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Who Engineered the Anti-Japanese Protests in 2005?

Yue-him Tam

I. The Problem

On April 9, 2005, an estimated 20,000 Chinese protestors surrounded the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, attacking it with rocks and shouting anti-Japanese slogans. Thousands more expressed their anger in other parts of the capital and damaged some Japanese retail stores and restaurants. Quickly *The New York Times* identified this event as the “largest to be held in the capital since a massive outpouring [of] anti-American sentiment in 1999, after the United States bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade during the war against Serbia.”¹ Anti-Japanese demonstrations also occurred in Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and other cities in early April. The protestors demanded that Japan openly acknowledge her history of aggression in China and other parts of the Asia Pacific region prior to and during World War II. To this end, the protestors called for a boycott of Japanese goods. The mass demonstrations ended in late April, when the government started to arrest some protestors and close down their websites.²

After the demonstrations, the anti-Japanese campaign moved on. From April to June, the Chinese actions climaxed in a massive online citizens’ campaign that gathered over 42 million signatures opposing Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. The Chinese government did not stop the signature campaign. In early April, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao openly urged Japan to “face up” to its wartime history. He hinted that China would not endorse Japan’s

bid saying, "Only a country that respects history, takes responsibility for history and wins over the trust of peoples in Asia and the world at large can take greater responsibilities in the international community."³ In October, as a response to the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Premier Junichiro Koizumi and 100-some Japanese lawmakers, the Chinese government cancelled the visit of Japan's Foreign Minister and abruptly sent home a delegation of Japanese political and business leaders. Japan reacted strongly against the Chinese actions.⁴ The result of these and other nationalistic events in Japan and China distressed their already troubled relationship, tumbling it to the lowest point since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972.

Who engineered the protests? What motivated those widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations in China? What were the protesters driving at? Why did the demonstrations take place in the spring of 2005? Many Japanese politicians blamed the Chinese government for stoking nationalism against Japan for political gain. Shinzo Abe, now Premier and then Acting Secretary-General of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), declared that "deepening social inequality was behind the anti-Japanese protests." He claimed, "Beijing was using Japan as an outlet to vent that anger."⁵ Echoing Abe's claim, Murray Scot Tanner, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, testified at a public hearing in Washington, D.C. that he believed the Chinese government was behind the demonstrations. He labeled the government's permissive attitude as "a disturbing trend." He warned the Chinese government, "By aligning itself tacitly with the protesters (notwithstanding its public calls for restraint), it risks having its policies boxed-in or manipulated by protestor demands." Furthermore, he predicted, "whereas the Belgrade bombing was in many ways a one-time event in which popular anger was likely to cool later, China's disagreements with Japan have both a longer history and an indefinite future."⁶

For many critics, the Chinese government engineered the demonstrations. They did not believe that the protesters' call for respect of history was real. The anti-Japanese demonstrations were viewed as a political or diplomatic conspiracy devised by the Chinese government, in which Japan was used as a scapegoat to whitewash the mounting social and political problems in China. Indeed, some Western journalists and political commentators openly displayed their contempt for the Chinese protests. Eric Margolis, a New York-based foreign correspondent, defense analyst, and columnist, reprimanded the Chinese in early May 2005: "Chinese usually rank among the world's more

intelligent people, but lately the red mandarins who run the People's Republic have been doing some seriously un-intelligent things." He demanded, "It's time to end using World War II as a political weapon or a means of extorting money and trade or political concessions from the vanquished. In WWII, no one's hands were clean. Forgive and forget."⁷

These critics have hypothetically attributed the anti-Japanese campaign in the spring of 2005 to the old cliché that since China is not a democratic country, its "red mandarins" are always in absolute control to do "unintelligent things." The Chinese victims and their kin should "forgive and forget" because their hands are "just as unclean" as the Japanese perpetrators during the war. The victims' call for respecting history and reconciliation with the Japanese is understood as propaganda. As such, the anti-Japanese demonstrations have to be necessarily engineered by the "red mandarins" for their political and diplomatic gains. The buses available at some demonstration sites to take the protestors home are taken as evidence showing the stage-management of the "red mandarins." The police's restrained use of force to break up the demonstrations and to protect Japanese property is taken as evidence to show the government endorsement of violence against the Japanese. In sum, many critics in Japan and the West did not understand the Chinese protestors' call for respecting history properly. They are merely seen as political or diplomatic tools of the government. Their fundamental question concerning the respect for history remains essentially unnoticed and unaddressed.

