It is always characterized by “the forms it takes, the forces it mobilizes, the outcomes it has” (Halliday 2005, 4). To substantiate this argument, Shaw contends that the transition from the 20th to the 21st century reflects a unique “global revolution” in which the very nature of state-society relations has been irrevocably altered (Shaw 2000a, 16-7). Shaw’s periodization of the beginning of global revolution in the modern shift in state relations, however, radically de-historicizes the evolution of revolution by positing this ‘unique’ global revolution against a static notion of pre-global revolution. Halliday’s account of revolution is much more decisive insofar as it refuses to make any static periodizations or fix any essential character to revolution. Drawing on, and to a large extent fusing, the arguments advanced by Skocpol and Halliday, I argue that revolution is constituted at both a domestic and international level, and provides a fundamental challenge to social order from top to bottom.

THE METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSION

If the ontological account establishes the objects of my inquiry as warfare and political organization and sets them against the field of world order, and the epistemological account establishes the language I’ll use to discuss these objects, the methodological aspect of my theory must synthesize these variables into a consistent narrative. Before establishing the relation
between warfare and political organization across time and space, however, it’s essential to understand the interconnections and discontinuities of the Braudelian temporal phases. Although these three temporal spheres interact with each other through both upward and downward causation, in a given historical moment they assume a fixed relationship to one another, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. The basis of all inquiries into history start with the world order, the fundamental and eternal basis upon which all subsequent human action is written. If world order is the unchanging basis upon which specific institutions are built, the longue durée represents the specific broad historical patterns of action and interaction that configure actors within world order. Very little can be taken for granted in this broad institutional mode; both the nature of

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27 This understanding of the relationship between temporal modes draws upon the idea of nested generative structures in a ‘temporal holism’ as argued in Latham (forthcoming). For more discussion on the relationship of Braudelian temporal layers, see Braudel (1982, 26); Ruggie (1998a, 141); and Reus-Smit (1999, 15).
actors and the stage they act upon (systems change) and the type of actions the international order provides for them to take (the historical structure of war) are open to change in the transition from one epoch to the next. As a subset of longue durée analysis, the conjunctural temporal mode is configured within the broad institutional structure of a given historical epoch. Inside these structuring rules, however, there is a great deal of room for variation in both the structures of political leadership and international norms (systemic change) and the way societies relate to the cultural, economic and technological dimensions of war as an embedded practice (the social mode of warfare). Finally, subsidiary to both the conjunctural mode and the longue durée are the relations of the événmentielle, which are both the fastest to change and the least consequential to the broad function of the system. Each new political and interactive development (interaction change) or technological or tactical advance (warfighting paradigm) changes the practices of the system without changing the fundamental social relations or broader structure. The relationship between these temporal modes resembles the Russian matryoshka doll, with each move toward a faster temporal analysis revealing an independent subfield prefigured by the institutional coordinates of the deeper temporal layers.

While this nested historical analysis mostly concerns itself with processes of downward causation, where the system’s deep structural rules establish the constitutional basis for faster temporal transitions, under-theorized are the opposite processes of upward causation. It is my contention that these upward processes are the essential driver of revolutionary change in political organization. My argument follows from the following fundamental premise: because collective survival is never guaranteed and relations of violence are a constitutive human condition, political organization responds directly to changes in the structure and organization of warfare. This developmental relationship has two modalities of change. The first, which I term

28 For a more detailed treatment of upward and downward causation, see the Chapter 1 section on Alexander Wendt.
Figure 2.4. The Constitutive Transformation of War and Political Organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporal Perspective</th>
<th>Transformation in the Organization of War</th>
<th>Transformation in Political Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Événmentielle</td>
<td>Warfighting Paradigm</td>
<td>Interaction Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjoncture</td>
<td>Social Mode of Warfare</td>
<td>Systemic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longue Durée</td>
<td>Historical Structure of War</td>
<td>Systems Change</td>
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‘necessary change’, indicates the direct and inevitable transformation in political organization as a consequence of a change in warfare within the same temporal phase. Because political violence constitutes a major risk to the continued function of social institutions, political organization is fine-tuned to changes in the practice of warfare and will quickly adapt to new developments in the same temporal mode. Alongside the necessary change that operates within temporal phases is what I term ‘permissive change’, or the possibility for upward transformation in political organization stemming from changes in a dependent mode of warfare. Just as change in the practices and principles of warfare demands a subsequent change in political organization at the same level, the new set of conflictual practices and relations entailed in the new mode of warfare open the possibility for a deeper transformation in the modes and organizing principles of a given polity.

To analyze this account, I will start with changes situated at the fastest temporal mode, the événmentielle. When a change in the warfighting paradigm occurs, often with the invention of a new weapon system or the institution of a new tactical approach to the battlefield, changes in
interactional practice necessarily must follow. Examples abound, from the institution of standing military forces, which necessitated states to create codes of international military conduct, to the development of radar, which necessitated different forms of communication both inside a state’s institutional structures and between allies who needed to share tactical information, and finally to the development of the atomic bomb, which made communication among rival nuclear states necessary and led to the creation of institutions like the International Atomic Energy Agency. While these changes in the warfighting paradigm necessitate interactional responses, however, hegemonic transition is only revealed as a possibility. While in some cases the development of new technologies and tactics has led directly to systemic change and hegemonic reorganization (think here of England’s adoption of sea power tactics and the subsequent Pax Brittanica, or the United States’ development of a nuclear capability and its unchallenged global supremacy immediately following World War II), such a change doesn’t follow by necessity. It’s much more likely that the hegemon will find a way to accommodate these changes within the larger social structures of war, making a fundamental systemic transformation unnecessary. With each change in the constituted practices of the warfighting paradigm, however, an opportunity for systemic change arises. Finally, developments in the warfighting paradigm have little to no direct effect at the level of the system itself. For changes in warfighting practices to affect what constitutes the dominant unit type, they must first effect a change at the conjunctural level, instituting a new social mode of war or establishing a new hegemonic balance.

Moving to an analysis of the *conjoncture*, we find the possibility for even more fundamental change in political organization. As a new social mode of warfare emerges, with attendant changes to the cultural, economic and technological relationship societies take towards warfare in toto, a direct change occurs in the systemic political order. Again, examples of these
forms of change are prevalent, including the transition from neoclassical war to what Shaw terms ‘Industrialized Total Warfare’, which shifted the hegemonic balance towards those states best able to mobilize economic and social production towards the machinery of warfare, and the transition between the grinding, cost-averse form of war motivated by the nuclear revolution and what Kaldor terms the ‘new wars’ framework, where a devolution in both aims and arms has threatened the tactical superiority and hegemony of traditional great powers (Shaw 1991, 21; Kaldor 2007, 11). Through the process of downward causation, the dominant aspects of the warfighting paradigm and the interactional political model are reconfigured within this new conjunctural mode. Transition from one social mode to another also opens the possibility for a fundamental change in the very coordinates of the system itself. The best example of this form of transition can be seen in the historical move away from ad hoc force structures to a well trained and supplied standing military unit. The transition to a permanent social mode of warfare, embedding military aims into the very fabric of the social body, necessitated the transformation of political order around a new form of political organization, the sovereign state. This argument will be treated in much more detail in Chapter 3.

Attempting to theorize revolutionary breaks in institutional political order from macro-level structuring principles down ignores the fundamental and constitutive role that smaller order revolutionary thought and action play in the creation of new forms and the territorial division of political organization. At the same time we must recognize the interlocking relationship between system-wide historical structure, subsequent episodes of social history, and surface-level events and processes, we must also acknowledge that revolutionary thought and action emerge through processes of upward causation from change in the operational and social aspects of warfare. Because violence is and remains a primary concern for the social body, political organization
will always have to deal with evolutions in the means and methods of organized political violence. Attempts to provide a comprehensive account of transformation in political organization must account for both the constitutive dimension of warfare and the vital role of revolution from below.

