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Promoting Democracy: American and European Thinking and Strategy

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Abstract

My thesis investigates the use of democracy promotion as an instrument of foreign policy. Through a comparative analysis of the United States and European Union (EU), the paper examines how different conceptions of democracy, power and the role of the state have led to divergent intellectual and strategic approaches towards democratization. The feasibility of these approaches is then tested in the context of Hamas' electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Though neither has been practically successful, the EU model has proven to be conceptually better equipped to cope with the challenges of spreading democracy in the age of globalization.
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For My Parents (Livius and Lelia),
Who in an uncertain time in their life showed me the meaning of nobility and sacrifice: Mama si tata, va multumesc si va iubesc!

For My Teachers (Ahmed, Christine, Mohammed, James and David B. and David C.),
Who have taught me to search for the company of great questions, cultivate rigor and refinement and to remember the value of humility.

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The first two are like brothers: they simply bring out what’s best in me. As for the third, she was, for the most part of writing this paper, my favorite distraction.
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CHAPTER I: Introduction

I. Context

The history of democracy as an idea and the history of democracy as a reality bear witness to a profound discrepancy: in its theoretical form, democracy has been an object of critical inquiry ever since human beings started thinking about the nature of political society; in its concrete incarnation, democracy has had a short and often turbulent life, and it is only in the last two decades – with the demise of the Cold War – that it could take root in larger Europe. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin Wall led many to believe that the twentieth century, which began with two bloody wars, would end with a democratic peace.

This conviction had a powerful impact on foreign policymaking. For although the political conditions in the post-1989 world became favorable to the establishment of democratic rule in Eastern Europe and in areas heretofore marked by the standoff between the capitalist West and the communist East, waiting passively for democracy to flourish on the ashes of hard statism was not sufficient. Rather, democracy had to be vigorously promoted and this objective became a common cause for the United States and the European Union (EU). In 1990, the Transatlantic Declaration stated that the first goal for the US and the EU – then the European Community – was to “support democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights worldwide.”¹ Five years later, the EU and the US adopted the New Transatlantic Agenda, which reaffirmed this creed and aimed to “seize the opportunity presented by Europe's historic transformation to consolidate democracy and free-market economies throughout the continent.”²

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¹ European Commission 1990.
² Ibid., 1995.
Even in 2006, with the discord over the Iraq war still fresh, both the US and the EU agreed that “the advance of democracy is a strategic priority of our age.”\textsuperscript{3} Thus, the consensus on democratization was deemed more important than the ardent, but episodic disagreements that accompanied it.

II. Purpose

In light of these developments, the purpose of this essay is to study the promotion of democracy as an instrument of foreign policy. This research effort seems a worthwhile task for at least two reasons. The first is that for both the United States and the European Union, the goal of spreading democracy has become even prominent over the past seven years. This is primarily due to the lessons the American administration drew from the terrorist attacks of 9/11. According to President George W. Bush, just like the Cold War, the international arena has once again turned into a battleground between the forces of freedom and tyranny. The crucial difference is that now “the survival of liberty in our land [America] depends on the success of liberty in other lands.”\textsuperscript{4} Therefore, he stressed that promoting democracy by all means goes hand in hand with increasing America’s security.

With respect to the EU, democratization as a principle is embedded in the Union’s institutional framework defined by the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht and its revised versions of 1997 in Amsterdam and then in Nice in 2001\textsuperscript{5}. It was an underlying rationale for the Union’s Eastern enlargement and a guiding principle in the formulation of the EU’s regional strategies, especially the European Neighborhood Policy. Most importantly, this aim is destined to carry

\textsuperscript{3} European Commission 1996.  
\textsuperscript{4} Dobriansky 2005.  
\textsuperscript{5} Chapter III will further develop this point.
more weight in the EU’s list of diplomatic priorities if the Union’s “presence” in global politics is ever to be translated into greater “actorness”, meaning that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will display more coherence.

Consequently, the present focus on promoting democracy offers a momentous opportunity not only to engage with the immediate dilemmas surrounding this policy, but to also delve into such profound questions as these:

a) Is democracy promotion a useful foreign policy objective? How do we evaluate its performance in the case of the US and EU?

b) How does the worldview of American and European policymakers inform the strategies they choose to pursue with regard to democratization?

c) In what ways does the power status of a political actor – the US and the EU – condition its conceptualization of democracy promotion and its rationales for making it a foreign policy objective?

d) Based on the answers to these questions, does America have an advantage over Europe or vice-versa? In the age of globalization, who is better equipped to carry out this mission?

Perhaps the words that I have used most frequently so far are “democracy”, “America” and “Europe”. They reflect in many ways my deep attachment to ideas and places that have played a critical role in my development as someone who grew up in Romania during the uncertain 1990s, but whose formative years have been spent in the United States and the Netherlands. Consequently, writing about democratization, America and Europe can also be perceived in the meta-academic sense of understanding more about my own roots and evolution to date.
There are four Chapters to this thesis: Chapter II offers a literature review focused on an exploration of three central concepts. These are: democracy, power and the state. At the first blush, examining the meaning of democracy does not require any justification because it is this essay’s central theoretical reference point. However, the two other concepts are equally important because, to begin with, advancing democracy often requires confrontation with a distinct political entity – one that is being persuaded or coerced to redefine itself. This is, therefore, an exercise of power made by an actor who claims to undertake it in the name of a well-defined set of values and on behalf of a particular or general interest. Second, if promoting democracy means exercising power, then the state is both the agent delegated to accomplish this task and the object of direct political experimentation. In other words, when the government of one state decides that spreading democracy is beneficial to its interests, the target of this policy is the institutional structure of another state, which becomes the focal point of the former’s efforts to bring about political transformation. The Chapter will, then, review a sample of appropriate works that expound on the signification of these concepts and the way in which they are connected. These include Jean Grugel’s Democratization: A Critical Introduction; Francis Fukuyama’s article End of History?; Stephen Lukes’ Power: A Radical View; Gianfranco Poggi’s The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects; and Manuel Castells’ The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture.

In Chapter III, the discussion becomes less abstract and my purpose is twofold: first, to solidify the conceptual framework elaborated above by highlighting specific American and European contributions, which are relevant given their diverging policy implications. With
respect to the United States, I shall concentrate on works belonging to, or analyzing the Neoconservative movement, such as Irving Kristol’s *The Neoconservative Persuasion*; Francis Fukuyama’s *America at the Crossroads*; or Charles Krauthammer’s *Democratic Realism*. In the case of Europe, the analytical lens shall be on authors who discuss the EU’s singularity as an international actor and the corresponding uniqueness of its foreign policy. Some examples are Robert Cooper’s *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* and Ian Manners’ *Normative Power Europe*.

My second aim is to inquire as to how the previously examined ideas have become incorporated into official thinking. Specifically, I will concentrate on America and Europe since 9/11 and will compare and contrast the 2006 *National Security Strategy of the United States* with the *European Security Strategy*, presented to the Cologne European Council in 2003. The goal here is to answer four questions: (a) what are the most serious threats to international peace and security according to each document? (b) how does the promotion of democracy fit within the broader framework of policy recommendations offered to tackle these problems? (c) in what kind of language are these documents written: do technical terms prevail over ideological formulations or vice-versa? and (d) what precise links can be drawn between the ideas analyzed in Chapter II and the ways in which they become incorporated into the documents analyzed here?

Chapter IV is designed as a case study that explores the policies adopted by the US and EU towards Hamas since it won the Palestinian municipal and legislative elections in January 2006. This example is particularly compelling because the movement’s victory epitomizes a democratic paradox: on the one hand, the Palestinian people voted Hamas into government in free and fair elections; on the other hand, this organization is labeled as terrorist by both the US
and EU, as it explicitly refuses to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and denies the legitimacy of the political agreements signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Hamas’ agenda is thus incompatible with the principles listed in the Roadmap to Peace, established by the Middle East Quartet (the US, EU, Russian Federation and United Nations). In this context, my objective is to investigate to what extent the policy prescriptions analyzed in Chapter III were implemented and if they were not, what are the political consequences for America and Europe. The sources for this Chapter will come from a repository of on-the-ground testimonials, such as the detailed policy reports issued by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group and inquiries into this matter conducted by the British House of Lords. This chapter is also dedicated to bringing forth the lessons from this research endeavor and strives to provide answers to the four research questions.

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6 One of the foremost challenges I encountered with regards to the case study was obtaining sources that accurately portray the conditions in Gaza and the West Bank from a variety of perspectives, including the one held by individuals whose lives are directly touched by the democratization policies analyzed in this paper. This task was further complicated by the fact that I do not speak Arabic. Given these limitations, I judged that the inquiries of the International Crisis Group and the House of Lords did justice to both historical precision and diversity of views.
CHAPTER II:

Constitutive Meanings

The importance of exploring in depth the significance of democracy, power and the state, this essay’s core notions, goes far beyond the scholarly requirement of building an argument on a firm theoretical ground. This is because an understanding of these ideas can help us fathom the epistemological borderlines that frame the policies which eventually become part of real life. This point has been articulated in 1987 by Brian Fay, who makes the case for an alternative path of social inquiry whose analytical force is orientated not so much on illuminating causal relationships between the actions of different agents, but on bringing to light the deeper, hidden, process by which knowledge informs social practices. According to the author, behind all social practices – i.e., sets of different social rules which condition purposeful endeavors - lie constitutive meanings, or “those shared assumptions, definitions and conceptions which structure the world in definite ways and which…[make up] the logical possibility of a certain social practice.”

This approach is not immune to criticism, chief among which is that it cannot be carried out diligently without an intimate knowledge of the aims of the social actors whose efforts and ambitions are under scrutiny. To this challenge, I respond with two qualifications: first, that this essay assumes that the programmatic documents which will be examined in the next Chapter contain references to the objectives of both the United States and the European Union. After all, it would be impossible to prove that all the time and energy spent in Washington and Brussels in the conception of these doctrines was nothing but a deceptive maneuver. Second and most

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7 Fay 1987, p.86. For example, the practice of the market can occur given shared definitions of private property or the notion of exchange of goods and services. Likewise, that of foreign policy-making can take place given presuppositions about state sovereignty, military intervention, national interest or national security.
importantly, that in line with Fay’s position, one cannot fully make sense out of these documents, nor the way in which they are implemented, without a thorough elucidation of their constitutive meanings which underpin the worldviews responsible for the creation of actual policy. Keeping this in mind, I shall now proceed to investigate them.

I. Democracy

Etymologically, democracy originates from the Greek words *demos*, meaning *people*, and *kratia*, meaning *power*. Its most basic definition is, then, the form of government in which power is exercised by the people. But as simple as it sounds, this is misleading. For example, today’s North Korea’s is officially a Democratic Peoples’ Republic and so was East Germany before the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Chapter X of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 guaranteed all the rights and liberties usually associated with democracy: freedom of speech, press, assembly or equality before the law. Yet in all of these regimes, the norm was, or still is, despotism. How then, can we clearly identify the characteristics of genuine democratic government?

A Provocative Concept

According to Jean Grugel, the meaning of democracy can be adequately discerned in the theoretical continuum which lies between minimalist and substantive interpretations: in the first instance, “democracy is a set of rules, procedures and institutions…a way of processing conflict”8 between social agents with interests that would otherwise collide. As such, Grugel subscribes to Adam Przeworski’s view that the accomplishments of such a polity are “nothing

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In the second instance, however, democracy is a way of regulating power relationships in order to maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live and have a say in the key decisions which affect society. Therefore, democracy in its most inclusive form cannot be separated from the concept of citizenship, which is ultimately a struggle about who gets to define what qualifies as a common problem and how it should be solved. Democracy is thus the political system by which such tensions are reconciled, or, in the words of Beetham, it is

a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control [...] The most democratic arrangement [is] that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly, one which realizes to the greatest conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise.

We may thus note that the central distinction between minimalist and substantive interpretations is not one of content, but rather one of nuance: the accent of the former is on the process of institutionalizing conflict, while that of the latter is on democratic principles, such as equality before the law, accountability and government with popular consent.

The contrast between the emphasis on processes and that on principles brings me to a second way in which we can expound on the essence of democracy, namely, by analyzing it through empirical and then ideological perspectives. According to Robert Dahl, an empirical conception takes into account as a single class of phenomena all those nation states and social organizations that political scientists qualify as democracies in order to (a) discover the necessary and sufficient conditions they have in common; and (b) the necessary and sufficient conditions for social organizations possessing these characteristics. Dahl recognizes that this

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9 Ibid.
method is primarily descriptive and he does not equate democratic practices within democracies with the democracy as a political idea. Consequently, he develops the term of *polyarchy* to denote a political arrangement that ensures the pluralist representation of different and conflicting social interests. This framework rests on institutions such as the free and fair election of government officials, an inclusive suffrage, associational autonomy or the right to run for public office, but underlying all of these is a consensus on the rules of procedure, the range of policy options and the legitimate scope of political activity.\(^\text{13}\)

A similar position was adopted by the economist Joseph Schumpeter, but unlike Dahl, his view of democracy is even more instrumental. He considers that when faced with the intricate tasks of statecraft, the people in general are unfit to rule and that democracy is nothing more than a mechanism which regulates the competition for leadership: “the classical theory [of democracy] attributed to the electorate an altogether unrealistic degree of initiative...[since] collective act exclusively by accepting leadership...democracy means only that people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them.”\(^\text{14}\) Therefore, what is essential for Schumpeter is that political systems safeguard the conditions which allow the free competition between elites and which include high-quality leadership in political parties; the autonomy of the political elites from the state; an opposition and civil society that accept the rules of engagement and a political culture of tolerance and compromise.\(^\text{15}\)

Though an ideological perspective on democracy may share many of these persuasions, it fundamentally differs from them in that it carries a powerful normative element: democracy is not only the political system which harmonizes the contest between opposing elites, but it is the *only* viable system of governance and its tenets enjoy universal validity. This is the thesis

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\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., p. 20.
\(^\text{14}\) Quoted in Grugel 2002, p. 19.
\(^\text{15}\) Ibid. p. 18.
developed by Francis Fukuyama in *The End of History?*, a work in which the author draws heavily from the thought of French philosopher Alexandre Kojeve. Kojeve was primarily concerned with the rehabilitation of Hegelian idealism and interpreted Napoleon’s victory over Prussia at the 1806 Battle of Jena as the triumph of the ideas sparked by the French Revolution, namely, those of liberal democracy: *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. The outcome of this struggle was the conception of a “universal homogenous state” which “protects through a system of law man’s universal right to freedom [and] exists only with the consent of the governed”\(^\text{16}\). In other words, liberal democracy is the only viable form of political organization, one which at the *theoretical* level reconciles all contradictions that have characterized human history, such as man’s quest for recognition (or *thymos*), the dialectic of master and slave and the transformation and mastery of nature\(^\text{17}\). Though in reality different regimes might forestall the actual implementation of liberal democratic norms, no other ideological alternative enjoys greater legitimacy.

Against the backdrop of the Cold War’s demise, Fukuyama resurrects this thesis and argues that the Western liberal democratic model has once again gained confirmation as universal and homogenous because it most potent rival, Soviet communism, has imploded. Consequently, “the triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident […] in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”\(^\text{18}\) In this sense, therefore, history has ended because the struggle over great ideas has been once and for all been concluded.

*From Democracy to Democratization*

\(^{16}\) Fukuyama 1989.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
Having commented on the meaning of democracy from ideological, empirical, substantive and minimalist stand-points, we can now perform a similar task with respect to the related concept of democratization. Just like democracy, its most concise definition masks a variety of complexities, for in its most cursory formulation democratization is simply understood as the transformation of the political system towards more accountable and representative government\textsuperscript{19}. Yet, why is it that some new democracies collapse under the pressure of diverging power groups and what are the pivotal conditions which determine the success or failure of such transformations?

One can attempt to answer this question through a dual analytical focus on history and theory. According to Stepan and Linz, the study of democratic transition in the twentieth century reveals different paths which societies can take towards this end. They include: (1) internal restoration after external conquest, which took place in Western Europe after 1945; (2) externally monitored installation, as with the American supervision of Germany and Japan after the Second World War; (3) democratic change initiated from within an authoritarian regime, the most prominent examples being Portugal in 1974, Spain in 1977 and Brazil in 1982; and (4) party pact, as with Colombia and Venezuela in 1958\textsuperscript{20}. Though this paradigm may be useful to underscore the factors that are unique to each type of transition, its explanatory power is nevertheless limited when applied to more intricate cases such as the one in 1989, when the changes in Eastern Europe were driven to various degrees by a combination of all these vectors.

An alternative view which can better respond to this challenge can be found in the work of Samuel Huntington, for whom the idea of “waves of democratization” is central to understanding how this process has evolved. He defines this notion as group of democratic

\textsuperscript{19} Grugel 2002, p.3.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 4.
transitions that occur in the same time period and which surpass changes in the opposite directions. They need not necessarily be full transformations of the political system and thus include liberalization policies that are only partial in their content and scope\textsuperscript{21}. Huntington identifies three waves of democratization: the first dates from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the 1930s and is associated with the expansion of capitalism and the creation of global markets; it was followed immediately by a relapse into authoritarianism, which challenged liberal democracy in its Fascist and Communist incarnations. The second wave was the result of the defeat of the Axis powers in the Second World War and encompassed Western Europe, Japan and certain parts of Latin America. It was conditioned by the Cold War and decolonization. The third wave began with the fall of dictatorship in Portugal and continued in the 1980s with democratizations in Latin America and most forcefully, in Central and Eastern Europe starting 1989. In this last instance, the trends towards democracy shared global causes, such the poor economic performance of authoritarian states, especially the Soviet Union; the growth of global communication links; the reform of the Catholic Church in the 1960s; and the development of the European Union\textsuperscript{22}.

One may note the this paradigm is somewhat similar to the one employed in Karl Polanyi’s \textit{The Great Transformation}, where the author argues that capitalist expansion is marked by a double movement: all measures aimed at market liberalization are followed by surges in protectionism which in the most extreme cases degenerate into authoritarianism\textsuperscript{23}. If, then, the first wave of democratization was followed by a relapse into dictatorship, speculating on what might lie beyond the third wave would be a worthy subject of reflection.

