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I. Introduction

*N*early a decade after national liberation in South Africa and Namibia, demonstrators outside of the 2002 United Nations Conference on Development filled the streets of Johannesburg with the resounding melodies of apartheid protest songs. Meanwhile, inside the conference gates, former President Thabo Mbeki called for an "end to global apartheid."

That same year, in the small city of Hilversum, Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn was shot dead. Known for his nationalist, right-wing politics, Fortuyn emerged as a prominent political figure, acquiring a cult following by appealing to anti-immigrant sentiment. His death inspired a resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia in a country that once stood for integration and tolerance.

These seemingly disconnected incidents demonstrate how, at both the local and the global level, people remain divided. As activists around the world organize under the rallying cry to fight global apartheid, disparities in rights to space and access to resources and social services persist at the local level. Macalester College's study abroad program, Globalization in Comparative Perspective, granted me the invaluable opportunity to explore firsthand this dynamic interplay of the local and the global. Over the course of my semesters of study in Namibia and the Netherlands, I explored the spatial dimensions of this global phenomenon, looking at the meaning of segregation and the politics of place in the global age.

To narrow this broad study, I focus on two specific populations and national contexts: the San in Namibia and the Moluccan community in the Netherlands. Grounded in these case studies, I examine the persistence of socio-spatial marginalization and inequity before moving on to analyze the impact of global forces on these national and localized conflicts. In Namibia, I examine how the land reform process serves as a means of transcending the infrastructure of apartheid. In the Netherlands, I look at the evolution of the Moluccan community following postcolonial resettlement. Exploring the politicization and social constructions of ethnic identities in each context, I critique the ideology and design of resettlement and reform programs. I also assess failures in the implementation process, highlighting how these initiatives can ultimately reinforce the marginal social status of the very people that they claim to serve.

This exploration is based on the premise that social and political dynamics are reflected through spatial organization. I hope to illuminate the underlying power structures that perpetuate spatial inequality at both the national and international level.

Further, I examine the role of these conflicts in the process of post-conflict reconciliation in the context of international justice. In addition, I explore how transnational advocacy initiatives that claim to empower can inadvertently perpetuate narratives that reinforce the socio-spatial marginalization of those on whose behalf they claim to advocate.

To carry out this study, I utilize a combination of academic texts and critical conversations in the places that were the subject, as well as the location, of my study. I reviewed literature in the social sciences, various media sources, non-profit groups, government organizations, and international governing bodies involved in issues of migration, resettlement, and integration. To lend perspective to my reading of these texts, I interviewed individuals involved in social services and public advocacy.

II. Transforming the Political Landscape: Resettlement Policies in Namibia and the Netherlands

Though globalization demands a re-evaluation of the nation-state, it does not render it irrelevant. Rather, it is a process that calls into question governmental obligations as it transforms the nature of national affiliations. Recognizing this integral, albeit changing, role of the state in the global era, I have chosen to focus on policy. While land reform

has become the focus of heated debate in post-apartheid Namibia, the challenges of integrating and understanding a growing immigrant population has taken center stage in the Dutch political arena. From rural Namibian farmlands to the suburbs of small cities in the Netherlands, globalization has not rendered the physical landscape irrelevant, but, rather, is redefining the terms of the politics of space. Though society in the global age may be increasingly detached from territory—no longer locked into specific localities—the symbolic value of territory and the particularities of locality retain their significance.

My project also presupposes that ongoing internal conflicts now play out on global stages, which reframe disputes over land. In addition to critiquing the rhetoric of policy and program design, I evaluate project implementation in each case in order to highlight how government failure to adequately supply social services can effactually undermine post-conflict reconciliation. Internal conflicts now play out through competing claims to space; divisions are reinforced by lingering segregation and patterns of land ownership and residence. "The identity of a place emerges by the intersection of its specific involvement in a system of hierarchically organized spaces with its cultural construction as a community or locality."[1] Thus, these localized conflicts bear both national and international significance, reflective of wider national and international contexts.

To illustrate the ongoing centrality of the state and its physical territory, I have chosen to examine resettlement policies. In Namibia and the Netherlands these policies target populations based upon their perceived marginalization.

III. Resettling Peoples, Reinforcing Inequality: The San in Northeastern Namibia

Before delving into these issues, a word on terminology is necessary. When I refer to the San, I do not use the label uncritically. I understand the emergence of the San as a distinct ethnic group to be product of Namibia's colonial history as well as an ongoing political process. I employ the term, however, because of its prominence in policy and advocacy. Those now classified as San in social policy consist largely of the peoples formerly referred to as Bushmen during colonial conquest in Southern Africa. San is a linguistic classification adopted in order to classify various groups in the region concentrated mainly in Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia. Ethnic identities are not only politicized,

but serve a distinct role in public policy. I aim to shed light on external narratives of San identity as well as the national and international implications of labeling, rather than trying to reveal the self-conception of these peoples or the diverse identities lumped together under the label "San." Thus, it is the political identity attached to ethnic groupings that I explore, not the meanings of these groupings themselves.

