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Opening Remarks

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I am pleased to welcome all of you to the first Macalester Civic Forum: Meditations on Global Citizenship; to welcome our distinguished guests, Professor Seyla Benhabib, Professor David Theo Goldberg, and Dr. Emmett Carson; to thank all of the faculty, students, and administrators who have agreed to participate in the events of this evening and the next few days; and especially to thank Dean Samatar, Associate Deans Andrew Latham and Karin Trail-Johnson, Margaret Beegle, and all the other members of the faculty, staff, and student body who have worked to bring this forum into being. Meaningful events of this sort do not just spring magically into existence. They are the products of labor—sometimes the labor of love, but labor nonetheless—and we who benefit should never forget to acknowledge those who have done the work.

I have been asked to help inaugurate this gathering by offering my own brief remarks on the meaning of global citizenship. This task is not a little daunting, partly because there are those in attendance whose academic and professional expertise positions them to address the topic of global citizenship with more grounding and context than I could hope to bring to my comments, and partly because I have been thinking and talking about global citizenship so often and for so long that I have begun to lose track of what I meant when I raised the subject in the first place, now nearly four years ago. Yet I will press on, and, to paraphrase E.M. Forster in Aspects of the Novel, will, I hope, begin to tell what I think when eventually I see what I say.
The first point I would make this evening is that if the effort to establish the Institute for Global Citizenship is any indication, defining, understanding, and enacting global citizenship is among the most difficult work one can imagine. Without question it is the most difficult work I have ever done, and I say that as someone whose days are not typically filled with ease and the absence of contention. I believe the work to be difficult not because there is deep disagreement about the value of global citizenship or about its appropriateness at Macalester College but because the phrase is so broad and the range of interpretations so wide that reaching meaningful consensus at times appears an impossibility. What could be more broad than the term “global”—unless one were to move to “extraterrestrial” or “galactic”—and what could be subject to more varied readings than the concept of citizenship, which surely means very different things to, say, Macalester alumnus Kofi Annan and to the vigilantes who patrol the southern borders of the United States? Understood in the loosest terms, everyone on the planet is ineluctably a “global citizen,” yet understood in the strictest terms, very few of us rise in our personal behavior to the standards of true global citizenship. Finding a meaning precise enough to have relevance yet fluid enough to encompass a range of competing principles and priorities may be the first and greatest challenge of our work—work, I would add, in whose value and appropriateness and even necessity for Macalester my belief remains utterly unshaken.

I begin in thinking about global citizenship precisely where I begin in thinking about any abstract idea; that is, with its concrete manifestations. I believe that global citizenship has its roots not in how we treat others whose faces we never see, nor in how we imagine in the most general terms our responsibilities to others, but in how we treat, every day and in the most quotidian circumstances, the people around us. That is, global citizenship is at its core about humility, generosity, and the voluntary foregoing of self-interest. Two of my favorite authors make this point with an eloquence and precision to which I can only aspire. Near the end of Charles Dickens's *Hard Times*, a reformed Mr. Gradgrind is pleading with Bitzer, a former pupil, to “disregard [his] present interest” and perform an act of kindness and grace. Bitzer is frankly puzzled, because, as everyone knows:

It was a fundamental principle of the Gradgrind philosophy that everything was to be paid for. Nobody was ever on any account to give anybody anything, or render anybody help without purchase. Gratitude
was to be abolished, and the virtues springing from it were not to be. Every inch of the existence of mankind, from birth to death, was to be a bargain across a counter. And if we didn’t get to Heaven that way, it was not a politico-economical place, and we had no business there.

Needless to say, the estimable Bitzer, for whom “the whole social system is a question of self-interest,” remains unpersuaded by Gradgrind’s appeal to his humanity.

Stephen L. Carter, the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale and the author of works of theology, legal theory, philosophy, and fiction, makes a similar point with less irony but comparable force in his book On Civility. Among Carter’s central observations are the following:

Civility has two parts: generosity, even when it is costly, and trust, even when there is risk.

Civility creates not merely a negative duty not to do harm, but an affirmative duty to do good.

Civility requires that we express ourselves in ways that demonstrate our respect for others.

Civility requires resistance to the dominance of social life by the values of the marketplace. Thus, the basic principles of civility—generosity and trust—should apply as fully in the market and in politics as in every other human activity.

I believe that one could substitute the phrase “global citizenship” for the word “civility” in any of these statements and begin to work toward a useful definition of the concept. In other words, the way we understand our relationship and responsibilities to those with whom we interact daily go a long way toward defining our understanding of the ways we should interact with local, national, and international communities more broadly conceived.

I am at bottom a fairly simple (if not simple-minded) person with an abiding suspicion of the academic proclivity to overtheorize. Certainly I do not believe that the theory and practice of global citizenship ends with the embrace of such basic principles as generosity, trust, humility, and respect, but I do believe that any theory that does not begin with these principles, that is not rooted in them very deeply, is bound to be inadequate. How we treat the people around us, how we relate to the
communities within which we are embedded, stands as a synecdoche for how we are prepared to relate to the larger world.

I will end, finally, by reminding all of you how deeply discussions of this kind are embedded in the “DNA” of Macalester College. I have cited before, and will no doubt cite again, the column written by Macalester President Charles Turck for the August 17, 1945, edition of the Mac Weekly in which he contends that, “the high task of every returning Macalester student and every new student is to prepare for the duties of world citizenship.” President Turck rightly acknowledged that this mission was not universally embraced by all colleges or all Americans and that, as he put it, “there may be parents who are reluctant to place their sons and daughters in an institution where the administration and faculty think and act, not in parochial terms, not even with a national bias, but in world terms.” There are no doubt such parents today, and perhaps some of their children are at Carleton. In any event, we cannot pretend that we are the first generation at Macalester to be having this conversation or that the fortunes of the college are easily disentangled from this commitment to thinking about our responsibilities in global terms.

Turck’s most trenchant observation may have been the same one that I noted earlier in Dickens and Carter: the creation of global citizens begins with the formation of individual character. “The vast scope of the world stage on which the present generation of students will live out their lives,” he wrote, sixty years before Thomas Friedman, “may suggest to some that personal qualities of character have become less significant. On the contrary, the individual is more important than ever. The more complex the social machine becomes, the more important it is that every individual have the moral and spiritual qualities to do his part. A world of peace means a world of peace-loving individuals.”

I would add, and conclude, by saying that a college of global citizens is not first and foremost one in which many students study abroad, or in which students hail from all parts of the country and the world, or in which students major in political science or international studies—though all these things are good and important—but one in which the responsibilities of local citizenship are understood and embraced in all their complexity and with all their difficulties. To quote Stephen Carter once again, it is one that manifests that “generosity of spirit that assumes the best, not the worst, of the stranger.”

Thank you, and best of luck with the forum that commences here this evening.
Musings on Global Citizenship

Ahmed I. Samatar

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world;
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
—William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming”

A topic such as the one discussed in this inaugural volume is at once intimidating and unavoidable—terrifying because of its weight and complexity; inescapable due to its heightened timeliness. To make even a modest contribution, then, average minds such as mine must press into service, even more than the usual practice, greater thinkers. In this spirit, I will start with Clifford Geertz. Reflecting on intimate encounters in contexts of acute diversity, he instructs us about the imperatives of mutual coexistence. “The next necessary thing…,” he declares in The Anthropologist as Author, “is to enlarge the possibility of intelligible discourses between people quite different from one another in interest, outlook, wealth and power, and yet contained in a world where, tumbled as they are into endless connection, it is increasingly difficult to get out of each other’s way.”1

I hold that Geertz is correct. Consequently, a preliminary definition of “Global Citizenship”—the emerging logos of our age—ought to start with a recognition of the dialectic of multiple differences that cannot be obliterated or wished out of existence, yet must co-evolve with each other. But perhaps one could dare to be a tad more adventuresome than Geertz. I suggest, therefore, that “Global Citizenship,” to respond effectively to both the ideational and concrete local and planetary challenges that confront us, may include the following: an extension of selfhood to belong to the human race without foregoing more local or regional affinities. Cosmopolitanism, then, is a fusion of immediate and transnational conceptions of self—a gateway to a revival of inclu-
sive empathy; an identification of the *problematique* at a given time; a discerning analysis; and a common *praxis* towards desirable and achievable utopia. More on this a bit later but, for now, let me propose that the context of global citizenship, contrary to popular conceptions that strictly associate it with the rise of contemporary globalization, is both *old* and *new*.2

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In its oldest guise, the world as *one* starts with physical geography. Nearly 200 million years ago, all the present continents were part of one huge landmass that geologists named Pangea.

It stretched, writes the historian Alfred W. Crosby, over scores of degrees of latitude, and so we can assume that it had some variations in climate; but with only one landmass, there would not have been much variety among its life forms. One continent meant one arena for competition, and so only one set of winners in the Darwinian struggle for survival and reproduction. Reptiles, including all the dinosaurs, were the dominant kinds of land animals in Pangea—and, therefore, the world—for three times as long as mammals have held that position since, and yet reptiles diversified into only two-thirds as many orders.

About 180 million years ago, Pangea began to break up like some immense tubular iceberg rotting in the heat of the Gulf Stream. First it split into two supercontinents, and then into smaller units that became, in time, the continents we know.3

Notwithstanding the cost/benefit impact of competition for space and resources for the continuation of life, Crosby reminds us of the spatial, if not climatological, closeness of the material envelope of human existence. In other words, despite some local differences, the biosphere was one—a point that has taken us until the late 20th century to fully realize, and only after the rise of a set of serious global and regional environmental dangers.

In terms of human movement, archaeologists and anthropologists tell us that with the great break-up, Africa emerged as the oldest of the continents and the epicenter of the beginnings of human culture. Here, I proffer, lie both the origins of human life and constantly mutating adaptability. The import of this is twofold: (a) that at one time, though so long ago, we were one numerically tiny family in one place; and (b) that, if beginnings have durable significance, human beings became a
“global” species with that, now realized, migration from Africa to all corners of the planet. No wonder, then, that all religions simultaneously underscore the eschatological unity of humankind as well as the rich variability in interpretations and personal practice of faith.

It is an increasingly acknowledged fact that none of the specific human civilizations begot itself. Whether African, Indian, European, Chinese, Meso-American, or Middle Eastern, each fed on the energy of the others at one time or another. As Fernand Braudel asserted, on the contrary, each civilization is akin to “a railway goods yard”—one that thrives on exporting its own contributions and, at the same time, importing that of others. The balance of exportation and importation would, of course, vary with the specificity of the circumstances—though some might propose that satiated civilizations are less keen on honoring the mutuality of exchange, let alone admit the fact that their own account might heavily depend on borrowings from others.

But, and to leapfrog, the project of modernity ushered in a massive and a new redrawing of many aspects of human life, including drastic displacements and replacements, and relations with nature. Some suggested benchmark dates are 1490, 1492, and the “Long 16th Century.” For many, particularly in Europe, this was an opportunity to not only get away from dreaded situations but, more positively, to start all over again. Here, it is important to note that these adventures were supported by the combined naked force of the state and a raw appetite for private accumulation. The immediate consequences were dual clashes: (a) deadly competition among the contenders for material riches and power; and (b) on balance, utter devastation and conquest of native peoples. The piercing expression of Karl Marx captures the multidimensional nature of the onslaught and the relentless forces at work:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of conquest and looting of the East Indies…the hunting of black-skins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre.

Increasingly, the shape of the world as one unit—one in which distant happenings had immediate local impact (and vice versa)—began to accelerate. Among the great issues was a rising concern over destruc-
tive *othering* and exclusion. This worry led to renewed cosmopolitan yearnings such as those expressed in Immanuel Kant’s landmark essay, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. In these pages, Kant proposes that humankind can find lasting peace, “in a vast grave where all the horrors of violence and those responsible for them would be buried,” or, alternatively, humanity could attend to the problem of violence by transcending feral nationalistic politics. The latter would demand putting into place “a cosmopolitan ideal that is not only necessary for survival but also a requirement of practical reason.” In other words, the only option against aggressive divisiveness is the creation of a universal community of all peoples founded on reverence for personhood and governed by the application of *just* laws.

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In our epoch, globalization is at once compounding and making distinctive the contradictions associated with modernity. These great tensions can be observed in some of the main spheres of human existence at the local, national, and transnational scales: relationship with nature; economic organization and livelihood; cultural encounters; and political order—all in a context of what has been identified as compressed time and a reconfigured space. For the purposes of these notes and the theme of the proceedings, I bring forth four of the many critical predicaments that seem to be central to our time:

- **War and peace**

If it is now part of our common sense that the disappearance of the hostile and armed division of the world into a nuclear-armed West and East is no more, both the threat of these lethal weapons in the nuclear states and the ambition of others to acquire them has not diminished. Russia, the core of the now defunct Soviet Union, and the United States, the heart of NATO, are both in possession of potentially devastating warheads (25,000)—notwithstanding some initial quantitative reductions on both sides. Moreover, both countries, particularly the U.S.A. (at nearly $500 billion), continue to pour large sums into efforts to sustain their military postures. On the other side of the world, the Peoples Republic of China, enabled by its galloping economic growth, is accelerating the modernization and thickening of its military capabilities. Hidden in this “quiet” arms race among these powers is an inten-
sification of a search for advanced technological innovations, through more sophisticated robotization, that will minimize the deployment of human beings in the battlefields. Though a clash between major nuclear-armed countries is a quick way to Armageddon, it is the cost to human security of more conventional wars that continues to challenge us. In the last two decades in particular, bloody conflagrations or their impact within countries has claimed millions of lives. From the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, Algeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to the Sudan, millions have been killed or died as a result of conditions induced by the wars. With easy acquisition of weapons in international markets and unconstrained by highly porous boundaries, internal strife fueled by a combination of material desperation in the midst of a visibly enticing but forbidden cornucopia, institutional decay, shrinking political arena, and contracting identities, presents a Hobbesian conjuncture.

The rise of these internal wars does not mean an end to the ambition of the powerful state to intimidate or even invade the lesser ones. None captures this dimension more vividly than the continuing war by the United States on Iraq. What only a few decades ago was one of the more successful countries in the Arab world to create a significant middle class (though accompanied by utterly violent political leadership) is now reduced to sorrowful levels of generalized pauperism, intra-community blood-letting, and massive internal displacement, with many millions seeking refuge in neighboring countries and other parts of the world. The other war of this nature is the one raging in Afghanistan. First it was the then Soviet Union who sent its troops into the country to shore up a client regime; and now it is the United States, accompanied by NATO allies. It is important to note in the case of the latter, regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the subsequent discovery that those who masterminded this horror as well as other ghoulish acts against the United States were ensconced in bases in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the confluence of imperial arrogance and messianic hatred on the part of the disgruntled is an explosive cocktail. No matter its different guises, violence is antithetical to individual and “common” self. Here, then, we may remind ourselves of the sagacious voice of Erasmus of Rotterdam. In 1519, he wrote this: “Though other actions have their different disadvantages...war always brings about the wreck of everything that is good, and the tide of war overflows with everything that is worst; what is more, there is no evil that persists so stubbornly.”
Social Justice and Freedom

Among the crucial elements of social justice, none looms larger than the grip of poverty on hundreds of millions in many parts of the world. The rich societies of the North, including the United States, are not immune to this condition. As a matter of fact, in both rural areas and urban communities, deprivation, both relative and acute, is part of the human landscape. American inner cities and the suburbs of European metropolises such as Paris underscore this cruel reality.12

But it is in the societies beyond the core of the global system where social exclusion is most pronounced. Crystallizing in the growing “favela-zation” of urban living—one in which chronic hunger, disease, decrepit housing, violence, and toxic environment are the norm—social injustice is, for instance, a common feature in the Peoples Republic of China, India, Brazil, the Philippines, Peru, Haiti, Thailand, Mexico, Egypt, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Moreover, the demise of the Soviet Union seems to have triggered the appearance and spreading sites of misery.

The fastest-growing slums are in the Russian Federation (especially ex-‘Socialist company towns’ dependent on a single, now-closed industry) and the former Soviet republics, where urban dereliction has been bred at the same stomach-churning velocity as economic inequality and civic disinvestment. In 1993 the UN Urban Indicators Programme reported poverty rates of 80 percent or higher in both Baku…and Yerevan. Likewise, the concrete-and-steel Soviet-era urban core of Ulaanbaatar is now surrounded by a sea of 500,000 or more impoverished former pastoralists living in tents…few of whom manage to eat more than once a day.13

Across geographies, the urgency for a fairer access to the necessary material and social means for a decent living is staring us in the face.14

To be sure, material sustenance is a precondition for human existence. Yet, as the familiar cliché has it, we don’t live by bread alone. Equally crucial is individual liberty, buttressed by legitimate procedures. In this evolving global milieu, there are still huge numbers of people whose daily lives are punctuated by a mixture of repressive local structures and habits and distant, if not nefarious, international institutions. Again, there are few countries in the world where the opportunities to cultivate and then protect individual liberty are not an ongoing concern. The promotion of autonomy and self-restraint, in the context of constitutional governance, seems to be indispensable for
empowered local and global citizens willing to acknowledge difference and still trust in one another. Warning about the explosive potential of deferred expectations and denial of dignity, J.G. Herder left this note, more than two centuries ago:

To fail to make use of man's divine and noble gifts, to allow these to rust and annihilate themselves, is not only an act of high-treason against humanity, but also the greatest damage that a state can inflict upon itself: for what is lost with such 'dead' and 'buried' assets is not merely the capital with interest; rather, since living forces do not let themselves be buried like dead capital, they fight back and among each other, and create much confusion and disturbance for the commonwealth. A human being, whose capacities are suppressed and prevented from being used, cannot rest, simply because he is alive, and in his frustration he is likely to use his gifts for destructive ends in the most evil and hideous way.¹⁵

- Environment

Global warming is the latest and frightening evidence for the worsening state of the health of the biosphere.¹⁶ Yet the deterioration of our ecological home, through our cultural and technological impact, has been in progress for a significant stretch of time. Perhaps the sharpest warning in the last fifty years came from Rachel Carson.¹⁷ In that landmark volume, Carson sounded the alarm that, at least in the United States, air, water, and land had become subjected to reckless exploitation through the use of chemical pesticides. Even more presciently, she linked the poisoning of rivers and lakes to grave dangers to human health. The great equatorial forests of Brazil, Central Africa, and Southwest Asia are under enormous pressures from logging to ranching, in the process shrinking the space for wildlife as well as diminishing the amount of oxygen available and adding more heat to the atmosphere. Furthermore, desertification, or the receding of grasslands, is another item in the evolving environmental dangers, while coastal areas are being over-fished. Add to the above the mounting challenge of declining water tables, toxic waste, and air pollution, and it becomes plain that the degradation of the environment is one of the awesome dangers facing the human race. Few of the informed now doubt that a "death of nature" is tantamount to our own demise. In contrast, a new calibration, at the local and global levels, of environmental protection and human needs (and even some wants) seems the only way to
reverse the current and pernicious trends and, therefore, serve both the sustainability of the ecosystems and community well being.\textsuperscript{18}

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If this new century is to become different from where we have been, then, we must think hard about what is to be done, particularly with an eye on the items identified above. Rising to such an \textit{obligation} is already underway in many households and communities around the world. To carry the impulse forward, and at a most fundamental level, the old consciousness of species-belonging ought to be rehabilitated. Linking this state of mind to ethically grounded endeavors will make possible the building of new supra-intersubjectivity and intercivilizational mutuality. In the pursuit of this large and difficult project, it is imperative to re-examine established perspectives—particularly that of the Left and the Right.

