Activating Informality: Negotiating Urban Identities in Bolivia and Brazil

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Activating Informality:
Negotiating Urban Identities in Bolivia and Brazil

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Honors Thesis in Latin American Studies
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Abstract:
Drawing on original research, this paper explores the relationship between community identity and informality in Bolivia and Brazil, answering the question “How does informality influence and operate as identity in the social imaginary of urban Bolivia and Brazil?” Based on case studies of informal settlements in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia and Niterói, Brazil, I argue that informality is a tool of social control, community resistance, and identity consolidation. Community identity is informed by the territorial stigmatization of place through national conceptualizations of race and violence, and histories of marginality, resulting in resistance identity and insurgent citizenships.

Keywords: community identity; informality; perception; territorial stigmatization; resistance identity; insurgent citizenship
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Legend of Abbreviations

AEIS – Áreas de Especial Interesse Social
AMMI – Associação de Moradores do Morro do Ingá
BOPE – Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Elite Special Forces)
CCSI – Centro Cultural San Isidro
CDU – Corporación Municipal de Desarrollo Urbano
COMPUR – Conselho Municipal de Políticas Urbanas
CPSC – Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz
IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
MAC – Museu de Arte Contemporânea
PDM – Plan de Desarrollo Municipal
PEMAS – Plano Estratégico Municipal para Assentamentos Informais Urbanos
PLOT – Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial
PMCMV – Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida
UPP – Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Unit)
UVs – Unidades Vecinales
Introduction: Problematising Informality as an Identity in Cities
Urban identity – identity as a sense of belonging to a city – encounters ambiguity in cities in which there is a visible divide between formal and informal space. Informal settlements (often referred to as slums), as spaces in which the informal or the unregulated economy reigns and urban development occurs independently of coordinated municipal efforts, have their own realities that shape urban identity formation. In these communities, identity at the community scale is intersectional, dynamic and, I argue, purposeful.

Governments and media often use the label informal to associate communities with poverty, violence, or racial difference. These communities may be dubbed “subnormal” agglomerations, unplanned sections, or poor. This rhetoric dominates dialogue around them and dictates outsider perceptions. Such perceptions are then used to justify forced evictions and planning policies that neglect infrastructure development in informal areas. Thus, because informality is associated with the undesirable and precarious, it is imagined as a demeaning identity rather than a flexible and pervasive condition.

On the other hand, the condition of informality is conducive to the development of identities that permit communities to challenge negative rhetoric. The circumstances of their existence involve an inherent marginalization, in part due to their dynamism and constant state of evolution. Informal communities usually begin as conglomerations of settlers, and over time consolidate as sections of the urban built environment. Their identity as a community thus also evolves, crystallizing in relation to their surroundings. Community identities also contain a narrative of self which residents project to those around them – yet external perceptions often subvert the desired narrative. Informal community identities are therefore projects, narratives of resistance that define an internal sense of self and assert a rhetoric that redefines its public image. These identities foster the power of residents of informality against their marginalization by society.

This paper explores the relationship between identity, urbanization, and informality in Bolivia and Brazil. Specifically, it answers the question How does informality influence and operate as identity in the social imaginary of urban Bolivia and Brazil? I analyze two cities: Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In each, I focus on one informal community – formed as a result of land occupation and in which significant characteristics of informality persist: Plan 3000 in Bolivia and Morro do Palácio in Brazil. I argue that informality constitutes a tool for narrative control used by multiple social actors in urban Bolivia and Brazil. The condition of informality fosters the formation of resistance identities and project identities. Further, community identity formation in the case studies is based on race and place of origin, the spatial relationship between the community and the rest of the city, violence, and marginality. In addition, I argue that informality is also used as a justification for rhetorical control and policy-implemented marginalization by outside forces such as the government and the media. Informality is thus a tool that benefits both the marginalized and institutions in power.

This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the relationship of those who live in informality to citizenship and identity on both the city and international scales. Considering the
condition of informality as scalar (on local, national, and international scales) reveals the experiences of those living in informality that transcend national and regional contexts, and the ways in which informality is perceived and manipulated as an extension of socio-economic and socio-spatial negotiations.

Problematizing informality and identity becomes significant when considered in relation to the inherent scalar relationships of informality. Informal communities do not exist solely in relation to the rest of the cities of which they are part, but also with the regions of influence of their metropolitan centers, their national contexts, and the international scale through the international flow of capital that binds all urban centers together. It is therefore useful to consider informality as a global phenomenon. Just as a city becomes increasingly globalized in terms of capital flow and metropolitan identity, so too do the informal communities within them.

Informal, or “slum”, identity – and the ways in which it is used and interpreted by multiple social actors – also becomes interconnected across regions, states, and continents. This begs examination of how citizenship relates to the informal-formal divide and the development of identity. Saskia Sassen argues that cities are the site of economic globalization, and that the city scale is becoming more relevant than the national scale in terms of international relationships. Within this context of the internationalization of urban space, marginalized peoples find new opportunities to participate and engage, given that their “political sense of self and identities are not necessarily embedded in the ‘nation’ or the ‘national community’. ”

It is thus important to recognize that local renegotiations of citizenship have international ramifications, and are influenced by global relationships and the globalization of the economy.

There is little scholarly exploration that relates informality to identity development in cities, let alone a comparison framed by a more holistic consideration of informality. I contribute to the literature on informal communities in several arenas. I develop a definition of informality that accounts for its pervasive nature and enables an investigation of intra-urban relationships. Building on this definition, I then propose that the scholarly approach to informality needs to be reframed in order to consider the power dynamics that control urban space. I argue that conceiving of space as socially or legally ‘legitimized’ or ‘delegitimized’ rather than ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ more accurately captures these dynamics. I also address a gap in the literature by joining the theories of insurgent citizenship, resistance identity, and territorial stigmatization to understand how stigma contributes to identity and citizenship in informal communities. In addition, this study is significant given that comparative studies of Bolivia and Brazil are not common, despite their geographical, social, and regionally articulated similarities. Although favelas and informal spaces in Brazil often appear in the literature, Morro do Palácio is not widely studied, and comparable communities in Bolivia are largely absent from the scholarly understanding of informality. I thus provide an understanding of communities new to the scholarly eye, contribute to creating a more cohesive view of urbanization within South America, and put previously ignored theories into conversation.

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Case Studies: Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio

The case studies are two informal settlements within large metropolitan areas in Bolivia and Brazil. In Bolivia, I focus on Santa Cruz de la Sierra, a city of 1.5 million in the heart of eastern Bolivia. This region, famous for its cattle, sugarcane, and natural gas production, drives much of the Bolivian economy. While a significant portion of Bolivia remains rural (roughly 32 percent remained in rural areas in 2010) Santa Cruz de la Sierra is the main population center in the eastern region. Its primacy makes it a destination for rural migrants, especially from western Bolivia. The department of Santa Cruz had a 2010 population of nearly 2.7 million – thus the majority of its population lives in the main city. Santa Cruz is also the department with the highest percentage of people living in urban areas; 81% in 2012, compared to 67% in La Paz, Bolivia’s most populous department (INE 2015). Residents of Santa Cruz de la Sierra are also proud of their famed hospitality; it is the so-called ‘law of the cruçeño.’

To understand the relationship between the informal and the formal city in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, I narrow my case study focus to the community of Plan 3000. Plan 3000 has many alternate names: the Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez, Plan Tres Mil, District 8, or simply “the Plan” – all of which are used interchangeably by locals and residents. In this thesis I confine my references to Plan 3000 or the Plan for the sake of simplicity. In this particular case, the term ‘community’ may be considered by some to be a stretch due to the size of the population. Because of its informality, the population of Plan 3000 is difficult to ascertain. Some estimate the district to be home to roughly 350,000 people. While this may seem to exclude categorization of Plan 3000 from the realm of possibility, I argue that due to the circumstances of its founding and the social dynamics and traditions that emerged from it, Plan 3000 is still conceived of as a community both internally and by others in the city at large.

Plan 3000 was founded in March 1983 as an emergency settlement, after the Río Piraí on the western side of Santa Cruz de la Sierra flooded and destroyed a section of the city. Notably, the affected homes were owned by the poorest in the city – the reason why they lived in an area prone to natural disasters to begin with. Hundreds (an estimated 3,000 families) of damnificados or ‘victims’ were displaced in the disaster, and after a short period of emergency housing in the departmental university, were resettled on a parcel of land on the other extreme on the city, far from the city center. Families were provided with tarps with which to construct emergency

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4 La Calle, March 2013, 20. According to census and other survey data, District 8 had 61,659 residents in 1992, and 148,704 in 2001. Regardless of the accuracy of the widely cited estimate of 350,000, it is clear that the growth rate of the district in the past 20 years has been extremely high.
5 The number 3,000 is widely referenced. However, the legal magazine LEX listed the initial number of families as 50. (LEX: Revista Legal. March 2012. Ed. 61. “Plan 3.000: Por qué quiere ser município?”).
housing. The new settlement was inaccessible by most vehicles due to poor roads; damnificados had to walk 5 kilometers to reach the outskirts of Santa Cruz.

“We didn’t think about a house, but a shelter, more or less respectable. The idea was that later, the Civil Defense or the City, would give us lots (of land), so we could build our houses.”

The lots awarded to families were often of very poor quality, full of vegetation and potholes. Abandoned by the state, the damnificados formed cooperatives to meet their basic needs, like potable water, kitchens, and distribution of rations. A founding resident described the necessity of self-organization amongst neighbors:

“In the end, we got tired and we organized ourselves into the Neighborhood Group of the Barrio San Antonio. I was the first president. I remember that we didn’t have money and we asked institutions for help to cover the needs of the neighborhood, and some of the officials labeled us beggars and hobos. They discriminated against us on more than one occasion” (María Zabala Cortéz Vda. de Chacón, Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez, 14).

Cooperatives for public goods such as water and electricity eventually succeeded in providing basic infrastructure to most parts of the Plan. As people built their own homes, neighborhoods consolidated, and few residents obtained land titles and therefore had little security or social mobility. According to María Zabala Cortéz, many of the original damnificados eventually left the community to escape the persistent extreme poverty in which they were placed.

“Over the years many people sold their lots because they could not endure the great necessities that came with living in a place like this. At the start there wasn’t enough money, food, transportation was horrible, there weren’t schools or basic services. Some didn’t last and they went in search of better days in other neighborhoods in other zones. After many years, we are seeing positive gains. We are missing a lot, but looking back, to when all this started, we are better off” (María Zabala Cortéz Vda. de Chacón, Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez, 18).

As the damnificados struggled to meet their basic needs and some looked for buyers for their lots, thousands of Bolivians migrated to the city from rural areas. The Plan’s population ballooned and diversified. In 34 years, it grew from a poor settlement of roughly 3,000 families to a bustling district of over 350,000 residents. Demographically, exact statistics for the community are elusive. During my research in Plan 3000, the statistic that 80 percent of the population of Plan 3000 are internal migrants was widely cited. This number also appears in articles published in the local newspaper La Calle. Thus, much of the community’s growth is due to internal migration, and therefore also involved cultural diversification among Bolivia’s lowland and Andean cultures.

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However much Plan 3000 has progressed in 34 years, significant poverty and social stratification remain. In 2001, there were over 32,000 homes in the Plan, 11 percent of which did not have electricity, and one percent of which had access to a sewage system. Informal commerce, mainly in the form of large, unruly, unregulated markets, dominates the economy, and many residents do not have legal titles for their self-constructed homes or lots of land, or rent them from a family without a legal claim. To use an analytic term common in Bolivia, it is one of the most “precarious” districts of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

The Brazilian case is drastically different from Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Plan 3000. The communities are of substantially different populations, have distinct relationships to the cities of which they are a part, and are situated within distinct socioeconomic histories. These differences increase the validity of observations about the similarities of aspects of life in informal communities.

In Brazil, I examine Morro do Palácio, a community of 1,850 (in 2010) in the municipality of Niterói, in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. This location results in several layers of spatial peripherality for residents, as by virtue of living in an informal community they are peripheral to the city of Niterói, which in turn is considered a dormitory city that supports the vibrancy of urban life in the center of Rio de Janeiro. Niterói developed as a satellite city of the center of Rio de Janeiro. Founded in 1573, Niterói’s twentieth century growth transformed it into a bustling population center by the 1960s. Along with the cities of Duque de Caxias, Nilópolis, Nova Iguaçu, São João de Meriti, and São Gonçalo, Niterói and other satellite city populations grew 368 percent between 1940 and 1960.

The community of Morro do Palácio has a vague history. The word morro in Portuguese refers to a hill, namely the hills that make up the geography of the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro. Historically, due to the difficulty of creating urban infrastructure on the steep slopes of hills, the land value of morros was lower than the surrounding regular lands. This made morros prime locations for unregulated land occupation. Morro do Palácio, or the Hill of the Palace, is

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8 Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Urbano Regional (CEDURE). 2011. La Producción Social de la Vivienda en Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

one such community founded through a process of occupation and continual settlement by the city’s poor. Not much is known, or remembered, about how or why the first settlers came to the morro, or why they chose that specific location. One resident of Morro do Palácio who has lived on the hill for 38 years said that when he first arrived, much of the hill was undeveloped mud and brush and that it was difficult to trek up and down the hill. He emphasized that when he arrived there were fewer houses and more plants, indicating that in 1978 there were already homes on the morro. From these comments and the knowledge that Niterói’s population boomed in conjunction with the rapid growth of Rio de Janeiro, it is reasonable to assume that Morro do Palácio has been minimally occupied since at least the 1950s.

This paper represents more contemporary experiences of residents of Morro do Palácio, many of whom arrived in the 1980s and 1990s. Some who moved to the morro as adults or adolescents were drawn to the cheap housing, and were economic migrants moving to Rio to find work. Those who arrived in the 1990s and had lived in the community for less than 20 years settled for similar reasons, but did not experience the same necessity of building their own home as did earlier settlers. It is telling that little is known about the community’s roots. Only in recent years have efforts emerged to recover this history, led by community centers and museums with an interest in defining the present through knowledge of the past. Today, although to a lesser extent, Morro do Palácio remains marginalized in terms of socioeconomic status and the racial demographics of the majority of its residents.

Given the differences in population, location within the city, and ethnic makeup of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, there may seem to be few grounds for comparison. In their current states, the economic possibilities and built environments within each are markedly different, resulting in differences in how people experience life in an informal community. However, it is the extent of their commonalities despite these distinctions that strengthens my claim. Among the most significant are their histories of struggle and bottom-up organization, the collective memory of this history, the fact than Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio struggle with criminal violence, the stigma involved in being a resident of each community, and the ways in which residents fight back against this stigma.

Methodology

This study is based on research conducted in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio during March-August of 2016. Interviews were conducted in Santa Cruz during March and April 2016, and in Niterói during August 2016. All interviews were conducted by the researcher; no interpreters were used. In Santa Cruz de la Sierra, I conducted semi-structured interviews of 25 informants within Plan 3000 (one of whom did not live in Plan 3000), and 24 interviews in the

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11 Many interviewees, or their parents, fell into this category. This group predominantly arrived in the community or were born into it in the 1980s.
central Plaza of Santa Cruz (4 informants lived in Plan 3000 or the other ciudadelas\textsuperscript{12}). In Niterói, I interviewed 15 informants who were residents of Morro do Palácio. I strove for a balance of genders and ages when seeking informants. Interviews were acquired largely by approaching informants in public, with the assistance of a guide in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, and on my own outside the community. The interviews focused on personal histories in each community, perceptions of the community and the larger city, and relationships with city residents who did not live in the community. I became familiar with organizations that are representative of community interests and identity, such as the Centro Cultural San Isidro and the MACquinho. These organizations became instrumental in finding additional informants as well as community members actively working on identity construction or “rebranding” in both Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. I also conducted archival research and consulted with local scholars and professionals on community history and on housing and formalization policy. In Santa Cruz, I visited the Biblioteca Departamental de Santa Cruz, the History and Sociology libraries of the Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno, the library at the Centro Cultural San Isidro, and the archives of the newspaper \textit{La Calle}. In Niterói and Rio de Janeiro, I visited the Geography department of the Biblioteca Nacional do Brasil and the library of the office of Urbanismo e Mobilidade of the Prefeitura de Niterói.

This investigation has several limitations. In Rio-Niterói, interviews of non-community members to collect perceptions of Morro do Palácio were not conducted. This was a function of the time spent in the research area, as well as the lack of a central location in which to find interviewees within the city. In addition, the community lacked the local notoriety of Plan 3000. To compensate for this lack of data, other scholarship on poverty and favelas in Brazil is used, in addition to news reports and interviews conducted by local media. Another limitation results from my positionality as a non-community member of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. Interviews in each community focused on perception, asking residents to comment on their personal relationship with their community. I argue in this paper that community members combat negative external perceptions of informality by emphasizing the positive aspects of community life. It is therefore likely that as a foreigner and an outsider, the community rhetoric I heard in interviews was more pointedly positive.

\textbf{Definition of Terms}

Informal communities exist in every country in Latin America. There are thus many different names for informal communities in the Americas, as well as distinct definitions of such communities. For example, Argentina uses \textit{villas miseria} or \textit{barrios populares}, and in Peru there are \textit{Pueblos Jóvenes} and \textit{barriadas}. In this paper, I take \textit{informal community} to mean an urban community that lacks economic and real estate regulation. This may mean that the community was formed through land occupation, and that current residents do not have land titles.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ciudadela} is the predominant label for large informal settlements in Santa Cruz de la Sierra.
Within the case study locations, there are various ways to refer to these communities. Of the multiple terms used to refer to informal communities and settlements in Bolivia, I rely on the term *ciudadela*, which is common in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Ciudadelas are highly populated sections of cities characterized by a lack of regulation and poverty. A similar term used in a specific instance in this paper is *villa*. In Brazil, two of the most common terms are *favela* and *comunidade*. Favela is a well-known term for informal settlements that carries stigma related to poverty, violence, and danger. For these reasons, some communities in Brazil prefer to identify as *comunidades* – or communities. The merit of identifying as a favela then comes into question. As is clear in the debate between the terms *favela* and *comunidade*, each name has a specific context of development and context-dependent connotations. When referring to Morro do Palácio in this paper, I use the terms ‘community’ or *comunidade*. In cases in which I use *favela*, this is the designation that the community uses to refer to itself.

**Chapter Outline**

Chapter 1, “Theoretical Framework: On Informality, Citizenship, and Identity: Constructing a Framework for Intersectional Informality”, examines the literature on informality, alternative citizenships, and community identity construction in order to find the intersections between these theoretical arenas, and proposes an intersectional definition of informality. The overarching theoretical framework of the thesis is built from this cross section of scholarship. I engage with the work of Manuel Castells to consider possibilities of social organization under the condition of informality. James Holston’s concept of insurgent citizenship emerges as an additional guiding framework for the analysis of community cohesion and power, framing the ‘performance’ (sociopolitical activation) of community identity as an institutionally delineated category of civic identity. I expand upon this framework and consider citizenship as an institutional identity that is complicated by the reality of informality, and liken insurgent citizenship to Castells’ resistance identities in the context of territorial stigmatization.

Chapter 2, “Constructing Identity: Contextualizing Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio”, defines the basis for community identity formation and contextualizes external perceptions of each case study. The story of identity formation in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is examined in detail. In both cases, the common themes of race, marginalization, community violence, and socio-spatial peripheralization are discussed. An application of the theoretical framework reveals that these bases of identity formation are conducive to the development of resistance identities. The chapter argues that community identity in the case studies is a consequence of national conceptualizations of race and class as articulated through socioeconomic divisions in space (territorial stigmatization), which in the context of informality, interact as resistance identities.

Chapter 3, “Perceptions and Control” explores the commonly-held perceptions of outsiders about Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, identifying their intersections and roots. I argue that these perceptions are present in media rhetoric and housing policy, and contribute to the social control, or the construction of socially-imagined limitations, of each community. These
social perceptions therefore control both the pervasive public rhetoric about each community through their influence on the media, and have more serious ramifications, such as when they influence policy and governance. Perception and territorial stigmatization is also used to justify control of informality through mechanisms such as housing policy. I show that perceptions of informality as a condition contribute to the use of the concept of informality as a tool of control – the top-down and pervasive force that resistance identities act against, and thus also is a force that activates identity.

“Conclusions: Informality as a Tool” presents conclusions about the use of informality as a tool in Niterói-Rio de Janeiro and Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In addition, I analyze the implications of case study identity for the understanding of urban informality, concluding that urban space should be framed as ‘legitimized’ or ‘delegitimized’ in order to accurately conceive of urban citizenship.
Chapter 1
On Informality, Citizenship, and Identity:
Constructing a Framework for Intersectional Informality

“Where the shanties of migrants sprout next to the mansions, factories, and skyscrapers of industrial-state capitalism, new kinds of citizens engage each other in struggles over the nature of belonging to the national society.”

(Holston and Appadurai 1999, 10)
Introduction: Incorporating Informality and Identity

South American urbanization is characterized by high levels of socioeconomic inequality that are dramatically articulated in the spatial development of cities. This spatial inequality is attributed in part to globalization and the increase in the interconnectedness of cities, which leads to the dispersion and fragmentation of urban functions and the growth of urban sprawl. Cities in Latin America are also characterized by “intense multiculturalism” representative of the indigenous, African, and European populations that resulted from processes of colonialism, as well as by intense post-WWII growth. The informal sections of cities (e.g., occupations, squatter settlements, slums) have their own organizing logic and their own methods of design. In many large Latin American cities the majority of urbanites live in these informal sectors.

Due to intersections between these informal settlements with racial and class differences, the informal is typically associated with poverty, economic insecurity, a lack of public resources, criminal activity, and socially determined racial tension. The size of the informal sector – both in terms of the tertiary economy and physical urban space – has grown exponentially as increased industrialization and employment opportunities attracted rural Latin Americans to the cities, which were not prepared for a large influx of poor internal migrants. Today, such settlements and the tertiary economy are common throughout the world, both in the global North and the global South. However, the global South faces unique challenges related to the size of populations living in informality and the integral nature of the tertiary economy to the ‘formal’ economy and spatial organization of cities. Tertiary economies (e.g. street vendors) are often unregulated, and supplement regulated economic interaction on a massive scale. These challenges have compounded with globalization as urban markets become more connected to the international flow of capital and less reliant on local or national economies, and the informal has grown more integral in the urban global South. “The informal city, long treated as an aberration or an exception to the standard of urbanism, is actually becoming the norm throughout the global South, and it does so as an integral part of the global economy” (124-125).

Scholars argue that the increasing presence of informality in cities result from a “dual city” phenomenon, in which the realities of urbanites are distinct based on their relationship to the spatial production of legitimized capital, or in this case the false dichotomy of formality and informality. Castells’ theory of the dual city holds that with the rise of the information economy and concurrent globalization, cities become increasingly economically and spatially dualistic.

“The new dual city can also be seen as the urban expression of the process of increasing differentiation of labor in two equally dynamic sectors within the growing economy: the

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information-based formal economy, and the down-graded labor-based informal economy. The latter is a highly dynamic, growth-oriented, and often very profitable sector, whose reality is far distant from the survival activities with which it has generally been associated” (Castells 1989, 225).

Cities are thus conceived in terms of planned space (by urban planners, local government, etc.) and unplanned or unregulated space, ‘real’ homes and the slums. In relation to the identity of urbanites, this implies that the notion of urban identity is complicated by the reality of a physical, economic, citizenship-rights, and at times cultural divide between the slums and the formal city.

After exploring traditional definitions of informality and offering a more intersectional approach for its consideration, I propose that informality is a tool used by social actors in urban space, both those in positions of power and the marginalized in the supposed “dual city” dichotomy. Like the law, the designation or excuse of informality is used by governments and those in power to marginalize others. This label and the reality of its associated condition is a means through which marginalized communities can resist, acknowledge, and draw power from the processes of their marginalization. This chapter lays the groundwork for an exploration of informality as a social tool in urban settings and the role of urban identity in this negotiation of legitimized power.

In addition to Castells’ dual city theory, I incorporate his scholarship on identity to understand the consequences of the perceived urban divide on community identity formation. Castells’ theory of resistance identities and their territoriality facilitates this investigation. To relate the concept of identity to mechanisms of power and the legitimation of certain identities, I incorporate James Holston’s theory of insurgent citizenship. I argue that informality engenders alternative citizenships, and that these citizenships must also be considered in terms of resistance identities. Citizenship is both a status and an identity, and alternative citizenships operate as identities that emerge from the condition of informality. Informality thus creates the conditions for certain kinds of identity formation. As informality elicits insurgent citizenships or resistance identities, there also is a necessary counter reaction from social actors who have a stake in the maintenance of the status quo.

**Constructing a Definition: The Complexities of Informality**

What do scholars and governments mean by ‘informality’? Many definitions of informality exist, ranging from a focus on economic differences, social class, and physical infrastructure. I consider definitions that are specifically relevant to the slum context and allow for the possibility of dynamism in these definitions, and for the existence of actors who develop and cultivate their lived evolutions. This is viewing informality as a lived phenomenon. In this

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section I categorize the traditional approaches to defining informality, reviewing spatial, economic, and social considerations as well as questions of legality. I then construct a more cohesive definition of informality incorporating these classifications to highlight the necessity of complicating these traditional definitions.

The informal sector can be broadly defined as “comprising all activities performed beyond government regulation” (4). Such a definition is straightforward and easily applicable to distinct contexts. However, it is perhaps too broad, as it does not acknowledge the ways in which this ‘extra-governmental’ activity manifests. Informality has spatial, economic, and social components, each of which contribute to context-specific definitions used by scholars. Each of these components also relates to the concept of legality, which presents a false dichotomy that classifies informality in terms of legitimacy and desirability, which has social and economic repercussions for those living in informal communities.

In spatial terms, informal can mean peripheral, unplanned, or refer to the legal status of land ownership. For example, historian Brodwyn Fischer describes informal cities (“underprivileged and peripheral neighborhoods” in Latin America) as places with “illegal or semilegal land–tenure arrangements, substandard construction, lack of formal urban planning, a mostly poor and nonwhite population, and little or no access to public goods and services” (12). She draws attention to the fact that by this definition, informal urban settlements have existed in Latin America since the colonial era when poor and marginalized populations would live in settlements outside the main city, which was reserved for people of European descent.

Scholars also conceive of informality in terms of how land value is determined by capitalist development. Considered from the capitalist spatial development perspective, informality is determined by variation in the economic control and production of space – spaces that are regulated by the market and those that are not. The relationship between space and capital, analyzed by Marx, dominates many considerations of urban informality. The focus on the production of capital in urban space means that many analyses build on definitions of informality framed around the flow of capital.

In Latin America, cities consist of formal, informal, and illegal sectors, which manifest spatially. The formal, informal, and illegal economies interact to produce “a complex configuration of the real economy” (122). Valenzuela-Aguilera and Monroy-Ortiz define informality as “a dynamic and modern modality of daily reality – that although it exists “outside” the formal market, or put another way is found in sectors of the population not “legally” incorporated, but subsumed by the necessity of social reproduction – contributes to the

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development and consolidation of important areas of current capitalism.”

In short, this definition of informality refers to the condition of existing outside of a formal market, while participating in an officially unrecognized sector of the economy that together with the formal economy forms the true, interactive and dynamic economy that then manifests spatially in urban development. The informal economy is “not reported, not registered” and involves the “production and distribution of licit goods”, relying on networks and social connections “to avoid fraud and abuses” (121). This is distinguished from the illegal economy, also integral to economic development, which deals in illicit goods and requires criminal organizational force. This economic consideration of informality is thus based on differences in the economic production of space, but recognizes that formality is in reality influenced by informality.

Similarly, geographers and scholars of development tend to emphasize the importance of a spatial approach to informal economy. For example, de Soto follows a capitalist-based theory of development, taking into consideration the spatial dimensions of economic development by focusing on property as the “unit” of informality. He distinguishes between the formal and the informal in terms of “legal” and “extralegal” – people that have legal rights to their property and those that do not. De Soto argues that formal property rights allow citizens to transform their assets (property) into capital. De Soto emphasizes the extralegality of communities in which the informal dominates the formal, but recognizes that “they are held together by a social contract that is upheld by a community as a whole and enforced by authorities the community has selected” (28). Thus, De Soto’s informality emphasizes the importance of access to capital, but takes into account the social ramifications of this lack of opportunity.

