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The Ethiopian State: Perennial Challenges in the Struggle for Development

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The Ethiopian State:
Perennial Challenges in the Struggle for Development

Hawi Tilahun
Presented to the Department of International Studies, Macalester College.
Faculty Advisors: Dr. Ahmed I. Samatar and Professor David Blaney
4/26/2016
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My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Professor David Blaney. Every conversation has been a source of encouragement and intellectual growth. He willingly gave me the intellectual space to wrestle with important questions and treated all my ideas with great care and attention. His innumerable feedbacks have been critical in the revision process of my honors thesis and classroom engagements have also created new areas of research interests. I have thoroughly enjoyed our discussion of the “counter-movement” and the fate of the Oromo people within the political economy of Ethiopia. I extend my deepest gratitude for his sincere mentorship and continual encouragement.

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To my family, who remain the inspiration for my work, I am forever indebted for their love, sacrifice and relentless support. To friends who witnessed my victories and setbacks, who kept me company in my corner of the library, who bought me coffee and offered a hug when I needed one, thank you!

Last but not least, I thank God for giving me the grace to see this project into full completion.
Abstract

This honors thesis examines the evolution of the state and nation-building processes in four historical periods in Ethiopia. I argue that, in the generational efforts towards consolidation and change, each period throws up acute tensions between an increasingly centralizing political apparatus and the civic and material existence of ethnic peripheries. These contradictions are apparent in the attempts to secure the country's territorial sovereignty under Menelik II, the efforts towards modernization by Emperor Haile Selassie, the militaristic-cum-Marxist drive under Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, and the construction of a developmental state under the leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. While some achievements could be discerned in each period, all of them raise questions about legitimacy and competence—two factors that are indispensable for the ultimate success of a state in managing its own vulnerabilities and the fate of its society.
“The Amharas and Tigrayans have their history, whereas other people have their anthropology” — Christopher Clapham
Chapter I: Introduction

I. The challenge

The nation-state is the most well established form of political organization in the contemporary international order. For the majority of African states, conforming to the nation-state structure continues to pose many challenges. The vast majority of African states are artificial colonial constructs in that their boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers in ways that led to what Benjamin Miller (2007) calls the “nation-state imbalance.” Only in a few cases does the territory of a nation overlap with the political boundary of the state. At the time of independence, African leaders adopted this model in conformity with European states. This forced the collective lives of people to be told in one historical narrative, providing limited space for the expression of multiculturalism and a negotiated space for diversity and difference.

Both the colonized and the non-colonized worlds are faced with the challenge and task of building a viable and capable state. The state is also tasked with creating a meaningful citizenship that imagines a national identity into being. While the state and state-like institutions hold agency in moving a society forward, it is critical to note the constraints faced by the state itself. In the current era of neoliberalism, post-independence Africa faces endogenous and exogenous political and economic forces that undermine the role of the state and cripple its capacity for reform and development.

The challenges of the African state, particularly that of Ethiopia, spur my intellectual curiosity and encourage me to investigate the state-building and nation-building processes to better understand the political and economic dynamics of the present times. I hope to investigate Ethiopia’s past shortcomings and potential assets for the building of a just, multi-ethnic state. From the beginning, the creation of the
Ethiopian nation-state was a project of establishing a dominant Amhara identity, relegating other communities to the periphery. This undermined the political and social structures of indigenous societies and created little to no viable space to accommodate and honor difference. Within the boundaries of the state, the rise of capitalist forms of accumulation and class formation further intensified the problem and politicized ethnic differences. The adoption of Ethiopia's current ethnic federalism system is a response to the shortcomings of Ethiopia’s historical and political past—a past constructed on identity politics, policies of destructive homogenization, and economic injustice. The proposition of establishing a federalist state is still under great debate; not the least is the central question of whether the new design overcomes the destructive effect of past homogenization. For the Oromos and other marginalized ethnic groups, the question of national identity remains one that is heavily contested.

II. Research Questions

Central questions I wish to engage in this thesis project are: What endogenous and exogenous forces guided the formation of the Ethiopian state? How does one characterize Ethiopia’s process of state-building and nation-building? I wish to focus my analysis of the state during four dominant historical periods: Menelik II (1889-1913), Emperor Haile Selassie (1931-1974), Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974-1991) and Meles Zenawi (1991-2012). Engaging the broader question of my topic’s importance and positioning it in regional perspectives, I seek to find the lessons Ethiopia offers to the Horn of Africa and beyond on the issues of historical inheritance and ethnic politics.
III. Motivation

“History is about ideas, specifically the conflict of ideas and how those conflicts played out in earlier times and what they can tell us about today.”—Robert Freeman

There are three reasons that contributed to my decision to do an honors thesis. First, through this academic pursuit, I wish to understand Ethiopia’s past and develop my own critical thoughts when evaluating the future direction of Ethiopia. Second, the opportunity to study my own society with rigor would grant me the opportunity to engage with contemporary challenges of the Ethiopian state from a place of critical knowledge. Such an understanding will include an exploration of the threads of counter-histories that contradict the national narrative and shed light on the geopolitical realities that impact state formation and development. Here, I will particularly aim to shed light on the development of capitalism, class formation and the continuous struggle over material life that has now become intimately linked with the politics of ethnicity in Ethiopia.

Thirdly, I am pursuing an honors thesis to better understand dominant paradigms or ideas. The distinct historical periods in Ethiopia were associated with certain ideologies that further shaped the direction of the state and state-society relations. While some of these paradigms remain and further materialize in the next historical period, other ideas were fought off or uprooted for the making of a new order. This struggle over ideas and their material consequences is one that is not unique to Ethiopia; the very challenges faced by Ethiopia also speak to some of the problems confronting other developing countries. Thus, I wish that the knowledge I gain through this work will give me greater capacity to engage other societies and the complex histories and identities people inhabit.
Fourth, this academic work will allow me to facilitate my own agency as a civic-minded individual in an international setting. One of the greatest pitfalls of the Ethiopian diaspora is the lack of knowledge. By knowledge, I mean an understanding of the nature of the past that allows for deeper evaluation of the contemporary dominant power structures of the age—of which Ethiopia is a part. Whether engagement takes the form of education, advocacy or a specific project on the ground or amongst the diaspora, I want my future action and means of civic living to be informed by critical scholarship.

Fifth, through undertaking this honors thesis, I also seek to grow personally. During my time at Macalester College, I have begun to critically question what it means to be an “Ethiopian.” I recall many contradictory experiences of identity. Questions such as “Are you Habesha?” or “Where are you from?,” as simple as they might appear, have brought me to reflect on the problematic nature of political boundaries that guide identity formation. I now realize that these questions are embedded in larger economic and political processes that characterize the development of the Ethiopian state itself. Furthermore, stories of the Oromo diaspora serve as the greatest personal impetus toward this research. These narratives are full of many wounded contradictions. Memories of the diaspora reflect the realities of ethnic marginalization and the imperatives for a national, Ethiopian identity. Experiences of displacement both at home and abroad have left historical grievances that have not been properly dealt with. Whether it is at sacred sites of worship or social gatherings, ethnicity has become a vehicle of division and segregation. How does one confront the political past? What does unity in the midst of diversity mean? I bring these subjective inquiries into my paper for reflection.
IV. Sources and Methodology

In gathering information for my project, I will mostly rely on scholarly books and articles. Although there are many important historical works on Ethiopia, there are few studies that have theorized the state-formation and nation-building processes in the country. Taking note of this gap in the literature, I follow the footsteps of historian John Markakis to theorize the development of Ethiopia’s state-apparatus over time. In particular, I will stress the value of Charles Tilly’s “predatory theory” to explain the making of the state in the first three historical periods. The Ethiopian state under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, although still showing some predatory tendencies, exemplifies the characteristics of a developmentalist aspiration. I hope for my learning of history and theorization to be guided by “historical understanding.” By this, I mean scholarly insight and evidence and employing both distance and intersubjective intimacy in my analysis. Finally, this is my first intellectual engagement with such a daunting topic. Consequently, I will strive to be epistemologically modest.

V. Preparation

There are both academic and personal experiences that have prepared me to undertake an honors project. Through the course, Power and Development in Africa, I was exposed to important concepts and a way of understanding the struggle for development based on the interplay between structure and agency. Another class that has prepared me for this work is Global Political Economy. Through this class, I was introduced to one of the pivotal works of Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. Polanyi highlights the performative nature of capitalism, what he refers to as the liberal creed, both on human individuals and the natural environment. Understanding the
processes of early capitalist formation and its intimate links to the underdevelopment of peripheralized countries has given me important insights to build upon when evaluating state development in Ethiopia. Furthermore, these insights allow me to situate Ethiopia within the larger international political and economic context. The class, *Paradigms of Global Leadership*, has drawn my attention to the importance of leadership and the place of both reformist and revolutionary leaders in the course of history.

My study abroad experience in the Netherlands has contributed to my academic endeavor in several ways. Through the seminar, *Perspectives on Globalization*, I was challenged to reflect on the notions of multiculturalism and the connection between historical grievances and contemporary global conflicts. Through my independent study on the Oromo diaspora, I began to realize the greater gravity of the failed Ethiopian project. Stories of the diaspora revealed complexities of defining one’s home and political identity. I was brought to reflect even more deeply on this during my brief Harvard Divinity Exploration Program. Through Professor Michael Jackson’s lecture on the “The Politics of Storytelling,” I began to locate diasporic narratives and scholarship as sites of knowledge production and the struggle for power and agency.

My final International Studies seminar, *Capitalism and World (Dis) Order*, has also given me important insights and stirred my curiosities toward a deeper study of capitalism. As a historical phenomenon, capitalism has had an evolutionary history that is marked by a centre-periphery relationship. This centre-periphery relationship, however, is not limited to the countries between the Global North and South. Industrial capitalism and free-trade imperialism of the late 19th century created systems of extraction that affected the social fabrics of colonized countries. As such, centre-periphery relationships
are also evident within each of the developing countries. Throughout this research, I hope evaluate the relationships between social consciousness, the division of labor and ownership over the means of production. This is intimately linked to both the state and nation-building project of the Ethiopian state.

Both scholarly works and course discussions have given me pathways to developing some of my inquiries and expectations for my honors thesis. In addition, my largest questions come from personal experiences of witnessing inequality. On my recent trip to Cape Town, post-apartheid South Africa appeared full of paradoxes. Remnants of apartheid were visible both in the geographical makeup of the place and in the division of labour. From township settlements to the ongoing racial tensions, the reality of inequality was visibly apparent. Where wealth remains concentrated in the hands of a small minority, the question of economic apartheid, particularly as it relates to landownership, remains heavily contested. As I do my research, I will address key questions concerning land ownership and reflect on the realities of inequality on the lines of ethnicity.

VI. Organization

The second chapter of my thesis will begin with the review of the literature looking at four prime concepts. The first concept is that of the state. The discussion on the state is further subdivided to investigate the “predatory theory” and situate the state-building project within regional and internationalist perspectives. The second concept is that of nations and nationalism. Modernist perspectives of nationhood and nationalism in the context of Africa will further be discussed in this section. The third concept, world order, will evaluate the three dominant economic moments in history: the liberal creed, embedded liberalism and the neoliberal order. The last concept is that of development.
This concept will be highlighted through a brief historical exposition and will provide the different ways development has been conceptualized to fit modern and changing contexts.

The third chapter will assess the state-formation process during the time of Menelik II (1889-1913). Understanding the territorial construction of the Ethiopian state at this particular period will situate Ethiopia amongst Europe’s Scramble for Africa and the pursuit for capitalist gains. This chapter is devoted to evaluating the interlinked processes of war-making, state-making, extraction and protection based on Charles Tilly’s evaluation of Western Europe’s state formation process; this is similar to Ethiopia’s process of state development at the time of Menelik II. The fourth chapter will evaluate the Ethiopian state under the leadership of Emperor Haile Selassie (1931-1974). As a reformer, Emperor Haile Selassie provided critical changes that placed the country on the path of modernization and development. However, the time of the Emperor holds a great contradiction between new infrastructures that transformed Ethiopia’s traditional institutions and regressive socio-political systems that reinstated the Emperor’s hegemony.

The fifth chapter will look at the process of state transformation at the time of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974-1991). The Ethiopian Student Movement spearheaded the struggle against vestiges of feudalism, imperialism and capitalism. This chapter will reveal the inherent contradictions between building a socialist society while also keeping a high-level of state-centralization to secure hegemony over the periphery. The sixth chapter will assess EPRDF party ideology. Key areas of assessment in this chapter are assets and shortcomings of ethnic federalism and the place of the neoliberal order in
shaping Ethiopia’s political economy. The concluding chapter of my thesis addresses key findings, lessons and future inquiries. These will include reflections on the importance of history and the place of both internal and external forces in shaping Ethiopia’s political contradictions.
Chapter II: Literature Review

I. The State

The state, as an ultimate condensation of public power, is the centre of gravity for collective authority. Samuel Finer (1975, 86) suggests that contemporary states possess the following five characteristics: (1) territorially defined population with central organ of government, (2) such territory has, to a great extent, secured territorial sovereignty, (3) the organ of government has a specialized personnel such as the civil service and the military service, (4) the population has ideally horizontal links which forms a sense of common nationality or “community of feeling” and, finally, (5) the population has to varying degrees distributed forms of gains and duties. Key to the study of the state and particularly the organ of government is the concept of power. Power is defined as who gets what, when and how. The question of who gets left out is also equally important. Power gives one the capacity to influence and is determined by the means of compliance. Power can be taxonomized into four categories: physical power or immediate application of force (military power), economic power (means of capital accumulation or access to livelihood), political power (organizing institutions such as church groups and unions) and cultural power (ideas and the creation of intersubjectivity) (Samatar 2014).

Samatar and Samatar (2002) showcase five typologies of the state. These categories are treated as capturing discrete kinds of political entities. The ideal integral state enables a network of collective services to function and does not reduce its citizens to despair and carnage. This type of state is emblematic of a moment of integral balance. In a Gramscian sense, this type of state is congruent to an effective state. An effective state not only succeeds in delivering public goods but, particularly important, the
leadership generates a degree of moral and intellectual bonding with its citizens. This “organic” affiliation is central to what he calls “hegemony” or the establishment of the “national-popular.” Presently, there does not exist an integral African state. A developmentalist state is one that is conspicuously active in the improvement of human capital and the enhancement of the productive forces and national accumulation. This state is driven by the ambition to rapidly mollify (reduce) societal vulnerability. However, this often comes at the expense of civic pluralism and basic liberties (Samatar and Samatar 2002, 9). This type of state is strong when it comes to resource management and building economic capacity but proves relatively weak in encouraging robust citizen participation. A prime example of this type of state is Botswana. The third type of state, a Prebendalist State, is typically preoccupied with protection and reproduction of immediate interests of the regime and its associates. A key characteristic of this type of rentier state is high dependency—“a combination of subservience to external powers, venality and despotism at home” (Samatar and Samatar 2002, 10). The fourth type of state, a predatory state shows degradation of state structure and institutions and resources become heavily contested. In a cadaverous state, life is nasty and brutish and the reality becomes war of all against all (Samatar 2002, 9-12).

In his book, Seeing like a State, James Scott (1998) speaks to the idea of legibility that builds and sustains the state-apparatus. The classic functions of taxation, conscription and the prevention of rebellions are ways to make society legible (Scott 1988, 2). The process of sedentarization and the organization of social and natural functions become part of “seeing like the state.” The above state typologies hold a degree of societal legibility or command over the population; as such, the growth of the state and state-
function is not only dictated by its monopoly over violence, but also its monopoly over societal legibility. Scott further argues that state-led arrangement have four of the following pernicious elements: administrative ordering of nature and society, high-modernist ideology, the use of power by an authoritarian state for the materialization of high-modernist ideology, and an unresistant civil society (Scott 1988, 5). As this entails a great deal of manipulation, society becomes ordered through both the dictates of global and domestic hegemons (Scott 1988, 183).

Within the contours of the state, the hegemonic drive is defined within the political context as the pursuit of a regime, through utilizing different political and social institutions, to gain legitimacy through attending to the interest of the non-dominant class in the society. The hegemonic drive is at its optimal state when there is a balance between its two vital cells: dominance and consensus. This means that both the dominant and the dominated classes accept the right to rule and to be ruled. Consensus is the expected outcome when the interests of the people are taken into account. When the hegemony begins to fall into decadence, the domination begins to supersede consensus, resulting in the loss of legitimacy and the building up of a counter-hegemonic drive. Patrick Chabal asserts, “If the legitimacy of power diminishes, it carries less authority, leading to a counter-hegemonic drive” (Chabal 1992, 164). The counter-hegemonic drive is governed to some extent by political morality—the assessment of the hegemon’s compliance to a constitutional or political order that is meant to, in some way, balance its power and assert its accountability to the civil society (Chabal 1992, 164).
A. Predatory Theory and the State

The bellicist account, otherwise known as the predatory theory, documents earlier European state-formation. In Tilly’s renowned aphorism, “War made the state, and the state made war” (quoted in Taylor and Botea 2008, 27). Based on an extensive historical analysis of modern European states, the bellicist perspective reinstates war as the primary and central means of extraction, critical in building a centralized state apparatus (Thies 2009, 625). In other words, the predatory theory treats war as the primary vehicle for institutional development, in which the need to extract resources necessitates the establishment of centralized state institutions. The defining factor of state building is the state’s ability to penetrate society to extract revenues and resources. Extraction is needed in order to build the capacity of the state and to develop its administrative institutions (Kisangani 2014, 2). Tilly analogizes this process of Western European state-formation in the sixteenth and seventeenth century to “organized crime” (Tilly 1985) involving three interrelated processes: war-making, extraction and capital accumulation (Tilly 1985, 172).

Tilly uses the analogy of criminal protection rackets to explain the dynamics of early-modern European state formation. Through the racketeering analogy, he demonstrates that state leaders, like criminal syndicates, create threats that only they can mitigate--for a price. The interdependent processes of war-making and state-making thereby function as “protection rackets” to secure power for the state-builders (Tilly 1985, 169). As the state sells security in exchange for revenues, it develops organized means for coercive extraction and protection. Many governments could be said to operate as racketeers since “the repressive and extractive activities of governments often
constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens” (Tilly 1985, 171). Though Tilly is drawing parallels between organized crime racketeering and state-building, rulers don’t set out to run crime syndicates. Instead, they often produce danger while also providing a shield against it (Tilly 1985, 171).

As part of this effort to consolidate their authority, “wielders of coercion” (Leander 2004, 4) become responsible for what Tilly and other bellicist scholars identify as war-making, state-making, protection and extraction (Tilly 1985, 181). These interrelated processes yield organizational features that constitute the modern characteristics of a centralized nation-state. It is critical to note that power holders did not engage in the war-making, extraction and capital accumulation processes to construct the nation-state; instead, nation-states became the by-products of securing power and exercising authority in expanded territories through war-making.

War-making, which involves establishing a monopoly over the means of coercion to fight against outside intruders or enemies, calls for the establishment of a standing army and related coercive mechanisms and organizations (Tilly 1985, 181). Waging war is a costly endeavor and takes great investment of human and financial capital. In order to secure resources for war, European rulers had to locate and secure capital through outright conquest, selling assets or forcefully dispossessing those with capital (Tilly 1985, 172). What this produced in the long-term was organized systems that ensured “regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit” and regular forms of taxation within a particular territory (Tilly 1985, 172). In this process, state-builders strengthened their administrative capacity through state bureaucracies, mapped their territories and gathered needed information for capital accumulation (Robinson 2002,
European rulers often provided ways to protect their inside supporters. Institutions such as courts and assemblies took shape in the processes of guaranteeing demanded protection by the ruled (Tilly 1985, 181). The more costly the war-making activity, all other variables being equal, “the greater the organizational residue” (Tilly 1985, 181).

The competition over territory and capital as a result of war-making led to the unintended consequence: the state or the development of a state-apparatus (Leander 2004, 4). Before the French Revolution, Tilly notes that the use of local magnates as indirect rulers was key in ensuring protection and governance among European provinces. These magnates “collaborated with the government without becoming officials in any strong sense of the term, had some access to government backed force, and exercised wide discretion within their own territories” (Tilly 1985, 174). However, the state magnates also were potential enemies and possible allies of opposition in the region (Tilly 1985, 174). Thus, the use of indirect-rule decreased with two distinct strategies: (1) dispatching officials to local provinces and communities (2) Encouraging the build-up of subordinate police forces (Tilly 1985, 174). In the earlier European experience, supporters of the state, which carried out the protective and extractive processes for state consolidation, were generally “landlords, armed retainers of the monarch, and churchmen” (Tilly 1985, 181).

In addition to building the administrative capacity to secure power within a territory, the process of state building entailed eliminating or neutralizing enemies inside the territory. This took the form of establishing surveillance systems and bureaucratic forms of guaranteeing control within the territory (Tilly 1985, 181). Emphasizing the interaction between the processes of war-making and state-making, Sorenson writes,
“Before the full consolidation of state power, would-be rulers always had to think in terms of two-front battles, against ‘domestic’ as well as against ‘international’ opponents” (Sorenson 2001, 346). Developing the administrative state apparatus was critical in protecting given territories from both outside intruders as well as inside enemies.

Tilly describes the protection that is provided by the wielders of coercion in the state-building process as a double-edged protection. Again, functioning as a racketeer, this means that state agents produce “both the danger and, at a price, the shield against [a threat]” (Tilly 1985, 171). Thus, governments can “commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war” and create protective mechanism to further counter opposition (Tilly 1985, 171). Providing protective mechanisms is intrinsically linked to the state-building process. Protection in the Tillyan approach involves securing allies internally and providing protection for “domestic players that support their rule” (Kisangani and Pickering 2014, 2). Protection of allies also means repression of rivalries in the state (Taylor and Botea 2008, 29).