Among the provisions we need for this new journey, the Left’s stress on communitarian solidarity and social intimacy are precious. Democratic citizenship is unthinkable without such a credo and the institutions that give concreteness to it. But, we now know, after bitter experiences, that forced “community” and perverse conceptions of equality end up becoming an essentializing folly and a license for indulgences masquerading as “progressive” action. The ultimate cost is the erosion of \textit{thymos}.

On the other hand, the Right’s emphasis on the preservation and enlargement of individual liberty, risk-taking, and the restraining of collective power is wise to appropriate. By the same token, the liabilities of the Right to be avoided include self-seeking atomization. Put another way, in his \textit{Critique of Dialectical Reason}, Jean-Paul Sartre correctly brings to our attention the syndrome of “inert gathering with its structure of seriality.” Sartre’s famous example is that of the bus queue. Notwithstanding the appearance of a social group, each is isolated from the rest and, consequently, connected only by way of their alienation—the basis for what condemns them to their mutual alone-ness. The upshot is that the merging of a self-possessed individual and hyper-consumerist culture is antithetical to the conduct of a common life—one in which the “self” and “other” commune.

A key mechanism to attend to the project of “global citizenship” is politics or the ordering of human associational life. Politics is to be understood as at once good and an unavoidable evil. The first points to
Ahmed I. Samatar

a moral exercise necessary for the creation and maintenance of a civilized community; the latter reminds us of the presence of such vices as avarice, mendacity, and megalomania. Both Aristotle, in the first instance, and St. Augustine, in the second view, are instructive. Living in the midst of this contradiction, then, is a perpetual assignment, with stress on ethical thinking and living as a way to strengthen the spirit of personal and public goodness and diminish the seduction and destructiveness of self-serving or sectarian glory. A contemporary meditation on global citizenship, without completely overlooking the historical peculiarities of individuals, communities, cultures, and civilizations, cannot afford to underplay commonalities that defy differences. Two relevant insights from two remarkable world citizens, separated by millennia, still affirm our affinities: Diogenes the Cynic and Edward W. Said. In his prescient thinking, Diogenes construed “global citizenship” as an eternal form of exile from the easy slippage into the orbit of local axioms, the reinforcing assurance of myopic attachments, and the intoxicating feeling that often accompanies self-importance and conceit in one’s own group. For Said, “Universality means taking a risk in order to go beyond the easy certainties provided us by our background, language, nationality, which so often shield us from the reality of others.”

Given the preceding, cultivating the identity of “global citizen” or “universal human,” in Martha Nussbaum’s conception, is a demanding and endless task but one whose time has come. It is a remaking of both the self and the other in a multi-dialogical fashion. This requires attachment and detachment, individual responsibility and collective action—an exercise whose ultimate purpose is to create a global civic culture competent to treat the major issues of our age. Macalester College’s awareness of this imperative is on record. In December 1943, the Macalester Weekly, our student body paper, printed this remarkable declaration:

The Mac Weekly editorial policy has been to strive toward better world citizenship among Macalester students, agreeing that the ultimate goal of education should be the establishing of a sound and just peace for all peoples.

These sentiments are notable because they fly in the face of a time in the United States when an aggressive nationalist fever was ascendant. Such farsightedness and courage are even more needed at this precarious juncture in American and world history.
Civic Forum 2007

Notes


The similarity of the angles of observation of Marx and Adam Smith on this particular, often unacknowledged, point is remarkable.

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already been very great; but in the short period of between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events, no human wisdom can foresee. By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen rather from accident than from anything in the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when those discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries.


12. Even among the majority that is better off, there is a growing concern over what some see as the corrosion of civic culture by a relentless manufacturing of consumption. On this issue in the context of the American society, see Benjamin R. Barber, *Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007). Also, John E. Schwarz, *Freedom Reclaimed: Rediscovering the American Vision* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).


21. After a distinguished scholarly career in educating us to understand the making of our “Modern World-System,” Immanuel Wallerstein urges us to act, within the possibilities of our circumstances, in a spirit of a new pan-humanism:
Civic Forum 2007

We are at the end of a long era, which can go by many names. One appropriate name could be the era of European universalism. We are moving into the era after that. One possible alternative is a multiplicity of universalisms that would resemble a network of universal universalisms. It would be the world of Senghor’s rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir. There is no guarantee that we shall arrive there. This is the struggle of the coming twenty to fifty years. The only serious alternative is a new hierarchical, inegalitarian world that will claim to be based on universal values, but in which racism and sexism will continue to dominate our practices, quite possibly more viciously than in our existing world-system. So we must all simply persist in trying to analyze a world-system in its age of transition, in clarifying the alternatives available and thereby the moral choices we have to make, and finally, in illuminating the possible political paths we wish to choose.

Global Citizenship and Responsibility

Diane Michelfelder

Let me start by thanking the organizers of this inaugural Macalester Civic Forum as one of the initiatives of our new Institute for Global Citizenship, for putting together this session in particular, and for inviting me to take part in this exciting conversation and sharing of perspectives on the meaning of global citizenship. Such an occasion is an example of liberal arts learning at its best: an opportunity to look at the same phenomenon from multiple angles and points of view, and see what can spring forth as a result.

I must confess I initially thought the invitation to be a part of a forum whose explicit purpose was the collegial exchange of “meditations on global citizenship” was perhaps extended to me by mistake. The word “meditations” brings with it the suggestive, philosophical ring of thoughts to oneself assembled in serenity and calm. In this light, a “meditative provost” is strikingly oxymoronic. What I have to offer here are perhaps less meditations in any traditional sense of the word than thoughts on the go. Still, I hope they will be intelligible and also reflect the probing seriousness that characterizes the spirit of this occasion.

Becoming a global citizen, as all of us know, does not happen by virtue of simply belonging to the world; rather, it is the result of active and sustained thought, energy, and effort. To be a citizen of a particular country frequently does not require any action on one’s part other than just “showing up,” being born to this or that set of parents in this or that set of specific circumstances. But global citizens are made, not
When we accept the identity of being a global citizen, we accept the responsibilities that are both complex in their nature and reflective of significant breadth of scope.

When we say that at Macalester we value the formation of global citizenship, we are saying in part that we value something whose formation is directly linked to goods that are ethical in nature. Not everything we hold as a valuable part of the student academic experience at Macalester has that explicit connection (for example, how to craft a logical, intellectually penetrating, and eloquent essay). I would venture, however, that no matter what definition one gives to global citizenship with respect to its transcending or not transcending citizenship in traditional nation-states, the cultivation of a sense of responsibility is an elemental component of what it is all about.

How can we best take on the duties of shaping the student academic experience at Macalester in order to promote such a sense of responsibility? I want to use most of my time here to focus on what Macalester’s commitment to fostering global citizenship might mean with respect to our sense of academic purpose, as well as to the shape of our academic structure and programming. I will, though, begin not with the local but with the global, with some observations about global citizenship in a fairly broad context of responsibility, and with the idea in mind that it is from this wider context that a foothold can be found for thinking about the question just raised.

From my perspective, a global citizen is someone who takes responsibility for the health of the common good. A global citizen understands responsibility as a form of stewardship—stewardship for what humanity shares, for what it holds in common, and on which it deeply depends. Perhaps the most obvious and transparent example of something in which we all share, hold in common, and on which we deeply depend is the environment. So, for example, the philosopher Peter Singer starts out his book *One World* by talking about the relationship between scientific causality and ethical responsibility in regard to the earth’s atmosphere. If the carbon emissions I produce as a result of my driving habits contribute to a condition that leads to floods that kill hundreds of people halfway around the world, the knowledge that I may have contributed to such a disaster ought to give me pause and lead me to make changes in how I get from the location where I am to the place where I want to be.¹

This spring, Stavros Dimas, the environment commissioner for the European Union, called for speed limits to be placed on the remaining
6,000 or so kilometers of EU roadway that still lack them: the German autobahn. The German environment minister immediately objected to this suggestion, describing the approach to be “a trivialization” of the climate problem. Yet it could equally be said that Dimas’s approach is a way of optimizing individual responsibility for decreasing carbon emissions in particular and for protecting the environment in general. To consider the responsibility associated with global citizenship in this light amounts to defining responsibility along fairly straightforward and conventional lines. To put it another way, the causal “frame” within which I would weigh my responsibilities as a global citizen is really no different from the one in which I would weigh my responsibilities as an ordinary citizen. If I do not pay the taxes I owe, everyone suffers. If I do not vote, my inaction might throw the election to the other candidate.

Let us now switch the scenario to consider another type of loss: the erosion of the world’s languages. Recently, the International Herald Tribune reported there are now only eighteen native speakers remaining of Manchu, the prevailing language spoken during the Qing dynasty, whose existence spanned the period from the mid-17th century until the Republic of China was formed in 1911. All of its current native speakers are more than eighty years old. With 6.6 billion people in the world speaking nearly 6,900 languages, but with only 200 of these languages spoken by more than a million people, one can imagine many similar stories of irreversible loss to follow—and to follow all too quickly, if the numerous predictions showing half of these languages disappearing by the end of this century are to be trusted.

In an essay appearing in Frederic Jameson’s provocative volume *Cultures of Globalization*, Duke University professor Walter Mignolo (one of the featured speakers in our 2005 International Roundtable on *Don Quixote*) draws attention to the fact that of the twenty-five languages spoken by 75% of the world’s people, the number of people speaking non-colonial languages exceeds those speaking English and other colonizing languages. This is an intriguing point to consider.
with respect to the currents of globalization, but for the moment I want to concentrate on the following question: As a global citizen, does a person have a responsibility to help prevent linguistic erosion on a global scale, just as he or she might have a responsibility to prevent environmental degradation on a global scale?

I, and probably many of you as well, would say yes. Just as we owe the environment our stewardship, we owe it to language as well, as language is something humanity shares and on which it deeply depends. Linguistic diversity creates a kind of mulch, as it were, out of which new ideas and new perspectives can emerge; and as inheritors of the liberal arts tradition of education, it is particularly incumbent upon us to preserve multiplicities of perspectives. Still, it is difficult—perhaps not impossible but decidedly difficult—to draw out the responsibility in any kind of causal way that a person might have in this context. I can trace causal connections between energy usage, climate change, and human welfare, but it’s harder for me to draw causal connections between, on the one hand, my speaking English on this particular evening and, on the other hand, my contributing to the disappearance of Manchu or Scottish Gaelic or some other endangered language.

This leads me to consider the possibility that one characteristic of the responsibility associated with global citizenship is capaciousness. To be global citizens, we need to be capacious enough in our thinking to imagine common goods where they might not be self-evident. We must have a capacious sense of ethical responsibility in order to do our part in protecting and enhancing those goods where the causal linkages between what we do and their diminishment may not be easily traced.

Let me now approach this point about capacious responsibility from a different angle. Built into responsibility in this sense is a willingness to take risks. It is the willingness to refrain from quickly dismissing a people or particular individuals because of their beliefs or cultural practices, to extricate ourselves from the familiarity of our own comfort zones, and to accept responsibilities toward strangers as well as toward those with whom we share our lives in more intimate ways. Additionally, the more informed we are, the more we may grow in our adeptness to assume risk, capacious responsibility, and the attitude of global citizenship.

In *One World*, Peter Singer mentions the well-known essay by the philosopher Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” in which Williams cautions us in addressing ethical questions not to have
what he called, “one thought too many.”

Suppose you as my neighbor or friend are in need of a ride to the airport, which I offer to provide. Williams argues I do not need any justification for why my action is the right thing to do beyond pointing to the facts that you are my friend or neighbor and that I bear you some affection. If, however, I justify what I am doing by noting our friendship and adding that when I give preferential treatment to my friends I end up bringing more good into the world than when I don’t, Singer would wonder if I am not “overthinking” the situation. But from the perspective of good global citizenship, an additional thought such as this one is necessary, for the very reason that it might not be additional at all but rather the only justification at one’s disposal. Without an impartial justification at hand, something like respect for fellow citizens as members of a global community, I may not be motivated at all to act responsibly for the sake of strangers. But to claim that “we are all in this together” or, perhaps more elegantly, that we are all fellow citizens in an interdependent global community, may in many situations be a fairly “thin” and consequently ineffective justification for helping to improve the literacy rates of women worldwide, for example, or otherwise better the conditions of those living in dire situations. The more context, the more knowledge and information I have, the more I might be propelled toward not only seeing a complex ethical dilemma reflected in a particular situation but also adjusting what I do in the course of my everyday activities to respond to it. Context can help to turn the notion of a human community from an abstract concept into a more concrete notion, and can provide greater traction for responsible action than abstract ethical principles alone.

With this as a backdrop, let me now turn to the question, “What would a Macalester College that was fully ‘encultured’ with the goal of helping prepare students to be global citizens look like?” In particular, what would it look like with respect to academic programs and the structures that animate and support them?

I do not see any need for us to make global changes to promote global citizenship. The history and mission that give form to the vibrant identity of Macalester College render unnecessary a radical revamping of our academic priorities. I do, though, see numerous opportunities for change that would enhance both academic community and academic inquiry while at the same time leading to what we could call an intellectually sustainable environment for the promotion of global citizenship.
First of all, helping students achieve the understanding that provides the traction for responsible action as a global citizen is arguably the provenance of all academic departments within the College. We need to continue to pay particular attention to the cultivation of critical thinking, quantitative reasoning, and the understanding of issues related to race, gender, and class. We must encourage fluency in at least one language other than English, knowledge of the world’s religious traditions, scientific understanding, geographic literacy, and what is now being called critical information literacy (understood not only as the acquisition of the ability to separate good online information from bad, but also as the strengthening of the will to seek out information on websites or blogs so that you get to meet up with what is other and very unfamiliar).

As a lead-in for my next point, I’d like to turn to a passage taken from a talk given by Robert Weisbuch at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies but originating in David Damrosch’s book, *We Scholars*:

Too often, American scholars still hold fast to a hermeneutics of exile, using their specialized knowledge to dwell in a distant time within an esoteric disciplinary space, returning periodically like Rip Van Winkle from his inaccessible mountain retreat. We scholars rightly cherish our independence of mind and our originality of concept, but we need to balance the hermeneutics of exile with a more creative hermeneutics of community.¹⁰

There are many good signs at Macalester that the creative hermeneutics of community is flourishing with respect to the kind of community Damrosch had in mind, including the Urban Faculty Seminar and courses resulting from it, such as the History Department’s “The Global in the Local,” the Lake Street Project, this spring’s Environmental Studies senior seminar in which students are getting experience writing grant proposals for the new EcoHouse, and so forth. Yet for us to fully invest ourselves in supporting global citizenship as a student learning outcome and as a subject of academic inquiry and reflection—with regard to both public scholarship and its more traditional forms—we need to be able to engender a more creative hermeneutics of community within Macalester College itself.

The physical layout of academic space at Macalester does not easily lend itself to the smooth circulation of creative ideas and the formation of programs that cross disciplinary lines. Seen from a geographical/
Diane Michelfelder

political science perspective, our academic structure is rather akin to a collection of nation-states. We are certainly not unlike many other liberal arts colleges in this regard, but without sacrificing the importance of department- or division-based place, we need to act more transnationally, as it were, if we are to build superlative programs supportive of scholarly inquiry related to global issues. There are certainly such promising programs in various stages of development and conversation on campus—the Fellows program in global citizenship and leadership connected to the Institute, and a concentration in community and public health and another in human rights and humanitarianism, to name three. These potential programs represent a good deal of appealing “traction” for the development of responsible global citizenship among our students. While it will be challenging, I hope we will be able to advance all of these good ideas beyond the planning stages.

Along with this, it would be good to think of what we could do to take a more “global in the local” perspective here “in house.” Recently in Chicago I had the pleasure of attending a symposium at the American Chemical Society meeting in recognition of Professor Emeritus Truman Schwartz, the 2007 recipient of the George C. Pimentel Award in Chemistry Education, and to hear Truman talk about his experience as a practitioner of the liberal art of Chemistry. It meant not only assigning students readings by chemists, for instance, but also asking them to discuss how the Second Law of Thermodynamics is involved in Shakespeare’s plays.11 The more imaginative work of this sort that we can do, the more our students’ minds are primed for the big-picture thinking that global citizenship demands.

Another closely connected question is how to have more hospitable physical spaces for curricular and co-curricular programming that facilitate cross-disciplinary inquiry. In this regard, I believe the proposed Institute for Global Citizenship building is an exemplary step toward creating a place that can be both an intellectual commons for many faculty at Macalester as well as a space to bring our own community together with the larger community of which we are a part.

Finally, and to return to the idea of meditation with which these thoughts began, we live in a time marked not only by the scale of the global, but by great variety of scale, from the global to the “nano.” With the latter scale in mind, I am mindful that this is also a time when our attention is easily, even rapidly, deflected from one thing to the next. In the years to come we will need to find some way to build greater capacity within our students for sustained or capacious (to use
that word again) attentiveness, which is a prerequisite, much like critical thinking or other skills we aim to cultivate as part of a liberal arts education, for effective and ethical global citizenship.

Let me close with this observation. Both the process of inspiring others to become global citizens and the process of becoming one oneself require intellectual reach and stamina. Assisting our students to develop the intellectual wherewithal, the nuanced judgment, and the will to live lives of global citizenship is work that takes much imagination, collective engagement, and focus. It is, though, critical work to do. I am confident that as we take it up, those who will come after us will look back upon it and see it reflective of the integrity, distinctiveness, and exceptionality that characterize so much of what Macalester faculty, staff, and students do. But until we get to this point, as Andrew Latham said, let the open-ended conversation about global citizenship begin! 