\textsuperscript{21} Quoted in Grugel 2002, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p.34.
\textsuperscript{23} This is only one of the points articulated in Polanyi’s volume, in which he argues that civil society, through the state, attempts to respond to the negative externalities of extreme market liberalization.
The nexus between capitalism and democracy leads me yet another contribution which can enlighten this discussion. According to Anthony Giddens, modernity is above all a universal idea which spreads across the world and creates a single global culture\textsuperscript{24}. It is equated with (economic) progress and the changes which shaped societies in Britain and the United States throughout the nineteenth century, and which amount to the maturation of capitalism as an economic system. This in turn led to the rise of mass consumption, and a wealthy middle class who demanded more political participation. In the view of Seymour Martin Lipset, this process can be delineated as the transformation of a previously pyramidal social structure into a diamond with a growing middle class\textsuperscript{25}. Thus, when democratization is perceived to be inherently tied to modernity, its conception gains universalist connotations similar to those which stem from ideological interpretations.

The most distinctive feature of this account is a privileging of structure over agency. This corresponds to the basic tenets of historical sociology, which regards democratization as a process of state transformation aiming at harmonizing class conflict. Unlike modernization theory, however, this position does not espouse claims to universalism and stresses the importance of understanding the particularities of each case, specifically the nature of the relationships between social classes\textsuperscript{26}. Conflict is thus seen as a natural societal characteristic and transition to democracy is dependent on the way in which the aristocracy and the peasantry are redefined in their different confrontations with the rising bourgeoisie\textsuperscript{27}.

The consequence of this framework is that democracy depends on certain preconditions. This rather pessimistic approach is rejected by explanations which concentrate on agency, which

\textsuperscript{24} Quoted in Grugel 2002, p.46.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{26} Grugel 2002. p.52.
\textsuperscript{27} Grugel 2002, p.52.
argue that democracy is the product of “conscious, committed actors who possess a genuine willingness to compromise.” 28 Since its successful creation does not rely on the structural context, a society’s economic, historical and cultural ballast can be molded to fit the construction of a democratic edifice. Therefore, spreading democracy is a desirable political venture with a real potential for attainment.

Though this school of thought received much impetus after the demise of the Cold War, its intellectual lineage started with an earlier critique of modernization, which made the case that the functional characteristics of mature democracies should not be confused with their genetic causes. 29 Democratization does not require the deeply rooted preconditions identified by modernists, but is instead the result of a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle between elites, whose formal and informal compromises play a crucial role in the institutionalization of the new political system. 30 This in turn shifts the analytical focus from underlying structures to the creations of rules and institutions such as elections and constitutions. Paradoxically, however, this theory is not immune to universalism, for just as modernization logically concludes that one can identify a series of phenomena which are pervasive in all societies undergoing democratization, so do agency-orientated paradigms maintain that democracy can flourish in every society provided that its elites find the alchemy which can make this change possible.

Regardless of the academic tradition to which they belong, all accounts of democracy and democratization which have so far been explored share a number of prevalent concerns. First, all schools of thought take into consideration the role of processes such as elections and overall, the institutions of representative government, to underscore their function as a panacea for social

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p.59
conflict. Second, all of them emphasize the pivotal role of elites in shaping how transitions to democracy evolve. Third, most of them contain a universalist appeal, which relates either to the applicability of their conclusions or to their analytical capacity to encapsulate the quintessence of trans-societal phenomena. Fourth, each paradigm somehow integrates the concept of democratization within an international context. And fifth, each cannot be fully grasped without a discussion of the concepts of power and the state, which so far I have touched on only implicitly. Thus, the final part of this section will situate the discussion more firmly within a global background, while the ones that follow will delve into a thorough exploration of these two core ideas.

Global Ramifications

When analyzing the concept of democratization in the wider context of present-day world affairs, two questions stand out. The first one relates to the idea of globalization: how does this phenomenon, perhaps the most striking feature of the twenty-first century, shape the prospects of democratic governance? The second inquires into the motives based on which certain states promote democracy: what are the underlying assumptions based behind this policy?

With respect to globalization, scholars from all disciplines have spilled much ink to decipher its intricacies and its significance is a matter of controversy. For Anthony Giddens, globalization means the “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa.”\textsuperscript{31} Nederveen Pieterse compares globalization to a prism “in which major disputes over the collective human condition” such as “capitalism, inequality, power [or] development are

\textsuperscript{31} Quoted in Van Boxem 2007.
now refracted.\textsuperscript{32} Most scholars emphasize the role of transnational flows of capital, labor and ideas, as well as the spread of communication technology as the catalysts of this all-encompassing process.

These two examples are only drops in the sea of scholarly attempts to capture the essence of this phenomenon. Yet Pieterse’s definition is particularly compelling because among the major disputes over the collective human condition, democracy occupies center stage. Indeed, in a world where the destinies of all societies are increasingly overlapping, political struggles become couched in similar tonalities. According to David Held, democracy offers a way of ordering complex and particular events in a language that is universally understandable, being the only grand or meta narrative that can legitimately frame and delimit the competing “narratives” of the contemporary age\textsuperscript{33}. Consequently, is the promotion of democracy only a rhetorical instrument?

Historically, one may argue that this has not been the case, for the rationales based on which countries promote democracy are more complex. According to Rosato, states seek to advance democracy based on two justifications. The first is normative and holds that an important effect of democracy is to socialize political elites to act on the basis of democratic values, which include the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the proclivity to negotiate in a spirit of “live and let live.”\textsuperscript{34} These norms are then externalized in the international arena and in turn lead to trust, stemming from the expectation that the democratic leaders of one country will act towards those of another in the same way in which they do with respect to their own citizens. Thus, when conflicts of interest arise, the opposing sides will always seek to compromise. This

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Quoted in Grugel 2002, p.121.
\textsuperscript{34} Rosato 2003, p.586.
explains why war between a democracy and a non-democracy is more likely than war between two democracies.

On the other hand, the second logic for advancing democracy is institutional and focuses not on the norms shared by democratic political elites, but on their accountability to internal constituencies, who are endowed with the power to deny them future access to political leadership through free voting\(^35\). This is because a democratic system places a series of constraints on office holders who are forbidden the luxury of committing to bellicose projects that generally lie beyond the scope of electoral support. Specifically, these constraints refer to (1) the assumption that the general public is repulsed by war; (2) the pressure of anti-war groups; (3) the slow mobilization of the army; and (4) the availability of accurate information that can avert wars\(^36\). Whether or not this logic is defensible, we shall see in Chapter IV, which focuses on a case study of American and European efforts to promote democracy.

Finally, what are some of the concrete manifestations of these two positions? According to Whitehead, regardless of which presuppositions they embrace, political actors have so far pushed for democratic change through means such as (a) control, as in the case of the United States in post-war Germany and Japan and in Latin America in the mid 1980s, notably El Salvador and Guatemala; (b) elite consent, as with Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and South Africa in 1994; and (c) conditionality – the process of EU integration exemplifies this strategy\(^37\). These strategies will be dealt with amply in Chapter IV.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., p.587.
\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Quoted in Grugel 2002, p. 122.
II. Power

A pervasive characteristic of the various theories about democratization examined above is their proposition that democracy – either through norms or social mechanisms – harmonizes the rivalries between contending elites, making them either less prone or more constrained to exert a violent presence in global politics. Therefore, since democracy is assumed to institutionalize or even extinguish conflict, and since conflict is a matter of struggling for power, it is fitting to engage in a thorough inquiry into the significance of this idea. This is all the more so if we note that two of the types of democracy promotion strategies identified above, control and conditionality, make use of carrots and sticks in order to bring about their goals.

*Power: A Holistic Interpretation*

Steven Lukes proposes a framework for understanding power which encompasses previous attempts that focus either on the study of elite decision-making or on revealing the hidden ways in which power is exercised. His thesis is that these intellectual trajectories must converge into a paradigm capable of identifying both the overt and covert ways in which power is manifested and preserved. The corollary to this argument is that one must detect expressions of power even in those cases where conflict is either absent or latent.

According to the author, a one-dimensional view of power is that articulated by Robert Dahl, who defines this notion as the successful attempt of one agent to make another do what he otherwise would not do.\(^{38}\) Power is thus a matter of capacity and it can be gauged by determining for each decision which “which participants had initiated alternatives that were finally adopted,\

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\(^{38}\) Quoted in Lukes 2005, p.16.
had vetoed the alternatives proposed by others or had proposed alternatives which were turned down.”\textsuperscript{39} In other words, ascertaining the efficacy of a political actor is a matter of quantifying the number of concrete outcomes in which one was successful. This argument also implies that far from being concentrated in the hands of a single elite faction, power is diffused throughout various social groups, each possessing its own ability to influence the results of a struggle.

According to a two-dimensional perspective, this way of deciphering power is incomplete without a consideration of the energies devoted by actors to “creating and reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to the public consideration of issues which are innocuous” to them\textsuperscript{40}. In the words of Bachrach and Baratz, such efforts to “mobilize bias” include the manipulation of “a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others.”\textsuperscript{41} Ideology, therefore, becomes an indispensable instrument in the exercise of control.

The great merit of this approach is that it brings clarity to a number of concepts that are often erroneously assumed to be synonyms of power. \textit{Coercion,} for example, implies the use of threats such as deprivation of resources in order to secure an adversary’s compliance where there exists a conflict over values or different courses of action. \textit{Influence} is exerted where compliance is assured without the use of threats. With respect to \textit{authority}, an agent complies to the will of another because he acknowledges that the latter’s commands are legitimate either in terms of his own values or because it they have been issued through a reasonable procedure. Finally, \textit{force} is

\textsuperscript{39} Lukes 2005, p. 17. 
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 20. 
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 21.
involved when an agent altogether strips another of the possibility of compliance or non-compliance\textsuperscript{42}.

Since from the above list only force – and in an indirect way, coercion – involves the use of violence, the two-dimensional approach to power shifts the testing ground of this idea from situations of conflict to those of consent. This in turn leads us to a conceptualization of power which ties it to authority and the pursuit of common objectives\textsuperscript{43}. This is the approach adopted by Talcott Parsons, who defines power as the “general capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations in a system of collective organization” when they are “legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals.”\textsuperscript{44} This argument is further developed by Hannah Arendt, who underscores that the phenomenon of power is strongly related to that of collective action. This means

not just the ability to act, but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is in power, we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name\textsuperscript{45}.

Thus, a political actor can be dominant only so far as he can assure the support and validation of his allies or constituency. Violence employed to secure power is thus a manifestation of weakness, because it is only instrumental and will never be legitimate. Power, on the other hand, “far from being the means to an end, is actually a very condition enabling a group of people to act in terms of the means-end category.”\textsuperscript{46}

Hence, a tri-dimensional view of power, such as the one advanced by Lukes, takes into consideration all forms of manifestation, whether they take place in situations where conflict is

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., pp. 21-22.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Quoted in Lukes 2005, p.32.
\textsuperscript{46} Quoted in Lukes 2005, p.33.
overt, covert or absent; or whether the analytical lens focuses on decision-making or the manipulation of bias. In addition, he argues that power must be examined as it is simultaneously exerted in three different contexts: one is practical and refers to the fact that political agents must always calculate their relative strength to be sure that they can manipulate others to accomplish their goals or that they themselves do not become subject to such manipulation; the second is moral and is based on the observation of Terence Ball that “when we say someone is in power, we are…assigning responsibility to a human agent or agency for bringing (or failing to bring) about certain outcomes that impinge on the interests of other human beings47; the third is evaluative and refers to ascertaining the distribution and extent of power within a society. Here the concerns that come to mind are the degree to which a form of social organization gives its citizens freedom from the power of others, and whether they have the sufficient strength to meet their needs and wants48. Finally, Lukes completes his framework by emphasizing that as much as power is associated with the capacity to enact change, it also means the ability to receive the outcomes enacted by others49. Hence, power has both active and passive concretizations.

A Global Perspective

Since the overarching theme of this essay is the promotion of democracy as an instrument of foreign policy, it is useful to pause for a moment and inquire how the framework discussed above can be applied to the realm of global politics.

The focus of the one-dimensional view is on elite decision-making and it can be tested only through situations of conflict. This view is somewhat similar to a traditional perception of

47 Ibid., p. 66.
48 Ibid., pp.64-67.
49 Ibid., p.71.
inter-state relations, in which the decision makers are the great powers and their capacity to wage war is the indicator of their status. Power is therefore gauged by military might. In this context, the United States is by far the most formidable actor in the international arena. The military defense budget for 2007 amounts to $650 billion, or seven times more than second-positioned China, and more than all the military budgets of the next fourteen countries put together\(^50\). The fact that the US could topple Saddam Hussein in two weeks, fight another war in Afghanistan and patrol the world through five command centers bears witness to its unchallenged position.

The two-dimensional view, on the other hand, underscores the importance of acting in concert, a case in which persuasion, influence and, to a certain extent, coercion, become more important than raw force. In this regard, the European Union stands out as a redoubtable agent, who expands its influence by co-opting other European countries within its ranks on the condition that they implement a number of reforms based on standards shared by all EU members. This is known as the *aquis communautaire*, and each potential member has to negotiate the application of its prescriptions to all government policies, ranging from agriculture, to education and the regulation of market competition. The candidate countries in turn receive structural development funds and once membership is attained, they have a say in the shaping of EU trade, development and security policies. This has prompted some commentators to make the claim that Europe’s fixation with operative frameworks is a sign of its transformative power, i.e., its capacity to induce countries to adopt legislation and that in the long run will reshape the nature of their societies\(^51\).

The difference between these two approaches can be re-conceptualized in terms of the distinction between hard and soft power. While the former refers to attaining military

\(^50\) Global Issues 2007.
\(^51\) Leonard 2005.
superiority\textsuperscript{52}, the latter defines the “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion” and “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s [or a group of countries’] culture, political ideals and policies.”\textsuperscript{53} Soft power is thus contingent on the ability of the shape others’ preferences and is manifested thorough such strategies as agenda setting, attraction and cooptation. Moreover, it reflects the focus of diplomatic efforts not necessarily on “possession goals” – which refer to strategies by which counties gain short-term advantages – but on “milieu goals”, which target the shaping an environment hospitable to a particular set of policies, such as the promotion of democracy\textsuperscript{54}. I will elaborate more on this point in the following Chapter.

A tri-dimensional view of power would offer a view situated somewhere in-between the ones above. It would acknowledge American military supremacy, but also the United State’s capacity to exert its own type of soft power, which in some cases may radiate more powerfully than that of the EU. For instance, several Eastern European states that were either EU members or candidates supported the 2003 military intervention against Saddam Hussein to a large extent because their leaders felt indebted to America for the crucial role it played in the demise of the Cold War. Moreover, a tri-dimensional perspective would also highlight that while America has lost much legitimacy since the start of the War on Terror through episodes such as Guantanamo Bay or the extraordinary rendition cases, soft power instruments are not enough to respond to urgent crises. Consider the case of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when the much expected “hour of Europe” was replaced by the US’s muscular involvement in the Dayton Accords and later in Kosovo. Hence, the US and the EU do not enjoy full superiority either in the practical or moral contexts which Lukes discusses above.

\textsuperscript{52} Nye 2004, p.x.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 17.
Power and the State

In this last stage of my discussion of power, I wish to make the transition to the final concept of this chapter, the state, by looking at power from a theoretical vista centered on the origins of this phenomenon.

For Gianfranco Poggi, any investigation into the nature of the modern state must begin with comprehending how power is tied to economic, ideological and political resources. Drawing from the work of Norberto Bobbio, he argues that economic power “avails itself of the possession of certain goods, which are rare or held to be rare, in order to lead those not possessing them in carrying out a certain form of labor” or as Robert Dahl would put it, in making them do what otherwise they would not. Ideological power is based upon the fact that certain ideas, formulated by persons endowed with authority and spread in a particular way may also exert influence on the conduct of individuals. With respect to political power, it is ultimately grounded in the possession of means by which physical violence may be exerted. Hence, this view pulls the discussion of power from the highest level of theoretical sophistication, down to its most brutal appearance. This, Poggi argues quoting sociologist Peter Berger, is a pervasive feature of all societies: “the ultimate [and] the oldest means of social control is physical violence” and this is true “even in the most politely organized modern democracies.” For even in such societies, where there may be innumerable steps that curtail the sudden application of raw force, the ultimate response to non-compliance is raw force.

Poggi further argues that although these resources may be employed in concert, they often can work to constrain each other. Yet what makes the use of economic and ideological

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56 Ibid.
57 Poggi 1991, p.5.
resources possible is the fact that such use can take place within an environment that is relatively secure. Consequently, political power emerges as paramount because while the other forms affect the quality of existence, it is the determinant factor that conditions existence itself. The German author Wolf-Dietrich Narr puts it as follows: “physical violence produces consequences directly, immediately, without the recourse to media of communication; normally, speculations about its causes are superfluous….it addresses the integrity of the human body in a direct, immediately comprehensible fashion.”

If this is the case, why is political power necessary? This question has preoccupied thinkers in all ages. Antiquity offered an ambivalent response which highlighted both the ideal that political experience, a fundamental trait of rational human beings, should be lived through open public discourse, and power’s chief task to “make binding upon each collectivity its specific designs for living and to uphold their validity in dealing with other collectivities.”

Such a unilateral act of imposition can only come through war. Classical political philosophy texts such as those of Thomas Hobbes argued that in a world where life is made nasty, brutish and short by the inherent wickedness of humanity, only a supreme authority based on the threat of violence can keep men at peace. Other explanations find the chief reasons for political power in the complexities which inevitably arise when human collectivities overcome a certain threshold. In such cases, “arrangements must be met to sustain those qualities of durability and cohesiveness which smaller, homogenous communities derive directly from each member’s natural affiliation to custom with their kin.”

Whether because of a wicked human nature which inspires fear, anguish and the seemingly constant possibility of conflict, or due to the sheer growth of human communities,

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58 Ibid., p. 10.
59 Ibid., p. 12.
both explanations discuss political power in relation to its scope. This in turn shifts this analysis to the concept of the state.

III. The State

Political power, physical violence, scope of power – all these notions resonate with the classical, Weberian, definition of the state as the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence. Explaining why this is the case is a task that would unavoidably require historicizing the phenomenon in question. This exercise, however, would be far too grand for this essay to attempt. Instead, it may be more fitting to (a) recognize that its origins lie in the most ancient human political designs which precede its full appearance; and (b) identify the core features of the modern state and inquire how they are being reshaped by the process of globalization. This is not only a maneuver of theoretical convenience, but also one of utmost necessity because part of this project looks at how the European Union, an association of states, is promoting democracy in the world.