David Harvey also analyzes the effect of capital on spatial development, grounding his theories in Marxist conceptualizations of space. He critiques conceiving of urbanization in terms of the accumulation of capital, delving into the “right to the city” of all urban residents and focusing on the formalization of informal settlements and the acquisition of property rights. Harvey equates the informal with the illegal, restricting his analysis to the relationship between land settlement, titling, and value. Importantly, Harvey highlights the danger of construing of informality solely in terms of property rights. Referencing De Soto, Harvey acknowledges that gentrification often follows formalization, in that “the concomitant effect [of formalization] is often to destroy collective and non-profit-maximizing modes of social solidarity and mutual support, while any aggregate effect will almost certainly be nullified in the absence of secure and adequately remunerative employment”. This observation reveals a slightly broader definition of informality – one that exposes the social systems of support that develop in tandem with the conditions of poverty and living outside of a formal market.

The definitional paradigms represented by Valenzuela-Aguilera and Monroy-Ortiz, De Soto, and Harvey suggest that informality means lack of regulation. Yet this masks nuances in

19 (Ibid.)
urban planning policy and the organizing power possible in states of deregulation. Drawing on the idea that informality corresponds to the processes of capitalism and interacts with both the legal and the illegal, informality can be conceived of as an organizing logic, or a method through which capitalist development organizes space. This is especially relevant in an increasingly globalized world, in which urban areas are more and more connected with one another in network fashion. AlSayyad (2004) defines urban informality as “an organizing logic, which emerges under a paradigm of liberalization” (26). Liberalization has resulted in the deregulation of markets and urban development regulation in an effort to support the flow of capital (e.g. neoliberal free trade policies). According to AlSayyad, informality is then also an organic form of regulation that works to counteract the negative organizational impact of liberalization.

Informality as an organizing logic manifests on multiple scales. On the local scale, within an informal settlement for example, the settlement is spatially organized according to the logic that most responds to the needs or possibilities of the community and not according to the designs of an urban plan. On a city scale, informality becomes synonymous to the concept of legitimacy. There are many forms of urban informality, including those legitimized by the government; for example, a government-funded commercial development built on improperly zoned land is considered more legitimate than a poor urban community formed through land invasion (Roy 2011). Thus, urban informality – whether technically legal, illegal, or ‘extralegal’ – may be considered either legitimate or illegitimate by institutions of power. Conceiving of informality as a continuous part of urban space thus reframes the scale of legitimized urban space within the city. The ‘informal’ is only ascribed negative connotations when it is delegitimized. This assumption, that legitimation of informal space comes to define spatial divides (‘legitimized’ and ‘delegitimized’) in the urban context, is the theoretical assumption behind the idea of the “dual city”, and is a main operational assumption throughout this paper.

Informality is also operationalized on the regional or international scale. The misconception that slums or informal spaces only exist in the ‘Third World’ is prevalent in much of the scholarship. For example, Friedmann and Wolff (1982) consider ‘slum theory’, or slum-focused scholarship, as literature related to cities in the “semi-periphery” of the world city system. However, informality does not neatly fit the tenets of world systems theory. As Roy (2011) notes, informality exists throughout cities and has more to do with the legitimacy of the use of space. One salient example of informality outside of the world “periphery” and “semi-

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periphery” is the existence of colonias in the United States.\textsuperscript{25} Colonias are informal settlements located along both sides of the US-Mexico border. Authorities in Texas have historically struggled with how to effectively integrate colonias into the formal land system in a manner that addresses the lack of service provision and land titling issues, while Mexican officials have been more successful with integrating colonias on their side of the border. Problematic informalities are therefore not just a phenomenon of the “Third World”. This example complicates the categories of the world systems theory, indicating that analyzing informality requires more nuanced discussions and at smaller scales.

Given the complexity and nuances of the relationship between the formal and the informal, how do scholars approach a more complete definition of informality? The discussion above makes clear that informality is an organizing logic that determines and is influenced by inherent differences in the production of capital, which then affects how people in informal spaces live their lives. This implies that informality carries with it the possibility of inherent social difference. However, informality is not a mindset or way of life. “The problem with the notion of urban informality as a way of life is that it evokes Wirthian notions of an urban ecology that somehow correlates with social organization and cultural mindsets” (5).\textsuperscript{26} Informality is thus not a cultural trait, nor is it something more natural to a certain ethnicity or those who are ‘impoverished’. It is clear that definitions based in capitalist thought can erase the social realities of living in informality. Writing on the architectural similarities between formal and informal housing in Rio de Janeiro, Fernando Luiz Lara claims “the degree of informality is associated either with the degree of social vulnerability or with the extent to which the resident population is marginalised and ‘informalised in all dimensions of their lives, or both.”\textsuperscript{27} Even within informal settlements, there are varying levels of informality in terms of the quality of the built environment, income opportunity, and access to services.

Considering the social aspects of informality enables its use as a device that reveals the relationships between class, legitimacy, and urban power. The definition of informality must therefore combine the spatial, economic, and social realities of the condition. In this paper, I then define informality as an organizing logic characterized by its relationship to the economic and regulatory ‘gray space’\textsuperscript{28} between the legal and the illegal, which may be legitimated by the government or society when convenient to the interests in power. As this paper then focuses on informal settlements, spaces which are spatially, economically, and socially marginalized, the


\textsuperscript{28} The notion of “gray spaces” draws of Ananya Roy’s (2011) definition of the term.
following examination deals with *delegitimized* (spaces that are not considered legal, regulated, or formal) forms of informality.

Figure 1.1 outlines the common definitions of informality according to their economic, spatial, or social biases. The definition of informality used in this paper combines key elements from each definitional arena. Depicting the intersections of these arenas shows that common considerations of informality only arrive at partial understandings of the concept, indicating that scholars may find it useful to develop standardized ‘qualifiers’ for informality (much like has been done by political scientists for ‘democracy’), and that the term ‘informality’ itself may be insufficient to explain the influence of capital on uneven spatial development and the inherent marginalizing power dynamics between urban residents in this development.

**Figure 1.1: Definitions of Informality**

- **Economic**: An alternative to the formal economy.
  - Both legitimate and illegitimate
  - Extralegal, held together by social contract

- **Spatial**: Legally unregulated space
  - Gray space between legal and illegal, influences the formal
  - Peripheral

- **Social**: A means of social reproduction that is “a dynamic and modern modality of daily reality.”
  - Not a cultural trait, not a ‘natural’ category
Informality and Citizenship

Delegitimized informality is characterized by social structures that facilitate growth in informal areas. Lack of governmental oversight drives the emergence of more organic forms of organization, and therefore it is important to investigate notions of citizenship in relation to agency, community, and identity in informal spaces. Lefebvre (1968) presents the “right to the city” as a human right, activated and demanded by the working class. As an abstract concept, the right to the city affords the right of access and ownership of urban space to all urban residents. This theory connects the spatial manifestations of capitalism to both the real and desired urban experience.29 Considering the right to the city in relation to informal communities legitimizes their existence from a theoretical perspective. Here, I conceive of the right to the city as a right of urban citizenship that can be understood through performances of citizenship at the community scale. To consider the role of ‘community’ in the performance of citizenship, in Chapters 2 and 3 I examine the existence and role of community organizations in each case study in responding to and defining a community rhetoric of self. To frame this investigation, I draw on James Holston’s concept of insurgent citizenship, connecting it to scholarship of intra-urban relational citizenship.

The right to the city works as an assumption in much of the scholarship on urban citizenship. Scholars, even those that conform to the dual city framing of space in terms of the legal and the illegal, present an inherently community-based notion of the performance of citizenship that accounts for the classification of citizenships in spaces of varying legality.30 For example, Jorge Hardoy and David Satterthwaite (1989) explain subaltern urban citizenship, classifying citizenship as part of a divide in cities between the “legal” and the “illegal”.31 There is thus little nuance in their discussion of the legality of housing settlements and their conceptualization of informality; the authors only use the term “informal” to refer to self-constructed housing. Definitionally, this contrasts with the concept of informality as an organizing logic as theorized by Appadurai and Roy, but reveals the common consideration of informality as synonymous with illegality. The authors do however discuss the role people living in informal, or “illegal” settlements play in developing the urban landscape. The builders of these settlements are referred to as urban planners, who create their own spatial structure, communal values and codes, and methods of accessing and providing public services the government fails to provide (32).


30 Holston (2008) discusses the consequences of definitional variations of citizenship, proposing that certain kinds of citizenship emerge from spaces that are classified as ‘illegal’; Harvey (1985) connects capitalist development to the urban consciousness, explaining how capitalist structures affect the way urban communities act and mobilize and how community consciousness can lead to competition for urban resources. Harvey (2012) also discusses “the right to the city”, mobilizing the concepts of social connection and the influence of capital.

“It could be said that the unnamed millions who build, organize and plan illegally are the most important organizers, builders and planners of Third World cities. But governments do not recognize this, they do not see these people as city-builders; indeed, they usually refuse to recognize that they are citizens with legitimate rights and needs for government services” (Hardoy & Satterthwaite 1989, 15).

Thus, people forced to operate outside of the official governmental sphere of influence – the formal city – participate in urban life in ways organic to their specific urban context.

James Holston (2008) considers this kind of organic and survivalistic participation a form of citizenship. Holston theorizes the idea of subaltern agency within the postcolonial paradigm, and specifically within the context of Brazil. Holston explores the institution of citizenship in Brazil, positing that it at once legitimizes and marginalizes Brazilian citizens by legalizing social difference (4). Holston distinguishes between two kinds of citizenship: a citizenship that is simply the legal inclusion into the national body – an entrenched, government-defined citizenship, and a citizenship that results from insurgence against this non-inclusive norm. He asserts that the conditions of “residential illegality” lead to popular participation, the practice of citizenship, and community mobilization to fight for inclusion in the formal city. Holston specifies that the resistance mindset is not inherently part of these communities, but rather their location places them within the paradigm of entrenched citizenship and thus both unsettles this institution with their existence and perpetuates the attributes of traditional citizenship (by valuing the attainment of citizenship markers such as property and regulation) (13). Holston specifies that the urban peripheries in which this occurs most are constructed by residents, and therefore that “their experience of the peripheries – particularly the hardships of illegal residence, house building, and land conflict – became both the context and substance of a new urban citizenship” (4). Therefore, the context of physical and social peripheralization and the condition of informality engender a constant renegotiation between traditionally defined citizenship and more organic, daily practices of insurgence, or insurgent citizenship. In tying its emergence to living outside the formal sphere, Holston implicitly links insurgent citizenship to the condition of informality. I assert that this relationship should be more explicit. The assertion that informality leads to insurgent citizenships frames my approach to the case studies of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio.

Holston (1999) also opens space for the consideration of citizenship as an identity. Holston discusses the distinction between defining citizenship based on the acceptance and protection of differences (difference-specific) rather than holding marginalized and non-

33 In the Brazilian context, citizenship is often associated with rights (pg. 19). Individuals are not de facto considered citizens – citizenship has more to do with the granting of rights and the establishing of the hierarchy of Brazilian society.
34 (Holston 2008, 24)
marginalized citizens to the same standard (difference neutral) (8). Difference-specific notions of citizenship allow for the institutional protection of marginalized groups, facilitating their access to services that may have previously been more accessible to others. This “rejects citizenship as a homogenizing identity with the charge that homogenization reduces and impoverishes” (9). Within cities, difference-specific definitions of citizenship become especially important in relation to migrant communities. As poles of capital and centers of labor, cities experience high levels of rural-urban migration that place groups of extreme socioeconomic and even cultural difference in close proximity (10). Cities are thus the sites of articulation of national anxieties regarding race and class, where the informal represents both the oppressed and their agency. Thus, insurgent citizenships are manifestations of difference-specific inclusion, where citizenship incorporates these differences.

The importance of defining citizenship as difference-specific rather than difference neutral is evidenced by Caldeira’s consideration of urban segregation, in which she highlights how citizenship is commonly conceived of as a single entity.36 “Cities of walls do not strengthen citizenship but rather contribute to its corrosion” (136). In her estimation, urban citizenship encompasses the methods of participation and rights of both the privileged and the marginalized; this is a difference neutral position. Difference-specific definitions allow for an expansion of the forms of action and existence than can be considered citizenship, and thus of those who are considered citizens. Holston’s insurgent citizenships and Hardoy and Satterthwaite’s (1989) described citizen engagement are examples of this.

The theory of insurgent citizenship is supported by the work of subaltern scholar Ananya Roy (2011), who discusses the necessity of scholarship on subaltern urbanism, which takes into account definitions of identity, community, and informality that apply in the informal slum context. Roy’s subaltern urbanism identifies “economies of entrepreneurialism and political agency” as the main themes that this approach to slums considers (227). Economies of entrepreneurialism refers to economies in which participants take a more active role in creating their own opportunities, and may be characterized by more small-scale business and a kind of “ground up”, individualistic economy (e.g. street vendors and home businesses). Roy argues that increased agency accompanies this kind of economy, which is what Holston considers as insurgent citizenship. Thus, conceiving of urban slums as places in which self-organization and agency are a way of life and means of survival merges traditional urban theory with the urban experience of people living in informality.

Identity in Informality: Insurgent Citizenship, Resistance Identity, and Territorial Stigmatization

If informality engenders forms of citizenship that function as identities, is informality itself an identity? As previously explored, informality is not a mindset (Roy 2011). GC Spivak (2005)37 goes further in her theorization of informality, maintaining that informality itself is not an identity, especially not at the community level. I agree, but posit that it is most useful to consider identity formation at the community level, especially when relating community cohesion to avenues of collective agency. Spivak holds that informality is not an identity, where informality or subalternity refers to a lack of opportunities for social mobility. Similar to many postmodern scholars, she conceptualizes informality or subalternity as a device through which agency can be built when applicable. In other words, the label of ‘informality’ can be activated as a point around which organization becomes possible when necessary, but it is not an identity. Considering subalternity as a condition outside of identity thus allows for the building of social infrastructure, which then allows for agency in informal communities. Roy’s similar approach is based on the claim that informality is an organizing logic that appears throughout urban space, and is thus as much a part of the formal structure as the informal. This makes informality a heuristic device that can be used to assess top-down urban planning and the reality the diversity of urban economies. Roy’s informality is also not spatially bound as it is pervasive throughout space, suggesting that identities cannot be spatially bound by the condition of informality.

Roy’s and Spivak’s approaches to informality and identity help separate the two conditions. In particular, Roy’s suggestion that institutional designation of certain informalities as less legitimate is helpful, as it reveals that perceptions are involved in the delegitimization of certain informalities. However, the fact that these authors found it necessary to lay the theoretical groundwork that separates informality from identity opens space for the consideration of the operation or perception of informality as an identity. Absent from their theorizations is analysis of the relationship between internal definitions of identity and socially perceived identity – or the role of social institutions in general. Incorporating their claims, I argue that informality is not an identity, but rather that it is often perceived as such, and may act as a condition that factors into the formation of other identities (ethnic or political). This claim is relevant in both case studies, where perceptions of informal communities – especially historical opinions – are racialized and subjected to stereotypes of class. Thus, in addition, I resist their warnings that community-level analysis is not the most relevant by considering that outside perceptions of identity are the most relevant at the community scale.

Evaluating these claims requires an understanding of the mechanisms of identity formation. Identity is a social construct, formed through a parallel process of identification and differentiation; of internal and external factors.38 Bolivian sociologist Paula Peña Hasbún

38 (Peña 2009, 5).
clarifies the mechanisms of these processes in her study of identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In terms of group identities, the internal construction of an identity is based on factors that promote “self-identification”, such as symbols, cultural traditions, and a collective memory. Drawing on Hobsbawm and Gadamer, Peña explains that traditions are the basis of cultural symbols that represent the cultural values of the past, and thus become reference points for identity construction (6). Collective memory regarding these symbols and commonalities works to interpret the past in a manner that supports the maintenance of commonalities that are valid in the present. Peña notes that “the selection criteria of historical facts and their very interpretation vary from generation to generation”, but that the memory of a shared history forms a basis for unity and a common identity (6). Therefore, different aspects of this common history become more or less relevant given the context in which and identity is relevant. Peña states that traditions and collective memory can manifest through “common institutions” that reinforce feelings of belonging. It is then in “the relationship between people, institutions, and their cultural practices that identity is constructed”. The process of differentiation then involves the simultaneous process of defining the self through defining and opposing the “other”. Defining the self – in this case the group – is a process of definition via exclusion, in which those to whom the traditions, history, and traits of the group do not apply are considered as the other.

Peña’s framework helps situate the interaction between the kind of identity formation she describes and external forces and perceptions that also affect community development. Bridging this gap, Castells (1997) proposes a theory of identity in what he dubs the informational network society. Castells proposes three variants of constructed identity in the globalized context: legitimizing identity, resistance identity, and project identity. Legitimizing identity is introduced and disseminated by dominant institutions (such as the state), resistance identity stems from social actors who build identity through resisting a marginalizing “logic of domination”, and project identity is the creation of a new identity that “redefines their [the marginalized] position in society” in order to transform the social structure itself (8). These categories interact extensively, as for example, a project identity is nearly always necessarily a resistance identity. Of particular interest in relation to informality is the idea of resistance identity, or “the exclusion of the excluded” (9). This is in essence “the building of a defensive identity in the terms of dominant institutions/ideologies, reversing the value judgment while reinforcing the boundary.” Thus, members of informal settlements create an identity based on the fact of their designated marginality, which both reclaims and reinforces this difference. According to Castells, resistance identities also lead to mobilization around the idea of a cohesive community. The process of resistance identity creation is thus a key element of identity formation in informal areas.

39 (Ibid.)  
40 (Peña 2009, 6).  
41 (Ibid).  
42 (Ibid.)
Castells’ idea of resistance identity is inherently related to Holston’s theory of insurgent citizenship. The three categories of identity (legitimizing, resistance, and project) are in reality distinct designations of citizenship. For example, a state-determined definition of citizenship can be considered a difference-neutral legitimizing identity, as it is designed to be the only legitimate consideration of a citizen. In turn, the insurgent citizenship inherent to informal communities is a resistance identity. The act of determining an alternative narrative of what legitimate participation as an urban citizen should look like – by existing in a peripheral, marginalized, but economically central space – is an act of resistance. Because Holston conceives of citizenship as an identity, insurgent citizenship can then be a resistance identity.43

Castells’ theory is also essential in considering the importance of the community scale for identity creation and perception. Castells touches on the importance of purpose behind collective identity creation. “Who constructs collective identity, and for what, largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it.” As the most visible unit of belonging for an informal community, the community scale is the most relevant unit for defining a sense of place and symbolism that can be projected to the outside world. In addition, the extent to which these identities are defined from within the community is an indication of the robustness of community agency and cohesiveness. Therefore, taking into account identity and its ‘quality’ is a method of accounting for the nuances of community cohesion that Roy and Spivak stress. The measure of community cohesiveness can also be discovered through an examination of its territoriality as a territorial identity. Castells frames the development of resistance identities, or the occurrence of insurgent kinds of citizenship, as a reaction against the processes of globalization that have solidified the dual city dichotomy; the development of local identities in the network or globalized society is an act of defense against the unknown (61). Castells posits that territorial identity forms a sufficient base for community identity formation. In relation to informality, territorial identity suggests that commonality is mainly formed amongst informal communities as a result of the condition of social mobilization around common interests. Following Castells’ theory, ethnic identities may also be activated as a point of connection, but are unlikely to be as unifying as interest-based identities that reveal territorial commonalities – especially in diverse communities. In addition, it is essential to recognize the danger of conflating informality with ethnic identity, as it leads to a deterministic and belittling definition of informal.

43 "The growing inability of the nation–state to respond simultaneously to this vast array of demands induces what Habermas called a “legitimation crisis,” or, in Richard Sennett’s analysis, the “fall of public man,” the figure that is the foundation of democratic citizenship” (Castells 1997, 261).
44 (Castells 1997, 7)
45 Oscar Lewis popularized such a deterministic and normalized view of the marginalized – known broadly as the ‘marginality school’ of thought. Lewis theorized that the condition of poverty engendered specific, generalizable cultural traits that were true of poor communities around the world. This idea is based on early twentieth century scholarship that determined that the poor were “obstacles to their own progress” and that the causes of poverty were
This paper posits that the concept of informality acts as a tool of social control, in part because of the power of perception in determining social norms and influencing action. With Peña, Castells, and Holston, I establish how territoriality and informality lead to the formation of community identities in informal spaces. Loïc Wacquant’s (2008) theory of territorial stigmatization serves as a further link between the development of these resistance identities at the community scale and the influence of external perception within urban space. Territorial stigmatization provides an explicit theoretical explanation for the repercussions of the stigma of marginality and its repercussions. According to Wacquant, because poverty and marginality tend to be concentrated, “a taint of place is thus superimposed on the already existing stigmata traditionally associated with poverty and ethnic origin or postcolonial immigrant status, to which it is closely linked but not reducible” (2008, 238). The people who live in these places thus take on these negative perceptions associated with their place of residence. This stigma is based in part on the racialization of marginality, and in turn of urban space (2016, 1079). Wacquant also develops an “institutionalist conception of the ghetto as a concatenation of mechanisms of ethnoracial control founded on the history and materialized in the geography of the city” (2008, 3). Thus, territorial stigmatization inherently connects the negative social imaginary and social control of delegitimized informal spaces. It is important to note that Wacquant’s analysis focuses on marginality rather than informality; I therefore expand the theoretical application of territorial stigmatization.

Towards Establishing Informality as a Tool, and Perception as a Unit of Analysis

Building on Holston and Castells, I have established that informality engenders insurgent citizenships, which must be considered in terms of resistance identities at the community scale. This is based on the assumption that citizenship is an identity, and that insurgent citizenship emerges as an organic alternative identity to the government-defined equivalent.

I have also discussed the relevance of perception in this process of self-determination and community consolidation. Perception works in tandem with community identity, either embracing a community’s self-determined narrative of self, or defining it contrary to such an organic conceptualization in favor of broader social narratives of race, class, and the condition of informality (territorial stigmatization). It is this relationship which then makes possible the use of informality as a social tool.

It is precisely because informality is pervasive and exists in legitimized or delegitimized forms that it is used as a social tool. On the part of those in power – who establish laws, reinforce

mainly structural (Fischer 2014, 34). Assigning marginality a cultural status limits the analysis of its development and causes, and robs residents of poor communities of their agency.

Wacquant elaborates on territorial stigmatization by adding that it is necessarily accompanied by “spatial alienation and the dissolution of ‘place’” (2008, 241). Essentially, that stigma of marginalized communities leads to the loss of a consolidated sense of place within those communities. The other theories in this framework argue against this idea, and the case studies provide evidence to the contrary. (Wacquant, Loïc. 2008. Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality. Cambridge: Polity Press.)
social norms, and create the official rules of ‘legitimization’ – the act of delegitimizing certain informalities manifests as a method of control; territorial stigmatization controls social possibility. Conversely, as Spivak (2005) theorizes, the label of informality (or is associated status) can be used to generate power and commonality. It is a point around which community identity emerges, and is therefore a foundation of community citizenship and agency.

The use of informality as a tool further relates to in-group and out-group differences in perception of community identity. Perceptions of an informal community held by residents reflect the internal narrative of community identity, as manifested in community agency. On the other hand, perceptions of the community by non-residents are dependent on societal stereotypes as well as the top-down, delegitimizing definition of informality disseminated throughout society. Internal rhetoric and external perception of the identity of informal communities thus become representative units of the relationship between the subaltern and society. In the following chapters, I use the two case studies of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia and Rio de Janeiro-Niterói, Brazil to suss out the relationship between resistance and acceptance as they relate to informal community identity. Combining the perspectives of Castells, Holston, and Wacquant, this paper clarifies a larger social model of the role of informality and stigma in intra-urban identity formation and relationships.
Chapter 2
Constructing Identity:
Intersectional Informality in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio

“[Cities’] identities, modes, forms, categories, and types recombine in the gray matter of the streets. City narratives are, as a result, both evident and enigmatic. Knowing them is always experimental.”

(Holston 1999, 155)
Spaces of Insurgent Citizenship
Introduction

James Holston’s consideration of citizenship opened the dialectical possibility for citizenship to be considered an identity, and offered a distinction between distinct forms of citizenship identities. Chapter 1 asserted that these resistance identities constitute forms of insurgent citizenship, and vice versa. Through an examination of the case studies of Morro do Palácio and Plan 3000, this chapter addresses this claim.

In this chapter, I combine Peña’s categories of community identity formation (common institutions, cultural traditions, collective memory) with Castell’s theory of resistance identity to analyze the cases of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio de Janeiro-Niterói. Interviews conducted in informal settlements in these cities reveal that the traditions, collective memory, and common institutions that inform identity are influenced by four main dialoguing social categories and processes: race and place of origin, spatiality, violence, and marginality. In both the Bolivian and Brazilian case, in order to resist a dominant narrative of community identity, residents challenge their marginalized status while simultaneously reinforcing their identity difference. This is accomplished through internal community dialogue and the emergence of community organizations that help to define and reinforce a contrasting image of the community as ‘self’. In the process, as they establish that they are not as they are perceived, they reinforce their difference from the rhetorical norm, or what Castells refers to as the “legitimizing identity” (8). The role of community organizations in redefining community identity – and therefore the possibilities for citizenship – in each informal settlement works to support my claim that informality itself can act as a social tool around which organization and identification is possible.

Migration, Ethnicity, and Place of Origin: Racialized Resistance Identities

Race and ethnicity are obvious and outwardly apparent characteristics that influence how people are perceived and treated in society. In Bolivia and Brazil, racial and ethnic differences are geographically segregated, both within cities and regionally. Each country also has a long history of internal migration from poorer, rural areas to urban centers that offer more opportunities for employment. This leads to the conflation of internal migrants with class and racial difference from the urban norm. Additionally, in both countries, internal migrants often settle in urban informal settlements upon arriving in the city. For migrants, memories and conceptualizations of their place of origin may become more salient once in another context. These memories, as well as their experience of difference in the city, then inform how and the extent to which internal migrants identify with their urban communities.

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47 This redefinition of the self according to a strategic and designed definition corresponds to Castell’s theory of project identities.
Here, I detail the historical and geographical determinants of identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio de Janeiro, and explore how these identities are articulated and interact within Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. I argue that national and regional constructions of race affect local racial identities and ideas of class, which merge with place-based identities, resulting in the racialization and stigmatization of sites dominated by informality.

Bolivia: The Construction and Political Articulation of Ethnic and Racial Identity

Historical Context of Race

Bolivia has long been split by east-west regionalisms that date back to the era of colonization. Within these regional distinctions are three at times nebulous identities – cruceño, camba, and colla – which are constantly renegotiated at different scales and in the places in which they converge. As an informal section of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and a site of cultural diversity, Plan 3000 forces residents to confront these identity markers.

Cruceño, meaning “of Santa Cruz”, is an inherently place-based identity. According to Peña in her study in identity in Santa Cruz, “‘the cruceño’ is the sum of historical characteristics of the cruceño community that have developed throughout its history” (Peña 2009, 17).

The history of the cruceño identity is rooted in racial mixing and elite projects of power. Kirshner (2009) identifies the main ethnic cleavage in Bolivia as the divide between the “poor indigenous majority”, the “elite criollo minority”, and the mestizo class (8). This racial divide has its history in the colonization of Bolivia, during which the white Spaniards who controlled the area mixed with native lowland groups (8-9).

The geographically determined isolation of the region led to survival-based economic activity (36, 41). This survival and self-sufficiency mentality became a trait of the colonial cruceño identity (44). The city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra remained underdeveloped well into the first half of the twentieth century, only gaining a telephone line, potable water, and electricity for the first time between 1910 and 1930 (92).

Isolation resulted in progressive whitening through miscegenation, which led to the popular misconception of the cruceño population as a “white” and unmixed group. Over time, the entire Eastern region of Bolivia took on a similar identity, that of the Oriente (45). This shared regional history thus upholds of a regional identity based in the collective memory of this history and the similar social structures that resulted from it.

Cruceño identity is based on a history of isolation and cultural confrontation. Before the 1950s, the Bolivian east was characterized by a lack of development and government

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50 (Moreno, 1960: 29, in Peña 2009)
resources.\textsuperscript{51} The years of neglect in the first half of the century led to strong regional cohesion in the ‘abandoned’ east. There thus existed and still persists a strong attachment to the idea of regional autonomy in the east, as well as a distrust of the central government. After the revolution and land reforms of 1952, internal migration and government-sponsored colonization projects in the east increased rapidly. The next wave of migration in the 1980s, caused by a draught in the west, contributed to sustained regionalism, and neoliberal economic and land reforms increased the economic production of Santa Cruz, making the department and city even more attractive as a pole for internal migration.\textsuperscript{52} These massive migrations led to feelings of resentment among many cruceños about their lack of control over regional development (46). This helps explain current regional political and identity divisions in Bolivia, which are based in geographical difference in addition to questions of race and class.

