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Power, Morality, and Self-Interest: The United States and European Union Foreign Policy Impact on Human Rights in Colombia

Federico Segura Molina

Preface

*T*his essay examines the impact of the foreign policy of the United States and the European Union (EU) on the human rights situation in Colombia. Not only was this project an essential component of the Macalester-Maastricht Globalization in Comparative Perspective Study Abroad Program, but a variety of factors also motivated my study:

- Colombia is an anomaly in the study of foreign policy and human rights. As a region with uncommon political, economic, and social realities, Colombia is a country where two distinct approaches to foreign policy and human rights, those of the U.S. and EU, are simultaneously at work. Despite their significant ideological and philosophical differences, however, both the U.S. and the EU strongly support Colombia's administration and its national policies. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the human rights situation in Colombia and to create effective policies in the future, it is important to understand the unusual impact international action has had on national policy and the fate of human rights.
- It is imperative to reconcile these two different approaches to foreign policy, as well as the myriad perspectives and accounts of the current human rights situation in Colombia. It is my desire to inspire reflection upon how past and current actions of the U.S. and the EU have ameliorated or deteriorated the human rights situation in Colombia. In addition, I hope to contribute to the search for a

long-lasting solution to the political, economic, social, and ideological chaos that has wreaked havoc upon Colombian society.

- Finally, I have a strong personal connection to the topic. As a citizen of Colombia who is pursuing an undergraduate degree in International Studies in the United States and the Netherlands, I have a deep interest in exploring the complex connections between Colombia, the United States, and the European Union.

The development of this project has been set against a rapidly changing backdrop. Major events between 2007 and 2008 include a deep institutional crisis based on a confrontation between Colombia's executive, legislative, and judicial powers; the infiltration of paramilitary and guerrilla elements into the state apparatus and all spheres of public life (known as "parapolitica" and "farcpolitica," respectively); critical changes within guerrilla and paramilitary organizational structures; the prospect of a third period in office of President Uribe, along with an impending change in U.S. administration and significant changes to EU foreign policy brought about by the implementation of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty; and the unexpected liberation of 2002 Colombian presidential candidate and French citizen Ingrid Betancourt, along with the subsequent reactions in France and around the globe. While it proved challenging to comprehend the impact of these events on the human rights situation in Colombia, the changing nature of the subject certainly made my research all the more fascinating.

Apart from the way events unfolded throughout 2007 and 2008, my experiences during the fall and spring semesters also revealed different viewpoints regarding the subject matter. An internship as a fundraising and outreach assistant at the Nonviolent Peaceforce during my fall semester provided me with a new perspective on U.S. involvement in Colombian politics. As a grassroots, unarmed civilian initiative seeking to address the human rights situation in Colombia, the Nonviolent Peaceforce is critical of the Bush Administration's current military-based approach. This experience has allowed me to analyze U.S. policies from a variety of angles, thus helping provide the most unbiased account possible.

During my spring semester, I participated in the Macalester-Maastricht Globalization in Comparative Perspective program in Maastricht, the Netherlands. Exposed to Europe's different understanding of human rights, I was able to compare Europe's approaches to foreign policy with those of the U.S. Moreover, taking classes led by Euro-

pean professors; conducting interviews with professors, students, and policy makers; and attending lectures and conferences shed light on European perspectives regarding general American foreign policies as well as those directed specifically at Colombia.

I. Introduction

The foreign policy of the United States and the European Union toward Colombia is of some importance to all three parties involved. For decades the U.S. has played a key role in influencing the global political economy and the fields of international security and development. The EU is a rising international actor seeking to advance its own model of global governance, of which the rule of law, peace, democracy, and the promotion of human rights are all critical components. As a developing country with a long-standing internal armed conflict intimately tied to the production and commercialization of illegal drugs and extensive human rights violations, Colombia has been a historical focus for U.S. and EU foreign policy efforts as part of the global war on terrorism and narcotics. Beyond such efforts, there are important underlying political, economic, security, and ideological interests in the foreign policies of the two entities toward Colombia.

In response to a significant gap in the foreign policy assessment literature (particularly regarding EU foreign policy), it is important to determine how successful the U.S. and EU foreign policies in Colombia have been in achieving their particular goals and expectations. Even more important to this study is the degree to which Colombia has benefited from its interaction with the U.S. and the EU. In addition, it is imperative to examine the extent to which the specific Colombian populations targeted by the U.S. and EU have been able to fulfill their rights and meet their own interests and needs through these foreign policies. This leads to the following research question: How successful have the U.S. and EU been in meeting (a) their own national interests and policy objectives, and (b) the human rights needs of the Colombian population?

In light of the research question, this study argues that, through a focus on military and development aid, U.S. foreign policy has partially achieved the restoration of public order in Colombia and the protection of Colombian citizens' individual rights to personal security and freedom of movement. In addition, through a free-trade regime, U.S. foreign policy has promoted important welfare rights in Colom-

bia, including the right to work and to protection against hunger and poverty. Yet in doing so, the U.S. has also undermined basic civil, political, and socioeconomic rights of large segments of the Colombian population, particularly those whose ideological inclinations and economic means of livelihood oppose U.S. interests. For its part, EU foreign policy has had limited but promising success in the promotion of basic civil, political, and socioeconomic human rights in Colombia by tackling their root causes and the structural aspects of poverty and inequality.

In Section II, I set the context of my analysis by underscoring the main aspects of foreign policy analysis. In Section III, I engage in a discussion of U.S. and EU models of global power and governance and then I go on to provide an overview of U.S. and EU foreign policy. In Section IV, I provide a theoretical and practical analysis of the relationship between foreign policy and international human rights in general, and specifically in the context of U.S. and EU foreign policy. In Section V, I map out the historical background and current human rights situation in Colombia. Sections VI and VII provide the historical background and highlight the main events and themes of U.S. and EU involvement in Colombia. In Section VIII, I discuss the impact of U.S. and EU involvement in Colombia's human rights situation, and provide some analytical reflections on the combined human rights impact of both policies. In Section IX, I provide four recommendations for a more successful U.S. and EU foreign policy that maximizes its positive impact on Colombia's human rights situation. Finally, I conclude with a summary of the main arguments, suggest areas for further research, and discuss some reflections and lessons of my study on the phenomenon of globalization.