A state that is able to secure internal supporters and eliminate opposition strengthens its capacity to extract resources (Tilly 1985, 181). Extraction, the means by which the above three processes take place, manifests in fiscal policies and administrative capacities which allow agents of states to penetrate society to secure human and material capital (Tilly 1985, 181). In the narrative of state-building in Europe, Tilly claims that “mercantile capitalism and state-making reinforced each other” (Tilly 1985, 170). Rulers of the state have to manage their relationship with the polity through concessions and negotiations in order to secure their power: “Extracting financial resources requires
bargaining with those controlling these resources” (Leander 2004, 5). The process of extraction thereby yielded notions of rights, citizenship, and legitimacy, which were critical in sustaining state-society relations.

State-builders also have to provide a level of protection in order to secure legitimacy for the process of extraction. Miguel Angel Centeno speaks further to the state's extractive power. Borrowing the term from Michael Mann (1988), he notes that growth of state administration and centralization provides the state with *infrastructural power*—“the capacity to penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Centeno 2003, 86). This process of trade-off between rulers and the ruled also creates a body of civil servants who express their demands to the state and play a role in building the state infrastructure (Leander 2004, 5). The process of penetration often takes different forms: “Extraction, for instance, ranges from outright plunder to regular tribute to bureaucratized taxation” (Tilly 1985, 181). Successful processes of empire-building or state-building offer the opportunity to capture economies of scale. Although most significant in capturing new trade and finance endeavors, these economies of scale also affect industrial production (Tilly 1985, 179). In the European experience, centralized state taxation also channeled peasant production into the international market, further augmenting “the opportunities for trade creation and economic specialization” (Tilly 1985, 179). Therefore, mechanisms of mercantile capitalism that encouraged capital accumulation or extraction were intimately interlinked with state consolidation (Tilly 1985, 170).

To summarize, the European experience shows a great lord engaging in effective war-making to become dominant in a given territory. War-making capacity entails
securing human and material capital. This leads to extractive means to secure resources in order to make war-making possible. Securing successful extractive means of creating violence entailed “elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great lord’s local rivals” leading to the process of state-making (Tilly 1985, 183). State structures such as military organizations, war industries, and schools also become part of the war-making and state-building process. To sustain the state apparatus, agents of the state ally with different social classes. This reality opens the discussion for the engagement of culture, vital in sustaining the bellicist account. The processes of war-making, state-making, protection and extraction converge to develop a centralized state apparatus.

**B. Expanding the Bellicist Account: Some Regional Perspectives**

The predatory theory has influenced thinkers that analyze state consolidation in regions outside of Europe. Herbst (2000) and Centeno (2002) argue that conditions in Africa and Latin America, respectively, impede the experience of interstate total war that was crucial for state-building shown in the European context (Taylor and Botea 2008, 20). Through his analysis of Latin American countries, Centeno interrogates the nature of intrastate war that facilitate state-formation. He categorizes external war-making into two categories: total and limited war. Centeno argues, “states in Latin America have had and continue to have severe limitations on the types of wars they may engage in, while these wars never develop into the kind of struggles that produce more powerful states” (Centeno 2003, 82). Total wars usually consist of vast casualties, are based on some kind of *moral or ideological crusade*, and consist of vastly militarized society that produces institutions orientated toward complete victory. They also secure an amassed support and engage the state’s inhabitants directly and/or indirectly in war (Centeno 2003, 83).
According to Centeno’s argument, total wars “produce richer, more powerful states” (Centeno 2003, 83) as their capacity to extract from society is fully optimized. This is also facilitated through the greater loyalty secured between the population and the state (Centeno 2003, 83). Centeno contrasts the total-war experience to what he calls limited war. He contends that “limited war” characterizes much of the Latin America experience. Limited wars are often geographically constrained to few areas with overall short durations, fought between those with similar ideologies over economic or territorial issues and do not consist of mass political or military mobilization that sustain emotional fervor and a sense of loyalty to the state except in the initial moments of war (Centeno 2003, 84).

In evaluating the challenges of state building in Africa, Herbst (2000) emphasizes that state-formation in Africa differed from the earlier European experiences. High population density and scarcity of land did not persist in pre-colonial Africa. The process of state-formation in African countries also did not consist of war-making and state-making, critical in development of state administration and infrastructure in European countries. In other words, post-colonial African states were not the “organic” products of external war. African leaders inherited political structures from the colonial era and were left to deal with the internal implications of an exported nation-state model. The creation of Sub-Saharan African states from the outside had great implication to the development of leadership in the countries: “that act of external creation left domestic contenders inside the states with a free reign to do whatever they pleased to their subject populations and to each other” (Sorensen 2001, 347).
Further articulating the challenges facing African leaders to build strong and cohesive states, Herbst notes: “The fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa—be they precolonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent era—has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people” (Herbst 2000, 11). Herbst posits the challenges of state-building in the context of political geography. Unlike Europe, land in Africa was abundant and thus, pre-colonial African states were not driven by scarcity to fight over territory. Therefore, states did not have to create state administration to defend their boundaries and further extract from society to sustain administrative capacity (Robinson 2002, 513). According to Herbst, the lack of state-development due to low population density, intrastate rivalry over territory, and permanent establishment of colonial boundaries and Cold-War politics could help explain the persistence of weak states in Sub-Saharan African states (Robinson 2002, 513-518). Herbst further notes the ecological diversity and geographical features of Sub-Saharan Africa that prove costly in the projection of power, thereby impeding the process of state-consolidation (Herbst 2000, 12-13).

Both Centeno and Herbst offer regional perspectives outside of the European experience. Centeno integrates the state-building process in Latin America through evaluating the nature or magnitude of war. As such, he argues that total wars demand greater extraction for the building of state institutions. Herbst considers other variables such as political geography and colonial expansionism that situate the African state-building experience. As previously noted, the Tillyan account of state-building is sufficient in explaining state-consolidation relevant to the European experience.
However, it fails to take note of changing international orders that shape contemporary state formation and consolidation.

C. State-building: Internationalist Perspectives

*Fixed Borders, Intervention and the Changing Nature of War*

Scholars from the world systems approach draw attention to international systems that impact contemporary state-building processes. In doing so, they evaluate the realities of strong/weak state dynamics through the global context and persistent, hegemonic power structures. More precisely, the structures of the international system have changed so much that earlier forms of state building processes cannot be replicated. Their critique is important as the nature of states and state-making in the twenty-first century differ drastically from sixteenth and seventeenth century of Europe. International norms and institutions thus play a significant role in the making and unmaking of contemporary states. This calls for the assessment of state dynamics in light of current international norms and institutions.

In assessing state-formation processes, Atzili (2006/2007) critiques fixed borders and the norm of territorial sovereignty after WWII. Atzili concludes that international norms lead to the unintended consequences of weak-states: “states that lack legitimate and effective governmental institutions” (Atzili 2006/07, 139). These weak-states, in turn, become the breeding ground for greater instability and intrastate conflicts (Atzili 2006/07, 139). Atzili advances a threefold argument: first, the norm of fixed borders impedes the natural process of state centralization as a response to external rivalry (Atzili 2006/07, 140). Similar to Herbst’s argument, this point draws from the predatory theory, which reinstates war as motor for institutional development. Territorial sovereignty has
been established as an inviolable norm or principle, which discourages interstate rivalry and, thus, impedes earlier European state-formation processes. Second, the lack of such external threat fails to facilitate a sense of internal cohesion and a common identity among the subjects, further undermining “loyalty” to the state (Atzili 2006/07, 140). Noting on the place of war as a means for this loyalty, Atzili comments: “The relative ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of contemporary European states is a product, rather than a precondition, of the state-building process” (Atzili 2006/07, 147). In other words, the dual process of war-making and state-making created not only the state but provided the means for the construction of the nation.

Sorensen links the reality of fixed borders with the rise of intrastate conflicts in the contemporary world. He notes that international norms and fixed borders brought Third-World armies “to face inward” and to fight battles within fixed boundaries to secure legitimacy (Sorensen 2001, 346). In other words, fixed borders established a norm by which countries could no longer engage in external conflict (war-making) but instead engage in internal rivalry (state-making). Thirdly, Atzili notes that there is no mechanism with which strong states could overtake weak states (Atzili 2006/07, 140). The barring of annexation further perpetuates the conditions of weak-states. Atzili’s argument provides a great paradox: fixed borders, which were initially introduced to undermine conflicts, are instead playing a critical role in the rise of intrastate conflicts.

In light of territorial integrity, Atzili problematizes the link between war-making and state-building. Although this perspective brings us closer to evaluating contemporary phenomenon of weak-states, Atzili’s argument does not take note of other direct and indirect interventions by outside powers, which have serious implications to state-
formation as well as intrastate conflicts. Sorensen’s scholarship best captures this argument: “the respect for existing borders did not mean that stronger states refrained from any kind of involvement whatsoever. Within the framework of existing territorial demarcations, they indeed felt free to pursue their political and economic interests in most any way that they saw fit” (Sorensen 2001, 348). Furthermore, Sorenson evokes dependency theory in articulating the economic behaviors of core states in relation to peripheralized, weak states that perpetuate strong-weak state relations. He further highlights another irony created by the international context: “the situation of post-colonial states is indeed peculiar: their continued existence as states is guaranteed by the international system, but the pursuit of political and economic interest by stronger states has frequently hindered the process of state-building” (Sorensen 2001, 348).

Conditions of developing countries today reveal the complex impact of the international systems in state-formation. Luttwak (1999) critiques international interventions that, in the end, undermine sustainable peace. He argues that the establishment of the United Nations and the hegemony of the Security Council impede the natural process of war-making that leads to peace (Luttwak 1999, 37). Thus, he proposes for wars to persist until these endemic conflicts potentially transform into peace—either through both parties declaring truce or the weaker surrendering. Further showcasing the European experience of war-making which led to state-building, Luttwak writes, “An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively” (Luttwak 1999, 36). Because total wars could ultimately result in peace, Luttwak critiques imposed
cease-fires and armistice by multilateral organizations in the conflicts worldwide. This, he argues can perversely “prevent the transformation of war into peace” (Luttwak 1999, 37). He further argues, “If the United Nations helped the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively, it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war” (Luttwak 1999, 38). Because interventions impede the “transformative effects of both decisive victory and expansion” Luttwak stands with the proposition that wars should persist (Luttwak 1999, 44).

Further critiquing the nature of war in light of these international systems, Kisangani and Pickering (2014) argue that previous literatures on warfare fail to consider the activities of transnational rebel groups. They hypothesize military intervention of states against transnational insurgents or rebels are central to state-consolidation (Kisangani and Pickering 2014, 4). This is because the increased level of extraction needed for state-building depends on the military might of post-colonial states fighting transnational insurgents or rebels (Kisangani and Pickering 2014, 2). Their argument echoes the assertion made by Tilly decades ago: “War makes states, I shall claim. Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war making all belong on the same continuum—that I shall claim as well” (Tilly 1985, 170). Whether it is fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia or strengthening military powers such as Ethiopia in fighting terrorism in the Horn, this particular scholarship opens further conversation on the changing nature of warfare and its implications on the enabled extractive capacity of the state.
II. Nationhood and Nationalism

Although the concepts of state-building and nation-building are often used interchangeably, they hold different sets of meaning. State-building focuses on institutional development and the building of governmental apparatus through employing physical and political power. Although these are also evidently used in the nation-building process, cultural power takes precedence in establishing a sense of communal consciousness or a community of feeling: “a nation can and has been defined as a population conscious of its common nationality” (Finer 1975, 88). A nation generally describes a distinct people, defined by a common ancestry, history and language (Bamidele 2015, 12). Out of these components arise expressions of Nationalism.

Nationalism appears in different forms and expressions across societies. In places like Germany and Italy, the concept of a “nation” has operated as a movement that unified culturally divided peoples. In the colonized worlds of Africa, the Caribbean and parts of Asia, nationalism has served as a means for self-assertion and as a weapon against colonial structures (Young 2007, 246). Crawford Young identifies the core principles of nationalism as *an ideology of human solidarity based on shared history, common destiny, and the right to independent political community* (Young 2007, 246). The idea of a nation is closely linked to that of self-determination and the normative notion of popular sovereignty (Young 2007, 246). This concept also lends the state a level of legitimacy both domestically and internationally.

A. Nationalism: Highlighting Modernist Perspectives

Scholars of the modernist perspective often see Europe as the birthplace of nationalism (Crawford 2007, 246). Earlier understandings of nationalism are associated
with the rise of modernization in Europe (Smith 1995; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). The ideology that underlines processes of modernity and the birth of such nationalism trace their roots to late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Enlightenment period. European enlightenment perspectives upheld the ideals of reason and progress and a universalized notion of history, which links nationalism to the rise of modern democracy (Chatterjee 1986, 3). In his writings, Ernest Gellner sees modernity as having a distinct form of culture and social organization. He identities industrialization, as a distinct element of modernization, as a key factor in constructing the nation in Europe. As outlined by Enlightenment perspectives, industrialization set the stage for a “rational and objective approach to life” that demanded the reorganization of labor (Palmer 1998, 4). In other words, these economic and social forces brought by industrialization were prerequisites for nationalism.

According to Gellner, “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983, 1). This means that nationalism is found within the political boundaries of the state. Further affirming the congruency between an established state and nationalism, Gellner writes, “nationalism emerges only in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted” (Gellner 1983, 4). The process of industrialization, which underlines nationalism, is also coupled with the project of cultural homogeneity. Nationalized education system that appeals to a political unit as well as a “folk culture” that defines this particularized territory further give the nation platform for expression (Palmer 1998, 4). Gellner interestingly hints at the destructive nature of such nationalism project. He demystifies the myth that nationalism is the product of new units, constructed from the
“raw material of the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world” (Geller 1983, 48). Instead, nationalism is recognized as having an authoritarian and destructive nature that uproots previously established orders and traditions:

Nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society...It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves (Gellner 1983, 56).

Like Gellner, Benedict Anderson (1983) attributes the creation of a nation to another modernization moment: the rise of print capitalism. As the search for markets grew larger, the idea of print-as-commodity facilitated the formation of a distinct type of community and further accentuated the appearance of the state (Anderson 1991, 37). Anderson notes that by 1500, at least 20,000,000 books had been printed, allowing for the dissemination of greater print materials and knowledge in Europe (Anderson 1991, 37). What print-capitalism did, he asserts, is assemble the distinct “idiolects” of pre-print Europe into distinct territorial units (Anderson 1991, 43). Anderson argues that the print-languages laid the foundation for national consciousness in three distinct ways. First, print-as-commodity developed unified arenas of mass communication and exchange below Latin and above vernacular languages (Anderson 1991, 44). Anderson writes, “Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper” (Anderson 1991, 44). Connections with fellow-readers through print carved out the space for an imagined community. Second, a new “fixity to language” was created through print-capitalism; this fixity gave language an image of antiquity, critical in the idea and the subjective experience of a “nation”
rooted in time and space (Anderson 1991, 44). Third, a type of “languages-of-power” were created, as certain dialects become dominant in the final print forms while others failed to have their own form of print dissemination (Anderson 1991, 44). The three ways print capitalism facilitated the idea of a nation is underlined by the interplay between “fatality, technology, and capitalism” (Anderson 1991, 43).

Anderson proposes a more constructivist perspective to the nation as an “imagined political community” (Anderson 1983, 6). Although nationhood finds its expression within the confines of the state, he argues that a nation represents “cultural artifacts of a particular kind” (Anderson 1983, 4). A nation is *imagined* into existence through the rise of print capitalism, mass communications and literacy (Palmer 1998, 6). In addition, Anderson provides three characteristics of such imagined political community as limited, sovereign and consisting of a particularized community (Anderson 1983, 7). As Anderson notes, the nation is limited in that its imagination is not “coterminous with mankind” (Anderson 1983, 7). In other words, a nation is defined by a specific space and time that is finite and distinct to a given population. Second, this imagined political community is also sovereign; the nation is a product of the liberal thinking, which ruled out “divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” (Anderson 1983, 7). Unlike the previously established divine authority, the sovereign state is now endowed with freedom and equality in governing a religious, pluralist society. The third and most pertinent aspect of a nation is its distinction as a political community. Anderson conceives of the nation as reinstating a horizontal bond with those in the same political boundary (Anderson 1983, 7). Therefore, a sort of social contract that exists among citizens strengthens the imagination of a nation.
B. Nationalism: Critiquing the fields of invention and imagination

Gellner’s view of nationalism begins with the congruence of the political and national unit. He also asserts that industrialization, as key component of modernization, facilitated the process of nationalism in Europe. Furthermore, Gellner provides that “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner 1964, 169). Anderson critiques Gellner’s understanding of nationalism as its relation to the idea of “invention.” To Anderson, “invention” underlines nationalism that has a fictitious or fabricated undertone. Anderson writes, “Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation.’ In this way he implies that ‘true’ communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations” (Anderson 1983, 6). According to Anderson, all communities are the product of some sort of imagination. Therefore, “Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 1983, 6). Imagining the community as limited, as sovereign and as a political community yields the prototype of a nation.

Partha Chatterjee (1993) also provides a unique critique and a worthy question to consider in light of Anderson’s idea of an imagined political community. Considering the experiences of the postcolonial world, Chatterjee inquires: “If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain “modular” forms already made available to them by Europe and other Americas, what do they have left to imagine?” (Chatterjee 1993, 5). Chatterjee’s question deals with the ownership of history and the lack of agency in imagining an “authentic” nation. Chatterjee also takes issue
with the definition of the “nation” which draws from its nature as a political organization both in the writings of Gellner and Anderson. Chatterjee argues that: “anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains—the material and the spiritual” (Chatterjee 1993, 6). To him, nationalism inhabits both the spiritual and the material realm of social institutions. Chatterjee characterizes the spiritual realm as “an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity” (Chatterjee 1993, 6). These include areas such as language, literature, drama and the family that serve as legitimate spaces of sovereignty and agency (Chatterjee 1993, 6-7). The area of the material realm speaks to things such as the economy, statecraft, science and technology. These, Chatterjee argues, are characterized by Western dominance and superiority (Chatterjee 1993, 6). Through such distinctions, Chatterjee restores a sense of agency and authority over one’s own political and social history.

The question of authority and agency also arises in Chatterjee’s critique of Gellner’s work. Geller exposes the dynamic processes of nationalism that seem to flow from the imperatives of industrialism. There is also a process of interdigation, by which such “high culture” is woven into power structures both at the macro and micro levels. Despite the intriguing sociological look at nationalism via industrialization, Gellner fails to evaluate the question of “alien imposition” whereas this “high culture” is the product of an outside-imposed order (Chatterjee 1986, 6). One reason for this is Gellner’s focus on the European experience of nation-building. Chatterjee also provides another critique of Gellner’s ideas at the level of epistemology and political philosophy. According to
Chatterjee, Gellner’s evaluation of the creation of such “atomized individuals” and “impersonal society” is evaluated at the surface from a sociological perspective. As a scholar of subaltern identities, Chatterjee is well aware of the flow of dominant ideas that move both domestic and global history in hegemonic directions. Thus, this project of nationalism—with an “alien imposition” of a “high culture”—becomes a universal project in the hands of the dominant. In the post-colonial experience, the establishment of such paradigms set a ruling framework that cripples organic and free imaginations in the nation-building experience.

C. Nation-building and Nationalism: The African Context

“Modern European intellectual fashion not only decrees that a nation must have a past, it also demands that it have a future. Have faith in the historical progress of man, it preaches, and history will not let you down” (Chatterjee 1986, 9).

As Alexander (1990) notes, Eurocentric perspectives of the nation translated into hegemonic projects of constructing the nation in African states. In other words, a universalized framework of a nation, which draws its meaning from the rational and progressive ideas of the Enlightenment, came to define nationalism and underpins its imported caricature in the non-European world (Chatterjee 1986, 11). Speaking to the Sub-Saharan post-colonial African experience, Crawford notes that political agency is the product of the intertwined “selfhoods” of nationality, ethnicity and citizenship (Young 2007, 242). Although state boundaries were merely colonial constructs, African notion of nationalism is intimately attached to “created” territories--even if the state institutions prove dysfunctional or derelict (Young 2007, 241). To put Crawford’s assertion in the context of Anderson's “imagined community” concept, territory becomes the inherited, rather imposed, imaginative framework for nationhood and agency in Africa. In addition,
most secessionist claims and movements in Africa have been based on colonial territorial
designations and subdivisions (Young 2007, 244).

The building of a national identity among multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and
multi-religious communities continues to pose challenges for many African states. Basil
Davidson describes the curse of the nation-state as The Black Man’s Burden (Davidson
1992). Post-Independence era, the project of building the nation-state based on the
European model commenced with fervor. This political structure stood as the only route
toward real progress and a unit of development rooted in the ideas of modernization:
“modernization, as it at once appeared, had to mean the wholesale import of non-African
scenarios and solutions” (Davidson 1992, 199). For most of the African leaders, they
treated independence not as a time of departure but arrival: “Accepting the nation-state
that was offered to them, the pioneering nationalists saw no useful alternative and asked
no further questions about its credentials or potentials” (Davidson 1992, 168). Thus, the
new carved out national sovereignties accepted their fate without much retaliation at first.
However, the three strands that came to characterize the state--territorial inheritance and
awkwardness, illegal trade and inherent contradictions between dictatorship and
democracy—manifested themselves more evidently in the 1980s (Davidson 1992, 215).
The ecological context would also prove challenging as European practices of
exploitation and “development” took their toll on African bodies and livelihoods.

III. World Order

Robert Cox defines world order as a “historical structure” of global relations.
World order is characterized by three elements: ideas, institutions and material
capabilities. While intersubjective ideas point to the shared nature of social relations that
create meaning and reproduce certain habits and behavior, collective images of social order are the beliefs and perceptions held outside of the inner group and, thus, create different meanings and interpretations. Unlike intersubjective ideas that constitute shared foundations for social discourse, collective images bring forth rival ideas that hold potential for different trajectories to prevalent world orders. For Cox, then, justified by dominant ideas, institutions undergird and operationalize a particular set of human relations and world order; in this sense, they underscore power relations existing at the beginning (Samatar 2015). The political economic history of Europe and the United States can be characterized by three distinct periods: the liberal order of the late 19th and 20th century, embedded liberalism of the Keynesian era, and the neoliberal order of the contemporary world. These economic and social paradigms held both domestic and international policy implications in the colonized and the developing world.