Following independence from colonial rule in 1990, Namibia's government faced the tremendous challenge of reconstructing social welfare programs. Apartheid rule in the colonial era was designed to lock a black majority into poverty. Decades of apartheid rule resulted in a lingering spatial isolation and socioeconomic stratification rivaling that in South Africa and Brazil. Though social welfare programs have the potential to help Namibians break out of these structures of isolation and inequity, shortcomings in the provision of key services on the part of the state not only fail to transform the system, but can also serve to trap people in poverty and reinforce colonial era narratives. Insufficient healthcare in the face of a growing HIV/AIDS pandemic, inadequate education, and the lack of available housing are among the failures in social services that contribute to widespread frustration in a nation already largely disillusioned with the post-independence government.

Although land reform in Namibia attempts to deconstruct the social infrastructure of apartheid rule, the process has inadvertently undermined national reconciliation and failed to reverse the growing socioeconomic inequality. More than the simple reallocation of land from a white minority to a black majority, the reform process attempts to redefine land rights and tenure systems in order to redress inequity rooted in past injustice. While commercial land under freehold tenure plays a major role in the reform process, it is the redistribution of land through communal land reform and resettlement policy that directly impacts the majority of Namibians.

The 1997 National Resettlement Program (NRP) claims to empower landless Namibians, the poorest of the nation's poor. Within this broad category of "formerly disadvantaged Namibians," the NRP identifies the San as one of a few primary program beneficiaries. However, the NRP represents only the latest chapter in a long history of the dislocation and relocation of the people now classified as the San. What is more, in order to resettle the San, policymakers must first locate them. In doing so, the state and non-governmental organizations alike

reinforce social narratives depicting the peripheral social status of the group as manifested by socio-spatial isolation and insecure tenure.

The NRP allocates tenure rights through Communal Land Boards and Traditional Authority structures. Though the government grants tenure rights, it keeps communal land in the hands of the state. Allocating leases of up to ninety-nine years for settlers, the Namibian government ultimately "vests trust in the State for the benefit of 'traditional' communities."[2, 3] Hence, ethnic groups are accepted as political entities, and these identities and affiliations play an integral role in the construction of the state.

Despite the politicization of ethnic groups, ethnic divisions and discrimination also dominate policy making and the political process. Group interests in the land reform process are furthered by representatives on regional land boards, and many San communities and advocacy groups have expressed concern regarding the lack of representation of San communities in regional land negotiations. The Ju/'hoansi and !Xoo, based in Omaheke, were denied recognition by the government in 2001.[4] The decision demonstrates the underlying lack of political power allocated to San groups. They are rendered passive recipients of government programs—targeted beneficiaries rather than participants in the reform process.

Insecure tenure is also symptomatic of this underlying lack of political power. Although it is clear that contemporary tenure insecurity is rooted in past subjugation, according to the NRP, land reform is not to function as a form of reparations. As such, land rights will not be awarded based upon ancestral claims.

At the same time, the reform process aims to improve the socioeconomic status of "formerly disadvantaged Namibians." Thus, while the drafters of the reform process have attempted to avert the lengthy and ultimately impossible task of restoring pre-colonial land holdings, the political agenda underwriting the effort cannot be ignored. Transforming the physical landscape, land reform is central to efforts to reclaim the political landscape following colonialism.

In another attempt to avoid controversy in the reform process, state policy classifies Namibian land by usage for the purposes of redistribution rather than according to holdings. The Ministry for Land Reform and Resettlement (MLRR) classifies land for reform purposes in terms of communal versus commercial areas. Such a division is a superficial one. The first consists of more agriculturally productive and commercially oriented territories frequently owned by white Namibian farm-

ers, and the second consists of land predominately populated by Black Namibians. Although liberated from formal apartheid rule, the divisions stemming from apartheid policy remain firmly in place. In other words, the divisions between a minority elite land-owning class and the majority of the nation's poor communal farmers persist.

While uneven patterns of land use in post-independence Namibia are the product of colonial era land seizures, the infrastructure of colonial rule, the reform process avoids racial classifications. The choice to employ an alternative framework for understanding social divisions represents a conscious effort to move away from racial classifications, to promote a national consciousness that no longer functions along black and white lines. Though this approach attempts to avoid racial classifications, the reform process continues to employ ethnic terms, identifying the San as a distinct group and political entity for resettlement purposes.

Turning to the controversial issue of expropriation, Namibia's approach to commercial reform is guided by a willing buyer/willing seller model. It is notably passive when it comes to expropriating commercial property. This type of policy stands as a dramatic divergence from the more radical socialist rhetoric underlining liberation era politics. Former president and leader in the liberation movement, Sam Nujoma, who oversaw the establishment of a number of key reform policies, including this one, noted that:

> It has to be said that the Constitutional Principles document was formulated by the Americans and the British to favour the interests of individual white settlers…It must be clearly stated that the inclusion of a clause, which serves to perpetuate the status quo of inequity in land distribution in Namibia, was never in line with SWAPO's position in addressing the land question in Namibia. The inclusion of this clause has resulted in the problem of lands, which we have after the turn of the millennium.[5]

In light of the slow pace of commercial land acquisition for reform and resettlement, little has changed. Currently, 3,800 white commercial farmers maintain ownership of just under half of Namibia's territory, while approximately one million black Namibians occupy communal areas. Without adequate commercial land on which to resettle landless Namibians, the majority of resettlement programs have taken place in communal areas. Relocating landless peasants into communal areas in the less agriculturally productive northern zone has not served as

an effective means of redistributing wealth or alleviating poverty. The expropriation of commercial farmlands is necessary in order to obtain adequate space for the resettlement of landless Namibians. Without sufficient land for resettlement, the NRP simply relocates poor farmers into new settlements where they continue to struggle to subsist. It does not tackle the greater task of transforming the structures underwriting the current inequitable distribution of land.