CRITIQUE

A number of potential objections to the theoretical model I have established immediately jump to mind. First and foremost, a critic of my model could potentially argue that despite my careful argument for the lack of definite and determine patterns of causality throughout history, my theoretical model ultimately falls into the same deterministic trap. Taken as a whole, however, I do not think this criticism pertains to my theoretical argument. While I do critique models of change in political organization that assume a static variable throughout human history as the driver of all institutional formation, like neorealism’s assertion of causal anarchy or the commercialization model’s belief in an essential world-economy, my model doesn’t attain the same calcification for three reasons. First, in my analysis of the different ways war operates, I am careful not to ascribe to war any essential character outside of the use of organized violence to compel some action or change on an external agent. While war always concerns conflictual and violent relations between polities, it doesn’t necessarily do so in a certain pattern or essential mode. This flexible concept of war allows different forms of conflict throughout history to inform my theory, and also avoids the unilinear, teleological narrative of war implicit in Deudney’s account. Second, my theory doesn’t presume that warfare and political organization flow from a single model globally. Vast differences in polities and their violent relations exist and have existed not just across time, but also across space. Especially in examining historical
institutions, I am careful to present institutional systems in political order and warfare as just a few among many. As we move toward a more contemporary frame of analysis, a unified global mode of investigation appears to be more readily explicable. Even in this global system, however, I note the uneven character of development, especially because it provides insight into the possibility of revolutionary systemic change. Finally, while my model describes how political organization changes, it doesn’t make claims concerning what end that evolution is directed toward. There is no endpoint of violent relations towards which war develops. Instead, warfare reflects a specific constellation of technological, social, and historical variables that attain at a given moment and in turn structure the form and content of political organization.

A second critique of my method might argue that I have misstated the constitutive connection between warfare and political organization. To substantiate my belief that there is a constitutive link between warfare and political organization, I would argue that the question of societal survival in an uncertain and violent world has been the central organizing principle reflected in both the empirical record and the vast majority of political theory throughout history. Variously represented as anarchy, the state of nature, and the insecurity paradox, this constitutively violent relationship, which Deudney systematizes into the concept of violence-interdependence, is one that affects all social communities after they come into contact with another society. A critic might retort that if violence is the fundamental constitutive element in political organization, my theory cannot account for countries that have abandoned their militaries altogether. This objection poses an interesting quandary for my argument – does a society have to maintain some aspect of warfare? Despite the elimination of their military forces, however, I would argue that these countries still operate socially and structurally in patterns of warfare. Implicit in the abolition of the means of warfare is the belief that should a
state threaten or attack their polity, another state will step in to provide for their defense. Additionally, states without a military still participate in international structures that address how modern security concerns operate. Fundamentally, I would argue that this ability to eliminate formal military structures is part and parcel of a broad institutional arrangement of war that allows states to feel secure under another state’s military umbrella. Finally, it is not as if these states have abandoned all forms of coercion. They still maintain national police bodies and the ability to mobilize against domestic threats, which could be argued to function in the same way as a standing military, only absent the full scope of weaponry and tactics.

Related to this critique is an argument claiming that I’ve reversed the relationship between political organization and warfare. Such an objection might argue that the reason we see developments in the practices and structures of warfare tactically, socially and structurally is a result of concomitant changes in the form of social organization. This argument, however, doesn’t hold much conceptual weight. First, it is difficult to envision processes of revolutionary change in political organization that aren’t rooted in mutually constituted relations of violence. One could potentially argue that the possibility for institutional transformation without violent action is possible in contemporary society, but even allowing this clarification the theory seems to leave out a broad swath of history. Second, if we understand political organization as concerning itself with the maintenance of social order, it is difficult to envision how changes in political organization even happen. In other words, there’s no fundamental reason why change in political organization ever occurs. The lack of any consistent motivating pattern behind change is a major disadvantage to this theoretical model. Finally, it is difficult to conceptualize how changes in interactions between states drive technological and tactical advancements on the battlefield, which the reverse seems at least conceivable. Changes in the diplomatic posture of
and relations between states in no way implicate the development of new tools of war. A theory centering on changes in political organization would have to eliminate, or at the very least ignore, this constitutive dimension.

Finally, a critic could argue that in centering my analysis on war, I have focused too heavily on material considerations at the expense of ideational change. While this criticism is true of the geopolitical competition model, which focuses entirely on the technology of war and its material aims, I have made a conscious effort to use a social theory of war that includes both its material and ideational aspects. War must not only be understood as a consequence of the weaponry and material involved, but also as a deeply embedded cultural phenomenon that has an effect on every part of society. While there is perhaps an argument to be made that my theory eliminates the role of Habermasian analyses of communicative interaction, I would argue that these pure forms of discourse have never existed, and if they have, it is impossible to conceive of them absent the implicit role of violence.

CONCLUSION

If we are to understand the constitutional role that transformation in war plays on alterations in the fundamental nature of political order, we must have a grasp of the ontological, epistemological, and methodological implications of such a theory. Ontologically, this chapter relies on a Braudelian temporal model to divide organized political violence and international political transformation into three modes of analysis. Corresponding to the fastest temporal mode, that of events or the *l’histoire événmentielle*, are the ‘warfighting paradigm’ and ‘interaction change’. These modes reflect the function and day-to-day practices that constitute the larger field of inquiry in which they operate: for the warfighting paradigm, the technology
and tactics of battlefield combat; for interactions change, the relations and diplomatic posture of actors vis-à-vis one another. Corresponding to the next temporal layer, that of periods or the *conjonctore*, are the ‘social mode of warfare’ and ‘systemic change’. These modes indicate the general order that the rules of the system have manifested: for the social mode of warfare, the general constellation of cultural, economic, and technological relations war entails; for systemic change, the general hegemonic balance in the international system. Finally, corresponding to the slowest temporal mode, that of broad historical epochs or the *longue durée*, are the ‘historical structure of war’ and ‘systems change’. These modes represent the most fundamental constitutive principles of institutional order: for the historical structure of war, the very constitutive antagonisms, political architecture, and concept of war; for systems change, the predominant political unit-type. All of these ontological types existed across a fundamental backdrop of world order, or those constitutive characteristics fundamentally bound up with human social existence.

Epistemologically, this chapter isolates three mobilizing terms and attempts to provide a working definition of them for use in my theory. First, I examine the generic concept of the ‘state’. Concluding that Weber had it mostly right, I argue (against Mann’s contingent definition) that we should understand the state through the corrective boundary conditions that Wendt establishes as constitutive to statehood. Second, I examine the epistemic construction of war and warfare. Beginning with the Clausewitzian understanding of war as the use of force to make an enemy submit to our will, I draw upon Shaw’s insight on the social dimension of war, concluding that war must be understood as a fundamentally social phenomenon. Finally, I examine the concept of revolution, beginning with Skocpol’s analysis of social revolutions, which aim at changing the fundamental conditions underpinning society, and political
revolutions, which change the mode of politics but not the social order that underpins them. While I agree with Skocpol’s characterization of revolution in the domestic context, I draw on Halliday to argue that revolution also has an explicit international character.