In this essay I will try to look at the protests from the perspective of the protesters. I will examine their grievances and sentiments. By way of visiting their websites or blogs and conducting personal interviews, I argue that their collective call for respect of history is real and that the Chinese government did not engineer the demonstrations. The demonstrations can be considered the Chinese response to the insensitive and irresponsible views of some Japanese leaders about Imperial Japan's war crimes and atrocities in Asia. It should be noted that my argument does not preclude other hypotheses about the causes of the protests. A multitude of explanations must necessarily be employed in any coherent account of the causes of an event that is so fundamentally fragmented and controversial in its narrative.

This essay will focus on the demonstrations from within. Accordingly, I will examine the factors leading to the Chinese anger. I will then turn to an examination of the protesters' mentality and rationale

for their actions. Finally, I will discuss a few significant elements in the anti-Japanese campaign in 2005, trying to see a full picture of the incidents.

II. The Origins of the Chinese Anger

Several incidents can be identified as the immediate origins of the Chinese anger in the spring of 2005. In the early spring the Japanese government approved the publication of the new edition of a controversial history textbook, first published in 2001 by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform. One of the avowed aims of the new textbooks is to encourage Japanese nationalism and pride in Japan's wartime history. It whitewashes Japanese war crimes, including the Nanjing Massacre, the sexual slavery ("Comfort Women") system, the biochemical warfare, and the inhumane treatment of Western prisoners of war and Chinese forced laborers. The new textbook dismisses Japanese wartime atrocities as the product of Chinese fabrication or propaganda. It conveys the message that Japan sacrificed herself for the liberation of Asia from Western imperialism during World War II. The atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki made Japan the true victim of the war. The post-war Tokyo Tribunal, which tried General Tojo Hideki and other top Japanese war criminals, represents little more than the victor's justice.

To ward off the mounting social and political tensions stemming from the extended economic stagnation beginning in the 1990s, Premier Koizumi and his administration sought to stoke nationalism in Japan. In spite of strong protests at home and from abroad, Koizumi pointedly and repeatedly visited the Yasakuni Shrine, where convicted Japanese war criminals were enshrined. While Koizumi defends his visits as a way to pray for peace, the Chinese and other Asians take them as a senseless offense.⁸ The Chinese ask how the Jewish people would react if the German Chancellor paid tribute at Hitler's tomb. On a different front, to secure support from the Bush administration, Koizumi contributed not only funds but also troops to the war in Iraq, which has remained a constitutional issue in Japan. In early 2005 Koizumi went a step further. He sought to void the pacifist clause in Article 9 of Japan's Constitution that limits Japan's military activities to the country's immediate defense. The Chinese fear that the change in the pacifist Constitution would lead to a military build up in Japan, which would become a major security concern in East Asia.

The Chinese found new and pragmatic grounds for concern in early April 2005, when the Koizumi administration officially allowed Japanese companies to begin drilling oil and natural gas in an area of the East China Sea that is in dispute between the two countries. Immediately Beijing protested and declared that it “retains the right to take further action” over the drilling.⁹ The territorial dispute over the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands can be traced back to the early 1970s. But both sides have refrained from taking aggressive action until the Koizumi administration’s authorization occurred in April 2005.

There were other incidents that caused sensational uproars in China. Suffice it to mention the Japanese sex tour in Zhuhai, a southern coastal city, in 2003. It is reported that a group of 380 male staff from one Japanese company checked into the International Conference Center Hotel on the evening of September 17 for prostitute shopping. “Some 500 prostitutes later crowded the public areas of the hotel, in full view of other guests, and an orgy-style party ensued that continued past midnight.”¹⁰ The Chinese were particularly offended that the mass orgy took place on the eve of the 72nd anniversary of the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931, which marked the start of Japan’s massive invasion of China.