Further, by maintaining state ownership of communal lands, the process fails to award permanent title to beneficiaries. Instead, these programs award usufruct rights to use of the land and its resources, reinforcing a colonial era view of communal lands as peripheral areas of low agricultural productivity.

This points to the limits of land reform under Namibia's nationalist, liberation party government: "Traditional mainstream nationalism has turned yesterday's natives into postcolonial settlers and postcolonial natives…Even with the colonial power gone, we keep defining every citizen as either a native or a settler!"[6] The persistence of the dichotomy between settler and native in postcolonial resettlement in Namibia demonstrates that Namibians have yet to be liberated from colonial era structures for organizing power.

Compounding the situation, commercial farm expropriations displace farm workers, many of whom identify as San. In this way, land reform that promotes expropriation also undermines its stated goals of serving the poor. The issue of dispossession as connected to expropriation demonstrates how communal resettlement and commercial reform are deeply intertwined and interdependent. Progress in one area is dependent upon progress in the other. Resettlement is thus an essential part of a larger process of reformulating the relationship of the people to the land. This is a process that would involve granting permanent tenure rights as well as transforming segregated residential patterns in urban as well as rural locations.

While the NRP involves the reallocation of tenure, it does little to promote alternative forms of tenure that could benefit the San. What is more, by failing to promote alternative tenure systems, resettlement programs perpetuate colonial era views regarding efficient versus inefficient land use. Within this framework, San land use is frequently deemed unproductive and inefficient. "It is the government's goal to get the other Bushmen who still lead a nomadic life to settle them in locations especially built for them…It is in any case the goal of the Catholic Mission to get Bushman out of nomadism," reads one colonial

era document, "and to have them living in allocated areas as borders," tenants on land owned by wealthy white Namibians.[7]

Though less overt in claiming that citizens' use of the land must be in line with a certain national ideology or value system, the contemporary land reform process leaves little room for divergence from mainstream, commercially focused land practices. Nomadic land uses patterns widely practiced among San peoples are not legitimated by commercial definitions of tenure. Moreover, these hunter-gatherer based livelihoods are incompatible with animal grazing practiced by the majority of communal farmers in Namibia. Consequently, current resettlement policy does little to bring about the type of fundamental reform that could change the socioeconomic status of resettled peoples.

Furthermore, while resettlement programs attempt to combat marginalization, these initiatives have perpetuated widespread perceptions of the San as a lazy and dependent subgroup. These notions have combined with official policy and program rhetoric to construct stereotypes of dependency. These attitudes have fueled discrimination, inciting internal violence and conflict among Namibians, hindering post-conflict reconciliation following apartheid and the struggle for liberation.

In addition, rights to the land in communal areas are allocated under the authority of traditional leaders, utilizing a system for consultation with the government tied to the divvying up of Namibian land into the ethnically divided homelands of the colonial era. In the latest phase of international indigenous rights legislation, environmental protections are increasingly incorporating indigenous people into their mandates, asserting their voice in provisions related to the land and its resources. Among these, the Convention on Biological Diversity, created in 1992, states that, "practices of indigenous and local communities [are] embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources." Thus, community-based natural resource management programs must be placed within the context of broader trends in programs that seek to re-envision the relationship of communities to the land and its resources.

In his inaugural address, Namibian President Pohamba stated that, "traditional leaders are custodians of our cultural heritage; they are also promoters of our traditional values."[8] Yet, "traditional" is a broad and ambiguous label, which encompasses a wide variety of leadership structures and types of land usage. Tradition is not static, nor are the

wide array of livelihoods termed "traditional." While deeming a practice as such grants it a certain cultural value, it also relegates it to the margins.

What is more, the elections of traditional authorities are not without controversy, and issues of representation have plagued the reform process. The current tribal authority system draws from the leadership structures put into place during the colonial conquest. In this light, the continued use of many representatives for consultation in the land reform process today legitimizes notions of indigenous group identity through the homeland system.

As a window into the limitations of resettlement programs, I focus on two resettlement locations in the northeastern region of Omaheke, Skoonheid, and Drimiopsis. Approximately 8,000 people classified by the state as members of the San, including Ju/'hoansi, Naro and !Xoo groups, live in the Omaheke, making the region home to one of the nation's largest San populations.