Methodologically, this chapter begins by arguing that Braudel’s temporal phases should not be understood as ontologically distinct spheres, but instead as progressively nested in one another. Each temporal mode operates against a backdrop of relations configured by the deeper temporal layers. I then move on to argue that constitutive changes in the nature of warfare as situated in the different temporal modes directly create the conditions for change in political organization. I rely on two modes of change to describe the relationship of change within temporal layers and across temporal layers. The first mode of change, which I call ‘necessary change’, occurs within a temporal layer and is a direct and necessary transformation of political order in response to a concomitant change the practice or structure of warfare. The second mode of change, which I call ‘permissive change’, operates across temporal layers and argues that a change in a dependent mode of warfare has the potential to alter the deeper structures of political organization on which it rests. I argue, against potential critiques of my method, that this model allows for the best understanding of changes in political organization and functions as an ontological bridge between purely material and purely ideational understandings of both warfare and political organization.
CHAPTER 3
CONSTITUTED MILITARY TRANSITIONS, PAST AND PRESENT

OVERVIEW
This chapter will address the transition between European feudalism and the modern state system and the potential transition from the modern state system to new forms of political organization from a theoretical perspective connecting developments in warfare to constitutively-oriented transformations in political organization. Examining the Military Revolution in detail, I illustrate processes of upward causation rooted in changes in the technologies and social practices of warfare, which culminated historically in sovereign territoriality as the predominant form of political organization. I begin by looking at changes in the warfighting paradigm; specifically, the technological developments related to the emergence of gunpowder, mobile capital ships and the artillery fortress and the tactical development toward an infantry-driven force posture. These innovations are then tied to changes in interaction strategies pursued by different polities and changes in the systemic organization of political actors across the continent. Next, I examine how the move away from ad hoc military structures towards standing forces is indicative of a shift in the social mode of warfare, unpacking the interconnected cultural, economic and technological developments such a transformation entailed. I then examine the interconnections between this transformation in the social mode of warfare and the subsequent reorganization of the systemic balance of power. Finally, I examine whether this social shift altered the very nature of the European system of political organization and the implications such a transition potentially posed for the broader political system.
Moving on the modern context of war and political organization, I begin by analyzing the revolution in military technology away from high-yield weaponry toward crude and inexpensive small arms and explosives. I then relate this to the warfighting paradigm, arguing that this technological shift has stymied the traditional Western way of war and necessitated the development of a new warfighting model aimed at fighting focused, high-intensity conflicts against non-traditional military opponents. Next, I use the work of Herfried Münkler to examine the consequences this shift has had on interaction strategies, specifically examining the rise of non-state actors and their integration into diplomatic channels. I also address how transformation in the speed and conduct of military operations has fundamentally altered the organizational structure of militaries at war. I then examine the consequences this shift in the warfighting paradigm entails for the systemic balance of power, arguing that it could potentially be hazardous to the continued exercise of global power. Next, I examine the consequences of the shift in the conduct of war on the social mode of warfare, arguing that within the new war paradigm, violence is no longer constituted around states but rather around identity groups. Drawing on Mary Kaldor and Mark Duffield, I investigate the consequences of this downward shift in the social mode of warfare on the systemic balance of power and the global system as a whole. Finally, drawing on Phil Cerny, I examine the possibilities for a neo-medieval transition to account for the changing nature of warfare.

**FEUDAL TRANSITION IN THE WARFIGHTING PARADIGM**

While the precise chronology of the Military Revolution is very much in question, what the literature seems to consistently support is the fundamental transformation in the technology and
tactical organization of warfighting. I will begin by discussing the transformation in the technological aspect of the warfighting paradigm. Geoffrey Parker argues for three main technological advances that drove warfare in a new revolutionary direction: the naval supremacy of the capital ship’s ‘broadside’, the creation of gunpowder artillery and weaponry, and the development of the ‘artillery fortress’ as a response to the increasing role of gunpowder-based warfare (Parker 1996, 159). The development of capital naval vessels with the ability to withdraw their cannons into the ship on truck carriages for quick reloading allowed fleets to sustain ranged conflict over prolonged periods. This in turn completely shifted the tactical environment in which naval combat operated—no longer were ships made and crews trained for strategies of ramming and boarding. Instead, highly trained bombardiers able to fire consecutively throughout combat came to dominate naval skirmishes, and completely altered the makeup of navies across Europe. Smaller, longer range galleons gradually came to replace the massive, short-range flagships of the previous paradigm (Parker 1996, 95). Although this method of retreating from boarding action was considered unchivalrous by naval adversaries participating in the old paradigm, the tactic was so effective that it eventually supplanted prior methods of engagement entirely. Nimble, rapidly firing fleets decimated navies built around massive, dreadnaught-style vessel construction. The result was a fundamental transformation in the composition and conduct of naval warfighting.

Similarly, the gunpowder revolution completely changed the methods of land-based conflict by altering both the scope and speed of conflict. As Parker demonstrates, embedded

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29 While Roberts (1956) places the chronology of the Military Revolution in the century between 1560 and 1660, recent challenges to this chronology have emerged. For alternate versions of the transformation, see Black (1991), who argues military change occurred over a period of centuries spanning form 1550 to 1800, and Rogers (1994), who argues for a punctuated equilibrium model of military development.

30 Brian Downing (1992) argues that the role of gunpowder is overstated vis-à-vis the role of the pike in determining transformation. Regardless, there is a clear movement in the nature of siege warfare with the gunpowder revolution, which transformed in a very fundamental manner the structures of war. For more on the shift to siege artillery, see Black (1991, 8-9); Contamine (1984, 200-7); and Porter (1994).
observers witnessed a transformation in the very practice of warfighting towards the use of massive siege technology:

The verdict of Andreas Bernaldez on the conquest of Granada in the 1480s – ‘Great towns, which once would have held out a year against all foes but hunger, now fell within a month’ – was echoed by Niccolo Machiavelli concerning the French invasion of Italy in the 1490s: ‘No wall exists, however thick, that artillery cannot destroy in but a few days.’ (Parker 1996, 164)

In 1509, soldier, diplomat and historian Francesco Guicciardini argued that after the gunpowder revolution “[w]ars became sudden and violent, conquering and capturing a state in less time than it used to take to occupy a village; cities were reduced with great speed, in a manner of days and hours rather than months, battles became savage and bloody in the extreme” (Parker 1996, 160).

Warfighting transitioned towards strategies of forward deployment, with lengthy supply lines necessary to maintain the material and armament for further action. The military benefits of such an approach, however, were startling. Within a single of day of reaching a city, attackers could set up cannon and launch up to a thousand rounds at an enemy stronghold (Contamine 1984, 201). Quantitatively, the use of artillery exploded throughout the fifteenth century, with thousands of cannons and hundreds of thousands of pounds of powder stored by powers both great and small (Contamine 1984, 147-150). The gunpowder revolution also occurred at the level of individual soldiers, with efficient arquebuses and muskets gradually replacing the crossbow in the early sixteenth century (Black 1991, 8-9). The effectiveness of arquebuses against pikemen led to the dual use of firearms and pikes, both of which eventually fused together in the development of the socket bayonet (Downing 1992, 66). The marked improvement in effectiveness these tactics entailed led to a widespread shift to their implementation across Europe, and the vast expense of maintaining large armies based on these new technologies posed major difficulties for smaller polities throughout the region.
As a response to the effectiveness of the transition from trebuchets to gunpowder-based artillery, defensive structures were forced to transition from traditional castles to artillery fortresses hardened against such attacks. As Downing argues, “[d]evelopments in gunpowder and field pieces obviously made old castellar fortifications nothing more than large, vulnerable targets easily reduced to rubble. Fixed fortifications had to evolve: advances in one set of weaponry or techniques […] quickly led to corresponding evolution in the other” (Downing 1992, 67). Cannons, and ports for their use, were added to existing structures for the purpose of counter-battery while fortifications were rebuilt in new structural designs that ‘countersunk’ buildings to make them more resistant to cannon fire and geometrically adjusted walls to make cannon fire from the fortress more effective (Parker 1996, 164). Fortress building came to dominate the interwar periods in the late medieval age. Smaller polities aimed at creating superfortresses impregnable against any and all external attacks while larger, more diffuse polities were forced to spend vast sums of capital on modernized walls and inter-city support structures to deal with the new reality of massive siege warfare. Cities began to employ permanent, static artillery forces “consisting of one or several master cannoneers or artillers” whose only goal was the defense of fortified positions (Contamine 1984, 202). The consequence of this broad period of defensive construction was to prolong wars virtually indefinitely as “in one region of Europe after another sieges eclipsed battles in importance and wars eternalized themselves” (Parker 1996, 167). Decisive victory in field battle assumed far less strategic importance – only by controlling the fortresses could an invading force have any hope of maintaining control of the surrounding country.