According to Poggi, any organization which controls the population occupying a definite territory is a state insofar as (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another. Its first characteristic refers to the state’s ability to unify the political aspects of social life, make them distinctive from other aspects and entrust them to a visible, specialized, entity. To the degree to which the state is separated from civil society and the church, it recognizes that the individuals subject to its power have interests that are non-political in nature.

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which can be pursued in parallel to those entering directly under the spectrum of government concerns. In this sense, then, economic micromanagement is superfluous and the state only issues overarching guidelines for market regulation.\(^{63}\)

Autonomy and centrality bring into the discussion the question of sovereignty. This means that the state is claiming, and if necessary, is willing to prove that its mastery of the population and of a particular territory is subject to no other power. Control is exercised on its own account and resources are disposed of unconditionally.\(^{64}\) This shifts the analytical focus back to the concept of political power: if in its crudest form it means physical violence, what happens when it is woven into the institutions of government? According to the German sociologist Heinrich Popitz, it first becomes \textit{depersonalized} because it connects progressively with determinate functions and positions which transcend individuals. Second, it becomes \textit{formalized}, as its exercise is carried out through rules, procedures and rituals.\(^{65}\) Third, it \textit{gears itself into the existent conditions} of the social edifice which it supports and by which it is in turn supported.\(^{66}\) As a result, different institutions appear not as independent power centers, but as “organs” which assert and serve a unitary purpose in a competent manner, on behalf of a single entity.\(^{67}\)

The above paragraphs delve deeper into the relationship between the state and political power, but one aspect they do not address explicitly is the nexus between the state and the subjects of its control. In this regard, the first which comes to mind is territory. In a language similar to that of Nye, Poggi underscores that a state connection to its territory bears both hard and soft aspects. On the one hand, the boundaries of every country are geographically distinct

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\(^{63}\) Ibid., pp.20-21.

\(^{64}\) Ibid.

\(^{65}\) Ibid.

\(^{66}\) Ibid., p.18.

\(^{67}\) Poggi 1991, p. 23.
and militarily defensible. On the other hand, the part of the land in question is often idealized as the cradle and home of its population. The reference to idealization brings into the discussion the question of legitimacy: in the contemporary world, this stems from (1) democratic principles – the state claims to see its own existence as justified by the services it renders to its people, and [their] compliance as acknowledgement of this role; and (2) the belief in a national identity, which creates a backdrop of shared assumptions and understandings in the interactions of its citizens.

The point about the modern state’s democratic justification not only echoes the universalist tones resonating from certain definitions of democracy examined in Section I, but also offers a different categorization for the concept of power. Above I mentioned Poggi’s argument that the modern state is relatively aloof from civil society in the sense that it acknowledges that people have legitimate preoccupations of a non-political nature which do not require attentive monitoring. But this stance was not always prevalent. According to Mann, the sixteenth century European state increased enjoyed the despotic power to carry out security and administration functions without being held accountable by their citizens. In this sense, the state was both from and against society. On the other hand, the advent of the modern state meant that “power over” society transmuted into “power through” society, i.e. social life became coordinated through state infrastructures, which inevitably forced the state to establish close relationships with its citizens.

Before I move on to the next part of this section, three points of qualification are in order. The first is that although the works analyzed above treated the state primarily as a constructive enterprise, this is far from being a universal norm. In fact, brief overview of various types of

68 Ibid., p. 22.
69 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
70 Quoted in Grugel 2002, p. 41.
states suggests that in certain instances the state can be a destructive element. According to Samatar, an *integral* state can be described as one that succeeds in delivering public goods and manages to sustain a moral bond with its people. In its downgraded version, this type of state becomes *developmental*, meaning that government institutions enhance productive forces and national accumulation, often by sacrificing public debates and civil liberties. In a *prebendalist* state, power is once again re-personalized and the regime is preoccupied with fulfilling the immediate interests of the ruling elite by exploiting the national economy in its favor. When such a structure loses its capacity to function coherently, it becomes *predatory* and social life is reduced to scavenging over dwindling public resources. Moreover, collective bonds disintegrate with them. The endpoint of this degenerative process is the *cadaverous* state, where political life becomes once again nasty, brutish and short and civic life is no more\(^{71}\).

The second point is that all the characteristics of the modern state identified above – organization, autonomy, centrality, democratic legitimacy, and so on – are those of an ideal type and as we shall be below, many are put under pressure by the process of globalization.

Finally, thinking about the ideas explored above may give the sensation that the state somehow has a life of its own, possessing its own will. However, it is important to realize that regardless of the factors that condition its existence, the state is ultimately a human product, a direct result of the conscientious actions of rational human beings.

*The Globalization Connection: The Network State*

In the above section on democracy, I made the point that globalization is a multifaceted concept and an agreement on a clear definition is far from being reached among scholars. It is not

\(^{71}\) Samatar 2002, pp. 9-12.
impossible, however, to identify at least some of its characteristics in order to underscore how they are affecting the nature of the state.

For Manuel Castells, the epoch of globalization – which he calls the Information Age – started with the 1970s, when breakthroughs in engineering and computer science enabled economies to rely on production schemes that act primarily on information processing. This in turn led towards economic reforms aimed at decentralization, flexibility and broadening markets which resulted in the adoption of networking as a new mode of production.

According to the author, a network is a set of interconnected nodes, which are strategic points, centered on the key function which they perform in the overall structure. Belongingness to different networks determines the distance between flows of capital and information, which are “purposeful, repetitive sequences of exchange and interaction between physically disjointed positions held by social actors.” Networks are open, protean structures, whose form depends on the constant reorganization of their internal hierarchies and their relation with other external networks.

These developments in turn pose formidable challenges to the state’s ability to exert control over the resources within its sovereign territory. On the one hand, financial markets annihilate temporal and spatial constraints to capital mobility; on the other hand, Castells argues that the nature of work has become more individualized and labor is fragmented between workers who are either highly educated or a “discardable” factor of production. Hence, social relationships are marked by inequality, polarization and social exclusion.

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72 Castells 2000a.
74 Ibid., p. 443.
75 Castells 2000c, p.379.
The state thus finds itself in a crisis of legitimacy: not only do flows of capital and information bypass is regulatory capacity – the Asian financial crisis of 1998 is a good example of this reality – but in its drive to maximize competitiveness the state has sacrificed its mission to correct market failures. Consequently, welfare policies are gradually being abandoned.

In response to this provocation, some countries have reacted by exchanging power for durability and regrouping in a system of global governance in which sovereignty is shared in the management of international affairs. In other words, networking as a mode of production gave birth to the network state, a chain of institutions through which prerogatives that were formerly unique to each country, such as the management of economic policy, migration and even defense is now exercised jointly.

The European Union today is the most advanced expression of this development. Composed of twenty-seven member states, the EU’s economic policies are highly integrated: sixteen of its members use a common currency and all of them are bound by the Maastricht treaty to do so, most likely by 2015. Moreover, member states delegated to the European Commission the power to represent them in trade disputes involving third parties. In terms of migration policies, EU citizens enjoy free movement within the Union’s borders. With respect to the judicial system, decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice are binding on all members. On the other hand, the EU’s security policy demonstrates that certain traditional features of the modern state may never reach such a degree of integration. When it comes to articulating a coherent foreign policy, the Union’s actions often seem characterized by dissonance. In this regard, the most recent example is the disagreement over the US military action in Iraq: Great Britain and several Eastern European states took a bold

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76 Castells 2000b, p. 330.
Atlanticist position in favor of America; France and Germany, however, reacted with criticism and the Union was incapable of speaking with a single voice.

What this example demonstrates is that the European version of the network state is still a project in motion, being tangible in some areas and only a promise in others. Nevertheless, its challenge to the traditional conception of the state as the sole master of political life within a given territory cannot be discounted.

IV. Conclusion

I started this Chapter by emphasizing that an analysis of this essay’s fundamental concepts is crucial to understanding the constitutive meanings lying at the heart of the strategic doctrines that will be discussed in Chapter II. Therefore, I proceeded to investigate the notions of democracy, power and the state from various theoretical angles so as to gain a deep, yet comprehensive discernment of the nature of these ideas.

With respect to democracy, I looked at interpretations that ranged from minimalist to substantial, from empirical to idealistic. All of them underscored democracy’s potential to extinguish social conflict by giving a voice to contending elites and some even held that it was the only viable form of government for both reasons that pertain to both internal organization, and external effects. Furthermore, transition to democracy was either credited as being synonymous with modernity or regarded with pessimism given that it required certain preconditions to succeed.

Concerning power, I adhered to a view which takes into consideration both overt and covert manifestations and brings clarity to such concepts as coercion, influence and authority. In
addition, this perspective focuses on situations of consent, not only those of conflict, and places the determination of political power in various contexts: the practical, the moral and the evaluative. Finally, I elaborated on the notion of political power in order to identify the characteristics of the modern state – such as autonomy, organization, centrality, etc. – and underscored how our traditional understanding of this idea is being changed by the process of globalization.

Before I move on the Chapter II, it is important to note that one idea which has been addressed implicitly so far throughout this essay is that of ideology. The profound role it plays in shaping democracy promotion strategies will be closely followed in the subsequent pages and fully articulated in Chapter V.
CHAPTER III:

American and European Perspectives

My goal in the previous Chapter was to build an analytical framework through which American and European policies of democracy promotion will be examined. The literature review thus expounded on the significance of three concepts: democracy, power and the state. First, I investigated various definitions which explain the meaning of democracy from minimalist, substantive, empirical and ideological vistas, as well as reviewed two theories of democratization – modernization theory and historical sociology. Second, I examined the notion of power, borrowing Stephen Lukes’ paradigm which distinguishes between one-dimensional, two-dimensional and tri-dimensional conceptions. The difference between them depends on whether we consider conflict to be a precondition for evaluating the power of social actors: if we do, then this phenomenon can be defined as the ability to affect the behavior of others in ways contrary to their interests; if we do not, then, we must examine power as the ability to reach consent, whether by coercion or persuasion. Finally, I analyzed Gianfranco Poggi’s treatment of the state as an organization of political power and juxtaposed it to more recent theoretical developments such as Manuel Castells’ notion of the network state.

The aim of this Chapter is to make the transition from theory to empirics. This will be done in two ways: first, I examine how a number of prominent American and European thinkers have shed light on the concepts of democracy, power and the state, giving a local color to the constitutive meanings previously examined more generally. With respect to the United States, my focus shall be on Neoconservatism, an intellectual tradition which is often credited – and frequently castigated – for shaping the Bush Administration’s assertive foreign policy. Regarding
Europe, one must acknowledge that performing a similar task is a more complex effort because unlike the US, the EU is not a fully coherent polity. Hence, its fragmented structure as an association of states is not as conducive towards theoretical and policy convergence on questions such as democracy, power and the state as that of a fully centralized entity. Yet for all its diversity, the European Union is still a common experience for twenty-seven countries and the future of Europe, a common concern. Thus, it is indeed possible to find the traces of a European political lingua franca which addresses these ideas in a unitary manner.

Second, I will examine how these intellectual contributions have percolated within the realm of foreign policymaking by comparing the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) to the European Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS). Here the Chapter will seek to identify how: (a) each strategic doctrine ascertains the threats to international peace and security; (b) the ways in which each document argues that democracy promotion can help counteract these problems; and (c) whether they are written in language characterized by ideological or technical formulations. This will set the stage for the case study examined in Chapter IV.

I. The Neoconservative Persuasion

The title of this section is borrowed an essay written by Irving Kristol in 2003. Then, in the light of accusations that Neoconservative thinkers and strategists have hijacked American foreign policymaking, he tried to elucidate the myths surrounding this set of ideas and its adherents. Kirstol’s concise but crisp response merits attention because, more than any other intellectual in the United States, he is considered the founder of this movement, an exponent of the first wave

Kristol 2003.
of disenchanted liberals who, after embracing Marxism in the 1930s, recanted their beliefs in the wake of Stalin’s purges. Eventually, they became fervent anti-communists. This sentiment was reinforced in the 1960s, when they perceived the liberals’ aversion towards the Vietnam War as a dangerous predicament for the position of the US in the world and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society as a social engineering project that echoed Soviet tendencies to constrain individual freedom. 

The Burdens of Power

Ironically, Kristol rejects the notion that Neoconservatism is a movement and instead defines it as a persuasion, “one that manifests itself over time, but erratically, and one whose meaning we clearly glimpse only in retrospect.” Analyzed in this way, Neoconservatism is not a cohesive stream of ideas, but rather a “set of attitudes derived from historical experience” about fundamental concepts such as democracy, power and the state.

Though Kristol concentrates on all these notions, the most significant part of his essay is dedicated to the idea of power and the way in which it conditions a country’s behavior in world politics. According to the author, for a great power such as the United States, the “national interest is not a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation.” Rather, national interest is more expansive in nature and is deeply intertwined with America’s ideological foundations, which center on the idea of democracy. This is why the US defended France and Great Britain in the Second World War and will continue to “feel obliged to

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78 Fukuyama 2004.
80 Ibid., p.3.
81 Ibid.
defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from non-democratic forces, external or internal\textsuperscript{82}. What makes this enterprise feasible is that in terms of hard power – to use Nye’s taxonomy – America is superior vis-à-vis all other nations. This is not the result of deliberate planning, but an unintended consequence of the Cold War: Europe was in a state of fragile peace which made it possible to divert funds from military spending to social policy; the Soviet Union relied on surrogates to fight its wars, while the United States was directly involved in conflicts in Korea and Vietnam\textsuperscript{83}. With the Soviet Union imploding, America emerged as uniquely powerful, much like the British Empire is said to have risen to prominence in a fit of absence of mind. And with power, Kristol argues, “come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether welcome or not,” for “when you have the kind of power we now have, either you find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you”\textsuperscript{84}. In other words, America has the means, the political power, to defend and promote democracy, which avowedly is in its own interest.

We may accept or reject Kristol’s argument, but on at least one level it is valuable because it adequately synthesizes the views espoused by Neoconservative intellectuals after the demise of the Cold War. An example that bears witness to this fact is that of Charles Krauthammer. Emphatically entitled \textit{The Unipolar Moment} (1990) or \textit{The Lonely Superpower} (1991), the pervasive thesis of his essays is that America enjoys an unparalleled position of power in the international system – and that this position means that the United States is responsible for keeping the world’s peace. Most importantly, this should be done confidently with the supreme goal of promoting democracy.

According to the author, scholars erroneously assumed that the demise of the Soviet Union would bring about a world that is multipolar and in which the threat of war would be

\textsuperscript{82} Kristol 2003, p.3.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p.4.
reduced. This view – reminiscent of Fukuyama’s end of history argument – is inaccurate because, first, the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world consisted of the United States at the apex of an industrial West, a fact which became evident during the first war against Saddam Hussein:

There is a much pious talk about a new multilateral world and the promise of the United Nations as guarantor of the new-post Cold War order. But this is to mistake cause and effect, the United Nations and the United States. The United Nations is a guarantor of nothing. Except in a formal sense, it can hardly be said to exist. Collective security? In the [Persian] gulf, without the United States leading and prodding…no one would have stirred. Nothing would have been done: no embargo, no [Operation] Desert Shield, no threat of force.

Indeed, the United States was supreme not only in the militarily, but also economically and diplomatically to an extent that it could be involved in whatever conflict it chose. Moreover, multilateralism – in so many ways the diplomatic idiom of Europe – was not only deceptive, but also perilous. On the one hand, it mistakes “the illusion – world opinion, UN resolutions, professions of solidarity – for the real thing, which is American power.” On the other hand, multilateralism can become a fetish and an end in itself, which will constrain America’s free exercise of power. It would thus be a means to escape the burdens of keeping the world’s peace and it can be regarded as nothing more than the “isolation of the internationalist.”

The focus on Operation Desert Shield also reflects what Krauthammer considers to be the second distinctive characteristic of the post-Cold war era, namely, that far from being a safer place, it is actually more prone to conflict. This view stems from a rather grim conception of globalization, according to which observers who often say that modern technology has shrunk the world have omitted the dangers that come with this development, the most frightening of

85 Krauthammer 1990, p.23.
86 Ibid., p.25.
88 Ibid.
which is nuclear proliferation. Whereas during the Cold War it was “inconceivable that a small Middle Eastern state with an almost entirely imported industrial base could do anything more than threaten its neighbors” in this new era “peripheral and backward states will be able to emerge rapidly as threats to regional and world security.” This type of new threat is epitomized by what the author calls “the Weapon State”, which is described in terms of three characteristics: (a) it is not much of a nation state, its borders being drawn artificially by past colonial protectors; (b) the state apparatus dominates civil society – most Weapon States are oil exporters, which allows them to bypass social arrangements that would put redistributive obligations on the bureaucracy; and (c) the Weapon State has deep grievances against the West, which drive its military development and make it subversive of the international order imposed by Western countries. His prognosis was that the 1990s and beyond would be abnormal times, “but the best hope for safety in such times is American strength and will…to lead the unipolar world unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them.”

This assessment and the prescription it requires was shared not only by Krauthammer – who nominated Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the most dangerous Weapon States – but was instead a creed embraced by many other right-wing intellectuals during the 1990s and beyond. Faced with a decline in the defense budget under the Clinton Administration, William Kristol and Robert Kagan argued that in a dangerous world, such a move would be unwise and the United States should strive for nothing less than benevolent global hegemony:

having defeated the ‘evil empire’ [the Soviet Union in the words of Ronald Reagan], the United States enjoys strategic and ideological predominance. The first objective of US foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America’s security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests and standing up for its principles around the world.