**Notes**

7. Lagne, op. cit.

26
I welcome the opportunity to offer my musings on the concept of global citizenship that this occasion demands. First, let me acknowledge Cornell West’s important study, whose name I’ve appropriated for this talk. As we embark on the creation of the Institute for Global Citizenship, we need to unpack the language embedded in this project. In particular, what does global mean? Clearly, it suggests the dismantling of older, outmoded categories that juxtapose domestic and foreign. The term global also references the reality that traditional borders of the nation-state no longer have the same salience. Borders are permeable and constantly crossed by bodies, by products and commerce, by words and images. Ironically, at the same time that the notion of national borders has been called into question, here in the United States we live in a political climate that calls for renewed allegiances, resurgent patriotism, and the clinging to a national identity. Indeed, as many scholars have noted in the wake of 9/11, the mechanisms for the production of American nationalism (political discourse, laws, media, and cultural practices among them) have grown exponentially. Multiculturalism—that amorphous, ambiguous, and contentious term—has been used to this end. If jingoism and hyper-nationalism are characterized as an “us against them” mentality, multiculturalism has served to enlarge the concept of who is included within these formations. Multiculturalism has encouraged new categories of American identities and the recognition and celebration of these identities. You can be black, brown, mixed-race, immigrant, or native-born and simultaneously
American, but only if you are not located within a grouping associated with the “enemy”—Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, Third World fundamentalist, radical. Racial, ethnic, religious, social, and cultural differences can be embraced within our collective acknowledgement of common interests, or so it seems.

The contemporary moment brings with it enormous tensions around America’s global economic influence and the national political impulses that seek to reify an authentic American identity. Hence we must consider the other part of this enterprise at Macalester College: citizenship. While this era of globalization destabilizes the notion of citizenship, we are also situated within a political and social environment in which being a citizen has become the political lynchpin that defines who is one of us and who is the other; who is entitled to the rights of citizenship, and who is not. Like multiculturalism, citizenship is an ever-changing, politically contested term that can determine one’s life chances. It also becomes the framework through which the privileged may feel emboldened to deny those privileges to the disadvantaged. Is the undocumented immigrant worker from Mexico, Russia, or China, who cleans our houses, mows our lawns, and takes care of our children (and whom we pay under the table), less entitled to becoming a citizen? Should those individuals without legal status suffer in an exilic netherworld while they pay taxes, contribute to our GNP, and uphold our dearest principles of thrift and industry? Thus, when hundreds of thousands of Latino/a immigrants and their allies demonstrated across the country in spring 2006 to assert their rights in the face of a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, they asserted their citizenship and service to the nation as a sign of entitlement. But, if we are truly embracing the idea of global citizenship, why should their immigration status matter? That Latinos/as, who are fast becoming the backbone of America’s service and professional classes, are still seen as foreign, demonized by nativism and xenophobia, and considered an economic threat rather than an economic boon, unveils this dilemma.

I would argue that race in America is the overarching factor that calls the national identity of many, but not all, global subjects into question. Race matters. America is caught between its racial past and global present, a paradox that further complicates our already troubled intercultural relationships. Is the Mexican-American man who works as a janitor at the Macalester College Alumni House more or less a citizen after living in the United States for thirty years? If he were “white,” would we so easily question his credentials for citizenship? It is his skin
Jane Rhodes

color, the certain familiarity of his cultural cues, and his accent that conflate his racial difference with the status of national outsider. He is coded not only as racially different but as an alien invader, although he is a citizen. These representations have been underscored by more than 150 years (since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo) of legal wrangling, political rhetoric, and racist invective that reflect Americans’ profound anxieties about being overrun by those south of our national border. When I first arrived at the Macalester College campus, we had a long chat during which the janitor told me how he crossed the border as a young man and toiled in southern California until he learned of work opportunities in Minnesota. After making the cross-country trek, he was delighted to find a multigenerational Mexican-American community in the Twin Cities, where he decided to settle. The Alumni House worker is an example of a global citizen, yet many would deny him the category of American citizen and all that that implies because he also belongs to a category—Mexican—that has embedded in it the idea of someone who must be kept out.

Recently, political scientist Wendy Brown, in a lecture at the University of Minnesota, talked about the contradictions presented as new walls go up around the world in an era of “porous sovereignty.” In particular, she pointed to the U.S.-Mexico border and asked, “Why the proliferation of physical walls in an ostensibly globally connected world?” That our borders need to be under surveillance in the dangerous world of clandestine warfare makes sense. That we are obsessed with our southern border, the entry point for immigrants from Mexico, Central America, Brazil, Haiti, and China, among other locales, suggests that the border’s function has more to do with policing certain “racial” groups than it does with keeping the nation safe from harm. Indeed, these dual projects become the same.

Race matters. And darker skin often—but not always—matters. Race can be a stand-in for the other or for some linked category of difference. Members who share a religious identity, Muslim or Jew, can and have been called a race. Individuals who share a culture or historical or linguistic background, such as gypsies, have been referred to as a race. I am not arguing for any biological determinism, but rather for the ways that race haunts our consciousness, our sense of identity, and our ideas of nation and sovereignty. I want to suggest that despite the widespread celebration of the flow of global capital and de-territorialization as a process that breaks down barriers and opens up opportunities, the era of globalization has within it a backlash culture, in which racial
ideologies allow us to keep ourselves separate and apart from those we perceive to be a threat. Global media has played a significant role in disseminating racial ideas. How many people born outside of the U.S. have formed ideas about African Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos based on the repetition of images they consume in film and television? Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai explicitly links media and migration as embodiments of the global flow that governs contemporary life. He notes that media offers new resources and new disciplines for the construction of imagined selves and imagined worlds. Potential migrants use the media to rearticulate who they are and to prepare themselves for the world they encounter.

Race matters in all aspects of global politics. Let us look at the African slave trade, which is a starting point for making Britain and the United States global empires. In 2007, the United Kingdom marked the bicentennial of the abolition of the slave trade through a wide array of exhibits and programs. This has sparked considerable controversy because some of the observances have highlighted the British abolitionist movement and celebrated the fact that slavery ended there some twenty-five years before it did in the United States. Some critics of Britain’s commemoration point out that the anniversary makes it appear that white people liberated black; that British abolitionists were the heroes of the struggle against slavery. This slant reinforces the idea of African dependency on whites and the Western civilization that rationalized slavery in the first place. In reality, slaves rose against the trade from its inception, and the specter of rebellions led by Toussaint L’Ouverture in Haiti or Nat Turner in Virginia inflamed whites’ fears of black insurrection.

By 1820, more than ten million Africans had been transported across the Atlantic. Some estimates suggest two million or more died in transit. The British have debated whether this early global trade in bodies warrants an apology from its leaders. Meanwhile, British educational and cultural institutions have insisted that this episode in the nation’s history be recognized and interrogated. More than two hundred years since the slave trade, issues of race and citizenship continue to plague the United States and Britain, a direct legacy of the “peculiar institution.” Global formations shaped the African-American freedom struggles of the mid-twentieth century, for example. Black Americans became increasingly cognizant that their efforts to overthrow legal, social, and political discrimination were echoed in anti-colonial struggles around the world. From the 1930s, figures like Paul Robeson and
W.E.B. DuBois were central members of the Council of African Affairs, and in the 1960s, African-American activists met their counterparts in Bandung, Indonesia, to demonstrate their solidarity with global freedom movements. The abolition of the slave trade was not only a British phenomenon; it included the United States as its main traditional partner. Yet there is little national introspection here about the national complicity in slavery, as there has been in Britain. Instead, many Americans claim to be weary of references to slavery and have dismissed demands for reparations. Yet data makes it clear that the legacy of slavery in the United States remains profound. This is starkly represented by the disparities in the criminal justice system.

According to a 2006 report by the American Civil Liberties Union, African Americans make up an estimated 15% of drug users, but they account for 37% of those arrested on drug charges, 59% of those convicted, and 74% of all drug offenders sentenced to prison. While politicians and social scientists debate how to interpret these trends, most agree that race is a factor in these differences. The U.S. has 260,000 people in state prisons on nonviolent drug charges and 183,200 (more than 70%) are black or Latino. Overall, while African Americans comprise 12% of the total population, they are 50% of the jail and prison population. This is one million black men and women whose life chances have been profoundly altered and circumscribed. It is more likely that a black person of college age is in prison than in school. Despite the national resistance to affirmative action programs and other strategies that have been derisively called “reverse discrimination,” there are no economic indicators showing a black advantage. Black median income is significantly less than whites’ while black poverty rates are higher. Black unemployment rates are typically double white rates. For example, on average, black workers with the same education, the same experience, working in the same industry, and living in the same region of the country as whites still earn less money. Race clearly matters.

These racial inequalities reflect the dual forces of economic disadvantage and institutional discrimination. A common argument made by whites is that there has been more than enough time for blacks to catch up with whites economically because more than 150 years have passed since the end of slavery. However, economists have shown that economic (dis)advantages are inherited across generations. As economist Austan Goolsbee puts it, “The recent evidence shows quite clearly that in today’s economy starting at the bottom is a recipe for being
underpaid for a long time to come.” The processes of social mobility that have made it possible for earlier generations of European immigrants to succeed are dramatically slower for descendants of slaves. A substantial body of research finds that at least 45% of parents’ advantage in income is passed along to their children, and perhaps as much as 60%. If your great-great-grandfather was a slave or the child of former slaves, the opportunity to catch up is daunting. Indeed, rather than viewing the black underclass as morally deficient, we should acknowledge that the modest achievements of the black middle class are remarkable.4

Race in America matters: it is a primary determinant of life chances. Yet the current vogue is to deny that race matters and to suggest that we live in a post-racial, color-blind culture. No one embodies this more than Senator Barack Obama, who seeks to craft himself as the ideal global citizen. As most of you know, Senator Obama claims a mixed race, transnational identity—with black and white parentage and an upbringing in Hawaii and Indonesia. I have been fascinated by Obama’s political strategy to distance himself from the baby-boom generation by arguing that the issues that divided America in the twentieth century—race, class, and gender among them—should be transcended with a new political vision. I view this with great irony since Mr. Obama trades on the very racial terrain that he seeks to avoid. When he announced his candidacy, none of the national news media seemed to remember that he was mixed race as they openly wondered whether he could be the First Black President. Senator Obama offers us the classic racial paradox; no matter what you may call yourself, what matters is how others see you and define you. This was most eloquently captured by W.E.B. DuBois in his essay *The Souls of Black Folk,* when he wrote that black Americans endure, “this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”5

Race has no biological relevance when considering Senator Obama’s identity, but it has everything to do with whether or not he will become the next President of the United States. In his memoirs, Obama recalled that he felt his status as a global citizen left him ill prepared for the politics of race as they are played out in the United States. He talks about being overwhelmed by racist comments from high school classmates and he was forced to tolerate a coach who called black opponents “niggers.” “I kept finding the same anguish, the same doubt, a
self-contempt that neither irony nor intellect seemed able to deflect,” he wrote.6

As I close, I want to suggest that we not take the concept of global citizenship blithely; that we not embrace it as a marker for multicultural “progress” on a world stage. Rather, we need to remember that race, ethnicity, and other categories of difference have not disappeared; they stubbornly remain embedded in history, politics, and culture. Race still matters.

Notes
In my thirteen years as Chaplain of Macalester College I have been privileged to serve this community of scholars, students, staff, and alumni as we seek to educate the bright lights on the horizon of the future of our planet. Much of our work in this place has to do with bridging. We are in the business of bridge building—between academics and the co-curricular, between men and women, gay and straight and transgendered, between faculty and staff, between physical and emotional health, between our local context and the global arena, and between personal and public, to name a few. The act of building bridges and then the consequent act of walking across those bridges and engaging the world on the other side is in large measure what a liberal arts education is about. But in some ways the metaphor strains at this time on planet earth because it assumes that there is one side and the other side, and we often pay little attention to the chasm, the barrier, the river, the adversary, over which the bridge is built. It also strains because residing on one side of the bridge or the other keeps us separated from the side we have left, and places limits on our perspective with the deterministic positioning.

I thought of this bridging metaphor when I participated a few weeks ago with a group of Macalester seniors in a ropes course during our Lilly Senior Leadership Conference out on Whidbey Island in the Puget Sound. For those of you that don’t know ropes courses, they are set up as a series of challenges for a group to overcome in order to accomplish a set goal. In the particular challenge given to our group that day, we
were to navigate a series of steel cables that were about three feet off the ground, ranging in length from eight to twenty-five feet. These cables were strung between trees. The challenge was to get the group to the end of the course and if anyone fell off they had to start over again. Accomplishing this task took strategy, some coordination, and a lot of communication. But what was absolutely true about the experience was not the thought-out strategy at the beginning or the sense of accomplishment at the end, but the clear sense of commitment that we were all in it together and every person involved brought a particular gift or skill to the course that no one else in that circle of seniors and two staff people could replicate. It wasn’t the physics of the course or the foreknowledge that one or another of us had about the mechanics of a ropes course that was most important, but paying attention and discovering what each person brought to the task at hand. There was a hidden wholeness in the group that was brought to light as we made our way across the wobbly cables, linking hands, sturdying the timid, experimenting, and trying out new ways of thinking and processing.

One of the contributions the Institute for Global Citizenship must make at Macalester College is bridging and exposing the hidden wholeness in our institution. We live fragmented lives. Not only in our personal lives but also in our nation’s common life, we are increasingly polarized and our world increasingly perilous. There is much pressure on the planet to divide things up between good and evil, between the haves and have-nots, between religious and secular, powerful and powerless—one side of the bridge or the other. The critical function of our Institute for Global Citizenship is to focus not only on the problems of our time but to summon our students and every member of this community to realize the hidden connection among all of our worlds, and in that realization recognize that seeing the world in an undivided way may lead to discomfort and a lack of certainty about any of our individual contributions. Dianna Chapman Walsh, President of Wellesley College, in a lecture given at the Institute for College Student Values, says, “It is summoning the discipline to focus attention in all directions that causes discomfort, facing moral dilemmas in all their complexity. It is seeing past the self-interest…and cultivating the imagination and the generosity of spirit—in ourselves and those we touch—to focus on wrenching problems and yet not to lose heart, to open our hearts to sorrow without being paralyzed, to find in the world’s suffering our bonds of humanity.”

http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/maccivicf/vol1/iss1/6
The question that arises in the midst of this is how can we best prepare and support our students in becoming passionate and courageous participants in the world, and who also live undivided lives? My answer to that question is that we live an undivided life in this place, Macalester College, March 29, 2007, and beyond. This is not a new thought. As a matter of fact, it is at the core of our college’s founding. Have you ever really looked at the college seal? There it is, the undivided life: Two women, scantily clad, holding the symbols of late 19th-century enlightenment educational context. In the hand of one, the telescope, in the hand of the other, the open Bible, and a compass at their feet—Nature and Revelation, the heavenly twins. Edward Duffield Neill comments on this seal:

The trustees of Macalester College, believing in the harmony of nature and revelation, have engraved on their corporate seal two figures; one in loose, classic drapery, standing with telescope in hand, and compass at the feet, representing science investigating the laws of nature; the other, in sitting posture, clad in modest robes, holding open the Word of God, representing revelation. Both are in friendly converse, twin sisters of heaven, as the motto suggests. ‘Natura et revelato coeli Gemini.’ The object of the American College is not to promote an aesthetic or a medieval culture. It recognizes that the life of a young man from sixteen to twenty-one years of age is most critical and susceptible. Its aim is to develop harmoniously the body, the intellect and the affections.”

I think it is our students who are asking for an integrated life. The pressure on students today to prepare for and at the same time live their life on this globe is unbelievable. If our goal is to send from our midst citizen leaders who are going to have cultural fluency, intellectual curiosity for life-long learning, great relationships with partners, friends, and their own children, and a willingness to take risks in the pursuit of harmony, then we must open the way for this college and community to be a laboratory for effective action and deep, honest reflection, not only of the impact of our actions but of the motivations and informants of that engagement. We must take seriously our lives as moral agents, bringing into close contact the knower and the known, our inner life and what we are discovering in the outside world. What we are engaging is how the story of our lives informs the way we approach academic study. But this also includes how we play rugby on the lawn, how we party with one another, and how we engage in the conversations we have in advising appointments or with a colleague at
Civic Forum 2007

Old Main. In other words, the deepest engagement of the Institute for Global Citizenship is to bridge the world “in here” with the world “out there.” I not only mean a bridge from the Macalester “bubble” to the “world,” but the inner sanctum of our full life as citizens of this community, Macalester College, and the frontier of the human soul and imagination.

I don’t think it is any coincidence that many of the endeavors that are associated with the Institute for Global Citizenship are at their core reaching for an integrated life.

- The Civic Engagement Center’s legacy at Macalester is one of engagement with our neighborhood and community that takes the inner life of commitment to the world and seals that with a mutual vulnerability with the populations or causes one serves. The ethic of service is one of care for the other and opening the way to learn more in the engagement than one would ever hope to impart.

- The Lilly Project has at its core the big questions of the meaning and purpose of one’s life and how a person can live out dreams, hopes, and longings that drive us to contribute to the world. The thing that receives the most accolades from our students in this project is not the specific programs, such as Lives of Commitment or the Summer Fellows program, but the opportunity to stop and reflect on what one is doing, why one is doing it, and how it is drawing together the dizzying academic insights with the shaping of the soul. The Lilly Project is the speed bump in the Macalester autobahn.

But other developments in our life here at Macalester are indicators of the need for an integrated life and world.

- The development of the Multifaith Council at Macalester came out of the deep hunger in our students to be honest about their own religious and spiritual lives, lives that caused anxiety for some in this very secular and sometimes religiously intolerant campus. Having a place where students can explore their own religious/spiritual tradition in depth, and also to engage those whose assumptions may deeply conflict or run counter to their own in honest conversation, is excellent preparation for a world in which people are killing each other over conflicting gods. Even in its first year, the amazing opportunities to live in a religiously flourishing environment and to dare to craft a religiously pluralistic Macalester culture has awakened the imagination of each person on the Council.
The Rev. Dr. Lucy Forster-Smith

- The Pluralism and Unity Project that takes first-year students from diverse backgrounds and calls them to get to know each other and the wider Twin Cities community through the lens of race, ethnicity, and culture. Even the name calls out the type of educational life I am suggesting.

One of the suspicions I have about an undivided life at Macalester is that what we discover when we go deeply into the soul of this institution and into shaping a community of knowing in the fullest sense is that we will discover in our differences the yearning for a deeper knowing and connection.