Concurrent to these technological advances was the tactical advance away from mounted cavalry toward massed infantry. While feudal knights were well trained and equipped, they were
also strongly individualistic and lacked discipline. Arguing that they had sworn allegiance exclusively to the king, they often would refuse to take orders from any subsidiary officer. Similar problems existed among the peasant militias, which posed a dilemma for the ruling class: the necessity of their numbers in conflict abroad was balanced against their propensity to use their arms and training against local royal agents (Downing 1991, 61). The development of the tight square formation of pikemen and its strategic use in anti-cavalry phalanxes, however, would render both of these modes of military organization ineffective and largely irrelevant. The superiority in direct combat of these well-trained units of pikemen fundamentally altered the strategic balance in Europe, as polities with feudal militaries found themselves repeatedly on the losing side and subsequently switched away from the feudal military system toward infantry and artillery, the predominant strategic model to emerge from the Military Revolution (Downing 1991, 63-4). The dual necessity of more effective and more cost-efficient means of warfare drove leaders to adopt the infantry model, especially in conjunction with the purchase of large mobile artillery units.

The institutional consequences of the rapid transition to new technological and tactical modes of warfare were both massive and nearly immediate. Over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, leaders were forced to adapt to a mode of war that was fast, resource intensive, and extremely destructive. The successive failures of the great powers of the high medieval period to win victories using their feudal militaries against rival infantries constituted by pikemen and nascent gunpowder artillery necessitated the complete dissolution of the feudal knighthood and the abandonment of ad-hoc structures of war. The massive investment in artillery, especially in the example of France, represented a huge institutional shift in the military relations between competing states in Europe (Contamine 1984, 148-9). Concomitantly, the vast
military expense of creating these new forms of military technology and organization, not to mention supplying the vast standing forces that siege warfare against multiple, hardened defensive positions demanded, provided a major difficulty for polities across Europe. To the extent that political bodies were already in a position of economic profligacy, they could rely on mercenary forces and expensive defensive structures to sustain their social order, regardless of whatever limited territorial holdings they possessed. For states lacking a competitive advantage in trade, however, new taxation structures and territorial grabs became inevitable. To a certain extent, these expanding extractive structures constituted the fundamental institutional makeup of nascent sovereign states (Downing 1991, 120-1; Porter 1994, 66-7; Tilly 1992, 70-1). Similarly, the very organizational institutions required to maintain large military forces created proto-statist relations, both in the structures needed to provide food and arms to military forces abroad and in the constitution of a military hierarchy to relay orders from the ruling social classes to the conscripted units participating in combat operations (Downing 1991, 13-4; Porter 1994, 67-8). The necessity of new institutional forms within the reconstituted warfighting paradigm fundamentally altered the mode of interaction both within and between European polities.

Changes in the systemic layer were no less meaningful. The Military Revolution served both a deconstructive and reconstructive role in determining the balance of power across Europe. In its deconstructive capacity, the Military Revolution undermined the calcified institutional advantage massive polities like France and the Holy Roman Empire held during the high medieval period by undermining the role of feudal warfighting strategies. The discipline and speed with which a military built around infantry and artillery could move and attack, not to mention the increased role of direct naval warfare, completely undermined the power base a feudal military and castellar defense could sustain. Adding insult to injury, the traditional heavy
cavalry model was not only decimated in combat by the square pike formation, but it was a much less cost efficient model of military organization both in required training and in upkeep costs. Although it took a period of time for the depth of the military revolution’s consequences on systemic order to sink in, the old balance of power system died with the formal institution of infantry and gunpowder into warfighting (Downing 1991, 63). In the reconstitution of the balance of power, those polities best able to provide for a large standing infantry, well-supplied mobile artillery, and fortification against modern siege technology gained a comparative advantage in warfare. This shift encouraged polities able to maximize the relationship between coercion and capital, which privileged those political forms closest to the exclusive territorial sovereign (Porter 1994, 58; Tilly 1992, 27). The competitive framework established in the new warfighting paradigm set a basic framework against which a new hegemonic order could, and in this instance did, arise.

FEUDAL TRANSITION IN THE SOCIAL MODE OF WARFARE

Beyond the surface-level technological and tactical transformations that altered the specific methods and practices constitutive of warfighting, the late feudal period witnessed a fundamental change in the social mode of warfare. The medieval social mode of warfare, much like the corresponding form of political organization, was fragmented and cross-cutting, with actors claiming a variety of allegiances. As Porter argues, from personal political relationships, to the nonexistence of taxation policy, and finally to the lack of any real sense of diplomacy or capital cities, the aphorism “all politics is local” quite literally attained meaning (Porter 1994, 25, emphasis in original). This was especially true in warfare, where the means and resources of combat were held in private hands throughout a given kingdom or dynasty. Military
organization also varied in form: from private armies, to city walls, to locally maintained fortresses, and finally to personal estates. All of these forms of military hierarchy existed under an aristocratic patron, who styled himself part of a warrior class dedicated to the accumulation of a territorial power base (Porter 1994, 25-6). Violent conflict in this sense was both more common and more spatially and destructively limited, mostly focused on local power-grabs and brief territorial skirmishes with rival kingdoms that usually didn’t amount to long-term conflict. What rudimentary forms of proto-sovereign administration existed in polities like France and England only subsisted insofar as the king possessed personal power. There was almost no division between the personal military and financial holdings of the king and any public administrative capacity, which, if it existed at all, was merely an extension of a king’s patrimony (Porter 1994, 26).

Four fundamental alterations to the social fabric of Europe conspired to change this social mode of warfare in the late feudal period. First, kings and dynasts fearful of the growing power of their Continental rivals acted to expand their territorial holdings, and subsumed smaller polities that had not made the transition to infantry and artillery. Rival powers often challenged this expansion, fearful of the consequences of massive imperial holdings in the hands of their adversaries—for example, France went to war with the Hapsburg dynasty to prevent domination of the Italian peninsula (Downing 1991, 65). A second cause for warfare during this period were the so-called agrarian revolutions as the peasantry attempted to resist enclosure and restriction of the rights they had gained in the period following the Black Death. Third, the crisis of the Reformation created warfare not only between polities, but within them as religious unity under a fixed Christendom gave way to fragmented religious identity and subsequent conflict (Porter

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31 Because of the uneven nature of military development across space, this social change assumes a staggered character. Downing (1991, 64-5) discusses this territorial aggrandizement during the 16th and 17th centuries, while Black (1991, 82-4) discusses this transition in the context of late 18th and early 19th century Eastern Europe.
trade disputes between states occasionally erupted into conflict, “though this was hardly the cause of as many wars as Marxist historians might suggest” (Downing 1991, 65). The rise of all of these social and political fissures verifies Downing’s claim that during this period of constitutional crisis, war was much more common than peace. Each of these challenges reflected a threat to the social level of constitutive existence—territorial aggrandizement demonstrated a challenge to militaristic social relations, agrarian revolution established a challenge to the nature of social identity, the Reformation indicated a challenge to holistic religious identity, and trade war exhibited a tension in economic social relations. All of these crises played out across Europe in different geopolitical configurations, but to some extent all of these concerns affected polities across the continent.