90 Ibid, pp.31-33.
This call was based on the assumption that United States’ allies are conscious that they are in a better position as friends of the United States, because “most of the world’s major powers welcome US global involvement and prefer America’s benevolent hegemony to the alternatives.”92 This is because American foreign policy, particularly that of President Reagan, was sustained by a clear moral purpose which stemmed from the “understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony.”93 In their own words, “the United States achieved its present position of strength in the world not by practicing a foreign policy of live and let live” but “by actively promoting American principles of governance abroad – democracy, free markets, respect for liberty.”94

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and America’s military intervention against the Taliban prompted this school of thought to reassess its core assumptions. In 2003, Krauthammer wrote *The Unipolar Moment Revisited*, in which he interpreted these events as a validation of the Neoconservative thesis. According to the author, “the two defining features of the new post-Cold War world remain: unipolarity and rogues state with weapons of mass destruction.”95 Indeed, this last element is a historical oddity and poses a challenge for the US because in spite of its unsurpassed power, it could not survive the effects of a nuclear terrorist attack against Washington. Hence, the Bush Administration’s policies of preemptive strikes and regime change usher in “an unprecedented assertion of American freedom of action and a definitive statement of new unilateralism.”96 And if managed wisely, Krauthammer argues that this strategy could be more effective than the liberal internationalist vision, which inevitably results in handcuffing the United States. Liberal internationalism is – as we shall see – the dominant view in Europe.

93 Ibid., p.27.
94 Ibid.
95 Krauthammer 2003, p.6.
96 Ibid., p.10.
The Neoconservative case for unilateralism thus possesses a strong moral connotation and holds that this doctrine is both strategically feasible and normatively acceptable because it “defines American interests broader than self-defense” to include “two global objectives: extending peace by promoting democracy and keeping the peace by acting as balancer of last resort.”97 Indeed, there can be no greater proof that the United States is animated by good intentions than the fact that US interventions are not aimed at conquest or the extraction of natural resources, but that on the contrary “America is the first hegemonic power in history obsessed with exit strategies.”98 As such, a US foreign policy that is both muscular in its implementation and moral in its objectives can still be considered the best solution for a safer world.

How do these arguments fit within the larger theoretical framework outlined in the previous Chapter? First, power understood in the Neoconservative sense is primarily one-dimensional, that is, it is examined and gauged solely in situations of conflict and success is dependent upon the ability of a political actor to impose its will upon others. As shown above, these thinkers see the world post-Cold War era as an age of rising turbulence, when America must play a hegemonic role to keep a fragile peace through the force of its military. Power is thus located in two contexts – one practical, the other moral. Yet moral purpose is not seen as contingent upon actions which aim at persuasion, soft power, consent or the mobilization of bias, all elements of a two-dimensional view. On the contrary, Neoconservatives argue that America should carry on a muscular foreign policy based on its military superiority and the assumption that other countries understand that the US defines its goals in more general and inclusive terms. For example, the US fights for freedom, not for territory, for democracy not for conquest.

97 Krauthammer 2003, p.15.
Democracy and the State

The Neoconservative argument for an American Goliath puts a heavy emphasis on power, but power should be maximized not for its own sake, but for the sake of promoting democracy and confronting “weapon states” that threaten world peace. In this part, I explore these theses more deeply.

Though strategies to promote democracy gained more impetus after the downfall of communism, they played a central role in America’s diplomatic efforts to contain the Soviet Union and were a leitmotif of Neoconservative thinking before 1989. In this regard, one of the main questions the movement – or persuasion – grappled with was the apparent paradox of calling for America to promote democracy abroad, i.e. to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries on behalf of self-government. This task faced two obstacles: one was logical – intervening in other countries often meant occupation, thus mocking the idea of democratic autonomy; the other one was that even though “democracy can be brought at the point of a bayonet, it flourishes best if the bayonets are quickly removed.”

How, then, could these tensions be reconciled?

The answer came in form of an unexpected blend of realpolitik and idealism, which meant justifying democracy promotion on grounds that are not only ideological, but also strategic. According to Charles Krauthammer, “to intervene solely on the basis of democratic morality is to confuse foreign policy with philanthropy”, while “to act purely for the reasons of strategy – to act imperially – is corrupting and unsustainable for a democracy.” In the context of the Cold War, however, America could overcome these constraints because securing the

100 Krauthammer 1985, p.10.
safety of the United States meant fighting for democratic values which people in other countries equally subscribed to. Moreover, this should be done unilaterally because (a) there is no other power capable of carrying out this mission; and (b) smaller states that might otherwise be supportive of America’s purpose, are subject to threats the US is immune to. They are thus not entirely free agents and America must act on their behalf.

The lessons of the Cold War, Neoconservatives argue, continue to be valid in the world post 9/11. When Weapon States are threatening global order, the proper mix of idealism and pragmatism is still the best recipe to defend America’s security. This is because the confrontations of yesteryear are not all that different from those of today, when America finds itself “in a similar existential struggle, but with a different enemy: Arab-Islamic totalitarianism, both secular and religious.” The answer to this crisis comes in the form of democratic globalism, a “foreign policy that defines national interest not as power, but as values, and that identifies the supreme value what John Kennedy called ‘the success of liberty’.” However, just as in the case of the Cold War, this policy is still limited by realistic concerns. Its axiom is that the United States will support democracy everywhere, but it will commit “blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity – meaning, places that are central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom.” In other words, Neoconservative statecraft combines both the normative and institutional rationales that justify the thesis of the democratic peace analyzed in Chapter II, but normative justifications for spreading democracy are based on assumptions that leaders of democratic nations will seek to resolve international conflicts in the same manner as they resolve domestic ones – through

101 Ibid., p.11.
103 Ibid.
peaceful negotiation. The logic is one of norm externalization. On the other hand, institutional racioneles are more pragmatic in nature and argue that political elites in democracies are accountable to their constituencies through mechanisms of checks and balances, which constrain possible bellicose intentions. In the Neoconservative scenario, normative and pragmatic actions are not mutually exclusive, but complementary.

Finally, the tensions inherent in the notion of democratic realism, a term Krauthammer uses interchangeably with democratic globalism, are also present in Neoconservative discussions about the role of the state. As mentioned in this section’s introductory remarks, Irving Kristol was one of the first disenchanted liberals to move to the right after being a Marxist. He did so after being horrified by the purges Stalin was conducting in the Soviet Union, and after realizing that the massive projects of social engineering undertaken led to terrible consequences. Thus, Fukuyama has claimed that this attitude explains the Neoconservative critique of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society. In the words of Adam Wolfson, for the “neoconservative the true road to serfdom lies in the efforts of libertarian and left-wing elites to mandate an anti-democratic social policy in the name of liberty”\textsuperscript{105}, discouraging an active and lively interest in public affairs.

This threat to democracy in turn brings into the discussion the notion of regime, which is central to Neoconservative thinking about both domestic and foreign affairs. The emphasis on this idea was borrowed from philosopher Leo Strauss, who understood regimes not in a modern way as merely a set of institutions, but in the classical sense explained by Plato and Aristotle, according to which formal political institutions and informal habits merge into one another\textsuperscript{106}. Regimes are thus ways of life and a democratic regime produces a particular kind of citizen, who

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p.28.
\textsuperscript{106} Fukuyama 2004, p.25.
in the words of Socrates, lives “day by day, gratifying the desire that occurs to him, whether this means physical pleasure or philosophy.” In politics “he engages in and says and does whatever chances come to him…and there is neither order, nor necessity in his life, but calling this life sweet, free and blessed he follows it throughout”.

According to Fukuyama, if regimes are considered crucial to shaping human behavior – especially those of the elites – one can draw two implications. The first one is that certain problems in the realm of world politics can be solved through regime change. This argument is implicit in the normative explanation of the democratic peace thesis and holds that countries’ “foreign policy reflects the values of their underlying societies. Regimes that treat their own citizens unjustly are likely to do the same to foreigners” and consequently, “efforts to change the behavior of tyrannical regimes will be less effective than changing the underlying nature of the regime.”

On the other hand, if regimes are to be understood in more than a formal sense, then one should be mindful that the unwritten rules by which people operate, based on religion, kinship and shared historical experience are also a part of the regime. As a result, regime change is an extremely difficult task and claims that it can be carried out easily should be received with much skepticism.

Though I underscored above that Neoconservatism displays both normative and pragmatic nuances, the classical understanding of the idea of a regime makes the normative element more powerful. Indeed, this becomes more evident when we link the Neoconservative conception of democracy to the broader paradigm elaborated in the literature review. In the previous Chapter, my analysis of this phenomenon centered on four interpretations: (a) a

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107 Fukuyama 2004, p.25.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., p.29.
110 Ibid., p.30.
minimalist view, which holds that democracy is a set of rules and institutions for processing conflicts between social agents whose interests might otherwise collide; (b) a more inclusive, substantive understanding, which links democracy to citizenship and actual participation in shaping political decisions; (c) an empirical understanding, focusing on procedures that ensure the pluralist representation of all social actors; and (d) an idealist/universalist perspective, arguing that above and beyond institutional aspects, democracy is the only viable political system. In this context, Neoconservatism displays an unapologetic embrace of idealism, yet its prescription that norms are not divergent from strategic priorities often gives the impression that it aims to tame its global reach with minimalist precautions.

Moreover, the literature review examined the concept of the state and drew a distinction between (a) a centralized entity, characterized by Gianfranco Poggi as a subset of political power; and (b) a network state, defined by Manuel Castells as chain of institutions created by countries who voluntarily give up sovereignty in order to resolve questions of global governance that surpass their regulatory power. The latter implies that multilateralism becomes the modus operandi of tackling global problems, including world threats to international peace and security. In this regard, the Neoconservative persuasion is skeptical of this strategy and urges for America to reject the constraints imposed by such arrangements. Instead, the US should act boldly in pursuit of its goals and should reject agreements that limit the scope of its policies.

II. Europe’s Postmodern Dilemmas

Having analyzed how American Neoconservatives think about democracy, power and the state in relation to the US’s mission in the international arena, this section will perform a similar task
with regard to Europe. In this sense, Kristol’s definition of Neoconservatism as a persuasion, i.e. a set of convergent attitudes about fundamental political questions rather than a strong current, can be applied to discuss the way in which European thinkers have conceptualized the EU’s role in the world. Whereas in the case of the United States, the preponderant analytical concept was that of power, in the European scenario this role is fulfilled by the notion of the state. This is one of this essay’s fundamental claims.

*The European Union as a Postmodern State*

In order to understand the nature of the European Union as an international actor, Robert Cooper argues that first one must put things in an historical perspective focused on the development of the state. This is marked by three stages: in Antiquity, the choice was between either chaos or empire, for imperialism in those days was synonymous with order, culture and civilization. Its only alternative was barbarism. Empires, however, were not easily adaptable to change, and smaller states proved to be more dynamic actors. This is because states managed to concentrate power – especially the power to monopolize violence and enforce the law – in a single institution, which is to say that they became sovereign\(^{111}\). This sixteenth century development assured Europe’s rise to world dominance, but politically, it also ushered in era of ceaseless conflict, justified intellectually by notions such as raison d’état and balance of power. Hence, the price of domestic order was international chaos, as epitomized by the confrontations between Europe’s colonial empires outside the continent.

Balance of power and raison d’état, ideas belonging to the tradition of realpolitik, were responsible for the two conflagrations that devastated Europe at the onset of the twentieth

\(^{111}\) Cooper 2003, p.8.
century and reached their zenith in the Cold War. For in Cooper’s view, the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union was an oversimplified, concentrated version of nineteenth century European politics writ large, which, like its predecessor, was unsustainable. The reason was that even though this system managed to ensure a degree of order, its legitimacy was founded on ideas such as spheres of influence and balance of terror, but the ideologies of both sides were universal and rejected the other’s existence. When this paradigm finally became exhausted in 1989, a new international system rose on its ashes.

Using the relationship between law and force as the primary analytical tool, Cooper argues that today’s international system is one of multiple “time-zones”. First, there is the chaotic, premodern world, in which the state has imploded, order has broken down and violence is the norm. This is the predatory and cadaverous state, mentioned in Chapter II, where government institutions have lost monopoly over force and have been replaced by criminal networks who often fight for economic resources. Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Chechnya – all of them are examples of state failure and descent into anarchy. In other cases such as Somalia, the loss of identity which comes as a result of state collapse is supplemented by the rise of religion. Most importantly, state failure is not an isolated phenomenon and as the recent history of some parts of Africa shows, it can be contagious. This can be a formidable threat to international peace and security, for if “non-state actors, notably drug or terrorist syndicates take to using pre-modern bases for attacks to the more orderly parts of the world, the organized states will eventually have to respond.”

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112 Ibid., pp.10-12.
114 Ibid., p. 16.
115 Cooper 2003, p. 66.
116 Ibid., p.18.
This situation could mean the birth of a new, defensive imperialism, which would have to be carried out by organized, modern states. They constitute the second “time-zone” in Cooper’s paradigm, one in which the state is still sovereign, where foreign and domestic policy are insulated from one another and participation in international institutions is contingent upon national interest\textsuperscript{117}. The most robust modern state is the US: its diplomatic conduct is driven by the use of force and military alliances and by the rejection of interdependence and multilateralism\textsuperscript{118}. More than being just modern, the United States also has an imperial tinge in its desire to spread democracy, which, as shown in the previous section, is not without its contradictions\textsuperscript{119}.

Finally, Cooper argues that the third dimension is that of the postmodern world, which is characterized by the redefinition of sovereignty, the overlapping of foreign and internal policy, a high degree of institutional integration and a lesser preoccupation with power politics in favor of the promotion of the rule of law\textsuperscript{120}. In this case, “the state system of the modern state is also collapsing, but unlike the premodern, it is collapsing into greater order rather than disorder.”\textsuperscript{121} The only political entity that fits this description is the European Union, whose development was made possible by two treaties: (a) the 1957 Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community, which was a conscious effort to go beyond the nation state; and (b) the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, which set up a framework of mutual interference in countries’ military affairs. Signatories are obliged to notify one another of the location of their heavy weapons and so far more than 50,000 pieces items of military equipment, ranging from tanks to

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., pp. 19-21.  
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 47.  
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 49  
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 50.  
\textsuperscript{121} Cooper 2003, p.26.
helicopters – have been destroyed. In other words, “the legitimate monopoly on force that is the essence of modern statehood is subject to international – but self-imposed – constraints.”\textsuperscript{122}

All of these traits echo Manuel Castells’ definition of the network state explored in Chapter II, according to which the European Union is a chain of institutions created by countries who willingly give up a share of their sovereignty to build regulatory bodies which address problems that surpass their individual ability to solve them. This explains why the EU stresses the importance of multilateralism and commonly agreed standards in its diplomatic conduct, for “the more the postmodern network is extended [either through membership or partnership] the less risk there will be from neighbors and more resources to defend the community without becoming excessively militarized.”\textsuperscript{123} Hence, we see here a rather similar case to that of the United States, in which certain values are upheld not only for their own sake, but also because they are instrumental to the accomplishment of foreign policy objectives. Yet the difference in tone is quite remarkable and reflects deeper divisions. On the one hand, the Neoconservatives voice their bold judgment that America’s foreign policy objectives are advantageous for both the United States and the rest of the world; there is no talk about mutually agreed upon norms, but a call for other states to acknowledge America’s benevolent hegemony. On the other hand, the EU speaks the language of dialogue and is willing to push for its objectives not only through coercion, but also through influence. In other words, the postmodern state adopts a two-dimensional view of power, a position which is more aware of the reality that security can be enhanced not only through coercion, but also through influence and the mobilization of bias. This point will be elaborated more in the following subsection.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p.27.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p.78.
If the European Union aims to spread its norms through cooperation; if the United States still relies on the use of force as a primary foreign policy instrument; and if – as Cooper argues – the dangers of the premodern world mandate a new, defensive imperialism, how can the EU cope with these challenges? According to the author, the postmodern state must get used to the idea of double standards, which is to say that among themselves, such states can operate on the basis of laws and cooperative security, but when dealing with other types of states, Europeans should resort to the rougher methods of the earlier era, including the use of force. Though the corollary of this argument is that European and American strategies are actually compatible, so far there has been a considerable reluctance on behalf of the EU to act as a modern state. Most importantly, the idea of Europe as a more forceful actor is at the moment only a prospect and at most a goal for certain European foreign policymakers. Soft power, as we shall see, is still the preferred option.

**Power in the Postmodern State**

Even though the above subsection concentrated primarily on the nature of the European Union as a postmodern state, it implicitly addressed the idea of power: if Europe has a broader understanding of security, favoring multilateralism and interdependence over unilateralism – or strategies of oxygen rather than those of asphyxiation – this implies that the EU’s behavior is founded on a different set of assumptions concerning the nature of power. What might these assumptions be?

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124 Cooper 2003, p.63.
To begin with, one must note that the European Union started out as a deliberate effort to go beyond power politics, or to paraphrase the Neoconservatives, beyond interests expressed as power. Writing in 1962, Jean Monnet clearly stated that

One impression predominates in my mind over all others. It is this: unity in Europe does not create a great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe and consequently, in the world. People are often tempted to see the European Community as a potential nineteenth-century state…But the Europeans have built the European Community precisely to find a way out of the conflicts to which nineteenth-century philosophy gave rise.\textsuperscript{126}

This belief, coupled with the subsequent development of supranational institutions and the gradual expansion of EU through the integration process led to creation of a school of thought which held that the Union can best be described as a civilian power. This theory was originally formulated in the 1970s by Francois Duchene, who argued that Europe was becoming “the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more with the twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilized politics.”\textsuperscript{127}

The first criterion by which a civilian power could be recognized is its foreign policy objectives. Unlike a traditional, modern state that seeks “possession goals” such as bolstering national interests, a civilian, postmodern power aims for “structural goals”, which concentrate on shaping the environment in which states interact and are pursued through instruments such as regional cooperation, association agreements and institutionalized dialogue. This in turn gives rise to a diplomatic strategy which targets economic and social structure.\textsuperscript{128} For instance, starting 1996, the European Union has stressed the importance of sustainable peace as a durable means of conflict prevention in all its Common Positions and Presidency Statements at the United Nations.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Manners2002} Manners 2002, p. 182.
\bibitem{Ibid2002} Ibid., p. 184.
\bibitem{Smith2003} Smith 2003, p. 107.
\end{thebibliography}
on topics related to struggles in Bosnia, Macedonia, Africa or Afghanistan. It involves “both short term problem solving and long-term structural solutions to conflict prevention through the integration of human security concerns and the promotion of good governance.”\textsuperscript{129} In other words, EU strategy focuses on the need to build indigenous capacity for resolving internal tensions before they lead to violence\textsuperscript{130}, which highlights that although over the \textit{longue duree} Europe aims for other countries to share its norms, in the short run its foreign policy rationales are primarily institutional and procedural.