Finally, I would like to cite the Japanese bid in early 2005 for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council as a special rallying force for the concerned Chinese, both at home and abroad. As Japan’s bid was expected to be debated at the United Nations in the summer, a sense of urgency in expressing their opposition was felt by the Chinese activists throughout the world. As a response, a signature campaign was launched worldwide in early April by the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of WWII in Asia (GA), which is a grassroots and scholarly organization based in San Francisco. The response from China was particularly enthusiastic. On June 30, 2005, on behalf of the sponsoring organizations, the GA submitted to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan a petition with 42 million signatures collected in 41 countries. They demanded that Japan be denied a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council before it acknowledges its crimes in World War II, makes a sincere apology, and gives compensation to the victims. They further demanded that Japan not distort the historic truth in their textbooks. In the process of the signature campaign, the GA and its supporters publicized the utmost details of Japanese war crimes and the Koizumi administration’s militaristic tendency. As a result, many protesters, including Wan Ping, a Tsinghua University

student in Beijing, said that “Japan is not ready to be on the Security Council if it lies to its people about history.”¹¹

III. The Demonstrations Viewed from Within

I will now examine the behaviors and aspirations of the protesters through personal writings found in their blogs, where people can express their ideas and sentiments casually. It is unfortunate that—perhaps due to security concerns—there are few blogs in Chinese that carry detailed descriptions of the demonstrations in 2005. I have found, however, a few blogs in English that are helpful in understanding the demonstrations and the protesters.

A. Beijing

I will begin with the narrative of the demonstration in Beijing on April 9, 2005, found in the blog entitled, “A Swede and A Beijinger.” The blogger is a 31-year-old Swede known as Johan, who was a graduate student working on his master’s thesis while studying in Beijing.¹² Johan and his Chinese friend participated in the demonstration as observers, who cautiously tried to maintain a distance from the protesters.¹³ Johan and his friend started their tour in Hailong Dasha at Zhongguancun around 9:30 a.m. They followed the protesters to all the major locations, including the Japanese Embassy, where they witnessed vandalism until the demonstration ended around 6:00 p.m. Johan’s statement is thus a complete record of the demonstration in Beijing. He posted his statement shortly after 7:00 p.m. the same day, making it a fresh personal account of the event.

Johan was impressed with the following observations. First, the demonstration was largely orderly, because the demonstrators often followed the directives of the police. “These guys [the demonstrators] at the front were constantly told by the police when to stop, when to walk, etc. The march was at this point confined to one side of the street with policemen casually walking in front of them and 20–25 police minivans tightly following them...On the other side of the road people stopped and cheered and honked their horns in their cars.” He also noted the orderly ending of the event around 6:00 p.m. “The students get into busses and go back to their universities. Half an hour later the place was basically cleared. The students left voluntarily without fuzz.” Second, vandalism was mild. On the popular commercial

Zhongguangcun Avenue, Johan describes, "Some torn advertisements of Canon Powershot. Some torn advertisement, a hole in the panel of a small branch of a Japanese bank, and the stones at the embassy, was all the vandalism I saw, and I think that covers it all in this aspect." Johan saw some demonstrators throwing stones at the guardhouse of the Japanese Embassy. But he stressed that, "the embassy was sealed off by layers of riot-gear equipped guards. They were never challenged in any way by the protesters and police were casually walking among the protesters and even the stone throwers!" Third, Johan complained about the police for not doing more to stop vandalism entirely. "It is pretty sad to see police standing by watching [vandalization]. They could very easily stop this by just telling them [the protesters] to." Fourth, Johan found it ironical that many protesters were using Japanese cameras to take pictures while they were calling for a boycott of Japanese goods. "The whole thing was very well documented by spectators and protesters, mostly with cameras such as Sony, Canon, Panasonic, etc. That didn't seem to bother anyone." Finally, in his concluding remarks, Johan criticized the usual exaggeration found in the foreign media's reporting of the demonstration. The foreign reporters tended to produce "a large focus on the smashed window, therefore sounding more aggressive than it actually was." He also noted that the numbers in these reports were often inaccurate. Johan complained, "This is also the case when it comes to the reported numbers, often citing the highest numbers available, while this was not a very large demonstration."