Despite the interlocking responses at the level of culture, trade, and politics, however, the specific modality in which these forms of social crisis played out across Europe was in a transformation in the social mode of warfare. The inherently conflictual nature of all of these challenges required polities to build the practices and principles of modern warfare into the social fabric underpinning their rule. In this way, the social mode of warfare moved from a role as just one constitutive social mode among many into the primary mode of societal thought and action. Consequently, “armies became much larger, adopted new techniques and weaponry, and expanded central organization. Warfare became an extremely onerous and politically sensitive fiscal burden” (Downing 1991, 65-66). The most fundamental change to the social mode of warfare, however, dealt with the integration of a standing peacetime military force into societies across Europe. Whereas before this transformation, warfare was situated at the level of private actors under the nominal feudal authority of a king or dynast, the increased economic and

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32 Downing (1991, 65) lists Turkish military pressure as a fifth catalyst for war, but it’s unclear how the Turkish role in European security relations changed between the High Middle Ages and the Late Middle Ages.
organizational costs of warfare necessitated the rise of a central authority to manage the increased social costs. This new social mode of warfare surrounding an integrated, static military force immediately transformed the balance of power among European polities.

As the French, Spanish and English monarchs began to organize centrally around a sustained and unified military force, a number of institutional benefits accrued to them that directly transformed the systemic balance of power. First, logistical unification allowed common patterns of training and organization for pikemen, musketeers, and artillery forces to emerge. Cohesive training and establishment of a unified military doctrine allowed not only for standing forces to swell to massive sizes under emergent social hierarchy, but also for these forces to quickly conquer broad swaths of territory (Downing 1991, 69-70). Each of the institutional transformations created a direct competitive advantage that allowed these polities to expand their territory while shoring up their borders. Additionally, a standing army sustained internal order, because a centrally controlled military allowed the king or dynast to directly enforce societal codes against revolutionary impulses. This in turn shored up collective social identity around a central organizing structure. Through this process, the aristocracy surrendered their independent military forces to the central government in exchange for the title of officer in the king’s military (Porter 1994, 32-3). This fusion of public and private interests into the agency of corporate political organization allowed these polities to focus less on securing and maintaining order within their borders, and more on territorial expansion and the processes of modern warfare, giving them a direct increase in power relative to other regional governments.

This social mode of warfare extended far beyond the social roles related directly to conflict and the hegemonic balance. The king took special pride in maintaining his army during

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33 Interestingly, England took another 150 years after France and Spain to integrate the nobility into the officer corps and institute a standing army. According to Porter (1994, 33) this stunted English land power and made the English Crown dependent on superior naval power and territorial discontinuity.
peacetime as both a source of personal pride and a demonstration of his leadership. A clear indicator of the preeminent social role war came to play in post-feudal political organization can be seen in the practice of wearing military uniforms at court, encapsulating “the participation of the nobles in the service state, the systematization of the personal links binding nobilities and monarchs” (Black 1991, 89). The identification of the polity with military decorum clearly indicates the pervasive role of military social doctrine in the fundamental system of political organization. Here we see the birth of modern state practices, including corporate political identity as a sovereign, exclusive territorial control under a single ruler or bureaucratic apparatus, and the modes of taxation and individual subjectivity that are the fundamental building blocks of the modern sovereign state. Elite cooperation should not be understood as the result of economic or religious social factors, which despite being major social considerations did not drive change. Instead, we should understand state identity formation as a consequence of the political attempt to externalize relations of violence outward by establishing a common military identity under the aegis of a new social mode of warfare (Porter 1994, 101-2). The exogenous shock of persistent, fast, and deadly conflict throughout the continent drove the development of centralized, sovereign states best able to provide the financial and organizational wherewithal to survive (Downing 1991, 73; Parker 1996, 158-9; Porter 1994, 64-65, 72-73). Constitutive change in the social mode of war towards unified military identity in a standing force directly underpinned the subsequent transformation towards the unified sovereign-territorial state that predominates today.

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34 Black (1991, 67-8) argues that the relationship between warfare and state formation is reversed, with large territorial holdings demanding transformations in warfare. While this argument can account for structural and tactical changes, however, it does not account for the constitutive role of technological innovation on the very nature of warfare and political organization.
MODERN TRANSITION IN THE WARFIGHTING PARADIGM

In a similar fashion to the transition from feudal forms of military and political organization to centralizing, standing military forces and the sovereign-territorial state system, the modern world also appears to be undergoing fundamental transformation in warfare and political organization. Latham illustrates the changes reflected in the modern warfighting paradigm through the example of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the “transition from the mechanized ‘manoeuvre warfare’ warfighting paradigm that evolved out of the World War II experience to a new paradigm based on ‘non-linear’ combat operations, ‘information warfare’ and ‘precision destruction’” (Latham 2002, 237). This description of a doctrinal shift, however, is specific to the ideational context of what Shaw describes as the “New Western Way of War”, in which the Western bloc has moved towards a mode of ‘risk-transfer war’ (Shaw 2003, 2005). These wars aim to reduce danger to civilian populations and Western forces by implementing increasingly precise targeting and employing fighting techniques aimed at maximizing efficiency and minimizing allied deaths. As Shaw acknowledges in his most recent work on the question, however, the warfighting paradigm that risk-transfer war suggests is being increasingly challenged by the actual conduct of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Shaw 2005, 93).

The practice of warfare in these contexts poses a constitutional problem for the Western warfighting paradigm – in the same way that feudal military organization was ineffective in its response to the rapidity and destructiveness of infantry and artillery-based warfare, so too are conventional Western preponderance strategies confounded by the proliferation of cheap arms and their distribution throughout enemy populations.

Instead of focusing on the way the West has transformed its particular mode of war towards precision bombing and “rapidly configurable ‘virtual task forces’” as Latham and Shaw
do, I am more interested in the broader transformation of military technology towards a global market of cheap and effective weaponry (Latham 2002, 10). While traditional accounts of the transformation in military technology assume the development of weaponry necessarily leads to more and more destructive yields, a path leading directly from the ‘slingshot to the megaton bomb’, more recent accounts note a break in this continuity contemporaneous to the development of nuclear weapons (Adorno in Deudney 2007, 27). As the costs of war became too high to encourage direct great power conflict, war was increasingly subcontracted to proxies on the margins of superpower influence (Kahaner 2007, 5). A critical military technological development driving this new wave of conflict was the 1947 invention of the standardized and mass produced AK-47 rifle by Avtomat Kalashnikov. A weapon so cheap that in many countries one can be purchased for less than the price of a live chicken, the AK rifle kills more than a quarter of a million people annually and is the cornerstone of over 50 professional militaries, not to mention the weapon of choice for gang members and insurgents worldwide (Kahaner 2007, 2). Michael Klare recently went so far as to argue that “‘the most deadly combat system of the current epoch’ is ‘the adolescent human male equipped with a Kalashnikov’” (Klare in Faltas 2001, 397). Similar evolution toward the battlefield employment of crude, low-yield military technology can be seen in the widespread deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which to a great extent neutralize the advantage of a mobile infantry through inexpensive, often undetectable shaped explosives. Because counter-measures are often confounded by cheap alterations to the IED model, these explosive devices pose a major threat to troop transports and tanks operating throughout active battlefields.35