Therefore, the means through which these purposes are to be accomplished reflect other criteria which make Europe a civilian power, including: (a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in pursuit of international objectives; (b) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals; and (c) a willingness to develop supranational institutions to address critical issues of international management\textsuperscript{131}. Moreover, these traits are not only the result of the EU’s deliberate choice, but are also conditioned by its structure, which some scholars argue that is actually conducive to civilian or normative actoriness. These traits include: Europe’s devastating historical experience with conflict, the emphasis on legalism in the formulation and implementation of the Union’s various policies and the hybrid nature of its polity\textsuperscript{132}.

This conception of Europe as an international actor reveals a more sophisticated view of power than that of the United States. As stated above, it is two-dimensional in the sense that while it does not discard the role of coercion in achieving diplomatic objectives, its accent is on

\textsuperscript{129} Manners 2006, p.185.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Smith 2004a, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{132} Sjursen 2006, p. 242.
cooperation, consent and influence rather than the use of force. Moreover, even when coercion is exercised, this happens – in Poggi’s terminology – in the form of economic, not political power.

*Democratic Legalism vs. Democratic Realism*

The thesis that the EU acts as a civilian power and a postmodern state explains why the Union’s attitude vis-à-vis democracy is marked by legalism, thus reflecting the way in which enlargement and integration have shaped the Union’s course of action in this domain. According to Article 11(1) of the Treaty for European Union (TEU), the EU shall “define and implement a common foreign and security policy […] the objectives of which shall be to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”\(^\text{133}\). Similarly, Articles 177(2) and 181a(1) of the Treaty for European Community orient the EU’s development and economic strategies towards the same direction. A concretization of this strategy was the PHARE Democracy Program, through which the European Union offered economic assistance for restructuring to Poland and Hungary and then to most candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Its declared objective was

> to support the activities and efforts of non-governmental bodies promoting a stable open society and good governance and focuses support on the difficult or unpopular aspects of political reform and democratic practice, where local advocacy bodies are weak and professional expertise lacking\(^\text{134}\).

The program started in 1989 and funded a variety of small scale projects aimed to deepen democracy, including support for trade unions, professional associations, training of parliament members, thus concentrating on citizen involvement in democratic reform\(^\text{135}\).

\(^{133}\) Baracani 2004, p.7.
\(^{134}\) Grugel 2002, p. 128.
\(^{135}\) Ibid.
What this reflects is that at the level of official policy, democratization is understood in structural terms as a long-term process, which should be managed with patience and skepticism. The EU’s help is thus conditional upon local performance and membership comes only after candidate countries are ready to join the Union. For example, in 1993 the Union established the Copenhagen criteria for membership, which stipulated that functional institutions that guarantee the rule of law and the respect for human rights were a sine qua non for any country planning for accession. Further in 1998, the EU issued a declaration on human rights in which it proclaimed that “the indivisibility for human rights and the promotion plaristic democracy serve as a fundamental basis for [Europe’s] action”\textsuperscript{136}. These developments are normative in terms of significance, but instutitional in terms of their consequences. They highlight the belief that the road to membership is long and difficult and democratic miracles should not be expected to appear suddenly. Indeed, “making the East ready to ‘join’ Europe has been the leitmotiv of EU policies, rather than than the more idealistic and full commitment to democracy”\textsuperscript{137}.

This is both similar to and different from the American perspective. It is similar in the sense that just like the United States, the European Union seeks a balance between commiting to certain values – which would imply an almost universal engagement on their behalf – and seeing the instrumental role which they play for the EU’s interests. Yet while in the US, the Neoconservative parlance of democracy – or democratic realism – is characterized by a heavy moral emphasis to the extent that certain scholars argue that America’s unilateralism is virtuous, this kind of language is absent from EU policy statements and is regarded with suspicion by academics.

\textsuperscript{136} Smith 2004b, p.37.
\textsuperscript{137} Grugel 2002, p. 127.
III. American and European Strategic Doctrines

The previous two sections analyzed American and European conceptions of democracy, power and the state. I showed that Neoconservatives’ understanding of democracy promotion is determined by how they see America’s power status in the world, while in the case of Europe, this depends on how one conceptualizes the EU as a new type of state entity. The essay shall now continue to discover how these mindsets, worldviews or constitutive meanings inform strategic doctrines. However, before I begin the comparison between the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) and the European Security Strategy (ESS), it must be mentioned that with respect to the former, both its 2002 and 2006 versions will be taken under scrutiny. This is because although in this essay the most recent version takes precedence, a rigorous analysis cannot treat it in isolation from its initial formulation in 2002. The 2002 NSS was the first document in which the Bush Administration outlined how it would address the threats America faced post 9/11, and its core assumptions still inform the latest iteration.

Visions of Danger: The NSS and the ESS

One may begin by noting that the NSS (both in 2002 and 2006) and the ESS have two radically different historical points of departure. For the NSS, the twentieth century was marked by the confrontation between democracy and totalitarianism and “ended with the decisive victory of the forces of freedom and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise.”\textsuperscript{138} Consequently, today the United States has a privileged hegemonic position in the international system, which is maintained by faith in the values of a free and open society,

\textsuperscript{138} National Security Council 2002.
but which also implies the exceptional responsibility of defending these principles because they enjoy universal validity.\(^{139}\) With respect to the threats that the US faces in the wake of 9/11, President Bush declares in his introductory remarks to the 2002 NSS that “the gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”\(^{140}\) Specifically, the enemy is terrorism and the struggle against it is perceived as a new kind of existential battle for the United States, which will be fought over an extended period of time.\(^{141}\) Yet terrorism is far from being a solitary danger. To the contrary, it comes in a triad with rogue regimes and the proliferation for weapons or mass destruction (WMD) because “we must stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to use them against the United States.”\(^{142}\) This is entirely consistent with the Neoconservative analysis discussed above: the world in the post-Cold War era is not more secure, but rather more threatened by “weapon states”, which become instruments in the existential struggle between democracy and Arab-Islamic totalitarianism.

The same sense of great danger and opportunity permeates the 2006 NSS. Writing three years after the war in Iraq begun, the President is unequivocal in his introductory letter about the current state of affairs in which the US lies: “America is at war” and NSS is “a wartime strategy required by the grave challenge we face: the rise of terrorism, fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder.”\(^{143}\) In comparison to its predecessor, the most recent NSS is formulated on the same basic tenets and identifies the same threats, but differs in at least two respects: (1) each section contains a brief progress report with the successes and challenges since 2002, which includes details about Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq; and (2) it addresses a serious shortcoming of the 2002 NSS, namely, that in spite of the “significance attributed to terrorism,

\(^{139}\) Duke 2004, p.462.  
\(^{140}\) National Security Council 2002.  
\(^{141}\) Duke 2004, p.462.  
\(^{143}\) National Security Council 2006.
there is little [in the document] to actually help the reader understand the nature of the terrorist threat and how it might be addressed.”¹⁴⁴ In contrast, the 2006 version identifies four reasons which explain the rise of global terrorism: two of them are ideological and refer to (a) the rhetoric of historical injustices, which are constantly revived in order to fuel the thirst for revenge, and (b) the perversion of Islam as a religion in order to justify the killing of innocents. The other two attribute the rise of global terrorism to the lack of democracy, as terrorists are (c) recruited from groups of individuals with no political voice in their societies and (d) belong to socio-political milieus devoid of transparency – the worldview of the groups suicide bombers come from is distorted by conspiracy theories and false information¹⁴⁵. This is a concretization of Krauthammer’s stance that a common element in the DNA of weapon states is the state’s domination over civil society and their exploitation of deep historical grievances vis-à-vis the West in the service of their rise to greater power.

If the tone and content of the NSS reveal the deep sense of alarm caused by the threat of global terrorism, rogue regimes and weapons of mass destruction, the ESS, while fully cognizant of these dangers, paints a different picture of the world. To begin with, the historical reference point for this document is not the Cold War and the victory of freedom over totalitarianism, but the success story of European integration. Indeed, the first sentence of the ESS proclaims that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” and that “the creation of the European Union has been central to this development.”¹⁴⁶ Whereas the NSS credits America’s unparalleled political status in the world to its attachment to democratic values, the ESS focuses on Europe’s unavoidable mission to become a more proactive international actor: “As a union of 25 [now 27] states with over 450 million people and a quarter of the world’s GNP, the EU is

inevitably a global player” and “should be ready to share in the responsibility for a global security and in building a better world.”

Therefore, a critical distinction between the NSS and the ESS is that the former is written in the language of actuality – the US is the world’s sole superpower and must protect its security –, whereas the latter is formulated in the language of potentiality: the EU should come to terms with its weight as a top player in the world arena and move from mere “presence” towards greater “actorness.”

This point is perhaps best illustrated in the way in which the ESS discusses the main threats to international peace and security: unlike the NSS, it “acknowledges the existence of threats, but they are portrayed as issues that have to be taken seriously since Europe could be confronted by a radical challenge.” Specifically, the sources for these radical challenges are (1) terrorism, for which Europe serves both as a target and as a base; (2) the proliferation of WMD, regarded as potentially the greatest threat to the EU’s security. The ESS recognizes that “the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction;” (3) regional conflicts – whether violent or frozen, they persist at the Union’s borders and threaten it both directly and indirectly; (4) state failure – this differs from the American notion of “rogue states”, although the same countries are being held under scrutiny, such as Somalia or Afghanistan under the Taliban; interestingly enough – and without giving examples – , the ESS mentions “a number of states that have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society,” who are only encouraged to rejoin the international community; and finally (5) organized crime – a multifaceted threat that challenges the EU’s internal stability. This assessment is entirely consistent with Cooper’s notion that the zones of

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147 Ibid.
149 European Council 2003, p.3.
150 European Council 2003, p.10.
chaos, where law and order have broken down and the state apparatus has been hijacked by crime syndicates, represent the most formidable challenge to both the US and the EU.

To sum up, the American and European strategic doctrines perceive the threats to international peace and security in ways that are significantly distinct: the US is fully conscious of its role as the world’s most powerful international actor, but sees terrorism, rogue regimes and Islamist ideology as existential threats which require swift action. The EU, however, has a more eclectic perception of the factors that imperil its security: apart from those already identified by the United States, organized crime and state failure are considered as primary dangers. To paraphrase Cooper, the postmodern state is aware of the premodern elements that threaten its survival.

*Democracy: A Recipe against all Evils?*

In this context, how do America and Europe plan to counteract the perils that put their citizens at risk? For the United States, the antidote against these ills is not difficult to conceive, for if the Cold War ended with the victory of democracy over dictatorship, and if the same battle is being fought now in a different guise, it follows that the only winning answer is a genuine commitment to promote democracy. Indeed, the first paragraph of the 2002 NSS declares that the “values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society – and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe.”\(^{152}\) Based on this assumption, the purpose of American “statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system” because doing so is “the best way to provide

\(^{152}\) National Security Council 2002.
enduring security for the American people.”153 As in the Neoconservative analysis, the United States embraces the thesis of the democratic peace for both idealistic and strategic reasons: according to the 2006 NSS, since “democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts, countering terrorism; and extending peace and prosperity.”154

Surveying the policy recommendations that the 2006 NSS advocates in order to effectively tackle terrorism is a good way to understand how this philosophy is to be applied. I mentioned that the document identifies four factors that explain the growing magnitude of this phenomenon. To each of them, the NSS claims that the promotion of democracy offers an effective solution. For instance, in place of political alienation “democracy offers an ownership stake in society” and “a chance to shape one’s own future;“155 with respect to conspiracy and misinformation, democracy allows for “freedom of speech and an independent media which can expose and discredit dishonest propaganda”;156 regarding the calls for violent revenge against historical injustices and the perversion of Islam to legitimize suicide bombing, “democracy offers the peaceful resolution of disputes and the respect for human dignity that abhors the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians”157. Consequently, all the instruments required to fight these evils appear to be embedded in the fabric of democratic societies, which the US seeks to sustain and advance through a variety of means, ranging from public diplomacy, to development aid, military assistance and working within the framework of international organizations. Though all of the these avenues of action matter, the document makes it clear that America’s behavior

156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
shall not be constrained by other countries, a view clearly justified by Neoconservative strategic and normative presuppositions.

Before I move on to discuss the ESS, two prescriptions of the NSS should be kept in mind given their relevance to this essay, especially the case study in Chapter IV. First, although the document states that “freedom cannot be imposed, but must be chosen”, it also qualifies this assertion by noting that while in some cases the US “will lend more quiet support to lay the foundations of freedom,” and in others it will “take vocal and visible steps on behalf of immediate [my emphasis] change.”

Second, both the 2002 and the 2006 NSS make specific references to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: in the former version, it is mentioned that “there can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides” and that “America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestinian state living beside Israel in peace and security;” in the latter document, however, the language on the same matter is less abstract and the focus is on the Hamas’ responsibilities as an elected governing party in the Palestinian territories: although elections are the most visible sign of a free and democratic society, only a commitment by Hamas to the equality of all citizens, minority rights, civil liberties and the peaceful resolution of disputes would make it a legitimate political actor. Otherwise, this “government cannot be considered fully democratic, however it might have taken office.”

Meanwhile, since the ESS is less alarmist about the threats to Europe’s security, its remedies are equally reflective of this perception. For the US, what is at stake in the fight against terrorism is the survival of democracy in the world, which is synonymous with boosting America’s security. The EU, while acknowledging that the line of defense against these new perils will often be abroad, sees no clear-cut answers to these complex and interconnected

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158 Ibid., p.6.
problems. On the contrary, responding to each threat requires a mixture of instruments. For example, combating terrorism effectively is impossible without combining “intelligence, police, judicial and other means;”161 proliferation may be “contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures,” while simultaneously “tackling the underlying political causes.”162 Most importantly, given that in the era of globalization geography still matters, Europe is concerned with the security of its vicinity and in this regard, the ESS stipulates that “our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.”163 This is a crucial difference with the NSS, which clearly states that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”164 In contrast, the EU recognizes that “spreading good governance [and not democracy!], supporting political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening international order.”165 Hence, in this document the EU strives to foster good governance and political reform in order to create a cordon sanitaire around its borders. Whenever the promotion of democracy is mentioned, it is done so within the context of European integration166 and not specifically as a goal to be advanced in its relations with other international actors. Two factos may explain this difference: first, the conception of Europe as a civilian power means that the EU choses to forward its goals primarily through cooperation mechanisms such as partnerships and association agreements. Hence, declaring

162 Ibid.
165 European Council 2003, p.10.
166 Ibid., p.6.
straightforward that democracy promotion is one of the Union’s foremost objectives my hinder communications with states that are not as democratic and the choice for stability may only be a diplomatic subterfuge. Second, I emphasized above that the EU’s democracy programs such as PHARE reveal the Union’s conception that democratic change is a long term process. Consequently, the goals of promoting good governance and the rule of law refer to actual steps that should be taken over a long period of time.

Correlated to these objectives is a plan to operationalize them that differs both in scope and in substance from that of the NSS. While the US strategy (both in 2002 and 2006) is “truly global in its outlook” and takes on “an international mandate to expand the benefits of freedom around the globe”\(^1\), the ESS’s area of concentration is regional, even though the title of the document *A Secure Europe in a Better World* reflects Europe’s aim to make its normative aspirations more prominent. Most importantly, both documents aim to spread democracy (the NSS) and good governance (the ESS) in cooperation with other partners, but while the US relies on a distinct brand of American internationalism that combines values and national interests in order to forge an alliance of free-loving nations against terror\(^2\), the EU’s plan is to build an international order based on effective multilateralism. This strategy is inspired by the history of EU integration and implies upholding the norms of international law, working within the framework of international institutions such as the UN and making use of policy instruments related to trade, assistance and conditionality\(^3\). Furthermore, this reflects the belief that in a globalized world “there are few problems we can deal with on our own,”\(^4\) while the NSS is fully confident in the power of America to fulfill its global mission. In other words, while for the

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\(^1\) Duke 2004, p. 468.
\(^3\) European Council 2003, pp. 9-10.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 13.
EU – a civilian power and a postmodern state – cooperation is intrinsic to successfully tackling the threats to Europe’s security, for the US – a modern state whose policymakers espouse a unidimensional view of power – cooperation has become instrumentalized and is contingent upon the context in which democracy must be promoted. As it was mentioned above, the 2006 NSS declares that while America’s principles are firm, its tactics will vary.

Two further points regarding the ESS are worthy of attention. First, just like the NSS, the European document devotes some space to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the focus is not on quintessential role that democracy can play in finding a peaceful settlement, but on the relevance of the Israeli-Palestinian question to the larger problems that haunt the region and on the importance of international cooperation. For Europe, “the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority” without which “there will be little chance of dealing with the other problems of the Middle East.” To this end, the two-state solution which Europe has long advocated for requires a “united effort by the European Union, United States, the United Nations and Russia [all members of the Middle East Quartet], but above all by Israelis and Palestinians.” Secondly, although the ESS mentions intervention only in the context of failing states and as a potential option that needs to be exploited in the future, the final lines of the document refer to the EU-US relations and declare that “acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.” Thus, while Europe does not seek to promote good governance and reform in a forceful manner, the military option does not seem to disappear from the toolbox that Europe is intent on having at its disposal if it is to play a greater role in international politics.

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171 Rickli 2004, p.57.
174 European Council 2003, pp.11-12.
175 Ibid., p. 13. The emphasis is mine.
When it comes to the promotion of democracy, the NSS and the ESS remain different in both form and content. In the former, democracy is presented as a universal value which America must defend at all costs. As a concept, the NSS does not define it, but takes for granted the presumption that it enjoys universal validity. In fact, the word “democracy” appears 52 times in the 54 page 2006 document; additionally, the word “freedom” appears in 80 instances and “liberty” in 22. Consequently, it is difficult for the reader not get a sense that far more than being a security strategy, the NSS is in reality a creed, an enumeration of the articles of faith that guide the post-9/11 political agenda of the United States. In contrast, in the ESS the word democracy appears three times, the word freedom twice and the concept of governance (good, bad or global) five times in a document the length of which is about a third of that of the NSS. In terms of language, the ESS is far more procedural and as we have seen above in the example of terrorism, its prescriptions are less normative.