“It seems noteworthy that the contention emerged from Santa Cruz rather than La Paz. It is a cruceño perspective that reflects local circumstances. In La Paz, both elites and popular groups have long pursued political projects of national scope and aspirations. These same groups have been highly “territorialized” in Santa Cruz, their vision of development largely limited to the space of the region (see Soruco 2008: 7-8).” (Kirshner 2009, 48).

Confronted with more of a cultural clash, eastern cultural and business sector organizations began to fortify the cruceño identity and turn it into a regionally unifying symbol.\textsuperscript{53} Isolationist sentiments and the growing articulation of local power in the Oriente manifested in the founding of the Comité Cívico pro Santa Cruz (CCPSC) in 1950, which worked to define the cruceño as part of its civic agenda to actively combat the influence of the cultural differences of internal migrants.\textsuperscript{54} The CCPSC became a bastion of cruceño culture, valuing traditions based in the cultural mixing between Spaniards and lowland indigenous groups and idealizing rural life.\textsuperscript{55} The CCPSC continues to promote the culture and civic engagement of Santa Cruz. In the 1980s, therefore, the Comité was essential to forging connections between eastern departments and strengthening the idea of regionalism as legitimate.\textsuperscript{56}

Eastern Bolivian regionalism intensified and radicalized around 2003 during the beginning of the Gas Wars, when politicians in Santa Cruz fought for regional control using the cruceño identity as a point of reference to legitimize their regional struggle (19). Cruceño regionalism was thus revealed to be an elite construct, for which regional difference was useful politically. Evidence of this can be found in the debate over regional economic control. Cruceño

\textsuperscript{52} (Kirshner 2009, 44)
\textsuperscript{53} (Andrada 2012, 19)
\textsuperscript{54} (Peña 2009, 100;117)
\textsuperscript{56} (Andrada 2012, 19)
organizations that promote regional identity such as the CCPSC are made up of mostly business-class cruceños who have a vested economic interest in the success of the region. Anti-centralism in the east is supported by the fact that Santa Cruz developed many of its industries in a politically and economically liberal manner. This conflicts with the economic policies of president Evo Morales, turning a policy difference into a regional difference in governance. To this day, the tension between state control and regional autonomy in the economic arena is apparent. The involvement of the government in cruceño economic policy is seen as a threat and a failure of responsive governance. Beyond the economic basis for regional tension, conflict with the central government is exacerbated by the fact that Morales and his party draw support from his identity as a western indigenous person, interpreted in the east as a threat to the eastern way of life.

In addition, one must note that although regional tensions existed many years prior to Morales’ administration, they have intensified since his arrival on the political scene. The following quote effectively summarizes the intersection between ethnicity, regionalism, and politics during the Morales administration, and Table 1 below presents a timeline of the development of eastern regional identity:

“Ethnic considerations have suffused other conflictual issues, such as the country’s long-standing regional tensions, which in places like Santa Cruz is expressed in the desire for greater autonomy and has contained some racist connotations. In response, the MAS and its supporters have criticized the opposition as simply seeking to perpetuate a status quo from a bygone era that seeks to sustain white superiority” (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008: 9).

### Table 1. Timeline of Regionalism in the Bolivian East

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<td>Isolated east, limited development, reliance on regionalism</td>
<td>Incorporation of east into national scheme, resistance to new outside control</td>
<td>Heavy west–to–east migration, cultural clash, eastern orgs. key to promoting regionalism</td>
<td>Gas Wars, intensification and radicalization of regionalism</td>
<td>Regional identity informed by historical memory of regional development</td>
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**Contemporary Racial and Ethnic Identity in Santa Cruz and Plan 3000**

Today, Santa Cruz de la Sierra is more racially diverse and nearly 20 percent of the city’s residents are internal migrants. In the department of Santa Cruz in 2012, 19 percent identified as internal migrants – the most of any department – and 44 percent of all international immigrants

57 (Ortiz 2014)
in the country lived in the department.\textsuperscript{58} In Plan 3000 itself, international immigrants from Peru and Colombia are associated with the drug trade and criminal activity. The community is also home to a growing Chinese population.\textsuperscript{59}

However, identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra is still most differentiated in terms of the country’s three main identity markers: cruceño, camba, and colla. While cruceño is more inherently place-based in addition to a politically activated tool of regionalism, camba is more dynamic. The term camba as defined by Peña is a “name with which the general inhabitant of the Oriente (East of Bolivia) is designated” (129). However, Peña and others point out the camba has evolved since its colonial inception. Camba, derived from a Guaraní word, is considered to be more of a “cultural” identity with feudal or antiquated connotations.\textsuperscript{60} According to Peña, camba historically referred to the indigenous Guarani, and thus became racialized and associated with poverty (2009, 131). Peña’s 2001 survey of identity in Santa Cruz characterizes the camba according to three main uses: a reference to people born in eastern Bolivia, a gentilicio, or as a pejorative. To Peña’s informants, being camba most often meant being cruceño and from eastern Bolivia, or a “feeling” (132). However, a different ethnography classifies the camba as consisting of a “double cultural code” in which more traditional views of the camba – as associated with honor, machismo, and the rural life – contrast and coexist with values of democracy, social mobility, and the ‘modern’, creating a unique juxtaposition between past and present in conceiving of the self.\textsuperscript{61}

In this paper, interview subjects classify camba as a rural identity, tied to eastern indigenous ways of life, poverty, and simple living. Some of those interviewed expressed offense or disgust at being asked if they identified as camba. Thus, the dialectic between camba and cruceño is deepened through the evolution of economic and subsequent cultural change. As Peña concludes, “‘being camba’ is related to the culture and being cruceño refers to the desire to be so,” where all cambas are cruceño, but not all cruceños are cambas (2009, 133; 151).

The camba and the cruceño are placed into opposition with the colla. The term colla historically refers to the “mestizo del Alto Perú” (8). Today the term is applied to people from the western highlands, often in a derogatory manner. In general, colla refers to indigenous people from the Andes who have darker skin tones than the “mestizo” or “white” people of the Bolivian east.\textsuperscript{62} The term also has a pejorative connotation. Although the term originates from Quechua in reference to the Incas, colla has been used in Eastern Bolivia to ‘otherize’ and discriminate against internal migrants. However, a large percentage of Bolivians identify with one of the country’s many indigenous groups. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, as is its full name,

\textsuperscript{58} (INE 2015)
\textsuperscript{59} I observed many Chinese restaurants and popular lunch places, especially within the main market on the Rotonda. Upon entering, many owners and employees that I interacted with did not speak Spanish.
\textsuperscript{60} Waldmann, Adrián. 2008. El Hábitus Camba: Un Estudio Etnográfico sobre Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Santa Cruz de la Sierra: El País, 37.
\textsuperscript{61} (Waldmann 2008, 19; 251)
\textsuperscript{62} (Waldmann 2008, 157)
recognizes the legitimacy of all languages used by the indigenous peoples of the country, and the Constitution of 2009 includes a list of 37 official languages.\textsuperscript{63} This linguistic diversity is an additional difference between highland and lowland Bolivians. The cruceño or camba is associated with the Spanish language, heavily influenced with slang and terms from Guarani and other lowland indigenous languages, while the colla can speak Quechua or Aymara, both highland indigenous languages.

Such official recognition of ethnic difference and importance is a relatively new development in Bolivia. As previously mentioned, with the election of Bolivia’s first indigenous president Evo Morales in 2005, indigenous rights came to the forefront of the national dialogue. Within the cultural context of Santa Cruz, “highland migrants must position themselves in relation to at least two overlapping sovereignties, that of the Bolivian nation and that of cruceño autonomous territorial claims.”\textsuperscript{64} This view opens the door to an exploration of citizenship rights in terms of the negotiation of identity in Santa Cruz.

Plan 3.000: Los “Damnificados” and Migrants in Search of “Mejores Días”

Whether cruceño, camba, or colla, identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra is informed by collective cultural memories and differences in history, language, and culture. Plan 3000 is a hub for internal migrants in a majority cruceño city. In the context of interactions between the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the Plan, institutional practices and traditions bolster the maintenance of the cruceño, camba, and colla identities, and facilitate their political activation. Interviews with residents of both greater Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Plan 3000 reveal the interactions, popular associations, and flexibility of these three identity labels.

Many Plan residents can be conceived of as colla. It is estimated that 80 percent of residents of Plan 3000 are internal migrants.\textsuperscript{65} While this figure is difficult to confirm, the research conducted for this paper reinforces that Santa Cruz de la Sierra is a diverse city. Of the 50 people interviewed in the city, 23 were themselves internal migrants, and 14 were the children or grandchildren of internal migrants, meaning that 74 percent of interviewees had connections to other parts of the country. In addition, some of the original founders of Plan 3000 in 1983 were internal migrants. Two interviewees from Plan 3000 who had family members who were original settlers (damnificados) identified as colla or as from the West. Even though the term colla has a history of discriminatory use in Santa Cruz, many western Bolivians still self-identify as colla. The colla identity places these residents in opposition to the city of Santa Cruz, a traditionally camba and cruceño space. The community is then imagined as a racially distinct

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\textsuperscript{64} (Kirshner 2009, 11)

\textsuperscript{65} This figure was widely mentioned during interviews in the community, but is difficult to confirm due to a lack of data.
space, or a colla stronghold. Given the politics of the city of Santa Cruz, this geographical concentration of identity then becomes politically significant.

Regardless of the perception of Plan 3000 and the other ciudadelas in Santa Cruz, the self-identification of residents is diverse. 28 of the 50 people interviewed in Santa Cruz de la Sierra lived in the ciudadelas, 4 of whom lived in ciudadelas other than Plan 3000. Of these 28 ciudadelas residents, only 3 identified as being primarily from their ciudadelas (from Plan 3000, Villa Primero de Mayo, or Pampa de la Isla), 4 identified as a mix between colla and cruceño, 3 identified as colla, and the rest as cruceño or camba. 14 of the 50 total people interviewed were born in the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and an additional 3 were born in the ciudadelas. The rest were migrants from either the outer rural provinces of the department of Santa Cruz, western Bolivians from La Paz, Chuquisaca, Potosí, Oruro, or Chuquisaca, and a few from the rural Amazonian department of Beni. Of those born in the city, most self identified as cruceño even if their parents were western Bolivian migrants, although several identified as colla for precisely this reason. Perhaps because of the number of migrants interviewed, differences in nuances of self-identification were not significant between those who were interviewed in the center of Santa Cruz and those who were in Plan 3000, other than those interviewed in the center were more likely to identify as cruceño or camba and those in Plan 3000 were more likely to identify as colla. However, given the number of deviations from this rule, the following analysis takes into account the identities of people who live in the ciudadelas as well as those who do not.

For those born in Santa Cruz, cruceño may be both place- and ethnicity-based. Alejandro, 18, had lived in the Plan for 3 years after moving from an outer suburb (Warnes), and identified as cruceño “because I don’t have relatives that live on the other side.”66 For migrants, cruceño is a place-based identity that is easily acquired over time as a result of living in the city of Santa Cruz. For example, Rolando, an older man from a small community in Potosí who has lived in Santa Cruz de la Sierra since 1977, identifies a cruceño and as a migrant, but not as colla.67 He married a woman from La Paz, but said his daughters who grew up in the city also identify as cruceña. Another man who came to the city from an outer province of the department and had lived there for three years said “Everyone who migrates to Santa Cruz considers themselves to be cruceño.”68 However, for others of western Bolivian descent, their ethnic heritage can undermine the place-based application of cruceño identity. One young woman from Santa Cruz de la Sierra identified as cruceña, but not ‘too’ cruceña because her grandparents had migrated to the city from Cochabamba.69 The cruceño identity therefore has both place-based and racial significance.

The ambiguity and fluidity of the cruceño identity emerged from other interviews as well, especially as it interacts with the label of colla. Laura, another interviewee who lived in Pampa de la Isla and has lived in Santa Cruz her entire life – a fact that would indicate her identification

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as cruceña – identifies with colla more strongly because of her “colla blood”; her parents migrated from Sucre, Chuquisaca to find work. Laura also indicated that she preferred the culture of western Bolivia. Still others had no difficulty in identifying both as cruceño and with their western roots. For example, one woman said she was cruceña, potosina, and colla, while another identified as both cruceña and paceña. Both of these women have lived in Plan 3000 since they were 15-16 and 20 respectively, indicating that there is a relationship between young adulthood and the retention of multiple place-based identities.

Although many highland interviewees who identified as indigenous indicated that they still experience occasional discrimination, they noted that the frequency of such experiences had significantly declined during the presidency of Evo Morales. Informants pointed to the Law Against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination, enacted in 2010, which prohibits discrimination of any kind and puts in place mechanisms and procedures to deal with acts of racism. Thus, representation of diverse racial interests in government has led to a real reduction in discriminatory acts in Plan 3000. To a certain extent, this means that regionalized place-based identities have become less important in Plan 3000.

As opposed to cruceño or colla, camba was a loaded term for many interviewees, and emerged as having distinct meanings. Some felt that it meant something close to ‘peasant’ and carried a negative connotation, while others simply associated it with being from the rural areas within the department of Santa Cruz. Those in the latter group were more likely to identify as camba and to have come from the provinces of Santa Cruz department. Some interviewees who had grown up in the city also believed that camba was nearly synonymous to cruceño. For some with family who had migrated from the West but had grown up in Santa Cruz, camba is more associated with the eastern accent and traditions than a racial difference. For example, Luis, who lives in Plan 3000 and whose mother migrated from Cochabamba, identifies as “camba-colla”. For him, both camba and colla refer to accent differences and cultural customs, and he feels a connection to both.

Race and ethnicity are politically significant in Santa Cruz de la Sierra due to their politicization on the national scale. Politics have been further divided along ethnic lines in Bolivia since the rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and the election of president Evo Morales in 2005. Morales, an indigenous coca grower from the western department of Oruro, ran on a platform of multiculturalism, social reform, and the political institutionalization of both. Collas have been largely more supportive of the national government, whereas cambas and cruceños (who are not internal migrants) are more likely to support local or departmental parties, including the separatist movement to grant for cruceño autonomy. The role of Plan 3000 as a

70 Laura. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. April 6, 2016.
center for internal migrants has placed it in contrast or at times in direct political opposition to the rest of the city. In the 2014 national elections, for example, Evo Morales’ party (MAS) won an additional seat in the Santa Cruz parliament due to widespread support from Plan 3000. However, within Plan 3000, ethnic difference does not seem to be a point of tension. Both self-identified collas and cambas, many of whom also identify as cruceño, live in the community. Over time and with the influx of migrants, there have also developed different barrios analogous to ethnic enclaves, differentiated by the place of origin of internal migrants. Some neighborhoods are home to predominantly migrants from Cochabamba, where many residents speak Quechua, while others are populated by people from La Paz, and where a visitor may hear Aymara. Western indigenous cultural celebrations are also commonplace in Plan 3000. For example, the Barrio Urkupiña is a neighborhood named after a syncretistic religious celebration from Cochabamba. During the neighborhood’s weeklong folkloric celebration in August, residents serve traditional food from Cochabamba and La Paz, dance folkloric indigenous dances, and play traditional music. Eastern cultural traditions are also celebrated, as in the Barrio 18 de Marzo where there are more eastern residents (39). Discussing the initiatives of the CCPSC, Peña also gives the example of the Día de la Tradición, founded in 1989, which is “an opportunity to remember and preserve the cultural wealth of the department” and which in 1990 was celebrated in Plan 3000 upon its designation as an official city celebration (199).

Thus, Plan 3000 is a microcosm in which different regional identities interact and are redefined. This became more apparent in 2009, on the eve of ascension of president Evo Morales to power. At this time in Santa Cruz, cruceño youth groups were in direct conflict with those they deemed colla in the city. Violence broke out between these youth groups and others related to western identity. Groups in Plan 3000 held community meetings around the Rotonda, a symbolic center of the ciudadela as a historic community, and strategized about methods of self-defense. These conflicts are evidence of both the politicization and organization of community identity in Plan 3000.

Brazil: Migration and Racial Identity in Rio de Janeiro

Although the development of place-based regional identities resembles the processes that occurred in Bolivia, race is a concept that has plagued and challenged Brazilian society since the colonial era. Throughout much of Brazil’s colonial history, racial thought was dominated by the concept of scientific racism bolstered by the idea of the “noble savage”. In effect, scientific

75 (LEX 2012)
77 Proyecto Quiénes Somos. La Historia del Plan 3000: Mi Barrio, 37.
racism held that Brazil could never become a civilized country due to its ‘intrinsically inferior’ African population. This belief contributed to a national inferiority complex, as Brazilian racial miscegenation meant that the country could never be completely equal to the more ‘civilized’ countries of Europe that were idealized by the Brazilian elite. Thus, because racial purity was unattainable, white superiority was justified as necessary. Africans were also believed to be inferior to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. The Brazilian national myth of foundation idealized the indigenous population, maintaining that true Brazilians were the result of the mix between white Europeans and indigenous peoples, and therefore the colonizers had more of a right to the Brazilian territory than any European power.

Out of this racist tradition emerged the work of Gilberto Freyre, who first argued against the tenets of scientific racism. Freyre claimed that the African population in Brazil was in fact responsible for the majority of the social and economic development in the country since the colonial era. Freyre argued that the Brazilian culture was therefore itself a miscegenation, recognizing that Africans and Afro-Brazilians were not physically or mentally inferior, and that they did more to develop the country than other racial groups (although failing to recognize that as slaves they were forced to do so). Freyre’s work, however, gave way to the development of an arguably more dangerous ideology: racial democracy. Racial democracy negates the existence of institutionalized racism by implying that because the population of Brazil was so mixed, there existed a racial harmony in the country. There was therefore no racial problem to be addressed, an attitude which benefited the elite and prevented the reduction of racial disparity and discrimination. Under this ideology, poverty and other social disparities were conceptualized in terms of class difference. Since the 1970s, however, scholars have worked to debunk the myth of racial democracy, showing that race is still a main factor in social inequality.

The history of racial distinctions and identities in Brazil is riddled with policies supporting or negating racial identity markers. The identities recognized by the government changed over the years as policies advocating for the branqueamento (whitening) of the population took hold, changing how people could officially represent themselves. The Brazilian census evaluates race strictly on the basis of skin color, and not ancestry as in the US. In studies in which Brazilians were asked to racially classify themselves without any given categories, between 135 and 500 race-color terms emerged. Brazilians may identify as white, black, mixed, mulatto, indigenous, moreno, caboclo, and various other identities indicating distinct levels or combinations of racial mixture, although “white” is implicitly considered

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82 (Ibid.)
Interestingly, the 2010 Census categories for race were: *branca* (white), *preta* (black), *amarela* (yellow), *pardo* (mixed), *indígena* (indigenous), or *sem declaração* (unspecified). On the governmental level at least, race is simplified. However, these categories do not communicate the current labelling tensions and preferences of those who identify as Afro-Brazilian. Racial identities are often dependent on a combination of historical context and personal preference.

Place-based identities exist in conjunction with racial identities in Brazil. Relevant to this research are the terms *carioca*, *niteróiense*, and *nordestino*. Carioca refers to people from Rio de Janeiro. Niteroiense refers to those from the city of Niterói, a much smaller geographical location, which does not preclude those who identify as niteroiense from also identifying as carioca, as Niterói is part of the larger metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro.

The most important oppositional identity in this case is that of the *nordestino* (northeasterner). Nordestino is an externally constructed identity indicating that a person comes from the northeastern states of Brazil. This designation is heavily racialized. Caldeira writes that nordestino has been “used since the time of the Conquest to describe the native, the African slave, the worker, and the poor.” In Rio and elsewhere in the southeast, the term is also associated with internal migrants, as the northeastern states are one of the main places of origin for internal migrants to Rio and São Paulo. In these cities, because of the relationship between nordestinos and social marginality,

“...the nordestino narrative is an essentialized category meant to symbolize evil and explain crime. It is simplistic and caricatured – which does not mean that it doesn’t affect social relations. It is a product of classificatory thinking concerned with the production of essentialized categories and the naturalization and legitimization of inequalities.”

*Morro do Palácio: Nordestinos*

In Morro do Palácio, the carioca and nordestino identities manifest much as race and place-based identity exists in Plan 3000. As a small favela, the community is a site of settlement for internal migrants and has been for at least 40 years. In 2000, nearly 40 percent of migrants to Niterói were from the northeast, with a nearly equal number from the southeast (mostly from the neighboring interior state of Minas Gerais). Most surveyed in 2000 migrated to the city

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86 (Ibid. 31)
between the 1970s and 1990s. Migrants to Niterói come from Minas Gerais (21%), São Paulo (10%), Paraíba (9.5%), and Ceará (9%). More detailed information about the racial make-up and places of origin of community members in Morro do Palácio is difficult to find due to its informal status. Although census data in theory should be complete, official data on favelas and “subnormal agglomerations” is often questionable. However, a report from the 2010 Brazilian census on the number of private homes in these “subnormal agglomerations” gives an estimate of the number of residents in the community. According to this census, 1,851 people lived in Morro do Palácio in 2010, with nearly equal numbers of men and women, who lived in 571 homes.

Community interviews indicate that many in Morro do Palácio migrated from northeastern Brazil. The time period of migration corresponds to the survey from 2000; dates of migration of interviewees ranged from 1973 to 2000, with only one person migrating after that period in 2005.

Migration and place of origin was significant in terms of the self-identification of community members. 12 of the 15 total people interviewed in the community were not born in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. The time-related observations from the Plan 3000 case also seem to be true in the case of Morro do Palácio. Those who have been in the community longer were more likely to identify with the place identity of their new home, in addition to those who migrated at a younger age. Interviewees who migrated as adults were more likely to identify with their place of origin. For those who migrated when they were young or young adults, they were more likely to identify as carioca. No one identified as niteroiense, perhaps because as migrants, the moniker of carioca was more general and all encompassing. As in Plan 3000, people who moved to Rio or to Morro do Palácio as young adults identified as carioca more than nordestino. For example, Matheus, 48, moved to Morro do Palácio when he was 18 in 1986. He said that he feels more carioca than nordestino because he has spent more of his life in Rio. Similarly, Rafael, 63, also arrived in the community at the age of 18 – in 1973. He identified as more carioca than nordestino because “I left there young”. The comparison with Plan 3000 is even more apt because informants tended to identify with the larger metropolitan region rather than with a specific place-based moniker from their community. Significantly, the label of nordestino did not seem to have a negative connotation for residents, although many identified as from their specific state (e.g. Paraibano) rather than with the general moniker nordestino.

Few of those interviewed explicitly identified as palacianos. The one informant who was born and raised in the community identified as palaciano. In the documentary Jovens do Palácio: 3 Caminhos, three youth are followed throughout the community and talk about their

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88 (Ibid.)
experience growing up in Morro do Palácio. It is this demographic that is more likely to identify as palaciano, as they have not spent significant amounts of their lives in other places.

Place-based identities from migrants’ places of origin seemed to persist due to cultural markers, time in the community, and exposure to cultural traditions. Many informants who had migrated to Morro do Palácio as children or young adults felt a connection to their place of origin. One woman, Beatriz, felt more nordestina than carioca. Beatriz, 42, migrated to Rio de Janeiro when she was 18, then moved to Morro do Palácio because it was the first place she found and she had some friends in the community. She moved back to the northeast for several years in 2004 before returning to Morro do Palácio. Another interviewee, Henrique, has lived in the community for 30 years and identified as Paraibano (from Paraíba in the northeast). Henrique, 50, said he identified as Paraibano in part because he still speaks with the accent of his home state. Another man, João, 58, had only lived in Morro do Palácio for 18 years, a relatively short amount of time to have lived in the community. Having arrived when he was 40, he had spent much of his life in his home state and thus consolidated his sense of self in relation to that place.

Spatial articulation of identity within Morro do Palácio exists as it does in Plan 3000, even though the community is substantially smaller than the large urban district in Bolivia. The following quote from a community forum and panel discussion between residents of Morro do Palácio, students at the nearby university, and nonprofit workers in the area reveals the formation of identity “tribes” within the community.

“In comunidades, there are various communities within one. Because there is the side with the nordestinos, the side with the cariocas, you have those now who are coming to live up there from the college...the community has various tribes, and it’s weird sometimes. The side with the nordestinos has the best houses. Because they come from where they are used to poverty and having to work, when they arrive in the big city, for us that are born here and think it is fucking hard, for them, it’s easy, because they learned to work from an early age. And they are united. They are very united.” (Josemias, Morro do Palácio).

Josemias also describes a group of nordestino friends in the community that when someone might need a cistern, they get together and make one. But when it is a palaciano – someone who was born in the community and does not identify as nordestino – that needs help with a cistern, people ask how much they will pay. He says that it is hard for them to marry a

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carioca because of these kinds of cultural differences within the community. Another panel member, Ronilton Dias dos Santos, agreed, adding, “the community discriminates against itself.” This relative disunity in terms of race is supported in the findings of Janice Perlman in her 40 years of research in favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

“As for community unity, or more accurately the perception of community unity, 85 percent of the original interviewees said that their communities were “united or very united,” while in XX, only half (51 percent) of the original interviewees, 45 percent of their children, and 42 percent of their grandchildren felt that way. Nonetheless, there was a decidedly greater sense of unity in the favelas than in the conjuntos, and the bairros had the least of all. But even in the favelas, there is a diminished sense of unity” (Perlman 2010, 195).

Thus, as a site of informality, Morro do Palácio is also a microcosm of racial mixture. As in Plan 3000, place-based affiliations vary based on time living in the community, age of migration, and cultural preferences. There is little self-professed place-based identification with the community itself by the older population, but more with the generations who have grown up in the community.

Given the distinct social constructions of race and ethnicity in Bolivia and Brazil, the similarities in the ways in which people in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio self-identify in relation to migration, race, and place of origin is revealing of life in informal communities. These similarities point to several initial conclusions about the nature of place-based identity in informal settlements. First, that although many residents of these informal settlement communities are migrants and have lived in the communities for many years, their places of origin still determine their personal identities. In addition, racial and ethnic difference are conflated with place in both cases, factors which then contribute to the racialization of these informal settlements by association with the larger socio-spatial context, even though the internal dynamics and racial realities of these communities are more nuanced. These differences are key to the cultural diversity of the case study communities – a reality that is little known by many until investigated further. Also, although many of the interviewed community members do not identify with labels signifying that they are ‘from’ their new home communities, those that do are predominantly of the younger generations. The increasing number of people who identify with their communities as places indicates the crystallization or consolidation of a place-based identity in each case study. There are many reasons for this change. The following sections detail some of the key factors in community identity formation and consolidation. The section Forging Identity: Narrative Resistance against Marginality in this chapter argues that these factors necessarily lead to the consolidation of these identities as resistance and project identities.
The Social Power of Violence: Stereotypes and Resistance Identities

Violence is a social ill that affects all residents of a city, regardless of income, race, or social class. However, violence affects society’s marginalized on a disproportionate level. Aside from more often being victims of violence, society’s subalterns are also associated with marginality. In her book *City of Walls*, Teresa Caldeira demonstrates that narratives of crime can have on public opinion and interaction. According to Caldeira, the discussion of crime allows people to cope with the reality of violence while simultaneously reinforcing their negative associations and emotions. In addition, crime narratives create and maintain stereotypes that reinforce an unequal societal order, while leaving out the voices of the most marginalized. “The talk of crime is productive, but it helps produce segregation (social and spatial), abuses by the institutions of order, contestation of citizens’ rights, and, especially, violence itself” (39). Experiences with and narratives of violence can therefore shape popular perceptions of marginalized groups, which can then be conflated with group characteristics.

In this section, I discuss the effect of violence – both real and perceived – on social life and community identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio de Janeiro, and specifically the communities of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. I argue that the histories and current realities of violence in these communities lead to attitudes of defense on the part of community members. They define their current identity as a community by what they argue they are not, and thus actively construct a resistance identity based on the negation or minimizing of violence.

Bolivia – Plan 3000

Between 2006 and 2016, the crime rate in Bolivia rose 71 percent. The maintenance of significant socioeconomic inequality, drug trafficking, and a culture of violence contributed to this increase. In Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the districts inside of the fourth ‘ring’ of the city have a much lower poverty rate than the districts that fall outside this boundary, where the number of people living in poverty can be as high as 40 percent. According to the Bolivian sociologist Guillermo Dávalos, “inequality increases violence and confrontation.” In the department of Santa Cruz, the rates of theft, rape and domestic violence, and fraud were among some of the highest in the country in 2014; granted, Santa Cruz also has one of the largest population concentrations in the country.