B. Shanghai

The narrative about the demonstration in Shanghai on April 16, 2005 was found in Mark Wang's blog entitled, *Ryu2.mind* (<http://www.markwang.com/log>). As the blogger's profile is unavailable, I only know that Mark is a young Chinese American visiting in Shanghai as a researcher in 2005. Like Johan in Beijing, Mark was an observer, not a fervent participant in the demonstration. "Japan is a country near and dear to my heart," he confessed. He spoke some Japanese, had many Japanese friends, and had worked for a Japanese company for some time. He did not have any anti-Japanese sentiment, nor did he fully endorse the demands of the Chinese protesters. His participation was purely to satisfy his curiosity in seeing an unusual event.¹⁴ Mark and



Figure 1: The second group of the demonstrators starts marching from the People's Monument in the Bund, via Shandong First Road, reaching Yan'an Road in Shanghai. (All photos via courtesy of the *China Daily*)

his friend started the tour at 9:00 a.m. at the People's Square Station and finished it when the demonstration ended in the late afternoon.

Mark found the demonstration relatively peaceful and orderly. He remarks, "Despite reports of isolated violence and vandalism, the group we were with was rather peaceful. There was chanting: 'Boycott Japanese goods!' 'Protest Japan!', 'Return the Diaoyu Islands!', 'Koi-zumi resign!', and variants thereof were the most popular." Mark continued to describe the demonstration in action, "When we were at a loss for words, someone would break out singing the national anthem (written during the 1930s and whose lyrics refer to resisting the—Japanese, of course—enemy), and invariably, everyone would join in." The most violent action he saw was the harassing of drivers of Japanese cars. People spit at these vehicles or threw plastic bottles at them. "Some people wanted to throw rocks, but our leaders told them—'No, no, don't throw rocks! Let's be civilized...'" But Mark was disheartened to see the devastating look of the Japanese Consulate after vandalism. "Besides [it] looking like a Cubist piece of abstract art with paint splatters, windows were broken, and bottles and eggs were flying every-



Figure 2: The consolidated rally, consisting of many smaller groups, marching along Yan'an Road.



Figure 3: Working youths from areas outside of Shanghai driving their vehicles to scenes to render their support to the demonstrators.



Figure 4: Angry demonstrators overturning a parked Japanese car.



Figure 5: The demonstrators stepping and ransacking the overturned Japanese car, while putting anti-Japanese slogans on it.



Figure 6: The police constructing “human walls” to separate the demonstrators into smaller groups.



Figure 7: The riot police guarding the Japanese Consulate.



Figure 8: The riot police resisting charges from the demonstrators in front of the Japanese Consulate.



Figure 9: The demonstrators jamming the entire Hongqiao Development Area. The tourist buses parking near Wandu Building getting ready for taking the demonstrators home.

where. It was perversely like watching a game of basketball, with the baskets being the consulate windows."

Despite the vandalism, Mark praised the police for doing a good job. He thought the police were at times a "helpful escort" in front of the procession. At other times, they were efficient marshals. "We reach Hongqiao and find 'helpful' police blocking the way, and essentially making it impossible for us to get lost." When the demonstrators tried to "rush the entrance" of the Consulate, the police performance was superb. "They [the demonstrators] tried several more times, and thankfully, the police were able to hold them off without resorting to violence."

As a nonpartisan American observer, Mark was not concerned with the Chinese demands. He was nonetheless moved by the dedication of the mass of participants. He confessed, "What was most memorable about the whole afternoon was not the cause or messages themselves—but it was just seeing the passion and energy of the (if only somewhat) unleashed [sic] masses, young and old, male and female, wealthy and not-so-wealthy, all with one voice, one heart, and one cause. Whether it was from their hearts or not, I couldn't judge—although I observe that probably 99.9% of the folks there didn't actually live through that time of history. Still, it didn't make a difference."

