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Crawford Young

University of Wisconsin - Madison

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AFRICA: DEMOCRATIZATION, CULTURAL PLURALISM, AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL ORDER

Crawford Young

I. Competing Images of Africa

*A*t the turn of the millennium, contradictory images of Africa jostle for our attention. One portrait, painted in glowing colors during the epochal (but swiftly forgotten) tour of Africa by President William Clinton in March 1998, sketches an Africa of resurrection and renovation, propelled by liberating currents of democratization, and embodied by a new generation of leaders unencumbered by dogmas and practices of a failed past.¹ A “third wave” of democratization, identified by Samuel Huntington,² washed across Africa in what once seemed an unstoppable tide, initially triggered by a wave of urban rioting in Algiers in October 1988, and the startling seizure of effective power by a “sovereign national conference” in Benin at the beginning of 1990. At the end of the decade, although the momentum of democratization had long ebbed, new avatars appeared in the form of crucial and seemingly successful elections in Nigeria and South Africa.

A second, less happy image emerged in 1993 and 1994 in Burundi and Rwanda, where democratic transitions decanted into veritable ethnic holocausts, taking the lives of well over a million people.³ In the wake of these interactive disasters, many hundreds of thousands were displaced, most into neighboring countries. The eddies of violent ethnic conflict continue to swirl, spilling into neighboring states, and constituting an endemic source of disorder in the African Great Lakes region. In this picture, the demons of ethnic and religious difference haunt Africa, lurking in the background as an omnipresent menace to fragile political institutions.

A third image took form almost simultaneously with the first sweep of democratization. In 1991, at two ends of the continent, state institutions simply dissolved. The fate of Somalia and Liberia opened to view an entirely novel and unanticipated outcome: state collapse.⁴ Other cases were to follow, most notably Sierra Leone. This representation of an Africa spiraling downward into a maelstrom of uncontrollable disorder achieved popular currency through the widely-read Robert Kaplan article on “the coming anarchy.”⁵ Worse, the torments of Sierra Leone and Liberia were a mere preview of what lay in store for a wider universe; “West Africa is becoming *the* symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ threat,”⁶ wrote Kaplan. The excessively lurid colors of the Kaplan portrait repelled many readers.⁷ But during the course of the 1990s, two significant multi-country zones of intractable, interpenetrated civil strife emerged, one stretching from Liberia to Mauritania, and the other from the Horn of Africa in a southwestward arc to Angola and the two Congos. In more than a dozen of Africa’s 53 states, governments failed to pass the Weberian test of stateness: an effective monopoly of the means of coercion within their territorial domain.

Thus, issues of democracy, cultural pluralism, and political order are central to Africa at the dawn of the 21st century. Few voices clamor for a return to the patrimonial autocracies that served as the dominant form of polity during most of the postindependence period. Indeed, the sheer magnitude of the contemporary challenge to statecraft is a legacy of the manifold flaws of this form of rule. In spite of its disappointments and imperfections, the struggle for adapted and naturalized democratic institutions will continue. Effective accommodation of cultural diversity remains central to the processes and practices of a liberalized political order. The potential for escalated ethnic or religious conflict is present in many countries, but is not ineluctable. The revelation in this decade of the debilitated institutional capacities of a number of states, and the high costs of endemic disorder, make “bringing the state back in”⁸ indispensable. Though Somalis have exhibited remarkable resourcefulness in operating a stateless socioeconomic order for nearly a decade, the outer limits of such survival strategies are unmistakable.⁹ The benefits promised for a democratized political order — a more responsive, accountable, transparent, and moralized polity — presume the vehicle of a functioning state. Thus, the quest for

the efficacious state joins democratization and the accommodation of diversity on the agenda.¹⁰

In this essay, I explore these three themes in African politics, and their interaction. A backward glance at the evolution of this trio will provide an initial framework. Our main task is to elucidate the dynamics of democratization, cultural pluralism, and civil order in the final decade of our century.

II. The First Political Moment: Terminal Colonial Politics

Four political moments may be delineated in the postwar trajectory of African politics. In the first period, extending from 1945 till the symbolic high water mark of African independence in 1960, the core issue was the organization of a political transition, whose terms and timing were contested by the withdrawing colonial power and emergent African nationalism. In a second stage, extending from political independence until approximately 1980, a dominant mode of rule emerged, retrospectively characterized as patrimonial autocracy. A third political moment appeared about 1980, when a generalized sense of state crisis took form and deepened during the decade. The present phase, in the 1990s, opened with democratization as leitmotif, but soon found the hopes ignited by political opening clouded by the specters of escalated cultural pluralism, and state weakness or even collapse. A summary examination of the first three moments will provide the context for a more extended analysis of the fourth.

Two crucial changes redefined the nature of the African colonial state in the terminal imperial era. Firstly, Britain and France, the key colonial powers in Africa, had both made wartime commitments, in part to ensure the fidelity of the African subject to imperial defense, to create for the first time some scope for their participation in state management. On the eve of World War II, Malcolm MacDonald had pledged the "ultimate establishment of the great commonwealth of free peoples and nations," though adding that "generations, perhaps centuries," might pass before the goal was accomplished.¹¹ The French, at the 1944 Brazzaville conference on postwar African policy, promised "an ever greater part in the life and in the democratic institutions of the French community," while ruling out self-government.¹² Belgium was ultimately dragged along into the wake of these commitments, which led ineluctably to the creation of representative institutions with African participation. These, in turn, required loosening the

comprehensive restrictions on African political action. At a pace far more rapid than foreseen or intended, political space opened for political parties and other instrumentalities of a nascent civil society. The value of democracy made its first appearance on the African colonial scene.

