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There is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourselves.

David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*

I. Introduction

The Dutch have long thought that they are an exemplary nation, a guide and a beacon to the world, or as they used to put it, a “gidsland” for others to follow. As early as the 1600s, they vaunted their commitment to freedom and tolerance; later, they displayed a special zeal for peace, especially international peace. Since the 1960s, they have claimed a place in the front ranks of progressive nations, building a caring welfare state and expanding the rights of citizens—including the right to shop for things other than coffee at numerous “coffee shops.” Of course, they were not always consistent in acting out these virtues, as the Dutch themselves are well aware, which is one reason why most would now use the term *gidsland* with a healthy sense of irony, as a way to skewer pretensions to moral superiority. These days, in fact, the Dutch have a relative low opinion of their influence. They may be right: the outside world has not necessarily taken much notice of the stellar example set in the low countries—and when outsiders paid attention at all, they did not always like what they saw. To Dutch regret, the City in the Polder was not quite as visible or inspiring as the City on a Hill.

Even if their claim to moral leadership is open to question, the Dutch today are in the forefront of many global issues, including a potential push toward “global citizenship,” the topic of this essay. Their long-standing commitment to international law and human rights is reflected in the many legal institutions they host in The Hague. The Dutch have been very active in global civil society as well, playing a leading role in environmental organizations and supporting NGO work on development. At least for a while, they welcomed immigrants in a multicultural spirit, downplaying the need for integration into a national culture. In fact, focusing publicly on nation and national identity was not quite politically correct until recently. For a long time the Dutch have also been committed Europeans, actively contributing to expansion of the European Union (EU). In all these ways, and in keeping with an older tradition, they have looked beyond state boundaries and committed themselves to transnational causes. To some extent that applies even to soccer coaches, stars, and fans, intensely involved in the “global game.” If we characterize global citizens as people who identify with the world as a whole, aim to play an active role in it, and develop a “significant identity, loyalty or commitment beyond the nation-state,” we should find them in the Netherlands.

In a way, that is not surprising. By tradition and by choice, the Netherlands has long been a quite open society. The Dutch Republic, after all, pursued its commercial interests across the globe. It welcomed many people from many places, who could speak relatively
freely regardless of national background. It is no accident that a seventeenth-century Dutch scholar, Hugo Grotius, helped to lay the foundation for what we now call international law, embedding state action in common norms. In a later period, the religious fervor of Protestants and Catholics led many to venture into foreign lands as missionaries, creating yet more transnational attachments.

At the same time, the Dutch had little choice in cultivating their cosmopolitan inclinations. As a small power among giants, the modern Netherlands naturally favored a foreign policy that played down the ruthless play of power and instead focused on pursuing the common good guided by moral principles. Hosting peace conferences and legal institutions, which the Dutch pioneered in the late-nineteenth century, fit this strategic moralism that made at least the Dutch elite approximate what we now refer to as “global citizenship.”

Dutch support for European unification also stems from this mixture of moralism and strategic thinking. After World War II, taming Germany was a practical move. A common market would serve Dutch commercial interests. Building a common European “house” was good in principle, at least as long as French or German architects did not hold exclusive sway. It is not unreasonable to think of this European commitment as another step toward, or even an instance of, global citizenship. Certainly many intellectual defenders of the Union treat it as an exemplary experiment in rational transnationalism, showing the way to a more global solidarity. For all its innovative features, however, the EU remains beholden to state interests and national identities, and it therefore falls short of high cosmopolitan expectations. As a step toward global citizenship, to anticipate some other skeptical points I will make below, its record is ambiguous at best.

How exemplary are the Dutch themselves? How cosmopolitan are they really? In what ways, if any, do they help to move global citizenship from moral vision to empirical fact? In this essay, I will sketch some of the steps they have taken on the path toward global citizenship, but at the same time describe some hurdles they have encountered. At the risk of committing the sin of “methodological nationalism,” I will use the Dutch case to explore what Beck and Sznaider have called “cosmopolitanization.” Inspired by Delanty’s more general discussion of global citizenship, I will focus on three areas, briefly examining the Dutch as contributors to the global game and global governance, and as proponents of a multicultural transnationalism. I approach the case as a fascinated skeptic; fascinated by Dutch involvement in global flows and their responses to globalizing pressures but skeptical about the extent to which such involvement fosters an enduring global citizenship. My point about Dutch strategic moralism already alludes to my mixed assessment, which fits some strains in the literature on the subject as well. In thinking about global citizenship, we can learn some useful lessons from the Dutch case considered in its European context.