35 The use of IEDs is a fairly recent phenomenon, beginning with the conflicts in Lebanon and Chechnya, and reaching widespread implementation in ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Cohen (2007, 154) and Steven and Gunaratna (2004, 50-54).
Small arms and munitions provide a number of tactical advantages for forces employing them. First, they’re cheap, plentiful, and easy to produce. Even if the production of these weapons were to end completely within the week, eighty to one hundred million of the guns have been produced since their inception and millions of them still freely circulate, moving from hot spot to hot spot (Faltas 2001, 398). The weapons themselves are extremely durable and effective, with few moving parts making them resilient to jamming, their solid construction providing resistance to heat, cold, sand and rain, and their clip supporting a steady firing pace of 600 rounds per minute. Kahaner gives the anecdotal account of American GIs who found AKs buried in rice paddies for periods of six months or more that were filthy and rusted shut yet still fired perfectly when the action bolt was kicked (Kahaner 2007, 3). The weapons are simple to both operate and maintain, allowing children and women to use them with as little as an afternoon of preparation (Faltas 2001, 398). This directly transformed the conduct of military operations, with an increasing number of battlefield participants being both under the age of 18 and ‘irregular’ combatants, not adopting any uniform or consistent rules of engagement. Finally, these weapons can be dismantled into small parts and easily concealed or transferred, which allows for the easy circumvention of arms embargoes (Klare 1999, 13-4). IEDs have similar operational advantages, insofar as the training required to build and handle explosives is relatively limited and knowledge on how to manufacture such munitions is freely available via the Internet (Steven and Gunaratna 2004, 50). Additionally, the relative crudeness of the weapons makes their detection difficult, and insurgent groups have a combination of fake devices and secondary explosions aimed at bomb squads to deter their detection and removal (Bacevich 2008, 157-9).
The interactional consequences of this shift away from traditional preponderance strategies towards the cheap, distributed military power of small arms and explosives were both immediate and substantial. War can no longer be seen as primarily conducted at the interstate level—powerful militaries armed with the most advanced air-, sea-, and land-based technology no longer represent the core of the warfighting paradigm. Instead, the strategic focus of warfare has shifted away from direct military to military confrontation to dispersed, local, and high-intensity conflicts. The first major interactional shift can be seen in negotiating posture and policy. Traditional channels of diplomacy and conflict resolution tend to be state-centric—that is, they presume the primacy of the state in modern warfighting, and consequently begin processes of conflict resolution by attempting to shore up the modern nation-state container. What such an approach ignores, however, is the massive breakdown of the state military model globally towards a heterogeny of public and private military forms. As Herfried Münkler notes, the consequence of this de-statization process is to make “[l]ocal warlords and transregional entrepreneurs […] the main protagonists and profiteers” (Münkler 2005, 17). If the goals of prior leadership groups entailed nation or state-building, these new leadership groups are primarily concerned with personal and organizational wealth and power aggrandizement.

As a consequence of the increasingly internationalized nature of the war economy, conflicts are much less likely to burn themselves out and are instead perpetuated through the international black market trade of conflict resources. Consequently, the mode of engagement by Western and international forces becomes less one of diplomacy and more one of necessary intervention to end the threat to the economic and political interests of peacetime polities posed by refugee flows and illegal commerce (Münkler 2005, 127). This very mode of intervention,

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36 Kaldor (2007, 97-101) describes five groups of militants operating worldwide: regular armed forces, paramilitary groups, self-defense units, foreign mercenaries, and foreign regular troops under international auspices.
however, undermines the state’s claim to exclusive territorial sovereignty. The move to asymmetrical warfighting, consequently, has caused a similar shift in interactional techniques—no longer can international law be considered a reciprocal basis for interaction in the global political order. It has yet to be seen whether international law will be reformed or abandoned; nevertheless, this new asymmetrical warfighting paradigm has instituted similar asymmetries in global political economy that are forcing wholesale interactional transformation (Münkler 2005, 135).

The shift in the tactical and technological dimensions of war, beyond merely changing interactional structures and strategies, has also altered the systemic balance of the international system. Whereas traditional modes of contemporary warfare emphasized bringing maximal force to bear on an enemy in a show of overwhelming strength, such a warfighting strategy is unable to account for militants who don’t fight under the aegis of formal military structure (Kaldor 2007, 137-8). Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the two phases of the 2003 Iraq War. In the first phase, where the United States engaged a similarly constituted military force in the Iraqi National Guard, technological superiority allowed for a rapid victory in a conventional sense. Not only was Baghdad was captured, but the scope and the scale of the military operation throughout Iraq led the Army’s vice chief of staff to proclaim that the “speed of the advance was so dramatic that it unhinged the enemy” (Bacevich 2008, 157). Military rationale, working from the tenets of RMA strategic thought, argued that speed and technological efficiency rendered massive troop infrastructure unnecessary. The technologically sophisticated array of tanks, helicopters, and bombers allowed the United States to dismantle Iraq’s formal military apparatus in a matter of weeks. It was in the second phase of combat operations, however, that the systemic weakness of this technological approach vis-à-vis low-budget
guerrilla warfare conducted with small arms and munitions became readily apparent. Military technology built for large-scale conventional operations, including tanks and bombers, was virtually irrelevant to the urban and dissociated warfare that came to characterize the ongoing operations. The concentrated use of AK-47 fire substantially limited the ability of the United States to fly Apache helicopters on support missions (Kahaner 2007:1-2). Even the speed that the military relied on to quickly take control of the country became a viability, as the widespread use of IEDs allowed insurgent groups to become more agile than US forces tethered to bases and a network of secure roads connecting them (Bacevich 2008, 159). While there have been some improvements on the strategic warfighting model employed by the United States and its allies since the beginning of combat operations in Iraq, the pervasive influence of small arms and guerrilla tactics demonstrates the limit of US hegemony and has revealed the potential for a hegemonic shift.

MODERN TRANSITION IN THE SOCIAL MODE OF WARFARE

No less important than changes in the way we conduct war are changes in the way we socially relate to war. In a similar fashion to the social transition from the dissociative practices of warfare to the highly regimented, state-based warfare seen during the feudal-modern transition, the modality of war in the contemporary era seems to be moving from central authority to decentralized, identity-based warfare. Latham isolates two episodes from this conjunctural viewpoint occurring in the early and late twentieth century—namely, ‘Industrialized Total Warfare’ and “a conjuncture variously labeled ‘Information Warfare’ (Shaw, 1991: 20), ‘Spectator-Sport Warfare’ (McInnes, 1999), ‘Post-Heroic Warfare’ (Luttwak, 1995), ‘Virtuous War’ (Der Derian, 2001) and even (though, I would argue, erroneously), ‘Postmodern Warfare’
(Gray, 1997)” (Latham 2002, 241). ‘Industrialized Total Warfare’, roughly constituting the period from the beginning of World War I to the end of World War II, organized society around the three motivating concepts of mass destruction, mass mobilization, and mass production. This move towards maximal production and dedication to the war effort began to fuse the ‘fighting front’ and the ‘home front’ into a coherent organizational entity. The strategic implications of such a move were two-fold. First, states best able to maximize this socio-military nexus were given a vast strategic advantage in the mobilization of both personnel and material. Second, this form of warfare necessitated and enabled massive, increasingly destructive attacks on enemy homelands to destroy their productive capacity (Shaw 1991, 21). As society and the war effort merged, the line between civilian and soldier blurred to the extent that massive bombing operations on civilian populations occurred throughout World War II. The ultimate aim of war during this conjuncture was to inflict costs too severe for an enemy to bear. The logic of mass destruction governed societal organization (Latham 2002, 242-3).