The moral assumptions that "human rights are the rights one has simply because one is a human being"¹ and that human rights are universally accepted as normative ideal standards permeate the study. This is done intentionally in order to avoid claims of cultural and historical relativism, as well as debates over the philosophical foundations and origins of international human rights standards. While such claims and debates constitute an important element of human rights theory, they fall outside the scope of this study.

The framework I employ to conceptualize human rights and determine the human rights impact of U.S. and EU foreign policy toward Colombia is inspired by Jack Donnelly's "Universal Declaration Model," a synthesis of rights that are encapsulated in the 1948 Univer-

sal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Human Rights Covenants on civil/ political rights and socioeconomic and cultural rights. These three documents are the basis for the consensus on internationally recognized human rights. My framework further synthesizes Donnelly's model by focusing on and categorizing those rights that are paramount to the human rights situation in Colombia.² The framework is broken down into the following three categories of rights:

- Basic human rights, including the rights to life, liberty, security of person, nondiscrimination, and protection against torture.
- Civil/Political or freedom human rights, including the rights to equal protection under the law; protection against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; humane treatment when deprived of liberty; privacy; freedom of movement; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; and freedom of assembly and association.
- Social/Economic or welfare human rights, including the rights to social security, work, adequate standard of living, education, freedom from hunger, and health.

The bulk of the findings presented in this essay are based upon an extensive analysis of both primary and secondary sources. I examine diverse sources from both sides of the political spectrum—documents written by guerrilla leaders in Colombia to speeches by President Bush, reports prepared by the U.S. Embassy to those of Human Rights groups. While an examination of books, journal articles, opinion pieces, and government documents constituted the major part of my research, interviews conducted in Europe also played an important role in the process by providing me with new insights about European foreign policy. In addition, numerous conferences and lectures furthered these research endeavors by providing other perspectives with which to examine my primary research questions.

II. Understanding General Foreign Policy

Often viewed as an ambiguous and unclear concept, foreign policy is one of the most crucial instruments in international relations. An examination of the meaning of foreign policy allows us to comprehend its importance in global affairs. It can be defined as “actions taken by

governments which are directed at the environment external to their state with the objective of changing or sustaining that environment in some way.”³ However, in light of the complexities of the field of foreign policy analysis and the vast number of possible combinations of actors and parties (including individual governments and inter-governmental arrangements like the European Union, supranational organizations like the United Nations, and civil society and other non-state actors) as well as a multiplicity of activities (including unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions), it is essential to find a focus.

The focus of this study is on bilateral governmental and intergovernmental foreign policy. This is because national governments tend to have more foreign policy resources at their disposal than multilateral organizations, and the impact of their foreign policy actions can be more easily isolated than that of multilateral arrangements. The essay acknowledges, however, that such policy can be channeled indirectly through multilateral systems, international financial institutions, transnational corporations, and civil society organizations.

While the purpose of foreign policy can vary depending on the actors involved and the conditions in which the policy is conceived and executed, “considerations of power, national security, ideology and economic interests remain the main objectives of foreign policy.”⁴ Specific policy objectives and the mechanisms employed vary greatly depending upon how national and foreign policy interests are prioritized. Diplomacy, aid, and trade and investment are among the most commonly employed mechanisms and strategies in the world of foreign policy. Through the coordination of such instruments, foreign policy can display hard power (e.g., military intervention) or soft power (e.g., moral and normative pressure); coercive action (e.g., sanctions and other punitive measures); or constructive engagement (e.g., bilateral cooperation).

III. U.S. and EU Models of International Order and their Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice

McCormick provides a recurring and appropriate characterization of the U.S. and the EU in the international relations literature through the concepts of Europeanism and Americanism.⁵ Europeanism is characterized by peace, multilateralism and community, internationalism, soft/civilian power, and a liberal worldview. It encapsulates a progressive, modest, and pragmatic approach to international policy. In

contrast, McCormick describes Americanism as a model based upon war, unilateralism and individualism, nationalism, and hard/military power. When developing global policy, Americanism is extremely ambitious and displays a realist, orthodox worldview.

A. U.S. Foreign Policy Overview

The United States' primary goals and means of accomplishing its foreign policy objectives can be summarized as peace and security through neo-liberal economics, trade, and development. Providing military aid to countries in need is also a key component of U.S. policy, as it is believed that it facilitates cooperation in the global community.⁶ U.S. foreign policy, however, is by no means fixed. It is contingent upon an administration's understanding of national interests and objectives, a fact that often creates problems affecting the entire international system.

The problem of continuity and consistency is exemplified by the foreign policy of the Clinton and the George W. Bush Administrations. The former placed greater emphasis on international cooperation and conflict resolution in, for example, Northern Ireland and the Middle East. In addition, the Clinton Administration possessed a strong conviction that the U.S. should not only play a role in the protection of human rights abroad, but that the U.S. also *benefits* from facilitating the advancement of human rights because of a newfound political and economic international stability.

In contrast, the Bush Administration demonstrates a greater concern with strong political and economic relations with its neighbors and defending national interests through interventionist practices such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. This involvement is often at the expense of international cooperation in the fields of the environment, global economy, and international security and justice, to name a few. Yet, the humanitarian aid and poverty reduction programs in Africa, particularly the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, have had a positive impact and are often regarded as the greatest foreign policy achievement of the Bush Administration.

While all administrations, regardless of political affiliation, can be hailed or criticized in some manner, drastic changes in foreign policy approaches can have significant political, economic, security, and social consequences for the recipient state. The international community has had to adapt to radical changes in the U.S. approach to foreign policy.

Specifically, the world has had to adjust to the Bush Administration's foreign policy, characterized by the tendency to act unilaterally though hard, military power. This change has been criticized by Diplomats and Military Commanders for Change (DMCC), a group of former U.S. statesmen. The DMCC states that:

From the outset, President George W. Bush adopted an overbearing approach to America's role in the world, relying upon military might and righteousness, insensitive to the concerns of traditional friends and allies, and disdainful of the United Nations. Instead of building upon America's great economic and moral strength to lead other nations in a coordinated campaign to address the causes of terrorism and to stifle its resources, the Administration, motivated more by ideology than by reasoned analysis, struck out on its own...The Bush Administration has shown that it does not grasp these circumstances of the new era, and is not able to rise to the responsibilities of world leadership in either style or substance. It is time for a change.⁷

B. EU Foreign Policy Overview

Historically, EU foreign policy largely has been an intergovernmental matter, with member states controlling their own relations to a large extent. Instead of each member state acting on its own, foreign policy is utilized as a progressive measure by the Union to speak with a single and coherent voice.⁸ The singular policy that envelopes the objectives of the entire EU is known as the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP).

