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# The Past and Future of Democracy in the Middle East

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Rashid Khalidi

*S*elf-sufficient and secure on the continent that they have dominated for centuries, Americans have always looked on the world beyond the seas with a certain suspicion. In consequence, it has required an extraordinary effort and the call of a noble cause to persuade the American people that their country should engage itself abroad — whence the Fourteen Points, the Four Freedoms, and the struggle against International Communism.

As the administration of President George W. Bush tried to answer the persistent objections of its critics in 2002 and early 2003 to the pretexts it advanced for the radical step of a preemptive war in the Gulf—the first preemptive war in American history<sup>1</sup>—it increasingly turned to the democratization of Iraq as a war aim. In spite of the unprecedented sense of insecurity in the United States resulting from the surprise attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York and Washington, D.C., the administration's vivid descriptions of the danger of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (which now appear to have been exaggerated or false) were apparently not enough to bring the American people to support the war without reservation. It was thus necessary for the administration to invoke the need to remove a Baathist regime guilty of abysmal human rights violations against its own people, notably the Shi'ites and Kurds, as a sufficient reason for the United States to launch an unprovoked war against Iraq. But even simple "regime change" was apparently not enough: only turning that sad country into a functioning democracy would be a goal worthy of American ideals.

I will leave aside the highly problematic concept of one country actively "democratizing" another, with all the hubris that is implied,

not to speak of the fact that such a notion ignores how democracies actually evolve in real historical situations. Instead, I will focus on the important question of whether there was any real meaning or sincerity in the use of the term *democratization* by the Bush administration and its supporters as they beat the drums for an invasion of Iraq. Many doubts have been raised about the sincerity of these apostles of democracy, given that top officeholders in the Bush administration included figures who had amply shown their contempt for the democratic process at home and abroad, like Elliot Abrams and Admiral Poindexter, both convicted of lying to Congress over the Iran-Contra affair.<sup>2</sup> There are other grounds for skepticism on this score, since many of those who had so fervently preached the virtues of democracy in Iraq had never before been known for their solicitude either for the Iraqi people or for democracy in the Arab Middle East.

It is important to recognize that *if* carried out fully and consistently, a shift toward encouraging democracy and respect for human rights would constitute a reversal of an American policy toward Iraq that lasted for well over a decade (from at least 1978 until after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990). This policy consisted of directly and indirectly supporting the Iraqi Baath regime against its Islamic Iranian neighbor, including the wherewithal for Iraq to produce chemical weapons via provision by American and European companies. Such a policy, in turn, constituted only one element in a longstanding American approach to the Middle East based on studiously ignoring the human rights abuses and/or the undemocratic governments with which the United States was on the best of terms.

As the administration made its preparations for war with Iraq, there were a few other straws in the wind consonant with this proclaimed change in its Middle East policy in favor of support for democracy and human rights in the region. These included freezing aid to Egypt in response to that country's jailing of Saad al-Din Ibrahim, an Egyptian-American academic and critic of the Mubarak regime who has now been released, and President Bush's demand for reform and democratization in the Palestinian Authority in his June 2002 policy speech on the Middle East, although in both cases doubts were raised as to the real objectives of these new departures in American policy.

There have been lonely voices in the human rights community and among Middle East specialists who have long criticized the human rights abuses and anti-democratic nature of Middle Eastern governments aligned with the United States. These include the regimes of

countries like Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Egypt, which have consistently mistreated their minorities, tortured political prisoners, or muzzled the political opposition; Turkey, which until very recently forcibly repressed Kurdish demands for cultural and linguistic rights; and Israel, now in the 37th year of an occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that negates the democratic right of self-determination for the Palestinians. These countries' actions have rarely provoked the ire of the Bush administration, or indeed of earlier American administrations. For those who have regularly criticized these abuses taking place in Turkey, the Arab world, and Israel, such a change in American policy would be welcome, if a real change were in fact to take place. It would be considerably more encouraging if the same music were played in Washington regarding not only traditional whipping boys like Syria and Libya, with their harshly repressive regimes, but also close allies with whom the United States has major strategic and energy interests and is conspicuously silent about abuses, like Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Israel, and Turkey.