Plan 3000 also has a reputation as a *zona roja* or a red zone. Andrés Romero, a resident and community leader of the ciudadelas, said that “another of the negative aspects of the Plan is probably the high level of delinquency or of delinquent acts. This isn’t exclusive to the Plan, this

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97 (Caldeira 2000, 19)
98 (Ortiz 2016); (INE 2000 to 2014); (INE 2011); (Ruy 2016)
99 (Ibid.)
100 (Ibid.)
101 (INE 2015)
happens everywhere, but I think it is more notorious here.” Although Plan 3000 does have high crime and more gang activity than the rest of Santa Cruz, residents do not identify this as an important aspect of daily life. Indeed, interviewees eagerly took pride in the positive aspects of their community. Said one young man, “The majority of people think that the Plan is dangerous. That there are a lot of criminals, thieves and criminals, but they are only in certain parts. Not in the whole Plan” (Alejandro, 18, Plan 3000).103

A community study conducted by the project “Quiénes Somos” asked youth to gather the opinions and experiences of people living in the Plan. Participating youth included their personal opinions and experiences, with many stating that they felt safe and welcomed within Plan 3000.

“With respect to the place where I live, I feel comfortable and tranquil” (Fabiola Tosube, student).104

“Since I have lived in Plan 3000, I have felt safe and tranquil. People are very friendly and considerate” (Carmen Melgar, student).105

“I have lived in Plan 3000 for 3 years. I like to live here because the people are very good even though some people believe the opposite and say that our zone is dangerous and unsafe. I don’t think like them” (Lizeth Roca Salvatierra, student).106

Jaime Gumiel, an activist and youth mobilizer in Plan 3000 who was interviewed for the community survey, believed that Plan 3000 was a zona roja until he bought a house there and lived the reality. “It is a fairly young zone that has invaluable potential; it will become a cultural epicenter of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.”107 Gumiel also emphasized the positive in the Plan.

“[They] always treat the youth of Plan 3000 with a derogatory tone: gangsters, thugs, assailants, drug addicts. And it isn’t like that, because not all have bad habits. I want there to be productive things for everyone, that strengthen their spirit through the arts like painting, theater, and art in

102 “Otro de los aspectos negativos del Plan probablemente sea el tema del alto índice de delincuencia o de actos delictivos. No es exclusivo ese al Plan, eso pasa en todas partes, pero creo que tiene mayor notoriedad acá.” (Andrés Romero, 37, Plan 3000/Villa Primero de Mayo).
104 “Con respecto al lugar donde vivo, me siento cómoda y tranquila” (Fabiola Tosube, estudiante de colegio). La Historia del Plan 3000: Juventud y Futuro.
105 “Desde que vivo en la zona Plan 3000, me siento segura y tranquila. La gente es muy amable y considerada” (Carmen Melgar, estudiante de colegio). La Historia del Plan 3000: Juventud y Futuro.
106 “Vivo en el Plan 3000 hace 3 años. Me gusta vivir aquí porque su gente es muy buena aunque algunas personas creen lo contrario y dicen que nuestra zona es peligrosa e insegura. Yo no pienso igual que ellos” (Lizeth Roca Salvatierra, estudiante de colegio). La Historia del Plan 3000: Juventud y Futuro.
107 “Es una zona bastante joven que tiene un potencial invaluable; tiende a convertirse en un epicentro cultural de Santa Cruz de la Sierra” (Jaime Gumiel, Juventud y Futuro).
Residents of Plan 3000 are therefore adamant that they are more than the violence and delinquency their community has come to represent. In rejecting this stereotype, they reveal a community vision as a safe and progressing ciudadela. Plan 3000 is thus constructing an identity based on a selective embracing of the positive.

Brazil – Morro do Palácio

Rio’s favelas are notoriously dangerous places, as many are the headquarters and base of operations of drug trafficking organizations and gangs. Violence in favelas thus obscures institutional knowledge of the reality of favela life. Due to fear of these places, myth, stereotype, and reputation replace fact. Census takers may not enter these communities for fear of personal harm, which contributes to a lack of data on the extent of poverty, impeding or slowing community development efforts. This lack of knowledge about the reality of people living in poverty may also be intentional on the part of the government.

Janice Perlman’s seminal study *Favela* is based on an extensive survey carried out in 1976 and revisited 30 years later in favelas in Rio de Janeiro. In an explanation of the study methods, Perlman acknowledges that field work in favelas is often dangerous, and discusses the precautions taken by researchers to ensure their safety. Indeed, limitations to the study arose directly from the problem of violence, as researchers were forced to withdraw from the study for fear of personal harm from traffickers, interviewees had moved out of the communities since the time of the original study to escape the violence and thus were unavailable for the followup study, communities were inaccessible during gun battles, and informants were often unwilling to answer survey questions about violence for fear of repercussions from the ruling gang (351). Perlman notes that the rise in violence has been disastrous for people living in the city’s poorest communities. She points to the entrance of the drug and arms trade into these communities in the mid-1980s as the primary culprit (7). “The violence has made Rio’s most vulnerable population fearful of going about their daily lives, reduced their chances of getting jobs, lowered the value of their homes, weakened the trust and solidarity that has held their communities together, and co-opted homegrown community organizations” (166).

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108 “A los jóvenes del Plan 3000 siempre los tratan con un tono despectivo: pandilleros, maleantes, asaltantes, drogadictos. Y no es así, porque no todos tienen malos hábitos. Yo quiero que se hagan cosas productivas para todos y todas, que se fortalezca su espíritu a través de las artes como la pintura, el teatro, y el arte en general. Es cierto que tenemos problemas con las pandillas, pero muchos jóvenes apuestan por algo distinto, participan de cosas positivas” (Jaime Gumiel, *La Historia del Plan 3000: Juventud y Futuro*).

Criminal organizations associated with the drug trade are common in Rio’s favelas. These organizations are gangs that operate in multiple favelas and are often in conflict over territory. Thus, the element of criminal organizations within favelas necessitates another level of spatial awareness within the city’s informal communities. Communities located next to one another may be run by separate and/or warring groups, as is the case with the communities of Cidade de Deus, Gardênia Azul, and Rio das Pedras, neighboring favelas in the Barra de Tijuca/Zona Oeste of Rio. Here, each favela has very separate territorialities\(^{110}\), determined in part by the control of UPPs (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora), local militias, or trafficking rings.\(^{111}\) These controlling institutions are the main cause of violence in favelas. Three main drug gangs control favelas in Rio: Comando Vermelho – the Red Command (CV), Terceiro Comando – the Third Command (TC), and Amigos dos Amigos – Friends of Friends (ADA) (Perlman, 166). In addition, police units (UPPs) are frequently present in favelas and carry out “pacifying” operations to oust drug gangs, often resulting in the deaths of local residents caught in the crossfire. State presence in favelas – in the entire metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro – can therefore mean increased violence and death rather than improved order and safety.

Residents of Morro do Palácio say that the pacification of their community occurred roughly 5 years ago, in 2011. In November 2011, Morro do Palácio was one of the first communities in Niterói to receive a UPP, due to the high level of criminal activity and violence on the morro.\(^{112}\) Before pacification, it was dangerous to enter the community, and there were frequent night-long shootouts. Today, residents describe the community as “calm”. Although there are people still involved in the drug trade, residents are no longer at risk of dying from stray bullets, and the drug trade is isolated to certain sections or houses within the community.

In Morro do Palácio, people’s experiences with violence reflect the shift from living in fear to defending their now “calm” community from stereotypes of violence. One resident, Guilherme, is the owner of a small bakery in the community and has lived in Morro do Palácio for nearly 16 years. Guilherme acknowledged that it was difficult and dangerous to live in the community several years ago, but emphasizes that now it is a “good place to live.”

“Before, it was difficult to enter here. There were shootouts all the time. I have a hole in my door, a bullet flew in there, look…I have various bullet holes in my house…my house has several bullet holes in the wall, a bullet flew into my bedroom and hit her [my wife’s] arm. Today it is marvellous here…People viewed this [the violence] like a bomb. They came and left. No one

\(^{110}\) While there may be conflicting territorialities among controlling entities, residents of these communities still interact. One indication of the day-to-day interactions and relationships between favelas is the extent of operations of the informal economy. For example, there is an open Facebook group "Rio das Pedras, Gardenia Azul, Cidade de Deus Jacarepaguá – Compra e Venda" for businesses to attract customers.


wanted… no one knew… they came up to the entrance there down below...before families wouldn’t come here. Not hers [my wife’s] or mine. They were afraid of coming here. Today people want to come here. They want to get to know Morro do Palácio (Guilherme, 46).113

“Everyone is friends, they are all good people. It is a good place to live. [People] joke, converse...In reality, you could say that only family lives here. Only family” (Guilherme, 46).114

Aside from the reduction of violence, Guilherme appreciates the convenience and stability of his life in the community.

“I have family, and I live well. … My family studies nearby, … my wife is a pastry maker and baker… I own my house, so my life is peaceful. I have a peaceful life, a good house, thank God, we live a good life. Whoever says it is bad is lying” (Guilherme, 46).115

Thus, for Guilherme, a “calm” or “easy” life currently has more to do with financial security than physical safety. Even during the years of violence, he and his family remained in the community, continuing to work and live their lives.

Regardless of the drastic reduction of violence in Morro do Palácio and the resulting improved quality of life, comments from other palacianos reveal that violence is still present. Gabriel, 48 years old, has lived in the community for 30 years, after first living in Rio proper when he moved to the area. He doesn’t like the noise, “bandidos”, and drug trade in his community.

Others, however, take a more relativistic stance. Júlia, 21, remarked that Morro do Palácio “Is very calm. Other morros are more dangerous.” According to Júlia, outsiders are usually afraid of the community of Palácio. She said that people aren’t prejudiced, but afraid. “Prejudices no, but fear yes. Because below there are a lot of assaults, they think that they [assaltants] are from the morro. That I know of, they are not from the morro” (Júlia, age 21).116

Júlia tells people she lives in the community, on the morro, to tell them that in reality it is calm and there is not much violence now. Even though their fear exists, she says she does not feel judged when she talks about her community with outsiders.

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113 “Antes, era difícil de entrar aqui. Era tiro a toda hora. Eu tenho a porta furada, tenho bala que chegou ali, ô...tenho vários tiros na minha casa, na minha casa tenho várias furações de tiro na parede, passou bala dentro do meu quarto, atingiu o braço dela [his wife]. Hoje é maravilha isso aqui. ...As pessoas via isso aqui, assim como uma bomba. Entrava e escrudia. Ninguém queria...ninguém sabia...chegava lá embaixo ali, até para entrega,...antes as famílias não vinham aqui. Nem a dela nem a minha. Tinha medo de vir aqui. Hoje as pessoas querem vir aqui. Quer conhecer o Morro do Palácio” (Guilherme. Interview. Morro do Palácio, Niterói, Brazil. August 5, 2016).

114 “As pessoas são todos amigos, são todos boas. É um lugar bom de morar. ...Brinca, conversa...Na realidade, aqui é um lugar que pode dizer que mora só família. Só família” (Guilherme, 46).

115 “Tenho família, e vivo bem. Eu não tenho ... minha família estuda pertinho, a outra...se formou... minha esposa é confeiteira da padaria, ...a casa é minha, então a vida é tranquila. Tenho uma vida tranquila, uma casa boa, graças a Deus, a gente leva a vida boa. Quem diz que tá ruim é mentira” (Guilherme, 46).

That informants feel the need to explain to outsiders that their community is not dangerous, that it is a “good place to live” that is attracting new residents, points to persisting outside ideas of Morro do Palácio as an inherently dangerous place. The negation of this perception implies a strong internal sense of community identity that is not tied to violence or criminality, but rather actively works in direct opposition to such notions. In addition, some community members may not consider themselves to be victims of crime. But residents also realize that violence and drug trafficking still exist in their community. Although they want Morro do Palácio to be a place without violence or crime, criminals hide out in their midst. A community member said “they are contradictions that we encounter.” As in Plan 3000, community identity in Morro do Palácio is thus constructed through an intentional negation of the negative.

**Spatiality, Informality, and Control**

As evidenced in the discussion on place of origin, culture, and regional identity, peoples’ relationship to place is a determinant of personal identity. This concept can be expanded – or narrowed – to the city scale in order to better understand intra-urban identity dynamics. Here, I describe the physical structure of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio de Janeiro/Niteroi, and locate informal communities within the urban sprawl. I then discuss the effects of this relative location on residents and their community identities, as well as the relationship between informal communities and multiple scales of government as it manifests in urban policy.

**Bolivia – Plan 3000**

The built environment of Santa Cruz de la Sierra conforms to a classic Chicago School model of a concentrically expanding city. The city is literally divided into rings, each of which have their own socioeconomic or commercial functions. The ringed urban design was intended to transform Santa Cruz into a garden city, modeled after industrial European cities and heavily influenced by the ideals of modernism. The original organization plan that resulted from this modernist transition in 1957 was called the Plan Techint, which sought to incorporate the idea of the Garden City and a 1930s plan for São Paulo, Brazil (69). The center of Santa Cruz preserves the colonial city design, laid out according to the common Spanish “chessboard” with a central plaza and streets that intersect at right angles. In addition to its historic value, the center is currently home to governmental buildings, educational headquarters, museums, and local retail – segregated into sectors geared towards upper class customers and sprawling markets with both formal and informal commerce. Outside of the center, the city is organized in rings, inside of

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117 (NUPIJ UFF 2016)
118 (Kirshner 2009)
119 Maclean Stearman, Allyn. 1985. *Camba and Kolla: Migration and Development in Santa Cruz, Bolivia*. Orlando: University of Central Florida Press, 43);
which lie *unidades vecinales* (UVs) that were intended to be self-contained and self-sustaining neighborhood units. Radial roads run outward from the center, providing the main access to each ring. An update to the Plan Techint in 1972, the Plano Regulador, planned out the third and fourth rings of the city, and the fourth ring was designated as the city’s outer boundary (71).

Importantly, the Plan Techint did not account for rapid future urban growth, much less the extreme levels of rural-urban migration that began in the 1970s. The 1957 plan accounted for a maximum of 60,000 residents, and projected 200,000 residents in the year 2000 – this number was surpassed by 1978 (71). This lack of foresight meant that new arrivals to the city were forced to create their own infrastructure, settling outside the fourth ring on ‘open’ land. These were the sites of Santa Cruz’s first informal settlements. The informal in Santa Cruz was thus historically regarded as existing peripherally to the city. In addition, many informal communities experienced significant growth in the 1960s and 70s during the intense internal migration from the Bolivian Andes to Santa Cruz. Thus, informality in Santa Cruz is on some level associated with ethnic and cultural difference (166).

Within this concentric urban sprawl, many poor migrants settle in predominantly migrant neighborhoods. Low income neighborhoods have been historically ethnically dichotomous, split between highland and lowland migrants (often considered as camba or colla spaces). In the 1980s, most highland migrants moved to the western half of Santa Cruz, while lowland migrants concentrated in the eastern section. Stearman found that this distribution resulted from the location of different transportation routes into the city; the main highway connecting Santa Cruz to the west passes through the southwestern section of the city where many highlanders originally settled, whereas highways and railroads to Brazil, Argentina, and northern Santa Cruz are located in the northern and eastern sectors dominated by cambas (48). At this time, unskilled laborers were also concentrated around the city’s periphery (74).

Over the past 30 years, the spatiality of migrant settlement in Santa Cruz has become more complicated. Upper class neighborhoods are forming outside of the fourth *anillo* (ring), as developers build condominiums and housing complexes near the seventh and eighth rings as well as outside of the city limits. Highland and lowland migrants inhabit all areas of the city, although ethnic enclaves still exist on a smaller scale. These patterns are observable in a detailed analysis of the urbanization of Plan 3000, or the Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez.

Plan 3000 formed through urban expansion beyond the city’s rings. In 1983, the Piraí River that runs along the northwestern edge of the city flooded. As the river limited the city’s growth on that side, its banks became part of the periphery, and thus were the site of informal settlements home to low-income families and migrants. The flood destroyed these settlements,

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120 (Ibid.)

121 (Kirshner 2009)

122 (Stearman 1985, 49)
and residents were evacuated.\textsuperscript{123} The local government relocated the evacuees – \textit{los damnificados} (the damned) – to the southeastern sector of the city outside of the fourth ring, and the army provided military vehicles and tarps to move and house the families. With time, the municipal government allotted 3,000 official plots to 3,000 evacuated families, thus originating the name Plan 3000. The land on which they were settled was not developed.

> “Basic necessities became more and more urgent. We didn’t have water or electricity, and there weren’t streets or avenues, or even a road in good condition so that transport could arrive. The entrance area, just a simple lane, was a sandbank filled with holes with water” (María Zabla Cortez Vda. de Chacón, \textit{La Historia del Plan 3000: Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez}).\textsuperscript{124}

Today, Plan 3000 is rapidly expanding. For example, during the four years of his term, ex Deputy Mayor and current President of the Asociación de Juntas Vecinales Jesús Álvarez oversaw the creation of 29 new neighborhoods in the Plan.\textsuperscript{125}

> “Municipal District 8 has 145 neighborhoods. … The zone grows at an accelerated pace because Santa Cruz grows on the southeastern side, migration doesn’t slow, because to the southeast is the Rio Pirai, which limits settlement, to the north it is very expensive to live, not to mention the zone of El Urubó, which is even more expensive, so people opt to live on the eastern and [southeastern] sides” (\textit{La Calle}, n.174).\textsuperscript{126}

The historical spatial distancing from the planned section of the city led to resentment, distrust, and feelings of abandonment of evacuees and subsequent migrants to the settlement. This also led to the spatial differentiation of identity within Plan 3000. Some of the many neighborhoods correspond to distinct ethnic identities represented by internal migrants. However, identity on a community or district level (as opposed to the neighborhood scale) is determined by these feelings of physical separation, and thus resentment due to the lack of ease of access of resources that were and are more accessible in other parts of the city.

\textsuperscript{123} Pedraza, Gustavo. Political Analyst, Director of Gestion de Capital Social. Interview, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. April 4, 2016.;

\textsuperscript{124} “Las necesidades básicas se hacían cada vez más urgentes. No teníamos agua, ni luz, y tampoco habían calles o avenidas, ni siquiera una carretera en buen estado para que llegara el transporte. La zona de ingreso, apenas un callejón, era un arenal lleno de pozos con agua.” (María Zabla Cortez Vda. de Chacón, \textit{La Historia del Plan 3000: Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez})

\textsuperscript{125} (\textit{La Calle} 2013)

\textsuperscript{126} “El distrito municipal 8 tiene 145 barrios… la zona crece de forma acelerada porque Santa Cruz tiende a crecer por el lado sudeste, la inmigración no para, porque por el lado del sudoeste está el río Pirai, que limita el asentamiento, por la zona norte es muy caro vivir y ni se diga por la zona de El Urubó, es más caro aún, así que la gente opta por vivir por el lado este y [sudeste] [sic]” (\textit{La Calle} 2013).
“‘There was no transport. We moved around on trucks or on carts and buggies. Then, there recently appeared large micros [buses] and this was how we left and returned to our homes.’ In the first years of existence of the Plan, there only reigned disorder and a lack of attention from the authorities, who never imagined the dimensions that these scared citizens who arrived damp and with the few belongings they could save from the flood could achieve.”

These feelings of separateness are significant and manifest in policy initiatives. Plan 3000 is a designated ciudadadela, meaning that it is represented by a subalcalde, or deputy mayor. This decentralizes political representation. However, the subalcalde is an appointed position.

“Osvaldo Peredo, the city council member who represents District 8, the Plan Tres Mil, suggested that municipal decentralization, or “distritalización,” would be the most effective policy to support and encourage migrant integration. He explained that the measure would enable local government to be more representative, and that sections of the city with a substantial migrant presence could elect subalcaldes” (Kirsher 2009, 211).

The decentralization strategy is indicative that the city is developing new centralities significant enough to be recognized at a governmental level. Indeed, according to cruceno academic Gustavo Pedraza, Plan 3000 has its “own political, economic, and cultural centrality” with an “almost compact internal organization.” The community has its own internal commerce, its own Carnaval celebrations, a newspaper, churches, and a separate Comité Cívico. Pedraza emphasizes that “that isn’t normal in a barrio”, and that this internal organization developed out of necessity due to the distance of the original settlement from the rest of the city. “It was very difficult for them to come here.”

Thus, geographical separateness has led to the development of distinct representative structures and institutions from the rest of the city. There are Neighborhood Groups as well as district-level representation. However, a desire for autonomy and the reality of complex cultural differences do not preclude the merging of regional and ethnic identities within this institutionalized place identity. Cruceno culture is to some extent also an official part of the culture of Plan 3000. “The significance of the Plan is its people, there are people that have come from all parts of Santa Cruz and Bolivia, and even foreigners. The neighbors of the zone have

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127 “‘No había transporte. Nos movíamos en camiones o carretas y carretones. Después recién aparecieron unos micros inmensos y así como saliamos y volvíamos a nuestras casas.’ … En los primeros años de existencia del Plan, reinaba únicamente el desorden y la falta de atención de las autoridades, que en ese entonces no imaginaban las dimensiones que llegarían a lograr esos asustados ciudadanos que llegaron mojados y con algunas pocas pertenencias que pudieron salvar de la riada.” (Projecto Quiénes Somos: Mi Barrio 13, “Doña Aurora”).
129 (Pedraza 2016)
taken to heart the slogan of Santa Cruz, which days “The law of the cruceño is hospitality” and here we are welcoming.”

Brazil – Morro do Palácio

The urban form of the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro (of which Niterói is a part) is characterized by favelas, or informal settlements and land occupations that lie within the urban sprawl as opposed to on the periphery. Unlike the case of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and many other major cities around the world in which delegitimized informality exists around the periphery of the city, in Rio de Janeiro these communities exist on the morros that interrupt Rio’s built environment. Indeed, the morros have been a contentious feature throughout the city’s urban planning history. Major urban planning renovations in Rio have involved the destruction or moving of morros, an enormous undertaking requiring many years of labor. The best known example of this occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century with the removal of the Morro do Castelo. Further from the center of Rio de Janeiro, favelas are found on more level ground. However, in some of these cases – such as with the famous Cidade de Deus (City of God) – the current manifestation of the favela is not the original, rather a new community formed by a favela that was evicted from elsewhere in the city. It is important to note that favelas are predominantly found on land that is not wanted for development, or that was not wanted at the time of their founding. In most cases, these are the hills found throughout the city.

This rule applies to favelas in the city of Niterói as well. Niterói lies across the Bahía de Guanabara from Rio de Janeiro. Niterói has a long colonial history, often overshadowed by its more famous and commercially relevant neighbor of Rio de Janeiro. In 1834 Niterói became the capital of the state of Rio de Janeiro, after the municipality of Rio became the capital city of the Brazilian empire. The new state capital continued to develop throughout the 1800s, mainly according to a “chessboard” urban plan. In the early 1900s, government and public buildings were built, and further infrastructure development such as public gas lighting and a central sewage system was introduced. With the advent of the Estado Novo in 1937, Niterói became more modernized, and a main avenue (Av. Amaral Peixoto) was the focus of urban development – just as a similar project with the Av. Presidente Vargas was underway in Rio. In 1974, the bridge connecting Niterói to Rio de Janeiro was built, increasing accessibility between the two commercial centers on either side of the bay. The state capital moved back to Rio de Janeiro in 1975, and the subsequent years were characterized by increased “public investment, real estate speculation, infrastructure, and occupation” in the Região Oceânica and in Rio de Janeiro; in essence, an expansion of development outside of Niterói’s central business district and central

130 “Lo importante del Plan es su gente, aquí viven personas que han venido de todos lados de Santa Cruz y de Bolivia, y hasta gente extranjera. Los vecinos de esta zona aprendieron bien el eslogan de Santa Cruz, que dice Es ley del cruceño la hospitalidad y aquí somos hospitalarios” (Deputy Mayor Víctor Hugo Céliz, March 2016, El Deber).

131 (Cayres et al. 2010)
neighborhoods (2). This led to the abandonment and devalorization of the properties in Niterói proper (the neighborhoods of São Domingos, Ingá, Boa Viagem, etc).

The current state of abandonment of many buildings and public areas in this section of Niterói has led to revitalization efforts to revalue and repurpose urban space. Recent efforts include plans for new condominiums, which threaten the permanence of communities located in abandoned buildings or on the morros in these neighborhoods. Indeed, recent urban development comes at the cost of quality of life. “This would indicate a policy of homogenization of space on the part of public powers and real estate capital, which worry little about the question of socio-spatial segregation and the living conditions of the local population.”

This development trend is concerning in relation to Niterói’s favelas and comunidades. As in the municipality of Rio, favelas in the broader metropolitan area also exist within the formal city limits due to the city’s hilly geography. The morros are a physical obstacle that impedes the development of larger structures such as condominiums and apartment buildings. The community of Morro do Palácio is located on Morro do Ingá, beneath which is located a former governmental palace. The Morro do Ingá is located between the neighborhoods of Ingá and Boa Viagem – both middle-upper class neighborhoods with growing skyrises and constant development. “The neighborhood of Boa Viagem has had recent occupations and urbanization, and in the last few years accelerated rates of the construction of residential buildings, as well as an increase of offered services. Nevertheless, its initial occupation was made difficult by its topography, which due to its natural characteristics impeded access” (3). This same difficulty protects the permanence of Morro do Palácio even as its surrounding neighborhoods continue to evolve.

In terms of its location within the city of Niterói, Morro do Palácio is enviably situated. When asked if he was proud of anything in his community, one interviewee mentioned its relative location. “I live almost in front of the Cristo, next to the beach, everything is close, the bank...it is great here. It is a palácio. It is very good here” (Guilherme 2016).

The community is near Guanabara Bay, the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), and the Museu de Arte Contemporânea (MAC), designed by the architect Oscar Niemeyer. The MAC is a tourist attraction for Niterói, drawing people of various social classes to the base of Morro do Palácio. From the second floor of the homes of the top of the morro, residents have a privileged view of the center of Niterói, Guanabara Bay, and the famous skyline of Rio de Janeiro.

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132 (Ibid.)
134 “O bairro da Boa Viagem possui ocupação e urbanização recentes e passou nos últimos anos processos acelerados de construção de edifícios residenciais, bem como o aumento dos serviços oferecidos. Contudo, o início da sua ocupação foi dificultada pela topografia, que devido suas características naturais impediam o acesso” (Cayres et al. 2010, 3).
135 “Tenho, moro quase por frente do cristo, ao lado da praia, tudo pertinho, o banco, aqui é ótimo aqui. Aqui é palácio. Aqui é muito bom” (Guilherme 2016).
Considering its location, the relationship between the morro and the surrounding neighborhoods is key. The community is not formally integrated into the economy of Niterói. This means that most of the morro’s residents work in the service economy outside of the community, and that most do not have the legal rights to their property. Because of this, residents do not have access to the city sewer system, public electricity, and other formal services provided by the municipal government. The community only recently gained access to the water system, although they have had a public health clinic for many years.

*Peripherality and the Importance of a Name*

The spatial relationship of Morro do Palácio to the rest of the city relates to its identity as a community. This is most observable in the current efforts of community members to clearly define a community identity. Residents recognize that as an informal community in Brazil, the way they present themselves is important. Morro do Palácio is the official name of the community. Amongst community members and even nearby neighbors, it may be referred to as “the morro” as it is the nearest favela on a morro in that neighborhood (Boa Viagem/Ingá). Some residents refer to it as “the Palácio”. There are also two questions of name and identity that arise in the specific context of Brazil. The first is that because the community has little documented history and was formed as a result of waves of rural-urban migrants settling and developing the hill, the “official” name of the community may not correspond to its “actual” name.

In a panel discussion of several community members facilitated by the Museu de Ingá and the Universidade Federal Fluminense, both located at the base of the morro, community members discussed an identity crisis that manifested in the name of the community itself. It became clear that some of the first settlers of the morro believed that the true name of the community was Morro do Carniso or Morro do Carnisal, while others said it was Morro da Ingá. One panel member said that the true or original name from the 1960s was Morro do Carnisal. Interviews with some community members revealed that some believed the name Morro do Palácio was actually a designation from the military police during the years of Brazil’s last military dictatorship (1964-1985). If true, the implication is that the current name is an imposition, a sign of external control, criminalization, and vigilance over poverty. This consequence also manifests in another possible legal name for the community: Travessa de Ingá. This name is said to have originated during the height of the drug trade years as traffickers needed to refer to specific territories of control. This designation is then also seen as a contradiction to the wishes of the community’s self-definition. This version of the community’s name has everything to do with the territoriality of illegality, and nothing to do with self-determination.137

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136 (NUPIJ UFF 2016)
137 (Ibid.)
Another nuance of the community name debate is found in the distinction between *comunidade* and *favela*. One of my guides gently corrected me after I used the term favela in casual conversation, saying that she didn’t like the word’s negative connotations of poverty and misery, and that comunidade better represented the reality of life in Morro do Palácio. Another community member\textsuperscript{138} mentioned this debate, and said he preferred favela precisely because it acknowledges different realities of life. “We are not the same, we are different.” Favela helps to signal that they are not just another community, and that organization within it is distinct. For him, the word also conveys a sense of apathy that he finds representative of community involvement. He says that community members did nothing when the government wanted to shut down the state-funded daycare and did nothing to replace it. “Our difference comes from our disinterest...That is why I like to refer to it as a favela.”\textsuperscript{139} This implies that the lack of internal spatial organization is the result of apathy or the lack of formal community-level organization, and that perhaps the community is therefore deserving of a negative label like favela.