Like the U.S., the EU strives to promote international security, defense, and peace and stability. Human rights, democracy and good governance, and the rule of law are also stressed in EU relationships. The EU attempts to fulfill its objectives through development and humanitarian aid, trade, and international cooperation.⁹

The Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of the CFSP: (1) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; (2) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; (3) to preserve peace and strengthen international security; (4) to promote international co-operation; and (5) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.¹⁰

In addition to these objectives, the EU favors international cooperation and pooling the national sovereignty of individual member states for mutual benefit (internally, through integration and expansion of the Union, and externally, through its foreign policy). The EU also supports the work of the United Nations and International Criminal Court, as well as international protocols and human rights agreements. While the EU has been praised for its humanitarian focus, its policies are not without criticism. As stated by various critics of the EU, "the Union has made less progress in forging a common foreign and security policy over the years than in creating a single market and a single currency."¹¹ Continuing the argument that the EU is primarily concerned with creating a powerful currency, Hill and Smith claim that the development of the EU was a "purely empirical event" practically ignored by international relations theorists. The importance of European integration, they suggest, is minimal when compared to that of the political economy.¹²

In addition to such criticisms, the basic concept of one major union with various member states creates tensions between the multilateralism conducted by individual EU member states as well as the bilateralism between the EU and the target of foreign policy. Attempts have been made over the years to streamline the way CFSP decisions are taken; however, key decisions still require a unanimous vote.

A unanimous vote was difficult to attain when there were only fifteen EU members; now that there are 25 members, it is increasingly complicated to reach a decision. Despite their commitment to the CFSP, member governments often struggle with changing their own national policy in the name of EU solidarity. Just how difficult this can be was illustrated by the deep divisions among EU member states in spring 2003 over whether the U.N. Security Council should authorize the U.S.-led war against Iraq.¹³ At a summit meeting in December 2003, EU leaders adopted a European security strategy. It recognizes that citizens in Europe and elsewhere face potential threats from terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal immigration. Each kind of threat needs an appropriate response, often requiring international cooperation.¹⁴ Despite historical, ideological, and cultural similarities, there are clear differences in the way the United States and the European Union are perceived and represented in the international relations literature. Yet, there is also a long history of military and economic cooperation between the U.S. and Europe through the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and through the single most important commercial relationship in the world.

IV. The Role of Human Rights in EU and U.S. Foreign Policy

Donnelly argues that, “although universal rights [are] held equally by all human beings everywhere, states have near exclusive responsibility to implement them for their own nationals.”¹⁵ At the same time, the state can act as the principal violator or essential protector of human rights. While this may have been the case up until now, I would argue that in our age of globalization and interconnectivity, the statist conception—that the state is only capable of and responsible for realizing the rights of its own citizens—has been expanded in practice to include an ability and thus a responsibility to ensure the rights of foreign nationals abroad. This demands that we embrace an internationally recognized role for states in the implementation of human rights worldwide, whereby they can play a dual role of realizing or violating human rights abroad through the direct impact of their foreign policies or the indirect consequences of their policies on another state.

Claims that a foreign policy aimed at changing the human rights environment in Colombia (whether or not that is the main interest of such policy) violates Colombia’s state sovereignty and its ability to deal with its internal human rights affairs, and counterclaims that such a policy is a clear example of moral imperialism, are simply not applicable to the Colombian case. Given the deep involvement of U.S. and EU foreign policy in Colombia’s national policy and internal human rights affairs, as well as the fact that all three parties subscribe to internationally recognized human rights standards described in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Human Rights Covenants, one cannot argue that such a change would violate Colombia’s sovereignty. Whether or not the U.S. and the EU respect or violate these principles through their foreign policy in Colombia is a separate issue.

Power, national security, ideology, and economic interests remain the paramount objectives of foreign policy, with the human rights of foreign nationals mattering in varying degrees and “few countries making more than occasional, modest sacrifices of other foreign policy interests in the name of human rights.”¹⁶ This does not mean, however, that the human rights of foreign nationals may not be a legitimate or even altruistic foreign policy interest (especially in the absence of

other national interests), nor that they always are at odds with other foreign policy interests. Furthermore, states may undertake foreign policy human rights initiatives because they are legally, politically, or morally demanded by the general public of a state irrespective of other national interests.¹⁷

The realist perspective on human rights and foreign policy characterizing the current U.S. administration suggests, however, that U.S. foreign policy in Colombia is nothing but a means to fulfill obligations to and secure the human rights of U.S. nationals. This does not imply an explicit concern for the human rights of Colombian nationals despite what the foreign policy of the U.S. might say "on paper." In fact, it may well mean a lack of concern for the human rights of Colombian nationals on the part of the United States. A unilateral foreign policy aimed only at protecting American interests may prioritize, for example, anti-drug efforts over human rights in Colombia.¹⁸ Yet, and still in line with the realist perspective, U.S. (and EU) foreign policy interests could also be instrumentally achieved through the protection of Colombian nationals' human rights.

In contrast, the liberal view that characterizes the EU suggests achieving EU foreign policy goals through bilateral cooperation and constructive engagement in a way that would mutually enable Europe and Colombia to fulfill their obligations to and realize the rights of European and Colombian nationals, respectively.

This raises two important questions directly linked to the original research question. First, do the U.S. and the EU treat human rights abroad as legal demands or simply as moral aspirations? Second, how and through what means does violating or realizing the rights of Colombian nationals help the U.S. and the EU fulfill their respective foreign policy interests, including the human rights of their own nationals? What appears to be clear, and will be discussed later in this analysis, is that foreign policy can have major consequences on human rights abroad, whether or not human rights are a foreign policy priority.

Human rights, argues Donnelly, are an important element of American national identity and values. This is because "the particular combination of moral, historical, political, and national interest concerns have led to a strong human rights policy,"¹⁹ which contrasts with the perception of the U.S. as a realist actor. However, Buckley notes America's "cyclical romances with the notion of responsibility for the rights of extranationals."²⁰ This responsibility has been understood, on

one hand, as America's human rights mission to set an example and through its active international involvement on behalf of international human rights. On the other hand, there can be apparent disregard of the responsibility for human rights beyond its borders.