A. The Liberal Creed

Although Gilbert Rist situates the problem of self-definition during the rise of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ rhetoric in the mid-20th century (Rist 2014), Polanyi’s The Great Transformation traces the problem to the early 19th century with the rise of the liberal creed. As a secular religion, the liberal creed launched to create a utopian world, undergirded by the following three tenets: a competitive labor market, the gold standard, and international free trade (Polanyi 1944, 141). Although laissez-faire was pursued as an end in of itself, the liberal creed also served as a “vehicle for destruction” (Polanyi 1944, 164). This secular faith demanded for the uprooting and annihilation of social and cultural institutions in order to make way for the functioning of the free-market. Later exported to the colonized world, this disorganization of society was evident among
English laboring class of the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Polanyi 1944, 165). By destroying the very institutions that gave reason to man’s existence, the liberal project took away the means for self-definition. In response to the liberal project, the countermovement emerged to reclaim the “self” through different groups, sections and classes. Polanyi insightfully notes that these collectivist measures were about \textit{social recognition} (Polanyi 1944, 160). Although the liberal creed defined itself as an economic project, the countermovement revealed otherwise; the struggle for maintaining organizations and institutions that were critical to the self-definition question retaliated against the reorganization of human and societal life by the liberal creed.

\textbf{B. Embedded Liberalism}

The immediate post-war period led to many problems predominantly facing the North. WWII left war-torn European countries in dire need for assistance and the United States, the only big power left standing, aided in the reconstruction process. The economic volatility wrought by the free-market, the problem of deflation and crisis around the gold standard called for a new global economic order—that of embedded liberalism. The crisis of the economic liberalism era lead to the protectionist policy of the welfare state that called for protective monetary policies that national policy autonomy (Ruggie 1982). After WWII, embedded liberalism became the dominant ideology that guided international monetary order. Putting aside the older practices of the gold standard popular among the classical liberals, proponents of embedded liberalism sought national autonomy through strengthened “adjustable exchange rates, international provision of balance-of-payments financing, and the endorsement of capital controls” (Helleiner 2003, 55).
The era of embedded liberalism, which Ruggie argues was underlined by a social purpose, posed the question of “self-definition” to newly independent countries. Political calculations of the United States, Britain and France were critical in informing monetary choices of Southern governments. For the newly decolonized world, the establishment of central banks signified more than a change in monetary policy. Central banks served the economic and social purpose of asserting political independence (Helleiner 2003, 68). In addition to controlling national monetary activity as well as promoting development plans directly, the various policies of embedded liberalism allowed for the state to serve as a site of development and protection. The state was to be led by “economic nationalist thinking that placed a high priority on the goal of state-led industrialization as a tool of nation-building” (Helleiner 2003, 62). Despite these protectionist policies and rhetoric of “national” independence, newly independent countries struggled to garner their economic autonomy and fully define themselves.

The challenge of self-definition was partly due to the geopolitical goals of the US as well as the policies of ex-colonial powers. Despite the British advising against the creation of central banks for the maintenance of colonial currency board, most Southern governments decided to establish a level of monetary and political autonomy. However, some Southern countries did not create national banks guided by domestic monetary objectives. This was a reality among ex-French colonies of West and Central Africa. France took harsh measures against countries that did not comply and remain within the CFA zone. Countries such as Guinea and Mali were given harsh ultimatums, facing a trade-off between central banks and level of economic autonomy and the loss of broad security, trade and aid (Helleiner 2003, 74). Threats of punishment served as obstacles for
economic self-definition. Further interrogating domestic politics, Helleiner also notes that conservative leaders headed the governments that remained under the CFA zone. These leaders held weaker nationalist ideologies and generally accepted France’s assimilation policies. The self-definition question was thus not only undermined by ex-colonizers and world powers; leaders who maintained their elite status and benefited from previous colonial social order also undermined the self-definition project.

C. Neo-Liberal Order

The era of embedded liberalism faced many crises that changed the direction of the international economic order. The problem of inflation in the United States, trade deficits, and the rigidity of business that stagnated competition advocated for the return of a more liberalized economy. The developing countries also faced high-inflated energy costs and mounting debt that limited their economic growth and capacity to pay off loans. Within the new era of the neoliberal order, the route to development is paved by liberalization and the unmediated integration into the world economy (Wade 2003, 630). As shown in the previous two eras, developing countries still struggle for complete economic self-definition in the neoliberal order. Through different multilateral and bilateral agreements between developed and developing countries, Wade evidences the continual undermining of economic self-definition. Writing particularly on the newly developed countries of East Asia, he documents their battle to dictate new kinds of industrial and technological policies when the world system favors the continual dominance of developed countries (Wade 2003, 622).

Wade also draws our attention to another critical problem—the problem of internal articulation. He writes, “One of the strangest silences of development thinking is the
silence about internal integration” (Wade 2003, 633). The liberal order of the early 20th century as well as neoliberal policies of today holds international integration as a key tenet. Developing countries are expected to play on the field of international economy without first fully addressing the problem of national integration or nation self-definition. This has further undermined their capacity to compete in the world market. Wade further argues that the internal articulation question must first be addressed in order to fully participate in the international economic order.

The historical and economic frontiers established by developed countries reveal the on-going struggles of developing countries to define themselves politically and economically. The case proves nuanced in the case of East Asian countries. The economic advancement narrative told by Amsden proposes a new model of development adopted by late industrializers. In almost all Third World countries, industrial output grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. The East Asian expansion, particularly that of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, pose a paradox for those seeking to understand economic growth and development. While conventional economists predicted that the economic development of these countries has been based on free-market ideology, other economists attributed economic growth to the growing role of governments. Furthermore, the reality of “lateness” brought these countries to think about adopting a different method of growth, one that is characterized by learning or borrowing foreign technology from developed countries (Amsden 1990, 11). How does development by learning differ from that of development based on invention and innovation? To answer this question, Amsden identifies four critical assets: Getting relative prices ‘wrong’, conglomerates or diversified business groups, strategic shop-floor focus and the use of cheap labour
(Amsden 1990, 12-14). The state has particularly used subsidies to get relative prices wrong. In return for these subsidies, the government employed disciplinary mechanisms to “tame” businesses to act in accordance with the goals of export-led economic growth. Although the economic growth of “late-developers” such as Taiwan and Korea are often showcased as success stories, their success is often measured by how far they have “caught up” with developed countries (Amsden 1990). Developed countries continue to set the metrics of success measurement, and developing countries still lack their own economic paradigms to define exactly what “success” and “failure” means. Through the writings of Polanyi, we see the shaping of world systems through the liberal creed that reorganizes human and social relations forever. Helleiner’s piece responds to Ruggie’s assertion of the social purpose underlying embedded liberalism. The story of central banks and Wade’s evaluation of bilateral and multilateral agreements provide vivid examples to the continual struggle of developing countries to achieve economic self-definition in the old and new era.

IV. Development

“Power always belongs to the one who can make himself the master of words” (Rist 2014, 78).

In general terms, development is understood as the mobilization of material and mental capital for the purposes of advancing human flourishing. The project of change and growth is thus situated in a perpetual struggle to improve the wellbeing of individuals. The phenomenon of underdevelopment is a relationship whereby the stronger exploits the other with minimal cost to improve its own society; in other words, development of the core is dependent on the exploitation of the periphery. The greatest example of the underdevelopment phenomenon is the colonial experience. Through the
extractive economies of the core states, regions in the periphery were underdeveloped. Under this process of underdevelopment, undevelopment is marked with a gap between the potential of the natural world and the output of held by the society; in other words, this is the problem of inert potential that needs to be cultivated. While undevelopment is marked with society in relation with itself, underdevelopment is when a society is in relation with an external force.

Offering a more politicized understanding of the terms “development” and “underdevelopment” Gilbert Rist situates the concept of underdevelopment in the post WWII period. In his inaugural address, President Truman laid out four points, three of which addressed the US’ stance in support of the United Nations Organization, future commitment in the reconstruction of Europe and the creation of joint defense action (NATO) against the Soviet (Rist 2014, 70). The fourth point, according to Rist, inaugurated what he called the “development age” and a new interpretation of history and progress (Rist 2014, 71). The first paragraph of the fourth point in the inauguration stated: “we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits for our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (quoted in Rist 2014, 70-71). Representing a synonym for “economically backward” areas, this was the first time the term became employed for a larger audience and for a wider circulation (Rist 2014, 72). It was no longer things developing and the fourth point made it possible to think of developing a whole region. This was also underlined by a power dynamic, as hegemonic forces would act on the other to make “development” a reality: “Thus ‘development’ took on a transitive meaning (an action performed by one agent upon another) which corresponded to a
principle of social organization, while ‘underdevelopment’ became a ‘naturally’ occurring (that is, seemingly causeless) state of things” (Rist 2014, 73). Beyond the semantic consequences, these commitments also shaped the ways one would view the geographies of the world. Contrary to the North-South relations structured on the colonizer/colonized dichotomy, the new ‘developed’/’underdeveloped’ division provided a new world paradigm.

The “condition” of underdevelopment was the incomplete form of development, a process in history of growth that had not reached the desired destination. Even though this process would be added by outside agents, development was thought of as primarily “an internal, self-generated, self-dynamizing phenomenon, even if it could be ‘assisted’ from outside” (Rist 2014, 74). What was the result of employing this kind of rhetoric for the United States? First, it yielded a vocabulary that would justify the process of decolonization and allow the United States to deploy “a new anti-colonial imperialism” (Rist 2014, 75). Secondly, it justified the need for intervention as one could not respond to extreme need with passivity. The developed/underdeveloped dichotomy also neglected to take into account socio-political processes of poverty; it neglected the consideration of history defining poverty in terms of lack rather than the result of historical circumstances. Finally, the fourth point instilled the hegemony of the United States; national statistics and GDP measurements gained their rightful place in the absolute measurement of development and poverty (Rist 2014, 76). Within the system established by the global hegemon, decolonized countries remained bound not in their political space but in their economic autonomy (Rist 2014, 79).
Despite the political, historical beginnings of the development project, several scholars offer a different method of conceptualizing development. Martha Nussbaum proposes a different theoretical framework with which to approach the project of development. The “Human Development” paradigm, otherwise known as capability or capabilities approach, assesses the real opportunities people have “to be” and “to do” (Nussbaum 2013, 4). Moving toward this approach puts into question issues of inequality and questions of what constitute a quality life—something GDP measurements fail to do. Also striving to merge the fields of economics and philosophy, this paradigm is founded on the conception of human dignity and the worth of a human life. As such, its gives an embedded interpretation of the economy as directly linked with that of other fields such as philosophy, history and gender studies (Nussbaum 2013, 14). This entitlement or rights of individuals’ capabilities calls for positive liberty: the obligation of the state or government to ensure the creation and preservation of these capabilities. As noted by Nussbaum, “a society that does not guarantee these to all its citizens, at some appropriate threshold level, falls short of being a fully just society, whatever its level of opulence” (Nussbaum 2013, 7). That being said, Nussbaum lists the ten capabilities identified: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reasons, affiliation, other specifies, play and control over one’s environment (both political and material) (Nussbaum 2013, 7). Nussbaum also address the problems of cultural universalism problematizing the human development approach. As a point of counter-argument, she proposes that the capabilities are laid out in an abstract way, ensuring their own contextualization through state-society relations (Nussbaum 2013, 7).
In light with the capabilities approach, Amartya Sen provides an understanding of development that links to the concept of freedom or unfreedom. Thus, development as freedom means thinking in terms of the capacity of individuals to “lead the kind of lives they value—and have reason to value” (Sen 1999, 18). Thus, overcoming the challenges of deprivation, oppression and destitution becomes part of the development project that strives to remove these unfreedoms. Sen further comments that the first step in countering contemporary problems of development is “to see individual freedom as a social commitment” (Sen 1999, xii). Rather than looking at the growth of a country’s GDP, industrialization or social modernization (all of which can expand human freedom) to define the arrival point of development, he argues that development has to be viewed “as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen 1999, 3). Thus, development means the removal or elimination of the sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states (Sen 1999, 3). Once these constraints are lifted and social opportunities instituted, Sen argues, “individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other” (Sen 1999, 11; 39-40).

Conventional ideas of development as a universal and a module project have failed to take note of dynamic historical, cultural and social dynamics shaping different societies; this has yielded detrimental effects on peoples’ way of life. The critique of conventional development has taken many evaluative forms, including the above capabilities or freedom approach. However, there has been little discussion on the links between ethnicity and development. The rise in intra-state conflicts globally brings
scholars to evaluate the repercussions of mainstream development as it relates to ethnic conflicts. Seeking to reconcile the concepts of development and ethnicity, Scholars such as Rodolfo Stavenhagen and Bjorn Hettne propose the theory of ethnodevelopment.

The Ethnodevelopment philosophy derives great inspiration from the alternative development paradigm. According to Stavenhagen, the idea behind ethnodevelopment entails: “an ethnie, whether indigenous, tribal, or any other, maintains control over its own land, resources, social organization, and culture” (Stavenhagen 1990, 90). This concept thus grants societies a level of agency to negotiate their own needs and demands with the state. Hettne further carries the conversation of ethnodevelopment, proposing that the “ethnic factor” needs to be given much attention and explored in light of development (Hettne 1990, 195). According to Hettne, ethnodevelopment is based upon four pivotal principles. These principles, proving compatible to ethnic peace, include cultural pluralism, internal self-determination, territorialism, and sustainability (Hettne 1996, 24).

As Hettne notes, conceptualization of culture from a pluralistic stance, rather than from a state-orientated hegemonic stance, acknowledges the diversity and the varying values and behavioral systems within the state (Hettne 1996, 24). In a concrete and practical sense, “It grants to the subnational cultural groups the right to use their own language, practice their religions and to carry out cultural practices forming part of their identity and socialization process” (Hettne 1996, 25). Key to the idea of cultural pluralism also entails the “indigenization of development” (Hettne 1990, 75). This refers to the process by which “ideas and institutions are more or less radically modified by the receivers to suit their own specific situation” (Hettne 1990, 74). In other words, local
knowledge because part of the development work approach. The ethnodevelopment framework, through the concept of cultural pluralism, lends ethnic minorities and indigenous communities a level of agency that recognizes their voice in the negotiation process.

The idea of cultural pluralism constitutes the first step to understand the different conceptions of development as specified by various groups within the state (Hettne 1996, 30). These specificities and needs are thus articulated and further implemented through the political means of ethnodevelopment’s second pillar: internal self-determination. The idea of territorialism upholds these essential culture-specific needs as it pertains to an ethnie’s connection to a particular place or habitat (Hettne 1996, 30). Further elaborated upon by Mario Blaser, the idea of territorialism converges with vertical threads that constitute one-component life projects. Vertical threads of life projects recognize the importance of place-based history and memory that of a particular community’s way of life (Blaser 2004, 31). Hettne also rightly emphasizes the need for regionalism, critical in fighting “global forces of homogenization and ethnocide” (Hettne 1996, 30). I view the idea of regionalism as that encompassing the vision of a horizontal thread, of recognizing the translocality and spatiality of life projects (Blaser 2004, 31). Regionalism, Hettne argues, provides the larger framework to garner and implement tenants of ethnodevelopment (Hettne 1996, 30). Translocality offers not only a sense of protection but also a way of sharing knowledge and wisdom that broadens development perspectives.
Chapter III: Basic Information

I. Physical Geography

The country of Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa bordered on the east by Somalia and Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north and Kenya to the south. It is a land locked country with an area of approximately 435,186 sq. miles. Its area is slightly less than twice the size of Texas. The country is marked with distinct and diverse topographic zones. Among the Ethiopian highlands and rugged mountains, Ras Dashan stands as its highest peak at 15,158 feet. The northern highlands are covered with hills and mountains that are flat-topped called amba (Markakis 2011, 24). The Somali Plateau is located just east of the Great Rift Valley and covers the southeastern section of Ethiopia. The Danakil Desert to the north reaches to the Red Sea and the country of Eritrea. Numerous river valleys criss-cross the highlands and on a larger scale and are divided by the Rift Valley running in a northeast-southwest direction (Zewde 1991, 2). The Rift Valley cuts across parts of East Africa including the countries of Kenya and Tanzania (Zewde 1991, 2). Other parts of Ethiopia’s highlands include the smaller southeastern highlands of Bale, Harar, Arsi and Sidamo; this subsides into the lowlands where the Oromo and the Somali people reside (Zewde 1991, 2).

There are four major water systems that water the country. The first three rivers, Takkaze (Atbara), the Abbay (the Blue Nile) and Baro (Sobat in Sudan), flow westward into the Nile River. Lake Tana, located in the northwest region of Ethiopia, is the chief source of the Abbay River. The second group consists of Ganale and Wabe Shabale flowing toward the Indian Ocean. The Gibe River begins and ends in the south-western

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1Greek in origin, the term “Ethiopia” was used as a general designation to describe the African landmass south of Egypt in classical times (Zewde 1991: 1).
highlands while the Awash sets off from the highlands west of the capital into the northeastern sands (Zewde 1991, 2). The Awash River is the only river that flows eastward in the country (Markakis 2011, 24).

The southwest region of Ethiopia gets the heaviest dose of rain, due to the southwesterly nature of the wind movement (Zewde 1991, 4). This has resulted in a “dense concentration of tropical broad-leaf forests” (Zewde 1991, 4). Despite the prevalence of deforestation, this area still accounts for 65 % of the country’s forest reserves. This region has also served as the primary bases for tradable goods, such as elephant tusk and coffee. In the northern region, intense human activity to sustain increasing human and animal population has led to cultivation practices that degraded the land (Markakis 2011, 26). Furthermore, the need for firewood, fencing and materials for building have resulted in deforestation in the northern and central parts of Ethiopia (Zewde 1991, 4).

II. Political Geography

Ethiopia is defined by nine regional states and the two largest cities, in terms of population, are the chartered cities of Addis Ababa (3,273,000) and Nazret (324,000), the latter a robust transportation center and capital city of the Oromia regional state. Dire Dawa stands as the industrial center of the country with several key markets. The city of Mekele, located in the Tigray region, is Ethiopia’s principal economic and educational locale.

III. Social Geography

The Abyssinian highlanders remain the oldest group with a long record of long-lasting occupation and cultivation in the Horn of Africa (Markakis 2011, 25-26). Ethiopia
is home to a population of 91.73 million people, the second most populous country on the continent, after Nigeria. Ethiopia is composed of about 77 ethnic groups. The Oromo ethnic group, who live mostly in the southern highland periphery, make up approximately 40% of the population. Approximately 32% of the population is made of the Amhara and Tigrean ethnic groups and trace their roots to the ancient Abyssinian kingdom. The Sidamo people, representing 9% of the population, are situated in the southern foothills and savanna regions. Inhabiting the arid regions of the east and southeast are the Somalis and the Afars, making up 6% and 4% of the population approximately. While the Gurage make up 2% of the population, other people groups make up the remaining 1% of the population.

According to Ethiopia’s Demographic Profile in 2014, about 43% of Ethiopians were reported as Orthodox Christians. Close to 34% of the population is reported to practice Islam, mostly situated in the regions of Oromia, Somali and Afar. Evangelical or Pentecostal Protestants make up about 20% of the population; Pentecostal Christianity is also the fastest growing religion in modern day Ethiopia. 2.6% of the population is reported as practicing traditional religions. The Falashas of Ethiopia practice a form of Judaism that traces its roots to ancient Arabian-Jewish or Egyptian-Jewish immigration; many of these individuals have suffered persecution and claim immigration to Israel.

IV. Economy

Since the installment of the current EPRDF regime, the Ethiopian economy has progressively liberalized, although land remains in the hands of the government. 85% of the Ethiopian population is engaged in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. Within the agricultural sector, several commodities are produced: maize, sorghum, millet, other
cereals (barley, wheat, teff), tubers, and sugar cane. Coffee, chat, gold, leather products, and oilseeds are the country's largest exports. The manufacturing sector is largely centered in the city of Addis Ababa, with over 90% of large-scale industry owned by the state. While natural gas is found in the Ogaden region, other undeveloped natural resources, such as platinum, marble and copper, are also present. The Ethiopian economy has suffered from a “yoyo effect” of GDP growth due to weather patterns, drought and the dictates of international market.
Chapter IV: Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913)

I. Introduction

The current boundaries of the Ethiopian state were formed under the leadership of Menelik II, the founding father of modern-day Ethiopia (Crummey 2000, 215). Previously the King of Shewa (1866-1889), by the turn of the century, he consolidated power to secure Ethiopia’s territorial sovereignty. During the 19th century, the area currently known as Ethiopia held a number of feudal nobilities, kingdoms and principalities (Hiwet 1975, 1). Following the end of Zemene Mesafint (Era of Princes), the need for a centralized state apparatus, with greater functional and territorial reach, became apparent (Hiwet 1975, 1).

This chapter seeks to locate Ethiopia’s state-building project under his leadership. It also situates this project in the historical, colonial endeavors taking place in the Horn of Africa. Although the militarization and mobilization of the center was essential in guaranteeing Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, the internal expansion that accompanied these self-strengthening reforms were consequential. In particular, it forever changed how the center related to the populations in the periphery, thereby planting the seeds of future centrifugal challenges to the Ethiopian state. The system of taxation, the gult land-allocation and the practice of slave trade were all crucial in building a state-apparatus that not only reinstated power at the centre but also marginalized conquered peoples in the periphery. This chapter will narrate state-building in the country through the interrelated processes of war-making, state-building, extraction and protection as expounded upon through the predatory theory. Drawing on the work of Polanyi, this discussion will also be supplemented by the social and cultural transformations that occupy national...
articulation. Abyssinian political and cultural domination was critical in the making of the Ethiopian “nation-state.” This chapter thus traces both external and internal dynamics that led to the Ethiopian state development.