If spreading democracy in the Middle East were to become a central objective of United States policy, as the Bush administration's rhetoric indicates, that would certainly be a good thing, depending, of course, on the means employed to achieve this objective. It would be especially good if it were consistent, and included respect for elected leaders and governments, such as those of Iran, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority, even if they operate in systems that are highly imperfect, and, more to the point, even if they say and do things that may be disagreeable to U.S. policymakers. During the lead-up to the war, it was particularly instructive to observe the behavior of leading Bush administration advocates of "democratizing" Iraq as they tried to oblige a Turkish government with an overwhelming mandate in a recent election to go against the clear wishes of the great majority of their people and accede to American requests to use their territory as a military base for the war on Iraq. One "administration official" fulminated, "the Turks seem to think we'll keep the bazaar open all night." Their pique was unseemly and showed, perhaps, how shallow their democratic inclinations were<sup>3</sup> when Turkish leaders dragged their feet in acquiescing to U.S. demands in the face of polls that showed as many as 95 percent of Turks opposed to war on Iraq. It is a little known fact, rarely mentioned by most policymakers, that the American record in the promotion of democracy and human rights in the Middle East has been an undistinguished one since World War II, as the United

States gradually became the major power in that region. It was not the only Great Power of which this can be said. Beyond the appalling record of the old colonial rulers, some of the most egregious violations of human rights and most grotesque perversions of the popular will that have marred post-World War II Middle Eastern history took place in countries that were Soviet protégés from the 1960s through 1990, notably Iraq, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen. The regimes of other states aligned with the Soviets for much of this period, such as Egypt, Algeria, and Yemen, hardly had good records on this score. Nevertheless, the record in regard to democracy and human rights of regimes aligned with and supported by the United States during the Cold War was often little better, from Saudi Arabia to Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and Iran under the Shah. The rationale for tolerating these abuses was often the need to keep such countries on the side of the United States during the Cold War.

Even after the United States became the undisputed Great Power in the Middle East after the Cold War, things improved very little: American policymakers rarely, if ever, allowed the lack of democracy or the abuse of human rights to serve as obstacles to relations with friendly governments. Thus, a change by the Bush administration in what has been a consistent approach over nearly six decades of seeking strategic and material advantage, irrespective of the unrepresentative or repressive nature of a given regime, would certainly be a thoroughly new departure for American Middle East policy.

But several dauntingly difficult issues are raised by such a departure, laudable though it initially may appear. The first is that the United States would not only have to be consistent as between friends and others, it would also have to accept the full consequences of dealing respectfully with democratically elected governments. Perhaps the best historical example of the problems posed by such an approach is that of France under de Gaulle. When the French President realized that American forces under the NATO umbrella were carrying out operations on French territory without the cognizance or consent of the French government, he immediately asked for their removal and was broadly supported in this by the French people. Of course, France was and is a democracy and a major European power, and the United States immediately, albeit unwillingly, accepted the verdict of the leaders of the French Fifth Republic. Over forty years later, U.S. forces are still not based in France, which nevertheless remains a NATO ally. This is the case, notwithstanding the fierce attacks directed against

France before, during, and after the Iraq war by voices in government and the media.

In the current context, this raises the question of what if Saudi Arabia were to become a democracy — perhaps not an immediate prospect, but not an impossibility — and what if a democratically elected government were to ask the United States to do something it did not want to do, like remove its military forces, which the U.S. resisted strongly until recently? Any such democratic government in that country would make such a request if it were responsive to the wishes of its people, since according to many apparently accurate accounts, the U.S. military presence in the kingdom is unpopular among a broad stratum of the population. In recognition of this fact, in early 2003, the United States moved some of the forces it stationed in Saudi Arabia after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to neighboring Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, and has since removed the rest.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, these small countries cannot provide some of the facilities that the huge expanse of Saudi Arabia offered. What if a democratic Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar (all countries that have held elections of some sort recently; indeed, Kuwait has had a parliament, with interruptions, since it became independent in 1960) were to ask the U.S. to remove its bases? Would the United States simply withdraw all its forces if asked to do so by democratic governments in this region? These are not idle questions, especially since the disappearance of the Iraqi Baath regime of Saddam Hussein has removed a major pretext for the presence of U.S. forces in the region as a whole. Given the demonstrated eagerness of the Pentagon to maintain military bases in many parts of the Middle East, the likely answers to these questions do not seem very encouraging, nor does the example set in the French case appear likely to be followed.