V. The Human Rights Situation in Colombia

Since the arrival of the conquistadores in the late 15th and 16th centuries, Colombia has had the distinct dishonor of suffering some of the worst human rights abuses on record. Colombia continues to have one of the highest murder rates in the world, an astonishing number of displaced people, and a long history of crimes against union members.²¹ In addition, poverty is rampant, creating intense class conflict and low standards of living.²² When examined using the human rights framework for this study, Colombia's human rights situation is especially complex, bearing witness to violations of all three rights categories: basic human rights, civil/political human rights, and social/economic human rights.

Although various analysts claim that the exact number of people who have died as the result of government, paramilitary, and guerrilla activity will never be known, it is estimated that more than 35,000 Colombians have been killed within the past decade. Massacres in areas with little to no state presence and high levels of illegal activities, specifically narco-trafficking, were also common occurrences in Colombia's recent past. As reported by Gustavo Gallón, Director of Colombian Commission of Jurists, there were 160 separate massacres from October 1999 to October 2000 in which 1,084 people were killed.²³ While basic human rights violations have either directly or indirectly affected almost all sectors of Colombian society, union workers represent an area of the population that has suffered severe civil and political rights infractions.

According to a report published by the late Senator Paul Wellstone, paramilitary groups (with the occasional participation of guerrilla groups) led an undeclared war against Colombian union leaders for over fifteen years. Like the U.S., Colombia guarantees its workers the right to organize; in Colombia, however, organizing frequently costs a union member his life.²⁴ In the year 2000, 129 trade union leaders were assassinated; in the year 2001, 159 others were murdered. While union leaders were specifically targeted for years, any member of society who took an active stance against human rights violations was risking

his life. This is demonstrated in the fact that between 1986 and 2001, 418 educators were murdered, struck down for fighting for students' rights to quality education or for publicly criticizing a political group or figure.²⁵

Internal displacement of the Colombian people is also a major item of discussion on the human rights agenda. As of 2007, there were between 1.8 to 3 million displaced Colombians, second only after Sudan.²⁶ In 2001, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton reported that approximately 300,000 people are displaced each year, the majority of whom are poor, indigenous, or Afro-Colombian.²⁷ Driven from their homes and jobs in fear for their lives, these displaced Colombians are not only deprived of their civil and political human rights, but also stripped of their economic and social ones.

With an unemployment rate of 11.2% and with 49.2% of the population living below the poverty line,²⁸ the right to an adequate standard of living is enjoyed by only half of the total population. Various scholars argue that the privatization of public services, along with the influx of agricultural imports, has worsened Colombia's human rights situation.²⁹

Due to Colombia's vastly complex human rights situation, it is ever more critical to analyze the role that U.S. and EU policies play in the country's human rights agenda. Unfortunately, despite the EU's and the U.S.'s best intentions, some scholars claim that Colombia will be incapable of implementing any proactive human rights strategy with its current distribution of economic, military, and political power.³⁰ Colombia's human rights situation is further complicated by the fact that victims of violations may also be perpetrators. For example, a guerrilla group whose right to freedom of thought and expression may be denied by the Colombian state may also conduct massacres and kill union leaders. Furthermore, one cannot forget that perpetrators are also human beings, and, as such, they are entitled to their human rights. Issues such as balancing the rights of the majority population with those of national minorities raise the questions of which and whose rights should the U.S. and EU prioritize.

VI. U.S. Involvement in Colombia

A. Background

America's extensive involvement in Colombia dates back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. By declaring Latin America within its sphere of influence and forbidding Britain and Spain, the former imperial powers, from exercising control over the region, the U.S. set a precedent for its future engagements in the region. By 1903, the U.S. was already exercising its power when it sought to gain control of the Panama Canal. The U.S. finally gained control of the region by helping Panama engineer its secession from Colombia.

In 1946, the U.S. established the School of the Americas (SOA), now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC) in 1946 in Panama to "bring stability to Latin America." Various scholars claim that Latin American police and government officials learned the arts of torture, assassination, intimidation, and death squad deployment from U.S. officials. Evidence for this claim is the extensive list of Colombian officers who not only were tried for human rights abuses, but were also graduates of the School of the Americas, thus providing a link between the U.S. and human rights abuses.³¹ Currently, SOA alumni top the lists as perpetrators of major atrocities throughout Colombia and Latin America.³²

Scholars support the theory that the U.S. backed the assassination of liberal presidential candidate Jorge Elieser Gaitán in 1948, leading to three days of brutal violence and the destruction of downtown Bogotá, known as El Bogotazo. Ensuing civil war, known as "La Violencia," lasted until 1958.

Following the 1952 Military Assistance Agreement between Colombia and the U.S. as well as several loans to President Rojas Pinilla's right-wing government by the U.S. to fight insurgence, the Pentagon designed the 1964 Operation Marquetalia. The Colombian government attacked peasant self-defense communities formed in response to income inequality and social injustice. This marks the official birth of the Marxist guerrilla group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-EP). In 1984, U.S.-backed Operation Condor aimed to eliminate progressive, liberal, and revolutionary elements of Colombian society.

During the 1990s and 2000s, U.S. assistance to Colombia focused on increasing military and police aid in response to the deteriorating

security situation within Colombia. U.S. military and police aid to Colombia went from \$88.5 million in 1997 to 308 million in 1999, with additional installments in ensuing years.³³

B. Plan Colombia

Originally marketed as part of the “war on drugs” and later as part of the “war on terror,” Plan Colombia was adopted in September 1999 by President Pastrana “for peace, prosperity and strengthening of state.” Still functioning today, the purpose of the plan is to end a forty-year guerrilla movement, eradicate drug production and trafficking, and restore public order through the strengthening of the Colombian state.³⁴ President Pastrana identified five pillars to Plan Colombia: a peace process, the economy, counter-drug strategy, reform of the judicial system, and social development.³⁵ As the largest, most comprehensive display of direct U.S. intervention in the hemisphere, Plan Colombia is a security-based approach to foreign policy that addresses issues of national security, terrorism, and narco-trafficking, through military means and direct military intervention, as well as through alternative economic development.³⁶ Colombia is the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid (after Israel and Egypt). U.S. military aid totaled \$1.3 billion in 2000, \$153.4 million in 2001, and \$186.4 million in 2002. It is estimated that roughly 80% of the aid went to military and police programs while only 20% went to social programs.³⁷ In 2008, aid increased to \$542 million, while \$545 million has been requested for 2009 (\$402.823 million or 73% toward military programs and anti-terrorist assistance, while \$142.366 million or 27% toward social development programs).³⁸ While the U.S. and Colombia requested aid from Europe for the program, EU countries have not yet contributed significantly to this effort.