With all this said, you might respond, how is this global citizenship? I think we have too narrowly defined what we mean by global, somehow equating it only with things that are international, multinational, beyond our borders. I want to propose that global certainly comprises that definition, but also global is the large view, the vistas of our human inner landscape and the universe’s story. Such citizenship is not only political, social, and economic, but also aesthetic, ethical, and religious.

Martha Nussbaum, in her book *Cultivating Humanity*, describes a liberal education as, “the preparation of a whole human being for the functions of citizenship and life.” This entails the “cultivation of three capacities:”

1. A capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions,
2. An ability to see oneself not simply as a citizen of a local region or group but also as a human being bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern, and
3. The narrative imagination which “is the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story and to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have. This means “learning how to be a human being capable of love and imagination.”

I am awed by the remarkable capacity of our students to engage the ambiguity of our world and mostly come out on the side of love and imagination. I am inspired by the urgency of not only our current students but students throughout our history that have held the vision...
confidently that we must contribute to our world, we must defy the cultural trends toward consumer capacity-building. They have kept their sights set on their place in the muck of it all, in the miracle of it all.

I think that an occasion like this one that asks us to think big and learn large is a time to ask the profound questions. One of those questions is, “What is the soul of Macalester College?” What is at the very center of our life together, not as a static reality but the living, breathing, alive, stumbling, and standing Macalester College? Robert McAfee Brown, a theologian who taught here in the 1970s, once said, “The larger the horizon becomes, the smaller the world turns out to be.”

This paradox of the world writ large on our consciousness, and the issues of our day arriving at our own doorstep and asking us to deal with them, is what global citizenship requires of a Macalester student.

Each and every one of us in this institution, from the full professor to the greenest first-year student, must engage in the perilous task of taking up our particular role as a global citizen. That raises the stakes pretty high and it also means that we must be willing to sacrifice and deeply care about the commons in our activity on campus. This means we are not only smart but we strive for wisdom, wisdom that is marked by paradoxes such as: Dying is what gives deep life, sacrifice brings abundance, confusion gives way to insight. Our days bring us the opportunity to turn up every stone and see what is crawling around under there. Our days demand that we take audacious risks, only to crack open the soul’s light to the enormous power of perilous hope. This time in history requires that every brilliant thought be harnessed by our academic institutions in collaborative efforts to address the most pressing problems of our globe. One writer by the name of Reverend Virginia Safford advises us to, “plant ourselves at the gates of hope,” even in situations of pessimism, because “with our lives we make our answers all the time, to this ravenous, beautiful, mutilated, gorgeous world.”

The complexity of the world demands that the divide between the mind and the heart be bridged. When we overemphasize the critical capacity, then the affective capacity atrophies—the spiritual as well. When we venture into the heart of mystery, we must never allow the critical edge to cut out the heart...taking with it hope and leaving us in a cynical stew.

The contribution of the Institute for Global Citizenship must be more than just flexing our critical muscles in order to see the world's
issues clearly, but shaping an imagination from a deeply knowing heart that engages the world in all its complexity and takes the time to do the very hard work of creating an imagination of what can be, what must be. To quote Dianna Chapman Walsh again, “as sure as I am that we are providing our students with a great education, I’m equally sure that we are letting them down in important ways—not feeding their yearning to be living the deepest ontological questions they see unfolding around them and within them, which they don’t know quite how to embrace, but attending chiefly to their minds when their hearts (and ours) are being broken by events in the world.”

The global demands that arrive at our threshold are shaping our life here at Macalester. But it not lost on me that our common life happens under the United Nations’ flag flying overhead. We “on the ground” are challenged by a world that is anything but united, but we have the opportunity, in living our life in this place, to be exemplars of a united heart, mind, soul, and strength. We have the opportunity here at Macalester to shape on this soil the world in the way we want it to be outside this place. And in our actions we have the opportunity to build a bridge from this place into the frontiers of the future, as stewards of our life and the life of this planet.

Notes
1. Diana Chapman Walsh, *Trustworthy Leadership: Can We Be the Leaders We Need Our Students to Become?* (Fetzer Institute, 2006), p. 3.
Part II
Just Membership in a Global Community

Seyla Benhabib

At the dawn of a new century the transnational movement of peoples has emerged as a major political issue of our times. Whether initiated by economic migrants from the poorer regions of the world trying to reach the shores of resource-rich democracies in the North and the West, or undertaken by asylum and refugee seekers escaping persecution, civil wars, and natural disasters, or caused by “displaced persons” fleeing ethnic conflict and state-inflicted violence in their own societies, such movements have presented the worldwide state system with unprecedented challenges.

Here are some numbers. It is estimated that whereas in 1910 roughly 33 million individuals lived as migrants in countries other than their own, by the year 2000 that number had reached 175 million. Strikingly, more than half of the increase of migrants from 1910 to 2000 occurred in the last three decades of the twentieth century, between 1965 and 2000. In this period, 75 million people undertook cross-border movements to settle in countries other than that of their origin. ¹

While migratory movements in the latter half of the twentieth century accelerated, the plight of refugees has also grown. There are almost 20 million refugees, asylum seekers, and “internally displaced persons” in the world. The resource-rich countries of Europe and the Northern Hemisphere face growing numbers of migrants, but it is mostly nations in the Southern Hemisphere, such as Chad, Pakistan, and Ingushetia, that are home to hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing wars in the neighboring countries of the Central African Republic, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.
Since September 11, 2001, the discourse on immigration has also been increasingly criminalized. Non-members seeking entrance into countries other than their own, for any of the above-named reasons, are increasingly considered as “threats” and potential “criminals.” This is most strikingly reflected in the fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Service of one of the oldest immigrant countries of the world, namely the U.S.A., has now become incorporated into the Department of (so-called) Homeland Security.

Given the salience of these developments, it is surprising that the cross-border movements of peoples, and the philosophical as well as policy problems suggested by them, have been the object of such scant attention in contemporary political thought. In my recent book, The Rights of Others, I intended to fill this lacuna by focusing on political membership. By this term I meant the “principles and practices for incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers into existing polities.” The principal category through which membership has been regulated in the modern world, namely national citizenship, has been disaggregated or unbundled into diverse elements, and state sovereignty has been frayed. Consequently, “We are like travelers navigating an unknown terrain with the help of old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs. While the terrain we are traveling on, the world society of states, has changed, our normative map has not.”

From a philosophical point of view, transnational migrations bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies between sovereign self-determination claims, on the one hand, and adherence to universal human rights principles, on the other. There is not only a tension but often an outright contradiction between human rights declarations and the sovereign claims of states to control their borders as well as to monitor the “quality” and quantity of those admitted. There are no easy solutions to the dilemmas posed by these dual commitments. As the institution of citizenship is disaggregated and state sovereignty comes under increasing stress, sub-national as well as supra-national spaces for democratic attachments and agency are emerging in the contemporary world, and they need to be advanced with, rather than in lieu of, existing polities.

In this essay, I begin by exploring the origins of the institution of citizenship, then consider the “disaggregation” of citizenship within the European Union and in some other countries of the world, and finally I return to recent developments within the United States concerning...
immigration and conclude with philosophical reflections upon “just membership.”

I. Citizenship in Western Political Thought

The concept of citizenship is one of the cornerstones of Western political thought. In Greek thought the terms polis, politeia, politike, and politikon are all derived from the same root. Their Latin cognate is civitas, from which is derived “citoyenne” in French and “citizen” in English. In German, we encounter the term burgh, meaning fortress or town, and the derivation of burgher, as in Staatsburger, the German term for citizen. In Turkish the word for citizen, Vatandas, derives from the term Vatan (which may be Arabic in origin) and which means “homeland.”

This brief etymology serves to remind us that citizenship means first and foremost membership in a bounded community. What such membership entails is itself dependent upon the nature of the political community. As Aristotle noted, a citizen in a democracy is not the same as a citizen in an aristocracy: in a democracy all can vote, without qualifications of descent and property, while in an aristocracy only some can. Throughout the history of the West, citizenship has excluded certain groups of individuals, whether they be women, non-propertied and laboring males, or non-Christian and non-white peoples. These human beings have been barred from citizenship on the grounds that they did not possess the necessary attributes for citizenship, which were often understood in conventional terms such as lack of property or income. More often, though, they were regarded in much more essentializing terms as lacking the requisite capacities of intellect and emotion.

With the advent of political modernity through the American and French Revolutions, citizenship was extended to ever larger numbers of human beings. It was also enriched through the growth of rights and entitlements that accrued to this status.

Modern citizenship still means membership in a bounded political community, which can be a nation-state, a multinational state, or a commonwealth structure. The political regime of territorially bounded sovereignty, exercised through formal-rational administrative procedures and dependent upon the democratic will of a more or less culturally homogeneous group of people, can only function by defining, circumscribing, and controlling citizenship. Ideal-typically, the citizen is the individual who has membership rights to reside within a territory, who is subject to the state’s administrative jurisdiction, and who
is also, at least in principle, a member of the democratic sovereignty in whose name laws are issued and administration is exercised. Following Max Weber, we may say that this unity of residency, administrative subjection, political participation, and cultural membership constitutes the “ideal typical” model of citizenship in the modern nation-state of the West. The influence of this model, whether or not it adequately corresponds to local conditions, extends far beyond the West. Modernizing nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, which entered the process of state formation at later points than their West European counterparts, copied this structure when they came into existence as well.

What is the status of citizenship today, in a world of increasingly deterritorialized politics? How is citizenship being reconfigured under contemporary conditions? How have globalization and the weakening of the functions of the state in controlling and protecting its economy, culture, and boundaries against the forces of globalization affected the theory and practice of citizenship? How has globalization contributed to the reconfiguration of multiculturalism? Which are the most salient conflicts around cultural identities in today’s world?

II. Globalization and New Forms of Political Conflict

Recalling Vaclav Havel’s words may give us some insights into these questions. In a graduation address to Harvard undergraduates more than a decade ago, Havel said, “This civilization is immensely fresh, young, new and fragile… In essence, this new, single epidermis of world civilization merely covers or conceals the immense variety of cultures, of peoples, of religious worlds, of historical traditions and historically formed attitudes, all of which in a sense lie ‘beneath’ it.” The spread of globalization is accompanied by new forms of resistance and struggle, along with demands for “the right to worship…ancient Gods and obey ancient divine injunctions.” The new global civilization has to understand itself “as a multicultural and multipolar one.”

As Havel notes, our contemporary condition is marked by the emergence of new forms of identity politics around the globe. Such identity politics, driven by the attachments of nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, “race,” and language, are particularly widespread in the following domains: (1) At the thresholds and borders of new nation-states, which have emerged out of the disintegration of communist regimes in the territories of the older Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe; (2) In Africa, where the nation-state, a fragile insti-
tution with roots barely half a century old, is crumbling in Rwanda, Uganda, the Congo, and the Ivory Coast; (3) In the Middle East, where as a result of the Gulf and Iraq Wars and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nation-state boundaries, which were haphazardly drawn by the occupying powers at the end of the First World War after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, seem more problematic than ever; (4) In failed states such as Afghanistan, where prior to U.S. intervention, an armed group such as the Taliban could take state power, while leaving some areas of the country to the authority of warlords; (5) Compared to these kinds of identity politics which emerged through institutional failures affecting states’ capacities, the most prevalent form of identity politics in Western democracies since the late 1960s has been struggles for multicultural inclusion, and in some cases, for the multicultural diversification of citizenship concepts.

The worldwide women’s and Gay and Lesbian movements, the Quebecois aspirations in Canada, the Basque separatist movement in Spain, and the ethnic pride movements in the U.S.A. are some of the best known “struggles for recognition,” to use Charles Taylor’s famous term.11 Reflecting a social dynamic that we have hardly begun to comprehend, globalization has thus proceeded alongside socio-cultural disintegration, the resurgence of various separatisms, and international terrorism.

The impact of these developments upon the institution of citizenship has been “the disaggregation of citizenship.” Ideally, citizenship had bundled together residency, administrative subjection, democratic participation, and cultural membership. What we are seeing today is that the unity of residency, administrative subjection, cultural identity, and democratic participation—in short, the modernist and unitary conception of citizenship—is being deeply challenged. Nationality and residency status are uncoupled, in that increasing numbers of individuals reside in countries where they are not nationals. Furthermore, residency is accompanied by entitlement to extensive social rights; in some cases, even political participation rights are granted on the basis of residency and not citizenship.

These developments have taken place against the background created by the rise of an international human rights regime. By an “international human rights regime,” I mean a set of interrelated and overlapping global and regional regimes that encompass human rights treaties as well as customary international law or international soft law.12 Such examples would include the U.N. treaty bodies under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The establishment of the European Union (EU) has been accompanied by a Charter of Fundamental Rights and by the formation of a European Court of Justice. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which also encompasses states that are not EU members, permits the claims of citizens of adhering states to be heard by a European Court of Human Rights. Parallel developments can be seen on the American continent through the establishment of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

While these treaties are binding on signatory states alone, they have set into motion certain developments within global civil society. In the words of Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International law today is undergoing profound changes that will make it far more effective than it has been in the past. By definition international law is a body of rules that regulates relations among states, not individuals. Yet over the course of the 21st century, it will increasingly confer rights and responsibilities directly on individuals.”

Against this general background let me analyze the disaggregation of citizenship effect more closely.

III. Disaggregation of Citizenship: The Case of the European Union

The view that citizenship is a status that confers entitlements (that is, benefits as well as obligations) derives from T.H. Marshall. Marshall’s catalogue of civil, political, and social rights is based upon the cumulative logic of struggles for expanding democracy in the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries. “Civil rights” arise with the birth of the absolutist state, and in their earliest and most basic form they entail the rights to the protection of life, liberty, and property; the right to freedom of conscience; and certain associational rights, like those of commerce and marriage.

“Political rights” in the narrow sense refer to the rights of self-determination, to hold and run for office, and to establish political and non-
Seyla Benhabib

political associations, including a free press and free institutions of science and culture.

“Social rights” are last in Marshall’s catalogue. They were achieved historically through the struggles of workers, women, and other social movements of the last two centuries. Social rights entail the right to form trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations, health care rights, unemployment compensation, old age pensions, childcare, housing, and educational subsidies. These social rights vary widely across countries and depend on the social class compromises prevalent in any given welfare-state democracy. Their inclusion in any internationally agreed upon catalogue of universal human rights—beyond the mere right to employment and a decent standard of living—is a bone of contention among different countries with varying economic outlooks.

The disaggregation effect is most advanced in today’s world in the contemporary European Union, in which the rights of citizens of the 25 member countries are sharply delineated from those of third-country nationals, within a patchwork of local, national, and supranational rights regimes. These so-called “third-country nationals” include about three million Turks, scattered across Germany, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Denmark and the U.K.; close to two million members from the federation of former Yugoslav states living throughout EU countries; about 820,000 Algerians; 516,000 Moroccans; 200,000 Tuni-
sians, mainly in France; and 689,000 migrants from India, 547,000 from the West Indies, and 406,000 from Pakistan, mainly in the U.K., some of whom have Commonwealth citizenship.

According to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003, which was not ratified by member states, and was rejected through Dutch and French referenda in 2005) and following upon the earlier Treaty of Maastricht (1992), “Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it.”15 Nationals of all 25 countries who are members of the European Union (the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, and Cyprus) are also citizens of the European Union. What does being a citizen of the Union mean? What privileges and responsibilities, what rights and duties does this entitle? Is citizenship in the Union merely a status category, as was membership in the Roman
Empire? Does membership in the EU amount to more than possessing a passport that allows one to pass through the right doors at border crossings? 

Clearly, Union membership is intended to be more than that. Not just a passive status, it is expected to involve an active civic identity. Citizens of EU states can settle anywhere in the Union, take jobs in their chosen countries, and vote as well as stand for office in local elections and in elections for the Parliament of Europe. They have the right to enjoy consular and diplomatic representation in the territory of a third country in which the member state whose nationals they are may not be represented. They have the right to petition the European Parliament and to apply to the European Ombudsman. As European monetary and economic integration progresses, EU members are debating whether Union citizenship should entail an equivalent package of social rights and benefits, such as unemployment compensation, health care, and old age pensions, which members of EU states can enjoy in whichever EU country they take up residency.

The unitary model of citizenship that combined continuous residency in a given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoyment of political rights, and subjection to a common administrative jurisdiction, is coming apart. One can have one set of rights but not another. One can have political rights, such as local and EU level participation and voting rights, without being a national, as is the case for EU citizens. More commonly, though, as a “guest worker” one has social rights and benefits without either sharing in the same collective identity or having the privileges of political membership. But this latter claim also needs modification. In countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, “third-country nationals” are also granted some political participation and voting rights. In the U.K., Commonwealth members can vote in local elections.

A two-tiered status of foreignness has evolved: on the one hand, there are third-country national foreign residents of European countries, some of whom were born and raised in these countries and know no other homeland; on the other hand are those who may be almost total strangers to the language, customs, and history of their host country but who enjoy special status and privileges in virtue of being a national of an EU member state.

The obverse side of membership in the EU is a sharper delineation of the conditions of those who are nonmembers. The agreements of Schengen and Dublin were intended to make the practices of granting
asylum and refugee status more uniform throughout member states. Referred to as “legal harmonization” in the early 1990s, these agreements had the paradoxical effect of making such status in the Union increasingly difficult. Although the European Council of Ministers reiterates its adherence to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and Asylum Seekers and its Protocol of 1967, the EU seeks enhanced cooperation with sender countries in controlling the readmission and return of their nationals who reach EU territory illegally. Cooperative efforts with sender lands to enhance border controls, intercept illegal immigrants, and create asylum systems have increased. Since in many cases individuals seeking asylum and refuge are escaping the oppressive, illegal, and even murderous regimes of their own countries, enhanced cooperation with these governments can only have disastrous effects upon their lives. A very serious danger posed by these developments is the undermining of the individual rights-based system of the Geneva Convention and of the moral as well as constitutional obligations of individual states toward refugees and asylum seekers, which were based on their own past histories of collaboration or resistance to fascism and totalitarianism.

IV. Citizenship in Non-European Contexts

Can this “disaggregation of citizenship” model be generalized across regions and countries? Despite being the largest immigrant nation in the world, the American conception of citizenship has remained remarkably unitary at the level of granting political rights, by making “naturalization” a precondition for political voice. Unlike in some countries of the EU, there are no voting rights for legal residents within the U.S.A. at either the local or the statewide levels. This practice is usually defended by the argument that since the granting of citizenship to legal migrants is fairly open, transparent, and speedy, it is not unfair to make the acquisition of citizenship a precondition for political voice.