The second major transformation, little noted at the time, was an extraordinary expansion in the scope of state action. This emanated partly from a defensive reaction to the crisis of legitimation brought about by the hostile scrutiny of colonial welfare by a newly critical international community, and by the steadily expanding clamor of African subjects and their political spokespeople for the basic infrastructure for a better life: schools, clinics, safe water, local roads. But equally important was the dramatic increase in the resources available to the terminal colonial state. In the years between the eve of World War II and independence, state revenue in Ghana and Nigeria expanded tenfold, while in the Belgian Congo it multiplied by thirty.¹³ To this revenue bonanza was added, for the first time in the colonial era, significant infusions of metropolitan public capital by way of various colonial development funds. These developments paradoxically created a rapid expansion of the European-staffed superstructure of the state, a phenomenon labeled a "second colonial occupation" by Hargreaves, who noted that this produced "a large-scale infusion of technical experts, whose activities... increased the 'intensity' of colonial government."¹⁴

We may detect in these twin processes the opening of a dialectic between democracy and stateness which continues until today. The very essence of the colonial state was its alien and authoritarian nature: a superstructure of European hegemony superimposed by force on diverse African societies, which were constituted as mere subjects of imperial occupation. Although a tiny handful of Africans or Afro-Caribbeans worked their way some distance up the colonial hierarchies, the command posts in the central and territorial administration remained almost entirely in European control till the very end. Although the Belgian Congo was perhaps an extreme example, with only three Africans out of 4,632 bureaucrats in the top three ranks of the civil service in 1960,¹⁵ similar patterns existed until the eve of independence even in Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, where the pool of qualified Africans was substantial. Alien control remained even more marked in the security forces; nowhere were armies under African command at the moment of independence (save in the few cases where

decolonization occurred through armed struggle), and often remained under European command for some time after power transfer (1961 in Ghana, 1965 in Nigeria). Even in Nigeria, where Africanization of the officer corps began in 1953, at independence there were only 61 Nigerian officers, few of field grade.¹⁶ The alterity of the colonial state was profound and comprehensive—politically, culturally, racially.

The inner core of democratization was, in contrast, African, even though for variable periods immigrant races often clamored for a disproportionate role (for instance, “racial partnership” in its various guises in British-ruled eastern and central African territories and the dual college electorate arrangements in French-ruled Africa until 1956). The growing voice of African nationalism at once combated and contested the political authority of the terminal colonial state, yet viewed favorably rapid state expansion, a process which indeed became naturalized in the expectations of the elite as a normal condition. Even though the harshness and brutality associated with earlier phases of colonial rule rapidly softened in the postwar years, there were ample vexations from which to weave a narrative of protest. As distinctly political representative institutions gained scope and authority, African nationalism found through democratization a vehicle for challenging the prevarication and dilatory maneuvers of colonial authorities seeking to prolong their final tutelage. The state was thus an adversary of democratic forces, yet at the same time a prize to be won. Discourses of revolutionary transformation notwithstanding, the actual agenda of African nationalists was above all occupation of the institutional infrastructure of the colonial state. The aphorism attributed to Ghanaian independence leader Kwame Nkrumah, “Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else shall follow,” was the well-articulated major premise in the conquest of sovereignty.

In the 1950s, as democratization brought frequent competition, the issue of cultural pluralism came to the fore. The multi-ethnic nature of African societies was, of course, familiar to all, and indeed had long served among the justifications for alien rule. In addition, regional administration had generally been erected upon a primordial “tribal” template, which in turn had a powerful impact upon the social construction of African identities.¹⁷ Tribalism was frequently perceived as an essentially rural phenomenon, with the newly urbanized African detribalized. This reading confused the larger matrix of local structures of rural community with the issue of ethnic identity; urban migration involved at least partial exit from the former, and often

redefinition of the latter, around larger identity constructs. The urban environment was also the locus for new forms of ethnic organization, in the shape of welfare or burial societies and social groupings. What was unclear, however, was the dynamic that would ensue from the encounter of cultural pluralism with the democratic process, initially confined to electoral contest for seats in representative bodies.

Once anticolonial struggle began in earnest, it was soon territorialized; an earlier pan-African discourse remained a dream for some, but effective combat could only occur at the territorial level. Nationalism thus came to embrace the territory as supreme locus of legitimate identity. Tribalism, invariably the weapon of one's adversaries, was castigated as subversive to the struggle, and redolent of backwardness. Yet, for all contenders, the existence of ethnic consciousness constituted a tempting reservoir of possible vote banks. Once given, ethnic vote banks were monetized, the logic of competitive difference took hold, and rival groupings were tempted to align with competing formations. The withdrawing colonial powers, now preoccupied with honorable exit and the need for internationally respectable political structures as legacy, insisted on open competition (though they were not above covert support to the most moderate groupings, especially in the French and Belgian cases).

With a few exceptions (Senegal, for example), ethnicity and, in the cases of Uganda and Sudan, religious sect or denomination, became central vectors in political competition. The very dramaturgy of democracy as electoral process tended to illuminate its impact. The independence elections in particular were highly charged; the stakes—conquest of state power—were immense, and the unfathomable costs of exclusion through alignment with a losing party raised the emotional temperature. For the winners, too, the view that cultural pluralism was a dangerous adversary was reinforced.

III. The Second Political Moment: the Would-Be Integral State

The achievement of independence redefined the interaction of democracy, cultural pluralism, and the state. In a trend swiftly manifest throughout the continent, democracy understood as competitive party politics and cultural pluralism fell into disfavor. The state, on the other hand, was the supreme agency of fulfillment of the promises of nationalism. To achieve its historic mission of bringing rapid development to Africa, the state required unencumbered power. Open political compe-

tion was divisive and hampered the state in marshaling resources and energies for development. Indeed, such energies were in finite supply; those diverted into political party competition subtracted directly from the capacities for development. "At the present stage of Ghana's economic development the whole community must act in the national interest," wrote Kwame Nkrumah. "In fact, most of our development so far has had to be carried out by the Government itself. There is no other way out...."¹⁸