C. Economic Policy and Trade

The U.S. remains Colombia’s most important commercial partner. The “*Tratado de Libre Comercio*” (TLC) is the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Colombia and the U.S. that was signed in 2006 but has not yet been ratified by the U.S. congress. According to the Bush and Uribe Administrations, the TLC will play a crucial role in promoting important social-economic rights in Colombia through increased trade and less regulation between the two countries. However, the treaty’s approval was initially delayed until April 2008 and remains unap-

proved to this date due to Colombia's still worrying human rights record, specifically with regards to the rights of union workers and the current state of Colombia's healthcare system. Washington is also weary of, and demands further clarification regarding, the alleged links between President Uribe and ultra-right paramilitary elements before the treaty can be revisited.

It has been argued that economic intervention and control of major utilities and industries are a significant element of U.S. economic policy toward Colombia,³⁹ and that Colombia's indebtedness to U.S. banks, the IMF, and the World Bank continues to grant the United States virtually unrestricted access to Colombia's natural resources and biodiversity.⁴⁰ This is in line with the view that the U.S. is committed to fighting insurgencies in order to gain and maintain control over Latin America's natural resources, particularly petroleum and cheap labor.⁴¹

VII. EU Involvement in Colombia

A. Background

Although the EU is currently making considerable efforts to involve itself in improving Colombia's economic, political and social situation, the EU's participation in Colombian (and Latin American) affairs has been minimal when compared to that of the U.S. Starting in the late 1980s, however, the EU became increasingly proactive. Employing a multi-layered strategy to facilitate peace, the EU uses diplomacy, trade, and aid to fulfill its policy goals. The EU provides political and financial support to existing peace initiatives.⁴²

In addition to providing aid, the EU increasingly involves itself in negotiations for peace. It constantly encourages the Colombian government to create a dialogue with the country's armed resistance. Believing that peace talks will improve Colombia's security situation, the EU has claimed that it is ready to provide complete financial support for this initiative, assuming that the result of such talks are strategies concerning "concentration, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the members of the illegal armed groups in the society."⁴³

B. EU Aid to Colombia: Military vs. Humanitarian

Providing aid is one of the three main components of EU foreign policy regarding Colombia. In contrast to the U.S., however, the EU is

extremely hesitant to provide military aid, preferring to grant support for humanitarian and social programs. From 2002–2006, the EU provided €105 million for funding alternative development (28.5%); economic and social development and reducing poverty (38%); administrative and legal reforms (24%); and promoting human rights (9.5%). From 2007 to 2011, the EU plans to allocate €104 million to fund (with an additional €56 million in 2011–13) peace and stability, including alternative development (70%); rule of law, justice and human rights (20%); and productivity, competition and trade (10%).⁴⁴

In addition to the aid programs, the EU provides Colombia with considerable grant support. Member states of the European Community have strived to coordinate efforts to establish a strong framework for the pursuit of peace in Colombia, and have provided aid since 1994, which has totaled over €100 million in fourteen years.⁴⁵ In 2004 alone, the EU contributed over \$420 million in support of the peace process, human rights, and the environment.

In 2005, the EU unveiled a multi-million euro plan to help Colombia's displaced people. Targeting approximately 130,000 people a year, the plan hopes to provide aid immediately after people have been displaced. Food and essential non-food items, water and sanitation, shelter, health care, and protection are at the core of the plan. Not only does this plan attempt to restore the rights that displaced people lose when driven from their homes, but it also offers assistance to families of missing persons.⁴⁶

C. The EU and Plan Colombia

In contrast to the U.S., which assigns an overwhelming majority of its aid to military programs, the EU has declared its active anti-military stance on various occasions. Stating that Colombia will not achieve stability unless it engages in an actual peace process and that military aid will not lead to lasting peace, the EU clearly distinguishes its policies from those of the U.S. This distinction displays itself when one examines the EU's participation in Plan Colombia.⁴⁷

When the Colombian government and then-President Clinton announced Plan Colombia in 2000, they asked the EU and other international donors to contribute to the social aspect of the plan. The EU, not wanting to involve itself in the military aspect, again channeled its support toward the peace process. Providing approximately €330 million, the EU directed its aid to Plan Colombia's initiatives target-

ing poverty, economic inequality, and civil rights. When assigning its aid, the EU warned against the possible negative consequences of crop fumigation, and insisted on the necessity of providing farmers with adequate production alternatives.⁴⁸ Moreover, the European Union created the "Laboratorios de Paz" (Peace Labs) in order to address the root causes and structural aspects of inequality, poverty, and wealth distribution. This is the EU's biggest project in Colombia, with a total budget of €42.2 million over eight years (the EU contributes €34.8 million and the Colombian government the rest). It covers an area as big as Belgium, with a population of 800,000. The plan was proposed in 2002, and within a year, it was operating in thirteen of the region's 29 municipalities. The first Peace Lab promotes rural development in one of the worst areas of the conflict, the Magdalena Medio region. Local people, who are resisting the violence and want to create a life outside the drug economy, design and manage the program. The EU launched a second Peace Lab in 2003 with a similar budget. It covers 62 municipalities in three other conflict-ridden regions of Colombia that have a population of some 1.4 million people.⁴⁹

D. Trade

While the EU is generally seen as taking a more passive role in global trade when compared to the United States, the EU is one of Colombia's major trading partners, second only to the U.S. Recognizing that Colombia has enormous commercial potential with its varied geographical topography and incredible biodiversity, the EU is the number one investor in the country. The EU does not demand reciprocity for its exports to Colombia through its General System of Preferences (GSP); in addition, the majority of Colombian goods are exempt from EU customs duties. By offering Colombia this handsome trade regime, the EU clearly hopes to pursue future trade agreements.⁵⁰

The EU has specific trade objectives when negotiating with Colombia and the Andean community (CAN) as a whole:

1. To facilitate the implementation of the CAN common market in order to promote the movement of goods and services. This common market will ideally encourage worldwide trade and the adoption of the World Customs Organization's international standards, thus making trade safer for all parties involved;

2. To promote the exportation of goods from CAN to the EU through GSP until a free trade agreement is negotiated;
3. To support CAN countries in fulfilling the goals and ideals of the WTO.