In Skoonheid, resettlement began in 1993 on three farms, consisting of Herero, Damara, and Owambo residents in addition to a San majority. Residents are mainly comprised of former commercial farm workers new to communal agriculture, and are supported by Food for Work programs implemented by the government. This program is only the most recent in a long history of government subsidies targeting the San that exchange labor for food. It is as if the San exist outside of the wage labor system, and, as such, have become a type of "underclass."[9] The prominence of this type of welfare program in resettlement locations reinforces economic dependency and, consequently, the status of the San as a dependent sub-class.

Further, conditions of poverty have reinforced divisions among ethnic groups, straining communities and contributing to inter-ethnic conflict. Interviews with residents conducted through a recent survey by Namibia's only public assistance law firm, the Legal Assistance Center (LAC), reveal internal conflicts running along ethnic lines. One Damara woman stated that, "The future…depends on whether the other tribe [the San] are able to change their attitude."[10] Another Damara resident explained that, "The relationship with the San community is not good. We are always told by the San people that this is their farm."[11] The statement speaks to how longstanding, competing claims to land contribute to ongoing conflict in communities composed of residents of several ethnic affiliations. Thus, while it may not be possible to restore land based on ancestry, the injustice of dislocation and expropriation

manifested by tenure insecurity continues to shape the attitudes of beneficiaries regarding one another just as they undermine the cooperation necessary for the success of resettlement programs.

The words of one San resident also reveal this challenge: "If we get some space then it is not long before the blacks take it and bring in their cattle. When they come, they don't see us and we must live under them…when we tell them to leave they say you are just a Bushman—you cannot have land."[12]

The statement reveals how attitudes regarding ethnicity can be employed in order to rationalize the denial of land rights to those classified as San. First of all, it is widely held that the San have been marginalized in terms of their rights to the land because they have never made claim to permanent land rights. This is a function of the exclusion of the San from systems of land ownership as well as the nature of patterns of land use employed by many San. Rather than settling on a piece of land to raise livestock or grow crops, the San have tended to hunt and gather, dependent upon watering holes and wild animals for their subsistence. Thus, it has been easy for other groups to come into an area occupied by the San in order to utilize the land for their own purposes.

The language used regarding race in this instance is also extremely telling of lingering divides, and the transfer of the black and white divisions of apartheid into the postcolonial era. The speaker refers to "blacks" when discussing other ethnic groups, supporting a view of the San as a race apart from the majority black population, reinforcing the identification of the San as an indigenous minority and unique subpopulation.

Furthermore, employing the word "Bushman" as a label for the San ties contemporary identities into a colonial history. This is a history, that has worked to construct a homogenous identity based in part on the perception of deep-seated marginalization and subjugation of an ethnic group from a diverse group of people with a variety of tribal affiliations. "The Bushman think this place belongs to them," another resident noted.[13]

Findings in nearby Drimiopsis also speak to the prevalence of conflicts among resettled peoples as well as expose flaws in program design. This smaller area, consisting of 120 family units, was originally intended to serve only as a temporary camp. Although many residents have moved on to Skoonheid, Drimiopsis remains overcrowded and occupied by temporary residents that have yet to officially register

with the government. As is the case in Skoonheid, the majority of residents are landless former large commercial farm laborers categorized as of San ancestry.

What limited social services are available are inaccessible to the majority of residents. Many are unable to afford school fees. Many cannot access water, because the diesel engines for pumps have been stolen. This theft is symptomatic of the frequency of crime, evidence of how the lack of governmental protections and police services undermines the successful implementation of social policy.

In another area of Omaheke, Animus, police have been accused of harassing San residents. According to a lawyer representing the victims of police harassment, officers confiscated vehicles and assaulted San children. These acts are one of a number of alleged rights violations and abuses of the San at the hands of the police. They are not isolated occurrences. In 1999, three traditional leaders made official complaints of "emotional harassment" by the Omaheke police and claimed that officers had broken into their homes and taken property. In another instance, police in Omaheke were accused of taking and consuming meat belonging to the San.[14]

Ongoing tensions in Skoonheid also demonstrate the broader context of violence and conflict in the region. Domestic violence is reportedly widespread, as are thefts. Another resident claimed that the San are "dirty" and stated that, "it is all the Bushman who are stealing our belongings."[15]

The challenges involved in dealing with crime demonstrate how an underlying lack of basic social services can fuel inter-ethnic tensions. Without a police force, the people of Skoonheid are forced to settle disputes themselves, which complicates relationships and creates conflict among community members.

Returning to the case of Dripmiosis, in addition to a monthly food package, many settlers are involved in MLRR's Food for Work programs. Yet these programs fail to create economic independence. For instance, residents involved in the Food for Work scheme are required to work in a communal garden and must sell the surplus. Rather than reaping the rewards of their labor, they must put any profits earned into a bank account outside of the settlement.

One San resident, Dina, has spent her life as a domestic worker for whites in the region and has not found economic independence in Dripmiosis. Although she has ambitions to start her own business to generate some kind of income, resettlement has left her without the

tools to develop this ambition. Without the tools for economic inde-
pendence, beneficiaries are forced to either seek work on commercial
farms, labor for wealthier communal farmers in the North, or continue
to live in poverty on overcrowded communal lands.