C. Hong Kong

The anti-Japanese demonstrations in Hong Kong in April 2005 were uneventful and small in scale when compared with those in the mainland. However, the Hong Kong protesters continued their fight in their blogs and by sending letters to the editors of influential local newspapers. I will introduce their fights by drawing on the blog entitled, "Miss Kwok's Secret Garden" (www.louisakwok.blogspot.com). The blogger, Louisa Kwok, is a young English teacher at a secondary school in Hong Kong. Louisa is Chinese, but refuses to call herself a patriot of China. "I have never been a patriot and will never be. Every year, I still protest against the June 4th massacre [in Beijing in 1989] and discuss the issue with my students, hoping that no one will forget what the Chinese government did to the innocent students in 1986 [sic]. We still have people coming out every year demanding the Chinese government to redress the issue."¹⁵

After the demonstrations in Hong Kong, Louisa debated with Western journalists and scholars, such as Peter Kammerer and Tom Plate,

who urged China and Japan to move forward, not look backward, in order not to risk Asia's peace and prosperity. Louisa did not concur. She raised a thoughtful question: "If Germany did not offer an official apology after the Second World War; its prime minister visited the grave of Hitler overtly and continually; and its government allowed the modification of history textbooks to whitewash the things it did to the Jews, could other European countries and the USA forget about the past and move on?" In her rebuttal to other critics, Louisa defended the protesters in China: "China does have its own unforgivable past but it doesn't mean that anyone can deprive its people of expressing their anger towards the Japanese textbook incident. Condemning the Japanese whitewashing their atrocities during their invasion in China is what every citizen will do if he/she knows what really happened."

Finally, Louisa endorsed the letter to the editor of the *South China Morning Post* written by Fion Yip, a Hong Kong resident, who addressed the issues raised in the Western columnists' writings. Fion declared, "Whether the Chinese and Korean peoples forgive Japanese war criminals is a personal decision. But it is utterly wrong to try to forget what the Japanese did to China and other Asian countries. It is dangerous. If we do not learn from history, it will repeat itself." She further defended the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China as legitimate and necessary, as long as the demonstrators did not resort to violence. She said, "The protests, as long as they remain under control and there is no serious damage, should not be suppressed." Fion went on to stress, "Those who are sympathetic towards Japan should re-read the history of massacres, tortures and other war crimes. Given the complex international politics—China's tricky relationship with the US, the Taiwan issue and so on—who can guarantee Japan will never invade China again? To expect no protests is even more dangerous to world peace. That's why we all need to speak up."

It is clear that the above narratives of the 2005 demonstrations in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong all show respect and sympathy for the passion and energy of the demonstrators. Some go further to defend the Chinese concerns as legitimate and rational in terms of maintaining world peace. These concerns are rooted in the dark pages of the history of Sino-Japanese relations. It is these concerns that drive the protesters to the street to air their grievances collectively. The Chinese government does not seem to have a role in the process.

In this connection, I should mention the alleged story from more than one source that some demonstrators were released from work by

their Korean employers in China. To encourage their Chinese employees to participate in the demonstrations, some Korean employers offered double pay to the employees willing to join the demonstrations in Shanghai and other places.¹⁶

The narratives have confirmed that the demonstrations in China were largely orderly. Vandalism took place as a form of expressing anger. No looting was reported. The police were restrained in using force and did their job well. Despite their diversified backgrounds, the protesters from Beijing to Hong Kong were in solidarity in their goals, to quote from one narrative, being “all with one voice, one heart, and one cause.” The narratives seem to indicate that a new culture of social and political protest is being born in China because the protests in 2005, unlike their predecessors in history, ended without bloodshed and remained highly educational to the younger Chinese both at home and abroad.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Unlike in previous nationwide protests, the majority of the participants in the 2005 demonstrations seemed to be young people from the working class, although there were also many college students. Remarkably, the protesters were unorganized. There were no obvious leaders or organizers in the demonstrations. The forty-two protesters arrested in Shanghai in late April 2005, for instance, were largely working youths. They were charged with property damage or instigating protests by spreading demonstration schedules through their personal websites or mobile phones.¹⁷ None of the individuals was identified as a leader of the protests. The demonstrators might make a variety of demands in their slogans, but their shared goal was directed at Japan’s refusal to face up to history and act responsibly.