This argument, however, does not attend to the facts on the ground. There are at present an estimated twelve million, in official language, “illegal migrants” in the U.S. I prefer to call them “undocumented migrants.” Many of these individuals are active and contributing members of society. Many serve in the national labor force, working on farms and in hospitals, hotels, and sanitation services. Others send their children to school and are active on community and school
boards. These individuals, who service hospitals as nurses or orderlies, are themselves scared to become sick and dependent on hospital facilities. Not having one’s papers in order in our society is a form of civil death. The status of an illegal migrant is one denuded of political voice and the protection of civil laws.

More poignantly, on April 4, 2003, U.S. newspapers reported the case of Lance Corporal Jose Gutierrez, aged 27, who died in a tank battle outside Umm Qasr in Iraq on March 21, 2003. Corporal Gutierrez was an illegal immigrant from Guatemala, an orphan who had reached the United States through clandestine means and who joined the Marines in California. His case is by no means unusual: over a dozen legal and illegal immigrants, mainly from Mexico and Central America, who were members of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Iraq, have lost their lives since March 2003. It is estimated that about 37,000 immigrants serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, making up about 3% of the population on active duty. Their sad stories compelled both conservative and liberal lawmakers to hastily pass bills granting these slain soldiers, and in some cases their spouses and children, posthumous citizenship. Others suggested that immigrants who join the Armed Forces be granted citizenship immediately, while still others advocated the reduction of the current waiting period for the granting of citizenship to those in the military from three to two years.

This is by no means the first time that immigrants have served in the U.S. army. With the abolition of universal conscription, however, joining the army has become a venue for upward mobility for large numbers of low-income legal and illegal migrants. We thus have the disturbing case of individuals dying for a country that denies them voting rights if they are legal permanent residents waiting to become “naturalized”; and if they are illegal migrants, as was the case with Corporal Gutierrez, they do not even have the right to obtain a license or open a bank account.

The causes of migrant “illegality” can vary from bureaucratic mishaps and mistakes to desperate attempts to escape home countries via smugglers, known as “coyotes,” because of circumstances there. The status of illegality should not stamp the other as an alien. Clearly, a democratic adjustment of the practices of legal incorporation is needed in order to normalize the status of illegal immigrants.

While illegal migrant status means civil death and political silencing, the lack of a political voice for legal permanent residents means their effective disenfranchisement. An increasing number of individu-
Seyla Benhabib

als wish to retain dual citizenship or to live in one country on a long-term basis while not abdicating their original nationality. Making the exercise of democratic voice dependent upon one's nationality status alone, as the United States laws do, flies in the face of the complex interdependence of the lives of peoples across borders and territories.

The immigration bill that failed to pass the Senate in spring 2007 (S. 1348), “A bill to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes,” was a double-edged sword. While it promised amnesty to millions of undocumented workers, the attainment of which entailed a number of onerous logistical and financial loopholes, it also changed the meaning of immigration in ways that have not been noted. President Bush’s proposal for a guest worker program obliges these individuals to leave the U.S. after their contracts are up, without the possibility of ever acquiring permanent residency or, eventually, citizenship status. This bill proposes to make into U.S. law the creation of a permanent global underclass that services the U.S. economy but can never have access to the benefits of a democratic voice and U.S. citizenship. This is a radical reversal of the self-understanding of this country as a “nation of immigrants,” and this shift in policy reflects the paranoid politics of the post-9/11 world in which the “foreigner” and the “immigrant” are not viewed as a potential partners with whom we must share a moral and political space, but as “threats,” as “enemy aliens.” (Given the heated race for the 2008 Presidential elections in the U.S.A., this bill has now been tabled till some indefinite date, and certainly till after the elections.)

While the United States has remained impervious to many calls to facilitate dual citizenship and is making it increasingly difficult for guest workers to attain American citizenship, countries like Mexico and the Dominican Republic permit their large diasporic populations to retain certain citizenship rights at home, such as voting in local and national elections, continuing to own property, and, in the cases of the Dominican Republic and Colombia, even running for and holding office. Increasing numbers of Israeli citizens also hold dual citizenship, either with the U.S.A. or with other countries of origin. Throughout Southeast Asia, India, and Latin America, “flexible citizenship,” which permits the disaggregation of aspects of citizenship by giving individuals multiple residency, property, and political participation rights, is emerging as the norm. 24

Nevertheless, there is a paradox that affects most of these developments and which is inherent in the logic of modern statehood and
citizenship. It is captured by Hannah Arendt with the phrase “the right to have rights.”

V. Hannah Arendt and the Paradox of The Right to Have Rights

In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt wrote:

Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to a community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer a matter of choice, or when one is placed in a situation where, unless he commits a crime, his treatment by others does not depend on what he does or does not do. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion…. We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation.

The first use of the term right in the phrase “the right to have rights” does not show the same discursive structure as its second use. In the first mention, the identity of the other(s) to whom the claim to be recognized as a rights-bearing person is addressed remains open and indeterminate. Note that for Arendt such recognition is first and foremost a recognition of “membership,” the recognition that one “belongs” to some organized human community. One’s status as a rights-bearing person is contingent upon the recognition of one’s membership. Who is to give or withhold such recognition? Who are the addressees of the claim that one “should be acknowledged as a member?” Arendt’s answer is clear: humanity itself. And yet she adds, “It is not clear that this is possible.” The asymmetry between the first and second uses of the term right derives from the absence in the first case of a specific juridico-civil community of consociates who stand in a relation of reciprocal duty to one another. What would this duty be?: the duty to recognize one as a member, as one who is protected by the legal-political authorities and treated as a person entitled to the enjoyment of rights.

In Arendt’s view, the right to have rights transcends the contingencies of birth, which differentiate and divide us from one another. The
right to have rights can only be realized in a political community in which we are not judged by the characteristics that define us at birth, but through our actions and opinions, by what we do and say and think. “Our political life,” writes Arendt, “rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act and change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals...We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”

To sharpen the issue, Arendt was just as skeptical about the ideals of world government as she was about the possibility of nation-state systems ever to achieve justice and equality for all. World government would destroy the space for politics by not allowing individuals to define shared public spaces in common. The nation-state system, on the other hand, always carries within itself the seeds of exclusionary injustice at home and aggression abroad.

While Arendt offers us only paradoxes, albeit fruitful ones that show new paths to thinking, we are by no means at a point where we have resolved them. But the sharp contrasts which she drew between human rights and citizens’ rights have been mitigated through the evolution of cosmopolitan norms and the disaggregation of citizenship. National membership is no longer the sole guarantor of access to rights and entitlements. Increasingly, the world legal community is recognizing a human right to membership, which means the obligation of states to naturalize long-term residents and not to denationalize or deny citizenship to others.

Just membership in the new global civil society entails recognizing the moral claim of refugees and asylum seekers to first admittance; a regime of porous borders for immigrants; an injunction against denationalization and the loss of citizenship rights; and the vindication of the right of every human being “to have rights,” that is, to be a legal person, entitled to certain inalienable rights, regardless of the status of their political membership. The status of alien ought not to denude one of fundamental rights. Furthermore, just membership also means the right to citizenship on the part of the alien who has fulfilled certain conditions. Permanent alienage is not only incompatible with a liberal democratic understanding of human community, it is also a violation of fundamental human rights. The right to political membership must be accommodated by practices that are non-discriminatory in scope, transparent in formulation and execution, and justiciable when
violated by states and other state-like organs. The doctrine of state sovereignty, which has so far shielded naturalization, citizenship, and denationalization decisions from scrutiny by international as well as constitutional courts, must be challenged.

Notes
4. Ibid., p. 2.
5. The French term bourgeois, as both Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the young Karl Marx have reminded us, originally meant town dweller; hence, claimed Rousseau, bourgeois and citoyenne were confused, since the free town dweller was also considered the citizen. As Rousseau went on to note, however, the term bourgeois transformed its meaning and acquired the identity of private entrepreneur, exchanging in the commodity market, when (in the course of the development of Western modernity) state and civil society, which comprised the market as well, became clearly distinguished from one another. See Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works. Marx and Engels, 1843–44, vol. 3 (New York, 1976); and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy,” trans. by Judith R. Masters (New York, 1978).


14. T.H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, p. 44 ff. There is a teleologism in Marshall’s account that reflects his social democratic hopes and biases. The acquisition of rights by different human groups was never as smooth as suggested by Marshall. Women, blacks, colonials, and many other peoples were not part of the “social contract” that Marshall saw being extended to the British working classes through the advancement of capitalism. See Benhabib, The Rights of Others, pp. 172–73.


16. By referring to Roman citizenship in this context, I am recalling some of the civic republican criticisms of the extension of Roman civitas to provincial elites and those who served in the military. As Rome conquered more peoples and territories, Roman citizenship lost its hereditary character and became more territorial. With the rise of the empire, the franchise lost its significance. From Machiavelli to the young Hegel and to Edward Gibbon, the extension of Roman civitas and the decline of the republic were seen to go hand in hand. Contemporary historian Michael Mann argues that the invention of extensive territorial citizenship also gave Rome an edge over other entities such as Carthage. See Mann, Sources of Social Power, 2 Vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 254.

I do not mean to take a position on this extremely complex historical matter, but to signal that the topos of the transition from republic to empire and the decline of active citizenship are present in the memory of many contemporary European observers as they reflect on the transformations brought about by the European Union. I wish to thank Willem Maas for his extremely helpful observations and suggestions on this matter.

17. See Willem Maas for an analysis of the origins of European citizenship rights as developing through border-crossing and residency privileges for workers from southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) who worked in the coal and steel industries of northern European industrialized countries. See Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens. Europe Today Series (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007).


19. More recently, the European Council has undertaken to expand to “third-country nationals” a bundle of rights, including cross-border mobility and employment, which are more equivalent to those of European Union citizens. See the European Commission’s Directive 109, which came into force in February 2004, and extends the concept of “civic citizenship” to third-country nationals. According to this directive, third-country nation-


22. In 1999–2000, the ruling SPD-Green Coalition in Germany compromised the rather generous and liberal Law of Asylum of the German Constitution to assure the cooperation of the conservative CDU and CSU in passing an immigration bill in Parliament. Similar compromises have been urged by the Blair government in Britain. The British Government has been planning to deport asylum seekers to new “Regional Processing Areas” (RPAs) and “Transit Processing Centers” (TPCs). While the former are to be located in the region of the refugee crisis, the latter are supposed to be close to the external borders of the EU. The Presidency of the Thessaloniki EU Summit decided not to place proposals for Transit Processing Centers on its agenda, but the merits of Regional Processing Areas or Protection Zones, which are supported by the British and Danish governments in particular, are to be explored further. As Gregor Noll observes, “It is no exaggeration to state that it could very well mean the end of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Essentially, the British, Danish and other supportive governments are intentionally and proactively seeking to create a permanent state of exception in the international refugee regime.” See “Visions of the Exceptional,” 27 June 2003. Online at www.opendemocracy.net.


26. In this essay, I do not address the question of how such rights claims may be justified and on which philosophical grounds we can defend “human rights.” I have undertaken

27. Arendt, pp. 296–297.
28. Ibid., p. 301.
29. For a more extensive treatment of the “human right to membership,” see Benhabib, The Rights of Others, p. 140 ff.
Intervention

Carly Martin

Dr. Seyla Benhabib’s article, “Just Membership in a Global Community,” explores the shifting meaning of political membership in the current conditions of global migration. She investigates the conflict, in her words, the “outright contradiction,” between democratic sovereignty—the claim of a self-governing people to define its community by limiting its membership—and the recognition of the “right to belong” to which, according to Dr. Benhabib, any human is entitled. The very term global citizenship—the status of one who claims membership in a limited political community, while simultaneously placing him or herself in the community of human inhabitants of the earth—evokes this tension. How is it possible to assert one’s belonging in a community while simultaneously recognizing the rights of nonmembers, the rights of others, to enter into the space delimited by this community or to ultimately become members themselves?

I will respond to Dr. Benhabib’s essay primarily through an analysis of the human right to belong, and human rights in general, to which she appeals. After examining her discussion of the “right to have rights,” I will consider possible philosophical bases for such a human right, focusing in particular on the Kantian theory of philosopher Alan Gewirth. I criticize Gewirth’s portrayal of the human agent, the subject of human rights, as purely rational and thus “universalizable,” and I claim that such an understanding of the human agent may be a source of the tension between citizenship and human rights that Benhabib describes. In the end, I argue that it is precisely an understanding of the particularized, historical nature of human agents, an understanding that one’s position is not universal, that can inform a just practice of citizenship.

Dr. Benhabib explores the intersection of citizenship and human rights through an analysis of Hannah Arendt’s phrase, “the right to have rights.” This phrase, she explains, evokes a growing consciousness in the current era of the right of an individual to belong to a political community. Arendt’s first use of the term right captures this right to belong, this “human right to membership,” in Benhabib’s words. The second use of the term rights refers to the rights that an individual may hold as a member of a political community; these are the rights that a citizen enjoys. He or she may, as Benhabib states, “stand in a relation
of reciprocal duty” to other members of the community, and others must “recognize [this individual] as a member, as one who is protected by the legal-political authorities and treated as a person entitled to the enjoyment of rights.” Yet the status of an individual as a citizen of this political community, a claimant to rights in the second sense of the term, is dependent upon others’ recognition of this person as someone who can and should be a member of this community in the first place, evoked by the first use of the term.

Benhabib concludes her presentation by arguing that all human beings have the right to membership in a political community, and that as global citizens, we must work to affirm this universal human right through our own political practices. She calls upon states to recognize the human rights of migrants and thus to allow refugees to enter their territories and to grant eventual citizenship to long-term resident aliens. It is the migrants’ fundamental status as human persons that entitles them to such political rights.

Benhabib’s argument, then, rests upon the claim that humans, as such, hold claim to certain rights, such as the right to belong. Yet, probing this assumption, we must ask in what sense human-ness justifies a claim to rights. What is it about human persons that entitles them to claim basic rights? What gives us the obligation to grant a refugee fleeing violence in his or her state entrance into the bounded territory of our community?

Explicitly in her article, Benhabib justifies human rights based upon international law and treaties formulated since the mid-twentieth century. The 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which became the basis for later international covenants, serves as a set of guiding principles for the treatment of individuals by their own states, by foreign states, or, most pertinent to our present discussion, when they cross state borders. While, as Dr. Benhabib notes, these treaties pertain to relations between signatory states and do not currently “confer rights and responsibilities directly on individuals,” such treaties create a legal justification for human rights, a normative momentum toward the increased recognition of these rights by all states. Yet a legal justification for human rights is not sufficient, I argue, because we understand humans to have rights whether or not they are enforced or written into a treaty. We must not justify human rights based upon the way we currently recognize them, but we must rather justify a form of treatment that all humans deserve. In this way, we require a moral or normative justification of universal human rights. Such a justification
Carly Martin

should be able to tell us what it is about a person that gives her a claim to certain rights or entitlements that she may demand from other persons or governments.

Western moral philosophy yields many different methods for the justification of human rights. We could make a utilitarian defense, claiming that the recognition of human rights augments humanity’s happiness or welfare. We could argue from intuition, stating that human possession of certain rights is a self-evident truth. This position might coincide with a defense of human rights based on religion. Or, with John Rawls, we could argue that individuals considering their society from behind a “veil of ignorance,” unaware of their social location, would choose to invest each individual in society with certain rights.

Another commonly invoked justification for universal human rights is that based upon human agency, and it is a form of this argument that I will briefly sketch and critique. Contemporary philosopher Alan Gewirth, arguing from the tradition of Kantian moral theory, presents us with one such argument for universal human rights. Gewirth premises his argument upon the claim that all humans are actual, prospective, or potential agents; in other words, any human is, will be, or could be an agent insofar as she can think rationally, act, and justify her act to others through communication. An agent acts intentionally in that she acts to achieve a certain purpose, which she views as a good or worthy end.

Certain conditions, however, are necessary in order for the agent to achieve her purpose. Gewirth argues that successful action requires two necessary conditions: the freedom and the well-being of the actor. Freedom, here, is the ability to control “one’s behavior by one’s unforced choice while having knowledge of relevant circumstances.” Well-being encompasses basic goods, such as life, bodily integrity, and mental stability; nonsubtractive goods, such as the ability to plan for the future (and thus not being lied to or stolen from); and additive goods, such as the right to education and the right not to be discriminated against based upon race, gender, sexuality, class, religion, nationality, or ability. Both freedom and well-being are necessary for action, and, insofar as the agent understands the purpose of her action to be a good, her faculty of reason dictates that she must take her freedom and well-being to be necessary goods. In order to pursue her goals through action, then, an agent must make the prescriptive statement that freedom and well-being are goods that are due to her. The agent
must demand the right to freedom and well-being from others in order to take successful action.

The agent, then, claims that she holds rights to these necessary conditions of freedom and well-being. But why must she recognize the rights of others, of humans as such? The agent, Gewirth argues, makes the claim to her own rights based upon the fact that she is a rational person and prospective agent; she claims that she deserves rights because she has purposes that she wants to fulfill. But she must then accept that any rational, purposive agent is entitled to the same rights. Thus, in order to ensure that the necessary conditions of her own goals are met, the agent must recognize the rights of other agents to demand these same necessary conditions. Each agent, in this way, ought not to interfere with the rights of other rational prospective agents to freedom and well-being, and, in some cases, must assist other agents with the achievement of these conditions. Through this argument for the universal duty of a rational person to recognize the rights of another equally rational person placed in his or her situation, Gewirth develops a defense for universal human rights.

At this point, in an essay of greater length, I would first evaluate the logical soundness of Gewirth’s argument and subsequently determine whether the right to political membership that Dr. Benhabib discusses can follow from the rights to freedom and well-being that Gewirth defends. Because of the constraints of this essay, however, I will assume that Gewirth’s theory is sound and does entail a right to political membership. I will critique Gewirth’s account of the human subject of rights and will enquire as to whether the notion of rights itself makes sense under the framework of his theory.