According to Odendaal and Harring, the pervasive view of resettle-
ment beneficiaries, especially the San, as "loafers" has made its way
into discussions at the level of the national government. Counter to
this perception, researchers reported that, overall:

> Resettlement projects are full of people with the desire to make a living,
> but frustrated by a lack of support and a lack of opportunity. Many are
> unemployed or underemployed so, on any given day, many people will
> be sitting around standing and not working.[16]

In both locations, national cohesion and reconciliation are under-
mined by the failure of the state to provide adequate support services
or meet basic needs in resettled communities. Resettled San are locked
into dependency, reinforcing their peripheral status and promoting
discriminatory views of the San as a sub-population. Frequently dis-
located and unable to subsist on agricultural activity or to acquire
employment in impoverished resettlement locations, many are forced
to continue to seek work at commercial farms. As such, resettlement
locations represent only a new stop in continuing cycles of dislocation
tied to the spatial insecurity of landless Namibians.

NRP program administrators have even admitted to the failures
of project implementation thus far. According to Namibia's national
newspaper, the Headman of Skoonheid, Frederick Langman, "said
that he and his people are still not 'feeling' the fruits of freedom."[17]
Furthermore, in 2001 members of Omaheke's resettled communities
put forward an official complaint to the MLRR demanding that the
ministry send a delegation to the area "to investigate pressing prob-
lems in their communities."[18] These problems include various inci-
dents involving harassment by both community members and police
forces in addition to theft. Specifically, in 2004, a dozen members of the
San community in the Omaheke region declared their intention to sue
Herero communal farmers, claiming that these farmers strung up from
a tree two individuals later identified as San residents. The incident
demonstrates how conflicts over the land continue to be directly linked
to violence. Although conflict may be declared officially over, these
confrontations demonstrate that civil conflict persists. Confrontations

over rights to the land and land use serve as a platform through which internal tensions now play out, prolonging strife decades after the long war for liberation.

IV. The Moluccan Community: Perpetual *Allochtoon*?

Although the rise in popularity of nationalist politician Pim Fortuyn and the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gough made the weaknesses of multiculturalism in the Netherlands headline news, these incidents represent only the latest episode in a long history of the challenges of multicultural integration in the Netherlands. Ethnic Dutch and immigrant communities alike have long struggled to foster tolerance and social justice. The difficulty of such a task has been made particularly relevant in light of recent anti-Muslim hate crimes and widespread public fears of the Islamic community.

This fear of the "Other" and the hesitance of the majority to incorporate outside communities into Dutch society are not specifically attached to Dutch Muslims. Decades before the most recent resurgence in fears of terrorism and violence associated with Muslim immigrants, the Dutch were confronted with the threat of violence within their nation's borders.

Examining the history of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands offers a window into the conflicts and contradictions embedded in Dutch multiculturalism today. Dutch Moluccans have been frequently portrayed as an ideal immigrant group through the lens of an assimilationist model of integration, receiving labels like innocuous and well adjusted. Yet, just a few decades ago, Moluccans in the Netherlands were associated with a series of terrorist attacks. These acts forced the people of the Netherlands to reconsider the nature of Dutch, Moluccan, and Dutch-Moluccan identities alike.

The formation of this hybrid identity began before the first members of the South Indonesian island population set foot in the Netherlands in 1951. Throughout the 20th century, Moluccans took on a unique role in the colonial ruling system in the Dutch East Indies. Following the economic decline of the regional spice trade, which had earned the islands the nickname Spice Islands, many Moluccans were recruited to serve as soldiers for the Dutch colonial army, the KNIL.

Nicknamed "Black Dutchmen,"[19] Moluccan soldiers earned a reputation for their loyalty to the Dutch crown. As in Namibia, national divisions were drawn along ethnic lines. Divide-and-rule tactics rein-

forced ethnic differences. Compounding this fragmentation, many soldiers already identified themselves as standing on the fringes of Indonesian and Javanese society because they adhered to a minority Christian faith. Tapping into pre-existing factions for the benefit of consolidating colonial rule, Dutch colonial authorities classified the people of the Ambon islands, now referred to as the South Moluccas, as an ethnic minority. In an attempt to quell resistance to Dutch rule, colonial forces splintered opposition groups fighting for an independent and unified Indonesia. To assist in this task, members of the KNIL were deployed throughout the East Indies in order to stifle internal upheaval and consolidate Dutch rule in the face of growing Indonesian resistance.

Testament to mounting separatism in the region, many Moluccans had their own political aspirations apart from national independence. In the wake of colonial rule, the former soldiers of the KNIL feared persecution for their service and allegiance to the crown. This political divide, the peripheral geography of the island territory, and the prevalence of a minority Christian faith in a predominantly Muslim culture all combined to foster an overarching sense of separateness within the Moluccan community in the region. This sense inspired one group of Moluccans to stake a claim to an independent republic in 1950. Just one year following the establishment of an independent Indonesia, the act marks the beginning of a long struggle for political autonomy, an ambition that has taken on symbolic meaning for Moluccans living abroad, as disputes over territory now persist into the beginning of the 21st century.