II. Background

Both my own work and the wider academic literature give reason to think that global citizenship may flourish as more than a figment of the philosophical imagination. With John Boli, I wrote a book, *World Culture: Origins and Consequences* (2005), which explored ways in which world culture increasingly structures our experience, subjecting a
wide range of activities to global norms. We combined two influential ways of thinking, neoinstitutionalist or world polity theory and globalization theory, which entail some basic claims about global citizenship: at the very least, national citizenship will increasingly be “relativized” or disembedded in relation to conceptions of humankind, as Roland Robertson would put it, and such old-fashioned citizenship will also be subjected to external constraints, holding states to account in terms of universal rights, as John Meyer and Yasemin Soysal would put it. A second book, *Globalization: The Making of World Society* (2009), treats globalization generically as the process in which more people become more connected in more different ways across larger distances. Though my subtitle hedges a bit on the status of “world society,” it certainly implies some serious questions about who belongs and how. In principle, global citizenship captures the various attempts to answer that question. My third book, *The Netherlands: Globalization and National Identity* (2008), is a case study of globalization, examining how the Dutch redefine their national identity in response to various globalizing pressures. While the Netherlands has witnessed a kind of nationalist revival, I argued that many leading figures have also worked on what I call a “cosmopolitan” nationalism instead of withdrawing behind their dikes. If that is correct, the Dutch should remain eager to help fashion more global forms of citizenship.

The broader literature is even more emphatic about the prospects for global citizenship. Many commentators, of course, view globalization as a spur to global citizenship: the more people become connected in fact, the more they will want to feel they belong to a community wider than the nation-state. This is a quasi-functional argument in the sense that it portrays global citizenship as a form that meets a need. Several authors go a step further, arguing that we, all of us, are already global citizens, at least in the minimal sense that we carry rights and duties as human beings, belonging to a world that in effect has become a single place. Many people who think about global citizenship take another step beyond what I have suggested, namely, that it is an inherently good and moral project, perhaps even essential to the flourishing of humanity. This explicitly cosmopolitan stance on global citizenship thus contains a strong normative argument. Discussions of global citizenship often mix these elements, for example by suggesting that we have moral obligations to humanity that require certain already developing institutions for their adequate expression. I will comment briefly on the normative element in discussions of global citizenship below, but for empirical analysis the idea that all of us already are global citizens is not very helpful. I prefer to use the sometimes fuzzy notion of global citizenship as an empirical yardstick, a way to examine how and how far particular people are actually moving toward “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond the nation-state.”

The literature on my three areas of interest bolsters the optimistic case to some extent. For example, much work on global governance has tried to chart the “retreat of the state” and the rise of new forms of transnational authority. The relative autonomy of the International Criminal Court, headquartered in The Hague, is a case in point. Similarly, work on civil society has made the case that nongovernmental organizations of all sorts represent universal values detached from national interests. Relevant examples include many environmental organizations, for instance the World Wildlife Fund, co-founded by a Dutch prince; Greenpeace, now headquartered in Amsterdam; and Friends of the Earth, with an 81,000-member Dutch affiliate (called *Milieudefensie*). Finally, migration...
scholars have suggested that we may be witnessing a new kind of transnationalism emerge among immigrants who are granted more extensive rights without having to assimilate into host countries. The Netherlands, for example, grants all residents local voting rights and subsidizes minority organizations even as the denizens also maintain their original nationality. Lots of trends push lots of people out of the nation-state shell, a necessary though perhaps not sufficient condition for realizing the Kantian project.

Some of this work also displays a more skeptical streak. Students of governance, for example, have questioned the "retreat" of the state by showing that states are stubborn, both in holding on to their key tasks and as strategic actors on the global scene. The actual structure of global governance—fragmented, partial, and messy—hardly reflects the idea and vision of a common good. Others target the work of global civil society by questioning its selective concern and lack of representativeness, and even fairly sympathetic analysts counsel against an overly "romantic" view of the global good done by civil society groups. Many students of migration, finally, find "bifocal" identities on the part of migrants as well as renewed integration efforts on the part of states more likely than full-fledged transnationalism. This work leaves the form and viability of global citizenship unclear.