II. European Imperialism in the Horn

The northern highlands of Ethiopia, consisting of the majority Amhara and Tigre ethnic groups, were known by European travelers as Abyssinia as early as the sixteenth century. The ancient territory of the Abyssinian kingdom comprised the current provinces of Tigre, Begemder, Gojjam, and part of Shoa and Wollo (Cohen & Weintraub 1975, 11). In the Southern and southwestern regions of Ethiopia, a number of people groups and Oromo kingdoms persisted with varying levels of political and social organization and evolution (Hiwet 1975, 1). These 19th century political and social organizations ranged from “primitive communal societies to states with powerful kings and elaborate mechanisms for the exercise of authority” (Zewde 1991, 16). Today’s provinces of Wollega, Hararge, Gemu Gotta, Bale, Arussi, Illubabor, Kaffa, and Sidamo, as well as parts of Shoa and Wollo were incorporated into the larger Abyssinian kingdom, constituting what is today the boundaries of the Ethiopian state (Cohen & Weintraub 1975, 11). This internal consolidation and expansion took place in parallel with European colonial expansion in the region.

Imperial contention for raw materials and resources began in earnest in the Horn with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Markakis 2011, 94). In the late 19th century, laissez-faire capitalism of the industrial revolution underwent a transformation to monopoly capitalism by which trade was controlled or concentrated in the hands of few individuals (Hiwet 1975, 2). This new phase of capitalism involved rapid accumulation,
centralization and internationalization of capital, destruction of the “petty manufacturer,” and the rise of the stock exchange through the increase in the activities of companies, cartels and trusts (Hiwet 1975, 2). This period of capitalist globalization marked the “big thinking” and performative nature of the free-market economy--of moving from “small scale petty commerce of imagined “tradition” to large-scale manufacturing” (Tsing 2009, 154). The greater need for cheap, raw materials and agricultural produce, which called for a “bigness of production,” drove the scramble for colonies by European powers (Hiwet 1975, 2 & Tsing 2009, 154).

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed European imperialism and the international capitalist economy at Ethiopia’s frontiers (Crummey 2000, 226). This new era marks the critical moment of European intervention for territorial and economic gains that will transform the political economy and state-consolidation processes of the Ethiopian state-in-the-making. In particular, this will influence Menelik’s decision for southern expansion and conquest of southern peoples and regions. Although European interests in the region were multifaceted, the main driver of European scramble in the region was economic (Zewde 1991, 24). African markets were sought after to deal with the excessive production of industrial goods as the result of the industrial revolution in Europe (Zewde 1991, 24). In particular, Britain, France and Italy were all determined to seize raw goods and materials from the Horn (Markakis 2011, 94).

European powers facilitated this process of extraction through the introduction of a certain type of state structure. They introduced centralized, state infrastructures in their colonies and relied on taxation and commerce to generate revenue (Crummey 2000, 227). To the west, the British controlled the Sudan; to the south, Kenya; and, to the northeast,
Somaliland (Crummey 2000, 226). Although the control of the headwaters of the Nile was the principal driver of British colonial policy in the region (i.e. Lake Victoria and Uganda), the British also pursued trade along the Baro from the Ethiopian port of Gambella (Crummey 2000, 226). This changed the political economy of the region, leading to parts of western and southwestern Ethiopia to become highly commercialized; due to such changes, the province of Wallaga, in particular, rose in economic importance (Crummey 2000, 227). This part of Ethiopia, a fertile ground for the supply of highly demanded international products, would prove essential in filling the coffers of the central state treasury under the emperor’s control. Through their skilled diplomacy, the French influenced the court of Menelik II: winning a concession to build a railroad linking the city of Addis Ababa to Djibouti (Crummey 2000, 226-227). Starting in 1917 and following the next five decades, the railroad served as Ethiopia's main source of commercial trade and influence (Crummey 2000, 228). As Polanyi rightly notes, the commercialization of soil to meet international demands for trade facilitate internal articulation, as shown through the Ethiopian state-in-the-making.

Although the three imperial powers had competing objectives for colonization, they were open to the possibility of joint action, as evidenced by the Tripartite Agreement signed by the three colonial powers (Crummey 2000, 226-227). Britain's interest in the Nile Basin and France’s desire to control the railway zone were defined clearly (Zewde 1991, 150-151). Although Italy’s intentions were shrouded with vague language, the country took the largest claim amongst the other colonial powers: northern region (Eritrea) and south-eastern region of Ethiopia (Somaliland). These European colonial encroachments posed existential threats and Ethiopia therefore expanded the effective
frontiers of the state to establish a buffer zone designed to protect the central and northern highlands. This process of incorporation of the periphery into the larger Abyssinian kingdom was thus occurring alongside European economic and territorial expansion in the region.

**III. Territorial and Cultural Expansion**

The acquisition of military aid from external actors, facilitated through deft diplomatic maneuvering, was instrumental in the consolidation of the boundary of the modern Ethiopian state. Congruent with the Tillyan perspective, territorial expansion also entailed securing resources that proved essential in building the Ethiopian state. As European powers intensified their colonial assaults in the territories of the Horn, Menelik II was aware that Ethiopia could also fall prey to colonization. He warned, “If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator” (quoted in Hiwet 1975, 6). As the only ruling province excluded from the civil wars of the Era of Princes, the Shawan dynasty seized the power basis and eventually imperial throne (Markakis 2011, 90). Menelik II began his expansion project as a vassal of Emperor Yohannes and followed a pattern of territorial expansion that marked the Shawan dynasty (Zewde 1991, 60). The mid-nineteenth century saw the great expedition of Menelik II and his Abyssinian counterparts to incorporate peripheral lands into the core Abyssinian empire. This brought conquered territories into the political economy of the Ethiopian state-in-the-making and began the imposition of the high culture of the northern Abyssinian kingdom on conquered territories (Markakis 2011, 98).
A strategic calculation went into conquering the lands in the periphery; incorporated territories were integrated through different methods and to varying degrees. This was based on the different levels of threat and benefits to political and economic state-consolidation. Forms of incorporation were judged based on categories such as religion, structure of indigenous subsistence production, ability to produce internationally tradable goods, and the territories strategic importance to the imperial state (Clapham 2002, 13). Of these, Zewde notes that the desire to control long-distance trade was probably the most important consideration (Zewde 1991, 60). These motives prompted Gojamites and the Shewan forces to secure the Oromo Gibe region: “the green and lush Oromo lands and their boundless commodities (gold, civet, ivory, coffee) and the prosperous markets of Assenedbo (whose population swelled to 100,000 on market days), Embabo, Jimma and Billo” (Hiwet 1975, 4).

The victory at the Battle of Embabo (1882) marked a critical moment for Menelik II to begin articulating the boundaries of the Ethiopian state internally and externally. He recognized the “external implications of his internal expansion” in light of the scramble for Africa that would take place shortly after (Zewde 1991, 61 & Hiwet 1975, 6). A month after his expedition in the South, he pronounced to the European world: “I am happy to be able to tell you that a long and hard campaign of seven months against the kingdoms...lying to the south and west of my dominions and masters of the route from Shewa to Kefa, has just permitted me to subject and render tributary the kings of Limmu, Gomma, Guma, Gera, and the Christian king of Kafa” (quoted in Hiwet 1975, 6). His announcement to European powers confirmed the fixed borders of the Ethiopian state-in-the-making.
The Battle of Embabo made the south-west region vulnerable to Abyssinian conquest (Zewde 1991, 62). In this process of internal expansion and consolidation of central authority, Menelik eliminated enemies who resisted his rule or neutralized his enemies by integrating them into the empire-building project. The Oromo rulers Kumsa Moroda (later dajjazmach, and baptised Gabra-Egziabher) of Leqa Naqamte, Jote Tullu (also made dajjazmach) of Leqa Qellam, Abba Jifar II of Jimma, and the rulers of the other Gibe river states, such as Illubabor, further to the west surrendered to Menelik with “little to no resistance” (Zewde 1991, 62). The conquest of south-west Oromo region not only signified territorial expansion and consolidation for the Emperor but also allowed the Emperor to secure economic gain that would strengthen his political and military power (Zewde 1991, 62). In the Southern plateau, Shoan forces met fierce resistance from the Arsi Oromo. Arsi leaders Suffa Kuso and Damu Usu were willing to accept the offer of internal autonomy in return for the acknowledgement of Menelik’s suzerainty. However, the other clan chiefs and elders remained resistant to this exchange, offering levies from different clans in the region to muster an army against Menelik’s men (Zewde 1991, 62). Although the fight marked an unequal struggle between arrows and firearms, the battles between Menelik’s army and Arsi fighters lasted for four years. The final conquest of Arsi opened the way for the seizing of the city-state and commercial center of Harar in 1887 (Markakis 2011, 90).

As the incursion into Harar needed more sophisticated planning than the battle at Embabo, Menelik dispatched one of his spies, Asme Giyorgis, to secure inside information needed for the attack. In his assessment of European state formation, Tilly emphasizes the establishment of surveillance systems and forms of guaranteeing control
as key in the state building process. Disguised as a Muslim merchant, Asme collected data for three months on the city-state ranging from its “cultural life, economic conditions, number of dwellings, composition and size of population” (Hiwet 1975, 7). Menelik made a rationale for conquest, relaying to Italy a proposal for their co-scramble for Southern territories: “Italy was to occupy Zeila and Berbera, and Minilik was to occupy Harar” (Hiwet 1975, 8). Two months later, he expressed his intentions of annexing all of the territory mentioned above (Hiwet 1975, 8). Menelik led his men of 20,000 against the emir of Harar, commanding no more than 4,000 men. The victory at the Battle of Chelenqo, January 6, 1887, marked the opening of Harar to the exploitive Shewan domination. After securing the imperial throne in 1889, Menelik commanded forces from other Christian provinces to continue his Southward expansion. This was briefly checked by the Italian invasion from the north, which resulted in the Battle of Adwa (1896).

Through methods of forced incorporation and concessions, land in the periphery became articulated into the larger Abyssinian kingdom. Territorial expansionism was embedded within the tripartite process of what Donham (1986, 11) calls Abyssinianization: rist land-tenure system, the establishment of Amharic as a dominant language and the proliferation and expansion of the Orthodox Christian Church. The latter two were critical in sustaining the cultural and political hegemony of the Abyssinian kingdom and the religious traditions of the northern, Semitic-speaking peoples while the previous instigated the systematic practice of extraction. The “Great Tradition” of the Abyssinian kingdom, as it expanded southward, defined the national history of Ethiopia at the cost of the historical, social and economic subjugation of
colonized areas. The set of Abyssinian ideologies and attitudes, coupled with the Orthodox religious institution and the Amharic language, served a self-legitimizing purpose that defined the northern peoples as more civilized than their southern neighbors (Clapham 2002, 11). Having their cultures and traditions condemned to second class status, conquered peoples in the south could only enter into the political and social life of the defined Ethiopian state through adopting the lingua franca of Menelik’s empire and through conversion to Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity (Marcus 1995, 2). Furthermore, the Emperor used the method of name changes to Amharic to reinforce Abyssinian hegemony. This forced an identity on conquered peoples that would erase their historical lineage and cultural traditions. Their collective lives would now become narrated through the ‘greater’ Ethiopian ‘national’ narrative that was only defined by Abyssinian customs and traditions.

IV. Militarization and Internal Legitimacy

Territorial and cultural expansion gave Menelik and his men the means to engage in external war making. In the Tillyan typology, war-making involves the capacity to fight against outside intruders by securing a monopoly over the means of coercion. In the Ethiopia case, this process was facilitated by Menelik II’s keen ability to secure modern weaponry from European powers. By playing the colonizing powers against each other, Abyssinian leaders secured modern weaponry and ammunition (Markakis 2011, 92). Against Britain's arms embargo imposed on Ethiopia, France and Italy allowed Menelik to secure sophisticated firearms. Ironically, the same rifles and fieldpieces Italy granted to the Abyssinians as a sign of cordial friendship would later be used against them at the battlefield of Adwa (1896). During the Battle of Adwa, the Ethiopian force of 100,000
annihilated Italy’s army of 20,000 (Hiwet 1975, 12). Among Ethiopia’s 100,000 men, “80,000 were armed with rifles, while there were nearly 9,000 cavalry as well as 42 artillery and machine-gun batteries” (Hiwet 1975, 12). The rest of the men carried all types of weaponry, ranging from swords and lances to spears (Hiwet 1975, 12), equipped by all possible means to ward off Italian intrusion. The fight put up by the Ethiopians was no “primitive” warfare but the result of state building: “Unlike the rest of the continent, European imperialism met its match in this corner of Africa” (Markakis 2011, 3).

The building of an Ethiopian army was precipitated by the precarious security threat posed by imperial powers: “By the turn of the twentieth century, Menelik’s army consisted of approximately six hundred thousand riflemen and innumerable traditionally armed warriors” (quoted in Keller 1988, 37). Before securing the throne as emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik also invited foreign officials, mostly French and Russians, to instruct Ethiopian soldiers in the use of modern weaponry (Keller 1988, 37). During his rule, Menelik introduced two dominant features that contributed to the state-making process: a standing army and salary payment for soldiers (quoted in Keller 1988, 38). Despite the efforts of the emperor to professionalize the army in lieu of European military organization and strategies, many traditional patterns and organizations persisted (Keller 1988, 38).

Congruent with Tilly’s core logic, this organizational feature of the Ethiopian-state-in-the making was critical in eliminating a powerful external enemy. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s relations with European powers during the time of Africa’s colonization and its victory over Italy planted seeds of legitimization for Ethiopia’s state-formation process. As Clapham (2002, 11) rightly notes, Ethiopia benefited from the “the norm of
sovereignty” and gained a level of recognition for statehood through displaying its ability to secure modern weaponry (Clapham 2002, 11). In other words, the emperor’s ability to negotiate with European powers articulated the state to outside powers and thus, legitimated the notion of fixed Ethiopian borders. Furthermore, there was a racial dimension to the battle that gave the victory at Adwa great significance: “It was a victory of blacks over whites” (Zewde 1991, 81). As Ethiopia symbolized hope and independence, Blacks all over the world rallied around this victory and gained great inspiration to fight against white domination. The Ethiopian state gained a level of legitimacy through such Black solidarity. In addition, the Addis Ababa Treaty, signed after the Battle of Adwa, affirmed Ethiopia’s independence and territorial sovereignty. Through the treaty, the northern frontiers of Menelik’s empire were clearly defined (Hiwet 1975, 12), but Ethiopia lost access to the sea through the creation of the colonial state of Eritrea (Crummey 2000, 226).

Although the victory at Adwa guaranteed a level of international recognition and legitimacy, Menelik II had to think about how to further secure and stabilize his rule. In the Tillyan perspective, protection involves securing allies internally and providing protection for domestic players and chief supporters of the empire; this facilitates the guaranteeing of internal legitimacy. Similar to the European experience of local magnate installment to rule different provinces, the Ethiopian example, in particular, confirm the important role of indirect rulers in state-consolidation. In Ethiopia, indirect rulers who occupied intermediate positions were crucial in securing abyssinian power in the periphery. While assimilating to the dominant culture of the abyssinians, local balabbats (indigenous elites who were subordinate to the lowest neftegna) served as social bridges
linking the imperial state to local inhabitants (Crummey 2000, 225). They proved crucial in the extraction process and transferring of capital to the centre and provided a protected provincial ruling structure: “Rulers of empires generally sought to co-opt regional and local powerholders without utterly transforming their bases of power, and to create a distinctive corps of royal servants...whose fate depended on that of the crown” (quoted in Markakis 2011, 110) They carried out functions of the state such as “maintaining law and order, reporting crimes and apprehending perpetrators, hearing disputes and administering traditional justice, as well as assessing and collecting taxes.” (Markakis 2011, 110) Furthermore, the balabbats were rewarded and transformed to a land-owning class themselves; they also usually retained a tenth of the state tax (Markakis 2011, 110). This allowed them to secure a higher status in the newly engineered socio-economic hierarchy (Markakis 1973, 364).

For some, submission to Abyssinian powers led to “assimilation into the Abyssinian ruling class, and even links with the royal household” (Markakis 2011, 95). In regions such as Wellegga and Tigray, marriage with the imperial family provided the linkage of indigenous rulers to the imperial family. Places like Jimma, which held vast Muslim population, were excluded from marriage prospects (Clapham 2002, 13). The political nature of marriage prospects signals the cultural and social landscape that underlined Abyssinian cultural and religious domination. Menelik used both indigenous intermediaries and transplanted Abyssinians to rule the incorporated territories (Markakis 2011, 4). Amhara and Tigrean naftannas, the Orthodox church and balabbats (subjected themselves to political and cultural assimilation) aided in the development of the Ethiopian “nation” defined under predominantly Amhara hegemony (Marcus 1995, 2).
The particular use of armed retainers and churchmen by the Ethiopian state echoes that of the European experience.

V. Taxation, the Gult System and Slave Trade

A key component of the process of state-formation is the process of extraction or capital accumulation. Extraction allows the leaders to garner human and material capital to further guarantee a centralized state apparatus. In Ethiopia’s state-building process, this is evident in the areas of taxation and law. In the 1890s, Menelik II instituted several national levies, i.e. the agricultural tithe, and constructed a centralized department of taxation for revenue collection throughout the regions: “No longer could provincial administrators arbitrarily forward the minimum acceptable amount to Addis Ababa; they had now to justify their receipts and render a full accounting” (Marcus 1995, 3). Taxes were commonly levied after conquering a particular land and in preparation for an upcoming external war. After securing the city-state of Harrar, for example, the emperor imposed a compensation cost of 10,000 Maria Tereza dollars to be collected from each gate of Harar (Hiwet 1975, 8). In the fight against Italy in the late 19th century, the emperor would impose a special tax to pay for the importation of 100,000 carbines (Markakis 2011, 92). Taxation was also purposed to build a national economy that linked the centralized, state apparatus to the social and commercial developments of provincial hamlets (Marcus 1995, 3). Based on the Tillyan account, taxation is also crucial in channeling peasant production into the international market.

After the subjugation of the Southern region of Ethiopia, the building of the Ethiopian empire was further facilitated through the importation of the gult land system. This system entailed “the parceling out of the conquered lands and peoples in tributary
relationships to the groups and individuals who conquered them” (Crummey 2000, 229). This land tenure policy primarily functioned to reward or to support Menelik’s military forces. To exploit the resources of the conquered lands remained a priority, as it proved the only way to pay the soldiery and to maintain the imperial treasury (Markakis 2011, 97). Military garrisons or rifleman, named naftannas, were crucial in keeping peace and security within the newly colonized spaces. The “ethos” of the gult system became for Menelik's men “to eat” the land (quoted in Markakis 2011, 97). The new garrisons that occupied the south were supported through the tributary relationship between the new settlers and the gebbars (Crummey 2000, 223). Furthermore, the rank of the garrisons determined the number of gebbars they received; while a commander might receive a hundred, a private might get less than five (Crummey 2000, 223). Through such economic exploitation and social stratification, the Abyssinian rulers defined their upper class status and secured their rule in the periphery.

The presence of ketemas (garrison towns) also became crucial for the greater security of the Imperial authority within the provincial regions. These garrison towns were erected throughout Ethiopia’s vast territory but were most apparent in the southern regions (Keller 1988, 39). Menelik dispatched his “watchmen” or soldiers for the administration of conquered territories and to mitigate any uprisings in the regions (Keller 1988, 39). Where these men were present, they also worked to reinforce Abyssinian cultural hegemony. Compared with the naftannas, “The subject peoples in the empire were generally seen as primitive, without culture or effective government, and lazy, dirty, and warlike: they were naked or dressed in skins; they were heathen who needed the word of God” (Marcus 1975, 193). If a particular soldier had an offspring by a
southern woman, the northern wife would often adopt the child into her household to raise him in Abyssinian culture (Marcus 1975, 194). As part of this assimilation process, the status of an Oromo woman was enhanced through becoming mistresses for a northerner (Marcus 1975, 194). These, among many, serve as examples by which Abyssinian culture instated its hegemony, relegating all other peoples are subordinate and backwards.

Further, the military garrisons played a central role in developing Ethiopia’s centralized state apparatus and bureaucratic authority. Trusted generals were given important posts such as governor-general of different provinces (Keller 1988, 38). The installment of these men proved crucial in securing successful submission of new territories. This would later prove a challenge as the presence of naftannas “blocked the state access to local tribute and the producers’ access to economic opportunity” (Crummey 2000, 229). In other words, the naftannas often failed to pass on the large majority of the tributes received from their tributaries, thereby blocking the transfer of wealth to the imperial state (Crummey 2000, 224). Consequently, the state pursued its own land-owning objectives through the measurement of land under the qalad (rope) system. This made the state not only a distributor of land but also a major claimant in the process of land allocation. Congruent with Tilly’s thesis, practices of revenue collection and the gult land-tenure system functioned as extractive mechanisms that facilitated the building of a more centralized, Ethiopian state.