Such reasoning was entirely consistent with dominant wisdom in the world at large with respect to overcoming underdevelopment.¹⁹ Irrespective of ideological preference, a central state role as theologian, organizer, manager, and, indeed, proprietor of development was beyond dispute. The war against poverty, ignorance, and disease required no less. Responsive to this universally shared vision, African state builders set to work. Especially during the 1970s, the state domain experienced vast expansion through a wave of nationalization measures and the launching of a vast array of state-owned enterprises. The social service sector, especially education, was rapidly expanded, with missions elbowed aside by the state as school proprietors. The numbers of ministries and agencies multiplied. In capitalist Nigeria, for example, which already had 75 state enterprises in 1960, the number exploded to 500 by the 1980s; the number of state employees increased from 70,000 to one million.²⁰ In officially socialist Tanzania, former economic advisor to the Tanzanian government Reginald Green noted with satisfaction that by the mid-1970s, 80% of the medium and large-scale economic activity lay in the public sector, a figure higher than that for Soviet bloc states at a comparable time after the imposition of state socialism.²¹

Nation building went hand in hand with state building. An ambitious project of erasure of cultural pluralism was undertaken. In 1959, Guinean leader Sekou Toure famously observed that, "In three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much damage to our country and its population."²² Although few would have gone quite so far as Toure, the belief was widely held that ethnicity and religion could be safely relegated to the private sphere, and banished from public life. To achieve this end, political party competition was an unaffordable luxury. The extensive pedagogical resources of the state—the media and educational system—were deployed to foster the precept of territorial state as nation-in-becoming. The resiliency of the African state system

in its hour of weakness bears witness to the indisputable impact of these didactics.

For political rulers, the vision arose of a veritable “integral state,” a system of perfected hegemony whereby the state achieves unrestricted domination over civil society. Thus unfettered, the state is enabled to pursue its rational design for the future, and amply reward the ruling group for its services.²³ The array of associations that emerged in the liberalized terminal colonial environment were compelled to reformulate themselves as ancillary structures within the ruling party. In turn, the party became an instrumentality of the will of the ruler. The party absorbed all individuals and groups, in the process claiming to embody an organic unified national *will*, interpreted and applied by the leader. In the more extreme cases, such as the Congo (Zaire) of Mobutu Sese Seko in the early 1970s, this extravagantly etatist form of rule reached surrealistic proportions.²⁴

An effort was made to rationalize single party rule as an organic form of democracy, in its most jacobin sense. Ritualized forms of imagining popular support—crowds mobilized to applaud the ruler, plebiscitary elections, sartorial display of the presidential image—purported to express a public will. In some cases, competition within the party was permitted for legislative seats, a practice pioneered by Tanzania. The most thoughtful claim for the compatibility of single party rule and democratic practice appeared in the 1965 Tanzania Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State.²⁵ Although the assertion of a democratic ethos was less comprehensively denatured by autocratic practice in Tanzania than in most instances, the credibility of the claim steadily depreciated.

IV. The Third Political Moment: Economic Stagnation and State Crisis

By the end of the 1970s, the perception of a developmental impasse took root. Not only had the promises of the integral state to bring rapid and transformative economic expansion failed to materialize, but symptoms of actual decline appeared. “Afropessimism” percolated into media treatment of African affairs, echoing views held in official milieux. A report prepared for the 1979 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Monrovia came to the dispiriting conclusion that “Africa . . . is unable to point to any significant growth rate or satisfactory index of general well-being.”²⁶ The 1980s were a decade of conti-

mental decline. The African external debt, negligible in 1970, ballooned to over \$200 billion by 1990 (and \$350 billion today). In most countries, per capita income dwindled—in a number of cases to levels below that of 1960. Africa, demonstrated Carl Eicher, was the only major world region to experience declining per capita food production after 1960.²⁷

The deepening economic crisis was paralleled in the political sphere. The celebratory tones of the first generation of works examining African independence faded; in their place emerged, in the 1980s, a “state crisis” school of analysis. Congolese bishops, in a 1981 pastoral letter, charged that the state had degenerated into “organized pillage for the profit of the foreigner and his intermediaries.”²⁸ An influential study by Naomi Chazan fired an opening salvo in the “state decline” literature: “The Ghanaian state thus seemed to be on the brink of becoming less distinctive and relevant. Indeed, some kind of disengagement from the state was taking place... an emotional, economic, social and political detachment from the state element.”²⁹ Jean-François Bayart added that, “the brutality of the territorial administration, of the chiefs and of the armed bands which control the countryside constitute... reasons for... desertion as the sole pertinent response to the arbitrary action and wasteful consumption of the state... [and]... continues to sap civic space, to constrain the process of accumulation of power and wealth, and to render predation easier than exploitation.”³⁰ The state, in the popular mind, had long ceased to serve as protector and benefactor. A host of unsavory epithets characterized the state in popular writing: prebendal state, predatory state, pirate state, vampire state.

Single party patrimonial autocracy, through the effective monopolization of power by the ruler and his inner clique of henchmen, appeared to drive cultural pluralism to the margins of political society. With a few exceptions, the analysis of ethnicity was peripheral to academic analysis of African politics until the 1980s. Ethnic associations were widely suppressed, and often ethnic categories disappeared from censuses. On superficial scrutiny, the observer at the zenith of the integral state, about 1970, might have concluded that cultural pluralism had been successfully relegated to the modest private realm, which the state wished to permit.

But some straws in the wind suggested that, as Vail coyly phrased the matter, ethnicity “failed to cooperate with its many would-be pallbearers.”³¹ The major civil wars ignited during this period in Nigeria (1967–1970) and southern Sudan (in effect, 1956–1972) rested upon

ethnic forms of consciousness and grievances, although a regional idiom was employed.³² Another important harbinger was the ethnic genocidal slaughter in Burundi in 1980, when a small Hutu uprising against the Tutsi-dominated single party military regime was met with a systemic destruction of Hutu educated classes, and death estimates ran as high as 200,000.³³ An ethnic calculus was discernable in the political management by rulers, especially in the command structure of the security forces. Even as resolutely nation-building a leader as Julius Nyerere indulged, choosing key military leaders from his Mara region.³⁴ African rulers responded to the security imperative through the application of an "ethnic security map" in the structure and control of their military forces.³⁵ Patrimonial practice honeycombed the political realm with clientele networks, within which ethnicity usually supplied the cementing basis of affinity. At the mass level, as estrangement from the state deepened, ethnic affinity became a survival resource of first importance. The underground nodes of secure reciprocities and social solidarity, even if they were denied formal organization, were critical sites of identity.