Whatever the preferred connotation or term, it is clear that both *favela* and *comunidade* have a certain power. Morro do Palácio finds power in acknowledging its marginality. Another crucial side of this name debate relates to the legal consequences of self-determination. Knowing the legal or officially-determined name of the community is key in fighting for land titles through the process of regularization. Future deeds will only be legal if they include the correct name of the community. This technicality and its implications is illustrative of the difficulties and complexities of living in informality, as well as making the transition from delegitimized informality.

This name debate is also indicative of the purpose of group identity definition in Morro do Palácio. The constant renegotiation and redefinition of the community’s name for future utility point to community identity in Morro do Palácio as a resistance and project identity. In this instance, identity is territorialized for the purposes of creating a structure through which the community can gain legitimacy and access to more rights. Claiming a history associated with a name is a first step in the community’s resistance against their institutionalized marginalization.

**Forging Identity: Narrative Resistance against Marginality**

Narratives of marginality within Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio are temporally divided. Residents of both communities often discuss memories of the initial poverty of their communities in order to highlight the progress the community has made, establishing a communal collective memory.\textsuperscript{140} While recognizing the significance and extent of the extreme

\textsuperscript{138} Ronilton Dias dos Santos, a former president of the Morro do Palácio Residents’ Association (Associação de Moradores do Morro do Ingá). He made these statements during the roundtable conversation between community members, museum staff, and UFF collaborators (NUPIJ UFF 2016).

\textsuperscript{139} “Essa diferença nossa, vem de nossa desinterés. ...Por isso eu gosto de chamá-lo de favela.”

\textsuperscript{140} (Peña 2009)
poverty historically present in both locations, this rhetoric is intended to contribute to the project of bettering the community’s image, complexifying the notion that these areas are simply impoverished. In addition, present-day marginality is recognized by the communities in order to emphasize current necessities. The recognition and application of marginality as a means of identity production is therefore temporally dependent.

In addition, many of the social determinants of identity in both Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio indicate a struggle between externally-determined and internally defined identity in informal communities. The resistance against social narratives of race, poverty, violence, and physical separateness are observable on a community scale. Community narratives of marginality are a significant part of this redefinition. External narratives are refuted through active community organization designed specifically to improve both internal and external opinions about the nature of community. To understand the relationship between poverty and community identity, this section discusses the socioeconomic reality of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio and explores residents’ views of their communities and their socioeconomic status. In recognizing the developing internal community narratives of self, it becomes clear that community organizations in both locations are working to help define and consolidate a positive sense of community identity. This work is the active articulation of identity as a resistance identity and project identity, the process of which is a form of insurgent citizenship.

**Bolivia – Plan 3000**

Plan 3000 continues to suffer from economic and infrastructural necessities. District 8 is one of the most impoverished districts in the city, with the majority of homes with “low economic capacity”.\(^{141}\) Access to public health services, although improved, remains difficult for many.\(^{142}\) In an interview with current Deputy Mayor Víctor Hugo Céliz, he revealed that only about 30 percent of the Plan had paved roads as of March 2016.\(^{143}\) However, he was quick to situation this lack of development in the context of progress. “Like all *ciudadelas* experiencing growth it has its problems that today are small in comparison with previous years, because today it is much better.”\(^{144}\)

Many of the original residents of the Plan tell detailed stories of the widespread poverty during the first years of the community. As part of the community’s efforts to value its history, these stories are widely publicized in publications celebrating the anniversary of the founding of Plan 3000. One such publication is *Tiempo & Espacio*, a magazine published in Plan 3000 that includes the voices of community members.\(^{145}\)

\(^{141}\) (CEDURE 2011, 21)

\(^{142}\) (Proyecto Quiénes Somos – *La Historia del Plan 3000: Salud y Urbanidad* 2013)

\(^{143}\) (El Deber 2016)

\(^{144}\) “*Como toda ciudadela en pleno crecimiento tiene sus falencias, que ahora ya son pequeñas a comparación de años anteriores, porque hoy está mucho mejor.*”

\(^{145}\) (*Tiempo & Espacio*, Ed. 2, 2012)
Concepción Cortés Rojas, born in Cochabamba, was one of the first inhabitants of the community and worked to provide housing and health services for the damnificados. Her comments reveal the struggles of the first residents of the Plan, which were mainly due to institutional failure on the part of the city government.

“We lived in conditions of extreme poverty, with a little rice and wheat, used clothing, straw mattresses, we received donations from the Mennonites of chickens, cheese, and milk.” “In addition, many people cheated us, because many donations didn’t make it to their destination, they were diverted somewhere else. They were supposed to build us bedrooms and a bathroom, but we only received an unfinished 4m x 4m room.”

Narratives of the founding and marginality of Plan 3000 are also illustrative of the “entrepreneurialism” in informality discussed by Roy (2009). Residents who were part of the original group moved to the site of Plan 3000 after the flood in 1983 destroyed their homes near the Río Pirai remember the community unity and teamwork that arose out of the desperate poverty and isolation in which they found themselves. As an abandoned community, the economy grew out of the need to survive economically and simultaneously develop the basic infrastructure of the built environment of Plan 3000.

“At the beginning there was incredible chaos, but later, bit by bit, we became organized. And even so, it was still difficult and complicated. To get a gallon of water, for cooking, we were in line from 4 in the morning until mid day. For a while, that was the solution we found, while we were doing the paperwork to create a public services cooperative.”

However, the consequences of this drive also contributed to the sprawling, disorganized growth of Plan 3000 as the community increased in population and size. The Plan’s chaos is a main complaint of many in the community and of those who visit it.

“The ciudadelas are also characterized by a marked disorganization. Mostly a result of the uncontrolled growth of the markets, informal commerce, brought about by public transportation...it is the only thing we have to move between the furthest neighborhoods at an

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146 “Vivimos en condiciones de extrema pobreza, con arrocillo, triguillo, ropa usada, colchón de paja, recibimos donaciones de los menonitas que consistía en pollos, queso y leche.” “También mucha gente nos engañó, porque muchas donaciones no llegaron al lugar del destino, se desviaban a otro lado, tenían que construirnos dos dormitorios y un baño, pero tan solo recibimos un cuarto de 4x4 en obra bruta.”

147 “Al comienzo se armaba un caos tremendo, pero después, poco a poco nos fuimos organizando. Y aún así, seguía siendo difícil y complicado. Para recibir un galón de agua, que servía para cocinar, hacíamos cola desde las 4 de la madrugada hasta casi el medio día. Por un tiempo, esa fue la solución que encontramos, mientras gestionábamos los trámites para crear una cooperativa de servicios públicos.” (Proyecto Quiénes Somos – La Historia del Plan 3000: Mi Barrio, 19).
affordable price, but this also brings a certain disorganization. A vehicular and commercial chaos...it is the central characteristic of the Plan” (Andrés Romero, 37, Plan/Villa).

“We are arriving in the heart of the Plan, here at the Rotonda, and you don’t see drainage canals. We are arriving in the heart of the Plan, look at the commerce. No one respects public space...here people bring out their things to sell where they deem it convenient. So there is a total lack of respect of private property. There is a total lack of respect of public space. … It is very evident here. It is evident and there has been a lot of permissivity. And also, because of this there was a fire, it took them two days to put out the fire and the third day they returned” (Andrés Romero, 37, Plan/Villa).

“It has been practically 33 years since the foundation of the Plan, and it is a real pity that the Plan still does not have plumbing or sanitation systems” (Andrés Romero, 37, Plan/Villa).

Thus, much of the marginality in Plan 3000 manifests as internal spatial disorganization and a lack of infrastructure.

How does the community reconcile this challenge with their desire to attract investment and disprove negative stereotypes? Much of the rhetoric that drives efforts to consolidate a more positive community identity in Plan 3000 is related to the *pujanza* of its residents; its driving force that makes it a vital contribution to the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Residents conceive of themselves as hardworking and business-oriented. This attitude is apparent in news media produced inside Plan 3000. In the newspaper La Calle, the front page reads “Plan 3000 consolidates a new identity.” Pictured in the group of people on the front page is Amélia Solorzano, the owner of Patra, one of the largest sportswear manufacturer in Santa Cruz that works within the local and national markets. She is a resident of Plan 3000, and her presence on the front page highlights the community’s self-identification as a sector of business people.

The magazine also profiles Pedro García Menacho, a TV personality on the network Red Uno. Menacho has lived in Plan 3000 since he was 5 years old. His comments illustrate the defensive attitude toward the progress of the Plan.

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148 “Las ciudadelas también son caracterizadas por una desorganización bastante marcada. Sobre todo fruto del crecimiento descontrolado de los mercados, el comercio informal, fruto del transporte público...es lo único que tenemos para movilizarnos hasta el último barrio de una manera económica pero eso conlleva también una desorganización. Un caos vehicular, comercial...es la característica central en el Plan” (Andrés Romero).

149 “Estamos llegando al corazón del Plan, aquí en la Rotonda, y no ves canales de drenaje. Estamos llegando al corazón del Plan, mira el comercio. Nadie respete el espacio público... aquí la gente saca a vender sus cosas donde ellos lo ven conveniente. Entonces hay una falta total de respeto de toda la propiedad privada. Hay una falta total de respeto al espacio público. Y te digo...que es una falta de respeto porque es un tema cultural de repente no es...no solamente que sea en el Plan. Pero aquí está muy marcado. Está muy marcado y ha habido mucha permissividad. Es más aquí había fruto de esto un incendio, tardaron dos días en apagar el fuego y el tercer día se volvieron a sentar [en un mercado público, informal, que estuvimos pasando en este momento]” (Andrés Romero).

150 “Estamos prácticamente a 33 años de la fundación del Plan, y es una verdadera pena que el Plan todavía no tenga el alcantarilla o sanitario” (Andrés Romero).

151 (*La Calle* 2013, 8).
“Message to Plan 3000: That they understand that the Plan will succeed when the will of its residents wants it to.” (Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012).152

“Many think that Plan 3000 is the backyard of Santa Cruz. Plan 3000 has 20% of the population in Santa Cruz, it is not a dormitory city, it is a place of a lot of commercial activity, of endeavors to get out of extreme poverty and contribute to the development that all Bolivians deserve for a better destiny.”153

“Plan 3000 has created itself alone with its hardworking people, the great migration from the west has made it self-sufficient, so that it grows in a very unorganized manner.”154

“It needs to be the determiner of its own destiny, to be politically and institutionally autonomous, it must prioritize education, health, and good nutrition.”155

The magazine also conducted an interview with Dr. Herland Vaca Diez, the president of the CCPSC in 2012. Dr. Diez was born and raised in the city of Santa Cruz, “three blocks from the main plaza.”156 His phrasing here indicates the importance of the physical plaza and city center – a symbol of cruceño civic history – to his personal identity. His views of the Plan 3000 are representative of the tension between marginalization and modernization in the cruceño imaginary. “The first thoughts I have about Plan 3000 are that there have been many social problems, there is poverty, backwardness, lack of education, health, basic services. Now I see vigor, work, integration, effort, and progress.”157

The magazine Tiempo & Espacio is a good example of the defensiveness of positive community image within Plan 3000. Tiempo & Espacio actively tries to represent the progress of the community since its founding, and celebrate the work of its residents. After quoting a resident, for example, the magazine sends the line by saying “proclaimed this beloved founder of the beautiful and thriving Ciudadela.” Other internally-produced media also aim to celebrate the community’s positive developments. The most salient example is the newspaper La Calle, a small paper founded in 2008 with the goal of showing the entrepreneurialism and positive

152 “Mensaje al Plan Tres Mil: Que entiendan que el plan va a salir adelante cuando la voluntad de sus pobladores así lo quieran” (Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012).
153 “Muchos han pensado que el Plan Tres Mil es el patio trasero de Santa Cruz, el Plan Tres Mil tiene el 20% de la población boliviana en Santa Cruz, no es una ciudad dormitorio, es un lugar de mucho movimiento comercial, de emprendimientos que busca salir de la extrema pobreza y contribuir al desarrollo que todos los Bolivianos merecemos un mejor destino.”
154 “El Plan Tres Mil se ha hecho sola con su gente trabajadora, la gran migración del occidente ha hecho que sea autosuficiente, de manera que crece de forma muy desordenada.”
155 “Necesita ser dueña de su propio destino, ser autónoma política e institucionalmente, se debe priorizar la educación, la salud y buena alimentación.”
156 (Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012)
157 “Las primeras ideas que tengo del Plan 3000, es que había muchos problemas sociales, había pobreza, atraso, falta de educación, salud, servicios básicos, ahora veo pujanza, trabajo, integración, esfuerzo y progreso” (ibid).
developments within all the ciudadelas. An article published in *La Calle* after the newspaper was awarded as the most popular newspaper in the ciudadelas in 2014 describes the newspaper’s mission. “It was born to show the good side of the ciudadelas. Its pages are fed with good news. The protagonist is the common citizen.” In the edition celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the community in 2013, a self-promoting article in *La Calle* declared:

> “Before *La Calle* was born, the ciudadelas Andrés Ibáñez did not have a means of social communication like those in Pampa de la Isla and Villa Primero de Mayo, that shows that these zones have small medium, and large business people, talented athletes, artesans, beautiful women, and institutions that transform lives” (*La Calle*, March 2013, 34).

In an interview, the director of the newspaper, Daine Álvarez Ortiz, acknowledged this difference between *La Calle* and other newspapers in the city, saying that they did not report on violent crime in the ciudadelas or have an obituary section specifically because these types of news items were overrepresented by other media in the city. However, this approach does not limit *La Calle* from reporting on serious issues and educating the ciudadelas about the realities of their continued marginalization. For example, the front page of the early October 2009 issue declares “The campaigns discriminate against the marginalized neighborhoods,” and follows with editorials and political analysis with titles such as “Politicians forget about the barrios yet again.”

In addition to being conscious of the implications of the type of stories they report for the representation of the ciudadelas, *La Calle* also acknowledges identity differentiation from the idea of the ‘city’ within the ciudadelas more explicitly. The front page of *La Calle*, in their 33rd annual edition celebrating the founding of Plan 3000, announces, “Plan 3000 consolidates a new identity.” Explaining further, the newspaper asserts “its protagonists have worked to construct a new identity of a vigorous, progressive, entrepreneurial ciudadelas forging new horizons, leaving behind its ‘fame’ as a Red Zone, which tarnished its image for many years.”

Such explicit language that recognizes Plan 3000 as a community with an emerging cohesive consciousness highlights the role of community media in identity construction and the raising of this consciousness. Community media is therefore evidence of the realization of Plan 3000’s project identity. The vision of the identity of Plan 3000 as uplifted by *Tiempo & Espacio* and *La Calle* is one that takes into account its origins and celebrates the hard work of residents in consolidating the transformation from impoverished informal settlement plagued by poverty to a bustling, contributive district of the city in which needs are still unmet, but progress seems more possible. The tenets of this identity – hard work, resourcefulness, and cultural diversity – are

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158 (*La Calle* 2014, 29)
161 (*La Calle*, March 2016)
162 (*La Calle*, March 2016)
evident in the tone of these media. Given that *La Calle* sees its work as a deliberate strategy to control the narrative of ciudadela identity, their promoted identity is also a resistance identity that works against the dominant negative narrative.

The active refutation of dominant narratives – consciousness-raising of a resistance identity – is also manifest in many Plan 3000 community organizations, such as the Centro Cultural San Isidro (CCSI). The cultural center offers free youth programming, including art and gardening classes, has its own internet radio station run by youth from the community, and hosts regular theater productions and concerts of local and national bands. The CCSI also works on initiatives to encourage responsible and active citizenship and to educate local youth and uplift their experiences as young residents of the ciudadela. For example, the CCSI collaborated on a project to create a series of books entitled *La Historia del Plan 3000* (The History of Plan 3000), in which local youth conducted interviews and community meetings to gather and document information about the history of their community. The project, “Quiénes Somos”, held as its primary goal to encourage youth. The center relies on the support of both local and international volunteers, and coordinates with other community initiatives in Santa Cruz.

The CCSI was founded by Juan Pablo Sejas, a sociologist from Santa Cruz. In an interview, Sejas – himself the child of migrants – elaborated on the necessity of this type of organization for developing a sense of community identity and the self-worth of its residents.

“I recognize the history of my parents, I’m mestizo, but I’m from Plan 3000. So, being from Plan 3000 also makes me important because I represent this diversity of cultures, of the distinct people that exist here. Since before this project, the conflict between collas and cambas was very serious, very apparent even in schools. But when they begin to understand the identity of the neighborhood, of the territory and its history, the levels [of conflict] start to diminish. And today, to make a comparison, they have basically gone away. Now, if they call you camba or colla … it doesn’t really matter. But years ago it did. And this was an important shift in the equilibrium…of being able to generate an identity” (Juan Pablo Sejas, CCSI, 2016).

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163. A small concert at the Centro Cultural San Isidro in March 2016 featured an alternative rock band (*La Logia*) and a female rap artist from Sucre, Chuquisaca. Both musical acts focused on themes of indigeneity and identity.

164. (Proyecto “Quiénes Somos”)

165. “Yo reconozco la historia de mis padres, soy mestizo, pero soy del Plan 3000. Entonces, al salir del Plan 3000 también me da un valor importante porque de una manera reivindico esta diversidad de culturas, de gente distinta, diversa que existe acá. Desde antes de este proyecto, evidentemente las luchas de colla y camba eran muy fuertes, muy duros en los mismos colegios. Pero cuando ellos se empiezan a entender esa identidad del barrio, del territorio y su historia, los niveles empiezan a disminuir. Y hoy en día, haciendo una comparación, en los términos básicamente han quedado relegados. Ahora, te digan camba/colla… oséa, pasa de ser percibido. Pero años antes no. Y eso fue quizás un cambio transcendental en el equilibrio…de poder generar una identidad.” (Juan Pablo Sejas, CCSI).
The work of the CCSI is thus an example of an organization encouraging institutionalized forms of insurgent citizenship in the community, and working to directly impact positive identity production.\textsuperscript{166}

Aside from the rhetoric of resistance and identity reformation in Plan 3000 exemplified by CCSI, community members also engage in more traditionally active forms of citizenship. Since its founding, Plan 3000 has seen a variety of forms of self-organization as a means of survival. From its first days of abandonment and isolation from the city center, community members organized to provide food, water, and electricity to those in need.\textsuperscript{167} This initial organization evolved, and today Plan 3000 has its own civic committee, water cooperative (COOPLAN), and neighborhood organizations.\textsuperscript{168}

This self-organization contributes to an increased sense of community cohesion that manifests civically. The most salient example of this is the fact that there is a movement pushing to make Plan 3000 its own municipality.

“One of our dreams is to have a mayor’s office with our own officials, elected and financed by us, this deep desire will be achieved with the unity of all the loyal and brave neighbors on the road to autonomy, self-determination of the pueblos that put us on the quickest path to development, we promise to generate better days for Plan 3000” (Dr. Juan Ollisco Rocha, Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012).\textsuperscript{169}

Dr. Diez, president of the CPSC, agrees with the vision of municipal autonomy for Plan 3000. “I would fight [for autonomy] because it is like this, it has people, quantity and quality, and the closer the better to administrate its resources.”\textsuperscript{170} In 2006, a group of representative bodies from the Plan gathered to organize a committee on behalf of the ciudadela to begin the legal process of transitioning from ciudadela to municipality.\textsuperscript{171} The project was eventually postponed by officials as it was determined that to complete the process legally, a new law enabling municipal autonomy would need to be enacted. However, the desire remains. María Eugenia Villarroel Ríos, a Neighborhood Director from the Plan, shared in a 2012 interview that the demand for municipal autonomy stems from the fact that Plan 3000 is not attended to by the Santa Cruz city

\textsuperscript{166} There are many other organizations in Plan 3000 that work in a similar vein. The Fundación Hombres Nuevos works to address the poverty and build capacity in the Plan (Fundación Hombres Nuevos).

\textsuperscript{167} (Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012)

\textsuperscript{168} “Uno de nuestros sueños es tener nuestra alcaldía con autoridades propuestas, elegidas y fiscalizadas por nosotros, este ansiado anhelo se va lograr con la unidad de todos los vecinos fieles y valientes en el camino de la autonomía, autodeterminación de los pueblos que nos expone al camino más rápido de desarrollo, comprometámonos en generar mejores días para el Plan 3000” (Dr. Juan Ollisco Rocha, Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012)

\textsuperscript{169} “Yo lucharía porque así sea, tiene gente, tiene cantidad y calidad, cuanto más cerca, mejor para administrar los recursos” (ibid).

\textsuperscript{170} (LEX 2012, 23)
government. A lack of responsiveness has therefore led to increased demand for municipal decentralization of the ciudadelas. Notably, this kind of movement is not isolated to Plan 3000. The Villa Primero de Mayo, a neighboring ciudadela founded in 1969, has a similar movement for municipal autonomy. The Villa “today represents a thriving zone of Santa Cruz that has decentralized the commerce of its principal businesses”.

Thus, citizenship in Plan 3000 and the ciudadelas is becoming politically institutionalized. Although Holston’s “insurgent citizenship” does not rely on such participation, the development of these movements shows that community identity (or at least the imaginary) within Plan 3000 is cohesive enough to be politically articulated, and supported by numerous representative bodies. The process of this increasing institutionalization is a form of insurgent citizenship, as residents are forming alternative representational organizations and promoting an alternative vision of citizens in their community. In light of calls for autonomy, their new identity relies on their status as citizens.

Brazil – Morro do Palácio

Amid pervasive economic marginalization, homes in Morro do Palácio are constructed by residents. Many remain “unpolished”, with visible concrete, bricks and corrugated metal, unfinished plastering, and self-constructed drainage systems. The community relies on the informal and tertiary sectors for its survival; many residents work in service provision – as doormen or in local shops. There are also businesses within the community, such as corner stores, small clothing shops, bakeries, and bars.

Discussions of marginality in Morro do Palácio are similarly temporally divided as in Plan 3000, although on a smaller scale. Community members discuss the history of the morro amongst themselves, as the older generations educating the young or the newer arrivals. These stories are related to the physical poverty of Morro do Palácio. During my research and an interview with an elder member of the community, my guide asked the interviewee follow-up questions about what the community was like when he arrived 38 years ago; she was clearly interested in learning more. In addition, staff at the community organization MACquinho have attempted to gather stories from community members to document the reality of the past. One resident, Gabriel has lived in Morro do Palácio for at least 30 years. He said that when he arrived in Niterói, residents of Morro do Palácio lived in shacks made of wood and earth, or barracos.

172 (LEX 2012, 24)
173 (La Calle 2009, 1)
174 During the course of this research, my questioning prompted these stories. Often, my guide would become interested and ask followup questions. At this point, my role became that of an observer, as the guide would be better able to ask relevant questions about the history of their own community. The interview became more of a conversation.
Wooden houses like those Gabriel describes were common in favelas in Rio de Janeiro throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

However, in terms of physical infrastructure, Morro do Palácio has made important gains. The community now has a paved road that spirals up the hill to the soccer field at its very top. The steep man-made walkways that wind between homes and act as shortcuts between sections of the main road are covered with concrete and are kept clean. Access to electricity and water are widespread. On the community’s Facebook page from September 2016, there are pictures of residents putting up official street signs for the first time in the community’s history. At that time, the community was working towards also getting CEPs (zip codes) for Morro do Palácio. That said, residents say there are still improvements to be made. For example, Fernanda, a middle aged mother who has lived in Morro do Palácio for 24 years, complains about potholes and structures that were poorly repaired or not well made in the community.

One resident, Guilherme, attributes community gains to local expertise and cooperation.

“Engineers live here. Foremen live here. I’m a foreman. I know what I’m doing. I know that the capacity of anything is my limit. But there is badly done construction on the morro because they don’t have any idea what they’re doing.”

Notably, Guilherme distinguished between Morro do Palácio and other communities in terms of the built environment and the attitude of its residents.

“People keep coming, and keep living [here]. Compared to many places ... because this here is not a favela. Not here. Because if you go to other places like Rocinha, [all the houses are together]. Not here, here the houses are all separate. ... Because people are more...there are the *favelado*, and there are people who are not *favelado*. *Favelado* are the people who live in shacks. Everything is messy. And there are people who are not *favelado*. That come from outside, want to build a good house, want to show off their good house, want to have a good life. But there are people that don’t [want this]. They throw trash in the street, throw sewage in the street, and change where they live. But things change. Before you would see sewage in the street...complicated things, but it changed a lot.”

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176 (“Morro do Palácio.” Facebook Community)
178 “Mas aqui mora engenheiro. Aqui mora mestre de obra. Eu sou mestre de obra. Eu sei que tou fazendo. Eu sei a capacidade de qualquer coisa, é meu limite. Mas existe construção no morro que ...[é mau]... porque não tem som de que tão fazendo.” (Guilherme. Interview. Morro do Palácio, Niterói, Brazil. August 5, 2016.)
179 “As pessoas vão chegando, e vão morando. Em visto de muitos lugares, ...porque aqui não é uma favela. Aqui não. Porque se você conhece outros lugares como a Rocinha, como outros lugares [as casas estão todos juntos]. Aqui não, aqui as casas estão todos separados. [E porque?] Porque as pessoas são mais ...existe favelado, e existe pessoal que não é favelado. Favelado são as pessoas que são barraqueira. Tudo...pode ser abagunçado. E existem pessoas que não são favelado. Que vem de fora, quer construir a casa boa, quer demonstrar a casa boa, quer ter a vida boa. Mas tem gente que não. Joga lixo na rua, joga esgoto na rua, e aí, ele vai mudando aonde mora. Mas muda muito. Antes você via esgoto na rua, ...as coisas complicadas mas mudou muito” (ibid).
For Guilherme, the improvements to Morro do Palácio’s built environment remove the community from the marginalized category of *favela*, revealing his negative association with the term. To him, this makes the community more attractive to new residents.

The presence of “new” residents in Morro do Palácio also plays a significant role in determining present day community identity. There is a definite divide between people who remember the initial conditions of poverty and the things people had to do to survive years ago, and the people who only know the conditions they live in today and over the past few years. In May 2016, the Museo do Ingá held a panel discussion for representatives of Morro do Palácio to discuss the realities of their community and their interactions with the neighborhoods around them. From the kinds of questions put to the panel and the reactions of panelists to one another, it was apparent that discussions of what Morro do Palácio was like 20 to 30 years ago do not happen between people on a regular basis, but that community discussions like the panel discussion are a concerted effort to change this.

Indeed, the panel discussion is part of a larger effort on the part of community-based and neighboring organizations that recognize the importance of documenting history in an effort to create a community consciousness and understand how the community has evolved. Documenting the power of the past has become more important. Inside the community, this work is done by community nonprofit organizations. The principal institutional interaction between Morro do Palácio and its neighbors exists in the form of a partnership between the Museo de Arte Contemporânea (Museum of Contemporary Art – MAC) and a nonprofit located in the community – the MACquinho, or little MAC. In the 2000s, the MAC wanted to start a program to work with the youth in its neighboring communities. Youth from Morro do Palácio were invited to take part in art programming at the museum, and received scholarships to participate for six months. The youth applied to the city prefecture for a building for their activities. Oscar Niemeyer designed a building as a gift, but construction was delayed for 9 years. In the late 2000s the MACquinho was completed and began running under the Fundação de Arte Niterói, and more recently has been directed by the education department of the prefecture of Niterói.