Even at this early stage, nationalist organizing took place in a distinctly international arena. The U.N. worked alongside the Dutch and Javanese as the Moluccan community declared the Republic Malaku Selatan (RMS) through Article 2 of the 3rd Agreement in the draft of the new republic of Indonesia, which offered national factions the opportunity to opt out of the emerging and newly unified nation. Moluccans in the Netherlands advocating the political autonomy of the RMS throughout the middle of the last century also directed claims toward the U.N., appealing to the supranational body through various political factions fighting for the RMS in Indonesia and abroad.

Moreover, this struggle for an autonomous republic had taken on symbolic value for the community resettled in the Netherlands. Following World War II, approximately 12,000 of the 25,000 demobilized Moluccan KNIL soldiers were repatriated to the Netherlands and

placed in camps throughout the country. This program was originally conceived of as a temporary arrangement intended to repay ex-soldiers for their loyalty to the crown by allowing them (and their families) a safe exile in the Netherlands. Not intended to serve as a permanent solution, resettlement programs failed to consider the long term. These former military servants and their families found themselves in isolated settlements that included former concentration camps, such as Schattenberg and Bught. The act that was once intended to do justice for the subjects that put in the hard labor to establish the empire was plainly inadequate in recognizing the former soldiers for their service.

Such treatment through resettlement revealed the contradictions inherent in the Moluccans' social status in the Netherlands. Although technically citizens of the Dutch colonial empire, spatial marginalization reinforced social marginalization, a condition designed by Dutch policy. After Moluccans moved out of the camps, they were relocated to isolated communities, to gated neighborhoods on the outskirts of small cities. Locked into the periphery, Moluccans found themselves living alongside rather than among the Dutch.

This is but one example of how the Dutch "Pillarization" model of integration has fostered "remarkable subcultural segmentation…of society in general."[20] Social distance based on perceived cultural difference was reflected by spatial segregation and uneven control over the landscape. Here, in much the same way as in Namibia, spatial insecurity, segregation, and lack of land rights undermine national cohesion. "The dilemma here is that while the population on the ground is multiethnic, the authority, the law, and the definition of rights are mono- or uni-ethnic. The consequence is to divide the population ethnically… [postcolonial] clashes about rights are less and less racial, more and more ethnic."[21]

As the years passed, supposedly temporary resettlement conditions in the Netherlands revealed themselves as permanent living situations. Former soldiers and their families struggled to remain united across various cities through the struggle for self-determination. "Proud soldiers felt emasculated, quickly grabbing onto the RMS ideal to salvage meaning in their lives."[22] Today, the "RMS ideal" is discussed more frequently as an ideology than as a real political project. The symbolic value awarded to the struggle speaks to the meaning of rights to land and the power of space as a means of asserting political autonomy. Locked into the outskirts, Dutch Moluccans found themselves in a kind of double bind of marginalization and placelessness. In exile from

the South Moluccas, where civil conflict persists, while simultaneously locked into the margins of Dutch society, the community has been united by a homeland that exists only in their collective imagination.

In view of this situation, the series of attacks organized by a small group of second-generation Moluccan youths in the mid-1960s takes on a renewed social and political significance for the larger Moluccan community and among the Dutch as a whole. The youths that engaged in this struggle through violent occupations were symbolically claiming territory as part of a struggle for rights to space beyond Dutch borders as they worked to assert the political autonomy of the RMS. They gained notoriety by seizing the Indonesian Embassy and later hijacking a number of trains throughout the 1970s. Tensions came to a head when the group occupied an elementary school in May of 1987. By this point, the group had garnered international fame. Within the Netherlands, the hijackings and their aftermath forced the Dutch people to confront a community that had been relegated to the margins.

This chapter in the struggle for political autonomy also took on a distinctly international character. The youths were inspired by grassroots movements outside of their nation's borders, drawing from the Black Power movement in the United States. Today, Dutch Moluccans continue to speak of the RMS ideal, and protests have been organized in The Hague throughout the past decade in solidarity with ongoing nationalism supporting the RMS and civil conflict in Indonesia.

Furthermore, the consequent stigmatization of Dutch Moluccans as being associated with terrorist activity has worked to transform the social identity of the community. Many have returned to government-sanctioned neighborhoods where a sizeable portion of the population continues to reside, a testament to the lasting impact of policies designed to divide.

Additionally, persistent spatial and social peripheralization demonstrates the limits of the pillarization model for integration. It is a model that has functioned as the cornerstone of Dutch multiculturalism. Yet it features an ideology that is met with increasing skepticism as social divisions and tensions permeate the national dialogue on immigration. "'Multiculturalism' is both a feeble acknowledgment of the fact that cultures have lost their moorings in definite places and an attempt to subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a national identity."[23]

As such, multiculturalism assumes cultural difference to be a threat to national cohesion and stability. However, "a heterogeneous nation is

not necessarily less capable of solidarity than a homogeneous one."[24] The idea that difference is inherently a threat to national cohesion is present in both the Netherlands and Namibia. Thus, programs and policies that target beneficiaries based on ethnic difference contradict national ideologies regarding social cohesion.