To come to this conclusion, it is necessary only to examine carefully the line of policy promulgated by the tight clique of neo-conservative policy intellectuals surrounding Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Richard Cheney. They include Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Cheney's Chief of Staff Lewis Libby, Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton, and many other extreme ideologues. What is immediately apparent if one examines the underside of their new rhetoric about human rights and democracy is a longstanding and clear volition to restructure the regimes of several key countries in the Middle East, and thereby to reorganize the alignment of the entire Middle East. This

is perhaps most clearly apparent from a 1996 report produced for Israel's then-Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu by an Israeli think tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. This report was authored by a group headed by Richard Perle, Chair of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board (forced by a financial scandal to step down from the Chairmanship of the Board, he remains a member), and the chief guru among the neo-con war hawks. The group included Douglas Feith, the number three official at the Defense Department who is currently responsible for the U.S. effort in Iraq, together with other figures like David Wurmser, just appointed to head the Middle East section on Vice President Cheney's National Security staff.<sup>5</sup>

The advice these worthies gave to the hawkish Netanyahu was robust and muscled, and it has been faithfully reflected in the policy of Ariel Sharon, his successor as head of the Likud party. What did they call on Israel to do?: abandon the "peace process" with the Palestinians (the term *peace process* was placed in quotes throughout the report); adopt the right of "hot pursuit" against the Palestinians; "roll-back" threats; abandon the principle of "land for peace" in favor of "peace for peace;" and adopt the policy of "peace through strength." Most relevant to the Middle East policies these individuals and their allies have championed since taking over top positions in the Bush administration were their recommendations regarding Iraq, Syria, and Iran.

The report counsels Israel to seize the strategic initiative by engaging Syria, Hizballah, and Iran via military strikes at Hizballah and Syrian forces in Lebanon, and if necessary, "*striking at select targets in Syria proper*" (italics in original). Further, the report advised "weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria." This core objective was to be achieved primarily by "removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq," which they stated was "an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right." Jordan was cited as a key tool in this process, to be employed by Israel against its enemies in various ways, even placing a member of the Hashemite family that rules Jordan (and once ruled Iraq) on the Iraqi throne. In a masterful piece of double-speak, the report advises Netanyahu to state that, "Israel will not only contain its foes; it will transcend them," thus leaving to the imagination precisely what infernal processes this would involve.

Much in this extraordinary document is worthy of comment, not least of all the manifest ignorance of the history, politics, societies, and religions of the Middle East that informs it throughout. It should be noted that this is a distinguishing characteristic of most members of

the neo-con war party in Washington who agitated ceaselessly for the war in Iraq. This ignorance goes beyond the laughable, like misspellings of names and places, to the core recommendations of the report. Thus, Perle, Feith, and their colleagues suggested that putting a member of the Hashemite family back on the throne in Iraq would wean Shi'ites in Lebanon and Iraq away from Hizballah and Iran. This master stroke is possible, the report claims, since "Shia retain strong ties to the Hashemites: the Shia venerate foremost the Prophet's family, the direct descendants of which—and in whose veins the blood of the Prophet flows—is [*sic*] King Hussein." The lack of the most elementary knowledge of the history and religion of the region whose complete restructuring these individuals grandly propose is breathtaking: in fact, the Shi'ites were known as "*shi'at 'Ali*" or the party of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, and their loyalty was *exclusively* to him and his descendants, *NOT* to other lineages descended from the Prophet's family, such as the Umayyads, the 'Abbassids, or the Hashemites. In other words, the Hashemites, while related to the Prophet Muhammad, are not descended from him, while the Shi'a have no ties and no loyalty to the Hashemites. Moreover, the ill will between Iraqi Shi'ites and the Sunni Hashemite monarchy for over three decades is well attested. These are elementary things that any college student who has taken a few courses on Middle East history would know, but that these "prominent opinion makers," as they describe themselves in the introduction to the report, apparently did not.