The stage was thus set for a comprehensive project of liberalization, initially confined to the economic sphere but extending, by the end of the 1980s, to the political realm through an emergent discourse of democracy. In the pendulum swing between democratization and stateness discernable in the postwar decades, democracy as prior virtue regained its ascendancy. As in terminal colonial times, the nature of the state became stigmatized as the source of societal ills and discontents. Alien and oppressive in its colonial version, the postcolonial state was over-consuming and under-performing, "kleptocratic" to its core. The remedy was empowerment of civil society, a term whose rebirth in the 1980s was in itself emblematic of the new mood.³⁶ In this unfolding dialectic, there were three distinct moments: democracy as avenue of liberation from the alien bureaucratic autocracy of the colonial state; state as master agency of transformation and nation-building over the distractions and divisions of democracy; and finally, democracy as vehicle for remoralizing the political realm and replacing patrimonial autocracy with good governance.

The disrepute of the state in the third political moment reflected larger discursive trends in the world at large. The rise in the Western world of what is often termed a *neoliberal* discourse spilled over into a particularly harsh external view of the failings of the African state. The increasingly apparent shortcomings of state socialism and its sundry

African derivatives of “socialist orientation,” and the fiscal outer limits confronted by advanced welfare states, opened the door for a triumphant enunciation of the supreme virtues of the liberal market economy and its political counterpart, the constitutional democratic state. History deposited upon the world stage a pair of rhetorical grand masters who translated global trends into discursive talismans, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. With the state thus summoned to dismount from the back of civil society, an array of economic policy prescriptions congealed into a “Washington consensus” of the international financial institutions and the Western policy community. Its goal was to privatize, deregulate, establish free markets, dismantle trade controls, and assure free capital movement. Eventually, this program extended into the political realm: guarantee individual rights, assure the rule of law, and enforce accountability and the transparency of the state through some form of democratization.

The African state first found itself in the cross-hairs of the Washington consensus in the scorching critique of African economic performance in the 1981 World Bank report whose primary author was Elliot Berg.³⁷ Although African states produced a series of rejoinders, arguing that the essence of the economic crisis lay in a hostile international environment, their capacity to influence, much less control, a global discourse was limited by the very vulnerability which they argued. Through the 1980s, confronted with external debt obligations which were impossible to meet yet whose fiction of eventual reimbursement its creditors insisted on maintaining, and government resource shortfalls which made external assistance an absolute necessity, most African states had little choice but to engage in “structural adjustment” programs conforming to the requirements of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (IBRD). In reality, the structural adjustment prescriptions were rarely applied in their full rigor. States in their economically enfeebled and politically decayed condition often lacked the capacity for full application; not infrequently, the social costs were underestimated and unsustainable. As well, the one resource remaining in the hands of the African state, deployed with skill in some instances, was the art of dissimulation in deliberate but concealed evasion of some of the harsher strictures.³⁸

V. Democratization as Remedy to State Crisis

Although through the 1980s the remedy for the crisis of the African state was primarily perceived as economic reform, the limited accomplishments of early versions of structural adjustment programs and the continued shriveling of the legitimacy of the long-incumbent patrimonial autocrats gradually brought democracy back into the discursive arena. When Richard Sklar used his 1982 African Studies Association (ASA) presidential address to discuss the theme of democracy in Africa, his message evoked sardonic smiles.³⁹ In 1988, when Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja devoted an ASA presidential address to a summons to democratization as the necessary answer to state crisis, his words closely resonated with events. Simultaneous with his clarion call was the October 1988 wave of urban riots in Algeria and the shock wave they produced. The ruling *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) was a supreme icon of African liberation; its heroic eight year war against a colonial army of 500,000, and the million casualties endured, paved the way for negotiated independence of many other African states. The halo surrounding its version of socialist orientation and its activist voice in third world anti-imperialist diplomacy yielded a luminous external image.⁴⁰ Great was the shock at discovery that urban popular classes regarded the progressive discourse of the FLN regime as a cynical camouflage of the political exclusion and economic marginalization of the young and the poor, in contrast to the ostentatious affluence of a venal ruling oligarchy.

Other catalytic events followed in rapid succession, within and outside Africa. The surrender of the Afro-Marxist regime of Mathieu Kerekou at the beginning of 1990 to a hastily constituted "national conference" of the *forces vives* of Benin ignited a wave of successful demands for such assemblies in francophone Africa. Abandoned by the international community and his unpaid bureaucracy, with the structures of authority shredded, Kerekou had no option but to bow before the seizure of power by "civil society," through the declaration of sovereignty by the national conference, and to accept his own eviction from office by electoral process. The national conference route brought the ouster of perennial incumbents in Mali, Niger, Congo-Brazzaville, and Madagascar, as well.

The freeing of Nelson Mandela in South Africa in early 1990, setting in motion a genuine democratization in South Africa, was yet another potent trigger. To a lesser extent, the long-awaited liberation of

Namibia, sanctioned by an internationally monitored democratic election in 1988, contributed to the congealing notion of a democratic tide. Externally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the 1991 final collapse of the Soviet Union, and the sudden adoption of nominally democratic forms throughout the "camp of socialism" demolished much of what remained in the argument for single party rule, a form of governance for which the Soviet model supplied elements of theoretical and practical guidance.

Beyond the role of catalytic agents, regimes now encountered overwhelming pressures, external and internal, for political opening. By 1990, the United States was overtly pushing for democratization through a series of outspoken ambassadors (Smith Hempstone in Kenya, Frances Cook in Cameroon, Melissa Wells in Congo-Kinshasa, Daniel Simpson in Central African Republic). In the 1990 La Baule francophone summit conference, French President François Mitterand briefly joined the summons, suggesting to his African partners that French aid efforts would become more tepid without political opening. Even within the World Bank, influential voices argued that political reform was a necessary companion to economic liberalization; only through this vehicle could the vague ideal of "governance" be accomplished.⁴¹

Internally, diverse activists mobilized urban discontents. The pressure of the street, especially in capital cities, increased dramatically; so also did the risks in confronting mob action with security forces. The shrinkage of resources had sharply reduced the patrimonial distributions that previously lubricated political networks and sustained an array of notables willing and able to induce quietism among their clientele.