The MACquinho functions as a community center, offering computer and art classes, collecting information about the history of Morro do Palácio, and organizing community projects and events. Notable projects of the MACquinho include a youth community gardening project, an open access recording studio, and a community knowledge gathering project to record local knowledge of home remedies and medicinal plants. Classes teach youth skills and provide an outlet for creative expression – opportunities that are not readily available elsewhere in the community. Projects aim to improve the physical aspect of the community as well as build a sense of collaboration and community responsibility among the youth. Yet, despite the reasonably well-attended educational and community building activities located within their own

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180 (NUPIJ UFF 2016)
community, many residents don’t participate in MACquinho programming, and its staff are investigating as to why. One reason hypothesized by a staff member is that the building seems to have “its back turned” on the community; the building looks outward towards the bay with no windows on the community side. Despite this relative lack of participation, community organizations such as the MACquinho are instrumental in developing insurgent forms of citizenship and community pride; a key step in promoting a positive community identity.

**Figure 2.4.** MACquinho, Morro do Palácio, Niterói – designed by Oscar Niemeyer

**Figure 2.5.** View from the MACquinho towards the MAC (also designed by Niemeyer) and the Baía da Guanabara, Niterói.

In addition to the work of the MACquinho, students and professors from the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), the local university located a few streets away from the
morro, conduct research and projects in the community. One such project, the documentary *Jovens do Palácio* (Youth of the Palace), follows three residents between the ages of 20-24 in 2008. The documentary discusses the youth’s varied life paths, goals, and involvement with the MACquinho. This form of community reporting documents both the difficult reality of the community’s recent history and the nature of its social life, as well as the resourcefulness, loyalty, and entrepreneurial spirit of its youth. The subjects share their struggles with finding employment, avoiding the drug violence in the community, and coming of age in poverty. The documentary thus works to uplift narratives of the reality of life in Morro do Palácio, told by the perhaps the first generation of adults to have spent their entire lives on the morro. These narratives therefore represent the crystallization of community identity.

Community organizations, both internal and external, thus play an important role in identity production, consolidation, and the documenting of insurgent forms of citizenship in Morro do Palácio. The differences in senses of community identity over time indicate that as the built environment of Morro do Palácio improves and the sense of physical marginality diminishes, residents’ relationship to space changes. Organizations play an important role in this development. The MACquinho actively promotes activities that reflect positively on the community and build a communal sense of responsibility. Projects such as the documentary done through the UFF value and magnify the identity of the new generation. In addition, the community has an active resident’s association. The Associação de Moradores do Morro do Ingá (AMMI) acts as the community’s representative body. The AMMI works within the community to improve infrastructure and address unmet needs. They also work to integrate and facilitate the assistance of larger organizations such as the prefecture of Niterói. For example, in 2013, the AMMI organized a community meetings to present the development projects that the Câmara Técnica da Secretaria Executiva da Prefeitura would carry out.

The work of the MACquinho and the AMMI shows that community organizations in Morro do Palácio promote methods of participation that are in reality form of insurgent citizenship. Insurgent citizenship in this context manifests in the self-organization of community members to overcome their marginalization. To help achieve and institutionalize this, these organizations build on community ties and encourage linkages between community support and responsibility and identity at the community level.

**Conclusion**

The racial, geographical, and spatial context of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio reinforce the multifaceted intersectionality of identity. What is unique about these communities – due to their marginalization and informality – is that these determinants become activated as resistance

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182 (LIDE UFF 2008). Two of the subjects of the documentary were also interviewed for this research, separate from their involvement in the previous project.
183 Also referred to as the Associação de Moradores do Morro do Palácio.
184 (MamaterraTV, December 17, 2013)
identities. In both communities, but perhaps more so in Plan 3000, identity labels such as colla and camba become representative of the racial dynamics involved in the power dialectic between the formal and the informal. Discrimination plays into the relationship between cultures and identities in both cases, leading to the racialization of place. Internal migrants – collas – in Plan 3000 form a powerful base for resistance against eastern cultural hegemony in the city, and Morro do Palácio stands as a bastion for migrants of color in Niterói. These ethnic or racial labels then contribute to the construction of community resistance identities. Resistance identities act against social marginalization, and are particularly articulated as a reaction to rhetoric of violence. Narratives of violence from outside the communities are productive for outsiders, but internal identity pushes back against production of stereotypes and fear, attempting to separate personhood from criminality. It is in these realms that the idea of collective memory as an influence on identity creation is salient. There are different temporalities of collective memories of marginality (past and present), and of the “entrepreneurialism” that lift both communities out of this state. Thus, community identities that are based on tenets of resistance become a form of insurgent citizenship.

Community organizations in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio play a significant role in developing insurgent citizenship as well as in identity production. In both communities, the temporal difference in identity also follows a generational divide. The current generation of adults is one of the first that have been born and raised in each community. They have no personal histories of migration and change, and no other community context with which to relate. Their entire personal identity in terms of place is related to their community. Thus, there are two main temporal veins in discussions of marginality. One is associated with the creation of a community history; the other, with acknowledging the present and the needs of the current moment. Insurgent citizenship in each community is based on both.

The practices of insurgent citizenship open space for using informality as a social tool in negotiating a dialectic of power. The next chapter will show that racialization and marginalization of place in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is a method of external control of labeling a place, and of conflating race with social negatives such as violence and poverty.

185 (Peña 2009)
Chapter 3
Perceptions and Control

“My study revealed that residents of favelas are not “marginal” to society but tightly integrated into it, albeit in an asymmetrical manner. They give a lot and receive very little. They are not on the margins of urban life or irrelevant to its functioning, but actively excluded, exploited, and “marginalized” by a closed social system.”

(Perlman, 2010, 15)
Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro
Introduction

Chapter 2 argued that community identity in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is a form of insurgent citizenship and a resistance identity, but it did not analyze the narrative that this resistance necessarily fights against. The internally-determined identity of each community is not the vision commonly held of informality in society, rather it is influenced by power dynamics between the community and external sources – other residents of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Niterói-Rio de Janeiro and the public social rhetoric of poverty and race, driven by stereotypes and perceptions rather than fact. These perceptions, which Chapter 2 determined are territorialized through association with delegitimized informality, control the social imaginary of urban informality. Thus, territorial stigmatization is a method of social control. Clearly, perpetuated in the relationship between society and those living in informality are an imbalance of power and social recognition that necessitate community resistance. To understand the dynamic between resistance and the continuous nature of oppression, Chapter 3 examines the manifestations and consequences of societal perceptions of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio.

In this chapter, I use perception outside of the realm of urban studies and development methodologies. Within urban studies and geography literature, perception is often discussed in terms of community satisfaction as a measure of community development. This methodological tool bridges the power imbalance between marginalized communities, local governments, and development practitioners. However, in this paper perception refers to the more pervasive definition of “a mental image.” It is also closely tied to Wacquant’s concept of territorial stigmatization, as perceptions of space influence and are the result of stigma of space.

External perceptions of informal communities indicate the manifestation of social rhetoric around informality, and point to its intersections with race and class. This chapter explores the common perceptions of those who do not live in informal communities of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Niterói-Rio de Janeiro about informal communities in their cities, as well as the ways in which these perceptions manifest. I argue that perceptions and stereotypes of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio – and informal communities in general – are evident in both the media and public policy. Perceptions exist in a ‘feedback loop’ in which they self-perpetuate misconceptions about informality. This loop results in the mainstream media’s legitimization of incorrect beliefs and ineffective policy and governance, further marginalizing those living in informality. Perceptions are important because they influence the development of the social imaginary as well as of real, material possibility. In addition, perceptions – like stereotypes – have the capacity to erase and obscure because they are nonspecific, and the generalizations they

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186 (Wacquant 2008)
188 (Merriam-Webster 2017)
draw mask the complexities of life in informality. While it is true that informal communities experience extreme poverty that most formal communities do not experience to the same degree, the informal economy is a significant contributor to urban economic production. Generalized perceptions of poverty mask this fact. Because perceptions then become part of the social imaginary, they influence the way in which people think and react. I therefore also argue that perceptions contribute to the social control of public discourse and policy. To do this I first explore the perceptions of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, and informal settlements more generally, as evidenced by interviews with urbanites. I then conduct a media analysis of publications from both cities to uncover the rhetoric of racialized violence about each community. In the final section, I discuss the impact of these perceptions and resulting popular discourse on housing policy in Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

**Building Public Perceptions**

In both the Bolivian and Brazilian cases, any discussion of poverty or violence is inseparable from notions of race. In the settlements of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, this association also extends to physically peripheral urban spaces. Any categorization of perceptions is therefore inherently insufficient, and must be considered in conjunction with other categories. The interviews conducted in both communities reveal the difficulty of separating outsiders’ perceptions of informal communities into such categories. Statements about internal migrants, for example, carry both race and class-related opinions and may also be a comment about the state of violence in a community. However, the exercise of categorization allows for a deeper interrogation of the roots of different kinds of perceptions. Therefore, the sections that follow are an attempt to categorize perceptions to reveal both their basis and their relationship to other categories.

**Spatially Informal: Perceptions of the Informal as Illegal, Unregulated, and Peripheral**

The previous chapter established that informality elicits resistance identities, in part because of their spatial relationships to the rest of urban space. In this sense, delegitimized forms of informality are territorialized in terms of identity. Due to the concentration of people with marginalized identities in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, predominant perceptions of race and poverty in Bolivia and Brazil contribute to the further territorialization of resistance identity.

**Bolivia**

Perceptions of interviewees in Santa Cruz who did not live in Plan 3000 or nearby ciudadelas indicated that the Plan was almost uniformly conceived of as disorganized.\(^{189}\) Many informants were also aware that that the Plan’s population has grown due to internal migration.

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\(^{189}\) Only informants who had visited or had personal experience with Plan 3000 expressed these opinions. Of the people who expressed both negative and positive views, all but one had personally visited Plan 3000.
One Santa Cruz informant, Jhonny, said that he had only briefly visited Plan 3000, but that people there “have a lot of need” and are poor, and that much of the property is not regularized. Carolina, who lives elsewhere in Santa Cruz and used to teach nutrition classes in the Plan, described it as disorganized and dirty, and that people think very badly of the Plan. She mentioned that she disliked the disorganized nature of the Plan. These kinds of perceptions that identify problems with the internal spatial organization of Plan 3000 were mainly held by people who had visited or worked in Plan 3000 as opposed to those who had never been there in person.

One resident of Plan 3000, interviewed as she was resting after shopping in the city center in the Plaza 24 de Septiembre, said that she found the Plan chaotic because everything is growing. According to the informant, Plan 3000 was among the most unorganized and unsafe ciudadelas in the city, but has since become much more developed and has nice urban structures like plazas, although some sections still have significant poverty. Laura, another informant who lives in the nearby ciudadelas of Pampa de la Isla and worked in Plan 3000 for many years, echoed the frustration of both residents and visitors with the disorganization of the Plan. Laura was specifically bothered by the state of the informal markets on the Rotonda – the main roundabout – and thought they were ugly.

Laura’s comment alludes to a larger debate over public markets in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Joshua Kirshner highlights the importance of informal vendors in the city, observing that “market vendors have become a flashpoint for issues surrounding the informal economy, immigration, and demographic change” (153). Internal migration to Santa Cruz is associated with the rise of the informal economy, which most visibly manifests as sprawling markets or street vendors, overwhelmingly operated by Andean migrants. This growth of the informal economy has been referenced as the “marketization” or an “invasion” of the city, with an estimated total of 88 markets (18 informal) in Santa Cruz in 2007 (168). Plan 3000 has eight markets, all of which are informal (169). Kirshner argues that these processes have also resulted in spatially-articulated hostility towards migrants, which are most closely associated with urban markets. The rise of the informal market in Santa Cruz has also led to the consolidation of informal merchant power in the form of gremios, or vendors’ guilds, which due to the fact that many informal vendors are Andean internal migrants, then become racialized in the regionalist context of Santa Cruz identity politics (166).

Gremios today remain a strong political force, with a seat on the City Council and an ally in the mayor. The gremios are stigmatized as uncooperative and disorderly, while their leadership complain of a lack of government responsiveness to gremio demands (173). For

\[190\] Jhonny. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 2, 2016.
\[192\] Marina. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 2, 2016.
\[193\] Laura. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 6, 2016.
example, the municipal government organizes public space as a strategy to contain the sprawl of informal markets in Santa Cruz. However, gremialistas do not always comply with these policies, especially when they are formulated without vendor input, such as building a large indoor market in an area with no vehicle or foot traffic.\footnote{Gremialista interview, ibid 177} Due to this disconnect, informal markets persist even as the government invests in public works. This is the case in Plan 3000, where the markets on the Rotonda referenced by Laura remain despite the existence of a newly built large indoor market intended to house Plan 3000’s gremialistas.

The gremialistas in the Plan contribute to its perception as unregulated and disorganized. Cruceños who have been to Plan 3000, whether because they are residents or go to the Plan to shop or sell in the markets, see this disorganization of public space caused by informal commerce and the strength of the internal organization of these merchants as one of the principal areas of concern for further development of the Plan. Bruno, an older man and internal migrant from the Chaco region of Tarija to the south of Santa Cruz, believes that the Plan has “more merchants than residents.”\footnote{Bruno. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 3, 2016.} Bruno, a teacher, goes to Plan 3000 from time to time to buy certain products\footnote{The informant did not elaborate on the nature of his purchases.}, and although he does not think of the Plan as a zona roja and sees it as “a mix of all kinds of people”, he laments the prevalence of delinquency in the area. Numerous informants interviewed in Plan 3000 also noted their dissatisfaction with the internal organization of their community; one young woman mentioned that the disorganization of the markets embarrassed her.\footnote{(Leonora 2016); (Cristal 2016); (Sérgio 2016)}

The perception of the informal as spatially unregulated and separate in Santa Cruz goes beyond the issue of markets. The effects of ethnic difference and migration also play into the categorization of informal communities such as Plan 3000 as peripheral. Plan 3000 is physically peripheral to the center of Santa Cruz, as are the other ciudadelas and informal settlements in the city. In addition to this physical separateness operates a perception of the community as an ethnic stronghold, that because of its location attains a spatial manifestation. Since the height rural-urban migration from western to eastern Bolivia in the 1960s and 1970s, and the economic pull to Santa Cruz in the 1980s, Santa Cruz de la Sierra has been a pole for internal migration in Bolivia. This interregional migration carried with it the history of ethnic and cultural differences and discrimination in the country. Santa Cruz, long a city of European descendants and assimilated and essentialized indigenous peoples, was neglected by the national government in Sucre and La Paz for much of its history. Because of this, the city, department, and much of the east acquired a “do it yourself” identity. After the consolidation of ties between the east and the west, eastern regionalism took a more defensive stance. As westerners migrated east, the cultural organizations and governing bodies that had developed independently of – or without the assistance of – the central government in the west felt as though their way of life was under
threat. Colla migration to Santa Cruz was seen as an intrusion on cruceño or camba territory. Therefore, in the cruceño spatial imaginary there is a long history of conceiving of spaces as ethnically linked. The fact that informal settlements and commerce are dominated by Andean migrants in Santa Cruz contributes to their perception as colla spaces.

Brazil

Like in Santa Cruz, informal settlements in Rio de Janeiro have long been perceived as home to the urban ‘other’. Throughout the history of Rio de Janeiro, favelas, cortiços and comunidades have been physical and social peripheries. Rio’s first documented favela, Morro da Providência or Morro da Favella, was founded in the late 1890s on a morro near what today is the city center. Favelas emerged as places for the poor and the marginalized – namely ex-slaves. Before the advent of cheap mass transit in Rio, the poor were more likely to live near the center of the city and closer to their workplaces. The spatial differentiation in terms of centralization of the rich as the poor was thus less distinct than in the present era. Thus, many poor workers settled in tenement houses in the city, which were considered unclean by many. With new urban development projects in the 1900s, many of the city’s poor were evicted and found cheap or free land on the steep hillsides peppered throughout Rio’s sprawl. In addition, favelas developed as housing for runaway or freed slaves, and thus have a historical association with impoverished black Brazilians.

The people that settled in favelas profited off the land on the morros, as they would settle and rent out sections of their land to other poor families. Yet favelas “were also a steam valve, a way for politicians to ease social tension and reap political capital by protecting poor populations from laws and policies that fit crudely with the city’s material, social, and cultural realities.” Thus, favelas provided an excuse or a strategy for those in power. Authorities did not have to tailor their policies to benefit the poor, who could be scapegoated for larger social ills.

“There is every indication that some of the explanation boils down to the concurrence of ascendant urbanism and quick informal expansion. But writings from the early twentieth century about Brazil’s favelas and mocambos (shacks) suggest that the terms were invented not so much to describe the places where poor people lived as to spell out the relationship between such places and their surrounding cities” (Fischer 2014, 13).

The word favela therefore carries inherently racialized associations of poverty and otherness.

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199 (Stearman 1985, 74-75)
201 (Fischer 2014)
202 (ibid.)
More recent identity distinctions on the basis of differences in urban infrastructure emerged in the 1960s. At this time in Rio de Janeiro, the city was undergoing the process of infrastructure modernization. As the process progressed, areas of the ‘formal’ city were prioritized, and few favelas and *comunidades* were paved with asphalt, leaving the roads dusty, prone to flooding and erosion, and difficult to navigate. It was in this context that favela residents began to refer to the “legalized neighborhoods” of Rio as “the asphalt”. When asked if people in Niterói have prejudiced views of his community, an interviewee from Morro do Palácio used this term to distinguish between Morro do Palácio and the rest of the city.

“They are prejudiced, from the moment that they don’t go up into a community. … As long as they don’t know people from the community, without them being their employees, and without knowing the community, they’re going to see me, black, with lots of hair, as a thief. [About a community leader] they’ll say, oh, he’s a needy poor person, but they don’t know that in the community [he] is a businessman, and that I work in a building with children. When they come into the community, the wool gets taken away from their eyes. They have this idea that the community only has football players, prostitutes, and thieves. It goes away. … And the people that we say are “from the asphalt” are starting to buy things up here, to live up here. And it’s something we have to be careful of too. Why now that they are coming up here would I go down there?” (Emanuel, Morro do Palácio).

Emanuel’s use of the term reveals that these identity distinctions based on physical infrastructure difference and thus visible marginality persist today, although they can be overcome to a certain extent with increased contact between the formal and the informal. This implies that informality in Rio-Niterói is primarily seen as a place in the social imaginary, and inherently tied to historical associations of race and place in the city. In ideologically separating themselves from the identity of the ‘formal’ city, favela identity once again becomes a resistance identity, where resistance takes on a spatial dimension. Resistance identity is thus territorialized.

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203 (Fischer 2008, 66)

204 "Tem preconceito, desde o momento que não sobe em uma comunidade. ... Enquanto não conhece pessoas da comunidade, sem ser os seus empregados, e não conhece a sua comunidade, eles vão ver como eu, negro, cabeludo, como um bandido, o Salgadinho – vão falar assim, ah, é um pobre necessitado, mas não sabe que na comunidade Salgadinho é empresário da comunidade, eu trabalho num prédio com crianças. Quando eles entram na comunidade, passa a borracha na mente deles. Tinha essa visão que a comunidade só tem jogadores de futebol, prostituta e bandido. Sai. Sai. E o pessoal que a gente fala “do asfalto”, já tá começando a comprar coisas aqui em cima, morar aqui em cima. E é uma coisa que também nós temos que ter cuidado. Porque já que ele que tá embaixo quer subir, então porque eu vou descer?” (Emanuel, Morro do Palácio)

205 (Castells 1997)
Plan 3000 has a history of being perceived as a marginal section of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. These views are supported and fed by readily available information about the quality of life in the Plan. For example, a report from *El Deber* reveals that Plan 3000 had 7.4 percent of homes affected by mosquito-born illnesses such as dengue, chikungunya, and zika – the highest percentage of any district in Santa Cruz. 206

Interviews revealed two main schools of thought about the state of development of Plan 3000. Many informants – the majority of whom had not visited or been exposed to Plan 3000 in person – believed Plan 3000 to be a place of poverty and delinquency. One Santa Cruz resident who does not live in Plan 3000 but has owned a plot of land there since 1990 says that he invested in the plot when it was cheap. An internal migrant from Potosí, he lives closer to the center of Santa Cruz because it is nearer to his workplace. 207 His experience with Plan 3000 is thus mostly for economic gain. For the informant, the Plan is characterized by informal commerce, “gangs, and fights between gangs.” He likened the area to the city of El Alto, arguably the largest informal settlement in Bolivia on the outskirts of the capital La Paz, now its own municipality. This vision upholds this first view of the community as dangerous and impoverished.

Another informant interviewed in the city center said that in the past people said it was a "barrio marginal", a marginal neighborhood with a “bad reputation”, but with the many classes and organizations there currently, it is getting better. 208 Significantly, this informant was a resident of the ciudadela Villa Primero de Mayo, and had thus personally seen the development of the community. The perceived role of community organizations in this perception is notable. This remark is representative of the second view of the community, which acknowledges the problems in the Plan but is aware of and values its progress.

Brazil

Favelas in Niterói and Rio de Janeiro are famous for their high levels of violence and the poverty of their residents. One of the principal factors in these negative perceptions is the name favela itself, and other official designations for informal communities. In official government literature, favelas are dubbed ‘subnormal agglomerations’. This term immediately places the informal in a hierarchy with the formal, and removes the dignity of human organization that comes with the terms ‘community’, ‘neighborhood’, or ‘favela’. Elielton Quieroz Rocha, a resident of Morro do Palácio and employee of the MACquinho, signaled the importance of

complexifying the designation of subnormal agglomeration. “This causes a huge distancing”, “so that we see the community in a generalized way.” “Every community has its particularities, and community of Palácio is no different.”

In addition, as discussed above, favela is also inherently tied to social marginality and urban projects of power. The very names of informal communities in Brazil thus elicit negative perceptions.

“Our community is not needy. Lots of people see the community as needy. But today that’s not the case. Not ours. Because we have water, we have electricity, we have garbage collection, [but] we have a lack of responsibility among the residents in our community. There is a garbage dump there, but residents put their cars there and block the dump. People are building houses here on the sidewalk. Almost in the middle of the street … The problem with our community is us.”

(Emanuel, Morro do Palácio, 2016).

Territorial Stigmatization through the Media, Violence, and Race

The territorial stigmatization of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is significantly shaped by public discourse around violence as well as the reality of crime and lack of responsible policing in these areas. In her analysis of violent crime in São Paulo, Teresa Caldeira notes that “the talk of crime feeds a circle in which fear is both dealt with and reproduced, and violence is both counteracted and magnified.”

The more people talk about violence, the more stereotypes and fears about violence are reproduced. Caldeira importantly connects this to the ordering and classification of space in the public imagination. Narratives of crime order the space of the city according to possibilities of danger. Caldeira’s approach to the relationship between narrative and crime will frame the following analysis of perceptions of violence in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. According to Caldeira:

“Like other everyday practices of dealing with violence, crime stories try to recreate a stable map for a world that has been shaken. These narratives and practices impose partitions, build up walls, delineate and enclose spaces, establish distances, segregate, differentiate, impose prohibitions, multiply rules of avoidance and exclusion, and restrict movements” (Caldeira 2000, 20).

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209 (NUPIJ UFF 2016)
211 (Caldeira 2000, 19)
Thus, the “talk of crime” contributes to a social reordering of space within the city. Following this assumption, in this section I analyze the relationship between public narratives, the media, and government policy in the organization of space. This analysis focuses on narratives of crime and violence from both individuals as well as those perpetuated by the media. The media plays an important role in developing and maintaining public perceptions of violence in both Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. An examination of outsiders’ perceptions of these communities, media analysis, and government policy shows that public rhetoric, news media, and government rhetoric of violence are a means of social control and constant affirmation of informal communities as “violent”.

Bolivia

Among residents of Santa Cruz perceptions of life in Plan 3000 are negative. Plan 3000 is one of the more dangerous sections of the city, with frequent deaths and outbreaks of sickness due to unhealthy living conditions and the concentration of people living in poverty. The most negative perceptions of the Plan were overwhelmingly held by people with little to no personal exposure to Plan 3000. These informants expressed perceptions that were almost exclusively related to violence and migration. One informant who had never been to the Plan, Carla, described Plan 3000 as “definitively not a good neighborhood,” with vandalism, robberies, and rapes – “all the worst”. She hasn’t gone because she is afraid, and has no reason to go. Others echoed these sentiments.

“I have heard of it but I haven’t gone there...that there are many, many robberies, delinquency, that it is dangerous...but I haven’t visited that place” (Elena, 23).

“I don’t like to go to the Plan because there are very vicious people there” (Mauricio, 45).

This violent reality is publicly communicated in city-wide newspapers and on local television, which oftentimes seek out sensational stories of violence. During fieldwork in Plan 3000 and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, news reports of violence most often occurred in Plan 3000.

212 Larkins (2015, 15) points out that the “talk of crime” also occurs in favelas when residents of one community discuss the violence in and otherize other communities in an attempt to set themselves apart. Referencing Wacquant (2008), she says that the talk of crime “dehumanizes residents and contributes to “the militarization of urban marginality.”


214 “He escuchado pero no he ido...que allá hay muchos, muchos robos, delincuencia, que es peligroso, eso digamos, pero no he frecuentado ese lugar.” (Elena. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 2, 2016.)

215 “No me gusta ir al Plan porque hay gente muy viciosa por allá.” (Mauricio. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 2, 2016.)

216 However, other kinds of press that recognize the voices of the community are also apparent. During my fieldwork, I saw a newscast about a group of parents in Plan 3000 that had “taken” the modulo educativo in the Plan demanding that the director quit, accusing her of discriminating against colla parents.
Headlines like “Burned and abandoned vehicle in Plan 3000” or “Man attacks his partner after bout of jealousy” proliferate in the news.\textsuperscript{217} These reports tell a story of high levels of domestic abuse and violent crime in the area. For example, a search of the word “asaltos” (assaults) in the online version of \textit{El Deber}, one of Santa Cruz’s largest and most important newspapers, generated a list of two stories of recent assaults and robberies – both of which had occurred in Plan 3000.\textsuperscript{218} However, Plan 3000 is not alone in its violent media reputation. While many such incidents do occur in the Plan, the other ciudadelas in Santa Cruz are also essentialized as centers of violence. Plan 3000, also known as Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez, is one of three official ciudadelas in the city of Santa Cruz. The ciudadelas are subdivisions of the city – characterized by poverty and their peripheral location on the extreme eastern edge of the city. In general, the ciudadelas are parts of the city that are less regulated and more quickly developing than the more central districts. Santa Cruz newspapers, reporting on extreme cases of violence in the city, then help to perpetuate the reputation of the ciudadelas as strictly violent.

Aside from days of memorial celebrations of the founding of the ciudadelas, there is more negative than positive news from Plan 3000 (Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez), Villa Primero de Mayo, and Pampa de la Isla. One salient example is in an edition of \textit{La Estrella del Oriente}, the oldest major newspaper in Santa Cruz. The edition from March 18, 2016 celebrates the thirty-third anniversary of the founding of Plan 3000 on its cover and one additional page. While celebrating the fact that over the years the community has made “giant steps”, it acknowledges that residents still struggle with “civil insecurity, sewage, and flooding.”\textsuperscript{219} This rhetoric is both beneficial and detrimental to the progress of the Plan. Exposure of community issues in the city newspaper is a platform for problems to be brought to light and for public officials to be held accountable. Indeed, the article ends with a community member calling city authorities to action to solve the flooding problem, which affects “hundreds of families”. However, the rhetoric of insecurity and poverty does nothing to bolster the image or worth of the community in the public imagination. In the same edition of \textit{La Estrella}, in the “security” section, is a story of a horrific act of domestic violence in which a woman’s partner had punched her face leaving multiple wounds (which were featured in a large photo next to the article), and previously beat her while she was pregnant with their fourth child, who later died.\textsuperscript{220} This violence occurred in the ciudadelia Villa Primero de Mayo. Stories like this contribute to the creation of an image of the ciudadelas as overwhelmed by violence.

Residents of Santa Cruz (not Plan 3000) embrace the rhetoric of this negative press. Outside of Plan 3000, the community is thought to be one of the most dangerous parts of the city of Santa Cruz. For some, especially those who have never visited, the negative rhetoric shapes their perceptions of and interactions with the district. For example, one interviewee, Ariana, said...

\textsuperscript{217} (El Deber 2017); (Justiniano 2017)
\textsuperscript{218} (Justiniano 2016); (El Deber, Dec. 19, 2016)
\textsuperscript{220} (La Estrella del Oriente 2016, 10)
she had never visited the Plan because she had never had a reason to go, and mentioned hearing on television that there is “a lot of delinquency, and lot of gangsters” in the Plan. Another Santa Cruz resident echoed these sentiments.

“If you listen to the news coming out of Plan 3000 every day… all the rapes, robberies...of poor people, people that don’t have more than their little house, how is it that people can go and rob them? No, it’s not conceivable, is it? It’s not conceivable to rob poor people. And it’s drug addicts who do it. So they don’t care. They don’t live in reality.” (Carla, 60).  