Equally noteworthy is the report's perception of a complete equivalence of Israeli and American interests in the Middle East. It stresses the importance of "a *shared philosophy* of peace through strength," "continuity with Western values," and cooperating "with the U.S. to counter real threats to the region and the West's security." It advises Netanyahu to use language "familiar to the Americans by tapping into themes of American administrations during the Cold War which apply well to Israel." In what sounds eerily like a post-September 11 clarion call, the report says a "clean break with the past" can be achieved by "reestablishing the principle of preemption, rather than retaliation alone and by ceasing to absorb blows to the nation without response." The general similarity is obvious between these recommendations and the prescriptions for the American global strategy of the neo-con group that has dominated the Bush administration since September 11. What should also be obvious is that their prescriptions similarly con-



stitute the template for current American strategy towards the Middle East generally and Iraq in particular.<sup>6</sup>

This hegemonic strategic vision would almost certainly not be compatible with the freely expressed wishes of new Middle Eastern democracies, wishes that might well include policies of resistance to Israeli domination or the removal of American military bases established with the consent of various non-democratic Middle Eastern oligarchs, autocrats, and dictators. This runs directly contrary to the vision of these same neo-con intellectuals, who speak freely of establishing a long-lasting military presence not only in the fifteen countries of the Middle East and Central Asia where U.S. forces are currently based, but also elsewhere. All of this begs the rarely asked question of whether American bases in such countries increase or decrease the security of the United States in the long run, a question which, if asked seriously, might have revolutionary implications for American strategy and security. There is clearly a potential contradiction between the apparent advocacy of democracy and human rights by the hard-line hawks around Cheney and Rumsfeld, and their longstanding desire to expand the American military profile in this part of the world as well as in others. Given the oft-expressed contempt of many of these individuals for the peoples of this region, it is difficult to believe their protestations that they are motivated by pure, disinterested concern for the democratic and human rights of Arabs and Muslims. The 1996 report just cited never mentions the word "democracy," and mentions the advancement of "human rights among Arabs" solely as a tactic to isolate and undermine the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

There is little doubt that significant majorities of the people in many Middle Eastern countries thoroughly loathe their governments and would be happy to see them replaced by democracies that respect human rights. Nevertheless, there is every reason to question whether these peoples are eager for that process to be managed by outsiders or be accompanied by a long-lasting American military presence in major Arab and Middle Eastern states, as is currently projected in Iraq. Such an idea is particularly galling to Iraqis, given their country's size and regional weight as well as its rapid technical, social, and educational advances, before the follies of the Baath regime dragged it into a series of disastrous wars.

There are other solid historical reasons for suggesting that war, external intervention, and foreign occupation are far from ideal recipes for the introduction of democracy in this region. The historical experi-

ence of the first half of the 20th century in a number of Arab countries, as well as in Turkey and Iran, is illuminating. It is not well known that both Iran and the Ottoman Empire (which encompassed most of the eastern Arab countries until 1918) had constitutional revolutions in 1906 and 1908, respectively. The Ottomans, in fact, adopted a constitution in 1876, although it was soon afterwards suspended for thirty years. Nevertheless, both countries had parliamentary democracies and a free press well before such liberal innovations developed in Russia and much of eastern and southern Europe.

The pre-World War I experience of these two Middle Eastern parliamentary, constitutional democratic regimes with the great parliamentary democracies of the day, Britain and France, was far from happy. Both Western powers behaved with an imperialist rapacity that was indistinguishable from that of the great Romanov and Habsburg imperial autocracies. In Egypt, meanwhile, Britain had occupied the country in 1882, partly to short-circuit a nationalist movement that aimed to limit the autocracy of the Khedive and move toward parliamentary democracy. The result was a British military occupation that lasted for over seventy years, and that did much to stifle Egyptian democracy.

After World War I, things got even worse, in spite of the self-determination promised by President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Britain prevented the Egyptians from sending a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, thereby sparking the 1919 Egyptian revolution. Even after Britain was forced to concede to Egypt a constitutional monarchy and limited independence, it insisted on keeping military bases there, notably in the strategic Suez Canal zone. Furthermore, Britain repeatedly intervened in Egypt in coordination with its local allies in the monarchy and the aristocracy. This ensured that the popular majority party, the Wafd, which probably could have won any free and fair election during this period, was kept out of power for eighteen of the next thirty years, until the military-led revolution of 1952.

Similar experiences faced the parliaments of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, where Britain and France for decades maintained a military occupation against the will of the population, forcibly suppressing uprisings with great loss of life, as in Iraq in 1920 and Syria in 1925, and foiling the will of elected parliaments, in collaboration with co-opted local elites. When these parliamentary systems (that were relatively democratic in spite of their many flaws) were overthrown in nationalist military coups in Syria in the late 1940s and 1950s, they had consequently become largely discredited and were little mourned.