One explanation for why this is the case may be that since the EU is supranational organization of 27 states, it is much more difficult for a particular school of thought to impose a dogmatic understanding of the role democracy plays in tackling the threats which confront the Union. In contrast to the US – where after each election the winning party can translate its political vision into reality without too many structural hindrances, except for the checks and balances enshrined in the Constitution – policy-making in the EU is a process of constant deliberation. Decision by consensus in the European Council means that political formulae must be palatable to all member states. Since framing policy in technical terms makes it easier to fulfill this requirement, it is not surprising that the ESS is much more concise and its language
less ideological. We will explore whether or not this is a strength in the third section of this essay.

If the difference between the US goal of spreading democracy and the EU’s purpose of spreading good governance seems blurry, the comments of the Europe’s CFSP representative Javier Solana on this matter may give us more insights. According to him, “in the Middle East and elsewhere, democratic change is a long term process” and “to succeed, democratic movements have to be home-grown and adapted to local conditions,” as each society “must find its own path and move forward at its own pace.”\textsuperscript{176} What outside actors can do is “to help create a context conducive to political change” and “once change is under way, they can support and reward reformist forces.”\textsuperscript{177} This differs sharply from the American notion that while in some cases the US will be only lend passive support for the democratic agenda, in others it will push for immediate change. In addition, Solana believes that a culture of dialogue with regional partners can be more effective than coercion or isolation: he advocates for Europe to use its “sticky” power to “attract, stabilize and transform,” for close cooperation with Middle Eastern countries enables the EU to raise concerns over the direction and speed of political change. On the basis of his experience, Solana writes that “often a quiet word about the plight of a dissident can have more impact than a high-profile speech.”\textsuperscript{178}

\textbf{IV. Conclusion}

This Chapter had a dual goal: on the one hand, it aimed to solidify the theoretical framework developed in the literature review by examining how American and European thinkers relate the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{176} Solana 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Solana 2005.
\end{itemize}
concepts of democracy, power and the state to their prescriptions for the roles which the US and the EU should play in the world; on the other hand, I also tried to apply this framework in order to ascertain how these prescriptions are incorporated into official US and EU strategic doctrines.

With respect to the first objective, I focused on Neoconservatism and showed how this intellectual current’s views on American power condition its standpoints on democracy promotion and the role of the state. This endeavor led my analysis to such ideas as democratic realism, benevolent hegemony, the merger of normative and the pragmatic foreign policy objectives and the weapon state. The section on Europe concentrated on theoretical attempts to shed light on the nature of the EU as a political entity, which in turn prompted a discussion on the notions of postmodern state, civilian power and democratic legalism.

Regarding the second part of the argument, the paper compared and contrasted the 2006 and 2002 versions of the National Security Strategy of the United States with the 2003 European Security Strategy. It revealed that in spite of its awesome power, the US sees the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century as more dangerous than during the time of the Cold War, yet similar in the sense that it is marked by an existential struggle between democracy and (Islamic) totalitarianism. The only solution is more democracy, which should be promoted more vigorously abroad as a crucial element of American grand strategy. Moreover, I also showed how these strategic options are linked to Neoconservative thinking and how in the case of Europe, its less alarmist approach, as well as its emphasis on long-term processes of democratic change can be traced to its postmodern state structure, its original intention of becoming a civilian power and to the tradition of democratic legalism.

The following step in my argument is to test how these strategies are applied on the ground. This task shall be taken up in the following Chapter.
CHAPTER IV:

Hamas and the Disappointments of Democracy

One of the most important points underscored in Chapter I was that in the aftermath of the Cold War, both the United States and the European Union focused on democracy promotion as a key objective on the agenda of US-EU relations. This aim was enshrined in several policy documents such as the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration and pervaded – with notable strategic differences – even the rift between the American and some Western European governments caused by the former’s decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003.

Today, even though the US and EU have not abandoned their attachment for democratization, its impetus seems to have lost momentum in many parts of the world. According to Thomas Carothers, Latin America finds itself in a situation characterized by citizen discontent, challenges to democratic institutions and heightened polarization179. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia is experimenting a semi-authoritarian project which has delivered steady economic growth, driven by a surge in the prices of oil and gas. Countries such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Chad and Venezuela are in a similar position, with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez proclaiming “Bolivarian Democracy” as a more suitable political alternative than the one promoted by the West180. And then there is China, a country whose communist leadership has managed to combine tight political control and the suppression of human rights with aggressive capitalism. This recipe has lifted millions from poverty in the last decade.

179 Carothers 2007, p.12.
180 Ibid., p.13.
As Carothers points out, these developments pose an ideological counter-narrative to the Western liberal democratic model, exerting a powerful appeal to countries in the Middle East\textsuperscript{181}. Hence, Alexandre Kojeve’s notion that Western liberal democracy is synonymous with the “universal homogenous state” discussed in the literature review is under fire and the US and EU efforts to spread democracy are perceived with growing skepticism and in some cases, with open hostility. This seems to be the case even in America, where given the evolution of the Iraq War, public support for democracy promotion has dwindled: in a 2006 poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund for the United States, fewer than half of the respondents (45 percent) agreed that advancing democracy abroad should be a priority of US foreign policy\textsuperscript{182}. Consequently, both the external and internal pressures on the United States and the European Union to deliver on their commitments to democratization in the Middle East and the Palestinian territories are high. The prospects of failure could have long-lasting consequences on the US and EU’s reputation in world politics.

My purpose in this Chapter shall be to (a) investigate how the US and EU have implemented their democratization agendas after Hamas won the Palestinian elections in January 2006; (b) test the impact of their decisions; and (c) use this case study to answer the research questions formulated in Chapter I.

I. America, Europe and Middle East Democracy

In Chapter III, I emphasized that one of the most significant differences between the United States security framework (the NSS) and its European counterpart (the ESS) is that they are

\textsuperscript{181} Carothers 2007, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p.1.
formulated against the backdrop of a different historical experience. For the former, it is the demise of the Cold War and its interpretation as a victory of freedom against tyranny that informs America’s current response to the surge in global terrorism. For Europe, its strategic accent on effective multilateralism and good governance is rooted in the success story of EU integration, which over the last fifty years has delivered economic prosperity and the consolidation of democratic institutions for its member states. As we shall see below, this distinction is still relevant in understanding how these two international actors have conceived their democratization policies.

US and EU Policies: General Approaches

In the United States, funds for democracy promotion were established in 1961 by the Foreign Assistance Act, a mechanism by which the US supported anti-communist parties and individuals in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. In the 1970s, these efforts took the form of economic assistance and in the early 1980s, President Carter attached a human rights condition as a requirement for receiving American aid. Institutionally, the most important policy change in the United States came in 1983 with the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). It was a reaction to the rise in democratic movements in Eastern Europe and advanced the tenets of American economic liberalism: a minimal state and the reliance on free markets and free trade as the main vehicles to economic growth.

In Europe too, the focus on democratization increased in the 1980s, but unlike the US, the causes were primarily endogenous: Greece and Spain had recently ended dictatorial experiences.

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183 Grugel 2006 p.125.
184 Ibid.
and joined the European Community in 1981 and 1986 respectively. Moreover, the European Commission became more proactive in foreign affairs during this time and by the early 1990s, democracy promotion became embedded in the Union’s political and economic fabric, illustrating the degree to which enlargement and integration conditioned the Union’s course of action in this domain. As mentioned in Chapter III, Article 11(1) of the Treaty for European Union (TEU), stipulates that the EU shall “define and implement a common foreign and security policy that […] shall develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Similarly, Articles 177(2) and 181a(1) of the Treaty for European Community orient the EU’s development and economic strategies towards the same direction. According to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for membership, a country can join the EU only when functional institutions guarantee the rule of law and the respect for human rights. Finally, though enlargement has been the main factor shaping the way the EU has operationalized its democratization agenda, it is worth underscoring that in some cases, de-colonization has also played a notable role: British and French colonial administrators in Africa implemented gradualist policies to support indigenous self-government and with their retreat came the organizing of elections and general suffrage. These efforts were unsuccessful and Europe became more seriously involved in advancing democracy in the developing world in the 1970s.

US and EU Policies: The Middle East and the Palestinians

187 Ibid.
In the Middle East, the United States has advanced democracy in three ways: first, there are policy initiatives that support civil society organizations and state institutions with the underlying goal of fostering democratic change. The main American effort in this regard has been the 2002 Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which was influenced by the United Nations’ *Arab Human Development Report*, released earlier that year. According to this publication, the lack of political freedom, the dis-empowerment of women and the lack of knowledge are key factors that account for the current state of the Arab world.\(^{189}\) In addition, the US government announced at the 2004 G-8 summit held in Atlanta, Georgia the launching of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Partnership Initiative, which just like the MEPI was programmed with the view of encouraging democratic political reform, economic liberalization, support for greater education and women’s rights. The difference is that the BMENA included countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the fiscal year 2005, Congress allocated a total of $150 million for the MEPI (about $300 million were originally reserved for four fiscal years) and $75 million for the BMENA.\(^{190}\) So far, these programs have sponsored more than 100 projects in 14 countries.\(^{191}\) The second level at which the US implements its democracy promotion strategy is that of public diplomacy, as neither President Bush, nor Vice-President Cheney, nor Secretary of State Rice have so far spared an effort to underscore the vital importance of democracy to US foreign policy.\(^{192}\) As we have seen, this philosophy is the bedrock of the NSS. Finally, in line with the NSS, the third level of US democracy promotion strategies is that of military intervention, which is presently taking place in Iraq.\(^{193}\)

\(^{189}\) Dalacoura 2005, pp.964-965.
\(^{190}\) Ibid., p. 966.
\(^{191}\) Ibid., p.965.
\(^{192}\) Ibid., p.964.
\(^{193}\) Ibid., p.965.
For a number of reasons, the case of Palestine is particularly important for US democracy promotion efforts. When compared to the approach the US has taken towards countries like Egypt and Jordan – key American allies in the region –, the American demand for democratic change has been much more forceful towards the Palestinians and has been articulated in tandem with security objectives. Most importantly, the US has made Palestine a test-case for the spread of democracy in the Middle East. In 2002, President Bush declared that “if liberty can blossom on the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and oppression” and “equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government.” Consequently, until 2006 and Hamas’ electoral success, the US was the largest individual donor to the Palestinian Legislative Council, providing training for 80 percent of Palestinian parliamentarians. American programs focused on consolidating the Palestinian Judiciary, providing grants for strengthening citizens rights and technical assistance for elections. All these initiatives were channeled through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as the MEPI has not yet carried out significant programs in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Financially, this has translated into an overall commitment of $150 million in the fiscal year 2005, half of which was appropriated by Congress to USAID projects in Gaza and the West Bank. Also in 2005, following a visit to Washington by Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas, President Bush approved a cash transfer of $50 million in direct assistance to the PA.

With respect to Europe, in 1994 the European Parliament launched the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which is annually funded circa 130 million

194 Dalacoura 2005, p.969.
196 Ibid., p. 16.
198 Ibid., p.4.
Euros for projects worldwide, 10 percent out of which go to target countries in the Middle East\textsuperscript{199}. The EIDHR portofolio included programs which focused on human rights workshops, support for campaigns against torture and xenophobia, accountability in the judicial system, the funding for NGOs advocating women’s right\textsuperscript{200}. In 1995, the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which established a structure for cooperation with twelve countries littoral to the Mediterranean. This program was based on the Barcelona Declaration, which divided cooperation into political, economic and cultural areas and was operationalized through association agreements in which signatories are obliged to endorse a human rights clause. From 2000 to 2006, the EMP was allocated 1 billion Euros\textsuperscript{201}. In 2001, the European Commission adopted a more cohesive approach to democracy assistance which integrated democracy promotion objectives into country and strategy papers, ensuring that “human rights and democratic principles permeated all Community policies, programs and projects.”\textsuperscript{202} One of the main architects of this plan was the then External Relations commissioner Chris Patten, who favored a policy of gradualism: democracy, according to Patten, was “not like making instant coffee” and could “not be imposed from the barrel of a gun.”\textsuperscript{203} Patten – the last British governor of Hong Kong – was a fervent critic of the war in Iraq and argued that the European approach to democratization should take the form of partnerships for reform rather than unilateral imposition\textsuperscript{204}. Finally, in 2003 the EU started the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a new scheme which was inspired by the provisions of the ESS. Its purpose was to promote a “zone of

\textsuperscript{199} Yacoubian 2004, p.4.  
\textsuperscript{200} Youngs 2006a, p.64.  
\textsuperscript{201} Yacoubian 2004, pp.4-5.  
\textsuperscript{202} Youngs 2006b, p.53.  
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., p.54.
prosperity” around Europe and was structured in a series of differentiated action plans covering key areas such as political reform, economic development, trade and justice and home affairs.\textsuperscript{205}

Regarding the EU’s involvement with the Palestinians, the PA was invited to join the ENP in 2003. Under the “democracy and rule of law priorities” the EU and PA agreed to work together on strengthening the legitimacy of the Palestinian Legislative Council, regulating political parties, assisting in local elections and making the public administration more transparent.\textsuperscript{206} In 2005, the European Commission directed the Union’s financial commitments in two areas: (1) “support for the PA, including reforms” (70 million Euros), with Europe being the primary donor to the Palestinian Financial Management Trust Fund supervised by the World Bank; and (2) “building the institutions of the Palestinian state” (12 million Euros), which mainly focused on creating the conditions for an economic recovery in Gaza and the West Bank.\textsuperscript{207}

Yet, the relationship between the EU and the Palestinians predates the ENP: with the signing of the 1980 Venice Declaration by the then members of the European Community, the EU became the first major international actor to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate negotiating partner for the Palestinian people 13 years before the State of Israel. Moreover, it advocated a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before the United States fully subscribed to this position in 2002.\textsuperscript{208} Nevertheless, America plays a more muscular role in the region and often in the past, Europe’s potential as a negotiator between the Israelis and the Palestinian has been meet with skepticism on behalf of Israel and the US.

\textsuperscript{205} Yacoubian 2004, p.9. A detailed account of the objectives, incentives and conditions under the ENP is found in the work of Baracani 2004, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{206} Baracani 2004, p.29.
\textsuperscript{207} Schmidt & Braizat 2006, p.13.
\textsuperscript{208} House of Lords 2006, p.9.
US and EU Policies: Enter Hamas

American and European programs to promote democracy and good governance came to a halt in the wake of Hamas’ success in the Palestinian elections. Created between 1987 and 1993 during the first Intifada in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas – or the Islamic Resistance Movement – was originally inspired by the thoughts of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its aim was to contribute to the liberation of Palestine from what it considered to be Israel’s brutal and unjustified oppression.

Since the aim of this thesis is to analyze democratization strategies as instruments of US and EU foreign policy, it is necessary to include in this discussion an assessment of Hamas’ ideological evolution and its conception of democracy. In this regard, one can note the movement has gravitated between adherence to strict Islamic militant orthodoxy on the one hand, and dialogue and pragmatism on the other. The pendulum swing from one pole to its opposite is revealed by the sharp discrepancies between Hamas’ founding Charter and three key documents issued in between 2005 and 2006. They are: (a) its electoral platform of “Change and Reform”; (b) the movement’s draft program for a coalition government with Fatah, which was eventually rejected by the latter; and (c) its cabinet platform presented in March 2006 after Ismael Hanyia formed a minority government.\textsuperscript{209}

With respect to its founding Charter, the content is heavily dogmatic, purposefully anti-Jewish and its tone is that of call to arms on all possible fronts. According to Article 6, Hamas is defined as a “distinct Palestinian Movement which owes its loyalty to Allah, derives from Islam its way of life and strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.”\textsuperscript{210} Article 8

\textsuperscript{209} Hroub 2006, p.1.
\textsuperscript{210} Islamic Resistance Movement 1988.
stipulates that Allah is (Hamas’) goal, the Prophet its model, the Qur’an its Constitution, Jihad its path and death for the cause of Allah its most sublime belief. This objective is reinforced in Article 9, which calls for


discarding the evil [read Zionism], crushing it and defeating it, so that truth may prevail, homelands revert to their owners, calls for prayer be heard from the mosques, announcing the restitution of the Muslim state.

Thus, we can see that Hamas originally envisioned a Palestine that would be constituted and managed as a theocracy. In this regard, US and EU efforts to promote democratic change would come head to head with the Movement’s ambitions.

As for Israel, the Charter is unequivocal: “The Nazism of the Jews does not skip women and children […] they make war against people’s livelihood, plunder their monies and threaten their honor,” mistreating them “like the most horrendous war criminals.” In Hamas’ view, “exiling people from their country is another way of killing them” and the time will come when “Jews will hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!”

However vitriolic these claims may sound, they do not obliterate the fact that if read with diligence, the Islamic Resistance’ Charter contains a particular self-contradictory element. For example, Article 21 asserts that “the members of Hamas must share with the people its joys and sorrows and adopt the demands of the people and anything likely to fulfill its interest and theirs.” Clearly, the question becomes what does Hamas mean by “the people”? Moreover, how would the movement gauge the views of its constituency? While no specifications in this regard are made, one can speculate would that such a path would inevitably include some degree

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212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
of public representation and could open the way for broader change. This point does not absolve Hamas of any of its extremism. Yet, it helps us understand more holistically the origins of the sweeping changes that transformed the movement from a terrorist group which exiled itself from Palestinian civic life, to a very complex political animal which, aside from its military operations carried out through the Izz a-din Al-Qassam brigades against Israeli civilians and armored personnel, developed a vast social network and an a political apparatus capable of winning the hearts and minds of Palestinian voters in 2005 and 2006.

Indeed, if one read Hamas’ electoral platform without knowing its authors, one could reasonably presuppose that it belonged to an Islamist party whose doctrine emphasizes moderation, realism and a technocratic substance. Just like the founding Charter, the Change and Reform List – under which Hamas participated in the voting campaign – derives its legitimacy from Islam, but this time the religious references are more nuanced, if not ambivalent, signifying possible dissonance within the movement itself. The preamble invokes Islam’s “civilized achievements and political, economic, social and legal aspects”\textsuperscript{216} rather than jihad or the exclusive claim to Palestine. However, an Islamization agenda transpires through all the chapters dealing with education, social and legal policies, personal status and the media. For example, Hamas argues that “Islamic Shari’a law should be the principal source of legislation in Palestine”\textsuperscript{217}, while school-related policies should take root in Islam, which is understood as “a comprehensive system that embraces the good of the individual and maintains his rights in parallel with the rights of society.”\textsuperscript{218} However, most of these points contain a heavy emphasis on technical matters and the Islam nexus remains only at the surface.