At the close of World War II, however, a number of factors converged to make continued reliance on the total warfare model untenable. First, the nuclear revolution made the costs of full-scale war too high for anyone to bear, risking the extinction of humanity itself. Second, the costs of major war in terms of both capital and human life exceeded the benefits from engaging in full-scale warfare. Finally, the shift away from the massively mobilized armies of the past to more flexible, segmented, and professionalized military forces rendered tactics of mobilization largely anachronistic. The central mobilizing principle of warfare became precise, targeted operations aimed at military targets. The goal of military operations focused less on mass destruction and more on the ability to “paralyze and cripple the enemy” (Latham 2002, 243-5). Warfare, as socially constituted, became much less of a lived experience and more of a ‘spectator
While elements of continuity can be identified, it is clear that by the 1990s the world’s dominant social mode of warfare (i.e. the mode of warfare prevailing in the most advanced military powers) had evolved to the point where it was qualitatively different from that which prevailed during the era of Industrialized Total Warfare” (Latham 2002, 247).

This specific social configuration of warfare, however, cannot and should not be characterized as global. During the same conjunctural period of transition Latham describes between Industrialized Total Warfare and Spectator Sport Warfare (or whichever of the modern descriptors you prefer), a contemporaneous social transition was occurring at the margins of Cold War bipolarity. In the proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, the ‘clients’ being trained and supplied were often not a state military, but a particular oppositional identity group who used this emergent ‘war economy’ to form a coherent war footing. So long as they fought against the other bloc, their patron was happy, but in truth these groups were fighting for their constituted interests. This distinction is critical. In the rise of these oppositional identity groups we see the seeds of what Kaldor describes as the social organization of new wars around identity politics (Kaldor 2007, 82-3). Especially in the wake of the Cold War, the fissures in state political power and the opening of transnational economic and military spaces has allowed for the proliferation of identity groups challenging the local monopoly on violence. This fragmented, cross-cutting identity has recreated the social mode of warfare toward a logic of antagonistic relations between competing economic, national, religious, and political networks (Duffield 2001, 190).

As processes of increasing economic interconnection worldwide have opened the ability for goods and services to be widely distributed, they simultaneously opened channels for the creation of a ‘parallel economy’ in which “networks of corruption, black marketers, arms and
drug traffickers” can operate and establish a basis for social life outside of the state and the market (Kaldor 2007, 87). This parallel economic model allows identity groups to form both a parallel political economy and a parallel war economy that can drive long-term military operations against a state and create pockets of anarchy within territorial order. Money flowing in from state sponsors, direct family remittances, diaspora communities and humanitarian assistance are directed toward the perpetuation of this parallel war economy, which is forced into (and often escalates) direct conflict with state and international military authority (Kaldor 2007, 109-110). The result is perpetual conditions of warfare between cross-cutting jurisdictional entities, each claiming political, economic, and most of all military independence.

The threat such transnational military networks pose to the traditional balance of power and systemic order cannot be overstated. As was established in the previous section, state militaries are often unable to deal with the realities of new methods and techniques of warfare that don’t emphasize a strong central military. As these modes of warfare expand and become part of a larger movement creating new forms of socio-military organization, the challenges faced by traditional powers within international order become more perplexing. As Philip Cerny argues concerning the effect of globalized warfare: “superpowers became weaker in systemic terms […] because traditional forms of power could not cope with the globalizing challenges of the late-twentieth-century international order” (Cerny 2005, 16). The balance of power between states on both a regional and global scale depends in large part on their ability to maintain sovereign authority over their territorial holdings. Consequently, legitimation crises undermine states’ ability to project power or maintain relative power vis-à-vis their neighbors and rivals. The rise of new wars makes static predictions based on the standard neorealist capabilities agenda incoherent. If from one day to the next it is virtually impossible to understand the
constitution of military and economic relations through and across states because of the sheer preponderance of identity groups, it consequently becomes virtually impossible to ascertain a stable balance of power between states.

Posing an even more foundational problem for states, however, is the fact that these identity-based conflicts reveal the possibility of state sovereignty unspooling altogether. State attempts to deal with and combat new wars reflect the weakness “to ‘defection’ as the game players say—to players quitting the game and heading off on their own” (Cerny 2005, 17). The systemic response of the state system to its failures has been a fragmentation into a variety of potential remedies with no concerted action. Instead of addressing the constitutional factors that are driving identity-based conflict and de-emphasizing traditional state sovereignty, states have instead taken defensive actions that have driven backlash against the order itself, resulting in a downward spiral of violence of which terrorism can be understood as one factor among many. In response to this breakdown, Kaldor calls for solidarity among “cosmopolitan islands” around principles of humanism and mutual acceptance of difference (Kaldor 2007, 187-190). Such a project, however, seems to run in the face of the constituted nature of social relations as increasingly violent and conflictual.

While it is difficult to see the emerging successor to political order from within the processes of social and political change, Philip Cerny’s neomedievalism hypothesis provides an well-theorized narrative for the reconstitution of the international system around transnational order. Similar to the feudal constitution of politics, Cerny argues that we are likely to see the reemergence of competing and overlapping jurisdictional claims, each exercising some degree of authority. States are likely to lose both their territorial holism and their position of economic and

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37 In his most recent article, Cerny describes the phenomenon as “tangled hierarchy” (Cerny 2006, 693). For a more detailed account of the neomedieval order, see Cerny (1998; 2005). Early versions of this thesis for change in political organization can be seen in Cerny (1990; 1996).
political preeminence in international order, becoming instead “‘postfeudal residential aristocracies’ in a more and more globally integrated capitalist environment” (Cerny 2005, 21). Consequently, we should expect the rise of multiple competing institutions and the construction of identity across social, economic and political lines. Structural fault lines will move away from territorial borders toward broader spheres of authority. The result will be the creation of ‘durable disorder’—although divisions and violent conflict will remain constitutive factors worldwide, the flexibility of the broader neomedieval system allows for limited gains and should prevent the outbreak of chaos (Cerny 2005, 29-30). While the neomedieval prediction is certainly not rosy, and treats violence and insecurity as constitutive political factors, it offers a nuanced predictive account of a world transitioning beyond the state system to transnational political order.

CONCLUSION

By drawing connections between military and political transitions in the feudal and modern cases, I have attempted to focus on the continuities and discontinuities between these transformations across both time and space. In the feudal case, I began with an analysis of change in the warfighting paradigm and its effect on political organization. First, I illustrated the three technological innovations (the capital naval vessel and its broadside, the use of gunpowder weaponry, and the development of the artillery fortress) and the main tactical innovation (the implementation of the pike and massed infantry formations) that occurred during the Military Revolution. Within the same temporal frame, I argued that the necessary change these warfighting innovations entailed was an immediate shift in both the offensive and defensive practices of polities. As warfighting became simultaneously more rapid and more dangerous to their more limited holdings, the interactions between comparatively weaker lords and their
shielding sovereign became more reified. Similarly, the abandonment of the dispersed feudal knighthood in favor of fast military tactics necessitated international relations to focus more heavily on establishing official channels to pursue war and sue for peace. Following the principles of upward causation, I argued that the change in the warfighting paradigm was a permissive change enabling major shifts in the balance of power among medieval polities. Those powers able to mobilize vast resources and manpower around the new techniques of war ascended while traditional medieval powers unable to adapt to the changes in the warfighting paradigm declined. Moving to an examination of change in the social mode of warfare, I examined the move towards enshrining and centralizing the institution of warfare under as the essential organizing principle in society. This took place through a centralization of military authority under a single dynast or sovereign, and entailed feudal lords giving up their social status as warrior chiefs in exchange for subsidiary officer positions in the service of the king’s military. This corporatization of military identity directly transformed international order at the systemic level, greatly reducing the problem of internal conflict and allowing polities to focus on territorial defense and aggrandizement as the primary mode of warfare. Finally, I argued that the social transformation in the conduct of feudal warfare was a permissive change that allowed for fundamental systems change. As military structures under a single sovereign created processes of integration, bureaucratic innovations sprang up allowing for the king to move past his role as central military leader and assert greater and greater control over the polity as a whole. The institution of military hierarchy, consequently, founded the institution of hierarchical sovereign relations throughout what quickly became a politically unified territorial holding.