Returning to the case of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands, the government has launched a number of policies that target Moluccans in order to prevent the type of dissatisfaction that can contribute to the radicalization witnessed in the Sixties and Seventies. From promises to pay reparations through an organization known as the CAZ to educational associations like ISEM and the Moluccan History Museum based in Utrecht, a number of social programs now target the Dutch-Moluccan community in the Netherlands. The violent incidents have forced the Dutch government to reconsider a group that had once been conceived as model citizens, able to fit into the Dutch multicultural system by remaining locked into the social and spatial periphery.

Though generations of Dutch of Moluccan ancestry have lived their lives in the Netherlands, the term *allochtoon* is continually employed to describe members of the community. The name refers to second-generation immigrants and implies residual outsider status and lingering connotations of foreignness despite official citizenship. The persistence of the term in popular language stands as a testament to the limits of Dutch-Moluccan integration to this day.

V. Reinforcing Marginalization:
The Ethnic Minority in Policy and Advocacy

Resettlement is inherently a political act. "If one begins with the premise that spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference through connection."[25] While apartheid era Southern Africa organized society along racial lines, the contemporary political discourse in Namibia and the Netherlands uses ethnicity to classify and to categorize. Although race is largely associated with discrimination, recognized for its role as a tool of oppression throughout history, ethnic difference is widely accepted as a legitimate means of identifying members of society. The perception is that while society no longer subscribes to racist ideologies, ethnic divides persist and undermine

national cohesion. While race may be widely rejected as an appropriate means of classifying, ethnicity persists as a legitimate quality for dividing peoples in each case. Though resettlement programs, which attempt to tackle spatial marginalization, the political construction of the ethnic minority through public policy and advocacy have actually perpetuated the perceived separateness of these groups. Policies in both countries identify program targets by establishing their vulnerability. Identifying the San as a distinct group based upon a shared history of victimization, their cause has now been taken up by transnational organizations as well as appropriated by groups that claim to advocate for indigenous or immigrant rights at the global level.

This notion of the ethnic minority represents a uniquely local identity at the same time as it functions as a universal label.

> As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories, and reconfigure their ethnic 'projects' the ethno in ethnography takes on a slippery, nonlocalized quality. Groups are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally homogeneous.[26]

The notion of a sub-group, a minority, which stands apart from the majority, cuts across national lines. Ethnicity, however, has played a unique social role in each context rooted in the colonial era and influenced by trends in contemporary global politics and national developments. Although the Dutch were former colonizers and Namibia was a former colonial holding, the ideologies that have legitimized the colonial project in each society continue to shape contemporary thought. In both nations, race and ethnicity have served distinct social functions and played key roles in the organization of the social landscape.

Understanding the meaning of race and ethnicity in contemporary politics necessitates an exploration of the meaning of the terminology in the colonial era. While the Dutch took on the role of colonizer and Namibia the colonized, the ideology that grounded the colonial project in each continues to inform and impact the politics of identity in each nation. In Namibia, an indigenous majority now stands apart from the ethnic minority classified as indigenous as well, yet regarded as culturally distinct.

Thus, the ethnic minority in both Namibian and Dutch policy must be understood in terms of the historical and political connotations surrounding the social construction of ethnicity in each setting. Narratives

of the global political arena, like that offered by the "Clash of Civilizations," suggest that the world's people resort to ethnic affiliations. This ideology suggests that ethnic identities are somehow natural. Yet, to reiterate, "a heterogeneous nation is [not] necessarily less capable of solidarity than a homogenous one."[27]

Contemporary public policy can also legitimize ethnic divisions. In Namibia, rights associated with ethnicity differ from those attached to citizenship. Ethnic groups are dealt with as communities, represented by official, often externally appointed, "traditional" authorities in government negotiations. Citizens, on the other hand, participate in democratic national processes as individuals.[28]

In the Netherlands, ethnicity can also qualify citizenship. Immigrants are defined first by ethnic ancestry, while Dutch citizenship—national identity—is secondary. In both cases, ethnicity is inherited and portrayed as a simplistic, instinctual allegiance to a group identity. The social narrative implied by this type of policy is that race is somehow externally imposed as opposed to internally defined by communities in the same way as ethnicity. In contemporary politics, this is especially significant because it implies that ethnicity is somehow more legitimate. It is "natural" and authentic, specific to the unique qualities and characteristics of those that it classifies. Moreover, the persistence of ethnic labeling reinforces divisions between cultures, despite their plurality in the Dutch multicultural context.

What is more, the language employed in policy generally classifies actors in terms of settlers and beneficiaries. The term *beneficiaries* implies a one-sided dynamic in social policy. It suggests that those resettled are the passive recipients of government assistance, subsidized by the government in the reform process. The failure of the state to adequately deliver social services in Namibia has reinforced patterns of dependency and locked program beneficiaries into a subsistence livelihood through the welfare state. Similarly, it was dissatisfaction with resettlement conditions and the failure of the Dutch government to make good on the promise of establishing an independent RMS that inspired civil conflict in the Seventies. Both cases illuminate how inadequate social services lock citizens into dependency, contributing to lingering social conflict through contestations over space.