Gewirth argues that the exercise of rationality circumscribes human agency, and thus any foundation for human rights. He claims that we should recognize the rights of others, such as refugees’ rights to eventual membership in our political communities, because, possessing the same rational capacities, we would make the same claim to rights in their situation. In other words, Gewirth derives a universal claim to human rights by abstracting the agent from her particular situation; this abstracted rational agent is interchangeable with any other rational agent who, placed in her situation of potential action, would demand the same rights. The moral agent is constituted not by her particular history of relationships, environment, and so forth, but rather by the rationality that she shares with all other humans.
Gewirth’s method is sensible. In order to justify a claim that all humans deserve the same basic forms of respect, we must consider moral agents in light of the fundamental qualities that unite them, rather than in terms of the particular contexts that make each agent’s life unique. At the same time, however, shouldn’t an adequate justification of human rights account for the differential positions of agents as well as the qualities that make them identical? For a right—a certain form of treatment demanded by one person of another person or government—is a demand that has been, or can be, denied. One articulates the concept of rights only when a petitioned form of treatment, such as freedom of opinion or recognition as a member of a political community, is denied or threatened. In other words, the notion of rights becomes meaningful only when humans situated in specific circumstances are denied the basic, requisite conditions for survival, happiness, or agency. In this way, it seems that any adequate account of human rights must comprehend agents both in terms of their universalizable qualities, the bases for their fundamental identity, as well as in terms of the particular lived contexts that make each agent’s life irreducible to any other.

Hannah Arendt, as quoted by Benhabib, explains the relevance of historical context to the understanding of political rights. Arendt writes, “We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation.” Referring to the rise in a global consciousness of human rights following the Holocaust and other atrocities of the early and mid-20th century, Arendt demonstrates that talk of political rights only makes sense in the context of a current or past threat to human political membership. In order to develop a concept of a universal right to belong, we must understand that the position of an agent who is a citizen, a member of a political community, is precisely not “interchangeable” with that of all other agents.

One might respond to this claim, however, by arguing that the concept of the human agent as rational, and thus located in a universalizable position, is presupposed within the consideration of the particular circumstance described above. In order to understand that the differential treatment of humans as regards fundamental conditions for life and agency is wrong, we must already understand that all humans
deserve the same basic form of treatment. In other words, an understanding of the identity of all humans underlies our intuition that it is wrong to deny persons the basic necessities for agency. Therefore, the objection continues, a particularized understanding of the agent is not logically necessary to a defense of human rights.

I would answer, however, that the historical necessity of human rights, as evidenced by events like the Holocaust, is, in part, what gives meaning to the notion of rights and cannot be separated from it. If certain agents’ claims to basic conditions of well-being or, in Arendt’s example, political membership, were not denied or threatened, no universalistic account of rights would be necessary. In other words, the notion of right itself loses sense in isolation from the historical circumstances from which it has arisen. Just as the concept of rights loses meaning outside of the lived context of human difference, so is any justification of rights, based necessarily on the human subject of rights, nonsensical if it does not include a consideration of lived context.

If it is true that Gewirth’s failure to situate the concept of rights, and the human subjects of these rights, in historical context renders his justification of human rights incomplete, then how does this conclusion inform Benhabib’s discussion of democracy and the right to belong? First, I would argue, my analysis of Gewirth’s theory suggests the grounding for an adequate philosophical defense of human rights. Such a defense would base itself upon a consideration of the agent both in terms of the rational qualities that he or she shares with all other humans and in terms of his or her contextual and historical situation, although I acknowledge the difficulties of formulating such a theory.

Secondly, and more deeply, the role of historical context in comprehending a human subject of rights may also inform the tension between the practice of political belonging and human rights that Dr. Benhabib discusses. Tension between democratic citizenship and human rights is in part the result of a purely universalistic understanding of the human agent. Citizenship is simultaneously an affirmation of one individual’s membership in a state and a denial of others’ membership. Citizenship is, in itself, exclusive. This exclusion can lead, as Benhabib’s examples of political refugees demonstrates, to situations in which individuals are denied membership in any state, or in any state that can sustain them. Yet if a U.S. citizen, for example, positioned to shape U.S. citizenship policy through legislation, understands her obligations to others solely in terms of the rational capacity she shares with them, this reality that some excluded others are stateless cannot enter into her
moral calculation. A human right to belong seems meaningless unless she comprehends the strata of political membership that differentiates human subjects and her own role in propagating this differential membership through exclusive membership in her state. Insofar as a U.S. citizen understands the human agent as purely rational and thus universal, the exclusivity of her citizenship cannot emerge as morally relevant. Citizenship understood only from the perspective of the citizen, which I argue follows from a purely universalistic understanding of the human agent, fundamentally conflicts with the recognition of a human right to belong.

I suggest that integral to the practice of membership itself—namely, in this case, the formulation of laws that grant or deny citizenship—is an understanding that not all humans share one's position of political membership. In order to practice citizenship justly, in a way that recognizes the rights of others to also belong, we must attempt to understand the way power and privilege constitute us, and those we label other, as human subjects.

Notes
2. Ibid., p. 47.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 56.
5. Ibid., p. 57.
Intervention

Desirée Weber

I would like to begin by thanking Dr. Benhabib for sharing her insights with us and allowing undergraduate students to engage with her work in such a direct way. I would also like to thank the Institute for Global Citizenship for allowing me this opportunity to speak about such pressing concerns as globalization, democracy, and citizenship.

In addressing the issue of global citizenship, I would first like to offer a few remarks regarding my own questions about this complex issue, followed by a response to Professor Benhabib’s points. I will conclude with a brief consideration of the practical political implications of her arguments.

All of us certainly should, and perhaps must, grapple with the issues of global citizenship. I have an interest both in an academic sense and in a personal sense. Academically, I find that the issues of immigration, globalization, and human rights are often found at the confluence of politics and philosophy. Personally, as a German citizen but long-time resident of the United States, I am curious to see how building a cosmopolitan identity separate from, or in concert with, national identity can work. This is a particularly pressing issue at the 50th anniversary of the European Community and with the recent foreign policy choices of the Bush Administration.

Before I can even begin to define and circumscribe the complex notion of global citizenship, I find myself wondering in what context we are even asking these questions in the first place.

We do not ask these questions as a product of idle thought or academic privilege. Instead, we pose these questions in a world fraught with dangers, where conflicts abound and encounters with the foreign and the unknown are ever more frequent. It is in this context—one of contention and uncertainty—that these questions take on an urgency that they have not previously held. It is in this context that we are compelled to ask, what is a global citizen? What are the rights and responsibilities of global citizenship? These are important questions to which, I am not embarrassed to admit, I do not have any concrete answers.

Perhaps in this too, there lies a point. Before any definitive answers can be given, we must take a step back. We must examine the context. These questions themselves are not neutral, either in their framing or in their possible answers.
What are these framings that lie hidden? Or rather, what other questions should we raise and perhaps raise first? I will offer some preliminary suggestions. First, who defines, or has the ability to define, a global citizen? Secondly, who has the resources, access, or even power to be a global citizen? My hope is that these questions are not a retreat into the ivory tower of inaction. I hope they do not keep us from acting as global citizens. Let us remember, too, that abstract and seemingly benign concepts can manifest themselves in much more pernicious ways when all is said and done.

In exploring the issues surrounding global citizenship, I would like to raise one further point. What happens when we encounter the foreign, strange, or threatening? Does our resolve waver or is it strengthened? It is one thing to profess our commitment to internationalism, multiculturalism, and service to society. It is quite another to stick to those ideals when the going gets rough. Again I return to the framing concerns I discussed earlier. We—all of us—are asked to be global citizens in a dangerous world; danger in a political sense, but also in a personal sense. In such encounters, one cannot simply leave one’s identity safely behind. Engaging with the world, whether a free or forced choice, always has some impact on our own selves. The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has termed this the identity cost, the deeply personal and sometimes painful price for encountering what we don’t already know.1

Part of being a global citizen, then, is being prepared to be affected, just as much as we hope to affect; being prepared to put oneself on the line, as much as we ask others to do the same. Accepting the responsibilities of being a global citizen (while also being aware of the dangers) will allow us to strengthen our commitment in the face of uncertainty. Perhaps it is exactly in those moments of uncertainty that our commitments will be strengthened. Judith Butler, in her book Precarious Life, argues that events like 9/11 present us with a choice of what sorts of citizens we want to be.2 It is in this vein that I hope to embrace the challenges and dangers inherent in global citizenship.

With those preliminary concerns articulated, I would like to move on to the issues raised by Dr. Benhabib. These issues revolve around a central theme: the relationship between a cosmopolitan ethic and democratic self-governance, or manifested in slightly different terms, between sovereignty, on one hand, and human rights on the other; between national security, on the one hand, and asylum seekers’ rights on the other—even more generally, between identity and difference.
These are not meant to be simple dichotomies. Instead, they are contradictions that these iterations have caused. Formulating an effective course of action requires that we consider the backdrop of larger historical trends.

I would like to explore the question of immigration and citizenship in three realms: the cultural, the economic, and lastly within liberal democracy itself, where the two converge.

When considering the cultural aspect of the question, one conclusion is that belonging to a community provides us with a sense of self. Yet how do we negotiate between that sense of self and the sense of the other, the other that is taking up residence, literally and symbolically, in our cultural community? I made reference earlier to the identity cost of the encounter. But in a related sense, where do we draw or re-draw the boundaries? There are dozens of recent examples in which immigrants assert a continued allegiance to their former cultural practices, sometimes to the exclusion of cultural practices found in their country of residency. Where do we draw the line, so to speak? Where do one culture’s rights end? Especially in the legal framework of the European Union, these challenges are forcing careful thought and perhaps reconsideration of traditional ways of thinking about rights, citizenship, and democratic values.

A similar problematique presents itself in economic terms. What is the relationship between immigration and economic structures? Certainly globalization is seen as a phenomenon that has precipitated immigrant flows. In her recent work on borders and democracy, Wendy Brown makes the argument that regulating immigration is an effort to regulate cheap labor. Globalization isn’t just about striking trade deals and opening new markets; at the same time that capital flows freely, the movement of people is being restricted, which leads me to my next question. Is the status quo becoming increasingly deterritorialized, as the waning of the nation-state model might have us believe? Or is it being “re-territorialized,” but this time along the lines of economic advancement? Here, too, immigration presents us with a complicated set of circumstances that must be understood if global citizenship is to become the way forward.

Thirdly, at the confluence of cultural and economic logic, liberal democracy certainly holds a central place in these debates. Hannah Arendt was concerned that we only seem to become sensitive to the lack of rights when we encounter the stateless. While one solution may be the supranational human rights framework that is in place now, this
situation has seemingly replicated her paradox. The only time when international human rights actually gain traction is precisely in the moment when a person’s rights have been revoked. Here the tension between international rights and sovereignty is most acute and where the waning of the nation-state creates new challenges for international law.

As William Connolly has pointed out, there is always one group, or a progression of groups, that are granted rights, only for others to be excluded. This is not always or necessarily as a direct result of granting rights to another set, but is this perhaps a fundamental condition of liberal democracy? Is it inevitable for liberal democracy to function so that there is always a group excluded, the excess that the system cannot account for and at the same time is the reservoir from which democracy draws to perpetuate itself? What do we do in the face of that contradiction?

In turning to the practical political implications of Dr. Benhabib’s work, I would like to point out one final hurdle. The advent of the War on Terror seems to be a step back, a disavowal of international human rights and a tightening of borders due to heightened security concerns. More broadly it has perverted the 1990s ideals that saw international human rights and democracy as making the world a more peaceful place. Witness the example of Guantanamo Bay. The extralegal status of the detainees and in fact the facility itself seem to signal a larger trend of disavowing international norms, at least on the part of the so-called hegemon. More importantly, it raises the question, “What compels the powerful to follow international norms at all?” Again the tension between international human rights and sovereignty rears its head and again the tenuous nature of our commitment to these ideals stares us in the face.

On a more critical note and perhaps a note of caution, I would like to encourage an investigation of whether or not the legal contradictions in Guantanamo are not in fact the mechanism of governance that has been precipitated by the tension between international and domestic law in general, a tension that the powerful are in a unique position to exploit.

In conclusion, I would like to leave you with this thought: Global citizenship requires an awareness of context, of the political forces that facilitate and hinder inclusion. The discourses of cosmopolitanism and rights are fragile and require attentiveness in order to shape their political development. There is a difficulty of translating ethic into
action. There is a difficulty in understanding the structures that define the scope of possible actions. It is our responsibility to try, even in the face of opposition and especially in the face of plurality, to achieve the highest goals of global citizenship.

Notes

Bibliography
Neoliberalizing Race

David Theo Goldberg

I. Globalization, Race

If the eighteenth century was considered the age of enlightenment or reason, and the nineteenth century that of imperialism, the second half of the twentieth century has increasingly been identified as the age of globalization. Yet there have been various versions of globalization historically. Early modes of globalization were those stretching across known worlds in their day, among the states and city-states of the East that Gunder Frank analyzes in *ReOrient*, and their trading that stretched into the states and cities of the medieval Mediterranean Near East. There are no doubt others, linked to various empires. These might be called regional globalizations.

The first globalization with fully planetary stretch and pervasive world-making—or world-transforming—implications was the reach of Europeans to expand through exploration. It was ultimately to magnify European power through new access to existing mineral sources elsewhere, and to revive and remake itself through novel supplies of raw materials, new markets, new pools of exploitable labor, and challenging new modes-of-being that prompted novel objects of desire. This proved so far reaching and transformative for the world that it came later to identify itself as the period of “modernization” (not that earlier periods in other sites hadn’t experienced moments of birth *natio*, updating themselves, flourishing, and wilting)—with Europeans regarding themselves as modern, precisely as Habermas and others have long pointed out. But the enormous reach, range, and redirection
of the European impact across the middle of the last millennium—on learning, commerce, war-making, technological innovation, production, political organization, consumptive capacity, avariciousness, resource destruction, being and belonging, identity and interactivity, modes of thinking and existence, sensibility and sociability—signal a quality and quantity to the globalizing project that was genuinely singular. The notion of modernization in this context reveals less a measure of evolutionary success than a mark of re-making, with all its challenges and pitfalls, assertions and assertiveness, and devastations and destructiveness.

Race is commonly assumed in the popular imagination to be an antique notion, pre-dating this planetary globalization. It is considered a vestige of pre-modern or at least not adequately modernized social assertions and arrangements. I have argued extensively against this understanding, asserting that race is an irreducibly modern notion defining and refining modern state formation as this new form of planetary globalization takes shape. “Race” is so conceptually pliable and elastic that, since its early expression in the sixteenth century, it has shifted in meaning over time and space, assuming significance in terms of the prevailing conditions in the social region in which it is invoked. It is believed to account for and comprehend, to shape and order—in short, to manage—the demographic, political, cultural, and economic heterogeneities particular to the region at that time. These meanings overlap and “converse” with other regional landscapes. As a consequence, it is possible to draw generalizations, to identify broad transnational meanings for race at a common point in time.

II. Naturalizing Race, Race-ing History

Since being widely accepted as accounting for human variation, prevailing patterns of racial theorizing and the rule they prompt can be divided between what I call racial naturalism and racial historicism. Racial naturalism is the idea that those of non-European descent are in some biological sense inherently or naturally inferior. This represents a very long and thick tradition in racial thinking and theorizing, running from the likes of Sepulveda in the mid-sixteenth century, through Voltaire and Blumenbach, Kant and Hume, Carlyle and Spencer, and the eugenicists and Social Darwinists, to the likes of Murray and Herrnstein, Coon and Rushton. Racial historicism, by contrast, consists of the set of claims that those not European or descended from Europeans
are not inherently inferior but historically immature or less developed. This is a tradition that runs through much of Euro-liberalism, arguably from Locke through such thinkers as John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte, and mid-nineteenth century English political economists such as Merivale and Marx, to the formal colonial policies of assimilationism, developmentalism, and progressivism.

Historicism assumed increasing force as a counter-voice to naturalist racial presumptions from roughly the mid-nineteenth century onward. For a century or so, these two paradigms of racial rule were in more or less sharp and explicit contest with each other, both between and within racially conceived and ordered regimes. Where naturalism underpinned the institution of slavery, historicist racial presuppositions tended to fuel abolitionist movements, proliferating as common sense in the wake of slavery’s formal demise, and promoted as civilized moral conscience in the face of persistent naturalist regimes.

Racial naturalism and racial historicism also underpinned different forms of colonizing regimes. In the case of naturalism, examples are the early Spanish colonialism in Latin America and the Portuguese and later Leopold’s Belgians in Africa. The British in India and the French in North Africa and the Caribbean are illustrative when it comes to historicism. By the close of the nineteenth century, naturalism found itself on the defensive because of increasingly heterogeneous urban arrangements, intensified migration between colonies and metropoles, and an emergent shift from biologically driven to culturalist conceptions of race. As (a set of) conceptual commitment(s), naturalism was explicitly challenged to defend and rationalize its claims in ways it had not hitherto faced. In short, by the mid-twentieth century, naturalism had shifted explicitly from the given of racial rule to the anomaly, from the safely presumed to the protested.

Naturalism increasingly gave way to the common sense of historicism in the later nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, with the violence of an imposed physical repression yielding to the infuriating subtleties of a legally fashioned racial order. In modern constitutional terms, the law is committed to the formal equality of treating like alike (and by extension the unlike differently). This abstract commitment to formal equality, in turn, entails the color-blinding constitutionalism of “racelessness” as the teleological narrative of modernization and racial progress. Racelessness is the logical implication of racial historicism. It is the perfect blending of modernist rationality and the maintenance
of de facto, if “de-raced,” racial domination, juridically ordered and exercised.

III. Neoliberalizing Race

The Second World War is commonly assumed to have revealed the extreme dangers of racial conception and thinking, and what such commitments entail if not inevitably bring about. By the late 1940s, race was being challenged as a scientifically vacuous, morally repugnant, and politically dangerous notion. European societies especially sought to expunge race from social reference. This rejection, however, presupposed racial conception and its political order to be predicated quite exhaustively on its naturalistic interpretation. Following first the anti-colonial and then the civil rights struggles, increasingly the commitment regarding race in social arrangements came to be expressed as color blindness, or more generally as racelessness. In Western Europe this followed almost immediately its painful wartime experiences and its drive to reconstruct, reconfiguring as much Europe’s imagination of itself as the material conditions of its well-being. In the United States, the stress on color blindness took a couple of decades longer to solidify, materializing first as a characteristic expression of the civil rights regime and then as a reaction to its commitment to affirmative action. One was not supposed to judge intellectual or moral competence, or for that matter physical prowess, by the color of a person’s skin. Color blindness, or racelessness more generally, claimed to judge people according to individualized merit and ability. When members of a racially identified group were repeatedly judged to fail or to be less qualified, it would be attributed to the cultural deficiencies of the group, historically developed, rather than as naturalistically determined. Color blindness, far from inconsistent with racial historicism, was its contemporary extension, the perfect cultural corollary for emergent neoliberal political economies.