A powerful sense of historical inevitability, external pressures, and internal dynamics all colluded to bring about a spectacular wave of democratization. In its apparent spread and scope, the changes were astounding. Dating the democratic wave from the 1988 Algerian riots, if one tallies all instances of incumbent succession, including replacement of leaders from within the same party legitimated by electoral process, one comes to a figure of 25 of the 53 independent African states. Even if a more rigorous standard of displacement of the ruling political formation is adopted (and not simply retirement of the incumbent ruler), at least a dozen cases of genuine alternation occurred. Negatively put, only Libya has entirely held out against some adaptation or concession to the external forms of democracy, particularly a seem-

ingly competitive election. These figures bear witness to the extraordinary sweep of democracy as an official discourse of rule. However, it must be added that, in a substantial number of cases, democratization was purely formal, and not accompanied by its genuine practice in the everyday exercise of rule. In no less than 21 countries, the ruler in power at the time that the democratic wave began to roll still occupies the presidential palace.

What, then, may be concluded about a third wave of democracy in Africa, a decade after its inception?⁴² By the middle of this decade, a note of skepticism, if not disillusion, began to set in. Larry Diamond, whose scholarship and engagement in the democratic process stand out, asked whether the third wave was over in 1996.⁴³ In an influential article, Ferhad Zakaria suggested that the third wave was producing merely “illiberal democracy,” the external shell devoid of the internal substance.⁴⁴ The late Nigerian intellectual Claude Ake suggested that the electoralist form that an important version of democratic transition took is of a relevance “problematic at best and at worst prone to engender contradictions that tend to derail or trivialize democracy in Africa.”⁴⁵ Richard Joseph, an influential scholar-activist in the early phases of African democratization, concluded by the end of the decade that much of “really existing democracy” on the continent was merely “virtual democracy,” marked mainly by its external appearances and driven by an urgent need of the African state for international “presentability.”⁴⁶ A number of African scholars argued that the form of democracy imposed upon Africa was choiceless, since all regimes were compelled to march to the drummer of structural adjustment programs and the Washington consensus.

There is ample justification for this mood of enhanced skepticism. Wily autocrats learn to manage and manipulate the electoral process: the Moïs, Biyas, and Bongos have many counterparts. Ruling parties enjoy huge advantages in logistical capacities through their control of the state apparatus, modalities of transport, and funds, which find their way to government candidates. Control of television is an important weapon, even if some time is made available to the opposition. Political formations organized to challenge incumbents face acute resource problems, and are very vulnerable to splintering, often with a helping hand from the ruler. Thus far, the only clear cases meeting the Huntingtonian criteria of consolidation — a second electoral alternation of political formations — are met only in Benin and Madagascar (in addition to always pluralist Mauritius).

Still, a return to the authoritarian pretensions of the integral state era seems improbable. There is no resonating ideology now available which could legitimate such a return. Nor can a plausible claim be made, as was once the case in Asia, that authoritarian regimes provide more competent market economy development until a stage is reached when per capita income levels make political liberalization more sustainable (Taiwan, South Korea). The catastrophic developmental performance in the long era of integral state dominance shreds any such proposition. Indeed, the only two African states whose macroeconomic statistics come close to matching Asian norms are Botswana and Mauritius, the only countries to enjoy democratic rule throughout the postindependence period. Overall, African economic performance improved somewhat after the third wave, especially since 1995; in 1997, African regional growth figures actually exceeded those of other major world regions, an artifact of the Asian crisis and Latin American stagnation.

Even though the democracy project failed to meet its ultimate goal of purifying political practice and transforming state-civil society relations, important and durable changes have occurred. The discourse of the integral state, with its subtext of a necessary monopoly of power exercised repressively, all but vanished. Associational life, one measure of the vitality of civil society, now flourishes in much of the continent, with important consequences in such spheres as gender equity. Abuses of human rights have significantly diminished, in part because of the emergence of a new generation of human rights activists, abetted by the ramifying international human rights community and the expanding part such values play in the evolving international normative order. In most countries, an opposition press now exists in tandem with the official media, vociferous in its exposure of malfeasance. Frequency modulation radio made its appearance, ending the domestic monopoly on broadcast media (though television remains mostly in state hands). The very discipline of presentability, despite its obvious limits, compels the regular organization of elections open to opposition formations. Respectability has its ransom in the susceptibility of states to external monitoring. Even South Africa felt constrained to invite international observers to monitor their post-transition 1999 election. Finally, the application of some form of democratic mechanisms was a necessary element in the resolution of intractable civil conflicts: witness Mozambique, Liberia, Namibia, and Algeria.

VI. Return of the Ethnic Question

In the epoch of political opening, cultural pluralism returned to the political agenda in a very different global environment than that of 1960. At the moment of African independence, the ontological primacy of nation-state doctrine was, in retrospect, at an historical zenith. The homogenizing vocation of nationhood was an assumed necessity. Although African states, save for the Arab tier in the north, could not interpret nation-building as assimilation to a dominant ethnocultural identity, they could articulate a claim of the political and territorial unit to sole *legitimate* occupancy of discursive identity space. African states in their salad days went unusually far in stigmatizing cultural identity as tribalism, a residue of backwardness having no place in the realm of modernity.

By the time that political space was reopened for civil society in the 1980s, international discourse had radically altered. "Multiculturalism," a term pioneered in Canada in 1965, became dominant as a characterization of social reality. An earlier premise that macrohistorical process inexorably eroded the social weight of ethnic consciousness lost its credibility. Enforcement of homogeneity, in circumstances of late modernity, was virtually impossible; accommodation to the reality of diversity was the preferred route. Within Africa, partly as counterpoint to the widespread discredit of states, ethnicity became a domain of civic virtue, where a recognizable set of moral precepts governed social practice.⁴⁷ Rather than an artifact of primitivity, ethnicity imaged cultural authenticity, a heritage deserving nurture rather than rejection. Ethnicity and modernity were twins, not protagonists.