Thinking about the Dutch case adds to this literature in two ways: by making abstract discussions of global citizenship a bit more tangible, and by reinforcing the skeptical thrust of relevant scholarship on some key points. By itself, of course, a single case does not allow us to generalize about global trends. Yet before we make confident claims about such trends—for example, about the actual prospects for global citizenship—it helps to have a good feel for its constituent parts. To understand globalization, or the way in which spatial constraints on our lives diminish, it is important to see how it "takes place." From that perspective, it is not surprising that some very good work on globalization looks at it from within a distinctly "local," or perhaps I should say "glocal," setting. Discussions of global citizenship could benefit from this approach. The Dutch case matters in a more specific way as well. If it is true that the Dutch show more zeal than most in the pursuit of global citizenship, the particular dilemmas and difficulties they face should be especially instructive. To put it more concretely, I will argue that the Dutch case, and by implication the broader European experience, raises serious questions about the eventual crystallization of meaningful global citizenship. There is no straight path to global citizenship. It is often twisted, doubles back, or leads into muddy ruts. That pattern suggests that a "dialectical" approach to studying these sorts of issues might be most productive, sensitizing us to the way in which globalizing, space-spanning moves are always likely to be met by particularizing, resistant countermoves. In the end, I will suggest, national and global citizenship do not have to be competing opposites.

In this essay, I mainly offer description and analysis, but I am not a neutral observer. Visions of global citizenship, cosmopolitanism, and global democracy have aroused significant debate. In that wider debate I do not side entirely with those who reject altogether the desirability of citizenship beyond the nation-state, but I do think that in the near future, for most people in most places, acquiring meaningful national citizenship in liberal democracies governed by the rule of law is most important. I agree with Axtmann that democratic global citizenship requires mediation by the nation-state and, for reasons different than his, with Miller on the priority of strengthening national citizenship. Without more widespread, more effective national-level citizenship, global
citizenship is unlikely to flourish in any case. That much a Kantian advocate of global citizenship could still endorse. Yet I also think it is healthy to balance the Kantian motivation for the global citizenship project with a bit of Humean humility. Even in the global age, we should keep in mind Hume’s insistence that most people do not and will not care much for humanity as such.

III. Examples

Who or what exactly is a global citizen? I have cited some general definitions, as other commentators on the subject typically do. But before turning to a slightly more general discussion of the Dutch path to global citizenship, it might be useful to consider some concrete examples. My examples are three well-known Dutch figures who play a significant role in civil society, governance, and migration issues.

Example number one is Guus Hiddink, soccer coach extraordinaire. After winning the European Cup with PSV in 1988, he had a distinguished career abroad, coaching Real Madrid, South Korea, Australia, Chelsea, and most recently, the Russian national team. In nearly every case, he was credited with reviving a team and moving it to a higher level, based on understanding both the team’s own culture and the demands of top-level international soccer. In South Korea, whose team he helped reach the World Cup semifinals, he became a national hero. Along with some illustrious colleagues, he exemplifies “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond the nation-state.” If we think of soccer fandom as a part of global civil society, or at least a global public sphere, Hiddink may well be one of the best-known Dutch “global citizens.” Dutch coaches and players have left their imprint on the global game, the Dutch national team is a fixture in international competition and global discourse about such competitions, and through those ties Dutch soccer aficionados feel themselves connected to others. By analogy with Billig’s “banal nationalism,” I suggest we might call Dutch involvement in the global game a form of “banal cosmopolitanism.” But while they are adept at looking beyond borders, the Dutch also have used the global game to refashion their national identity.