\textsuperscript{216} Hroub 2006, p.5.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., p.7.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
The same sense of ambivalence is present in the chapters dealing with internal and external politics. The document condemns Israeli occupation and argues that Hamas will use all means necessary to end it, including armed struggle. With regards to domestic affairs, it stipulates that

the organizing system of the Palestinian political action should be based on political freedoms, pluralism, the freedom to form parties, to hold elections and on the peaceful rotation of power…Hamas will adopt dialogue and reason to resolve internal disputes and will forbid infighting and the use of force in internal affairs. [It] will emphasize respect for public liberties, including the freedom of speech, the press, assembly, movement and work.\(^{219}\)

According to Khaled Hroub, the language of reform is pervasive throughout the entire text, as evidenced by the attention given by Hamas to administrative matters such as the fight against corruption and the emphasis on the concept of citizenship. Hamas’ stated aim was to “achieve equality before the law among citizens […] assure their safety against arbitrary arrest, torture or revenge [and] stress the culture of dialogue.”\(^{220}\)

The plan to form a national unity government with Fatah and Ismael Hanyia’s speech in the aftermath of Fatah’s refusal reveal that Hamas was consistent in the pursuit of its goals, and at least for a brief interlude, the technocrats held the upper ground. Several articles of the proposed national unity platform underscored the urgent need to implement policies directed towards efficient and transparent public institutions. Just like the Change and Reform platform, the fight against corruption was a major goal. Article 7 emphasized the rebuilding of state institutions on democratic, professional and nationalist foundations and the rejection of one-party rule. Other principles included reinforcing the rule of law, judiciary reform and the protection of civil rights and liberties. Article 9 even suggested that “the government would deal with signed agreements [between the PLO / Palestinian Authority and Israel] with high responsibility and in

\(^{219}\) Hroub 2006, p.6.  
\(^{220}\) Ibid.
accordance with preserving the high the ultimate interests of our people.” This was a contentious issue, with some commentators debating on whether Hamas implicitly recognized Israel. Finally, the same notions seemed to inform the program of Hamas’ minority government, launched after Fatah rejected its offer to form a coalition. In the words of Ismael Hanyia,

We realize that …democracy requires hard work to impose the rule of law, renounce factional, tribal and clan chauvinisms and lay the foundation for the principle of equality among the people in terms of duties and rights. The government undertakes to protect the rights of every citizen and firmly establish the principle of citizenship without any discrimination on the basis of creed, belief or political affiliation.

Given Hamas’ purportedly democratic aims, the question arises as to whether or not the US and the EU actually had a partner in the newly elected government. The answer is elusive. At the level of both rhetoric and action, Hamas showed remarkable pragmatism and its emphasis on the technical aspects of reform alligned it much closer to the EU’s emphasis on good governance, rather than America’s unqualified understanding of democracy. On the other hand, one could argue that it would be inaccurate to put pragmatism and radicalism in opposite camps: could it be that Hamas’ newly found orientation towards democracy be nothing but a temporary, strategic ploy aimed at enhancing its power base?

However promising these documents might have seemed at their inception, their outcome was disappointing. To understand why this has been the case, the following section will put the above discussion of Hamas’ ideological evolution in the context of its relations with Fatah and Israel. The main point of emphasis will be on the causes its electoral victory and the post-election reality.

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221 Hroub 2006, p.9.
222 Ibid.
Hamas: From Political Obscurity to Center Stage

When the PA was formed in 1994 after the Oslo Accords, Hamas considered it was an illegitimate body, not least because it was dominated by Fatah, the organization created in the 1950s by Yasir Arafat. Furthermore, Hamas continued the uprising and on April 13, 1994 it carried out its first suicide bombing in the north of Israel killing eight people. Two years later, Hamas boycotted the PA presidential and legislative elections, which were won by Fatah and Arafat.

In 2000, the second Intifada brought Fatah and Hamas into a relationship of both competition and cooperation. Both organizations supported the unilateral ceasefire that was declared in 2003. One year later, Fatah and Hamas lost their founding figures: both Yasir Arafat and Sheikh Ahmad Yasin died in 2004, the former in a Paris clinic, the latter as a result of Israel’s policy of targeted assassinations against leaders of Palestinian terror groups. In fact, by the time Prime Minister Ariel Sharon implemented the unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza in August 2005, most of Hamas’ leadership had been annihilated by the Israeli Defense Forces. Following Arafat’s death, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was smoothly elected as PA president and unlike his predecessor, he adopted a policy of dialogue vis-à-vis Hamas, which was also eager to offer a positive response, given that Israel’s policies had severely weakened the movement. Consequently, on March 19, 2005 all Palestinian factions signed the Cairo Declaration in which the unilateral ceasefire was prolonged and pledges were made to start discussions about the integration of Hamas into the PLO. In the eyes of Hamas supporters, this

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225 Ibid., p.3.
226 Ibid., p.17.
signified that “many things have changed”, for unlike Arafat, Abu Mazen “believes in democracy and has allowed Hamas to become more and more involved [my emphasis]227.

One of the most crucial decisions taken by Abu Mazen was to postpone the Palestinian legislative elections, which Arafat had promised shortly before his death to early 2006, and organize the municipal elections throughout 2005 in various rounds. The rationale behind this plan was that given Israel’s pullout from Gaza, Hamas had gained considerable prominence and holding the elections on schedule would result in an Islamist victory, with the next Palestinian Prime Minister being a Hamas member. This scenario was unacceptable to Abu Mazen, but most importantly to the American administration, who expected that a postponement would allow enough time for Fatah to consolidate and gain a better position228. Indeed, the Palestinian President was certain about the validity of this prognosis and so were American officials. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that “we have to give Palestinians some room for their the evolution of their political process;”229 speaking days before the legislative elections were held, an American official bluntly asked himself:

What would we gain by pushing forward for another postponement in the hope that somehow Hamas can be curbed? Six months from now, the PA will not be any stronger, Fatah will be just as divided, nothing will be done about Hamas and our democratization agenda would have been stalled. Elections may not produce anything better, but they won’t produce anything worse230.

We may note in this assessment a first contradiction between the unqualified way in which democracy is presented in the NSS as a good of intrinsic value and which must be promoted by the US worldwide on the one hand, and the instrumental perspective through which the Bush administration evaluated the possible results from the Palestinian polls on the other.

228 Ibid., p.10.
229 Herzog 2006, p.3.
Contrary to these anticipations, municipal elections were held throughout 2005 and as the January 2006 general elections date approached, Hamas got stronger and stronger, while Fatah’s popularity plummeted. By December 2005, Fatah was in disarray; Hamas, on the other hand, was enjoying a surge in the polls that guaranteed the sympathy of 40 percent of Palestinians. In the first round of municipal elections, Hamas won 26 councils against twelve for Fatah in the West Bank and seven out of nine on the Gaza Strip. By the third round, this pattern was confirmed and even Hamas was surprised by its performance, proclaiming that angels must have joined the vote\textsuperscript{231}.

Why were Palestinians voting for Hamas? At least three reasons come to mind: first, during the last years of Arafat and even within the period of Abu Mazen’s chairmanship, the PA had been perceived largely as a corrupt body. Fatah was running the PA, hence Fatah’s association with corruption was unbreakable and as we saw above, the Change and Reform List made corruption a major campaign issue. Second, there was consensus among the Palestinians that the Olso Peace Process led by Fatah had failed to deliver on its promises, as during the past 15 years Israel had maintained colonization and had started building a separation wall\textsuperscript{232}. Third, with Abu Mazen’s rescheduling of the elections, Hamas gained considerable experience in communicating its political message to the voters: the name “Change and Reform” was appealing to the public, its organizers became experts at holding rallies and they enjoyed a virtual monopoly of campaigning in mosques\textsuperscript{233}. Consequently, on January 25, 2006, Hamas won a decisive victory over Fatah and Ismael Hanyia became Prime Minister, a position that was first held by Abu Mazen in 2005, when it was created in order to counterweight the Presidency, then occupied by Yasir Arafat.

\textsuperscript{231} International Crisis Group 2006, pp.8-9.
\textsuperscript{232} Zayyad 2006, p.108.
\textsuperscript{233} International Crisis Group 2006, p.8.
Though unexpected by outsiders, Hamas’ success signaled the beginning of yet another chapter of violent struggle in Gaza and the West Bank. In late January 2006, Abu Mazen ordered all security forces that would normally report to the Prime Minister to report to him. Disagreeing over this institutional arrangement, Hamas formed a minority government without Fatah. They were officially sworn in on March 29, 2006 and a week later the United States and the European Union suspended aid to the PA. June 2006 brought both a blessing and a curse: the European Union launched its Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) to alleviate the degrading humanitarian condition in the Palestinian territories, but towards the end of the month Hamas fighters kidnapped two Israeli Soldiers, which in turn triggered a massive reprisal from the Israeli Defense Forces: over 60 Hamas politicians from the government and Legislative Council were arrested and the only power plant in Gaza was bombed.

Against this backdrop, fighting between security forces loyal to the Prime Minister and those loyal to the President erupted all over the Palestinian territories and Ismael Hanyia met with Abu Mazen to resolve the conflict in November 2006. Though this triggered a halt to Israeli military operations, it was only in February 2007 after the two Palestinian leaders met in Mecca that a government of national unity was formed. Nevertheless, this compromise could not appease the extremists on either side and fighting between armed groups loyal to either Hamas or Fatah escalated throughout the spring. In May 2007, the Hamas Interior Minister resigned because members of the Fatah security apparatus refused to surrender control. Consequently, Hamas loyalists forced Fatah militants out of Gaza in the following month and Ismael Hanyia proclaimed this territory to be liberated. On the other side, Abu Mazen declared a state of

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emergency, sacked Hanyia and appointed Salam Fayyad, an independent technocrat formerly affiliated with the World Bank, as Prime Minister\textsuperscript{235}.

In the aftermath of this new development, the US and EU resumed aid to the PA, but the political situation continued to be volatile. In what follows, my main interest shall be on (a) a deeper analysis of effects of the US and EU suspension of aid after the election of Hamas; and (b) how the Palestinian leaders and the general public perceived America and Europe after their reaction to Hamas’ victory. The next section will then reflect on how these actions relate to the security strategies and constitutive meanings discussed in Chapters II and III.

\textit{A Dream Deferred? America and Europe Respond}

The response to Hamas’ electoral triumph was swift and unapologetic. First, Israel rejected from the very beginning the notion that Hamas should become integrated into mainstream Palestinian politics and argued against its participation in the elections on the grounds of the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, which banned Hamas from running in 1996. Its provisions stipulated that “candidates, parties and coalitions [that] commit or advocate racism, or pursue the implementation by unlawful or undemocratic means” were ineligible to participate in the election\textsuperscript{236}. Citizens questioned whether their country should wait passively for an arch-enemy who fights for their destruction to be handed the keys to the Palestinian government\textsuperscript{237}. Israel decided to stop the transfer of the monthly $60 million of tax revenues which it collects on behalf of the PA for merchandise destined for Gaza and the West Bank\textsuperscript{238}.

\textsuperscript{235} Conflicts Forum 2007.
\textsuperscript{236} International Crisis Group 2006, p.15.
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., p.9.
\textsuperscript{238} International Crisis Group 2007, p.2.
The US acted in a similar manner: economically, it imposed strict guidelines on all Palestinian recipients of American assistance directed by USAID in order to ensure that none goes to Hamas, the Hamas-led PA or to any group affiliated to the movement, regardless of their record on service delivery or transparency. All Palestinians who receive USAID grants are now obliged to sign an anti-terror certificate, check beneficiaries against published lists of international terrorists and submit names to further inspection by American government institutions. Moreover, any entities that contained the word “martyr” in their name would be ineligible to receive aid and any bank that agreed to collaborate with the Hamas-run PA would be blacklisted by the US government. Politically, the response was isolation and the subjection of any further negotiation with Hamas to the conditions enumerated by the Quartet (the renunciation of violence, recognition of the state of Israel and of the agreements signed by the PLO).

As for the European Union, although it followed the American example and discontinued direct and indirect donor subventions to the PA’s Single Treasury Account, it did not wholly suspend political relations and was the driving force behind the creation of the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM), which was set up in June 2006 in order to channel humanitarian aid to the Palestinians by circumventing the Hamas-led PA. Specifically, the objectives of the TIM were (a) to ensure the continued delivery of social public services to the Palestinian people; (b) to facilitate the maximum level of support by international donors and (c) to facilitate the resumption of Palestinian revenue transfers by Israel. The beneficiaries were patients of public and NGO hospitals in Gaza; 12,000 employees in public health facilities; 50,000 low income employees in the public sector and 5,500 pensioners. Taking into account the number of

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240 Ibid., p.2.
households that received aid, it has been estimated that circa 600,000 people benefitted from this arrangement, which was managed through the office of the PA President\textsuperscript{242}. Indeed this was a much needed plan, for the socio-economic situation in Gaza had severely deteriorated by the end of 2006. According to the United Nations,

the PA fiscal crisis resulted in an estimated decline of more than $500 million in Palestinian household income in the first half of 2006. As a result, real per-capita consumption levels declined by about 12 percent, with food consumption down by 8 percent…relative to the first half of 2005. \textit{This increased the number of deep poor from an average of 650,800 in second-half 2005, to an average of 1,069,200 in first-half 2006—a 64.3 percent increase} [emphasis in the original]. The individual deep poverty rate climbed from 17.3 to 27.5 percent as between the two periods\textsuperscript{243}.

By February 2007, after a year of more or less violent interludes between Fatah and Hamas that left the Palestinian institutions quasi-paralyzed, the British charity Oxfam concluded that

Two thirds of Palestinians now live in poverty, a rise of 30 percent last year. The number of families unable to get enough food has risen by 14 percent…The health system is disintegrating…[and] public servants are worst hit…their poverty rate has risen from 35 percent in 2005, to 71 percent in 2006\textsuperscript{244}. Throughout 2006, the EU disbursed $140 million to the TIM and the European Commission released a report in which it asserted that 80 percent of the civilian employees of the PA were to receive monthly allowances of $350\textsuperscript{245}. In fact, according to \textit{The Economist}, the humanitarian aid sent to Gaza and the West Bank in 2006 totalled $1.2 billion, a 10 percent increase from 2005, which was worrying international development workers because people were becoming more and more dependent on aid\textsuperscript{246}.

On the political side, despite adopting a similar policy to that of the US, the EU was more nuanced in its tone and more pragmatic in its actions, with Israeli officials complaining about

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{243} International Crisis Group 2007, p.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{244} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{245} Ibid., p.5
  \item \textsuperscript{246} The Economist March 24, 2007.
\end{itemize}
low-level meetings between EU consular staff and Hamas members\(^{247}\). This view is also shared by a recent report of the British House of Lords, which shows that although the EU has been quite closely aligned with the firm approach taken by the United States, the EU has been more pragmatic and less keen on trying to force Hamas out of government. The EU encouraged Hamas to accept the Quartet principles [renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, as well as previous accords signed by the PLO], in particular by holding out the prospect of a resumption of direct financial aid and assistance. Moreover, the United States went further than the EU by announcing it would blacklist any bank that continued doing business with the government. As a result, Hamas resorted to bringing millions of dollars in cash into the Palestinian territories in suitcases\(^{248}\).

Thus, we can see that unlike the United States, whose reaction to Hamas ran counter to the wholehearted attachment to democracy professed in the NSS, the EU adopted a policy of dialogue in an attempt to strike a balance between the American position and full cooperation with Hamas. Moreover, after the Hamas-Fatah national unity government was established in February 2007, there were signs that the EU was ready to rethink its approach and engage selectively with members of the cabinet who were not affiliated with Hamas, but who were collaborating with its ministers. An example is that of External Relations commissioner Benita Fererro-Waldner, who met with Salam Fayyad in April 2007, after he was appointed finance minister\(^{249}\). The most important questions to keep in mind are whether the EU’s preference for multilateralism had a greater impact on the success of democratization in Palestine than America’s unilateralist position and whether this choice made Europe a more legitimate actor in the hearts and minds of Palestinians.

\(\text{Palestinian Perceptions}\)

\(^{248}\) House of Lords 2007, p.18.
\(^{249}\) Ibid., p.21.
With Gaza and the West Bank crumbling under international sanctions, how did Palestinians react to the US and EU measures? The answer may quite surprising, for even though both the Americans and Europeans were blamed for the degrading conditions, the EU emerged as the more credible political partner. On the one hand, there was a widespread condemnation that the US and EU were being inconsistent in their quest for democratization in the region and the overall atmosphere was one of hopelessness: regarding USAID anti-terror certificates, the dean of the Islamic University in Gaza complained that “the Americans asked us to sign a form opposing terrorism. We said we don’t support terror and said send your auditors, but we weren’t going to humiliate ourselves.” Even USAID officials recognized that the restrictions were not serving their purpose, as they are “self-defeating and just sow bad blood.” Indeed, “the morale in Palestine was that the…failure of powerful forces to accept democracy’s result causes instability.” According to a head of a Bethlehem-based Palestinian NGO, the US and EU were “sending the message that if you want our money, vote for Fatah.” A Christian voter voiced his frustration with the Americans and Europeans: “I’m angry with the donors. All their sanctions are doing is weakening the population, not Hamas.”

This was indeed true, for as soon as it became clear that the West was going to suspend all aid to the PA, Hamas exploited this situation to garner support. One Hamas activist acknowledged that “the aid boycott is good for us because though America says it has declared war on terrorism, we say it is a war against Muslims.” From his Israeli prison cell, an Islamist militant lashed out against the donors: they “have ruined our house with their funds – they are

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251 Ibid.
252 Steele 2006.
253 International Crisis Group, 2006, p.32.
254 Ibid.
the source of our corruption. We don’t need their Euros. We need our dignity.”

Perhaps most strikingly, even when the aid came from the TIM, individual recipients in the territories were convinced that it was actually the PA who was responsible for these humanitarian efforts. According to a European diplomat who interviewed TIM civilian beneficiaries, he was unable to convince them that the sums deposited directly into their bank accounts through this scheme were provided by the EU, “because they kept insisting the payments came from the government.”