In order to fulfill these objectives, the EU employs a strategy to help Colombia integrate itself into the world economy. Focusing its objectives on economic development, the EU provides aid to ensure that Colombia's national products meet global standards, thus making Colombia's goods increasingly marketable at the international level.⁵¹

Finally, when considering trade with Colombia, the EU specifically states that it hopes to promote fundamental human rights. By supporting small business and promoting sustainable socioeconomic development, the EU is attempting to improve the human rights situation in Colombia by investing in the long term. Furthermore, the EU hopes that trade will eventually reduce the need for illicit activities, such as drug production and arms trafficking, thus creating a more secure social situation for all Colombians.⁵²

VIII. The Impact of U.S. and EU Foreign Policy on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia

The impact of foreign policy on human rights can be defined as the success of foreign policy in altering (improving or worsening) the human rights situation in the recipient country or region.

Depending on the scope of influence, the impact can be direct or indirect, short term or long term, intended or unintended, internal or external.

When determining the impact of U.S. and EU policies on human rights in Colombia, we must return to our original question: whose human rights and interests are the policies meeting? Only then can we really come to understand the effectiveness of foreign policy and identify any discrepancies between what a country's foreign policy is intended to do and what it is actually doing on the ground. There is, however, a series of methodological constraints to take into account, including the difficulty in isolating the human rights impact of foreign policy from that of other actors and their actions, along with the statistical accuracy, which, according to Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), is highly disputed. In

any event, accounts of human rights progress made in Colombia are mixed. On one hand, there are optimistic accounts, such that of the U.S. Department of State, suggesting that, “[Colombia’s] government continues to make progress toward the respect of human rights.”⁵³ On the other hand, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other non-governmental accounts suggest that, “while there have been signs of progress, [Colombia’s] human rights and international humanitarian law situation continue to be areas of great concern.”⁵⁴

A. U.S. Impact

The impact of the U.S. on Colombia’s human rights situation can be described as long lasting, nationwide, and wide scale. On the positive side, U.S. involvement in Colombia has greatly contributed to:

- Greater personal security through reduced abductions, massacres, homicides, guerrilla attacks against civilian populations and infrastructure, and illegal roadblocks. “This is the principal and greatest achievement in the promotion and defense of human rights and international humanitarian law that a government can hope to present,” said Colombian Vice-President Francisco Santos in March 2004.⁵⁵
- USAID is one of the many governmental organizations that consistently contribute to the human rights efforts in Colombia. Supported by the U.S. government, thousands of internally displaced Colombian families now have viable job options and a more secure future. USAID donated \$280,000 and, with the support of other organizations, managed to benefit 600 Cartagena families with machinery and equipment, furnishings, and other goods. In addition to the micro-credit fund that benefited 587 families, 30 families were relocated to new homes and 200 people were trained in business techniques. More than 3,000 people have benefited and now enjoy a better lifestyle.⁵⁶
- The Colombian Ministry of Defense released the “*Política integral de Derechos Humanos y DIH*” (Integral Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Policy), aimed to verify and standardize U.S.-backed military operations, as well as to avoid extralegal executions and other human rights abuses.⁵⁷
- A 53% reduction in political crimes and 9% reduction in illegal crop plantations, according to the UN (from 86,00 hectares in 2005 to

78,000 hectares in 2006).⁵⁸ According to Bobby Charles, "Seizures and eradications are at record levels."⁵⁹ As discussed below, the negative consequences of fumigation on the subsistence rights of the Colombian peasant population is an area of concern, therefore impact depends upon how one understands the problem.

- U.S.-Colombia extradition agreement as a way of directly attacking terrorist organizations and their structures (top-level paramilitary commanders extradited to the U.S. are unable to continue operating from there). In addition, although these individuals have been charged in the U.S. with narco-trafficking, their extradition ensures at least the partial fulfillment of their victims' rights to truth and reparations that originally were not being fulfilled due to the perpetrators' lack of cooperation with Colombian justice.⁶⁰
- The restoration of public order and the strengthening of the Colombian state, along with the gradual military and political debilitation of FARC and the continued demobilization of paramilitary groups. This has resulted in greater protection of the right to security of person and freedom of movement. It has also brought a relative sense of peace and economic prosperity, as evidenced through an increase in the country's stock market index and foreign investment flows to certain sectors of Colombian society.

On the negative side, the results so far are not reflective of the large sums of money invested in Plan Colombia⁶¹ in addition to the following features of U.S. involvement in Colombia:

- SOA graduates/Colombian officers have been tried for aggravated human rights abuses.
- Neo-liberal policies aimed at the privatization of public services, as well as the influx of agricultural imports, is undermining Colombian nationals' socioeconomic subsistence rights.
- Through its actions, the U.S. has defended the interests of Colombian elites who are subservient to U.S. goals and policies, thus perpetuating economic and political inequality. Also, through the indebtedness of Colombia to U.S. institutions, the U.S. has managed to maintain control over Colombia's natural and human resources, particularly oil and labor.⁶²
- U.S.-backed political assassinations as an example of major human rights violations, and the ensuing violence throughout the 20th century as the cause of human rights violations.

- With specific regard to Plan Colombia, increasing military aid and decreasing development aid has a profound impact on Colombia's human rights situation. Furthermore, being historically involved in violating the rights to freedom of thought and expression and trying to crush the political opposition, the U.S. could be said to be responsible for the creation of FARC, and indirectly for the multiple human rights violations committed by this illegal group. In addition, one could argue that the U.S. is responsible for the creation of the ultra-right paramilitary groups that are generally regarded as a response to FARC, and, in turn, for paramilitary-related human rights violations and the escalation of violence across the country.
- Through fumigation practices, the U.S. is perceived to be responsible for the loss of the means of livelihood of illicit crop growers, and, therefore, a major cause of displacement in Colombia. In addition, fumigation often causes severe deterioration of health: "Fumigation is a major part of Plan Colombia. It is meant to eradicate coca plants, but it is used against peasants and their rights to land. Deadly myco-herbicides, many food crops destroyed. Florida's Department of the Environment deemed many of these chemicals too dangerous to use in their state, but they get sent to Colombia anyway to be sprayed in areas of guerrilla activity."⁶³

It is worth highlighting that U.S. rhetoric on terrorism is conducive to U.S. action in Colombia, thus legitimizing such action while at the same time magnifying its potential human rights impact. It is also important to consider the long-term human rights impact of Colombia's political, economic, and military dependency on the U.S.