The increasing stress on individualized merit and ability was coterminous with structural shifts in state formation, from welfarism to neoliberalism, ever since the second half of the 1970s. Neoliberalism took hold of political imaginaries as capitalism vigorously sought to expand its market reach, and as technologies of travel, communication, and information flows became speedier and more sophisticated, shrinking distances and compressing time. As globalization took on dramatically
new forms, its regimes of management and rule developed novel strategies. Eventually, these cohered under the rubric of neoliberalism.

Neoliberal commitments were increasingly institutionalized under the rule of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Helmut Kohl, and have structurally transformed the state. From the 1930s through the 1970s, the liberal democratic state offered a fairly robust set of institutional apparatuses concerned (in principle at least) with advancing the welfare of its citizens. This was the period of social security, welfare safety nets, various forms of national health systems, the expansion of and investment in public education (including higher education, and in some states to the exclusion of private and religiously sponsored education), and the emergence of state bureaucracies as major employers. Since then, and as a reaction, the state has been molded into a structure increasingly securing privatized interests from the perceived contamination and threat of those deemed not to belong, to have little or no standing, the welfare of whom is calculated to cost too much, economically and politically.

Neoliberalism is identified as the undertaking to maximize corporate profits and efficiency by reducing costs, most notably as a consequence of taxes, tariffs, and regulations, thus expanding the freedom of flows of capital, goods, services, and more recently of information. It is committed to let the market regulate itself so far as the artificial constraints of politics will allow, placing faith in its capacity to optimize resource allocation and expand employment capacity as a result of sustained profitability and subsequent economic growth. It follows that neoliberalism is committed to de-nationalize industry and “de-unionize” labor in the name of limiting state regulation and reducing public costs, and so rolling back the need for public funding.

In short, September 11 hastened and heightened the shift already well underway from the caretaker or pastoral state of mid-twentieth-century welfare liberalism to the traffic-cop state of the turn of the millennium. The latter, by contrast, seeks to facilitate the privatization of property, revenue generation, utilities, services, and social support systems, including health care, aid, and disaster response and relief. The privatization of services is particularly revealing, shifting the traditional caretaking functions of the modern state (emergency relief, etc.) increasingly to charitable institutions. This inevitably produces bifurcated experiences of social goods and access, such as health care, education, and even public highways. In turn, privatized property, which is equated with nationalist identification and supplemental state
enforcement, has functioned to re-homogenize the body politic. Where the welfare state, with all its contradictions and failings, still produces a modicum of social egalitarianism, the neoliberal state exacerbates inequality, further privileging the already privileged.

In essence, neoliberal states are restricted to securing conditions for privatized interests to flourish, and to shaping (policing may not be too strong a term) the flows of information, capital, and consumer goods to these ends. Grover Norquist, the person most identified in the United States with articulating the neoliberal commitment, famously boasted that his “goal is to cut government in half in twenty-five years, to get it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub.” The rhetorical flourish and disarming bluntness of Norquist’s expression notwithstanding, the claim is somewhat misleading, if not downright disingenuous. The emphasis is less to get rid of the state—what, in any case, exactly would that mean?—than to shift its priorities radically, to redirect it to represent different interests, to do different work. Support for institutions of state violence (i.e., military, police, homeland security), their enactment, and (re)enforcement spiral upward at the cost of a diminishing treasury burdened by dramatic tax reductions for the wealthiest and consequently crimped state revenues and squeezed social welfare spending. Social welfare commitments, including subsidized education and health care, would be de-funded and the resources sustaining them shifted to repressive state functionalities, such as the police, military, and prisons. Far from dismantling the state, or drowning it, neoliberalism would make it more robust, more intrusive, more repressive.

The social ends of state emaciation, accordingly, are not that social spending should terminate. Rather, in being redirected into private hands, social spending and charitable giving are fashioned by and for the social and political interests of those with capital to spare. Those recalcitrant states or population factions not willing to support (or that indeed resist) the neoliberal political economy of structural adjustment, debt creation, and regulation, are subjected to more direct force by the military or police. In the extreme, “uncooperative,” “rogue” forces, or unruly populations (states, communities, groups) are subjected to “necropolitical” discipline through the threat of imprisonment or death, physical or social. These forces of unruliness are likewise defined through racial extension and rearticulation. Where the prevailing social commitments for the liberal democratic state had to do with social well-being revealed in the registers of education,
work, health care and housing, the neoliberal state is concerned above all with issues of crime and corruption, controlling immigration, and tax-cut-stimulated consumption. The contemporary slogan of neoliberalism might as well be: The state looks after your interests by encouraging you to choose to lock yourself in (to gated communities) while it locks the undesirables up (in prisons) or out (by way of immigration restrictions). Where the liberal democratic state was concerned in the final analysis with the welfare of its citizens, the neoliberal state is concerned above all with their security.

These transformations in the structure of the social fabric are rationalized to secure individuals, their families, and those they choose to care about. At the macro level neoliberalism expresses itself in terms of the nation over (even at the expense of) the state. The state is to stand for protecting me and those like me—my national family—and the rest be damned. The traditional language and objects of racial humiliation, expunged from social characterization because at odds with the rabid individualized communalism, are not so much erased as similarly structurally transformed. They now silently reference those who threaten their fiscal well-being (notably the perpetually unhealthy) or the social security of the nation (namely those deemed death approaching, mainly young Muslim men and those, even entire nations, identified as or with them).

In the U.S., the Minutemen, a vigilante border patrol group fueled by Latin American anti-immigrant sentiment with tacit approval from the Bush administration, has been protesting recently under the slogan, “This is America, get off my property.” In this, the Minutemen perfectly represent neoliberal state commitments. The traditional state function of border enforcement is abrogated to a private, self-promoted vigilante group. The claim to America is staked as a national one, the belonging to which is implicitly characterological. One is taken to belong because one embodies the characteristics—the character—of presumptive Americans, with rugged individualism racially coded as white. Public land, the property of the nation, is privatized and becomes enclosed, from which the group can expel those who do not “belong.” There is a privatizing, too, of extreme political expression, encouraging private sphere expression of views that the official representatives of the state, with its nominal commitment to neutrality and formal equality, cannot be seen to stand for or express.

If the Minutemen trade on racial presumption implicit in the representational codes they readily express and circulate, racial meanings
have animated neoliberal attacks on the welfare state. The most obvious example is the strident vocal attacks on the “Welfare Queen.” She is projected as the stereotypical single black mother of multiple children (usually portrayed as having different fathers), minimally educated, irresponsible, refusing work, and collecting welfare while partying all night long: sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll, at state expense.

Where the figure of the Welfare Queen suggested that the welfare state did nothing but support idle, undeserving, and overly fertile black women, the image of state support for the undeserving poor of color was branded into the social imaginary by the determined attack on affirmative action from the mid-1970s onward. Affirmative action was considered unacceptable to the neoliberal stress on individual merit because it was seen as rewarding undeserving people on the basis of group attributes or achievements, not on individual effort and excellence. Indeed, for neoliberals committed to privatizing individualization, the standard racism (i.e., rewarding people for no reason other than their membership in a racial group) came to be considered affirmative action. Liberalism’s very instrument for undoing the effects of racism became neoliberalism’s poster child for the condition of racism itself.

These attacks on affirmative action reveal a deeper critical concern for neoliberals troubled over race. In the U.S., neoconservative critics of the state implicitly identify it as representing blackness and the interests thought most directly to advance black life. As a result both of serious application of antidiscrimination legislation and of affirmative action policies, the state became the single largest employer of African Americans. The perception among critics of these programs accordingly devolved into the view that black people are either employed as beneficiaries of affirmative action or they are supported by welfare. In short, from the 1970s on, the state increasingly came to be conceived as a set of institutions supporting the undeserving (recall the identification of Bill Clinton as “the first black President,” first by Toni Morrison but taken up quickly by neoconservatives out to do him in). Fear of a black state is linked to worries about a black planet, of alien invasion and alienation, of a loss of local and global control and privilege long associated with whiteness.

Neoliberalism, therefore, can be read as a response to this concern about the impending impotence of whiteness. Neoliberalism is committed to privatizing property, utilities, and social programs; to reducing state expenditures and increasing efficiencies; and to individual
freedom from state regulation. As the state was seen to support black employment, to increase expenditures on black education, and to increase regulation to force compliance, white neoconservatives began to find neoliberal commitments relevant to their interests. It was but a short step from privatizing property to privatizing race, removing conception and categorization in racial terms from the public to the private realm. It does not follow, however, that the state purges racism from its domain. Rather, the state is restructured to support the privatizing of race and the protection of racially driven exclusions in the private sphere where they are off-limits to state intervention. California’s happily defused experiment with the Racial Privacy Initiative best represents the sort of structure that proponents of neoliberal commitment seek to put in place.

The Racial Privacy Initiative was a ballot proposition placed before the California electorate in the November election of 2003. It was intended to restrict state government from collecting any racially identified data except principally for criminal justice investigations (police profiling) or certain sorts of medical research. It was designed to make it impossible to track ongoing racial discrimination across a wide range of social indices, including residential, educational, and employment. While the proposition significantly failed to garner electoral support, its terms of conception should be noted. The Racial Privacy Initiative was not a proposal to outlaw racial discrimination, address the past, or redress structural racism. It was, to put it bluntly, the “protection of private racial discrimination initiative,” the undertaking not just to privatize racism but to protect ongoing discrimination in private, to restrict it from scrutiny and intervention.

An example from a different social context illustrates the implications of such a policy. Having run out of beef one day, a privately run soup kitchen in Paris discovered by accident that if it made soup with pork neither Muslims nor Jews would eat it. This “identity soup,” as it came to be called, served as the rallying cry for those explicitly considering Europe to be white and Christian, for those jingoistically calling for “Ours before the Others.” The outcry for or against this expression of continental nativism notwithstanding, this sort of private expression would be beyond the reach of state restriction in the U.S. (though a number of municipalities in France subsequently banned it). The neoliberalizing of race accordingly entails the delimitation of public interventions to curtail racisms and the discriminations on which they invariably rest.
The social traumas of post-Katrina New Orleans offer ample illustration of these shifts from the pastoral care of welfarism to the curtailed neoliberal state in the case of the U.S., leading the way both in definition and implementation of what we can properly now mark as the Age of Neoliberalism.

In the past couple of budget cycles, hyper-conservatives in the U.S. have targeted programs for the poor because they offer easy fiscal and political targets, and convenient ideological rationalizations. At the same time, defense budgets, whether narrowly or broadly interpreted, have spiraled upward. Thus, the defense budget for FY2006 increased five percent from the previous year and almost twenty-five percent from its 2002 total. The $40 billion worth of cuts in the 2006 budget projections were focused overwhelmingly on social programs like student loans, health care, and welfare for the poor. If one factored into the figure for the defense budget the entire range of institutional apparatuses sustaining the military presence at home and around the world (including $35 billion for Homeland Security, funds to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the considerable sums for their respective reconstructions), the total would reach a staggering $900 billion, up roughly thirty percent since 2002.

Funding for education, health, housing, and transportation, as well as emergency relief, has been cut repeatedly. Since 2003, when it was incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been reduced by ten percent (if President Bush had had his way the cuts would have come closer to 25 percent). Between 2002 and 2004, for instance, states cut their budgets supporting public higher education by a total of ten percent, adjusted for inflation. While first-rate public universities today receive only five to twenty-five percent of their operating budgets from their states, they typically are able to spend half or less on education per student than top-tier private universities. Students of color are overwhelmingly educated at public institutions, when they make it into higher education at all, while private universities are the preserve of wealthier whites. The cuts have had a debilitating effect on disaster preparedness and reconstruction, undercutting the agency's ability to sustain support for those most in need, as witnessed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and ceding to uncoordinated private charities the responsibilities of evacuation, clean-up, reconstruction, and care. The results have been more disastrous than the natural event of the hurricane itself.
As with personal or corporate bankruptcy, the emaciation of the social support sector due to the shrinking of government revenues forces a radical restructuring of public programming and state governments. The immediate implication of such state restriction and ultimately devastation is to redistribute wealth upwards. The point, explicitly articulated by neoconservative pundits and neoliberal proponents, including politicians, is to put more wealth into the hands of the already wealthy. Expenditures of the wealthy (largely on themselves), the public is repeatedly told, are supposed to trickle down into jobs for the less well off. (Foreign policy is fueled by the same logic.) But the mission, as much as any, is also to elevate the decision-making, social engineering, and effective powers of the well off. The social effect of state emaciation, accordingly, is not that social spending should end completely. Rather, in being redirected into private hands, it is fashioned by and for the social and political interests of those with capital to spare.

The elevated factions of social class in traditional racial states (the U.S. and South Africa are prime examples) have traditionally been white, or more precisely representing the interests of those occupying the structural class position of whiteness (and maleness). The U.S. Census Bureau reports that in 2000 the top five percent of white wage earners received wages almost double those of the top five percent of black wage earners. Unsurprisingly, the largest contributors by far to political campaigns are white men. Under this mandate of radical privatization, funded institutions and activities become dramatically less diverse in their programming, scope, commitments, and, notably, in their employment patterns. Given that the language of race itself—not just as an organizing principle of the state but as an analytic category for social critique—is being eroded and erased, it becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to sustain a critical focus on the pernicious effects of this restructuring.

I am suggesting that race is a key structuring technology not just of modern state formation but also, more contemporarily, of neoliberalism as the driving condition of late modern capitalist state formation. Neoliberalism represents the shift from a caretaker or pastoral state of welfare capitalism to a “traffic cop” or “minimal” state, ordering flows of capital, people, goods, public services, and information. In diluting, if not erasing, race in all public affairs of the state, neoliberal proponents nevertheless seek to privatize race alongside most everything else. Categories of race disappear from statistical ledgers of discrimi-
nation, thus leaving untouched the condition they are supposed to articulate, to mark and express as well as identify and assess. Devoid of race in the public sphere, racism—as modes of racially driven exclusion, debilitation, and humiliation—is freed to circulate as robustly as individuals or non-government (or non-government funded) institutions choose in private.

IV. Managing Heterogeneity

Throughout modernity, race fashioned inclusion and exclusion, ordering demographic diversity and shaping population heterogeneity to the reproduced benefit of those structurally in power, invariably identified in the racial scheme as white. With neoliberalism, race is purged from the lexicon of public administrative arrangements and assessments while remaining robust and unaddressed in the private realm. One can ask, then, how heterogeneity and its challenges are managed under neoliberal conditions of racial privatization.

At the center of neoliberal commitments is the principle that people should be free to express and exercise their preferences as they see fit. Since preference expression throughout modernity has been, to a greater or lesser degree, formulated in racial terms, preference expression and its products continue to carry racial weight. Cultural preferences, for instance, remain to a considerable extent racially predictable, as expressed by what music members of racially ascribed groups tend to listen to, what sports they prefer to play or watch, and so on. At the interfaces, this can be the cause of some tension, if not friction. It thus requires some massaging, if not persistent management. Accordingly, the two primary modalities of such racial management are mixture, on the one hand, and duress and invasive violence, on the other.

A. Racial Mixing

Free choice is best informed and exercised through interactions with others, through the free flow of commerce checked and bounded only by the security of agents and their social arrangements. Preferences, after all, can only be successfully expressed and exercised in secure environments. Certainly commerce thrives when people can interact and mix. On this account, mixture is considered to express and expand market possibilities (not unbounded mixture, to be sure, which can spiral out of control, but mixture subject to well-established controls long
David Theo Goldberg

set in place and bounded by racial presumptions about merit, excellence, and beauty, taken as unquestioned givens). Racial mixing may be desirable, but its product, while inflecting determining inputs from each of the ingredients, is exhorted ultimately to mimic the cultural and performative standards of those embodying historical power—in short, of whiteness.

Brazil is often considered the exemplar. Brazilians use varying terms in differing circumstances to make polite reference to people often as lighter or, more occasionally in disparaging terms, as darker than they are in fact. This preference indicates a desire for what whiteness symbolically represents, if not for whiteness itself. It is not unlike what was expressed by the young schoolchildren in Brown versus Board of Education (1954) in the U.S. context. This way of characterizing the matter presupposes some objectivity, some fixity, to the racial palette.

Another way of looking at this color flexibility is to tie it less to the “actual” color of a person, whatever that might mean or however it might be fixed, and more to a rhetoric of social characterization as racially understood. Thus, terms for “lighter” mark the referent in the speaker’s eyes (even when it is self-characterizing) as appealing or virtuous, while terms that are characteristically associated with darkness mark their target as the opposite. Livio Sansone reports that his visibly darker survey respondents in Bahia often refer to parents and partners by way of terms indicating lighter colors than appearance seems to suggest. Those who are wealthier would also more likely be designated by lighter color terms than those who are not.

Here the syntax of racial terms effect a semantic field the significance of which is more in their meaning-making than in any claim to the reductive objectivity of their referentiality. By casting this as a tendency, I am not suggesting that racial reference in Brazil has come completely unglued from color assumptions about referents, only that these connections are not as fast and fixed as racial characterization traditionally (pre)tends to presume.

Making blacks and blackness if not invisible then less definitive in the national self-identification and imaginary means that mixing effects two contradictory if complementary political dynamics. For one, it makes it far more difficult for those marked as black, as African descended, to organize politically around that self-understanding. If the nation sees itself as mixed (if lured heavily by Euro-mimesis, ethno-racially understood), then emphasizing blackness as the grounds for political organizing flies in the face of national personality, of the
being of the nation itself. It is seen as a retreat, as reactionary, as needless recourse to an ancien regime of race, and so as verging on racism itself. Denial of blackness and indigeneity as categories, character(s), or cultures undermines the possibility of launching a recognizable countermovement. At the same time, mixing (mestizaje/mesticagem in the Latin American context) as metonym for Euro-mimesis has tended to render blacks as the unwanted, as the national familia’s black sheep, the patria’s illegitimate child.

If a whitening mixture is actually or effectively the official mandate and domineering (though not altogether dominating) discourse, then Indians (mostly) and blacks (a little less so) become inputs in the calculator of mixture. This suggests the inputs themselves are not fixed in place but assume some fluidity, more so historically in the case of Indians than blacks. This instability, stabilized only in the mixed product, makes almost any organization ordered around the terms of input difficult, though not impossible. For one thing, the input categories themselves are kept unstable, with people dropping in and out of them depending on personal circumstances, prospects, relationships, and social relations more broadly. For another, such organizing is largely reactive, and requires considerable conscience- and consciousness-raising simply to enable the conditions of conceptual possibility for the organization to emerge. The volatility and motility of ethno-racial definitions undermine the stability necessary for longer term political effect, exacerbated, as they often have been, by globally dominant institutions and state powers for geopolitical and, lately, neoliberal purposes.