With the naftanna-gebbar system, members of the conquered people became tillers and servants on their own land. They were forced to surrender their production to the soldiers, the Crown and The Ethiopian Orthodox Church (Lata 1999, 156). Although
the gult system did persist in the northern highlands previously, the system reflected a new socio-economic dimensions that evidenced “subordination and inferiority of status” in the conquered regions (Crummey 2000, 223). The nature of the gult system was also transformed, particularly in the southern regions, through the introduction of the railroad in 1917. Certain commodities drove the commercial exports from the highlands: skins, hides and coffee. While skin and hides were the products of Ethiopia’s agrarian and pastoral society, the second was key in allotting new value and importance to land. As Crummey writes, “[Coffee] gave new value to land and reinforced efforts by the state to break down the social relations which it had, itself, originally put in place” (Crummey 2000, 230). This confirms Polanyi's discussion on the social and cultural transformations produced by the free-market system. In places such as Sidamo, Gedeo and Wallaga, coffee growing increased rapidly. Gult was particularly converted from “direct appropriation of labor toward tribute based on agricultural production” (Crummey 2000, 230). The railroad itself was also a great force of change. More lands were brought into the Ethiopian empire and the holders of the lands now got the opportunities to grow and to export coffee, becoming part of the larger economy of the Ethiopian empire and the global market. For the first time in the history of Ethiopia, western manufactured products were also made available through the railroad. This gave new value to cash that previously did not exist (Crummey 2000, 230)

Another common form of extraction during this period was Ethiopia’s involvement in the slave trade. Menelik is noted in history as “Ethiopia’s greatest slave entrepreneur” (Marcus 1995, 73). Menelik and his wife reportedly owned 70,000 slaves (Markakis 2011, 97). This was also common among some of the indigenous elites who
served as intermediaries on behalf of the state. Aba Jiffar of Jimma reportedly had 10,000 slaves (Markakis 2011, 97). Menelik led slaving expeditions (razzia) around the conquered areas. His heir presumptive, Lij Yasu, forcefully dragged about 40,000 Dizi slaves to the city of Addis Ababa; almost half did not make the journey alive (Zewde 1991, 93). Both goods from the south-west and slaves were used for exchange to garner modern weapons (Marcus 1995, 73).

The practices of extraction were key in processes of power consolidation by the Abyssinian empire. This occurred through political, economic and social processes that were embedded in practice. The cultural and economic landscape was transformed through an extractive economy that formed hegemonic institutions that dictated social class formations. Subordination, cultural annihilation and poverty became the products of policies pursued in the southern regions (Crummey 2000, 225). The superimposition of a supposedly high Abyssinian culture with its “Amharic speech, Christian religion, distinctive dress, and a refined cuisine” displaced the historical and social roots of its inhabitants (Crummey 2000, 225). Land alienation and dispossession not only created divisions that intensified ethnic and religious differences. They also created class divisions and social hierarchies based on property ownership and cultural superiority. Practice of the gult land-tenure system and Ethiopia’s slave trade rightly characterize the commodification of man and nature. This occurred within the larger framework of a capitalist, exploitative economy brought upon by European imperialism in the region. This also affected the cultural political economy of the Ethiopian state in the making, leading to the internal colonial practices of the Abyssinian counterparts.
VI. Education and Centralization

Tilly notes that the building of educational institutions served to solidify state infrastructure. This is particularly shown in the modernizing adventures of Menelik II. The Emperor strived to modernize the state through the expansion of education. This provided further support for strengthening the country’s knowledge economy and undertake the process of modernization. The intensified relations with Europe after the Battle of Adwa in 1896 provided more educational opportunities for Ethiopians (Zewde 1991, 103). The new intelligentsia, with French as its new lingua franca, proved critical for the expanded state infrastructure: “The expansion of the state apparatus...made the training of a cadre of officials imperative” (Zewde 1991, 104). Some of these educated men would later serve as radical voices for the marginalized communities of the Ethiopian state (Zewde 1991, 104). Missionaries sponsored most of the first educated Ethiopians; men such as Kantiba (Mayor) Gabru Dasta of Gondar region and Onesimus Nasib of Wallaga, served their respective peoples through increasing literacy and educational opportunities. Education was also a site of struggle for the state seeking to balance both elements of tradition and modernity. This is evidenced through the introduction of Menelik II School in 1908. The staff was made up of Egyptians of the Orthodox Coptic Christian Church: “It was felt that the Copts would filter down to their pupils a tempered version of modern ideas” (Zewde 1991, 108). The ministry of education, although it did not function as an independent entity, developed alongside the office of the archbishop (Zewde 1991, 109). Modern education provided both skilled individuals for the state apparatus and facilitated the “dissemination of ideas and change”
The place of the Church in educational institutions was also a way to sustain Abyssinian religious tradition.

According to Tilly’s argument, war-making and the processes of extraction and protection facilitates institutional development and centralization. In 1907, Menelik announced his consideration to create cabinet members to the outside world (Keller 1988, 40). Similar to European cabinet formation, Menelik appointed nine ministers in the office: ministers of justice, war, interior, commerce and foreign affairs, finance, agriculture, public works, and the ministers of the court and of the pen (quoted in Keller 1988, 40). The minister of the Pen acted as the emperor’s “chief secretary, archivist, and chronicler” (Marcus 1975, 228). Menelik did not select rich aristocrats or prominent men to these posts; instead, he was keen in selecting those who displayed loyalty to him and would thus strengthen his ultimate authority (Keller 1988, 40 & Marcus 1975, 228). Despite his little reliance on their expertise, these posts signified the development of a “secularized central bureaucracy” (Keller 1988, 40). Both the ministers and employees of the ministers were paid salaries directly from the emperor’s treasury (Keller 1988, 40).

Menelik sought to obtain both domestic control and international legitimacy through establishing important policies around money and banking. Ethiopia began to mint its own currency, the first becoming minted in Paris (Keller 1988, 40). This currency did not gain much acceptance at home or abroad in competition with the Austrian Maria Theresa dollar (Keller 1988, 40). Another monetary policy proposed by Menelik was the establishment of a national bank. Initiated by foreign capital, the Bank of Abyssinia was established as an affiliate of the Egyptian bank (Keller 1988, 40). The bank was tasked “to provide banking services in Ethiopia, produce and issue coins and
notes, set up bonded warehouses, assume custody of all money belonging to the state, and receive preferential rights to all state loans” (quoted in Keller 1988, 40-41). These financial institutions were crucial in centralizing the empire and garnering control over the internal activities of the state.

There were also other features of the state such as the building of railroad, postal services, telegraph and telephone operations, roads, bridges and hospitals that began to articulate the state as an institution. These new infrastructures served to facilitate the extraction process from the distant provinces and strengthened the viability of a centralized Ethiopian state (Keller 1988, 41). Innovations around communications allowed the emperor to reinstate “rapid communication with the outside world and facilitated administration and the dissemination of information within the country” (Marcus 1975, 200). Infrastructures such as roads were vital for the transport of troops and administrators while also providing the means to transport capital and human slaves that “produced the wealth needed to swell the imperial coffers” (Keller 1988, 41). Most importantly, these innovations provided a way for the emperor to legitimize his rule and secure his dominion over the Ethiopian state.

VII. Conclusion

The Tillyan perspective shows the importance of war as the primary motor for institutional development. The case-study on Ethiopia reveals the relevance of predatory theory in the country’s state formation process. Through the interlinked processes of war-making and state-making, the Ethiopian state mustered a sizeable army to protect the state from both global and local opposition. Furthermore, Abyssinian rulers devised a scheme to secure modern weaponry from European powers used to defeat Italy and
conquer the lands in the periphery. Polanyi's work on the implications of the free-market, resulting in the commodification of human life and nature, also sheds light on the extractive means by which capital accumulation became a reality. The examples of the gult land-tenure system, the introduction of the railroad and the practice of slave trade serve as Ethiopia’s examples by which the economy subordinates political and social life to free-market mechanism.

Furthermore, assessment of the cultural landscape of Ethiopia’s political economy confirms the embedded ways Abyssinian high culture and tradition defines the Ethiopian state-in-the-making. The installation of Amharic as the national lingua franca, marriages into the imperial throne, name changes to Abyssinian counterparts and the influence of the Coptic Church in educational institutions all display the social underpinnings of Ethiopia’s ‘national’ articulation. Two dominant themes, which appear in this historical period but become more apparent in later periods of Ethiopian history, are that of modernization and development. The next chapter traces the process of state building under the leadership of Haile Selassie I.
Chapter V: Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930-1974)

I. Introduction

Although the process of centralizing the state began with Menelik, Emperor Haile Selassie expanded on it, building on Menelik's legacy of state centralization and power consolidation. With greater force, the feudal-like society of Ethiopia embarked on the journey to modernization. The Emperor focused on solidifying the state, garnering a level of legitimacy both domestically and internationally and creating a more bureaucratic state apparatus; these efforts signaled a move toward promoting stability and unity within the country (Keller 1988, 67). There were several and distinct developments that characterized the state-building project in Ethiopia during the time of the Emperor; the project of development was undertaken with greater zeal after WWII.

In this chapter, I explore the different developments that characterized state-consolidation during the Emperor’s time. Key to my analysis is the contradictions between modernity and tradition that complicate the state-building endeavor. The first section will briefly document the ascension of Emperor Haile Selassie and highlight some of his achievement while serving as Regent. The second section will look at political developments, focusing on the creation of the first Ethiopian constitution and the use of an educated body of civil servants used for state-centralization. The following sections will assess themes that are relevant to power and legitimacy both in the domestic and international scene.
II. Ascension to the Throne

Emperor Haile Selassie, Tafari Mekonen until his ascent to power in 1930, was the son of Menelik’s cousin Ras Makonnen. Makonnen was a close companion of Menelik II and governor of the province of Harar until his death in 1906. The Emperor’s claim to the throne came from Makonnen’s lineage, which extended to King Sahle-Selassie of Shoa. Tafari was born in the province of Harar in 1892 and was appointed as governor at the age of seventeen, adopting the title Ras Tafari Mekonen. At a very young age, he proved competent in asserting his rule and managing divisive politics with calculation (Clapham 2015, 184). After the passing of Menelik II, his grandson, Iyasu, was named Emperor. However, his legitimacy was undermined due to his unfavorable status as a “a serial womanizer and secret covert to Islam” (Clapham 2015, 184). Iyasu’s particular association with Islam posed a threat to Haile Selassie, as he was the governor over an area that held a majority Muslim population. In 1916, Iyasu removed Haile Selassie from his post, relocating him to the wealthy province of Kaffa in the south-west (Clapham 2015, 184). Tafari remained behind the scene for the coup d’état to follow which removed Iyasu from the throne in September of 1916. This brought Menelik II’s daughter, Zewditu, to the throne as empress and Tafari as Regent and heir to the throne. The following decade were marked with power struggles in the centre that also reflected the struggle between philosophical orders of tradition and modernity. While Tafari presented himself as “the leader of the modernizing forces in Ethiopia,” his main challenger Minister of War, Fitawrari Habte-Giyorgis, remained the traditionalist opponent. In 1930, Tafari rose as powerful and unchallenged leader (Clapham 2015, 185).
III. Work as Regent: Domestic and International Policy

During his Regency, Tafari enacted policies that would lead the country of Ethiopia on the path of modernization. These policies were evident both in the domestic and international arenas. In the domestic scene, the Regent focused on the area of education and the building of Ethiopia’s knowledge economy. A department of education was founded in 1906 and was raised to ministry level in 1930. In 1925, he also opened a school for the sons of nobility. Prior to his time, elementary education was mostly the function of the Church (Markakis 2011, 110). Taking part in the modernization project, Tafari’s wife sponsored the opening of a school for girls. Another school, Medhane Alem, was founded for the children of balabbats in the capital city of Addis Ababa while other notables founded other schools in the provincial towns (Markakis 2011, 110).

As a Regent, Tafari made great strides to bring Ethiopia to the world scene. One important initiative he took was seeking entrance into the League of Nations in 1923. This marked Ethiopia’s acceptance into the community of nations as an equal player, with the required ban on slavery (Clapham 2015, 185). One year later, Tafari embarked on a diplomatic trip with tours around Europe (Italy, France and the United Kingdom) and the Middle East. To further protect his position and rule while abroad, Tafari took with him a group of advisors and prominent provincial rulers such as Ras Haylu and Ras Seyoum (Clapham 2015, 185). On their visits, these men took notes on the modern features that characterized the places they visited; in other words, they remained observant to elements of other places and cultures they could adopt to their own. Although Tafari was unable to secure Ethiopia’s unlimited access to the sea, he was able to block the Anglo-Italian accord, which, without the consent of Ethiopia, sought to
reinstate British and Italian sphere of dominion in the country (Clapham 2015, 185-186).

IV. The Constitution and Legitimacy

During his time as Emperor, Haile Selassie modernized the political structure of the Ethiopian state. To the outside world, the biggest achievement of the Emperor was the establishment of a constitution and a body of civil servants; these, also, were ways to further solidify his own ultimate power. The first Ethiopian constitution was drafted in July 1931, modeled to some extent after the Japanese constitution. This was revised in 1955, twenty-four years later. Both at home and abroad, the constitution was to show the Emperor as an “enlightened and reforming ruler” (Clapham 1969, 34). Drafted by the foreign-educated and leading intellectual of the time, Minister of Finance Bajerond Takla-Hawariyat, the document was supposed to showcase the centralizing ethos of the imperial government and display the secure and sturdy constitutional foundation upon which the emperor’s reign was based. Furthermore, the constitution functioned as a signaling device to communicate the trappings of a modern state capable of integrating into the larger body of states: “it was intended to create a modern facade for the absolute monarchy that Haile Selassie was fashioning” (Markakis 2011, 109). Although the constitution functioned to signal legitimacy, it remained evidence that “constitutional monarchy was an illusion” (Prunier & Ficquet 2015, 9).

The constitution established the supremacy of the Emperor: “In the Ethiopian Empire supreme power rests in the hands of the Emperor. He ensures the exercise thereof in conformity with the abolished law” (Chapter II, Article 6). The constitution further prepared the grounds for a bureaucratized state, consisting of judiciary and budgetary
institutions. The Emperor’s ascendancy from the Solomonic legend and his ultimate rule and honor due to him were defined in the constitution: “By virtue of His Imperial Blood, as well as by the anointing which He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and His power indisputable. Consequently, He is entitled to all the honours due to Him in accordance with tradition and the present constitution. The Law decrees that anyone so bold as to injure the Majesty of the Emperor will be punished” (quoted in Perham 1969, 427). The constitution once again reaffirmed the emperor’s alleged Solomonic roots, and solidified his role as the final arbiter of all things Ethiopia, thereby exempting the emperor from the requirements of having to derive his legitimacy from the consent of the governed. In short, the constitution, rather than serving a framework within which the emperor’s reign could be legitimized, instead served a different purpose: to shield the emperor from accountability by solidifying his dynastic legitimacy.

The most innovative achievement of the constitution was the creation of two legislative bodies: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Keller 1988, 70). Although giving the illusion of a democratic reform which would place these legislative bodies at the centre of law-making, the Constitution made clear that they were only responsible for advising the Emperor; thus, the power for decision making was vested in Emperor’s sovereignty. The facade of power-sharing was an appeal to the educated class, which held a disposition for change. The Emperor appointed Senators from the local nobility and chiefs; these senators would in-turn elect the deputies. The vision was for this system of election to evolve into participatory democracy by the subjects when “they were prepared to accept this weighty participatory responsibility” (Keller 1988, 70).
The sovereign reign of the Emperor, as enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution, was further vaguely articulated through Church documents such as the *Kebrā Nagast* and the *Fetha Nagast* (Keller 1988, 69). These documents legitimized the Emperor’s ancestry as tracing back to King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. The Emperor was thus “declared divinely ordained, and his successors could come only from the royal Solomonic line” (Keller 1988, 69). The traditional and legitimate function of the Church was being co-opted by a secular constitution that reinstated the Emperor’s reign and his successive rule in the empire. This trend toward secularization was generally regarded as a move toward modernity (Keller 1988, 70).

The constitution was amended in 1955 on the occasion of the Emperor’s silver jubilee. This was also designed to showcase Ethiopia’s progress and align with the far more advanced elements of the Eritrean constitution (Ethiopia had now formed a federation with Eritrea) (Markakis 2011, 117). The drafting committee consisted of three American advisers and two leading Ethiopian intellectuals: Walda-Giyorgis Walda-Yohannes and Aklilu Habta-Wald. Contrary to the stated commitment to change, “Even more than its 1931 predecessor, the Revised Constitution of 1955 was a legal charter for the consolidation of absolutism” (Zewde 1991, 206). As noted by John Spencer, one of the American officials present at the drafting, the constitution “was a screen beyond which conservative positions could be entrenched” (quoted in Zewde 1991, 206). Appealing to subjects as a modernized, democratic form, the amendment spelt out human rights standards such as freedom of speech and of the press. These lofty goals, however, were undermined by limitations of the law, which again upheld the supremacy of the Emperor.
Two modern institutions were introduced in the amended version of the revised constitution: *universal adult suffrage and provisions for an elected Chamber of Deputies* (Zewde 1991, 207). Although these indicated a break from the past, they proved only of marginal significance. Class bias of the deputies was evident in the property qualification for election and once elected, these men did not prove champions for innovation and change. As Markakis notes, “The introduction of elections for the Chamber of Deputies on the basis of universal adult suffrage was a purely cosmetic gesture, while the Senate remained an appointed chamber reserved for retired nobles and high officials” (Markakis 2011, 117). Therefore, Parliament functioned as an arena for self-promotion, rather than for popular representation (Zewde 1991, 207).

Although the constitution signified democratic pretense, there remained a move toward secularization and modernization of government bureaucracy. The Emperor employed Ethiopians educated abroad to fulfill the duties of state function. During the time of Menelik II, few individuals went abroad to seek educational opportunities. Haile Selassie sought people who were foreign educated and could help him in consolidating his empire. These people held both knowledge and linguistic assets that could be utilized to further communicate the state to outside powers. This recruitment for the state allowed the Emperor “to balance the influence of the traditional Abyssinian elite without creating a threat to his own power” (Markakis 2011, 110). The nobility at that time had little interest in modern education; consequently the majority of the first generation of educated Ethiopians had humble social origins and owed their rise to their own efforts and royal favour. The emperor “‘raised them from the dust’, the people said” (Markakis
In a way, the Emperor sought to create a system of personal indebtedness that would further legitimize his reign and secure faithful supporters.

The Emperor secured power and further solidified the protective and the regulatory capacities of the state strengthened through the professionalization of the Ethiopian army. With the opening of a military academy in 1934, the Emperor sought after foreign officers, often Swedish, for training of the Ethiopian recruits. For his own protection, the Emperor also devised a military unit, the Imperial Guard, who were trained by Belgian officials to protect the ruler (Keller 1988, 72). These proved an alternative source of protection in the case that the army itself posed any challenge to his rule and authority (Keller 1988, 72).

V. The Domestic Setting and Modernization

Foreign advisors had a critical role to play in the modernization projects carried out by the Emperor. Addis Ababa at the time was bombarded with diplomats, merchants and concession seekers; much of whom the Emperor viewed with skepticism. However, much of the innovations introduced were the result of negotiations with these foreign powers. The Emperor was able to “introduce such innovations as a national currency, a state bank, a postal, telephone and telegraph system, and the training of Ethiopian soldiers in the use of modern weapons” (Markakis 2011, 109). New tax regulations and a new currency, issued in year 1933, facilitated the process of state building in Ethiopia.

The Emperor identified trade as a vital source of national growth and revenue. The Emperor’s advisers urged him to further centralize customs collection in the peripheralized provinces (Markakis 2011, 112). Also vital in the area were the presence of ketemas (garrison towns) in the highland peripheries. The ketemas provided both the
demand and the infrastructure to facilitate domestic trade: “In these towns, the ruling class of neftegna, soldiers, clergymen and landlords congregated, representatives of a market demand exceeding in the scope of the traditional rural markets operating on the barter” (Markakis 2011, 112). New markets also developed as several business endeavors mushroomed throughout the regions. The development of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, completed in 1917, provided the primary means for foreign trade. Coffee, hides and skins became primary goods of export (Markakis 2011, 112). The development of class within the Ethiopian society and growing legitimacy globally were further reinstated through the practice of trade.

The rustic image of Addis Ababa was transformed through road construction, the presence of motorcars and the assembling of a police force to oversee activities of the capital (Markakis 2011, 109). Road construction held a unique element as the Emperor took direct note of the importance of roads linking provinces to the capital city; he was keenly aware of the importance of road construction to a secure and a centralized state (Pelham 1969, 182). Foreign engineers and local workers were utilized in these endeavors. Furthermore, a radio station was also inaugurated in 1933 with the founding of Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones (Markakis 2011, 112). While the Emperor showed a relentless commitment to the physical transformations of the state signaling growth and modernization, the maintenance of a regressive sociopolitical system that held little to no accountability by the governed marked a great contradiction; the resistance to construct legitimate institutions would later add to the grievances of an ever-growing urban intelligentsia.
VI. Italian Interlude (1935-1941)

Ethiopia fell to Italy’s occupation (1935-1941). The earlier defeat at the battle of Adwa left a wound in Italy and some three decades later, Italy under Mussolini returned for revenge. Two prolonged invasions were launched against Ethiopia from Eritrea and Somalia. One-quarter of a million soldiers and large number of military auxiliaries were used to subjugate the peoples of Ethiopia. According to Markakis, “The Italian interlude was a mini-rupture that separated the struggle for power at the centre before 1935 from the centralisation of power and its application of state-building, under the guidance of an absolute monarch, after 1941” (Markakis 2011, 108). During the time, The Emperor fled into exile, remaining abroad with his country facing enormous transformations until his return six years later.

Similar to the earlier European endeavors, the Italians had a civilizing mission in this part of the Horn. However, their greater initiative and motivation lay in economic exploitation and external trade (Keller 1988, 68 & Pelham 1969, 180). Capital investment in Ethiopia was astounding, further drawing Ethiopia into the global capitalist political economy (Keller 1988, 68). Spending on development was no less than 133,000,000 lire annually and government spending of 10,000,000 lire was established to meet the financial needs of the current administration (Pelham 1969, 180). Through such investments, the Italians facilitated the state-consolidation process. The heaviest investment went toward developmental infrastructure such as road construction. As noted by Markakis, “Using native labour, the Italians constructed 3,200km of metalled and tarred roads with innumerable bridges within twenty-four months, and completed 6,400km of all-weather road before they left” (Markakis 2011, 144). The roads, linking
the periphery to the centre also facilitated the rapid process of urbanization. Furthermore, they also dismantled certain elements of Ethiopia’s traditional elements and replaced them with modern infrastructures and institutions. Again, these new developments facilitated the process of extraction and capital accumulation. They accomplished two things: limiting the powers of traditional elites and eliminating the *gabbar* system of tenure (Keller 1988, 65). The latter brought “relief from the burden of Ethiopian rule to the people of the periphery, something that made its restoration in 1941 all the more unwelcome” (Markakis 2011, 114).