Moreover, sharp criticisms against the US and EU were voiced in the regional press. The Saudi-Arabian newspaper *Al-Watan* wrote on April 30, 2006 that the way in which the Palestinian people were going to be treated is “the harshest type of political punishment for their democratic choice.” In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood decreed that “the Western countries are known for their double standards. Domestically, they practice democracy. But abroad, they practice it only to the extent to which it serves their interests.” In Turkey, Prime-Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan concluded that “if the intention was to discipline the new structure in Palestine through economic methods,” this would only bring “controlled democracy, a stance that disregards the Palestinians.”

This suggestion about US and EU double standards was fortified even more when a number of Western academics and policymakers argued that deciding to suspend aid after Hamas got elected was in fact detrimental to the consolidation of Palestinian state institutions. For example, Richard Youngs claims the EU’s decision to follow the US and stop the flow of donor money to the Hamas-led PA contradicted its own policies: after pressing for a more

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256 Ibid., p.13.
258 Brown 2006, p.5.
259 Ibid.
parliamentary style of government in the Palestinian territories, the EU then switched its support from the legislature – now dominated by Hamas – to the President, Abu Mazen261. Moreover, the TIM by-passed good governance mechanisms such as the Palestinian Single Treasury Account and “diplomats complained of money draining ‘in a black hole’.”262 In the words of a former Palestinian Interior Minister, the Europeans “transformed transparency and accountability into a sacred principle, but this [was] happening under their noses and with their support and they said nothing.”263 Robert Cooper, whose work on postmodern Europe I discussed in Chapter III, underscores that Gaza runs the risk of becoming a failed state264. Furthermore, Nathalie Tocci suggests that Europe and America’s refusal to cooperate with Hamas missed the opportunity to overcome a major anomaly in Palestinian politics, namely, “the existence of an increasingly popular mass movement operating outside the legal confines and control of the Palestinian political system and carrying out acts of violence in the struggle against Israel.”265 As a result, Tocci posits that “by imposing sanctions on a democratically elected government [and cooperating willingly with the unelected government of Salam Fayyed], Western policies have discredited their legitimacy.”266

Counterpoint: The Benefits of Moderation

In spite of all these allegations, there is evidence in support of the notion that Palestinians perceived the the US and EU in different lights. In March 2006, a survey conducted by Near East

261 Youngs 2006b, p.3.
262 Youngs 2007, p.4
265 Tocci 2007, p. 142.
266 Tocci 2007, p. 141.
Consulting revealed that after the decision to suspend aid to the new Hamas-led PA had been taken, 17.1 percent of Palestinians politically trusted the EU and only 1.6 percent trusted the US. Moreover, 37 percent believed that the Europeans had a more just policy towards the Palestinians while only 2 percent agreed that the US adopted a fairer stance. Even certain commentators who contested the role of the EU in promoting democracy in the Middle East concluded that “Europe escaped the opprobrium of America’s democracy promotion efforts,” something which was confirmed one year later, when envoys from Middle Eastern countries tackled the subject in London. According to the Palestinian General Delegate to the United Kingdom, “the United States policy as a third party [in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict] has been a total failure.” With respect to the EU, although it shared some of the blame for suspending aid, Palestinians still wanted a stronger EU presence to act as a bridge between the United States and regional partners such as Syria, with whom the EU has been more eager to dialogue than the US. This also seems to be the position of Syria, whose ambassador to London stated “his desire for the EU to play the role of a counterweight to what he perceived to be the hegemonic role of the United States in the region.” This position was echoed by the Ambassador of Egypt. Commenting on the role of the EU’s border assistance mission at the Rafah crossing, he said that

For many years we were asking for a European presence in the Palestinian-occupied territories […] I have to go back every time to how we look to the European role as an honest broker […] We hope that this role can be expanded further and the Europeans can play more of a role inside the Palestinian territories, whether in the monitoring or any assignment that would be accorded to the Europeans in the future.

267 Schmidt & Braizat 2006, p.16.
268 Youngs 2006b, p.16.
269 House of Lords 2007, p.32.
270 Ibid., p. 23.
271 House of Lords 2007, p.35.
272 Ibid., p. 48.
This position seems to enjoy a wider appeal in matters beyond the Palestinian scenario. In a recent essay, Jordan’s Prince El Hassan bin Talal wrote that all the ills of the Middle East spring from the lack of a regional agreement between the countries in this area. In his view, “for peace to take root, long-term regional interests must overcome national interests” and “it is this vital multilateral ethos that Europe must champion so that division and disillusionment can be consigned to the history books just as they were in Europe after World War II”\textsuperscript{273}. In addition, a series of interviews conducted by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies in seven Mediterranean countries – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey – concluded that while Europe’s credibility suffered considerable damage as a result of the EU’s decision to follow the US and suspend aid to Hamas, the prevailing opinion was that “compared to the US, Europe enjoys a more favorable reputation.”\textsuperscript{274}

Thus, the analysis of the EU and US reaction to the election of Hamas leads us to a paradoxical conclusion: while there is evidence that the suspension of aid harmed the previous American and European efforts to support democratization, the United States’ boycott of Hamas delegitimized it in the eyes of Palestinians. It increased their perception of being isolated in an asymmetric struggle and fostered radical attitudes at the expense of those calling for cooperation with Israel and the international community. Most of all, it seemed to postpone indefinitely the sight of a solution: whereas in the time of Yasir Arafat the lack of the democracy was a problem, when democracy finally arrived its fruits were bitter. In other words, America’s unabashed strategic commitment to promoting democracy as its primary response to security threats developed in the NSS proved incapable of responding adequately to an undesired political reality. In contrast, confidence in Europe remained far less shaken. Europeans shared the blame,

\textsuperscript{273} bin Talal 2007.
\textsuperscript{274} Emerson & Youngs 2007, p.11.
yet the EU’s willingness to communicate – and one might argue, the fact that it spearheaded humanitarian efforts – has made it them seem more credible. Indeed, Palestinians appeared to want more of Europe rather than less. This request was voiced even in the early days of the aid suspension by the Hamas Prime Minister Ismael Haniya, who commended the EU for its generous support of the Palestinian people, said that “we expect it to play a bigger role in exercising pressure on the occupation forces to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories.”

Thus, the Europeans should become players rather than payers.

This brings us back to the security strategies discussed in Chapter II. As we have seen, the NSS argues that United States is imperiled by a vicious alliance of terrorists and dictators who seek to use weapons of mass destruction against the free world. To tackle this problem, America should sustain a vigorous campaign to promote democracy worldwide: since democratic nations are less likely to go war against one another and offer a voice to groups that are otherwise alienated from politics, more democracy means less terrorism and this makes America more secure. Most importantly, democracy is presented as a universal value, a way of life that people in all countries and all cultures would embrace if they were given the opportunity to make a choice. Hence, democracy in the American view is an axiomatic category, removed from any conceptual ambiguity and contestation.

When confronted with the practicalities of democracy promotion, America’s universal aims inevitably become instrumentalized. As the Hamas example demonstrates, fostering democracy can backfire and even collide with the goal of enhancing security. Yes, the Palestinians voted in free and fair elections, but those who win the elections appear to be

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275 Hroub 2006, p.15.
276 This is the way in which former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon referred to the EU. It is safe to assume he would disagree with Haniya’s call for a more active Europe, since that would appear as a counter-weight to the United States. Sharon’s exact quote can be found in an essay by bin Talal 2007.
committed to the destruction of America’s allies (in this case Israel). Consequently, the US refused to cooperate with the first elected government in the Arab world in what constitutes a radical departure from the core tenets of its security doctrine. True, the 2006 version does mention that Hamas must fulfill other criteria to be deemed a legitimate partner by the US, but this document was written after Hamas won the election and the American position had already been formulated. In the 2002 version, such qualifications are non-existent.

As for Europe, however problematic its attachment to the US policy line in this matter might have been, we discover that it still has a constituency in the Palestinian territories and the larger Arab world, something which can serve as a building block for future action. How can this be possible if, as our analysis has demonstrated, the outcomes of European policies have been equally troublesome?

My fundamental contention is that Europe’s choice for dialogue over isolation, for multilateralism over unilateral action offers a much wider maneuvering space than the narrow path chosen by the United States. Unlike the NSS, the ESS does not aim to spread democracy around the world and its focus is on good governance and political reform rather than the success of liberty. In terms of style, it is written as an objective policy memo, not as an article of faith: far from being dogmatic about democracy, the ESS is characterized by the predominance of technical jargon over ideological formulations. In fact, there is little espousal of any political creed in the document, except for the belief in the role of the EU in making Europe prosperous, peaceful and free and of the call for Europe to play a greater role in world politics. In terms of substance, its prescriptions for solving the world’s problems are sophisticated and cannot be reduced to the mantra of “security cum democratization”. Above all, the goals of the ESS are
more modest and as a result, this strategic choice offers room for flexibility and in some cases, even failure.

II. Democracy, Security, Peace: Four Theses about Democratization

The necessity of defending this argument brings me to the core questions that motivated this research endeavor and to the constitutive meanings analyzed in the literature review. In what follows I revisit these questions and the position expressed above.

Question No. 1: Is Democracy Promotion a Useful Foreign Policy Objective?

This question is important because it serves as a building block for tackling more conceptual dilemmas. Apart from this instrumental value, it also has its own intrinsic merit in that it is conducive to evaluative judgments that shed light on the players involved in this particular case study. In other words, we must ask (1) how do we measure the success of democracy promotion when it is employed by a particular international actor to serve its foreign policy and (2) who pays the price when such policies fail?

We may conjure two ways to answer this double-edged quandary: one is to look at the results and compare them against their purported goals. The other is to analyze which options are available on the table once certain plans have been set in motion.277 In the first circumstance, this Chapter reveals that the history of American and European democracy promotion policies in the Palestinian territories can induce pessimism. With respect to the United States, we have seen

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277 I borrowed these two ideas from an editorial written by Uzi Benziman for Haaretz, in which he was discussing the effectiveness of Israeli military operations against Hezbollah in the July War of 2006. Since I could no longer find the article, mentioning this here seemed the best way to give credit to the author.
how the NSS holds democracy to be the ultimate answer to America’s foreign policy troubles and how in the case of Hamas, the US’s strong, deliberate commitment towards democratization was turned on its head by an unacceptable political scenario. This reminds us of a maxim attributed to Henry Kissinger: foreign policy is no missionary work. Indeed, looking at the American example, the drawbacks of making democracy promotion the bedrock of a security policy – and most importantly, doing so in terms that reveal a quasi-religious devotion to this strategy – immediately come to light: they (1) put a straitjacket on the flexibility of American policies; (2) this path is conducive to accusations of inconsistency from those whose lives are supposed to be improved by American efforts; and (3) it leads often to more confusion about the role of democracy in conflict resolution and state building. This was certainly the case with the Palestinians during the violent struggles of 2006, as both Hamas and Fatah claimed they were fighting for democracy: the former asserted that it was defending its democratically gained mandate against “putchists in league with Washington,” while the latter argued that it was engaged in a struggle to defend the pluralistic nature of society.\(^\text{278}\)

If we take the second approach and focus on the available options once certain decisions regarding democracy promotions have been taken, the answer may be less cynical. As shown above, the US and EU were left with a rather different set of policy choices once assistance to the Hamas-run PA was stopped: the delegitimization of the former in the eyes of Palestinians sharpened, while the latter’s credibility was not as affected because it maintained open channels of communication and relied on nuance rather than firm rejection. In other words, if the United States wanted to stay true to the values it professed in its security doctrine, it would have to defend democracy universally and the refusal to accept unpalatable political outcomes would be synonymous with inconsistency. Europe, on the other hand, escaped this trap: though its

democratization agenda might have suffered, it still remained a more credible in the view of those situated at the receiving end of its actions.

This leads me to posit that regardless of how strategically justifiable or morally sound it may be to promote democracy as a foreign policy objective, overstating one’s abilities leads to much greater suffering than understating them. With such high stakes as a people’s right to choose their leaders freely, making democracy promotion the very foundation of a state’s foreign policy will become a liability rather than an asset: it will tie that political actor to obligations that could never be fulfilled independent of the context in which they must be implemented.

Question No. 2: What does the conclusion to Question 1 tell us about how the worldview of US and EU policymakers informs the strategies they pursue?

This question brings me to the one of the central assumptions of this paper, namely, that the analysis of constitutive meanings – understood in the way they were defined by Brian Fay (see Chapter II) as shared assumptions that structure the world in a definite way – are critical to the understanding of political life. Subscribing to this logic, Chapter III traced the intellectual lineage of the security doctrines that inform America and Europe’s security strategies. With respect to the US, I showed how Neoconservatives’ understanding of power conditioned their view of democracy and the state, whereas in the case of the EU, it was the notion of the (postmodern) state that played a crucial role in the formulation of the democratization policies.

If this argument is accepted, then we draw different conclusions about the relationship between knowledge formation and actual policy outcomes. On the one hand, America’s
perception of power as one-dimensional is too narrow for the complex tasks of 21st century statecraft: the NSS assumes that the US actions in the international arena are virtually limitless and as such, America has the duty – and indeed the unique chance – to promote Western liberal democracy – the only choice for dealing adequately with threats to US security. As shown by the case of Hamas, this belief is fallacious and the US’s response to the movement lends more credibility to arguments that claim that there is little relationship between democratization and security.

For example, the NSS argues that inclusion into a democratic polity will resolve the causes that lead young people in oppressed societies to join terror groups. But this thesis does not seem to survive the empirical test: a brief glance at the list of terrorist acts annually published by the US government shows no correlation between the number of attacks and the nature of the political systems in which they were perpetrated. According to the State Department’s annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, of the major terror incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2003 in the world, 269 happened in countries classified as “free” by Freedom House, 119 in countries that were “partly free” and 138 in states considered “not free.” In addition, of the terror acts that occurred in free states, India, the world’s largest democracy, accounted for 203 (75 percent), in contrast to China, the world’s most populated authoritarian state, which did not have a single act on the list.

A further point that illustrates the conceptual ambiguity created by making democracy promotion a national security objective is the extent to which it becomes confused with regime change. This pitfall was signalled both by academics and by practitioners. According to Thomas Carothers, “regime change policies in which the US government seeks to oust foreign

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279 Gause 2005, p.3.
280 Gause 2005, p.3.
governments hostile to US interests, whether through military force [as with Saddam Hussein in Iraq] or economic pressure [as with Hamas?] fail to gain international legitimacy and contaminate democracy promotion” when they are presented as efforts on behalf of democratization.\textsuperscript{281} Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister, argues that in promoting democracy, “modesty is the best policy.”\textsuperscript{282} Specifically, this means not including the spread of democracy in a country’s National Security Strategy, especially “if it involves regime change: it is particularly counterproductive for those democrats around the region trying to work for change from within.”\textsuperscript{283}

How does this compare to the strategy adopted by the European Union? As shown in Chapters II and III, the main concept informing the EU’s security strategy is that of the postmodern state, where conflict is institutionalized and the rule of law plays a central role in regulating countries’ behavior. Hence, the accent on effective multilateralism as the main modus operandi of EU foreign policy. Though this does not affect the outcome of EU foreign policy directly, it manifests indirectly in three powerful ways: (1) as shown by the Hamas example, the Union always keeps the channels of communication opened, which in turn lends it credibility as a political agent who is willing to put its constitutive meanings on the negotiation table; and (2) it offers the Union a wholly different time horizon: unlike the US, the experience of integration and enlargement have made EU policymakers conscientious of the fact that democratic change can take decades to materialize and as a result, this subject should be approached with greater caution

On this basis, I posit that the European Union is conceptually better equipped than the United States to be an agent of democracy promotion, and that in the case of America, the greatest enemy for democracy promotion comes from within in the form of conceptual

\textsuperscript{281} Carothers 2006, p.3.
\textsuperscript{282} Evans 2006, p.3.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid.
unilateralism – the unwillingness to call the fundamental assumptions behind its security policies into question.

Question No.3: How does power influence the constitutive meanings that inform the US and EU security strategies?

As it was shown in Chapter III, the concept of power plays a crucial role in the formation of US and EU security strategies, especially in the case of the former. In the case of the United States, this idea is understood in a one-dimensional way to mean “power over” rather than “power with”. This perspective gained ground with the demise of the Cold War, an event that left America in an unchallenged position of global dominance. This development has had conceptual manifestations in the resurrection of ideas such as Alexandre Kojeve’s notion that Western liberal-democracy is the universal homogenous state or that promoting democracy – as it is practiced and defined by the United States – is the proper answer to America’s security threats. In contrast, Europe’s response has been that of effective multilateralism, an approach based on the concepts of the postmodern state and civilian power. Both are radical departures from traditional understandings of such ideas: they underscore that power can be used to act in concert with other players, emphasizing dialogue and an understanding of democratization that is associated with historical sociology.

In traditional terms, Europe today is undoubtedly weaker than America, but as we have seen, its decision to continue talking to Hamas made it seem a more credible actor in the eyes of Palestinians. Though many scholars and practitioners would be happy to celebrate America’s military superiority, America’s delegitimization after stopping aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian
Authority raises the question as to whether in the age of globalization, such power can be liability rather than an asset? *Evidence from this paper seems to suggest that if we assume a correlation between the power status of a political actor and its ability to enact change, in the age of globalization, weaker might actually mean stronger. By this I mean that Europe’s case reveals that its departure from traditional understandings of power and its reliance on multilateralism have allowed it to think more creatively – and realistically – about how to enact change than the United States. As a result, Europe seems better prepared to grapple with the challenges of a world that is increasingly interconnected.*

*Question No. 4: What does the story of EU and US democracy promotion strategies in the Palestinian territories tell us about global governance?*

The EU seems to have a conceptual and strategic advantage over the US when it comes to democracy promotion. Though in terms of outcomes this has not become apparent, in terms of perception the EU’s actions in Palestine seem more legitimate, while the US appears more tied to national interests. What this tells us about the link between spreading democracy and globalization is that *in the 21st century, such projects can only be credible when the perception of an international mandate is clear. The EU, by virtue of its supranational structure, gives this impression and though Europe may never be capable of democratizing Hamas without America’s input, it may well be the case that success depends on each actor taking what the other currently misses: Europe – a more united and, when necessary, muscular action; America – a greater degree of humility, which stems from the realization that it will only become more secure when it will seek to transform at least part of its enemies into partners.*
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