B. EU Impact

The impact of EU policies on Colombia's human rights situation is very recent, area-specific, and therefore limited. The lack of presence and participation are, in this sense, important constraints on the human rights impact of foreign policy and its capacity to shape human rights processes and outcomes.

The literature on the impact of EU policy on Colombia's human rights is still very limited. Despite the newly ambitious breadth of EU activity in Colombia, the human rights impact of such activity remains a vastly unexplored topic. With that said, the European Commission regards the EU's first Peace Lab as highly successful:

There is now a community radio. It has constructed 150 schools and helped hundreds of families to survive through the farming of 5,000 hectares of palm oil (each farmer has 10 hectares for palm oil and land for subsistence farming), cacao production (helping 6,000 families) and exporting baby bananas to Europe. In 2005, the project bought 1,200 cows to support small ranches in the region. And it has set up many local networks bringing together, for example, young people, women, fishermen and fisherwomen.⁶⁴

This points to the EU's concern for, and concrete action towards, the protection of important socioeconomic rights in some of Colombia's poorest and most damaged regions, including the rights to education, work, and an adequate standard of living, and freedom from hunger. At the same time, and due to the respect that the Peace Labs have gained among different actors within the armed conflict, the labs can be said to have had limited but positive impact on security, peace, and stability, and the basic civil/political and socioeconomic human rights that derive from them.

In its 2007 "Conclusions on Colombia" report, the European Council has devised concrete objectives and expectations for the EU's involvement in Colombia.⁶⁵ Specific areas include disarmament; demobilization and reintegration into society of illegal group members and combatants; mediation in a possible humanitarian agreement for Colombia; humanitarian aid; poverty reduction; social equality and wealth distribution; displacement and the environment; alternative social and economic development; trade; human rights promotion; and drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. Again, the human rights impact of such activities has not yet been determined, but should inspire an important amount of research in the future.

U.S. and EU foreign policies have indirectly impacted the human rights situation in Colombia through their undeniable influence on national policy, on the one hand, and Colombia's political, economic, social, legal, and cultural institutions, on the other. U.S. support has been the backbone of President Uribe's national policy of Democratic Security and the "*Ley de Justicia y Paz*" (Justice and Peace Law), which have played a double role in both promoting and violating important human rights.⁶⁶ The EU has played a significant role in emphasizing the need for the Colombian government to make peace with the terrorist groups, along with a recent proposal for a humanitarian agreement that would allow hostages to be exchanged for guerrillas. The FARC would be offered a "meeting zone," in a rural and uninhabited

area, with no military presence and with the mediation of the Catholic Church, in cooperation with European mediators (France, Spain, and Switzerland). President Uribe also proposed to send an international medical mission to assist the hostages.

The impact of the foreign policy of the U.S. and EU on Colombian institutions can potentially have, I would argue, a large-scale impact on the promotion of human rights in Colombia. For example, the U.S. has had direct impact on Colombia's military and legal institutions (through the strengthening of Colombia's military and the U.S.-Colombia extradition agreement), though the lack of cooperation with the U.S. may also weaken Colombian institutions. Both U.S. and EU foreign policies seem to focus on supporting the policies of the Colombian government to promote human rights, yet the question arises as to whether foreign efforts to impact national institutions can come to fruition in a country like Colombia—one with weak institutions that have been deeply infiltrated by the paramilitary and the guerrillas.

C. Combined Impact of U.S. and EU Foreign Policy

The relationship and interactions in the execution of U.S. and EU foreign policies towards Colombia invite further reflection on the combined impact that both policies may have on human rights there. Are the policies and their outcomes complementary or are they mutually exclusive? Are there any instances in which both policies overlap, for instance, between the EU's Instrument for Stability and Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) that deals with issues of terrorism, arms trade, and security aid, and the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia?

The EU rejects an exclusively military solution to Colombia's conflict. In that sense, U.S. and EU foreign policy in Colombia can be said to be complementary, with the U.S. more concerned with the military and macroeconomic aspects of the conflict and the EU focusing on the more social and structural ones (thus magnifying the combined effect of the two different approaches, each of different scope). Yet based on their outcomes, U.S. and EU foreign policy in Colombia seem contradictory, and perhaps even mutually exclusive, because the U.S. approach is in direct opposition to some of the fundamental values that the EU and its foreign policy are based upon. It could also be argued that a great deal of EU policy efforts and aid go toward mitigating the direct consequences of U.S. foreign policy. In other words, EU policy serves as a social and humanitarian safety net for U.S. actions. Does the

EU bear the cost of the negative consequences of U.S. actions? It is also important to reflect upon the degree to which both policies help in the deterrence of further human rights violations, and the potential consequences of removing either foreign policy from the current human rights picture in Colombia.

IX. Recommendations

(1) U.S. and EU foreign policy makers should strive for greater coherence and coordination between their policies abroad and the models of power and global governance the U.S. and EU represent (and the values they each stand for), along with a better understanding and synchronization of their national interests, foreign policy goals, and the on-the-ground realities of their foreign policies. Finally, they should set specific human rights goals and expectations for both foreign policies and adapt the rhetoric to reflect the priority of human rights relative to their other foreign policy interests.

(2) The U.S. and EU should reconcile their policies and enhance coordination with Colombia's national policies through further incorporation of human rights and international humanitarian law in their approaches to security and public order. An increased social scope may, however, elevate the cost of U.S. operations in Colombia through greater assistance for the victims of military operations and macroeconomic policy, for instance.

(3) Through increased military power, EU foreign policy could have a greater impact on the human rights situation via peacekeeping missions and human rights monitoring.

(4) Focus more on the impact of U.S. and EU policies on Colombia's national institutions and promote socioeconomic and agrarian reform as the primary ways to ensure true protection against human rights violations in Colombia.