Were the anti-Japanese demonstrations spontaneous or stage-managed? I used to believe the government stage-managed the events, as evidenced by the availability of buses at the terminal sites of the demonstrations. From the participants’ narratives and my interviews, I was surprised to learn that the government agencies, business firms, or schools provided the buses for a different reason that is not fully understood outside China. The buses were provided mainly for taking the participants back to their workplaces or campuses in an orderly and timely way. Most demonstrators had to find their own transportation to the demonstration sites. The free return trip was meant to be a

control measure, so as to disperse the demonstrators before they had any chance to create trouble.¹⁸ This is perhaps why Johan, the Swedish observer, said it only took half an hour to clear the final demonstration site in Beijing, because “the students left voluntarily without fuzz” for the free ride.¹⁹ I also learned from my interviewees that the administrators at schools were under constant pressure from the government to keep an eye on the student activists. In turn, the administrators demanded that professors and department chairs assume responsibility for keeping their students busy in the classrooms, laboratories, or libraries. One professor at Nanjing University told me that he received more than eight phone calls per day in early April 2005 from the university administration to seek his help in discouraging students from joining the demonstrations.²⁰

The demonstrations came at a time when the leadership in Beijing finished undergoing a sharp change. By April 2005, President Hu Jintao was in the process of consolidating his power, after succeeding Jiang Zemin in March 2003. He wanted to depart from Jiang’s high-handed policy in suppressing public protests (e.g., Falungong) by adopting a more tolerant, protective policy toward peaceful public protest on all issues. President Hu’s top priority is “Social Harmony.” This change accounts for the permissive attitude of the police. This is also the time when China surpassed the United States as Japan’s top trading partner for the first time, making Sino-Japanese relations vitally important to Japan.²¹ Japan and China have now become mutually dependent on each other for economic development. The Chinese protesters have no fear to air their grievances against the Japanese. Moreover, this is also the first time when the Chinese people can make use of electronic technology at a massive level for social and political activities, all thanks to the rapid growth of the economy in China in the last two decades. Increasingly, Chinese young people can afford to own mobile phones, notebook computers, and other electronic equipments for communication. The popularity of electronic communication makes government control a more difficult task. As a result people are blessed with unprecedented freedom of speech.

The anti-Japanese protests in 2005 are admirably voluntary, stimulating, and intrepid actions of the young people in defense of truth and justice in history that China seldom experiences in the last few decades. The protesters simply see their actions as straightforward reaction to the Japanese leaders’ attitudes toward wartime history as reflected in the Yasukuni Shrine, history textbooks and other unresolved issues

relating to Imperial Japan's war crimes and atrocities during World War II. The Chinese have no intention to interfere with Japanese freedom of faith and speech, as they never protested against the Yasukuni Shrine before the official enshrinement of Tojo and other convicted war criminals in 1978 and Japan's massive revision of history textbooks in 1982. The Chinese stand is firm that worshipping war criminals or distorting history is unacceptable. Pointedly, they find Premier Koizumi's and other Japanese leaders' conflicting views of history purposely misleading, disturbing, and in need of correction.

Indeed, the Chinese protesters collectively take a bold excursion into a region of central importance, which many leaders in Japan and China either fear or disdain to confront.²² To these young protesters, history matters. With regard to Imperial Japan's war crimes and responsibilities, some Chinese may choose to forgive, but they can never forget. They are waiting to see sincerity and efforts from Japan toward redress and reconciliation. At the same time, these young protesters seem to be ready for another wave of protest if the response from Japan continues to be disappointing and irritating. For one thing, the internet and other communication technology in China increasingly continue to be helpful in their pursuit. The protesters do not need any engineers or organizers to guide or push them for actions. More than one young protesters in Shanghai whom I interviewed surprised me by being able to recite a part of the English mission statement of the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia as follows: "For only from truth in history, can we secure justice for victims, safeguard humanity from repeating mistakes of the past, and bring about genuine reconciliation and lasting peace among all people."²³ They all pledged to support GA's mission. It is my hope that the new Japanese leadership under Premier Abe will alleviate the coming of another wave of protest in China in the near future. The ball seems to be on Japan's court now. ●