Thus, cultural pluralism found a degree of acknowledgment, if not wholehearted acceptance. There was good reason for a degree of wariness: mobilized religious or ethnic consciousness is capable of activating the wilder and most uncivil human passions through its tendency to catalyze fears and anxieties regarding "the other," and in extreme instances permit the dehumanization and demonization of difference. The terrible toll of a decade of combat with Islamist insurgent fragments in Algeria, and the holocausts in Rwanda and Burundi, gave grim warning of cultural solidarities run amok.

The political ambivalence with which cultural solidarities are now viewed find expression in some of the institutional forms of political liberalization. No one else followed the audacious Ethiopian path of reconstituting the internal boundaries of the country on an ethnic prin-

ciple and empowering the provinces with a right of self-determination, including secession. In a number of countries, political parties based on ethnicity or religion are proscribed (for example, Eritrea, Tanzania, Nigeria, Algeria). In a number of instances, electoral systems designed to induce power sharing and to avert zero-sum ethnic power struggles have been adopted, often including a dose of proportional representation.⁴⁸ Generally speaking, constitutional treatment of cultural pluralism eschews formal enunciation of group rights.

Yet the global intellectual environment was radically different at the hour of independence. Understandings of the ethnic phenomenon were largely essentialist in nature, even if “primordialism” was not yet an explicitly elaborated mode of analysis.⁴⁹ If ethnicity was a mere primordial residue—an atavistic embarrassment from a past demanding erasure—then its widespread dismissal by intellectual observers within and outside the continent was logical enough. But the emergence in the intervening decades of instrumentalist and constructivist schools of interpretation firmly linked cultural pluralism with modernity itself.⁵⁰ As African intellectuals detached notions of cultural authenticity from the statist moorings provided by an earlier generation of political leaders (Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Mobutu Sese Seko), ethnicity won standing as a legitimate site of public cultural expression.

Various processes of identity construction are in progress within the more permissive environment of the contemporary political moment. The territorial state, as an identity container, remains a critical defining arena, notwithstanding the porousness of numerous boundaries and the emergence of substantial zones outside the control of central governments. Here one may note the challenges raised to the national ancestral authenticity of both ex-President Henri Bedie in Ivory Coast and President Frederick Chiluba in Zambia, as well as their principal rivals, Alassane Quattara and Kenneth Kaunda, not to mention recent Ugandan and Rwandan whispers that Museveni is really Rwandan and Paul Kagame a Ugandan. In addition, the one political conviction shared by nearly all Congolese is resentment at the Rwandan and Ugandan role in the current rebellions in the east, as well as the earlier sweep across the country by the Laurent Kabila forces.

The singular identity-forming potency of territorial boundaries, their colonial artificiality notwithstanding, even when they divide an ethnic community, is given eloquent documentation by William Miles,

in his impressively documented study of adjoining Hausa villages in Nigeria and Niger:

Incongruously, provocatively, it towers on high: a fifteen-foot metal pole, springing out of the dirty brown Sahelian sand. No other human artifact is to be seen in this vast, barren, flat savanna; only an occasional bush, a tenacious shrub, a spindly tree break up the monotonous, infinite landscape. One stares and wonders how, by beast and porter, such a huge totem could have been lugged here and erected in this desolate bush. But there it stands: a marker of an international boundary, a monument to the splitting of a people, a symbol of colonialism, an idol of 'national sovereignty.'

The pole, and its separation of Hausa villagers into *Nigerians* and *Nigeriens*, "has become an internalized, commonplace reality for millions of borderline villagers," creating a distinction "not only maintained but reinforced" since independence. His study shows "how effectively national differences can be superimposed upon antecedent ethnic identities and how powerfully boundaries function to reinforce this process."⁵¹

Important religious energies are at work in various locations and whose full implications are poorly understood. In many parts of Africa, there is a formidable proliferation of evangelical Protestant sects under indigenous initiative. On the Islamic side, various currents of reinterpretation are at work. The successor movement to the Muslim Brotherhood has held power in Sudan for the last decade. In Nigeria, in the words of Muslim scholar Sabo Bako, "Religion has been transformed from a non-political issue into a leading volatile political phenomenon," partly mirroring complex conflicts between reformist currents within Islam and older *tariq* (Sufi order) based structures closely tied to the old ruling elite.⁵²

On the ethnic front, a cultural intelligentsia takes its place, devoting its talents to the study, standardization, and literary diffusion of many African languages. These cultural scholars and their counterparts in the domain of popular vernacular literature follow a trail of ethnic entrepreneurship well trodden in other parts of the world. To cite but one example, a modest Dakar bookshop vending written materials in Pulaar (Fulani) has surprising sales figures, serving an audience of modest means. The dedicated labors of those supporting this financially precarious venture draw sustenance from international encour-

agement; UNESCO recently sponsored an international conference dedicated to the nurture and promotion of Pulaar, spoken from Mauritania to Cameroon. Comparable efforts are afoot in other areas.

In the electoral realm, ethnicity and sometimes religion have played some role since the democratic opening. In Kenya, ethnicity offers a weapon deployed by incumbent Daniel Arap Moi to divide his opposition into ineffectiveness.⁵³ In other countries, such as the Central African Republic in 1999, ethno-regional voting clearly operated as the major factor. In still other instances, ethnicity, though visible, was much less pivotal (South Africa 1994 and 1999, Nigeria in 1999). In Ghana in 1997, ethnic bloc voting was overwhelming only in Ewe constituencies, in support of co-ethnic Jerry Rawlings. In yet other cases, ethnic voting was of minor consequence (Senegal, Mali). The only instances in which electoral competition or its prospect severed the bonds of basic communal civility were Algeria, Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo-Brazzaville. In all four cases, violent action taken to set aside actual or prospective democratic outcomes bears the greatest responsibility for the reign of lethal disorder, genocidal in Rwanda and Burundi, which ensued.⁵⁴

VII. State as Remedy: The Challenge of Disorder

A pattern as unexpected as democratization, which is now a defining attribute of African politics at the turn of the century, is the spread and institutionalization of large zones of disorder. Some theaters of endemic civil conflict now extend back decades, especially the internal wars in Sudan and Angola. But these zones of armed combat have in the 1990s spread, interpenetrated, and joined to form a vast arc of disorder which engulfs the entire Horn of Africa, then extends southward to the great lakes region and through both Congos and Angola. A secondary terrain of conflict, recently more quiescent, has extended during the 1990s from Mauritania to Liberia, affecting in particular Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone. All told, about a third of African states are caught up in these conflict zones, whose common thread is the loss of the monopoly on military coercion, at least temporarily.