In the modern case, I illustrated the fundamental shift in the warfighting paradigm embodied by the evolution and global distribution of cheap munitions and durable firearms,
which reversed the upward direction in costs required to maintain a meaningful military capability since the Military Revolution, and the tactical shift toward guerrilla and insurgent military tactics, which altered the fundamental method of battlefield engagement. I argued that this innovation demonstrated a necessary change toward complete transformation in interactional strategies, with an ineluctable shift away from the traditional means of state-to-state conflict and diplomacy towards the recognition of a heterogeny of military forces. This in turn transformed the mode of military intervention and conflict resolution downward against the emphasis on maintaining a nation-state container. This technological innovation also represented a permissive change in hegemonic military relations, not only in the balance between constituted military powers, in which advanced, conventional Western militaries declined because their strategic superiority was largely neutralized, but also in the balance of power between nation-state militaries and sub-state actors, who were able to stymie the advance of Western militaries in conflicts including but not limited to Vietnam, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq. The social mode of warfare also transformed during this period, with conflict no longer an attempt to increase relative power for states and overarching political identities, but instead being fought in the name of sub-state, transnational identity groups. These constituted military identity groups operate from parallel economies that use the framework of globalization to build a war economy through backchannel financial flows and the sale of resources gained in conflict. The necessary change entailed by this new social mode of warfare was to fundamentally alter the systemic balance of power, with great powers being systemically undermined by actors who they could not target with traditional modes of military and economic power. As the exclusive territorial nature of sovereignty increasingly came under fire, transformation in the social mode of war
represents a permissive change away from the state system towards devolving centers of authority and cross-cutting social identity.

The parallels across these two historical periods are striking. While the impetus of the military revolution in the feudal transition was towards large, reified identities best able to provide comparative military advantage, the massive reduction in the cost of maintaining a competitive fighting force has begun the modern process of devolving military and political authority to identity-based interests. Such a transition can be read as an inverse mirror of the process of state formation—as the ability for sub-state actors to achieve massive personal and corporate gains through local military control increases, the political drive begins to move in a devolutionary rather than evolutionary direction. As the average size of a polity begins to move downward instead of upward, the reinstitution of crosscutting, neomedieval boundaries between and across local interest groups becomes a definite possibility.
CONCLUSION

If we accept, as Charles Tilly argued, that war made the state and the state made war, the fundamental question for academics, policy makers, and the citizenry at large is to take this ‘why’ statement and figure out the ‘how’. How can warfare be understood as a constitutive condition in human life and political organization? How do we explain and typify change across broad periods of history and wide gulfs in political theory and practice? It is my contention that only by linking the process of fundamental change in political organization back to prior transformations in the bedrock constitutive principles underpinning warfare that we can tease out a comprehensive account of the process of statization and the potential for de-statization. Instead of treating this transformation as a unified narrative of political progress, in which history is reduced to the broad brushstrokes of teleology, we need to focus on how change occurs in and across different temporal modes. The Braudelian method of dividing time into day-to-day, episodic, and epochal frames allows the reader of history to tease out the interlocking dimensions of change in warfare and how these shifts substantively effected transformation in political organization. While this historical model cannot capture all of the uncertainty and openness that fundamental processes of transformation inevitably entail, it offers a vision of the world that emphasizes nuance and links change from the smallest levels of politics and warfighting to the grandest levels of polities and their policies.

The literature at large, while both broad and deep, suffers from three main conceptual difficulties. First, to the extent that theories place weight on an underlying variable driving transformation, these accounts tend to reflect a deterministic bias. From the ahistorical structuring principles of anarchy in conventional and radical realism, to the historically
questionable concept of a world-economy, to the democratic principles entailed in globality, all of these accounts overemphasize the transhistorical constancy of their driver and never account for changes to this essential variable across time and space. Second, many theories describe the principles of change, but are unable to account for the constitutive drivers of such a transformation. Some event within or crisis to the very foundations of political order is required to move away from centuries of accumulated history and policy. The constructivist and commercialization models, however, provide no essential driver for change and are thus unable to tease out either how or why changes occur. Finally, the theoretical corpus on the topic of change in political organization vastly underemphasizes the role of warfare in political transformation. For most theoretical accounts war is a dependent variable determined by some external structure that cannot operate independently of politics. Even the most nuanced accounts like Teschke’s social property relations model, which attempts to sneak war in as a property relation, or the geopolitical competition model, which ignores the social function of war completely, fall short on this account.

A theoretical model centered on a nuanced and contingent definition of warfare helps to rectify many of these theoretical shortcomings. Where theories that assume a transhistorical basis for transformation usually focus on unchanging, ahistorically universal variables, a theory of war-driven change does not have any such determinacy. While warfare itself, in the broad Clausewitzian sense of force to compel action by another, exists across time and space, its specific dimensions and instantiations are always in motion. War as practiced in tactical, social, and historical senses is constantly in flux, changing with every new development across the various temporal registers. Warfare in one region of the world at a given time is vastly different from war conducted either in different geographical or cultural settings or different epochs.
Second, where a broad cross-section of the literature on political transformation is unable to describe the antagonisms driving change, analytical discussion of warfare immediately gets to the heart of that question. While the *raison d’État* behind war at any given time or place is a function of its historical, social, and tactical understandings of warfare, changes in the conduct and conception of war function as direct drivers in new forms of political evolution. Finally, focusing on war as the bridge between ideational and material triggers for change allows students of history and politics to see warfare as something more than just an interruption of politics and a noisy clanging of polities. Instead, warfare becomes a social practice, something that all political subjects play a part in both in thought and in action.

Although it’s too early to draw any substantive conclusions about the end state of this political and military revolution, what seems clear is that change is occurring. Consequently, the aim of scholars and policymakers alike should be to focus on the mechanisms of this change. Study of these processes of transformation is essential to understand the precise modalities and practices that are contributing to the rise of new wars and the fall of sovereign states. My thesis represents an essential analytical step forward in this regard. I have established a theoretical framework with a consistent ontological, epistemological, and methodological basis to study these processes of transformation across time, space and structure. The places where my thesis is most limited—the depth of my case study and limitation to the dimensions of European and Western political transformation—are the precise areas in which the theoretical core of my argument provides a foundation for further inquiry. Drawing connections between developments in warfare and political organization within the same temporal mode and in processes of upward causation will hopefully provide a method for further research that allows scholars of history and politics alike to tease out the contours of political transformation. At the very least, I hope my
project provides knowledge and nuance to the questions of transformation in warfare and political organization, filling a gap that the predominant literature is unable to suture.

Understanding transformation in political organization is vital to the academic and professional interests of a number of communities. First, scholars of history, sociology and political science ought to examine the basis for the deeply constituted transitions that threaten to alter so much about the world academia attempts to explain, theorize and ultimately understand. A coherent theoretical approach is vital to the consistent application of evidence and analysis to processes of transformation. Second, policymakers should focus on the conditions of systems change, especially insofar as the vague outline of a new global transition is beginning to emerge with simultaneous processes of institutional integration and disintegration occurring throughout the world. Understanding the way transitions have operated historically can help inform action taken to address current processes of transition. Finally, the citizenry at large ought to take a direct interest in this study, because the transformation of political order leaves no member of the global polis unaffected. Fundamental transformative processes pose the possibility of major alterations to our day to day life, which makes the understanding of political transitions and discussion of potential end-states absolutely essential.
WORKS CITED


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