Notes

1. Joseph Kahn, "In Rare Legal Protest, Chinese Seek Boycott of Japan Goods," *New York Times*, 9 April 2005, Late Edition, Final, Section A, Page 14, Column 3.
2. See "42 Arrested for Property Damage in anti-Japanese Demonstrations," posted online at www.chinaview.cn, 27 April 2005.
3. John Chan, "Japan Stokes Tensions with China," World Socialist Web Site (www.wsws.org), published by the International Committee of the Fourth International, 16 April 2005.
4. *Yomiuri shimbun* and other major Japanese daily newspapers, 10 April 2005.

5. Shinzo Abe spoke on the television program "Sunday Project" on April 10, 2005; quoted in John Chan, "Japan Stokes Tensions with China," World Socialist Web Site (www.wsws.org), 16 April 2005.
6. Murray Scott Tanner, "Chinese Government Responses to Rising Social Unrest: Prepared Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Public Hearing on "China's State Control Mechanisms and Methods," Washington, D.C., April 14, 2005. See <http://www.uscc.gov/index.html>.
7. Eric Margolis, "Anti-Japanese Rage Shakes China," posted on 2 May 2005, at <http://www.ericmargolis.com>.
8. Editorial, "Ribben weihe 'bangui' nan?" (Why Japan finds it Difficult to Remove the Ghosts of the War Criminals), *Xinhua*, at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/comments/2005-06/07content3049365.htm>.
9. John Chan, op. cit.
10. *Zhongguo qingnianbao* (*China Youth Daily*), 21 September 2003.
11. Robert Marquand, "Chinese Protest Japan Bid for Spot on U.N. Council," *Chicago-Sun Times*, 11 April 2005.
12. For Johan's profile, visit <http://www.blogger.com/profile/4091069>. All further quotations in this section come from Johan.
13. On one occasion, Johan wrote, "An annoying person came up and shook my hand, thanking me for my support, while I was clearly just standing and watching and taking pictures with my Japanese camera. After that I tried to walk with a distance from the crown [sic], no [sic] wanting to become any foreign mascot for this hateful parade." See "Anti-Japanese Demonstration," posted on 9 April 9, 2005.
14. Mark Wang, "My life as a protester, Part 1," in "Ryu2.mind," posted on 16 April 2005 at (<http://www.markwang.com/log>). All further quotations in this section come from Mark Wang.
15. "Anti-Japanese Protests," posted on 19 April 2005, in "Miss Kwok's Secret Garden" at (<http://www.louisakwok.blogspot.com>). All further quotations in this section come from Ms. Kwok.
16. Interviews with reporters from the *People's Daily* and *China Daily* in Shanghai in June 2006.
17. "42 arrested for property damage in anti-Japanese demonstrations," *China Daily*, April 27, 2005.
18. Interviews with administrators at Nanjing University and Fudan University in June 2006.
19. "Anti-Japanese Demonstration," posted on April 9, 2005. <http://www.blogger.com/profile/4091069>.
20. Interview conducted at Nanjing University on May 30, 2006.
21. Trade between China and Japan in 2004 was worth about \$167 billion, making China the biggest trading partner of Japan. Online at <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/04/17/china.japan/index.html>.
22. It is not difficult to understand why some Japanese leaders do not want to face the dark page in Japan's modern history. For some Chinese leaders, too, they have similar problems. For instance, it is not an easy task to explain to the people why China, the

biggest victimized country by Imperial Japan, gave up the right to demand for state to state reparations from Japan during the Sino-Japanese negotiation for normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972 and for the peace treaty in 1978.

23. I interviewed a few working class youth and college students in Shanghai in June 2006, who participated in the 2005 protests. GA's mission statement can be found in its webpage: <http://www.global-alliance.net>.