Example number two, perhaps slightly more serious for academic purposes, is Ad Melkert, the former leader of the Dutch Labor Party. In the Netherlands he is known primarily as the big loser in the 2002 parliamentary elections, in which the party of the recently assassinated populist Pim Fortuyn made great gains. Prior to this public drama, however, Melkert had already had a long career dealing with transnational governance. He had served on the board of the Dutch branch of the European Movement, acted as secretary of the EC youth forum, and directed Novib, the Dutch branch of Oxfam. After his electoral loss, he left the Dutch political scene but soon landed on the soft cushion of an executive director position with the International Monetary Fund, later moving to an administrator role at the UNDP and more recently being called to serve as U.N. Special Representative in Iraq. Europe, development, the IMF, the U.N.: as an exemplary member of the Dutch political elite, Melkert certainly has developed “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond the nation-state.” Of course, he is not the only one. Many of his colleagues have attained similarly high positions, and all have embraced similar commitments to the same causes and organizations. Melkert stands for the high-minded cosmopolitanism of the Dutch elite. While that Dutch commitment is very real, it is tempered by hard-nosed calculations based on personal and especially national interests.
Example number three is Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-Dutch immigrant and former Member of Parliament for the conservative-liberal VVD. She became world famous as the actual target of the assassination of Theo van Gogh by the Muslim radical Mohammed Bouyeri in 2004. Like many Muslims, Bouyeri viewed her as an apostate who had brought Islam into disrepute with her criticism of violence against Muslim women, scandalizing Muslims with the film Submission, which showed Qur’anic texts on a semi-nude woman’s body. Though having to live with special security, Hirsi Ali remained a vigorous advocate of free speech and of human rights for Muslim women, both in the Netherlands and on a wider global stage. After a dispute over her citizenship status, she moved to the U.S., while retaining her Dutch passport. Widely honored for her efforts, she has fashioned herself into a distinctive human rights advocate. A global citizen in her work—certainly showing “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond the nation-state”—she also exemplifies a kind of transnationalism as someone who assimilated thoroughly but ultimately identified with a community beyond the Netherlands. Though perhaps exemplary from a normative standpoint, this transnational cosmopolitanism is not exactly representative of the immigrant experience in the Netherlands—one indication that in dealing with migration, the Dutch may have been less successful than many wished in creating global citizens.

A. Soccer and the Limits of Banal Cosmopolitanism

For several decades now, the Dutch have helped to shape the global game. Long before Hiddink ventured onto the international stage, Rinus Michels took his coaching philosophy to Barcelona, which flourished after attracting Ajax star Johan Cruyff, who later succeeded as a Barcelona coach as well. Frank Rijkaard, star of a later generation, followed in Cruyff’s footsteps. Apart from the former players, other Dutch coaches also have been quite successful, including Louis van Gaal and Dick Advocaat. The Dutch soccer federation, the KNVB, became renowned for its coaching courses, setting global standards in teaching the game. Dutch players, of course, have had an even greater impact. Several cohorts of stars—from the days of Cruyff and Neeskens via Van Basten and Gullit to Rijkaard and Davids to Van der Sar and Van Persie—have helped to lead first Dutch and later foreign teams to great success. Early Ajax teams became legends, later Ajax and PSV teams followed suit. The Dutch national team finished second in two World Cups in the 1970s and finally won a major tournament at the European championships in 1988. Prior to the 2010 World Cup, it enjoyed a long unbeaten streak, earning it a number 3 FIFA ranking.

Far from building a bulwark against “globalization,” then, the Dutch by and large have relished the challenges posed by the global game. Many professionals, in soccer as in any other business, naturally developed a striking “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond the nation-state.” Many fans have become intensely aware of this foreign involvement, following the exploits of their favorite players and becoming attached to foreign teams. Aided by greatly expanded media coverage, they have joined a much wider universe of soccer discourse. If we think of awareness of others, appreciation of difference, and commitment beyond the nation-state as markers of global citizenship, those qualities flourish more in fans’ everyday involvement in the game than in many other spheres. To
capture that everyday quality, and certainly to avoid overly idealistic pretensions, I call
this a form of banal cosmopolitanism.

That cosmopolitanism, like the more serious forms discussed below, has its limits. Most
obviously, top coaches and players do not venture abroad as selfless humanitarians, a
notion often implied in the use of the term global citizenship, but rather as mercenaries in
a transnational entertainment business. They identify with their careers and are loyal
mostly to their paychecks. While taking a strong interest in the global game, the Dutch
are also deeply aware of the consequences for domestic competition, the quality of which
has suffered in the more open markets of this neoliberal era. Pessimists predict that, for
lack of resources, no Dutch club team will ever rise to the European championship level
again. Partly as a way to compensate, the Dutch still take a most fervent interest in the
fortunes of “their” team. The periodic “orange craze” is a national obsession. The global
game played on a global stage is thus used as a means to craft a new type of national
identity or solidarity. Though many fans know better, some even view their supposedly
distinctive brand of “total soccer,” a “brilliant orange” display of offensive-minded
teamwork, 19 as a national contribution to the global game. Under the veneer of banal
cosmopolitanism lie deep national roots.