X. Implications and Lessons on Globalization: Concluding Reflections

I have argued that the militaristic and economic development based approach to foreign policy in Colombia by the U.S. has contributed

to the re-establishment of public order and the promotion of important human rights, with the right to personal and human security as the main priority. Despite being highly integrated, however, the U.S. approach simultaneously undermines basic civil-political and socio-economic rights of large sections of the Colombian population, particularly those whose ideological inclination and economic means of subsistence oppose U.S. interests (thus resulting in the U.S. directly opposing key democratic and human rights principles). On its part, the EU foreign policy, through its more social and structural focus, has had limited but promising success in tackling the root causes and structural aspects of poverty and inequality in Colombia. In that sense, both U.S. and EU foreign policy in Colombia can be considered complementary. Yet, internal issues of the EU, such as its cumbersome decision-making processes and lack of coherent and consistent foreign action both on the part of EU member states and EU institutions, continue to limit the scope and potential of EU foreign policy in addressing and improving the human rights situation in Colombia. The impact of EU foreign policy on Colombia's human rights remains a largely under-researched area.

Areas of further research include the impact of recent and potential political events in the U.S., EU, and Colombia. Examples of hypothetically possible events include a shift from a military to a more social approach following a change in U.S. and/or Colombian administrations, or the further implementation of the Lisbon Treaty with its implications for EU policy and individual member states' foreign policies toward Colombia. In light of the lack of literature on EU foreign policy assessment, future research could focus on evaluating the achievements of EU foreign policy in relation to human rights in Colombia and other target countries and regions.

Finally, this study has shed light on the following two reflections and lessons on globalization:

1. The current state of conflict and human rights around the world illustrate the complex relationship and interactions between the global and the local spheres of life. The internationalization of conflict suggests that a matter that used to be contained within state borders has now acquired international and transnational dimensions, in turn becoming a primary foreign policy concern.⁶⁷ Simultaneously, and as suggested by Donnelly, "the moral universality of human rights, which has been codified in a strong set of authorita-

tive international norms, must be realized through the particularities of national [and local] action."⁶⁸

2. We cannot look at globalization as black or white. The benefits of any policy, intervention, or plan directed at changing or sustaining a situation abroad come at the expense of certain groups and individuals within different countries. The current challenge for domestic and foreign policy makers is to accentuate and extend the benefits while mitigating the costs of globalization.

The benefits associated with globalization aside, the costs do not fall on countries as a whole, but rather within countries, where there are distinct winners and losers. The same is true for international policies, like Plan Colombia. An example from the study would be the idea of competing rights, contained in the idea of protecting American security interests at the expense of Colombian nationals, whose rights are violated through anti-narcotic strategies like fumigation, as well as through the systematic deprivation of the rights to freedom of thought and expression of opposition groups and individuals.

Despite its common utilization in our everyday vernacular, globalization is an intricate phenomenon that is so far-reaching in its scope that it is difficult to take sides in the globalization debate. Globalization cannot be viewed simplistically in black and white or as a new world order that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's thesis is that globalization makes society as a whole richer by bringing overall economic growth to Colombian society. However, the costs inflicted on certain individuals and sectors of society require policy makers' attention. Specifically, and in order to ensure global economic security in the future, policy makers, local and global, need to work to build a safety net for people living in poverty in developing countries. Greater distribution of global wealth is essential in order to enhance economic growth to its full potential. Otherwise, the contrasts between developed and developing countries will only be accentuated by continued globalization. If done right, I believe it is possible that globalization can become a part of the solution to some of the world's most pressing problems and help decrease global economic inequalities. ●

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Notes

1. Donnelly 2002, p. 1.

2. Despite the indivisibility and interdependence that characterize the whole set of human rights, the rights included in my model correspond to those that are most frequently violated in Colombia, thus providing an analytical focus for this study.

3. White 2004.

4. Donnelly, p. 127.

5. McCormick 2007.
6. www.america.gov.
7. Diplomats and Military Commanders for Change
8. EUROPA, EU External Relations, Activities of the EU-CFSP.
9. Ibid.
10. EUROPA, CFSP Overview.
11. EUROPA, EU External Relations, Activities of the EU-CFSP.
12. Hill and Smith, p. 19.
13. European Commission, "Common Foreign and Security Policy."
14. Ibid.
15. Donnelly, p. 23.
16. Ibid., p. 155.
17. Ibid., p. 168.
18. *El Tiempo*, "¡Se fueron!"
19. Donnelly, p. 159.
20. Cited in Donnelly, p. 160.
21. Gutierrez, "Preface."
22. McInerney, p. 59.
23. Gutierrez, p. 51.
24. Wellstone, p. 247.
25. Glenn, pp. 75–76.
26. *CIA World Factbook*.
27. Gumbleton, p. 236.
28. *CIA World Factbook* 2007 est.
29. Suárez, p. 128 and Glenn, p. 74.
30. Goff, p. 80.
31. *War in Colombia: Made in the USA*, "Appendix."
32. Bourgeois and Panetta, pp. 253–255.
33. *War in Colombia: Made in the USA*, "Chronological History of Colombia."
34. Clark, p. 45.
35. McInerney, pp. 63–64.
36. *El Tiempo*, "Financiación Plan Colombia."
37. McInerney, p. 64.
38. *El Tiempo*, "Financiación Plan Colombia."
39. Clark, p. 32.
40. Ibid., p. 33.
41. Goff, p. 80.
42. European Commission, "War of Ideology."
43. Ibid.
44. European Commission, "External Cooperation Programmes, Colombia."

45. European Commission Strategy Report, "Colombia, 2007–2013."
46. Ibid.
47. Centro de Investigación para la Paz, La Unión Europea y Colombia.
48. Ibid.
49. European Commission, "Colombia: The Peace Laboratory—a Marriage of Rural Development and Peace."
50. Strategy Paper for Colombia, "CFSP Financing."
51. European Commission Country Strategy Report, "Colombia, 2007–2013."
52. Ibid.
53. *El Tiempo*, "El país en dos informes."
54. Ibid.
55. "Plan Colombia: Failure or Success?" p. 9.
56. U.S. Embassy in Colombia, "Options for Displaced Families."
57. *El Tiempo*, "El país en dos informes."
58. Canal Capital, 14 June 2007.
59. "Plan Colombia: Failure or Success?," p. 142.
60. *El Tiempo*, "¡Se fueron!"
61. Canal Capital, 14 June 2007.
62. Clark, p. 33.
63. Gutierrez, p. 52.
64. European Commission, "Peace Laboratory."
65. Council of the EU, "Conclusions on Colombia," 2007.
66. Human Rights Watch on Extradition.
67. Cottey 2007.
68. Donnelly, p. 181.

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