Interestingly, the more exposure informants had to Plan 3000, the more likely they were to have positive perceptions of the ciudadela. Many informants expressed mixed opinions, citing violence and disorganization as drawbacks, but adding that residents were hard working and that Plan 3000 was becoming a more organized and pleasant place to live.

Another key aspect to the creation of a violent community image is the racialization of violence in Bolivia. In the interviews of residents from outside the community there emerged the idea that the presence of internal migrants in Santa Cruz increases the level of violence in the city. For example, immediately after classifying Santa Cruz de la Sierra as a multicultural city, two informants outlined their beliefs about how internal migration has made Santa Cruz more unruly and violent.

“The people from the interior don’t respect the norms or rules of Santa Cruz. They turn bad and obstinate. They set up in the streets, the plaza, the bus terminals, the airport, and they sell food. It is a disorganized city. [The people from the interior] don’t understand. They say ‘I have to work and you all have to feed me.’ It continues to grow disorganized” (Leticia, 50s, SC).

Leticia said that when she and her family arrived in Santa Cruz in the 1970s, it was more organized. Leticia is therefore herself an internal migrant, but identifies as camba. Her companion Andrea, 19 and who also identifies as camba, added that “security was better, because there weren’t a lot of thugs.” Leticia added, “Evo Morales permitted this migration. [He said] ‘Go there to the cities of the cambas.’” Andrea believed that this made the situation in Santa Cruz worse. Another informant had heard that the Plan is “the most dangerous zone”, with robberies, a black market for stolen goods, and assaults. She had never visited because she was scared to do so, and added that without a migrant population, “there would be more security here. Right now it is too insecure [unsafe].” The fact that both Leticia and Andrea identify as

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221 Ariana. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. April 1, 2016.
222 “Pero si usted se pone a escuchar las noticias todos los días en el Plan 3000...todas las violaciones, el robo...gente pobre, gente que no tiene más que...su casita, como es se entran allí y le roban, oiga? No, pues. No da, no? No da para robar a la gente pobre. Y es gente drogada la que hace eso. Oséa que no les interesa. No viven en la realidad.” (Clara. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 6, 2016.)
223 Leticia and Andrea. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. March 30, 3016.
camba is important, as informants who identified as cruceño or camba were more likely to remark on the negative influence of collas or western internal migrants in the city.

There is therefore an element of east-west ethnic tension embedded in perceptions of Plan 3000, although racist views did not emerge in many of the interviews with people from eastern Bolivia. The majority of residents of Plan 3000 are internal migrants or descendants of internal migrants from Western Bolivia. It is clear from the fieldwork that the history of the formation of Plan 3000 is well known throughout the city and amongst informants of different generations, as is the fact that the population of Santa Cruz de la Sierra grew in part due to heavy west-east and rural-urban internal migration. The observed increase in violence as the city grew has then become correlated with the simultaneous internal migration to the east. Another informant, an internal migrant himself from the Chaco region who has lived in Santa Cruz for 30 years, noted that “the city has [culturally] ‘ruralized’” due to internal migration. This racialization of violence is therefore socially justified by the correlation between race or ethnicity and class in Bolivia, as the majority of internal migrants to Santa Cruz de la Sierra are economic migrants in search of employment.

Brazil

Rio de Janeiro is widely perceived to be one of the most dangerous cities in Brazil – if not Latin America. High crime rates and instances of assault, robberies, gun battles, and drug trafficking – especially in the favelas – often represent the city on an international scale. In addition, there is ample evidence that the increasing militarization of the police in Rio de Janeiro and throughout Brazil has contributed to a rise in rates of violent crime, police corruption and abuse of power, and distrust of the police, leading to a high rate of unreported violent crime. Caldeira suggests that increasing violence in Brazil “arises from a combination of factors that culminate by delegitimating the judiciary system as a mediator of conflicts and privatizing the process of vengeance, trends that can only make violence proliferate” (137). Within the metropolitan area of Rio – which includes the municipality of Rio de Janeiro and the 20 surrounding ‘satellite’ cities including Niterói.

Perhaps the most well known consequence (or cause) of violent crime in Rio is the rise of Unidades de Policia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Units – UPPs). These units were first deployed in Rio in 2007 in preparation for the Pan-American Games in order to “have a safe city to receive the athletes and international community.” Their primary goal is to expel criminals

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226 (Caldeira 2000, 137); (Larkins 2015)
227 Centro Estadual de Estatísticas, Pesquisas e Formação de Servidores Públicos do Rio de Janeiro (CEPERJ).
from Rio’s favelas and regain control of these spaces; they invade, clean, and pacify.\(^{229}\)

Significantly, the UPPs are tied to the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE) or the Elite Special Forces, descended from the policing arm of Brazil’s military dictatorship and famous for their extreme violence.\(^{230}\) According to Larkins, the UPPs are a direct result of the state response to negative perceptions of favelas, as favelas are “the site of violence in the Brazilian cultural imaginary” (15). UPPs are currently deployed throughout many municipalities in Brazil, including Niterói.

The city of Niterói, part of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro, is known to locals as Rio’s main dormitory city. Across the bay from the convoluted urbanity of Rio, Niterói is slightly less chaotic than its neighbor. Its lack of international tourist attractions makes it appealing to commuting Brazilians who want to escape the bustle of Rio at home while maintaining their access to the economic, cultural, and employment benefits of an internationally connected world city.

However, many *niteroienses* are expressing concern at the fact that their city is becoming more violent. They perceive a negative influence of the favelas in Rio on the increasing violence in the favelas and comunidades of Niterói. Just as in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, news media in Rio and Niterói help to disseminate negative images of favelas. The voices of these communities regarding self-determination of community identity are not represented in the mainstream media.

Morro do Palácio in Niterói, like many favelas and informal communities, has a reputation for violence that is reported on and therefore perpetuated by the media. Indeed, most publically available information on Morro do Palácio is related to violence. A January 2014 article in the Rio Times described the community of Palácio as one of “Niterói’s most dangerous favelas.”\(^{231}\) Battles between rival gangs CV and ADA occurred in Morro do Palácio as recently as May 2015.\(^{232}\) Even though the surrounding neighborhoods of Ingá and Boa Viagem are relatively calm, safe places to live, there are an increasing number of assaults and thefts. The Zona Norte of Niterói experienced the brunt of crime over the past 10 years, and Morro do Palácio is situated very near this area. In 2006 rates of theft were above 35 percent in central Niterói (the district in which Morro do Palácio is located).\(^{233}\) By 2016 the number was reduced to the still impressive 24.3 percent, and the percentage of crime in the Zona Norte increased.

Connections to Rio’s drug trafficking industry are thought to be the cause of Niterói’s burgeoning crime rate. Many favelas in Niterói are being infiltrated or co-opted by criminal organizations that have been kicked out of favelas on the other side of the bridge, in Rio. These

\(^{229}(\text{Larkins 2015})\)
\(^{230}(\text{Ibid.})\)
expulsions are the result of the work of the UPPs.\textsuperscript{234} According to the intelligence service of the 12th BPM (Niterói) that mapped the favelas and criminal factions in Rio and the Região Oceânica (Oceanic Region), in 2011 there were 55 communities in Niterói under the control of the three drug factions of Rio (CV, TC, and ADA). Figure 3.1 indicates that the community of Morro do Palácio was a destination for these fleeing gang members, and the map in Figure 3.2 shows that Morro do Palácio is controlled (in 2011) by the same faction that operates in Rocinha, one of the largest and most notorious favelas in Rio. Therefore, attempts to pacify Rocinha and favelas within the same criminal network have led to the diffusion of the gang’s influence to the larger metropolitan area, making Niterói a new hotbed of criminal activity.

\textit{(See Macalester College hard copy)}

\textbf{Figure 3.1.} “See where fleeing criminals go are going.” A graphic from a Rio newspaper shows that Morro do Palácio is a destination for criminals fleeing favela pacification in Rio.\textsuperscript{235}

\textit{(See Macalester College hard copy)}

\textbf{Figure 3.2.} This newspaper graphic shows that Morro do Palácio, pictured in the bottom-left photograph, was controlled by the same gang that operates in Rocinha, one of the largest favelas in Rio.\textsuperscript{236}

Much of this information was gleaned from television and newspaper reports of violence in Morro do Palácio. The ease of constructing the above narrative of violence in the community from clips of television reports and online newspapers is indicative of the prevalence of public information about violence in Morro do Palácio. Reports such as those pictured above in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are examples of how criminal activity and favelas are linked in the media. Figure 3.1 categorizes Morro do Palácio as a refuge for drug trafficking criminals wanted in Rio, and Figure 3.2 implies that the community is part of a growing network of communities controlled by criminal interests. The information in these reports is true, but incomplete. Missing from most media coverage is information about the relationship between residents and gang members, the percentage of residents actually involved in gang activity, and community life post-pacification.

Indeed, there are few analyses of the influence of policing itself on community violence. On one hand, trafficking organizations and gangs provide a sense of security in many


communities that they control, as they determine the extent and the kind of violence they will permit. Once police disrupt this control, personal security becomes compromised. Many favelas in Rio exist in a state of perpetual conflict between police and gangs, and the confrontations disproportionately kill larger numbers of poor black men. Caldeira notes that “the police, far from guaranteeing rights and preventing violence, are in fact contributing to the erosion of people’s rights and the increase of violence.” The process of pacification thus brings more violence than it aims to prevent, and harms the most marginalized in the process. Caldeira sums up the relationship between poverty and criminality by pointing out that poverty “reproduces the victimization and criminalization of the poor, the disregard of their rights, and their lack of access to justice.”

The process of pacification in Morro do Palácio began in 2011, although there is still a gang presence in the community. Residents describe the violence of the process as all encompassing; they were at risk from gun battles and described injuries and property damage from stray bullets. These confrontations, especially those that spilled onto the streets of Niterói below the community, were covered in the media, contributing to the public perception of Morro do Palácio as a center of violence.

With the intensification of the pacification effort in the metropolitan area of Rio, favelas and comunidades are generally regarded as dangerous. As indicated in Chapter 2 in the analysis of media coverage of violence in Niterói and Morro do Palácio, this danger is based in the reality of conflict between UPPs and traffickers; indeed, Morro do Palácio was among the first two communities to be occupied by UPPs outside of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. The media coverage of this violent reality contributed to a public image of Morro do Palácio that focused on its poverty and dangers. Many outlets cover the tragedies and the needs of Morro do Palácio, using headlines with words like “invasion” and “war.” These kinds of headlines are recent as well, for example, one article describes a warlike shootout between rival gang factions and subsequently the military police in May 2015. As much as this kind of journalism accurately reports on the most dramatic occurrences in Morro do Palácio, there is no balance to the public

237 (Larkins 2015, 59)
240 Caldeira 2000, 137
241 This phenomenon is common, as pacification can result not only in traffickers fleeing violence but also in their suppression and continued clandestine criminal activity as they blend into the community (Larkins 2015).
244 (Gustavo & Amado 2011)
246 (Ibid.)
rhetoric. Only more community-focused organizations and research centers through universities such as the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) and TV Comunitária de Niterói focus on presenting a more diversified view of Morro do Palácio’s reality.

Rhetoric of crime and violence in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio thus contributes to their territorial stigmatization. The communities become associated in the public imagination with danger and the possibility of criminal violence, which deters other urbanites from understanding the more positive aspects of community life. Plan 3000 struggles with perceptions of being a “bad neighborhood”, which is bolstered by the media’s nearly exclusive coverage of violent crime. This stigmatization is then reproduced in conversations between urbanites. In addition, the association between ethnic minorities in Santa Cruz and poverty adds another layer to the stigmatization of the community. Criminal activity becomes racialized, and due to the concentration of migrants in Plan 3000, its territory acquires an additional negative association.

A similar process occurs in Morro do Palácio. By focusing journalistic efforts on the violence in the community and its effects on the formal parts of Niterói – the asfalto – the onus of criminality is territorialized. It is important to recognize that it both cases, violence is a daily reality that affects the quality of life of residents. However, a lack of balanced media coverage and the propensity to sensationalize negative information contributes to a larger narrative that further marginalizes Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio in the public eye.

In both cases, the stereotypes are magnified as the community’s names are added to the long list of poor, informal favelas and ciudadelas in Rio and Santa Cruz that experience similar violence and stigmatization. The experience of each community thus becomes part of a larger imaginary of urban poverty, acquiring the stigma of processes outside itself.

**Mechanisms of Control: Influencing Policy and Shaping Media Narratives**

As is clear from the above analysis, media coverage contributes to the territorial stigmatization of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, affecting public perception of these spaces. The social rhetoric surrounding informality is fed by these perceptions, which are also based on social constructions and criminalization of race, class, and spatial relationships. The more insidious danger of public perceptions lies in their ability to influence actual policy, whereby they become institutionalized. For example, policy makers who are blind to or misinformed about the effect of militarized police in poor communities may support initiatives such as Brazil’s UPPs, and the Bolivian business class may be loath to invest in the growing businesses in Plan 3000 due to the racialization and classist associations of violence within the community. The desire to maintain the status quo means that government policy keeps the “other” at the margins of society. In relation to informality, this manifests as a directly or indirectly enforced separateness of Morro do Palácio and Plan 3000, which will not be incorporated into the social imaginary of the city or as equal beneficiaries of government policy until their public reputations
are altered. The informal is not part of the inclusive urban imaginary. As a result, lawmakers and the public can justify policies that negatively affect informal communities as well as equal application of laws that benefit them.

Examples of this interplay between social marginalization and government accountability in both case studies are abundant. In response to discrimination, residents of Morro do Palácio have taken public action to demand change. One recent example occurred in December 2013, when after a power outage affected the entire city of Niterói, Morro do Palácio was without electricity after the problem had been fixed in the ‘formal’ sectors of the city. Authorities said they would restore the community’s access in several days, even though most of the rest of the city had already been attended to. Aside from this lack of responsiveness, residents believed the lack of electricity posed a threat to their well-being, especially the elderly and sick of Morro do Palácio who would have to climb up the steep morro in the dark. After a full 24 hours without power, hundreds of outraged community members descended the morro and protested along the main road that lies beneath the community (which also houses the local law school). Protesters said they felt discriminated against, and that this lack of timely responsiveness was common for the community. Said a community member, “It’s absurd, it’s a lack of consideration for the poor. We’re poor but we work too.” In this case, the social positionality of Morro do Palácio provided an excuse for the prefecture’s lack of action. Arguably, the community’s informality and associated intersections led to its perception as a socially inferior urban space.

In Plan 3000 and other poor sections of Santa Cruz de la Sierra there are similar examples of unresponsiveness and outright administrative neglect. The ‘origin story’ of Plan 3000 is a somewhat dated example of this phenomenon. As previously detailed, the founding residents of Plan 3000 were given little assistance from the municipal government and were forced to self-organize to pressure local authorities to provide basic services like water and electricity. Plan 3000 also offers an example of more institutionalized forms of intentional urban differentiation. The official name of Plan 3000 is the Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez. As a ciudadela, Plan 3000 has fewer administrative ties than other sections of Santa Cruz. Although it is technically District 8 in governmental and urban planning circles, the Plan is still considered a separate institutional entity from the city itself. There is a total of four ciudadelas in Santa Cruz: Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez (Plan 3000), La Villa Primero de Mayo, Pampa de la Isla, and Bajío del Oriente. The ciudadelas are characterized by large populations, a relatively peripheral location to the city center (outside the fourth city ring), their status as reception hubs for internal migrants, high levels of poverty and violence, and consequently negative perceptions by many cruceños.

248 Unlike the other three ciudadelas, Bajío del Oriente is 60 years old, officially formed in 1952 as a result of the presidential agrarian reform. The land was originally a tile and brickworks district. It only recently became known as a ciudadela, and is not often discussed in conjunction with the others as it is located on the other side of the city. Terrazas, Alexander. “‘El Bajío del Oriente’ se Transforma en Ciudadela.” El Día. May 13, 2013.
249 (La Patria 2016)
Ciudadelas are also defined by their large populations and many neighborhoods as well as complete “consolidation of basic services”.\textsuperscript{250} Significantly, Santa Cruz’s four ciudadelas all began as informal settlements, and most remain characterized today by a lack of titled land and an ever-expanding market for \textit{urbanizaciones} – the distribution of parcels of urban land. In addition, ciudadelas are differentiated from simple informal settlements in Santa Cruz by high population density, the presence of some public infrastructure such as a market or a plaza, limited public infrastructure, and basic notions of design.\textsuperscript{251} Ciudadelas are therefore conflated with the condition of and settlement patterns of informality.

Leaders and activists in Plan 3000 have publically promoted the vision of the Plan as an autonomous municipality since 2006. Indeed, in many ways it functions and imagines itself to be its own entity, and it has been suggested to be “the only successful settlement in all of Latin America” despite the high levels of poverty in some sections of the Plan.\textsuperscript{252} Currently, Plan 3000 and all city districts have appointed sub-mayors (\textit{subalcaldes}), who are responsible for administrative duties within their district but have limited representative accountability. Official designation as a city would allow for municipal elections and better representation as well as more access to and better distribution of resources amongst Plan 3000 residents. One major obstacle to the equitable and accountable distribution of resources and general government responsiveness to need is the lack of knowledge of the official population of Plan 3000. The 2001 Census counted just over 148,000 residents in the \textit{ciudadela}, although there are estimated to be over 350,000 today. A leader of a Plan 3000 neighborhood said that an official designation as a municipality would authorize leaders to make Plan 3000 more self-reliant, receive the correct amount of resources for their population, and attend to those who need the most support.\textsuperscript{253} Without this designation and a more accurate census recount, the \textit{ciudadela} is more easily ignored and a lack of resources can be officially justified. The lack of institutional inclusion due to its history of informality thus continues to have ramifications for Plan 3000 in terms of quality of life and equal consideration under municipal law.

An important consideration of the power dialectic between perception and law is the way in which law is manipulated to benefit the elite more than the oppressed, and justified based on negative perceptions or assumptions. Holston reveals the duality of a social tool like the law in the case of Brazil, where rather than being used to protect the rights of all Brazilian citizens, the law was routinely manipulated by elites. For Brazilians, the law thus took on a negative association with control and the undermining of political citizenship.\textsuperscript{254} The law is therefore not an institution of moral legitimacy, especially as it relates to citizenship. “This law has little to do

\textsuperscript{250} (Terrazas 2013)
\textsuperscript{251} Traverso-Krejcarek, Ana Carola. 2017, email message to author, February 2, 2017.
\textsuperscript{252} (LEX 2012)
\textsuperscript{253} (Ibid.)
\textsuperscript{254} (Holston 2008, 19)
with justice, and obeying it reduces people to a category of low self esteem” (19). This unevenly applied control is what Holston refers to as a “misrule of law”.255

The role of the law in controlling informality is apparent in the relationship between classifications of legality and possible forms of citizenship. As Holston theorizes, “by making available strategies of action and argument, law also motivates the development of specific types of citizens to enact citizenship” by structuring the possibilities for the distribution of rights (19). This relationship between possibilities of action, consideration under the law, and the application of the law itself as a social tool is inherently unbalanced. In relation to informality, it can be argued that the “misrule of law” is indeed the permanent state of the law. However, the true duality of the law and the types of citizenships it encourages are evident in the struggles and occasional successes of informal communities, including in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. For example, in cases of official neglect and a lack of recognition of rights such as in Plan 3000 and of the outright failure to equally enforce the law and respond to emergencies as in Morro do Palácio, the law as an institution fails those living in informality. However, the law also acts a tool through which the marginalized have been able to gain power; to legitimize themselves and their presence.256 Law and public policy are therefore institutional tools that can legitimize and formalize actions informed by institutionalized perceptions, as well as provide avenues for actions of resistance by those marginalized by said institutions. This section explores this relationship, delving into how the governments of Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra interact with informal communities, and what these approaches reveal about the relationship between community identity and citizenship, the perception of these identities, and institutional policy.

Informality and the Law: Regularizing the Extralegal in Rio, Niterói, and Santa Cruz

Government Approaches to Informality: Development Strategies and Manifestations of Attitudes Towards Informality

Holston argues that in Brazil, citizenship is expressed through and determined by the law.257 Citizens use the law as a strategy of social action, and are also empowered by the law to enact legal or illegal citizenships (e.g. as a voter, or a someone in charge of a community crime ring).258 However, Holston also frames the law as a tool in the struggle over land, in which the powerful use the law to legitimate illegal appropriations of land “to the extent that illegality became a general condition of settlement and the distinction between legal and illegal porous. Even in its violation, law establishes the terms if not the means of conflict” (25). This

255 (Ibid.)
256 (Holston 2008, 25)
257 (Holston 2008, 24)
258 (Ibid.)
observation can be applied to both the Brazilian and the Bolivian case to understand how governments have approached ‘informal’ occupations of land.

The regularization of informal land is a concept at the heart of the debate about the best way in which to develop and support urban informal communities. Regularization refers to the granting of land titles and thus the formal incorporation of settlements into the governmentally-recognized urban space. Upon regularization, the government is obligated to provide access to services such as electricity. In theory, this practice should ensure that residents of informal settlements are given equal rights and access to services and the possibility for advancement that exists in formal sectors of the city. Therefore, prioritizing regularization reveals that the designation and control of land is a government’s priority, even if improving living conditions is the primary intention.

In reality, there is a debate as to whether integration of informal settlements into the formal housing market – an idea popularized in the development world by de Soto – is actually beneficial for residents. Land regularization as theorized by de Soto and many others is an intervention aimed at achieving housing security, and thus converting self-built homes into possible capital for future economic advancement. In theory, if a resident owns the title to their land the government cannot evict them. However, as Williamson argues, in many cases the most affordable housing market is located within informal areas. Regularizing the land and giving residents property rights thrusts them into the formal housing market, whereupon the value of their property increases and they may not be able to afford the rising cost of living in their own home. Scholars and activists like Williamson thus frame regularization as a path to gentrification. The 2016 World Cities Report produced by UN-Habitat also acknowledges this pattern, and proposes “less-than-complete title guaranteeing freedom from eviction may be more useful to lower-income owners than full legal title that can be traded on a market” (55). Williamson points to collective titling as a means through which it is possible to keep the informal real estate market stable while working to integrate informal communities into the formal city (2015).

Slum “upgrading” projects are another government strategy intended to improve informal living conditions while privileging the desires of the state. Upgrading involves investing in projects to improve the quality of homes. Participatory “upgrading” of housing is the approach advocated by UN-Habitat as an effective means of improving living conditions in the world’s slums. In theory, governments should be taking into account the needs and desires of the communities in question. However, this is not always the case. As in the case of Rio de Janeiro, municipal governments may move informal communities to other parts of the city instead of working to improve infrastructure in the original community location – a strategy that also skirts

259 (De Soto 2000); (Williamson 2015)
260 (Ibid.)
261 (World Cities Report 2016, 58)
the regularization process. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that upgrading also decreases land tenure security in informal settlements. In informal areas “speculation is accentuated by ostensibly philanthropic acts when seeking to improve tenure security through investments in infrastructure of slum areas by NGOs, developmental agencies and governments.” Infrastructure development can therefore also cause gentrification effects that economically force residents to relocate themselves.

The regulation of space as evidenced through planning is also an important indicator of how governments view informal settlements. In many cases, informal settlements or markets may occupy land designated as public. Public space is space in which difference is negotiated; a place of citizenship. However, the definition of citizenship is socially determined, and therefore only people who are citizens are welcome in public places. Thus, public space is socially controlled and is not public in the sense of being unregulated. On a basic level, this provides justification for governments to modify settlement boundaries or remove settlements from public land. Urban planning policies that modify the physical form or location of settlements demonstrate that residents of these communities are not considered full citizens of the urban space.

**Rio de Janeiro: Integration, Upgrading, and Relocation**

Here, I outline the housing policies common in Rio de Janeiro as they are largely representative of policies throughout the metropolitan area, including in Niterói. They are examples of the national approach to regulating space in *aglomerados subnormais* (subnormal agglomerations), of which there are thousands throughout the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. The unique geography of the region means that informal communities are located on the many morros that interrupt the urban layout, not only on the periphery or outskirts of city centers. A nuanced understanding of the reality of the *legality* and *illegality* of these occupations is paramount. As Roy theorizes, informality is not simply the existence of the precarious or temporary within urban space. Informal development is pervasive, and may be legitimized when beneficial to the elite and simultaneously vilified when in relation to the poor. Roy’s theory is highly representative of informality in Brazil. In Holston’s analysis of Brazilian citizenships, he highlights the importance of the law in framing and determining the distribution of the rights of citizenship in terms of land. “Brazilians have massively used the strategies of law to legitimate illicit appropriations of land – to legalize the illegal as I describe it – to the extent that illegality

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264 (Arendt 2006); (Mitchell 1995); (Gomes 2012)
265 (Roy 2011)
became a general condition of settlement and the distinction between legal and illegal porous.” Informality, as a gray space between the legal and illegal, is therefore also institutionalized to the benefit of the elite. Given this fact, the treatment of delegitimized informality that in Brazil is characterized by poverty and a lack of formal rights is concerning. Social and economic factors that characterize delegitimized informalities become twisted into justifications for unequal treatment. In terms of land rights, in which this principle dichotomy of types of informality emerges, favelas have been continually marginalized and forcibly removed to make way for city planning initiatives, in addition to experiencing systematic neglect by municipal governments. The following analysis focuses on the most contemporary government approaches to informality in Rio de Janeiro.

Governmental approaches to informality are significant on two main scales in Brazil: the national and the municipal. On a national level, the Brazilian Constitution determines the regulation of urban land management, but allows municipalities to determine the most effective ways to implement these guidelines according to local contexts. In addition, there exist several national housing institutions and policies, the most recent of which (2009) is the housing program *Minha Casa, Minha Vida* (PMCMV) which incentivizes the production of new housing units. In Rio de Janeiro, these guidelines and incentives manifest in housing policy as a governmental methodology of integration. In other words, the municipal government seeks to incorporate informal areas into the formal sector.

A book produced by the municipal government of Rio entitled *Cidade Inteira* (Whole City) reveals the integration trend. In Rio, it is seen as the government’s duty to provide housing.

“The housing policy of the City of Rio de Janeiro was devised in the principle that dwelling, more than having a house, is about a whole setting of goods, equipment and services that allow personal development through the improvement of housing conditions. Furthermore, as this setting belongs to the collectivity, it cannot be provided by the family. Thus, it is the Government’s duty to provide it to the city dwellers, [who] nevertheless might have already solved their housing problem, even precariously” (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 1999, 128).


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266 Holston 2008, 25
from unsafe land, Núcleo de Regularização (1994) a land regularization program, Novas Alternativas (1994) a building repurposing program, and Morar Carioca (2010) credited as one of the most innovative favela integration programs to date.  

Favela-Bairro and Morar Carioca exemplify the integration approach to informality regulation. Created in 1994 and aimed at favelas of 500 to 2,500 homes (about a third of the favelas in Rio, and 60% of the favela population in 1999), Favela-Bairro was intended to convert favelas into “low-income districts” of the city.  

“Using pre-existing buildings and services” Favela-Bairro conducted basic infrastructure development of the water supply, sewage system, electricity, garbage collection, reforestation, and the building of public community spaces. Buildings like sports arenas and public plazas would in theory decrease physical and symbolic boundaries between favela and city.  

Thus one main strategy of the municipal government was to improve public spaces to encourage the integration of the formal and the informal through interaction (133). Residents were not supposed to be evicted from their communities, and there was little focus on land regularization.

The Favela-Bairro program was well-received, especially by academics and urban planners, who appreciated the institutional approach to poverty alleviation. However, although planners intended the upgrading process to be participatory, allowances and responses based on the participation of residents of the decision-making process was limited.  

There was a “widely held perception that favela residents do not have the capacity to understand the upgrading plans as presented by the architects.” Stereotypes about poverty thus were an underlying factor in the government’s approach to incorporating informal settlements.