B. The Netherlands and Global Governance

Like Melkert, the Dutch have become global citizens through their involvement in global
governance. This has taken many forms. As mentioned in the introduction, the
Netherlands hosted many new institutions in the heady days of liberal internationalism at
the end of the nineteenth century, from the Hague Peace conferences to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, still in business today. At the founding of the United Nations, the
Dutch had some misgivings, especially about the role of the Security Council, but they
soon became disproportionately large U.N. donors and active participants in peace-
keeping missions. Naturally, the International Court of Justice would be seated in The
Hague, now the “legal capital of the world.” 20 Perhaps uniquely, the Dutch Constitution
in Article 94 provides that international law has “primacy” over domestic law. 21 This is
all the more surprising because the Dutch Constitution prohibits judicial review. This
primacy also applies to European law: the Dutch enjoy all the rights of European
citizens 22 and the protection of European courts. Dutch citizenship is already embedded
in a broader framework of rights and institutions. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands also
ranks high on various global indexes. On both the Kearney/FP 2007 globalization index
and the 2010 Swiss KOF index, the country ranked third, helped by trade, international
organization membership, and treaty scores. On the 2009 Human Development Index, it
took the same spot. As a contributor to global development, it ranks first. Like Melkert, a
number of prominent Dutchmen have taken high positions in IGOs, from the UNDP to
NATO to UNHCR. Undoubtedly, then, the Netherlands as a country, as well as many
prominent Dutch figures individually, has done much to foster a form of global
citizenship.

But all is not well. Let me cite three examples. Living up to their reputation, the Dutch
provided peace-keeping troops to the U.N. mission in Bosnia in the 1990s. That mission
turned to tragedy when their contingent at Srebrenica was overrun by Bosnian Serbs, who
proceeded to massacre the local Muslims. The event caused much soul-searching in the
Netherlands, including an authoritative report on the military effort. It ultimately caused a cabinet to take responsibility and step down. At minimum, it told the Dutch that good intentions are not enough, instilling a new, realistic caution with regard to global ventures.

A second example concerns the Iraq war. The Netherlands joined the “coalition of the willing” after combat operations were over and for a while supported reconstruction in the south. Though their contribution was relatively modest, it was at least symbolically significant as an endorsement of the U.S. effort. The decision to engage in Iraq has also become controversial. A high-level investigation of government decision-making concluded that the legal foundation for that decision was weak, putting the current coalition government in an awkward position by criticizing Prime Minister Balkenende’s role.

A third example has to do with Afghanistan, where the Dutch have played an important role as part of NATO forces in Uruzgan. Since the government only agreed to participate for a limited time, the left-center ruling coalition in 2010 had difficulty responding to a NATO request for extending the mission in a different form. In the deliberations, which resulted in a full-fledged crisis, domestic political considerations took priority, with the Labor Party (and others farther Left) largely opposing further involvement in the area. Surveys at the time of the cabinet crisis suggested that public opinion was similarly opposed, in keeping with previous trends.

My point in citing these examples is not to deny the Dutch cosmopolitan stance in foreign affairs and global governance. However, the claims of global citizenship still pale compared to those of pragmatic calculations and domestic politics. In dealing with the dilemmas of their recent engagements, Dutch policymakers showed a pragmatic streak by carefully weighing the costs of missions and the benefits of political gestures in securing alliances. That pragmatism applies to the domestic sphere as well: many foreign commitments depend on carefully balancing domestic interests and public opinion, part of which has opposed major foreign involvements, especially those that involve military action. In deliberations about key decisions, the actual interests of distant others typically remained secondary; for instance, the needs of Bosnian Muslims, Iraqi Shiites, or Afghani women did not determine major moves. In all these cases, strategic moralism, rather than an overriding commitment to the pursuit of human rights in their broadest sense, marked the Dutch approach. Any claim that a commitment to “global citizenship” was at stake in Afghanistan would have surprised a majority of the Dutch in 2010.

One more illustration complements this point. For several decades, the Netherlands has spent a relatively high percentage of its budget on assistance to developing countries, often close to one percent of GDP. A portion of this funding was channeled through government-linked NGOs, like NOVIB, once directed by Ad Melkert. Such assistance became sacrosanct, a symbol of Dutch commitment to humanitarian causes. In recent years, however, development cooperation has come under fire. Conservative critics, long skeptical of its benefits, have increased their efforts to reduce Dutch commitments, as evident in a prominent report by a Liberal Member of Parliament. Even more strikingly, the Scientific Council for Government Policy also issued a skeptical report, questioning the benefits of traditional assistance and minimally recommending a much more focused policy. Such reports are often harbingers of policy changes. Behind these critiques lies the economic reality of the post-2007 recession and a strand of public opinion that gives
priority to domestic spending—clearly indicators of limited solidarity among would-be global citizens. Whereas hesitations about humanitarian missions are most common on the political Left, opposition to development assistance comes especially from the political Right. One implication is that domestic interpretations of the requirements of global citizenship, and what is to be done to live up to them, vary rather significantly even in a country whose political system puts a premium on the search for consensus.