Throughout Latin America, mestizaje was married with blanqueamiento, or whitening, the pairing presided over by Euro-mimesis and consummated by racial democracy as national commitment. In the longer analysis, the marriage stabilized whiteness at the sufferance of any potential competitors. The conjugation of mixture and Euro-mimesis extends the political power of whiteness as the prevailing structural condition of any racially heterogeneous society through the application of the general principles in and to other local circumstances.

In the name of progressing beyond race, mixing deeply reinscribes the traditional assumptions not just of racial identification, but of racial derogation, denigration, and denial—in short, of racisms. Since the 1980s, various social scientists have demonstrated deep racial disparities on almost every significant social index (life expectancy, income, education, employment, residential access, infant mortality,
incarceration) in societies robustly marked by racial mixture and by (post)colonial histories of racism (most notably but far from only in Brazil). Yet even as it proves to be a distraction from these indices, racial mixtures reinforce the skewed social conditions represented by race, drawing critical attention away from, and leaving pretty much in place, the traditional structures of racial debilitation.

At the same time, *blanquiamiento* as a policy of whitening undercuts the lure of “passing,” so much part of the lore of the United States and to a lesser degree of South Africa. If one can “whiten up,” so to speak, by a mix of intercoursing, cultural and even moral *mestizaje*—indeed, where “enlightening” *mestizaje* is projected and promoted as national character, as aspiration—the pull of passing would seem to be largely moot. *Mestizaje*, one might say, is passing made more or less legitimate, manageable, more or less livable (envy and resentment, disdain and denial notwithstanding).

In short, Latin America indicates the ways in which racial mixture is structured in favor of presumptive whiteness as the measure of merit. It signals the direction of racism(s), the silenced but still gripping debilitations, under the normalizing constraints of neoliberal commitments to deregulation and de-unionization, privatization and individualization, reduction in public services, and maximization of free trade. Mixing accordingly offers the mode and metaphor for fixing in place traditional structures and relations of racially conceived power. Mixing is able to work its way in states legible to the forces of global political economy, those states willing and capable of regulating their debt, reducing public expenditures, and sustaining economic growth.

Mixing in this way offers one of the principal ways of regulating heterogeneity in different social circumstances, globally configured. Understood in this way, mixing establishes the horizon of possibility, the limits for heterogeneity, while making it seem as though there are no limits. Sometimes people, even whole populations, refuse to be bound by these constraints, refuse to subject themselves to the discipline of debt regulation and structural adjustment, to denationalization and state restriction—in short, refuse to give up their compelling identifications for the sake of greasing neoliberalism’s tracks. Then more invasive technologies of control are invoked by the traffic-cop state. The force of flows becomes more assertive.
B. Racial Duress: Violence

“Rogue states” are those states that have “proved” for a variety of reasons that they cannot be controlled or managed by the “soft hand” of debt regulation and structural adjustment in the new global scheme of neoliberalism. These are the sort of states identified by George Bush as representing the “axis of evil” (Iran, Iraq, North Korea) as well as Syria, Palestine, Venezuela, and Cuba. If the Euro-mimesis at the heart of racial mixture holds out to those engaged in the mixing the possibility of entering even a diminished whiteness, then rogue states are states (if properly states at all) of various sorts of non-whiteness, structurally understood, of anti-whiteness—which is to say, anti-Americanism. In short, they are states of reconfigured racial definition.

These states represent a more radical difference or otherness than those states properly plugged into the neoliberal global network of robust and unrestricted trade, free markets, and exploitable labor forces and natural resources. Their management logically requires a greater degree of invasiveness, of the imposition of duress or violence to control, than those states where intercourse is considered more appealing. Falling outside the reach of control through commerce, debt regulation, and structural adjustment, they are subjected to increasingly invasive measures of control, their supposed racial distinction opening them to external imposition, restraint, and ultimately violence.

This, then, suggests a new modality of occupying or potentially occupying state formation made possible conceptually by the projection of permanent racial infantilization, humiliation, or what I have elsewhere called “philistinianization.” Palestine offers the most obvious example. It has been marked as the first “permanently-temporary” state, to use Eyal Weizman’s incisive characterization. State boundaries are rendered impermanent, flexible according to the occupier’s needs and whimsical determinations, visible only to the day’s militarized cartographic dictates. Permanent impermanence is made the marker of the very ethno-racial condition of the Palestinian, and through the Palestinian to the possibility of the Arab as such. Although Lebanon is the latest case in the transformation from the neoliberal political economy of debt creation and regulation to the necropolitical by disciplining an otherwise unruly population through the threat of immediate and painful death, Palestine has embodied this form more or less since 1982. Palestine is the laboratory case for neoliberal regulation through aggression and violence.
Hamas and Hizbullah have been widely characterized recently as “states within states,” in good part because of the services they offer, the sense of militarist self-defense they have self-consciously constructed, and the loyal following they have conjured. While there is a sense to this, it is overly simplistic and predicates the picture as a contrast and competitor to “legitimate” and conventional state formations. It is more compelling to understand both as representing robust, organized responses from the realm of civil society to the sort of state demise and destruction that an aggressive, militarized neoliberalism has signaled for those state formations not passing its test for legitimacy. In this sense, such organizations are less competitors than complements to states shirking their longer-standing caretaker commitments in favor of their purely repressive functions. The Sadrists have recently announced a similar undertaking to establish services throughout Iraq for inhabitants of all affiliations failing to receive support from a state close to perishing.

The Palestinian in this conceptual scheme stands for one always between, always ill-at-ease, homeless at home if never at home in his homelessness. He is the explicit embodiment of Levinas’s facelessness: shifting, shiftless, unreliable, untrustworthy, nowhere to go, nowhere to be, the persona of negativity, of negation, of death’s potential. He is the quintessential Nobody, as Memmi characterizes the figure of the colonized, the embodiment of enmity, almost already dead. The territory of the state, at any rate, is multiply divisible, broadly between three islands but more locally between multiplying settlements, both overlooking and cutting off one local population from another. Indeed, the determination of the local, of who belongs and who does not, of the very meaning of occupier, is being rendered increasingly and deliberately ambiguous, doubtful. Possession is nine-tenths of belonging, of being, to twist a cliché.

This self-estrangement, this unheimlich homelessness, is instrumentalized through the elevation of the state’s security apparatus as the primary mode of governmental rationality and instrumentality. The main modalities of the terrorizing state today include targeted assassinations, expulsions, threatened deportations, “collateral damage,” perpetual imprisonments, and “preventive” detentions under the most trying conditions, accompanied by incessant provocations. Emergent leadership and political elites are constrained, if not killed. Proliferating checkpoints make Palestinian movement all but impossible, painfully snail paced, and they make life miserable. Access especially to
and within city centers is open and closed according to the calculations of security risks, military movements, and political whim. The population is economically and politically isolated, starved of the means to even a modicum of stable social life. Access to work and workplaces, hospitals, and education is severely restricted. The availability of food, medicine, and other basic necessities is carefully managed and manipulated. People die daily as much from debilitation as from bullets in numbers that do not show up on the daily roster of the dead.

The territory of the targeted population is reduced to a state of perpetual siege through closure and curfews, encirclement and sanctions, invasion and repression. Walls are erected, barriers go up, gates are locked, roads blocked, access denied. All critical opposition and any cross-societal solidarity are rendered unpatriotic, their “perpetrators” considered traitorous and treacherous, subject to the high crime of treason, and they can be incarcerated without trial. Ornery organic leaders are marginalized or “disappeared” by one means or another, their replacements handpicked in the name of a democracy promised or imposed. “We want you to choose your leaders, only not him. Or him. Or him…That one will be good so long as he has been trained in the West, one of us, understands our ways, is on our payroll.” It is democracy for the damned, but not of them, as the response to the Hamas electoral victory has more than amply evidenced. If this is the prevailing racial modality for Palestinians, it is not restricted to them, or to assertion only by Israel. As Monica McAlister has remarked regarding the United States, the point has been not merely to support Israel in its “palestinianizing” ventures, “to act with them,” but to emulate Israel in circumstances deemed similar, “to act like them” vis-à-vis the Middle East and Muslims, and perhaps more generally (i.e., Venezuela, Cuba). It just may be that we are all potentially Palestinians today. But is the potential for “philistinianizing” in each of us, too?

These forms of repression sooner or later prompt resistance from those subjugated and repressed by their measures. Resistance takes many forms, ranging from lack of cooperation to suicide bombings. The modes of resistance most likely to show some success concern themselves with building a more sustained coalitional movement, across ethno-racial distinction and class, national boundaries and religion, gender and generation. Even when targeted “surgical” strikes are ordered, resistance might emerge at great risk, as in Lebanon when Israel invaded in the summer of 2006, or when Palestinian women in
Gaza banded together to surround a Hamas house the Israeli military was targeting for air strikes.

Neoliberal jurisdiction thus conjures a set of racisms in which mixture constitutes the national imagination, the (self-)image of the nation. Tanned whiteness and Euro-mimesis become national embodiments. The frivolity and conviviality of carnival and soccer/golf/surfing/skiing become its coloring of culture while the whitening of class elevation and the blackening of impoverishment become its ends. The racial structuring of life’s possibilities and delimitations for those who do not “fit”—ultimately the violent rearrangement and disruption of the conditions of life and death itself—are unspoken.

V. Cordial Racism

The delicate link between racelessness and racism, mixture and violence, that neoliberal social arrangements forge is revealed most tellingly by the notion of racismo cordial ("cordial racism"). Cordial racism offers an illuminating conceptual summary of raceless racism’s logic, neoliberally licensed. The concept of cordial racism explicates exclusion or devaluation, though in terms carefully and self-consciously race-neutral. It is a mannered racism (even exaggeratedly mannerist), behavior by the book, racism knowingly in denial. The denial can assume two forms. The first claims that I cannot be racist (saying or doing something racist) because it is not in me, I am not intending it, how should or could I have known it to be racist…What I have said or done is not directed at any individual, and in any case I have treated you as I would anyone in such circumstances.

The other form is to deny that I intend anything mean: It’s just a joke. I say these things about all kinds of people (races, genders, people from other parts of the country, indeed, even about members of my own group). A recently popular song in Brazil characterized a black woman as “stinking like a skunk.” In the uproar that followed, the song was banned and the singer charged with racism, now a felonious crime in Brazil. This led one comedian to quip dismissively that, “It is natural that people stink, independently of their race.”

Here, curiously, the claim to equalize meanness serves to negate in two related ways. It is a negation, first and obviously, of the specific wrong—racism—directed at this target. Secondly, it is a failure to recognize, to comprehend, the ways in which traditional victims of racism (almost invariably shades of black-brown or black-associated
people) are targeted over and over. It fails to consider how this particular targeting at this time reinforces the accumulated targeting (both historically and contemporarily), exacerbates the vulnerability, reiterates the charge of inferiority, sanctifies exclusion, and concretizes and repeatedly cements in place the group’s or individual’s marginalization through humiliation. That is in fact how everyday racism works, as Philomena Essed has demonstrated so effectively.

So “cordial racism” as a concept softens the edge of structural degradation racially ordered—in and for any society *structured-in-whiteness*. Racial reference vaporizes into the very air we breathe. The informalities of *racismo cordial* have seeped across the world, the shadow condition of whiteness. It has blinded the privileged to the debilitations of life’s conditions, possibilities, and prospects, racially predicated. They cannot see the foreshortening of life itself, racially indexed, or the drudgery racially doubled in the name of individual decency, privatized effort, and personal cordiality.

The state, as might be expected, offers little counterweight here. The pressure of neoliberal global institutions (the World Bank, IMF, multinational corporate investment and bank loans, etc.) to denationalize and to privatize key institutions intensifies as states intervene to redress past inequities or to render economic distribution more equitable. So the state remains the nemesis of civil society and its social movements, and continues to provide little if any prospect for even identifying, let alone curtailing, racisms rather than prompting new modalities of their expression.

Cordial racism trades on race without naming it as such. If there is no race, there can be no racial harm—so no racism. Evaporation alchemizes the structural into the individual, the pernicious into the cordial, the public behind the veil of ignorant privacy, racisms into the virtues of mixed race (*mestizaje/mesticagem*). Mergence is emergence from the chilling fog of race into denial, the left behind, the new untouchable, the shadow of the shadow. We no longer need to do anything about racism, for there is nothing to do. And there is nothing to do because the index to the condition no longer exists. It is no longer thinkable, so no longer to be bothered about. A new day. Race is so...yesterday, racism so...not us.

The racisms resurrected by neoliberal virtualization are racisms denuded of their conceptual referents. In their mutedness, they are racisms unspoken yet unapologetic. Cordial to the bitter end.
Racial evaporation prompts racial skepticism. It prompts skepticism of the very wrongs being claimed to offend in the first instance. Where’s the offense? How bad can it be? The offense, if admitted, is less about the exclusions, inequities, or iniquities prompted by the racial characterization so much as it is an offense against society as such for invoking the offending term to begin with. The harm identified is less to the individual or group who have consequently suffered loss than to the society for having to deal with the nonsense of race itself. Can we just get over it, ignore it, will it into oblivion as though it never existed and left no legacy? It once marked individuals, to be sure, but now it has (and should have) no reference point, no measure, no determination.

It is often remarked consequently that, in general, racism is the product of ignorance. Not knowing better, whether on the part of individuals or institutions, leads to discriminatory expression, to derogatory reference, to failing to address social issues, to the all too easy possibility of ignoring problems because they aren’t identified to begin with. Racism also makes possible the not asking, the failure to collect data, the grounds for ignoring the invisible, and, by extension, the refusal to address deep social inequities which aren’t recognized as iniquitous precisely because they are not recognized at all. Racism, in short, is as much cause as effect.

VI. Conclusion

The conceptual and material conditions and implications, effects and challenges of raceless racisms, of racist informalisms and individualization, of mannered racisms and racial avoidance amount, in short, to the complex of neoliberalizing racisms. The expansive, almost horizonless proliferation of racially significant, inflected, or suggestive terms globally distributed (many with shifting meanings not only across space and time but from one user or user-group to another) speaks to the complexity of racial arrangements. Yet it refers also to the varieties and range of racial investment.

We can see exemplified here the more or less informal identification of race with class formation. Whiteness on this score amounts to the structural condition identified with relative wealth, education, social privilege, standing, access, and advancement. Blackness structurally, by contrast, can be conceived as exclusion or restriction on these indices. Individuals being elevated along these dimensions are taken to be
white(r), to be “whitening up.” It is also the case that the line of argument followed here reveals how the otherwise attractive celebration of mixture threatens to draw attention away from the materialities of racial injustices, of the debilitating exclusions produced and effected by racisms.

It follows that the individualizing of discrimination and exclusion, and the slipperiness as well as ghost-like quality of racial terms, make it an often thankless, even burdensome task to point out racist discrimination. Critics of racisms are viewed as akin to whistleblowers and often treated analogously—as spoil sports, or paranoid, or just plain delusional, seeing wrong by invoking terms the prevailing social order claims to reject. Racist exclusions accordingly become unreferenced even as they permeate sociality. They are often unrecognizable because society lacks the terms of characterization or engagement. When recognizable, however, they are more often than not in deep denial—the ghost in the machine of neoliberal sociality.

There are two further considerations barely discernible in the preceding line of analysis. The history of racial configuration is profoundly linked in its emergence, elaboration, and expression, to death and violence, variously articulated. Fred Moten has noted that black social life is one angled towards death, both physical and social. Blackness, historically conceived, is “being-towards-death.” One could perhaps generalize the point without diminishing the particular and quite pressing exemplification of the principle embodied in the modern histories of blackness. The intense modern experience of any group that has been conjured principally as the object of racial configuration will find its sense of self mediated, if not massaged and managed—in short, threatened—through its relation to death. What traces do the voluminous legacies of racially prompted death and violence leave in the making and making over, the remaking, of racially marked communities imagining themselves anew?

Different “minoritized” groups react to this mediation in different ways. For Jews, the slogan “Never Again,” articulated by Emil Fackenheim as the 614th biblical commandment, internalizes a vigilant aggressiveness expressed as survival at almost any cost. Radical Muslim political theology rationalizes the violence of its response to what Philomena Essed revealingly identifies as humiliation in terms of the lure of a liberatory reward in the afterlife. American Indians suffer the liquidation of their interests, first in the melancholy of disaffected sociality and in some regional states more recently in the turn to con-
Blacks respond variously to their persistent minority status and repeated (often spotlighted) invisibility. One type of response includes a turn to an insistent visibility of cultural performance, sometimes celebrating a counter-violence in the wake of a persistent challenge to self-confidence. Another reaction is racially driven political organizing, by assimilating or integrating as best as conditions allow, or (as in the case of Latin America) by an effort to amalgamate through mixing. All responses have decidedly varying results. In each instance, the valence of death lingers, if only as a negative dialectic, modulating the inevitable melancholy or aggressiveness vying for the sense and sensibility the group comes to have of itself.

Virtually every dominant structural or policy response by the state to this relational, racially inscribed “being-towards-death” that insists on what I have characterized as Euro-mimesis once more “minoritizes” the contributions and concerns of the historically “diminutized” and devalued. These responses thus reinscribe the racially excluded as secondary social citizens, as burdens of state largesse. The state suppresses their contributions in their own right to state formation or social reconstruction while silencing the terms of reference for even registering such contributions. In short, they offer both the precursor and perfect exemplification of neoliberal commitment to consumption sans the source of production, to pleasure denuded of guilt, excess unrestricted by constraint, fabrication unanchored from fact.

Anti-racist social movements mobilize for greater social recognition, access, equality, and protection from discrimination when focused on race as the principal organizing feature. They will more likely succeed in enabling greater recognition than produce any significant material benefits or dramatic social improvements, as Michael Hanchard has demonstrated in the case of Brazil’s Movimiento Negro. Vigorous access, equality, and diminished discrimination require ongoing, relentless, scaled social challenge and change around residential improvements and interraciality, significantly better educational opportunities from the earliest age, steady employment, and public recognition and general enforcement of the importance of antidiscrimination regimes. The ongoing tensions between anti-racist transformation, racelessness, socio-class divisions, persistent debilitations, and variations on the devastations of everyday life reveal in their ambivalence and ambiguity the enormous challenges to face down a half millennium of periodically renewed racial rule.
Bibliography