An allied pattern is a new dynamic of armed power seizure: no longer by a coup at the center, but by insurgent forces from the periphery. Pioneering this pattern was the National Resistance Army led by Yoweri Museveni in Uganda in 1986. Others who followed this exam-

ple were Idriss Deby in Chad in 1990, Isaias Afewerki in Eritrea in 1991, Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia in 1991, Paul Kagame in Rwanda in 1994, Laurent Kabila in Congo-Kinshasa in 1997, and Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997. Beyond these cases, armed operations from the periphery fatally undermined regimes in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. In all cases, there was a marked ethnic coloration to the insurgent elements.

The consequences of such power seizures are profoundly different than those of a coup at the center, which leaves the military instrument intact. The defeat and dissolution of an army disperses fragments into the countryside or neighboring countries, where they may reform into insurgent militia, especially if outside aid is available. Also, much of their armament may vanish into informal markets or remain with the former soldiers. A landmark moment in the dramatic escalation of unofficial arms flows was the disintegration, in 1991, of two of the largest and most abundantly equipped armies in Africa, those of Somalia and Ethiopia.

But dissolved armies are not the only source of the weaponry now widely available. Proliferating militia in the zones of conflict can readily obtain automatic guns, rocket-launchers, and land mines on the international market, especially from the erstwhile Soviet bloc with huge arms stocks and a desperate need for hard currency. In Uganda, government sources suggest that as many as 35,000 AK47s are in the hands of Karamoja pastoral warriors, a fact which has profoundly altered the scale of cattle raiding and the internal dynamics of these societies.⁵⁵ In many countries, such weapons are readily available in black markets, a sharp contrast with the situation in 1960, since the colonial state had effectively disarmed its subjects.

The warlord as visible political actor enters the stage in the 1990s, whose biography is well chronicled by William Reno.⁵⁶ Charles Taylor of Liberia and Jonas Savimbi of Angola are perhaps the prototypes, but they now have a legion of imitators. Warlords, once in control of a high value resource (gold, diamonds, timber, coffee), have developed well-honed mercantile skills, exchanging such assets for arms and supply. The kinds of insurgent operations now encountered in Africa bear little resemblance to the revolutionary maquisards of Algeria, Mozambique, or Vietnam — fish swimming in a sea of peasant supporters. Instead, they have learned to operate freely in zones where they are cordially detested by the populace. Intense antagonism to rebel militia is clearly evident in Uganda with regard to the Lord's Resistance Army

in the north and the Allied Democratic Forces in the west; the *Groupes Islamiques Armés* (GIA) in Algeria; the Cobras, Ninjas, and Zulus in Congo-Brazzaville; and the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* in Congo-Kinshasa. Animosity toward rebel militia, however, cannot be equated with support for the central government, in several of these cases also perceived as hostile to local interests.

Another novel factor explaining the sustainability of insurgency is the existence among its leadership of sophisticated military knowledge. The Congo-Kinshasa rebels of 1964 had only the most rudimentary military skills. In contrast, the Rwandan-led sweep across the country in 1996–1997 was an operational masterpiece. The key leaders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had extensive military experience in the Museveni NRA, during and after its guerrilla stage. The 1998 Congo rebels had not only Rwandan and Ugandan military advisors, but also former officers in the Mobutu army with overseas training. A Malian officer, in a recent research paper, explains why the Tuareg revolt in the 1990s was impossible to repress militarily, in contrast to an uprising in the early 1960s, which was eliminated with considerable brutality. The difference was leadership provided by “Afghans,” veterans of the combat against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s.⁵⁷ The GIA in Algeria had similar elements.

A disconcerting and deadly practice that has crept into recent African insurgent warfare is the deliberate use of child soldiers. Abduction of adolescents for guerrilla combat first came to notice in the practices of the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) during the 1980s.⁵⁸ Such children, isolated from their kin and communities, subject to intimidation and sexual abuse by adult insurgents, compelled to commit violent acts, often incited by drugs and the promise of supernaturally guaranteed immunity to bullets, can become fearsome combatants. Once forced into insurgent camps, they are also aware that their own communities will not welcome them back. Adolescent boys are feared as violent sociopaths, and girls irreparably damaged by sexual abuse and exposure to AIDS.⁵⁹

Insurgent militia can also find a readily recruitable pool of disaffected, unemployed, impoverished youths in the refugee camps and urban slums. The pathologically violent ethno-regional militia that took shape in Congo-Brazzaville in 1993, then reformed in 1997, originated in such milieux. From such combustible forces, former President Pascal Lissouba recruited his “Nibolek” Zulus, later Cocoyes; Brazzaville urban potentate Bernard Kolelas his Lari (Kongo) Ninjas; and past

and present autocrat Sassou-Nguessou his Mbochi Cobras. After first terrorizing and looting Brazzaville in 1993, they returned to street combat in 1997, leading to an officially admitted 10,000 – 15,000 fatalities and vast property destruction. In the somber analysis of a Congolese scholar, the banditry and violence of these ethnic militia, whose social targets include not only communal adversaries but the politician class generally, form part of a pathology which becomes enrooted. Bazenguissa-Ganga concludes:

The process of democratic transition in Congo in the early 1990s had a marked effect in disseminating the use of political violence throughout a large section of society. . . . Hence an analysis of the violence of the period, considered in terms other than as a dysfunctioning of the democratic process, can reveal much about the way in which political practice in Congo has been transformed. This amounts to a redefinition of common social experience and popular conceptions of social status, the true subject of the various conflicts which have been so tragically militarized.⁶⁰

When internal wars persist over time, they tend to generate a proliferation of militia fragments. Governments are tempted to arm their own militia (Kamajors in Sierre Leone, various Khartoum-financed armed groups in southern Sudan, sundry “Mai-Mai” and Hutu refugee groups in Congo-Kinshasa, village paramilitaries in Algeria). The result is a complex pattern of wars within wars, difficult to extinguish.