In short, measured against the demanding yardstick of global citizenship, the Dutch record on Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and development assistance is decidedly mixed. A suitable label might be “selective cosmopolitanism.”

C. The Netherlands in Europe

Melkert’s early role in the European Movement exemplifies widely shared cosmopolitan hopes. In the run-up to the national referendum on the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union in 2005, the Dutch social philosopher Guido Berns articulated those hopes in telling a gathering of interested citizens that a vote for the Constitution would mark a step toward “hybrid” citizenship.28 If I may paraphrase his argument slightly, it would make European citizenship more real, more tangible, more valuable. It would take narrowly focused national citizens out of their national “comfort zones.” Berns used more exalted language, to be sure, justifying the proposed constitutional framework in Kantian and Habermassian terms as a modest but important step in heeding the universal demands of reason over the arbitrary attachments of particular communities. The argument may have been more sophisticated than most, but the cosmopolitan intent was common in the Netherlands. Berns and nearly the entire Dutch elite supported the treaty and advocated a “yes” vote, reflecting their long-standing commitment to integration.

Even more than the Dutch global initiatives, Dutch involvement in Europe is driven more by pragmatic than Kantian considerations. From the Dutch point of view, market integration always served their commercial interests, the Community was politically helpful in taming Germany, and its decision-making structure favored small powers to some extent by helping to moderate strong-power dominance. Unification thickened over time, making hybrid citizenship a reality. Their supportive role made the Dutch exceptionally “good” Europeans.29 But here, too, the sailing got rougher. Part of the problem lay in the faulty fabric of the Union, long suffering from a democratic deficit, lacking a common political culture, and complicating its politics with expansion.30 Hybrid citizens were part of a hybrid Union, a mixture of transnational, federal, and state-driven components. Though this hybrid structure may have served Dutch interests, for many reasons the EU in practice did not quite live up to the high Dutch expectations. Over the years those expectations became considerably more sober, as a major Dutch reform proposal was rejected in 1991, prescient Dutch objections prior to adoption of the Euro were swept aside, and the Netherlands became a net payer to, rather than beneficiary of, EU funds. Public support for integration remained strong but declined by at least ten percent over recent decades.31 Even prior to the referendum, Dutch leaders had begun to sound a more skeptical note about EU affairs, and a former Dutch Euro-Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, pleaded for a slimmer Union focused on “core tasks.”

The referendum result still came as a surprise. By a 2-to-1 majority, voters rejected the treaty. Since French voters had made the same decision, the Constitution could not go
into effect and had to be renegotiated, as it now has. The vote was significant as a sobering reminder of the limits of “euro-enthusiasm,” and in that sense it disappointed the expectations of EU defenders like Berns. At the same time, it would be wrong to overinterpret the episode as an instance of parochial euroskepticism, signaling a Dutch withdrawal from the transnational project. For one thing, the meaning of the vote was in doubt. Research indicated that voter motives were rather mixed, and later public opinion data did not convey heightened discontent with the EU. In Europe, the Netherlands also had little choice but to re-engage. With some moderating adjustments and political arm-twisting—but without legitimation by a second Dutch referendum—the renegotiated Lisbon Treaty provided some of the same structural enhancements sought in the original Constitution, including a new Union president. The moderation itself, however, does suggest that Europeans have lowered their own expectations of full political unity and European citizenship, weakening its vanguard role as a steppingstone toward global citizenship. European cosmopolitanism is quite selective as well.

D. Migration and its Discontents

As Hirsi Ali’s exceptional experience shows, the Dutch have had greater trouble grappling with the absorption of newcomers than in dealing with any of the previously mentioned issues. To many in the Netherlands, the attacks aimed at her seemed to show the failure of a tolerant, accommodating approach to minorities. That approach had its roots in the 1980s, when Dutch policymakers began to recognize that the Netherlands had become a “country of immigration.” The “minorities policy” they devised tried to help minority groups preserve their identities, for example through language teaching in schools and subsidies for minority organizations. At the same time, of course, minority groups enjoyed the general rights of citizens, including the protection of Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution, which prohibits discrimination, and the benefits dispensed by the Dutch welfare state. Resident non-citizens also gained the right to vote in local elections. At a later point, dual nationality was allowed in an effort to stimulate nationalization. For some time, then, the Dutch approach reflected the spirit or model of global citizenship, in the sense of facilitating participation without pressure, extending rights without obligations, and respecting difference without imposing a common culture.