VI. The Global Dimensions of National Conflicts:
New Platforms for Social Change

Despite new transnational alliances and international development initiatives, the gap between the global rich and poor continues to widen. The conceptualization of a global apartheid by lobbying groups and activists around the world presupposes that a globalized economic structure reinforces socioeconomic underdevelopment in the South. Though this dividing line is broadly drawn between hemispheres, it is similar to those dividing former colonizers from colonies, the West from the rest, or the developed from the developing world. It is one of countless other terms intended to categorize the world to reflect global inequality. Proponents of the framework argue that globalization polarizes the distribution of wealth and perpetuates the marginalization of the nations of the Global South.

Yet this depiction of the global world order is extremely simplistic, and denies the interconnections between the dualities. Though apartheid is Dutch for "separate," the two spheres constructed through apartheid rule do not function in a vacuum from one another. Rather, apartheid works by dictating the terms of interaction. Isolation combines with limited interaction to perpetuate the status quo. Creating distinct social and economic spheres, apartheid rule in Southern Africa exploited spatial divides in order to create an infrastructure that reinforced systems of power. In the case of Namibia, this consolidated power into the hands of a white elite. In the contemporary world political order, this implies that power is now in the hands of an elite in the Global North.

Looking at segregation only at the macro level, however, fails to acknowledge the diversity that exists in the local context. The myth of a Global South denies the diversity that exists within nations and regions, and among peoples. The globalization process is unique in that it transforms the global along local lines and the local along global lines. Thus, local divisions are not only symptomatic of inequity, but also serve as its structural reinforcement at the micro level.

Still, the narrative of a global apartheid perpetuates perceptions regarding the exclusion of Africa from the globalization process, especially the economic dimensions of globalization. "The developed countries of the North have lost all sense of the noble idea of human solidarity,"[29] Mbeki argued at a conference in 1999. On another occasion, the South African president claimed that, "the process of global-

ization is an objective outcome of the development of the productive forces that create wealth."[30] Moreover, this sense of peripheral status as depicted through narratives regarding Africa's marginalization, the notion that Africa has failed to "harness the processes of globalization,"[31] suggests that an entire continent has been flatly excluded in the global era. It denies the interconnections and systems of exploitation that dictate the terms of global politics and economics. Hence, to appropriately use the apartheid system as a paradigm for understanding structures and systems of power in the era of globalization, one must recognize how segregation constructs socio-spatial divisions that reinforce uneven power dynamics at multiple levels. Globalization does not flatten. It is therefore essential to recognize how space, both in terms of its symbolic and economic value, creates a foundation for wealth as well as a means of perpetuating social inequity and exclusion.

Beyond their specific social contexts, new processes of working for international justice and transnational advocacy are connecting local conflicts to global struggles, creating a new transnational public sphere.[32] In this light, confrontations over space can serve as a new platform through which the world's people may strive to work for social change. Tackling the spatial manifestations of socio-political inequality can serve as a venue for addressing underlying social conflict. This is a task made particularly relevant in light of rapid developments in international justice and law in the global era. It represents harnessing the power of globalization's processes to work for change as part of the cultivation of a global ethic as envisioned by Peter Singer in *One World*, and other contemporary ethicists and social theorists of the global age. Indeed, globalization transforms the internal realm in addition to the external, forcing us to re-evaluate how we *observe* a global phenomenon in addition to that phenomenon itself.

It is within this larger, globalized framework for understanding the meaning that is attached to rights to space that initiatives to reform tenure and redistribute the land can reconcile conflicts at the international level. This demands the reconceptualization of rights to space as well as the deconstruction of the identities through which land ownership and occupational rights are organized. It is a task that is essential in harnessing the processes of globalization to work for a social change. The global era presents an unparalleled opportunity for the transformation of intra- and inter-national divisions alike, for the transforma-

tion of the social and political landscape, as we confront inequity as it is expressed through the physical. ◉

Notes

1. B. Rutherford, *Working on the Margins: Black Workers, White Farmers in Postcolonial Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver, 2001).

2. Willem Odendaal, "San Communal Lands Contested: The battle over N#a Jaqna Conservancy" (LEAD).

3. Werner 2001.

4. *The Namibian* 2001.

5. Harring and Odendaal, p. 51.

6. Mamdani 2001, p. 658.

7. Gordan 1992, p. 65.

8. Tapscott 1993.

9. Gordon 1992.

10. Harring and Odendaal, p. 71.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 70.

13. Ibid.

14. *The Namibian* 1999.

15. Harring and Odendaal, p. 70.

16. Ibid., p. 59.

17. *The Namibian* 2001.

18. Ibid.

19. Bartels 1993, p. 25.

20. Sturm 1998, p. 281.

21. Mamdani 2001, p. 659.

22. Bartels 1986, p. 29.

23. Gupta 1992, p. 18.

24. Henly, p. 290.

25. Gupta 1992, p. 8.

26. Smith 1994, p. 18.

27. Henly, p. 290.

28. Mamdani 2001, p. 652.

29. Bond 2002.

30. Bond 2003.

31. Bond 2002.

32. Smith 1994.

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