Britain and the U.S. similarly intervened in Iran in 1953 to frustrate the wishes of a democratic government, ultimately bringing it down over the issue of nationalization of the country's oil industry, and then installing the dictatorship of the Shah. There is also the case of Palestine, where Britain foiled the wishes of the Palestinian Arab majority for representative government from 1918 until 1948, during which time they installed a Jewish national home at the expense of and against the wishes of this majority.

What lessons can we draw from the experiences of this region with democracy over the past few decades? The first is that an unwanted foreign military occupation is incompatible with democratization. It is hard to read the words of key Bush administration policymakers without concluding that strategic motives relating to American hegemony in the world of the 21st century are uppermost in their minds. If the Bush administration has strategic objectives in the Middle East that transcend its proclaimed desire for a better, more democratic life for that region's people, then we may be in for a repetition of one of the ugliest phases of the Western encounter with this region.

Very few people in this country probably remember or know about the bitterness with which the Arabs and Iranians regarded the European occupation of their countries until the 1950s and 1960s, and the American and Soviet interventions that followed. However, very few people in the Arab world and Iran are unaware of these long and unhappy episodes in their history, for their educational systems instill in them the same attitude toward these overbearing foreign powers as our educational system does toward the despotic regime maintained in the thirteen colonies by King George III and Great Britain until 1776.

Rather than being incubators of democracy in the Middle East, invasion and occupation may in fact retard its development, as the historical record strongly suggests. What, then, can be done to address the abysmal record of most Middle Eastern countries with regard to democracy and human rights? To be more precise, we are talking mainly of the Arab countries, for most of them are in a far worse situation than are Turkey, Iran, and Israel. This is the case in spite of the Turkish military's ubiquitous involvement in politics and its chequered record as far as the Kurds are concerned; in spite of the poor record of Iran toward minorities and the manifest weaknesses of its new democratic system in the face of the continuing power of the theocratic religious establishment; and in spite of Israel's poor record as a belligerent occupier of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for more than

thirty-six years. All three countries nevertheless have functioning democracies in spite of these grave defects in their records.

In the Arab states, by contrast, the record is generally worse. There is the occasional relatively bright spot, such as the three Gulf countries that enjoy some aspects of democracy, although in the case of Qatar and Bahrain, they are very new and fragile, and in all cases small oligarchies make most of the key decisions; Lebanon, whose democracy has weathered two civil wars, occupation by both of its neighbors, Israel and Syria, and the stresses produced from 1968–1982 by a Palestinian state within a state; and Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, each of which has elements of a free press, the rule of law, and some of the forms of democracy, albeit without most of the substance. But contrasting with these somewhat bright spots (each of which is obscured in important ways) is an array of dark holes of dictatorial rule and wholesale denial of civil, political, human and other rights, ranging from Algeria, Tunisia, the Sudan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Oman to Syria and Iraq.

How can democracy be encouraged to grow where the buds are already in existence, and how can it be sown where the soil appears to be so barren? The first thing that must be recognized is that many Arab countries are far from devoid of a democratic tradition, notably all of the largest of them and a number of others, including Egypt, the Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Lebanon. This is, therefore, not a matter of enlightened Americans or Westerners bringing progress to a bunch of benighted Arabs stuck in the Middle Ages, which is the gist of what is said by all too many of the “experts” who pontificate on this subject in the media.

A second point is that this political struggle has nothing to do with Islam. Only their ignorance allows some so-called experts to make such assertions, which are belied by the thriving democracies in three of the largest Muslim countries in the world, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Malaysia (not to speak of Turkey, Iran, and all the Arab countries that once had parliamentary systems). Egypt did not cease to be a Muslim country during the thirty years it experienced parliamentary government, from 1922–1952. Was it because of Islam that democracy failed in Egypt? Of course not! It had much more to do with the fact that Egypt’s parliamentary regime was undermined by overt and covert British intervention, in collusion with the monarchy and aristocracy, so that it was incapable of ending the 70-year-old British military occupation or solving the country’s other problems. There is plentiful

evidence that Islam is no more incompatible with democracy than is any other major religion. The fact that Islam is capable of producing anti-democratic trends in no way justifies sweeping statements about its incompatibility with democracy, any more than the powerful monarchical, anti-democratic and anti-republican trends within French Catholicism in the late 19th century would justify such ignorant and malignant statements about Christianity.