Even before the attacks on Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh, however, the Dutch had begun to worry about the merits of multiculturalism, as the old policy had been labeled. Once committed to accommodating minority differences, official policy instead had shifted to focus on “integration,” stressing the need for full participation and minority commitment to civic duty. In the early 2000s, that policy got a distinct national twist with the requirement of a civic integration “contract” for newcomers, who had to prove minimal knowledge of the national culture prior to immigrating. Economic barriers to entry and tougher provisions on asylum also aimed to stem the flow of migrants. Public opinion shifted as well, with significant pluralities opposing further immigration. Populist politicians exploited public fears, especially focusing on the “threat” of Islam. By 2004, Dutch openness to migrants was already in question. Critics described it as a turn toward “repressive liberalism.”

If the native-born Dutch only half-heartedly celebrate global citizenship in their approach to newcomers, what about the newcomers themselves? Roughly half of the
migrants, more than one million, hail from Western countries. They receive little attention in public discourse or academic research. In fact, they may display some of the “transnational” features portions of the literature expects, as relatively footloose people who participate actively in the host society but are not bound to a particular place or identity.

For non-Western immigrants, the picture is mixed. A small minority of Muslim radicals (like Bouyeri) develops a transnational identity as “global Muslims,” but not quite in the way proponents of global citizenship have in mind. A much larger group, especially in the older generation, remains relatively isolated from the wider host society and oriented instead to their country of origin, as exemplified by ubiquitous satellite dishes in some minority neighborhoods. Although assimilating in some respects, younger generations experience such isolation as well, as indicated by evidence of diminishing social interaction between groups and mounting segregation in public schools. Many non-Westerners indicate a preference for living and socializing within their own group. Perhaps one million non-Western residents hold dual citizenship. It might be misleading, however, to view this record as evidence of steps toward global citizenship. Instead, an ethnic group orientation seems to prevail, with some “bifocal” effects through ties to the homeland—more sub-national than transnational.

In the Netherlands, as in the rest of Europe, the status of immigrants and the direction of integration policy are strongly contested. Some argue that integration has failed while others note progress over time. Some advocate a more welcoming approach while others favor a tougher line. Liberal, multicultural, and nationalist arguments clash. Behind the debates lie contending worldviews, some open and deliberately cosmopolitan, others more inward-looking and particularistic. The obvious implication is that there is no single Dutch model, let alone a European one, for how to promote global citizenship through migration. Both majority policy and minority identification display, at best, a very ambivalent cosmopolitanism. Even that assessment would strike some Dutch observers as too positive. In 2010, after all, the populist Party for Freedom, led by vocal critic of Islam Geert Wilders, won one and a half million votes in the national elections and provided parliamentary support for a new center-right government, which promised to pursue a more strict and selective immigration policy while demanding more active integration efforts on the part of newcomers.

IV. Conclusion

The Dutch are pioneers on the path toward global citizenship as vigorous participants in the global game, proponents of global governance, and at least partial advocates of immigrant inclusion. Yet they are not entirely trustworthy guides. In each area, the Dutch also resist following a straight path and instead take twists and turns. They are very imperfect global citizens. I have tried to capture the imperfections with the labels banal, selective, and ambivalent cosmopolitanism. Because the Dutch are in a good position to play a guiding role and often think of themselves as playing it, their hesitations and obstacles are instructive. They reinforce some skeptical thrusts in current thinking about global citizenship.

It is always risky to generalize from a single case, but the Dutch record reflects a broader European syndrome as well. Both domestic pressures and new global
entanglements constrain ostensible Kantian aspirations on the old continent. The difficulties of existing cosmopolitanization raise questions about those aspirations. They suggest that in understanding the modest cosmopolitan record, a little Humean humility goes a long way.

Notes

2. Everts 2008, p. 54.
7. Ibid., p. 32.
10. Glick Schiller, Levitt.
27. WRR 2010.
32. Lechner 2008, chap. 5.

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