After six years of occupation, The Ethiopian state was restored back to independence. Along with the Ethiopian forces, the British, Indian, Sudanese, West and East and Southern Africans aided the liberation fight (Keller 1988, 65). The infrastructures that were established by the Italians helped the Emperor establish his rule at his return. After WWII, the network of roads became crucial for the greater efficient economic exploitation of the periphery and a speedy deployment of Ethiopian forces (Keller 1988, 69).

**VII. Restoration and Global Politics**

Upon being restored to his throne, the Emperor found himself in a situation of having to deal with Britain's colonial tendencies. Although they played a decisive role in restoring him to power, many of the commanders saw Ethiopia as an “occupied territory” and, potentially, an additional colonial territory (Clapham 2015, 194). Despite Britain's pursuit, Ethiopian independence was widely recognized under the returning rulership of Emperor Haile Selassie I. However, an agreement between Britain and Ethiopia in 1942 recognized a “special status for the British” in the fields of military and foreign advising.
to the Emperor (Clapham 2015, 195). British commanders ran Ethiopia’s police force and the employment of other foreign nationals in the Ethiopian state had to have the permission stamp of British officials (Zewde 1991, 179). The British were also instrumental in helping the emperor further consolidate his power. When a notable uprising began in the province of Tigray, in the Abyssinian heartland, aid from the British aircraft helped the regime crush the rebellion (Clapham 2015, 195). The rebellion was a reaction to the garrisoned Shoan governors and soldiers in the Tigray region after the restoration of the Emperor (Markakis 2011, 115). The strong military presence of the British gave them a prime opportunity to seize control of Eritrea and the territory of Ogaden—in what they envisioned as the “Greater Somalia” (Zewde 1991, 180). While a UN resolution rendered Eritrea a federation under Ethiopia (1948), the whole region of Ogaden was restored to Ethiopia in 1954 (Zewde 1991, 183).

A key player in the decision regarding Eritrea was the United States. With America’s concern in the Middle East and a renewed interest in the Horn of Africa, the United States decided to strengthen its relationship with Ethiopia. The Americans had established a communication base in Asmara, which they felt would remain protected under Ethiopian rule (Zewde 1991, 183). In return for this concession, Ethiopia received American development aid and investment in education (Clapham 2015, 186). Primary focus for education involved public health and agricultural education, public administration training, scholarships and locus control (Zewde 1991, 184). During this time, the University College of Addis Ababa was also established, later known as Haile Selassie I University in 1951 (Clapham 2015, 196-197). Furthermore, the United States established a mission to train a modern Ethiopian army (Clapham 2015, 195).
VIII. Centralization of State Apparatus

From the end of WWII to the 1960s, political power endured high centralization in the palace (Clapham 2015, 196). The power that underlined the Emperor’s politics at his return took on a different framework than in years past. He established an absolutist order with a ruling class satisfied with land property and concessions (Zewde 1991, 202). As the years went on, the Emperor tended to remove himself from domestic affairs, building his credibility in the global arena: “He carved for himself a place as a venerated father figure in international diplomacy” (Zewde 1991, 203). The Establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa (1963) set another stepping stone for international recognition, while his domestic legitimacy was garnering heavy questioning by the masses.

His focus on foreign policy led the Emperor to leave most of domestic affairs to the hands of the governing elite. The Emperor continued his policy of recruiting younger and educated men from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Zewde 1991, 203). These were men who “he had chosen himself, whose careers had unfolded under his personal aegis, and who depended upon him exclusively for their position” (Markakis 2011, 116). While most of the palace members came from modest backgrounds and the region of Shoa, few were Tigrayans and others, like Yilma Deresa (Minister of Finance), represented the Oromo ethnic group (Clapham 2015, 196). Religious diversity remained limited, as all were Christian men with a larger majority representing Ethiopian Orthodoxy (Clapham 2015, 196). Along with the speedy recruitment of educated men to fill the state apparatus, the 1943 decree also created a larger ministerial system, with the establishment of a Council of Ministers headed by the office of Prime Minister. Like the
previous legislative bodies, the new institution was simply given an advisory role, and ultimate power was vested in the Emperor (Markakis 2011, 116).

IX. Privatization of Land and Capital Accumulation

Garnering effective control over the periphery and facilitating a more organized capital accumulation process became high priority for the Emperor upon his return. The thirty-four provincial units that existed before the Italian invasion were now redrawn and integrated to create twelve large provinces: Tigray, Begemdir and Semien, Wollo, Gojja, Wallega, Shoa, Arsi, Sidamo, Kaffa, Gemu Foga, Illubabor and Hararge (later divided to create Bale province). The 1962 annexation of Eritrea yielded fourteen provinces (Markakis 2011, 115). Despite the restructuring of provincial administration, there was no reform regarding the recruitment standards of the provincial rulers: “The paramount criterion being loyalty to the Emperor, provincial officials as a rule had neither modern education nor any other relevant qualifications” (Markakis 2011, 115). They were simply instructed to collect taxes and to maintain “calmness” (tseteta) or security in the region (Markakis 2011, 115).

The Emperor moved toward modernizing the economic sector through foreign investment. Imports were slowly becoming replaced with domestic manufacturing, although foreigners owned most of this sector (Markakis 2011, 119). Most of the investment in commercial agriculture and manufacturing was conducted outside of the Abyssinian heartland. Markakis gives the following justification: “this was where land could be appropriated without economic or political cost, where a cheap and docile labor force was readily available, combined with the feasibility of irrigation, the presence of coffee, and the regime’s desire to enrich Shoa, its home base” (Markakis 2011, 120).
Privatization and the allotment of land to patriots, exiles, soldiers and civil servants faithful in times of war and peace became the norm in the southern regions but provoked large resistance in the north, where old communal kinship system of land tenure persisted (Zewde 1991, 191). The shift to private property adopted other vocabularies that showed the coming of “modernization.” As noted by Zewde, “the term gabbar lost its exploitative associations and assumed the more respectable connotation of taxpayer” (Zewde 1991, 192). Furthermore the privatization of land meant greater tenancy. This was widespread in southern provinces as depicted by the percentage of land allocations: 75% in Hararge, 67% in Shawa and 62% in Kafa. These numbers showed comparable difference in the northern provinces: 15% in Bagemder, 20% in Gojjam and 25% in Tegre (Zewde 1991, 192).

Revenue collection, in the form of taxes, provided new sources of income for state and state consolidation. Four tax policies were instituted post-liberation era: asrat (tithe), land tax, education tax and health tax. The asrat tax was later amended in 1967 and replaced with tax on agricultural income. The heaviest burden remained on the peasants and particularly with the land tax, Shoan residents paid the least (Markakis 2011, 118). In the taxation system that existed up until 1967, the landlord class was exempted from paying taxes; this changed after the introduction of agricultural income (Markakis 2011, 118). Despite changes in privatization of land and tax derived from land-tenure, revenue from the agricultural economy still remained low at 7% of the total revenue (Zewde 1991, 193). Therefore, between the years 1963-1973, peasant agriculture was given secondary priority to commercial agriculture (Zewde 1991, 194).
This agricultural development plan encroached on the grazing areas of indigenous, pastoralist communities. In the Awash valley, large plantations were under way for sugar run by the DUTCH HVA company and cotton run by the British company Mitchell Cotts. The Swedish aid programme strived to transform the Arsi highlands of the Oromos into a “breadbasket of Ethiopia.” This came at the price of drawing greater class divisions between the indigenous peasantry and the landowners. Land leasing were mostly concentrated in the regions that were incorporated into the Ethiopian state during the late nineteenth century. Agriculturally productive regions in the Amhara zones, for example Gojjam, were left untouched and any effort to measure land quickly abandoned at the threat of a peasant revolt (Clapham 2015, 197).

**X. Conclusion**

During his reign, Emperor Haile Selassie engaged in the project of development and modernization. State bureaucracy took shape and several efforts were undertaken to improve domestic education, infrastructure and international trade. However, these signs of progress were ridden with many contradictions. While the image of the Emperor gained eminence on the global sphere, the largely marginalized peasant communities, particularly in the highland peripheries, suffered under Abyssinian-dominated land-tenure structure. The question of legitimacy—first and foremost articulated through the Ethiopian Constitution—further reinstated the autocratic rule of the Emperor. The uneven development that took place between the centre and the periphery and largely, cultural oppression of the peripheries would finally bring the Emperor’s rule to an end. The next chapter traces the rise of the Ethiopian Student Movement, the impacts of the Ethiopian revolution, and the policies pursued by the Derg to achieve a “socialist utopia.”

I. Introduction

As underscored in the previous chapter, there were contradictions in the Emperor’s modernization project. On the one hand, he was committed to some form of modernization that reformed certain institutions (i.e. education) and improved Ethiopia’s physical infrastructures. On the other hand, the Emperor had failed to garner full legitimacy and construct institutions that could accommodate diverse social groups and ideas. Therefore, there existed a significant gap between the sociopolitical changes unleashed by the modernization project and the capacity of the political system to respond to increasing demands for representation and a say in the political life of the country.

The revolution that finally ousted the Emperor was a unique phenomenon in Africa. The anti-colonial struggles, which had socialist underpinnings, particularly common amongst Portuguese colonies, were targeted at the removal of colonial powers (Prunier 2015, 209). Therefore, there was not a radical commitment for a social transformation in the post-colonial period (Prunier 2015, 209-210). By contrast, the Ethiopian revolution, spearheaded first by the Ethiopian Student Movement (1965-1974), challenged the internal feudal and imperial order of Emperor Haile Selassie (Gudina 2006, 126). The goal of the revolution was to liberate the country “from the vestiges of feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and imperialism” (Keller 1988, 198). Drawing from the experiences of the French, Chinese and Russian revolutions, these students began to articulate their demands through Marxist ideology. Carrying the slogans “land to the tiller,” “national equality” and “social justice,” the students searched for a new paradigm
to redefine the political ideology of the Ethiopian state and most importantly, to address the political and economic shortcomings of the past (Gudina 2006, 126).

This chapter assesses the condition of Ethiopia and the state-building project under the post-revolution dictatorial rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Key in the assessment is the reshaping of state-institutions away from a capitalist and imperialist society to one of socialism, although the institutionalization of such ideology did not fully materialize. The failure of the socialist project could mainly be attributed to the tensions between the decentralization of power to empower peasants and the centralization of state bureaucracy for greater control over the periphery. Another arena of contradiction was the prioritization of the class struggle over the national struggle. Furthermore, key themes in sight are the question of legitimacy and the ‘national question.’

II. Pathway to Revolution: Tracing Economic and Political Discontent

The imperial regime failed to bring about genuine transformation at a time when Ethiopia faced both internal and external challenges (Prunier 2015, 211). Both the constitution and parliament remained hallowed institutions that failed to produce real changes benefiting the masses (Prunier 2015, 211). The Emperor’s pursuit to centralize his power after the Italian defeat meant further bureaucratization of the state and higher taxation, the heaviest burden falling on the peasantry. The mid-twentieth century also ushered in a season of economic depression, leading to grave urban employment and inflation (Markakis 2011, 162-165); urban unemployment at the time ran at 40-50% (Prunier 2015, 212). During the previous regime, the more educated were easily accommodated within the state apparatus; the rising intelligentsia now lacked its privileged place in the country. Rising population growth further exacerbated the problem
of unemployment: the population of Addis Ababa grew from 300,000 to 700,000 twenty years prior the revolution (Prunier 2015, 212).

Global economic changes and the downturn of the economy also had tremendous impact on Ethiopia. The 1973 oil shock caused Ethiopia’s petroleum bill to triple within just one year (Prunier 2015, 214). Mass demonstrations in the cities and boycott by taxi-drivers followed. At the time, almost 70 % of Ethiopia’s economy was concentrated in the hands of foreign investment. Capitalists in the Ethiopian society were “mostly aristocrats who played the role of local partners but had no real autonomy” (Prunier 2015, 211). Foreign trade and state revenue decreased due to the closing of the Suez Canal and the price of coffee in the international market dropped tremendously (Markakis 2011, 164). Furthermore, the economy held distinct separation between the rural, agricultural sector, which existed “at the level of subsistence,” and a “modern” sector that characterized consumption and exports in the urban region (Prunier 2015, 212). This uneven development between urban and rural areas, in addition to the famine of 1972-1974, concentrated in the regions of Tigray and Wollo, caused great agitation (Markakis 2011, 165). Though the famine was not as severe as the one that took place in 1888-92, it merited a strong intervention from abroad. The flamboyant lifestyle of the Emperor and his men and the indifference expressed toward the fate of those suffering from the famine disaster caused great frustration among the masses (Prunier 2015, 214).

These developments along with the manifest incapacity of the Ethiopian state to deal with these multifaceted problems further exacerbated the disarticulation of state and society. Furthermore, the greater unity of the country under one “Ethiopian” national banner was brought into greater scrutiny. With the growth of the Ethiopian Student
Movement (ESM) in the 1960s, “national oppression” became part of the political discourse and a subject of heavy debate (Gudina 2006, 122). The rising intelligentsia questioned Ethiopia’s centralized state apparatus, significantly reinforced by Shoan dominance. Many student voices raised objections against Amhara political and cultural imperialism. The author Wallelign Makonnen gave the first well-written Marxist articulation to the problem of national oppression. In “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia,” he addressed the very problem of Ethiopia’s nation-building project:

To be a ‘genuine Ethiopian’ one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity, and to wear the Amhara-Tigre shamma in international conferences. In some cases to be an ‘Ethiopian’, you will even have to change your name. In short, to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an Amhara mask (quoted in Markakis 2011, 164).

These words appeared in the university’s student newspaper. After the murder of the outspoken president of the University student union and a burial ceremony interrupted by indiscriminate shootings from the Imperial Bodyguard, the hope for political and social reformation under the Emperor quickly dwindled; revolution was in the air (Markakis 2011, 164). This particular moment of intrusion revealed the decadence of the Emperor’s hegemony over the Ethiopian state. Rather than consensus serving as a basis for legitimacy, supreme dominance became a way to secure and sustain power and authority. The counter-hegemonic drive, expressed through the revolution, became a response to finally remove Emperor Haile Selassie and restore power into the hands of the civil society.
III. Framing the Ideological Struggle

After the fall of the Emperor, the challenge remained to construct a “social myth” that would yield a new political and economic order (Keller 1988, 191). The radical call for change arose out of the youthful, urban intelligentsia who embraced the doctrine of Marxism as “the scripture of modernity” (De Waal 2015, 157). Those that entertained revolution in Ethiopia read Lenin’s writings, the most popularly reading being “What is to be done?” considering the organization and the implementation of a Social Democratic Revolution (Lata 1999, 86). The student movement also drew inspiration from Mao Zedong's treatise *On Contradictions* (Markakis 2011, 162). Ethiopia’s call for a socialist state was not new to the Horn of Africa, as Ethiopia’s neighbors, Sudan and Somalia, had committed to scientific socialism since 1969 (Markakis 2011, 169).

The ideological basis of the student movement interpreted both the problems and solutions for Ethiopia as a class struggle, rather than a national struggle, against systems of feudalism and imperialism. The first contradiction arose from the interpretations of Ethiopia’s past challenges and future prospects. Town-bred radicals, committed to the Marxist ideology, held little understanding of the conditions in the countryside (Markakis 2011, 162). Spearheading the ideological movement, the focus on the struggle over material life relegated the “national question,” dominant in the periphery, a secondary status. That being said, national oppression was not erased from the class struggle interpretation. Instead, it was encapsulated within the larger “class struggle thesis” (Gudina 2006, 122). The class lens thus became a way to build bonds that surpassed geographical and ethnic divisions.
A new vocabulary for the political and social imagination arose out of the radical movement. The word “Abyot” from the Geez term “to refuse” or “to refuse to obey” was coined to capture the spirit of “revolution.” The word for “socialism” became the combination of *Hibrette* (social) and *sebawinet* (humane). The concept of “nation” was captured by a newly coined word-*beher* (Markakis 2011, 167-168). Through its first clear-cut statement, *Ethiopia Tikdem* (Ethiopia first), the Derg would later articulate its commitment to the ideologies of *hebretsebawinet* (communism) (Keller 1988, 193). Similar to other kinds of African socialism, communism in Ethiopia entailed a commitment to “equality, justice, self-reliance, the dignity of labor, cooperativeness, cultural pride, and above all national unity” (Keller 1988, 193). The new structure of government and other domestic and international policies arose out of a commitment to the socialist project (Keller 1988, 193).

IV. Urban Opposition and the Red Terror

The Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (Derg) seized power by overthrowing the Emperor. Ranging from a plain soldier to a major in the army, the military junta consisted of over one hundred members (Markakis 2011, 168). Following an intense internal power struggle within the Derg, which saw the murder of several high-ranking members of the committee, Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as the unquestioned leader of the junta in 1977 (Markakis 2011, 169). Their unity was based not

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2During the initial formation of the PMAC, the Derg was under the leadership of General Aman Andom. General Aman held a moderate stance and supported a level of autonomy for the previously colonized territory of Eritrea (Donham 1999: 22). In November 1974, controversy over the Eritrean issue and a suggestion for a negotiated settlement with Eritrean nationalist led to the general’s execution. The Derg also ordered the execution of fifty-seven other political prisoners (Keller 1988: 192).
on some common ideology but a general dissatisfaction with the power of the Emperor (Markakis 2011, 168).

The Marxist ideas of the revolutionaries took initial institutional forms through two civil society organizations that each claimed their vanguard roles in the movement and were multi-ethnic in nature: EPRP (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party) and All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Amharigna acronym MEISONE) (Markakis 2011, 163). Both were the offspring of the Ethiopian Student Movement and declared scientific socialism as a philosophical tool to transform the Ethiopian state (Gudina 2006, 126). However, the soldiers, who named themselves Workers in Uniform, also claimed the vanguard role (Markakis 2011, 163). Although the Derg had secured its formal state power, two principal issues remained that would bring the military junta in conflict and contradictory positions with these organizations: the secession movement in Eritrea and the role of civilians in the governmental apparatus; a call for a “people’s government” arose from the radicals of the Ethiopian student movement (Donham 1999, 21). The question remained as to who would lead the revolution.

The EPRP, mostly composed of Amhara leadership with strong ties to the Ethiopian Student Association in the United States, proved to be more “leftist” than the Derg (Prunier 2015, 219). The EPRP supported the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination both in theory and in practice (Gudina 2006, 123). With regards to the independence of Eritrea, EPRP also showed great openness to the independent struggle (Prunier 2015, 219). The Derg’s implementation of swift changes and resistance to any civilian opposition led the EPRP to labeling it “fascist”, beginning a series of direct confrontations with the Derg regime (Prunier 2015, 219). On the other hand, the
MEISONE supported the new regime and although recognizing the rights of nations and nationalities to self-determination up to secession, sought to solve the problem through the unified framework of Ethiopia (Gudina 2006, 123). MEISONE was readily willing to collaborate with the Derg in order to facilitate the construction of a fully functioning socialist society (Prunier 2015, 219). The creation of the Political Office for Mass Organization (POMOA) was a logical outcome of this collaboration, as both sides sought to garner support through mass mobilization (Prunier 2015, 220). But MEISONE and the Derg were headed to a direct collision, given the mismatches between their ideological convictions. After marginalizing the EPRP, the Derg turned to MEISONE, essentially driving it underground on the grounds of its “nationalist deviationism” linked to its large Oromo membership (Markakis 2011, 168 & Prunier 2015, 219).

Revolutions, often romanticized, are violently destructive events in which revolutionaries tend to use considerable violence and coercion to consolidate their power. In this regard, Ethiopia was no exception. As it became apparent that the sense of cautious optimism that prevailed in the immediate aftermath of the revolution was dissipated, the Derg and its erstwhile civilian partners engaged in assassinations and counter-assassinations as each side sought to assert supremacy in the struggle for political power and control of the state. The resulting urban violence led to a violent period in which the Derg used revolutionary terror, known as the Red Terror, to liquidate its adversaries. After the labeling of EPRP as “anarchist” in 1976, the Derg unleashed massive raids and killings. Death tolls reached frantic levels as the Red Terror ravaged the urban areas. Between the years 1977-1978, almost five thousand young people were assassinated (Keller 1988, 200). The outcome of this struggle was key as the Derg, under
the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, emerged as the most dominant force in the region.

IV. Building the Political Apparatus

An effective state center, under the guidance of a vanguard party, was deemed crucial for the development of a socialist state (Keller 1988, 230). The Derg understood that in order to secure its control of the state apparatus and bolster state authority, it either had to eliminate or co-opt the radicalized left (Keller 1988, 197). It achieved both through the announcement of the Program for the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR)\(^3\), the founding of the Yekatit 66 (February 1973) Ideological School\(^4\), the Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs (POMOA), and the installment of an advisory political body, the Politbureau (Keller 1988, 197).

There was a political vacuum created after the demise of the old order. The military junta thus fabricated a new “socialist elite” to fill the political vacuum for governance: “Western education was the trademark of this class, hastily garnished with a dose of raw Marxism provided in a special training centre” (Markakis 2011, 175). Unlike in the previous imperial regime, the new state actors were ethnically heterogeneous (although the precise nature of ethnic composition was never stated), prominent in the cadre and in the ranks of the military being the Oromo: “The Abyssinian element remained dominant, but was supplemented by expanding recruitment from the highland periphery, leavening with the beginnings of Muslim participation, and even a token representation from the lowland periphery” (Markakis 2011, 175). Senior civil servants

\(^3\)The PNDR document articulated a commitment to scientific socialism and outlined a “noncapitalist strategy for socialist development.” Similar to the statements in Ethiopia Tikdem, it interpreted Ethiopia’s condition through Marx’s theory of class struggle (Keller 1988: 197).