The 2010 Morar Carioca program is considered an extension of and improvement upon Favela-Bairro, with an “impressive participatory model, on-site upgrading that recognizes prior investments made by residents, a focus on sustainability, and special “social interest” zoning parameters to maintain areas for affordable housing.” However, Morar Carioca was never implemented in Rio. Conflicting political and business interests – typified by the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games – caused the municipal government to reevaluate its priorities. Plans to implement the program were abandoned, and any projects carried out under the same name are considered a “hollowed out” version of the plan. In addition, communities that expected upgrades under Morar Carioca experienced threat of eviction in preparation for Rio’s mega-events. It is here that local and national policies work in tandem. The federal program Minha Casa, Minha Vida (PMCMV) calls for new housing as a method of upgrading informal

271 (Ibid.)
272 (Riley et al. 2001, 529)
273 (Ibid.)
274 (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014)
275 (Ibid.)
settlements. However, these new housing areas are often built at the physical periphery of cities, in areas without sufficient infrastructure and far from the jobs and social circles of recently moved residents.\textsuperscript{276} Such settlements became useful for favela resident relocation during the recent urban restructuring of Rio, when favelas in Barra da Tijuca and the central port area were cleared to make room for sports complexes and tourist attractions in the years leading up to the 2016 Olympics.\textsuperscript{277} The municipality of Rio de Janeiro thus recognizes the need to approach the integration of informal settlements in order to alleviate urban poverty and conduct responsible development, but questions of economic growth and international interests often outweigh the implementation of such programs, and may even lead to their reversal.

\textit{Niterói: Neglectful Policy, Relocation, and Possibilities for Participatory Planning}

Niterói has a much shorter history of municipal policy regarding informality than Rio de Janeiro. As a municipality, Niterói attempts to follow federal and state directives regarding urban planning and land regulation, especially after the 1988 Constitution resulted in movements for urban reform and the development of Niterói's Directive Plan.\textsuperscript{278} The city’s first Secretariat of Housing was established in 2002, and the first concerted municipal effort towards developing a strategy for housing policy was in 2006, with the \textit{Plano Estratégico Municipal para Assentamentos Informais Urbanos} or the Strategic Municipal Plan for Urban Informal Settlements (PEMAS). PEMAS is part of an effort of the Ministério das Cidades, the Ministry of Cities, that enabled the development and implementation of integrated urban housing policy across municipalities (68).

Niterói has a nearly nonexistent history of low-income and informal housing policy. Low-income housing was constructed in Niterói in the 1970s and 80s, and not again until the year 2000. PEMAS faults the “inexistence of a national housing policy, and the disinterest of municipal authorities in implementing housing programs for low-income groups” (45). In part, this disinterest was based in the belief that because nearby municipalities also did not have low-income housing options, building new public housing would disproportionately attract the poor to Niterói. PEMAS clarifies that in fact, the lack of formal options for housing did not reduce the pull of the local job market, and low-income residents that worked in Niterói were forced to “invent” their own solutions, creating “situations of risk that resulted in tragedy with the loss of human life and, in others, in environmental degradation as a result of the occupation of areas under permanent preservation” (45).

According to the plan, the 2000 census showed more than 17,000 people living in 64 areas designated as ‘subnormal’ in Niterói. However, the same census also lists more than 50,000 people living in ‘favelas’ in Niterói. The PEMAS explains that this difference is

\textsuperscript{276} (Cardoso et al. 2013)
\textsuperscript{278} (Prefeitura de Niterói 2006, 68)
accounted for by different methods of conceiving of “areas of urban informal occupation” (34). While the city considers identification of these communities to be essential in moving forward with better service provision, differences in terms used for their classification among different institutions also contributes to the confusion. The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), the organizing body of the national census, lists communities as assentamentos subnormais (subnormal settlements), the COMPUR\(^\text{279}\) uses assentamentos populares precários (precarious popular settlements), and the municipal Directive Plan uses áreas de ocupação urbana informal or Áreas de Especial Interesse Social (areas of urban informal occupation or Areas of Special Social Interest). As illustrated by this diversity of labels and data collection strategies, any housing policy implemented in Niterói would be insufficient and ineffective due to these disparities. In 2005, a new municipal department (the department of Civil Defense and Community Integration) was formed to address these issues.\(^\text{280}\)

In 2004, the municipality developed a methodology for placing informal communities into a hierarchy of need to best identify those most in need of participating in municipal and federal housing programs. These determinations were made based on location, degree of consolidation (population size, duration of occupation, existence of a Resident’s Association), income of residents, quality of the built environment, and impact of the community on the environment (43). Significantly, communities that were closest to the ‘formal’ city in terms of infrastructure development and internal organization were prioritized for participation. The criteria for this prioritization included maps and demographic documentation as well as the possibility of being easily regularized.\(^\text{281}\) Therefore, communities that have the most social capital and most robust economies and internal organization received the majority of municipal assistance – as opposed to those with fewer resources. Tellingly, the plan refers to Morro do Palácio as Morro do Ingá, making it clear that the institutions involved in urban development value the land more than the community itself. This is further supported by the fact that PEMAS prioritizes the “localization, identification, and treatment...of cases of geotechnical risk for habitation and permanence” (45).

The use of informality as an institutional tool is most apparent in PEMAS and in Niterói’s housing policy through the use of the label “Areas of Special Social Interest” (AEIS). These areas, first created in 1992, were created to ease “land and urban regularization, to be able to apply a special urban strategy, so as to build popular housing in empty urban spaces” (46). Throughout the 1990s, the municipality conducted various social projects in AEIS through the program Vida Nova no Morro (New Life on the Hill) consisting of basic infrastructure

\(^{279}\) Counsel for Urban Policy

\(^{280}\) The Permanent Commission of Civil Defense and municipal department of Civil Defense and Community Integration consists of representatives from the departments of Social Assistance, Public Services, Environment, Urbanism, Health, the State Civil Defense, and the Firefighter Corps. (Prefeitura de Niterói 2006, 42).

\(^{281}\) (Ibid.)
improvement and health services. This program was not sustainably implemented and eventually failed, but resulted in a robust health program. Since 2004, more AEIS have been created as a result of Niterói’s participation in federal housing programs. These programs identify AEIS and include rules for their regularization, resulting in the Nucleus of Land Regularization in 2006. The label of AEIS is therefore evidence of a process in Niterói of 1) creating a hierarchy of need that rewards internal organization in informal communities, 2) encouraging the upgrading of informal sectors, and 3) creating institutional infrastructure to facilitate this process. Labeling is a strategy of regularization designed to promote relocation.

Niterói’s strategy of formalization is indicative of the municipality’s attitude toward informality as insufficient. PEMAS repeatedly refers to the “housing deficit” of Niterói, deliberately not including the existence of informal settlements and their infrastructure in the consideration of legitimate housing. According to PEMAS, this justifies Niterói’s housing strategy that is more related to upgrading and relocation than integration. In addition, the strategic plan for 2013 to 2033 calls for a curbing of “illegal occupations” through the definition of AEIS. However, the plan also includes the goal of making housing policy more participatory, and proposals considered in 2003 included the mapping of informal communities as a method of encouraging their regularization, and of taking into account the existing built environment when conducting community upgrades.

Much of Niterói’s policy therefore prioritizes information gathering in informal communities, as well as their relocation. These relocation efforts have manifested in recent years in the municipality’s participation in federal housing programs. For example, the SMHRF currently administers the city’s participation in PMCMV. As part of this effort, the city launched Programa Morar Melhor (Program Live Better) aiming to build 5,000 new housing units by 2016. The process of knowledge collection and creating official categories for informal communities in Niterói therefore points to the use of such designations as a tool that justifies relocation. Nonetheless, language in these same policies indicates that the city is open to participatory development in informal communities – an encouraging development if implementation follows institutional plans.

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282 In contrast to the relative failure of most housing policy in Niterói, the city also implemented Médico da Família, a public health program that had tremendous success and impact and was eventually adopted nationwide (ibid. 46).
283 Programa de Regularização, Urbanização e Integração de Assentamentos Precários do Ministério das Cidades (Program for Regularization, Urbanization and Integration of Precarious Settlements of the Ministry of Cities, part of Programa Habitar Brasil BID).
284 (Ibid.)
285 (Prefeitura de Niterói 2013)
287 Secretaria Municipal da Habitação e Regularização Fundiária (Municipal Secretariat of Housing and Land Regularization)
288 (Prefeitura de Niterói 2016)
Unlike in Rio de Janeiro and Niterói, the location of informal settlements in Santa Cruz de la Sierra is a product of the city’s history of urban planning. The most recent plan, the Plan Techint, was approved in 1969 and organized the city according to a concentric zone model, modeled after an early design of São Paulo, Brazil. This model plans urban space so that the formal housing and economic markets operate within concentric circles radiating out from the city center, relegating informal communities formed through urban migration to the city’s periphery to beyond the city’s fourth “ring” (162).

Similarly to Brazil, Bolivia protects citizens’ rights to adequate housing at the federal level. According to the Bolivian constitution, and cited in the 2012 law Regularización del Derecho Propietario sobre Bienes Inmuebles Urbanos Destinados a Vivienda, “all people have the right: to a dignified life, to private property and to habitat; and it is the obligation of the State to guarantee and universalize the exercise of these rights.” In addition, Bolivia’s Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social: 2016-2020 to eliminate extreme poverty by 2025 addresses housing as part of its goal for the universalization of basic services. The Law of Regularization places the responsibility for land regularization and home provision on municipal governments.

In contrast to Rio’s approach to informality that focuses on upgrading as a development strategy, the municipal government of Santa Cruz favors plans based on regularizing informal communities as a means of controlling urban land, as does Niterói. The preoccupation with regularization reveals the municipal desire for control of the land, and hints at the more pervasive issue of lobby control of land speculation. Oligarchic private sector landowners control the urban land market, and benefit from the capital gains of speculating on land occupied by informal settlements – a significant political effort would be needed to overpower them.

Therefore, the city of Santa Cruz has not actually implemented any official policy regarding informal settlements within the city. A 2011 study on the reality of informal housing in Santa Cruz reveals that there are several national and municipal plans or organizations dedicated to housing concerns. For example, the Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (PLOT), a 2005 city ordinance, demonstrates full municipal government understanding that informal settlements exist, are subject to intense land speculation, and are unregulated. Among other strategies, PLOT proposed creating a Corporation of Municipal Urban Development (CDU) in order to intervene in the housing market and relocate informal communities to more ‘suitable’ areas (30-35). While this plan, as well as its antecedents, recognizes that informal settlements could benefit from more direct interaction with the government, the main method proposed to enact change is settlement

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289 (Kirshner 2010, 161)
290 “Toda persona tiene derecho: a una vivienda digna, a la propiedad privada y al hábitat; y es obligación del Estado garantizar y universalizar el ejercicio pleno de los mismos” (Decreto Supremo 3453)
291 (CEDURE 2011, 35-7)
relocation and the regulation of land speculation. However, he CDU was never supported by the city government, and thus was never officially created.

This points to an underlying problem that pervades urban and housing policy in Santa Cruz: urban planning is not considered as important as individual public works, such as public market buildings (35). The new Plan de Desarrollo Municipal (PDM) adopted the projects outlined in PLOT and focused on urban planning directed by a multidisciplinary team, but was delayed in favor of construction projects and new public works. Therefore, although Bolivian academics, policy-makers, and some municipal officials recognize urban planning as a strategy to regulate and support those living in informality, the government as an institution is not willing to invest in such plans. This may be due to negative pressure from landowners.

“In the popular cruceño collective imaginary, obtaining a home is a strictly personal and at most a family problem, that must be resolved through personal effort, in a process of self construction that lasts many years and that implies enormous effort and sacrifice for the citizens that involve themselves in this adventure, for which there is no technical or economic support” (CEDURE 2011, 9).

The attitude of the Santa Cruz government towards informality can also be observed in the municipality’s relationship with urban markets. Kirshner (2010) provides a theory of the regulation of informal markets by the municipal government.

“The organizations charged with managing urban growth and development – municipal officials and planners – and traditionally powerful Santa Cruz civic institutions, such as the Comité Cívico and the Cámara de Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo (CAINCO) [Civic Committee and the Chamber of Commerce] attempt to regulate the most visible aspects of the informal economy through a new municipal plan to reorganize market networks” (Kirshner 2010, 152).

This regulation occurs through reorganization of large markets and forced vendor relocation. Informal markets in Santa Cruz are often run by poor Andean migrants, and thus become representative of occupation and cultural difference in the cruceño imaginary, as the Andean and lowland cultures have different cultural identities. Indeed, the large urban informal markets are conceived of as colla spaces (166). Hostility and group differentiation therefore manifests spatially as well as culturally (158). In addition, public informal markets and street vending occur in designated “public space” (173). Thus, definitions of the “public” also play into the government’s interaction with informality. Importantly, public space – while technically a space in which societal difference can be negotiated – is also a controlled space. Those that have

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292 (Ibid.)
293 “En el imaginario colectivo popular cruceño, obtener la vivienda es un problema estrictamente personal y al máximo familia, que debe ser resuelto por esfuerzo propio, en un proceso de autoconstrucción que dura muchos años y que implica enormes esfuerzos y sacrificios para los ciudadanos que se involucran en esta aventura, para la cual no hay apoyo técnico ni económico” (CEDURE 2011, 9).
the right to make use of public space are the citizens of society. Informal commerce in Santa Cruz is thus officially viewed as a practice of sub-citizens. Kirshner analyses the work of another scholar on Bolivian markets, concluding that:

“two factors are at work in the municipal government’s approach toward the public markets, namely a perception and an ideological factor. First, it recognizes that it has a physical and social problem on its hands, in which expanding markets occupy space, annex neighboring areas, worsen congestion, and thwart efforts to create rational, orderly urban growth. There is also an ideological issue at play, relating to the elite civic powers in the city and their opposition to “unhygienic” and “informal” uses of public space, as well as to the rising political muscle of the gremios and other associations of informal workers.” (Kirshner 2010, 172)

Informality in Santa Cruz de la Sierra is thus approached as a justification for governmental control of public space.

The policies of Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra reveal some commonalities in municipal attitudes towards informal settlements. Although Rio’s and Niterói’s planned policies regarding upgrading may be more effective integration interventions than Santa Cruz’s preferred method of regularization and urban planning, there is evidence that all three governments consider informal residents to be inferior to other urbanites. Non-participatory interventions, forced removal of informal communities, and the control of public space reveal these attitudes. In addition, government relationships with business interests often win out over plans for the integration of informal settlements. In Rio de Janeiro, the possibility of international investment in mega events led to the abandonment of one of the most progressive and unprecedented integration plans in history. In Santa Cruz de la Sierra the interests of large landowners are prioritized over those of people living in informality, also leading to the dissolution of an informality integration plan. These commonalities indicate that there are inherent challenges of government-led urban development due in part to the relationship between private and public sectors, and that these struggles marginalize informal communities.

It is also noteworthy that the governments of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Rio de Janeiro, and Niterói approach informality through the lens of land regularization. This is a strictly legalistic consideration of informality. As discussed in Chapter 1, informality has social characteristics as well as being an economic and spatially-associated condition. The fact that this view of informal communities and the means through which they can be developed persists indicates that informality itself is not well understood. Fischer also observes this to be true in her study of informality in Brazilian cities.

“Land regularization – understood through the lens of Hernando de Soto’s theories about the legal and bureaucratic sources of poverty – has come to be regarded as a kind of global panacea for the urban slum, and the fact that these theories demonstrate little understanding of the actual function
Still, regularization is seen by some residents of informal communities as a tool through which their physical existence may be legitimized, increasing the likelihood that government services such as water and electricity access will be more readily supplied, and giving residents more control over their property. Titles, although perhaps not as effective a development tool as once believed, are a symbol of legitimacy. For example, a former president of the Residents’ Association of Morro do Palácio discussed the importance of discovering the real, legal name of the community in order to be able to fight for the land regularization of the community. Although the informant sees the internal organization of the community as lesser or inferior to more ‘formal’ organization – as a first step along the process of community development – in his mind legalization is a main goal.

Conclusions

Widespread perceptions of informality in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio control the social rhetoric about informality, which in turn influence the attitudes of governing bodies and shape policy decisions that affect informal communities. The territorial stigmatization of these communities therefore controls social perception of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, which contributes to the perceived necessity to externally control these spaces through policy. From public rhetoric surrounding violence and marginality in poor communities and the resulting policies of control, it is clear that the government, policymakers, and the media produce and reproduce rhetoric around informality designed to legitimize the control these policies engender in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio-Niterói. This dialogue interacts with and shapes the commonly-held perceptions of the informal, in addition to the popularized social rhetoric perpetuated in the media. Perception thus both influences the socially-imagined limitations of informality, and seems to justify control. This works in conjunction with the unique forms of identity production in delegitimized informal spaces (as explored in Chapter 2) to facilitate the connection between delegitimized space and the marginalization of certain urban citizenships, necessitating the development of insurgent citizenships. In addition, this chapter has also shown that informality as a label is also mobilized as a legal tool for communities seeking formalization. Resistance identity then becomes a means for fighting for the legitimization of community citizenship within urban space.

These findings are supported by the 1976 study of favelas in Rio de Janeiro by Janice Perlman. Perlman found a strong relationship between the idea of marginality and practices of “othering”, which justified the relocation and removal of informal communities (2010, 12). “Marginality thus moved beyond the simply descriptive to become a material and ideological force” (12). In the present cases, informality and its perception have the same ideological force.

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294 (Fischer et al. 2014)
295 (Ronilton Dias dos Santos, NUPIJ UFF 2016)
Conclusions
Evaluating Informality as a Tool
Activating a Dichotomy: Reacting to the Narrative of Delegitimized Informality

In seeking to answer the question *How does informality influence and operate as identity in the social imaginary of urban Bolivia and Brazil?*, this paper has revealed the dialectic of power inherent in the designation and perception of informal urban spaces. Informal communities are the sites of distinct forms of identity production due to the intersectionality of marginalized identities that occur within them, the ways in which urban spatial marginality informs residents’ relationship to place, and the effect of external perceptions of this marginalization on the sense of self and community. This paper has argued that the label of informality can then be mobilized in conjunction with these forms of identity production to further marginalize or uplift citizens in delegitimized informal spaces.

There are two distinct veins in the nature and effectiveness of the activation of informality as a tool of identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Niterói-Rio de Janeiro. As a tool, it is mobilized according to or against a common narrative of territorialized otherness that lives in the urban social imaginary. This social narrative of informality is based on the intermingling and territorialization of perceptions of race, violence, social and spatial peripherality, and marginality. It is these perceptions that contribute to the delegitimization of forms of informality (settlements, economies not beneficial to the elite, etc.), leading to the dichotomy of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ informality in urban space. Informality becomes a justification for perceptions of community identity as negative, as well as for the creation of an identity that resists this classification. These resistance identities become politically significant when they mobilize the label of informality as a tool for acquiring recognition of community rights and claims to land.

The most visible activation of informality as an identity occurs when governments and policy makers in Niterói-Rio and Santa Cruz institutionalize the societal narrative of informality. The predominant perceptions of informality emerge as justifications for urban policy that negatively affect the marginalized communities they purport to assist. In Rio and Niterói, this is most obvious in governments’ forced evictions of historic favelas and emphasis on relocation rather than formalization, and of the increased militarization of favelas through occupation by UPPs. In Santa Cruz, this control is evident in the regulation of public space through urban planning targeting informal markets. These institutional interactions with informality show that policy has little nuance in how it conceives of residents of informal communities. The governments of Santa Cruz and Niterói prioritize policy that addresses the violence and state of irregulation of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, without taking into account effective internal strategies of survival, or enacting robust participatory planning measures. The images of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio as violent and poor, both concepts which are racialized according to the social contexts of each country, therefore have more weight in determining policy than do the desires of the communities such policies affect. The label of “informal” or related terms such as *favela*, *subnormal agglomerations*, *AEIS* (areas of special social interest) and *ciudadela* then becomes a tool of the institutionalization of the narrative of delegitimized informality.
Conversely, acting against this dominant narrative, informality is activated as an empowering identity by residents of informal communities. “Informal” and its reclaimed synonyms of *favela, comunidade,* and *ciudadela* are activated as rallying points for resistance against the stigmatized narrative of illegitimacy. They signify the movement to consolidate insurgent forms of citizenship into a cohesive community identity that captures the pride and progress of community residents. In both Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, informality is activated in this way in the rhetoric of residents, as well as through the work of community organizations. Community organizations are key in transforming the pieces of resistance identities in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio into project identities by working to improve the image and reality of their community. The organizations act as museums and media outlets that educate about the past and local knowledge, community centers that provide educational services and places for congregation, and centers of pride that actively encourage community members to see and work toward positive change. The reproduction of this rhetoric, as in Plan 3000’s *La Calle* or through the MACquinho, serves to directly counteract the pervasive narrative of delegitimized informality. The project of self-organization is to create and promote a new community narrative of self, and in turn, of the nature of informality.

It is these narratives that are the project identities of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. In both cases, the chosen form of differentiation from an identity of marginality is its aspirational opposite – that of the socioeconomic “norm” (the non-marginalized). However, the goals of these projects differ. Plan 3000 seeks to be incorporated into the societal norm of formality as in the rest of Santa Cruz. This project is complicated by the diversity of ethnicities and cultures in Bolivia, and their spatial differentiation within Plan 3000; on an individual level, many residents identify primarily with their ethnicity and do not feel culturally integrated into cruceño life. However, as a district that has developed intra-urban territorial interests and commonalities, its culture, desires, and economy are more in line with that of the city as a whole. As it becomes more physically integrated, so too does its culture and sense of self change. This can be explained by the spatial relationship of Plan 3000 to Santa Cruz. The Plan’s initial physical separation explains the ease with which distinctions were made between the community and the city. The fact that the community today is becoming a more formal and economic part of the city then also explains why some people see themselves as less separate and identify as cruceño. However, this does not mean that the Plan’s identity is merging with that of Santa Cruz — they want to be their own municipality – simply that they seek to gain the legitimacy of the formal sector. Conversely, Morro do Palácio desires equal treatment within Niterói, but the marginalization of racial identity outweighs the importance of assimilation into formality. In addition, its continued physical separation limits expansion, and explains why residents distinguish between their community context and the identity of the rest of the city. Morro do Palácio’s community identity thus places less importance on integration, instead prioritizing

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community power and internal development. The possibility of formalization and incorporation of informal communities thus affects the nature of the project of the redefinition of self.

The comparison of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio reveals more than an understanding of the dialectic of legitimization within urban space and intra-urban relations. Despite the many contextual differences in the case cities and the communities of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, their similarities offer important lessons as to the nature of community identity in informal communities.

The comparison of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is valid despite their obvious differences in size, economic power, built environment, and ethnic makeup. The fact that both communities continue to experience the same categories of marginalization – due to the constructions of race, internal migration, perceptions and realities of violence, marginality, and peripherality – is significant given their differences. Plan 3000, as a community that has exploded in population and contributes significantly to the city’s economy, experiences the same types of social marginalization as does Morro do Palácio. However, perhaps due to its physical location in relation to the rest of the city which permits expansion, Plan 3000 is further along in its economic development and sense of community power. In contrast, because Morro do Palácio is located on a morro, the extent to which it can physically expand is limited. As a result, there is no opportunity for palacianos to create significant sources of community income and employment, such as a factory.

In addition, the threat of violence remains a concern in both Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. In Morro do Palácio, residents no longer live under constant threat of stray bullets or gang-related violence, although the possibility of experiencing violence in interactions with UPPs or as a result of gang actions is still heightened. The threat is greater in Plan 3000, perhaps due to its size and relative lack of policing. It is more difficult to control and regulate criminal activity in the Plan, a sprawling and confusing section of Santa Cruz.

One of the more significant conclusions of this research is the similarities in the relationship between identity and internal migration in each case. Residents of each community were overwhelmingly internal migrants, or the descendants of migrants. Those who had migrated to the city and their community before reaching young adulthood were more likely to identify as being from the urban center (Niterói-Rio or Santa Cruz de la Sierra), while those who moved to the community as adults were more likely to identify with their state or department of origin. For children of migrants within each city, they were more likely to identify with the place-based identity of the city in which they grew up, although some also identified with the place of origin and the culture of their parents. The only people interviewed who identified with the informal community as part of their personal identity – in essence, as a determinant of where they were ‘from’ – were those of the younger generation who had been born and raised in Plan 3000 or Morro do Palácio. Place of origin thus plays an important role in personal identity within these informal communities. Given the distinct racial dynamics and contexts of migration in Bolivia
and Brazil, this finding indicates that there are compelling commonalities involved in the internal migratory experience of rural-urban migration in both countries. In addition, since identification with their communities as places was not individually salient for many interviewees, this indicates that the relationship between informality and identity in these cases is principally articulated at the community level, justifying the community scale comparison.

The marginalization of informality means that community action and support is more necessary than in other contexts. In both cases, the initial memories of community marginality were tied to collaboration among community members and the formation of networks of mutual support and organization that enabled survival and eventually community development. Identity on the community level is therefore more based in relationships. To that end, the work of community organizations is the principal means through which community identity has been articulated and continues to manifest. Identification as a cohesive community ‘unit’ remains a project in progress. This is also affected by the level of internal migration into informal communities. As destinations for internal migrants, cohesion of identity within informal communities battles against a constant influx of new residents. The continual process of creating a sense of community is therefore also aided by community organizations, which develop and promote positive representation.

However, it is also important to recognize that identity is activated differently depending upon the context of an individual’s experience. Residents of both communities indicated that when speaking to people from outside their communities, they are sometimes reluctant to reveal where they live for fear of judgment and the repercussions of the negative perceptions of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. In these moments, their identity is determined by external perceptions based in stereotypes of violence and marginality. In addition, their sense of belonging to a community is most relevant in this realm – when interacting with residents of their city from outside the community.

Informal communities are thus places in which racial identity, relative geographic location, violence, and economic marginality all intersect. The informal then becomes racialized, stigmatized as separate, dangerous, and inherently poor. In Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, multifaceted resistance identities have developed as a reaction to the marginalization that is socially legitimized and perpetuated by the negatively perceived “informality”. Community organizations then work to formally acknowledge community-wide resistance and provide avenues for amplifying this power, contributing to the project of community cohesion and narrative resistance.
Reflections on Informality

This exploration of informality in two distinct national contexts and urban systems has revealed that informality itself is complex and multifaceted. The notion of informality as a tool supports the idea that informality is pervasive throughout space\textsuperscript{297}, and is legitimized or delegitimized as a method of control and marginalization, which removes informal communities from the responsibility of governing institutions and limits the possibilities for their economic and social advancement. Considering the pervasiveness of informality indicates that it is perhaps more useful and more responsible to conceive of urban space as I have done throughout this paper – as legitimized or delegitimized. Rather than the label ‘informal’ which connotes inferiority and devaluation, ‘delegitimized’ implies an actor at fault; a responsibility which has yet to be or has purposefully not been met. This more accurately captures the dialectic of power between formal and informal space.

The terms ‘legitimized’ and ‘delegitimized’ are closely related to Wacquant’s idea of territorial stigmatization. Chapter 3 argued that territorial stigmatization is a method of social control of informal space, as perceived stigma contributes to the justification of policy that ‘otherizes’ informality. Conceiving of space in terms of legitimization therefore communicates that there is an uneven balance of power in the control of urban space – not all urban space allows for the same possibilities of belonging; of citizenship. This indicates that the delegitimization of space also delegitimizes citizens within those spaces.

In addition, focusing on ‘delegitimized’ and ‘legitimized’ space better communicates the nature of citizenship and belonging in cities. According to Holston’s definition of citizenship, only legitimated citizens occupy formal space; marginalized urbanites are relegated to the informal. Approaching citizenship in this way recognizes the power of labels as a tool for regulating urban space. Given that Holston indicates that informality elicits insurgent citizenships, it follows that insurgent forms of citizenship occur where the space of citizenship is delegitimized and devalued. Therefore, as a label, informality is central to projects of representation that depict delegitimized space as negative or positive. Informality thus serves as means to shape the narrative of urban citizenship.

\textsuperscript{297} Informality as an organizing logic.
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_Rio de Janeiro – Rocinha and Rio das Pedras:_

Appendix

(See Macalester College hard copy)

**Figure i.** Map of District 8, or Plan 3000. *Gobierno Municipal Autónomo de Santa Cruz de la Sierra*

(See Macalester College hard copy)

**Figure ii.** Map of Niterói. *Prefeitura de Niterói, 2010*
Figure 2.1. MACquinho, Morro do Palácio, Niterói – designed by Oscar Niemeyer. Photo taken by author.
Figure 2.2. View from the MACquinho towards the MAC (also designed by Niemeyer) and the Baía da Guanabara, Niterói. Photo taken by author.

(See Macalester College hard copy)

Figure 3.1. “See where fleeing criminals go are going.” A graphic from a Rio newspaper shows that Morro do Palácio is a destination for criminals fleeing favela pacification in Rio (Câmara de Segurança da Região Oceânica).

(See Macalester College hard copy)

Figure 3.2. This newspaper graphic shows that Morro do Palácio, pictured in the bottom-left photograph, was controlled by the same gang that operates in Rocinha, one of the largest and most famous favelas in Rio (Câmara de Segurança da Região Oceânica).