Where does this leave us as far as the nexus between democratization, human rights, and United States policy in the Middle East is concerned? Clearly, external intervention, especially military intervention, exacerbates the situation. Let us remember this as we watch the American occupation of Iraq unfold. Secondly, a strong case can be made that the endemic conflicts in the region, notably those between the Palestinians and Israelis and between Iraq and its neighbors, are major barriers to democratization. The growth of military budgets and the increased power of the state (at the expense of civil society) have been born of many factors, but among the most important are wars and other conflicts. Resolving these conflicts will not be easy. Remember that we are not just talking of Palestine-Israel but also the conflicts between Iraq and several of its neighbors, the Cyprus dispute, and other conflicts internal to the countries in question, as in Turkish and Iraqi Kurdistan and the southern Sudan. However, while resolving these disputes will not automatically bring democracy, allowing them to fester provides a pretext for the aggrandizement of state power as well as guarantees the constant creation of new obstacles to democratization and respect for human rights.

These conflicts ultimately have to be matters for the peoples of these countries to resolve for themselves. All external actors can do is limit their own intervention, help resolve disputes such as those between Israel and the Palestinians or over Cyprus (that they exacerbated by their past policies), and try to help civil society assert itself in the face of the enormous power of the state. Without wanting to overstress the weight of history, it would be well to recall that this region has been home to the first and some of the longest-lasting states in human history, in the Nile and Mesopotamian river valleys. It has a long tradition of powerful states that continued with the Islamic era, culminating in the more than 500-year history of the Ottoman Empire, one of the most powerful and best-organized early modern states. At the same time, the Middle East was also home to some of the greatest products

of mankind's individual genius and prophetic vision, which can be set against this longstanding tradition of state power.

In view of these great traditions, which had been well established for many centuries while Europe was still sunken in barbarism and ignorance, perhaps we should be a little more humble in our treatment of this region, afflicted though it is by some of the most unattractive regimes and intractable conflicts in the modern world. That humility, as well as attention to some of the historical points raised, is more likely to be a sound basis for moving the Middle East toward greater democracy and respect for human rights than are the claims of the Bush administration and its supportive voices in the media that the American military occupation will spark a new dawn of democracy in the Arab world. ●

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### Notes

1. It could be argued that the Mexican-American and Spanish-American wars were unprovoked, but they were certainly not preemptive wars: no one claimed that Mexico or Spain endangered the United States or were about to attack it.
2. Poindexter was recently forced out of his Pentagon job as head of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration (DARPA) after revelations about a DARPA scheme for investors to, in effect, bet on the likelihood of terrorist attacks, assassinations, and other similar disasters. Abrams is the President's senior advisor on the Middle East in the National Security Council. Other Iran-Contra veterans in senior positions in the Bush administration include Otto Reich and John Negroponte, neither of whom was ever indicted for their role in that fiasco.
3. These officials also described the reluctance of the Turkish government as "extortion in the name of alliance." David E. Sanger with Dexter Filkins, "U.S. is Pessimistic Turks will Accept Aid Deal on Iraq," *The New York Times* (20 February 2003): A1.
4. The Saudi government linked the removal of U.S. troops and bases to democratic reforms internally. See Patrick E. Tyler, "Saudis Plan End to U.S. Presence: Talk of Future Troop Expulsion, then Democratic Reforms," *The New York Times* (9 February 2003): A1, A12.
5. The report was entitled, "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," and can be located at <http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm>.
6. There are numerous analyses of this report, such as Jason Vest, "The Men from JINSA and CSP," *The Nation* (2 September 2002); Akiva Eldar, "Perles of Wisdom for the Faithful," *Haaretz* (1 October 2002); Tom Barry and Jim Lobe, "The Men who Stole the Show," *Foreign Policy in Focus* (6 November 2002); Brian Whitaker, "Playing Skittles with Saddam," *The Guardian* (3 September 2002); Robert Fisk, "The Case against War," *Counterpunch* (15 February 2003); and Akiva Eldar, "There is Fire Even Without a Smoking Gun," *Haaretz* (16 February 2003).

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