\(^4\)The school facilitated the learning of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
were required a time of re-education to understand the socialist agenda of state building. Many state agents were sent to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Cuba for “ideological indoctrination just as selected teachers and students had been” (Keller 1988, 231).

Securing a vanguard party remained one of the primary challenges of the Derg regime. After some period of transformation, the POMOA became the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working Peoples of Ethiopia (COPWE) in 1979. Of the 123 members of the central committee within COPWE, 79 represented military or police offers (Keller 1988, 237). The first general congress of the commission took place the summer of 1980, followed by a second gathering in 1983. At the third and final congress, the workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was formed September of 1984, replacing the former COPWE congress (Keller 1988, 235). The founding congress of the WPE coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Revolution (Markakis 2011, 178). The WPE full committee consisted of 29 members of armed forces and at least 44 ex-soldiers. Among the 139 full memberships, representatives of mass organizations held only 22 positions (Keller 1988, 235). The heavy dominance of Derg members in the WPE central committee indicated the undemocratic nature of representation.

The long search for the establishment of a civilian-based vanguard party must also be understood in light of changing global partnerships. In the aftermath of the Ethiopian revolution, the Derg’s human rights problems had led to the rupturing of relations with the United States. As a result, the new regime had made overtures to the Soviet Union in an effort to enjoy its patronage. The establishment of the WPE in 1984 as a “civilian-based vanguard party” was the culmination of this new pro-Soviet orientation that had
been underway since the rupture with the US (Keller 1988, 201). In other words, the inauguration of WPE was a response to the Soviet demand for a vanguard party, a necessary condition for the implementation of socialism. With Soviet Union as its primary partner, the Derg also sought to establish alliances with Cuba and other Eastern bloc countries (Keller 1988, 200-201).

VI. Security and Legitimacy

On December 1974, the Derg devised a ten-point programme that derived from its first statement of policy: *Ityopia Tikdim* (Ethiopia First) (Donham 1999, 26). This emphasized themes of equality, self-reliance, the nation, nationalization of the economy and elimination of the old feudal order of landlordism (quoted in Donham 1999, 26). The programme placed high emphasis on the *common good* that would link Ethiopia across ethnic, religious and geographical differences. One of the priorities of the regime was garnering control over the country’s periphery, in which much of the resistance to the authority of the regime was taking place in the form of outright secessionist movements that demanded greater political autonomy from the center.

In order to spread the tenets of socialism and make “decentralization” of power possible, the Derg developed the *Zemecha* (Amharic word for campaign) in 1974. These were a band of sixty thousand high school and university students selected to explain the aims of the revolution in the countryside (Keller 1988, 193). In the words of Edmond Keller, this signified “socialism by the back door” (Keller 1988, 192). These students, like an army, were sent out to “reconquer” the countryside. This time though, this would not be by force, but with knowledge (Donham 1999, 29). Many tensions developed as the students, well versed in the writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao, proved to be more radical
than the Derg (Keller 1988, 194), partly spurring the red terror discussed in the previous section.

The Derg also set out to create new mass organizations as well as strengthen existing organizations such as All-Ethiopia Trade Union, Dwellers Association and the All-Ethiopia Peasant Association. The formation of peasant associations (gabbar kebele) in the countryside and that of urban dwellers associations in the towns and cities was one of the most significant developments that heralded a break of sorts from the previous regime. By 1987, there was some 20,000 gabbar kebele in Ethiopia” (Markakis 2011, 172). The students sent out through the zemecha campaign, more radical than the Derg members themselves, strived to transform these peasant associations into real systems for self-governance. In other words, they took charge in hopes of transforming these local institutions into vehicles for decentralized form of governance. They took charge in aiding the peasants elect kebele leaders and find other methods for self-administration: “Great pressure was brought on the Dergue to recognize the kebele as institutions of local government” (Markakis 2011, 172). Farmers were now encouraged to organize themselves with one association for every eight hundred hectares of land (Keller 1988: 194). Judicial tribunals among the Kebeles now had jurisdiction to handle cases and offences against the Penal Code (Markakis 2011, 172). Furthermore, the kebeles collected taxes and were given permission to develop armed defense squads in their regions (Markakis 2011, 172).

Unfortunately, the changes introduced during the Zemecha campaign did not last long. Freely elected kebele leadership was removed from their post, further becoming replaced by Derg’s representatives from the centre. Peasant associations, which were
originally designed as mechanisms for self-rule, became restructured to “impose central policy decisions.” The economic fate of the peasantry also remained the same, perhaps worse, than the imperial era (Beken 2012, 90). The resistance to control is important to note, as the regime interpreted local autonomy as a threat to a highly militarized and centralized state.

The Derg sought to garner legitimacy in the periphery through implementing new policies concerning land tenure. The 1975 land reform nationalized all rural land and usurped the land without any compensation. Recalling themes from the French Revolution, the Derg stated: “It is essential to fundamentally alter the agrarian relations so that the Ethiopia peasant masses which have paid so much in sweat as in blood to maintain extravagant feudal class may be liberated” (quoted in Donham 1999, 27). Furthermore, the state established standards for land distribution and eliminated the sale and rent of land and hired labor (Markakis 2011, 170). As a revolutionary reform, this attacked the old feudal order of land ownership and undermined the economic foundations of the imperial system (Markakis 2011, 170). The impact of the reform was felt especially in the highland peripheries where systems of neftegna and ballabat persisted and were now abolished (Markakis 2011, 170). Through this decision, rural land was now transferred into the hands of the state; there was also an attempt to standardize land allotment at ten hectares or less granted to each conjugal family unit (Keller 1988, 194). Furthermore, as noted by Markakis, “the reform did not inspire commensurate enthusiasm in the northern provinces, where smallholding was the rule and large estates and tenancy the exception” (Markakis 2011, 170). In these areas, peasants had customary
rights to land, held greater level of mobility to identify with local elites and there was no ethnic differentiation between landlords and peasants (Donham 1999, 31).

In the urban regions, land policy was structured to get the wealth out of the hands of the urban-based privileged class. The Derg nationalized about 409,000 urban houses and apartments (quoted in Keller 1988, 196). Kebeles, newly created urban dwellers’ associations, took charge of administrating these newly created units (Keller 1988, 196). New housing units with low rents were now built on urban land that previously “belonged to members of the royal family, the mobility, or urban-based indigenous entrepreneurs” (Keller 1988, 196). The land reforms accomplished a type of alliance between the Derg, parts of the intelligentsia, southern peasants, and the urban poor (Donham 1988, 32).

VI. Resettlement and Villagization

Another season of drought in the early 1980s threatened the countryside, particularly in the north. Although help in international famine aid was distributed to the Dergue, it refused to transport aid to interior areas (funds continued to be used for other social and military purposes) nor did it use other means, such as Zemecha, to help in the endeavor: “The toll taken by this famine was estimated at one million souls” (Markakis 2011, 173-174 & Keller 1988, 225). The regime decided to react to the famine by implementing one of the most controversial policy decisions during the Derg era. The plan devised to resettle some 1.5 million people affected in the drought-prone regions to the “so-called virgin lands in the south which had adequate rainfall” (Keller 1988, 225). Between 1984-5, the regime and its cadre evacuated about 700,000 individuals to different reasons of the South such as Kaffa, Gojjam, Gondar, Wollega, and Illubabor
The vulnerable population were “mainly from Wollo (62.4 %), Shoa (18.4 %), Tigray (15.3 %), and went to the lowlands of western Ethiopia and to parts of the south” (Markakis 2011, 174). Despite the claim that the resettlement process was done solely for humanitarian purposes, critics contend there was larger political underpinnings to the relocation process. Some argue that the evacuation was done to depopulate the region from those involved in or supporting the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (quoted in Keller 1988, 226). Others also contend that the regime purposefully disrupted the efforts given by international relief agencies to bring the famine under control (Keller 1988, 226).

To further garner control over the periphery, villagization programs were also instituted through the rural land-reform policy, as part of the “Ten year Perspective Plan” (Keller 1988, 228). Following the invasion of Bale Province by Somali forces in 1977, most of the province became villagized (Keller 1988, 227). According to government officials, the villagization project in the sparsely populated areas of Bale secured better education, healthcare, agricultural extension and safe water opportunities (Keller 1988, 228). In late 1985, processes of villagization took place in places like Shoa and Arussi and in smaller scales in the regions of Gojjam, Wollega, Kaffa, Sidamo, and Illubabor (Keller 1988, 228). There was some resistance shown to this project in the Hararge lowlands, western Shoa and Gojjam (Keller 1988, 229). The long-term goal of the project was to move as many as thirty-three million people into villagized communities by 1994 (Keller 1988, 228). Like the resettlement programs, the political ramifications of these programs cannot be ignored. In places like Bale and Hararge, some claim that the
program was designed to “separate the general population from insurgent movements” (Keller 1988, 229).

**VII. The ‘National’ Question**

After the ousting of the Emperor, the Derg faced considerable ethno-nationalist resistance. In addition to the Eritreans, the Oromo, Sidama, Somali, Afar, Anywaa and Berta all launched their struggle for “national liberation,” threatening the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state (Markakis 2011, 186). This called for a great expansion of the military, creating the largest army in sub-Saharan Africa (quoted in De Waal 2015, 158). The secessionist movements, tracing their roots to the initial formation of the Ethiopian state under the leadership of Menelik II, launched their counter-movements against Shewan-Amhara dominance. As discussed in the previous chapters, the southern peoples of Ethiopia were forcefully incorporated into the Ethiopian state; thus, the state lacked legitimacy, particularly in the countryside. Through its doctrine of *Ethiopia Tikdem* (Ethiopia first) and *andinet* (oneness), the Derg envisioned a unified Ethiopia, thus retaining an unrelenting emphasis on territorial sovereignty and unity (Keller 1988, 202).

Although the affirmation of equality and respect for previously oppressed people groups and cultures was stated, there was no clear vision for creating an “inclusive national culture shared by all Ethiopians” (Markakis 2011, 185). In other words, the previous imperial policies of “Amharisation” were not explicitly condemned nor defended. The status of “Amharigna” as the national language and lingua franca was reinstated and education was used to spread the language in rural regions (Markakis
Consistent with Marxist ideology, the Derg framed the national struggle as a class struggle, reducing ethnic conflicts to mere “class contradictions” (Keller 1988, 203). The two southern peoples who advanced the colonial thesis in fighting for liberation were the Somali of Ogaden region and the Oromo elites (Gudina 2006, 124). The conquest of the Ogaden region during the time of Menelik separated the Somalis in Ethiopia from those living outside of the Ethiopian borders in the countries of Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti (Beken 2012, 87-88). Furthermore, the Ethiopian Somalis of the Ogaden faced exclusion based on their religion. As Muslims, they were historically in the margins of Ethiopia’s national narrative. Thus, the Somali Ogadenis faced “a triple oppression: on national, religious and class grounds” (Gudina 2006, 124). The independence of Somalia in 1960 held a vision for the unification of Somalis dispersed in these regions. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), established in 1960, supported this pan-Somali vision. The WSLF struggled for the incorporation of the Ogaden region into the territorial boundaries of Somalia (Beken 2012, 88). In July of 1977, supporting the WSLF and under the dictates of Siad Barre, Somali troops invaded Ethiopia. In 1978, with the help of the Soviet Union and Cuban soldiers, Ethiopia forces were able to oust Somali forces from Ethiopia’s borders (Beken 2012, 89). The aid given by the communist bloc helped in the defeat of Somali troops and was also pivotal in destroying other insurgencies in the south (quoted in De Waal 2015, 158). The subsequent victory signaled the consolidation of the Derg’s power and the further institutionalization of its policies.

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5The colonial thesis reinstated the southern conquest by the northern Abyssinians as a colonial endeavor, perpetuating centre-periphery relationship.
The 1960s saw the rise of Oromo nationalism, reflected both in the Bale revolt (1963-1970) and the development of the Macha-Tulama Association, founded in 1963 (Beken 2012, 89). After the fall of Haile Selassie, the Derg attempted to mitigate the grievances of the Oromo people; the Oromo people themselves supported some of these policies (Beken 2012, 89). The land reform was the major stepping-stone toward amending past policies under Menelik II and Haile Selassie I. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), established in 1974, drew its members from the radicalized bunch of the Ethiopian Student Movement and was armed for the independence of Oromia (Beken 2012, 90). Like the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which struggled for the independence of Eritrea, it justified its liberation struggle on the basis of earlier Abyssinian colonization (Beken 2012, 90).

The separatist movement for an independent Eritrea was first expressed through the founding of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) in 1958. ELM sought to achieve its objectives through diplomatic pursuits and UN intervention (Zewde 1991, 219). However, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), formed by Eritrean exiles in 1961, gained greater momentum and demanded independence through a concerned support from outside powers. The ELF held strong Muslim support and its pan-Arabic and pan-Islamic stance drew support from the Arab World. However, this would cause heavy conflict with its Eritrean Christian counterpart, which also gained strong support during the Ethiopian Student Movement (quoted in Beken 2012, 91). The EPLF represented the rival organization established by Christian Eritreans who converted to Marxism during the Student Movement. This group, with a strong Marxist and nationalist ideology and Christian leadership attracted more followers committed to guerilla warfare to secure the
independence of Eritrea (Markakis 2011, 184). After two civil wars between both separatist movements, Eritrea would secure its independence in 1994 after the fall of the Derg regime.

Another ethno-national struggle was also underway by the Tigray people in the northern region of Ethiopia. The grievances of the people of Tigray trace their roots to the time of Menelik II. The people of Tigray linked their fate and constant experience of famine to Amhara domination and their frustration remained political, economic and cultural (Markakis 2011, 188 & Beken 2012, 94). However, these frustrations were also linked by a sense of the “golden past” of the Tigrayan people, going back to the times of the Axum Empire (quoted in Beken 2012, 95). When The Derg took power, “Tigray was, by any measure, the most neglected and poverty stricken province in the Abyssinian homeland” (Markakis 2011, 188). Little development took place in the province of Tigray with peasant landholding also remaining minimal (Markakis 2011, 188). In 1975, the Tigryan students established the Tigryan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) during the Ethiopian student movement. After fourteen years of guerilla fight, TPLF would emerge to seize power in Addis Ababa (Markakis 2011, 189).

VIII. Conclusion

The attempt to radically shift from a feudal, capitalist society to one of socialism had a significant impact on state formation in Ethiopia. The vision of socialism carried by the Derg remained quite unclear and through the resettlement and villagization programs, communities were uprooted and social relations severed. The Red Terror launched against civil-society organizations indicated the establishment of the Derg as a military dictatorship. There was a clear tension between the Derg’s instinct for centralization and
the practical imperative for making concessions to the population. The kebeles and peasant associations were significant institutional developments that emerged early in the immediate aftermath of the revolution; they played a major role in the struggle for power between the Derg and its civilian opponents. The struggle to secure power over the ethnic peripheries was also eminent during the time of the Derg regime. The Derg’s policies of mass resettlement and villagization were not only intended to deal with the crisis of famine; they were also intended to curb the secessionist movements that threatened state sovereignty. The framing of Ethiopian politics on the basis of class, subordinating the issue of nationality as a secondary question, had severe implications. The next chapter will look at the ways the TPLF led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition addresses the “national question” under the developmentalist state of Meles Zenawi.
Chapter VII: EPRDF Regime (1991-2012)

1. Introduction

The collapse of the Derg and the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991 was the outcome of a decade and half of intense civil war. EPRDF was an umbrella organization consisting of six ethnically based opposition groups, with Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) at the centre (Keller & Smith 2005, 266). The many national movements that gained full force at the closing of the Derg regime gave rise to the political system of ethnic federalism. The nationalist question that caused the previous civil war against the Derg was one in which the overly centralized Ethiopian state was ill equipped to address. As such, the EPRDF, being an amalgam of different ethno-regional groups clamoring for some representation in a multiethnic federation, had little choice but to adopt this system, which was considered sufficiently accommodating to the demands of its partner organizations.

The precipitous collapse of the Ethiopian state created a momentary institutional vacuum at the center. In the immediate aftermath of the end of the civil war, the centralized state was no longer available to put a lid on subnational discontents that threatened to upset the equilibrium that had historically been in place. The adoption of the system of ethnic federalism is, thus, intelligible in the context not only of the long-standing nationalist question but also of the immediate threat of disintegration staring postwar state-makers. Furthermore, the decentralization implicit in the system of ethnic federalism was viewed as “the best to demonstrate the regime’s commitment to social equity and democracy” (Keller & Smith 2005, 266).
In this chapter, I will assess the process of state building that took place under the EPRDF regime. Zenawi’s vision of constructing a democratic developmental state drew inspiration from the success of the Southeast Asian countries. Yet, the state under EPRDF rule faced many domestic and international challenges that laid bare the inherent contradictions in this project: the challenges of ethnic federalism system as a way of practicing decentralized form of governance and the pressures of an international neoliberal order are of importance among many. The chapter traces the political ideology of the EPRDF government, the implementation of ethnic federalism and the economic priorities of the regime for the project of state building. While Ethiopia has scored rising GDP growth since the late 20th century, marked with economic growth in the modern sector, poverty among its peasant population still remains a challenge to be addressed.

II. Ascension to Power and the establishment of EPRDF

As stated in the previous chapter, TPLF was one of the earliest sub-national challengers to the Derg regime. Their ethno-national struggle stemmed from Amhara political hegemony, the reoccurring tragedy of famine in the region and impoverished fate of the Tigrayan peasant under Ethiopia’s successive regimes. During the early days of the revolution, from 1975 to 1985, the TPLF agenda held an ethno-nationalist stance; however, it did not clearly promote or object to the idea of secession (Prunier 2015, 420). Its nationalist leaning had, however, helped the party gain support from its Tigre-situated peasantry (Prunier 2015, 420). The changing stance of the TPLF and the creation of EPRDF took place in the midst of swift domestic and international changes. The fall of the Derg regime and years of civil war had left the country in complete economic disaster, grave infrastructural damage and on the brink of regional balkanization. The
civil war had a significantly adverse impact on the country’s agrarian economy. After the fall of the Derg, the country was also left with only a few million dollars of foreign exchange, unable to finance imports and economic development (Prunier 2015, 425). Besides through empty political rhetoric and slogans, the Derg also never devised concrete policies and solutions to address the ‘national question.’ In the international scene, there was a shift in the power politics of the Cold War.

The retreat of the Soviet Union and the military aid cut-off from the Derg undermined the political and economic power of the military junta; furthermore, the rise of the United States as the uncontested global hegemon signaled a new partnership for the Ethiopian government to come (Markakis 2015, 230). Since the TPLF began as an ethno-nationalist movement uninterested in secessionism, it had to form an alliance with other nationalist movements if it was going to be part of a political system in the context of a multiethnic society. Soon after, the TPLF set about to create EPRDF, a coalition of four-ethnically defined organizations made up of previous regional/national fronts (De Waal 2015, 159). This coalition was somewhat of a “trans-ethnic alliance,” although TPLF remained at the centre (Prunier 2015, 424). The true power-sharing nature of the coalition and TPLF hegemony are still debated (Prunier 2015, 423).

III. EPRDF Ideology

EPRDF began identifying the larger challenges that confronted the Ethiopian state after the fall of the Derg regime. The centralization of power under the “rentier state,” the “ethnocratic” nature of power and wealth concentration in the hands of a single ethnic group, and political and economic oppression of the masses in the periphery were identified as the primary factors for Ethiopia’s history of underdevelopment (Vaughan
According to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, there was one thing that would ensure the security and survival of the Ethiopian state: accelerated growth of Ethiopia’s economy. This entailed building a class basis that could sustain the country’s development and democracy (De Waal 2015, 163). Rather than the polarized debate between capitalism and socialism, the core of Mele’s argument was “rent-seeking versus revolutionary democracy” (De Waal 2015, 163).

The idea of a revolutionary democracy marked a critical component of EPRDF’s political philosophy and policy direction. Following the Derg’s policy of land reform, EPRDF saw the peasantry as a homogeneous bunch, with common needs and political ideologies (Markakis 2011, 249). Consequently, only one venue or political apparatus was deemed necessary or legitimate to capture this peasant interest (Markakis 2011, 249). Contrasting the previous regime’s struggle to establish a vanguard party to lead the socialist agenda, EPRDF quickly claimed its vanguard leadership, creating a type of ruling party-state coalition that secured hegemony over all political and economic life (Lefort 2015, 360). Revolutionary democracy was different from that of liberal democracy, in that the latter resulted from a fully matured capitalist market, something Ethiopia lacked. Furthermore, at the heart of revolutionary democracy is the notion that the masses need some guidance in arriving at democratic decisions. Therefore, a party-state was needed to direct the masses and promote their rights (Lefort 2015, 360).

The idea of the democratic developmental state was inspired from the experiences of Asian countries, specifically South Korea and Taiwan. These experiences would then

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6The history of Marxist influence continues to shape the conception of political power and the proper relationship between party and state. This history, in part, explains the EPRDF’s commitment to a strong state apparatus, even as it seeks to decentralize power. Unity of party and state, which to some extent characterizes the current regime, is the core tenet of Marxist ideology.
be adapted to fit the socio-political circumstances of Ethiopia (De Waal 2015, 165). The TPLF proposed that Ethiopia was still at a “pre-capitalist stage” and, thus, “major free market economy forces” have yet to mature to compete in the global market. Therefore, EPRDF showed resistance to the neo-liberal paradigm that would render the state a “night watchman state” and virtually allow the free-market to rule; this would hinder the state from needed intervention in the market and lead to a “dead end” (Lefort 2015, 360). EPRDF reasoned that the state should actively capture economic rents, using its monopoly for the purpose of value creation. In other words, the funds derived from these rents should be used for the government-directed development and state-building project (De Waal 2015, 164).

The developmental state envisioned had three elements: “autonomy from the private sector, obsession with development and hegemony of developmental discourse” (quoted in De Waal 2015, 163-164). First, the developmental state would both lead and remain interdependent with the private sector. With a satisfied peasantry and a growing middle-class population, the developmental state would be able to overcome the problem of rent-seeking. Despite the success that has come out of growth in the private sector since then, EPRDF concluded that it held no more faith “in the private sector’s capacity to promote development, than it had in the political opposition to promote democracy” (Markakis 2011, 263). Second, through a commitment to the project of development, economic growth is seen as the only means of survival and effective state building. Third, hegemony of developmental discourse would entail conceptualizing development not only in terms of capital accumulation but also the strengthening of technical capacity to achieve development, such as education at the secondary and tertiary levels. Zenawi’s
investment initiatives and political authoritarianism were all “cut from the same theoretical path” of the democratic developmental state (De Waal 2015, 165).

IV. Ethnic Federalism: Constitutional Provisions

In the 1991 charter, the EPRDF government spelled out three concrete reforms: “decentralization of the state, democratization of its politics, under a multi-party electoral system, and liberalization of the economy, in a neo-liberal international climate” (Vaughan 2015, 284). The process of decentralization, democratization and commitment toward socio-economic advancement were seen as forward solutions to Ethiopia’s state-building project and a response to the shortcomings of Ethiopia’s previous predatory politics. The reforms introduced by the EPRDF addressed two issues that were cultural and political in nature through the coining of “ethnic federalism.” Again, the recognition of a federal government in line with the multi-national character of Ethiopia was a response to the historical grievances of marginalized ethnic groups and a commitment toward their inclusion in the future political process. Although this was on the agenda of the Derg, the ‘national question’ did not receive a legitimate answer nor was Abyssinian hegemony fully addressed and challenged. Ethnic Federalism also addressed the “central hegemony” of the Ethiopian state. Centralization of state rule was now reversed for a move toward greater power sharing among the different ethnic states (kilils) to be created (Markakis 2011, 229).

The FDRE constitution in 1995 established the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Article 1) with the preamble giving the impression of the ‘coming together’ rather than ‘holding together’ of nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia (Fisha 2006, 132). Power is divided between the federal government and the states. As such, both the state
and federal governments shall have legislative, executive and judicial powers (Article 50.2). Furthermore, the Federal Parliament consists of two chambers: The Council of People’s Representatives and the Council of the Federation. While the former operates under a majoritarian party system elected for 5-year terms (Article 54.1), the latter displays a consociational power-sharing structure with one representative per ethnic group plus an additional representative for every million people of every ethnic group (Article 61.2).

The FDRE constitution spelt out the division of the Ethiopian state into nine federated National Regional states (kilils). The nine federated states are: Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harar, Oromiya, Somali, SNNPRS/the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State, and Tigray (Article 47). Settlement patterns, identity and cultural origins, language, consent of the governed, were key factors in the delineation of territorial arrangement (Article 39: 5) (Vaughan 2015, 285). Moreover, these states proved highly diverse in nature, “asymmetrical on every social indicator, with vast differences in population size, demographic distribution and profile, developmental indices and resources” (Vaughan 2015, 286). For those with ethnic diversity in their states, particularly in the southwest, there have been administrative mechanisms established for further accommodation of this diversity (Vaughan 2015, 286). Furthermore, there were five levels of government for Ethiopia’s brand of federalism: federal, regional state, zone, woreda (district) and kebele (local) levels (Keller & Smith 2005, 270).

The constitution states that “All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia” (Article 8). If the federal government abuses the
rights of the federated states, “Every nation, nationality and people of Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted right to self-determination up to secession” (Article 39). The preservation of national unity at the federal level and cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of ethno-linguistic groups within the ethnic states is negotiated through constitutional language policy. While the official language of the Federal government is Amharic, member states hold the right to determine their respective official languages (Article 5). The respective regional states of Tigray, Oromia and Amhara have adopted their own languages while states lacking majority ethnic groups (i.e. Benishangul/Gumuz, Gambella and the SNNPRS) have kept Amharic as their working language (Fiseha 2006, 135).

V. Ethnic Federalism: Assets and Shortcomings

The decentralization of power instituted after 1991 is unique in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Nigeria being the first African federation on the continent to precede Ethiopia’s new ethno-territorial arrangement. Reflecting on the Ethiopian experience, many feared that ethnic federalism could lead toward balkanization of the state, similar to that of Yugoslavia and “fragmentation of neighboring Somalia” (Vaughan 2015, 286). Others praised the new system and saw it as an opportunity to address the historical grievances brought by a highly centralized state. Through the establishment of ethnic federalism, the Ethiopian government devised a clever way to deal with many ethno-nationalist struggles and ensured the survival of Ethiopia’s territorial sovereignty. Multi-ethnic federalism also served as a conflict-mechanism technique, ensuring majority ethnic representation within boundaries constituting relatively homogeneous regional states (Fiseha 2006, 135). Through its language policy, the constitution also enabled a degree of cultural expression and survival, deviating from the homogenization project of
previous regimes. In sum, ethnic federalism challenged the previous nation-state order and allowed for greater power sharing in a structure that upheld the rights of previously marginalized peoples in Ethiopia.

Although the reorganization of the Ethiopian state on the lines of ethnicity promised to grant a degree of autonomy and voice to previously dominated groups, there are several limitations to ethnic federalism. The first critique of this system is that it introduced ethnicity, or its institutionalized form, into Ethiopian politics (Vaughan 2015, 286). As we have seen in the previous chapters, the use of ethnicity in Ethiopian politics predates the modern era. Ethnicity has played a key role both in the process of state-formation and power-consolidation. However, a problem arises where federal states have varying degrees of ethnic homogeneity. In this case, minorities in these regional states remain at risk of political and social discrimination. Put differently, “there is always a potential for local tyranny” (Fiseha 2006, 136). While the states of Oromia, Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Somali are largely homogeneous; the remaining four states are vastly heterogeneous. In the latter states with no dominant ethnic majority, the possibility for a minority to exercise “tyranny” over the majority is evident (Fiseha 2006, 136-137).

Secondly, some boundaries between the states remain vague and thus, difficult to delineate territorial demarcations. These have resulted in conflict over water resources and land grazing areas. Although these conflicts pre-date the current system, conflict between different communities and traditional enmities have been “transformed into conflict between adjacent regional states” (Fiseha 2006, 136). Competing contestations to the town of Babile by Oromia and the Somali Regional State, access to water and land areas by pastoral groups such as the Borana and Gari, and tensions between the Afar and
the Issa, from Afar and Somali Regional States respectively, all serve as examples by which conflict has been exacerbated through the ethnic federalism system (Fiseha 2006, 136).

The EPRDF government faced the challenge of balancing complete decentralization and centralization of power. To further reinstate its hegemony, the TPLF guided EPRDF government devised and superimposed “a political system controlled and guided from the centre” (Markakis 2015, 242). Again, this was accomplished through the merging of party and state as the sole driver of the state-building and development project (Markakis 2015, 242). The decentralization process of ethnic federalism was, from the understanding of the periphery, to garner a level of security and control over land and resources (Markakis 2011, 260). However, kilils remain powerless in the administration of their states. Often, kilil administrators lack trained civil servants to implement and regulate policies. This has particularly been the case in the following four regional states: the mixed areas of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella to the western border of Sudan and the Muslim pastoral Afar and Somali areas to the east (Vaughan 2015, 290). In the past, civil servants controlled from the centre governed these areas. As Vaughan notes, “Corruption, embezzlement and instability thrived as undereducated and inexperienced officials applied the enticing resources attendant on abrupt political promotion to communal or clan rivalries” (Vaughan 2015, 290). Land leasing has also resulted in the marginalization of pastoralist communities and the maintenance of their way of life, as the sparsely populated lowlands would be up for grabs.
VI. Economic Priorities and Land Privatization

The strategy that followed for the restoration of the economy focused on the rapid growth in agricultural production for domestic consumption and provision of raw materials for industrialization. Shifting away from the emphasis of export crop production, the main economic initiative of the EPRDF government was to raise agricultural productivity for the purposes of food security (Markakis 2011, 257). The TPLF reasoned “an economy based on foreign markets...becomes dependent on imperialism” (quoted in Lehart 2015, 362). The rhetoric of “independent development” “self-reliance” and “national market” thus became dominant discourses to guide internal food self-sufficiency (quoted in Lehart 2015, 262). Agriculture was considered a priority for the transformation of the economy and this was based on providing the farmer with agricultural inputs (i.e. fertilizers, seeds, etc.) through the “agricultural extension package” (Lehart 2015, 363). Although agricultural transformation was regarded as key for the domestic economy, it was also seen as “a launching pad for industrialization” through the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) program (Lehart 2015, 363). This program assumed the cycle of growth that would result from the rising purchasing power of successful peasants. The demand for food products would then lead to the development of new domestic industries, offering greater opportunities for employment (Lehart 2015, 363-364). Yet, the per capita income of Ethiopians reached its lowest point since the revolution in the year in 2002 (Prunier 2015, 431).

The early years of the EPRDF rule were prime times for economic growth; however, the failure to fully develop the agricultural economy keep purchasing power at minimum; this would in turn inhibit growth elsewhere in Ethiopia (Markakis 2011, 255).
With a relatively low success on agricultural returns similar to the last few years experienced during the Derg, the regime changed its focus “from the peasant to the land itself” (Markakis 2011, 255 & Lehart 2015, 364). Land privatization was most common in many parts of Ethiopia in the first decade of the 21st century (Markakis 2011, 257). Although it gained momentum in 2009, land was being leased to private capital for commercial cultivation in the early 2000s (Markakis 2011, 255).

There was a political dimension connected to the leasing of local land to foreign investors. Most of the leased land areas were in the lowland periphery and put into question the regime’s “strategy of development” (Markakis 2011, 255). Particularly, land was acquired from Oromo peasants cheaply as they were “allowed to rent half their holding; a form of disguised sale” (Markakis 2011, 257). International demands for food security and the drive by energy producing countries to invest in crop production for biofuel conversion led to another wave of what some critics called the “second scramble for Africa” (Markakis 2011, 260). Although the agri-business led to higher production of food, this production was now designed for export purposes, not for local consumption (Markakis 2011, 260).

Moreover, environmental regulations and protection policies that ensure fair trade among investors and the public remain minimal (quoted in Lehart 2015, 375). Commercial agricultural ventures and focus on FDI, particularly in the lands of the periphery, have “reinforced concerns about the autonomy, integrity, and capacity of state regulation” under the authority of the regional states (Vaughan 2015, 307). A new commodity, chat, has also flourished during this time without any government incentives or intervention. Having its roots in the native region of the eastern highlands of Ethiopia,
it spread to the Horn area and gained new foreign markets in Europe and North America. As noted by Markakis, “Its cultivation spread to all the coffee-producing areas of the country, where it competed with Ethiopia’s main export” (Markakis 2011, 259).

VII. War and Legitimacy

After some years of peace, Ethiopia was engaged in another war with Eritrea. In the years after 1991, things were relatively at peace between the two countries. Ethiopia supported their independence and a closer tie between Addis Ababa and Asmara was established. Signs of disenfranchisement started to develop on economic grounds, as Eritrea blamed Ethiopia for its protectionist policies prohibiting Eritreans to work and to invest in Ethiopia. In turn, Ethiopia accused Eritrea on the grounds of re-exporting goods to Ethiopia imported from abroad (Markakis 2011, 266). After a regional dispute on the land claim of Bademe in the northwest border emerged, war was declared between the two countries. With the leadership of the United States, a truce was called and both countries were obliged to bring their case to international arbitration.

Given the military advantages Ethiopia had over Eritrea, the war in Eritrea brought further division within the TPLF leadership. The division was due to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s decision to retreat from capitalizing on Ethiopia’s battlefield gains. General discontent also stemmed from the “overall posture of the government in its relationship with foreign donors, which the dissidents condemned as servile” (Markakis 2011, 273). In March 2001, core members of the TPLF and dissent voices were expelled from the Politbureau for an attempt to dispose Prime Minister Meles Zenawi through an internal bureaucratic coup (Prunier 2015, 426). Their expulsion further displayed increasing autonomy of Meles Zenawi (Markakis 2011, 274).
VII. Conclusion

The TPLF-led EPRDF government established certain ideologies to direct Ethiopia’s state-building project. The democratic developmental state brought to light the idea of a “revolutionary democracy” and the developmental state had the following three tenets: autonomy from the private sector, commitment to development and hegemonic hold on the development discourse. All of these led to a fusion of part and state, as EPRDF become the sole driver of modernization and development in the country. The lack of cooperation with the private sector and centralization of the party/state to avoid “rent-seeking” has, to a certain extent, crippled the country's development. The system of ethnic federalism, although it dealt with the problems of power centralization and gave previously marginalized groups a certain level of agency, still encounters many shortcomings. The true nature of power devolution and regional autonomy is still put to question today.

While resisting neoliberal policies in its earlier period, the early 2000s signal a policy reform that aligns more fully with a neoliberal paradigm. The privatization of land and leasing of land to TPLF supporters and foreign capitalists has marginalized the mass peasant population and has cast doubt upon the vision of the “democratic developmentalist state.” The internal structure of TPLF was split on the debates over relations with Eritrea, further undermining the power and decisions of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Under the current leadership of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe, EPRDF government faces the challenges of managing the delicate dance between its party/state protectionist policies and full integration into a liberalized economy under the neoliberal order.
Chapter VIII: Conclusion

I. Key Findings

I identify four sets of findings concerning state building and nation building within each of the historical periods explored. First, the predatory theory lends us a theoretical framework to understand the state-building process during the leadership of Menelik II. The territorial boundary of the Ethiopian state was constructed through the interrelated processes of war-making, state-making, extraction/capital accumulation and protection. In order to engage in capital accumulation, systems of taxation, the gult land-tenure system and slave trade were instituted to both strengthen the state-apparatus and ensure Abyssinian hegemony. This had both political and cultural ramifications. Abyssinian rule resulted in the marginalization of conquered peoples, particularly living in the southern periphery. Furthermore, the construction of the Ethiopian nation-state legitimized Abyssinian hegemony and developed class structures based on ethnicity. Although not explored in great depth, it is critical to note the interlinked development of mercantile capitalism and colonialism in the Horn that further precipitated the state-building project during the reign of Menelik II.

The second set of findings, associated with the time of Emperor Haile Selassie, reveal the contradictions between the modernization project and the keeping of tradition in the state-construction process. Building on the legacy of Menelik II, the Emperor embarked on a journey to undertake development and to create a more bureaucratic state apparatus. The first Ethiopian constitution was drafted in July 1931 and this augmented the legibility of the Ethiopian state. Although the provisions of the constitution gave the illusion of democratic reform, it was made clear that decision-making power was vested
in the Emperor’s sovereignty. Political power was highly centralized in the palace after the Emperor’s return from exile. Although the Emperor was committed to some form of modernization and development that reformed some institutions and improved Ethiopia’s physical infrastructures, the political climate remained monarchic, repressive and resistant to accommodate differing political ideologies.

The ousting of the Emperor and the installment of the Derg regime leads to the third set of findings from the research. The Ethiopian Student Movement challenged the systems of imperialism and capitalism through a Marxist perspective. Town-bred intellectuals placed class struggle at the center while those in the rural and peripheralized regions prioritized the national-struggle, thus giving rise to ethno-nationalist movements challenging Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. This contradiction, and, thus, the lack of a unified political project posed the challenge of garnering full legitimacy and consolidating power for the Derg. With its vanguard party established ten years after taking power, the Derg embarked on a journey to create a socialist Ethiopia. Some of the institutional developments that marked a break from the old, imperial rule were the establishment of kebele and peasant associations and the 1975 land reform, which did away with the old feudal order of land ownership. However, this vision of socialism did not fully materialize as ideological and political opposition was interpreted as a threat to the dictatorial rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Thus, under the Derg regime, the state largely remained predatory.

The final set of findings concern the establishment of EPRDF and its political ideologies. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the priority became building a democratic developmental state. The party made a distinction between “liberal
democracy” and “revolutionary democracy.” While the former was deemed the result of a fully capitalist market, the latter was based on peasant satisfaction and establishment of a secure middle-class. In turn, only one political instrument was deemed necessary to capture this peasant interest—the EPRDF ruling party. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi envisioned a developmental state with three critical components: a level of both autonomy and interdependence with the private sector; a commitment to development and economic growth; and hegemony over developmental discourse. The ‘national question’ that remained after the fall of the Derg regime received an answer through the ethnic federalism system. The system was intended to both guarantee the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and give new spaces for local, civic action. However, there are shortcomings to the system that undermine the federalism project and democratic nature of EPRDF’s centralized governance.

II. Key Lessons

Two main lessons have emerged from my study of Ethiopia’s state-building project. The first is the importance of geopolitics or intersocietal relations in the state-building and nation-building project. By this, I mean both the transfer of ideas from one society to another and also the political and economic power that is exerted to influence a country’s political and social direction. During the time of Menelik II, the European Scramble for Africa and free-trade imperialism played a significant role in the state-formation process of Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia was never colonized, this external process of colonization in the Horn instigated the southern expansion by Abyssinian rule. During the time of Haile Selassie, Italian occupation of the region had several impacts on state development and the fate of peripheralized ethnic groups. Both the acceptance of
Ethiopia into the League of Nations (during the time of Menelik II) and the establishment of the OAU (Organization of African Union) garnered attention that further secured the international legitimacy of the Ethiopian state. All these early developments were also accompanied with the rise and dominance of capitalism as an economic and social system. After the removal of the Emperor, global politics shifted and Ethiopia found a new friendship with the Soviet Union. Not only were the Soviets crucial in Ethiopia’s ideological development of socialism, they also strengthened the Derg’s coercive power and power consolidation, particularly in the periphery. The Soviet Union also placed significant pressures on the Derg to establish the vanguard party that would lead the socialist-state building project. During the time of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the idea of the democratic developmental state, based on the experiences of Southeast Asian countries, sets the inspirational grounding for a new political project. This political project was intended to balance protective and neoliberal policies. With the failure of agricultural productivity, the latter has gained momentum starting in the early 2000s.

The second lesson derived from this project is the importance of examining the movement of history. Within each historical period, we see the state responding—positively or negatively—to the contradictions of the policy enacted by the previous government in power. In other words, the contemporary historical moment always inherits the political past and devises new ideologies and institutions that confront these contradictions. These new ideas and systems also reveal the ways history is treated as a gateway to new possibilities. Furthermore, understanding history is very important as it also puts grievances into perspective. In particular, coming to terms with the political history of Ethiopia has given me greater insight to the interactions I witnessed among the
diaspora. In particular, the interviews I conducted among the Oromo population in the Netherlands revealed their own struggle to comprehend the conundrum that is the Ethiopian nation-state. Although the system of federalism has been enacted, its shortcomings still inhibit one’s full ownership over land and resources, particularly in the southern periphery. The culmination of historical events—some which have established deep paradigms of Abyssinian political and cultural hegemony—remain as part of the contemporary political, social and economic struggle for justice and civic belonging.

III. Future Inquiries

There are three future concerns that I derive from my honors project. The first concerns the relationship between capital and forms of labor as it concerns the concept of subsumption (process through which capital expands). Real subsumption is when pre-capitalist state is entirely transformed, having both political institutions and the state-apparatus oriented toward a capitalist mode of living and production. Situating this in the context of Ethiopia, I am interested to evaluate capitalist expansion throughout the historical periods explored in my honors. I find this to be a worthy inquiry as the building of infrastructure (i.e. railroads) for the transportation of resources in the early era of Ethiopian history or the growing influence of multinational corporations in the periphery in the modern era signify the changes within the society oriented toward capitalist extraction. Understanding capitalist expansion also reveals the deeper dynamics of social consciousness rooted in the struggle over material life and the distribution of surplus.

The second issue arises from EPRDF’s pursuit of a democratic developmental state. Although the developmentalist state is concerned with reducing societal vulnerability through improving human capital and enhancing productive forces, this also
comes at the expense of civic pluralism and basic liberties. The idea of a “revolutionary democracy” seeks to address this deficit of a developmentalist state—especially when it comes to the rights of the peasant population. Reflecting on the important concepts of democracy and the developmental state, I ask: To what extent does human rights become sacrificed for economic growth? What are the ramifications of this trade-off? The latter question arises from my reflection on Karl Polanyi’s concept of “embeddedness.” As an economic historian, he argued that economic functions could not be understood apart from the larger political, social and cultural world. In other words, economic relations have to be understood amongst larger historically evolved institutions. That being said, I am curious to evaluate the social and cultural transformations that arise from building a developmental state.

My final curiosity stems from a reflection on the need for reconciliation and justice. The rise of monopoly capitalism, which instigated the southern expansionist project of Menelik II, has left a costly wound in the country. This wound has manifested through ethno-nationalist struggles for liberation and self-determination. The socialist agenda brought by the Derg, although it made major attempts in dismantling capitalist and imperialist systems of exploitation in the periphery, failed in leading the democratization process of the country and tackling the problems of poverty and underdevelopment. The EPRDF regime inherited many difficulties accumulated throughout Ethiopia’s political past. These challenges, however, are also partly the by-products of a global political economy bent toward exploitative capitalist gains that further exacerbate ethnic tensions. These reflections bring me to the following questions: Does the neoliberal paradigm inhibit the process of reconciliation and justice? What
agency does the government and the people of Ethiopia have to construct a more just and reconciled society? Although I cannot answer these questions right now, I believe the quest for answers lies in thoroughly assessing both global and local structures that obstruct the making of peace and development.
Appendix A: Map of Ethiopia

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Appendix B: Regional States and Chartered Cities of Ethiopia
Appendix C: Shoan Conquest of the Periphery (1887-1890)
Bibliography