Yet another novel and dismaying element is the multiplication of private security forces, whose skills are available for rent by hard-pressed governments. A market for mercenaries appeared simultaneously with African independence, initially in Katanga, and periodically elsewhere. But the bundling of arms and private soldiers into corporate form, contracting their combat capabilities and military knowledge, is a phenomenon of the 1990s. It is partly a product of the redundancy of elements of the erstwhile apartheid national security machine. Executive Outcomes is only the most notorious of the new purveyors of military services.

The growing tendency for insurgent militia to operate across borders creates interpenetration of security logics for a number of African states. Senegal was drawn into a costly and fruitless intervention in Guinea-Bissau by its preoccupation with Casamance rebels operating

from that territory. Rwanda and Burundi regimes have morbid fear of the incursions of Hutu militia operating from Congo-Kinshasa. Ugandan dissidents, as well, found sanctuary on the Congo side of the Ruwenzori mountains. This provided the motivation for Rwandan and Ugandan overt backing of the 1996 and 1998 operations to oust Kinshasa regimes accused of tolerating rebel militia. This dynamic reached its paroxysm in the Congo-Kinshasa imbroglio, drawing into its vortex at various points eight foreign armies. The conflicts in the Horn are similarly and intractably intertwined.

VIII. State, Cultural Pluralism, and Political Order: The Road Ahead

The deep fears awakened by the spread of large theaters of disorder brought the issue of stateness squarely back into the center of reflection. The serious weakening of state fabrics, which was a product of the failure of the integral state projects and the prolonged period of economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s, came clearly into view. Policy space now must accord equal priority, along with democratization and accommodation of cultural pluralism, to the quest for an efficacious state, able to guarantee political order and supply basic services to civil society. The challenge is far more arduous than assumed in 1960, or in the initial phases of democratic opening from the late 1980s onward.

In the euphoria accompanying the seeming collapse of patrimonial autocracy at the beginning of the '90s, the scope and implications of state weakening were doubtless underestimated. The long period of economic decline, the decimation of civil service capacities through the radical shriveling of their livelihoods, and the widespread discrediting of the state apparatus as merely predatory, had exacted a heavy price in state capacity. Although, as Przeworski and Fernando document, the possibility of democratization is not determined in some absolute sense by level of development, its sustainability is influenced by low per capita income and the state capacity to bring about tangible improvement.⁶¹ The evidence of three decades of overwhelmingly autocratic governance provides no support for the claim on a necessary return to an authoritarian past. But political liberalization can only succeed in partnership with a restoration of state capacity.

In the world at large, the contemporary moment of the more gracefully acknowledged cultural diversity of civil society has created a global laboratory of political learning. Communal identities in most cases cannot be contained within a purely private realm. But the

resources of statecraft in the accommodation of diversity are considerable.⁶² Beyond the design of electoral systems mentioned earlier, various modalities of power sharing, regional distribution of power or decentralization, cultural sensitivity in language and educational policies, and a rule-of-law state respectful of group and individual dignity, can enable the efficacious state to manage difference. Opening public space to the expression of cultural diversity is not an open invitation to secessionist movements. Indeed, a particularly striking attribute of separatist movements in Africa is their disposition to ground their claims in a territorial rather than an ethnic discourse. The only examples of effective separation are Eritrea and, *de facto*, Somaliland, both restorations of colonial units. Although conventionally explained as rooted in Diola dissatisfactions, on closer inspection of the long-running Casamance dissidence in Senegal, the secession argument rests upon the assertion of a territorial identity of the zone, a notion paradoxically first advanced by French settler interests.⁶³ The same holds true for Katanga, Biafra, and southern Sudan, where sovereignty claims were asserted for a colonial administrative subdivision, even if, as noted earlier, ethnic energies underpinned these demands.

Even in Congo-Kinshasa, where a Weberian state quietly expired sometime in the 1980s and has never been restored, the multiple insurgent factions and their foreign allies all fight over the elusive fiction of a Congolese state. In Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the extended periods of total state collapse were not accompanied by permanent fragmentation, save for the separation of the formerly discrete colonial entity of British Somaliland. Warlords manipulate ethnicity, but are not ethnic entrepreneurs; even in Rwanda and Burundi, where ethnicity has been most explicit in defining conflict, the struggle is for control of an extant state, not remaking the state system.

Thus, in the long pendulum swings between democracy and statelessness, perhaps a new resting-place will emerge. In the terminal colonial period, democracy in the hands of African nationalism was the antidote to the abuses of the autocratic colonial state. In the initial post-colonial era, democracy as value succumbed to the higher claims of the integral state. The utter discredit of the patrimonial autocracy gave rise to an excessive association of economic, then political, liberalization with a subliminal animus toward the state as experienced. The transparent threat posed to an African future of progress by widespread disorder illuminates the urgent need for a reformed and restored stateness. Only a stable synthesis of an Africanized version of

the democratic and constitutional polity can assure the political order indispensable to any economic progress, and the effective accommodation of the cultural diversity which is a defining feature of most African states. ●

Notes

1. For a balanced appraisal of the "new leaders" thesis, see Marina Ottaway, *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
2. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
3. On these tragedies, see *inter alia* Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994); Gerard Prunier, *Rwanda: The History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
4. I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).
5. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic* (February 1994): 44–76.
6. *Ibid.*, 46.
7. At the 1995 White House Conference on Africa, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Vice President Albert Gore, and President Clinton all made reference to the article, deploring its negative tone. Equally noteworthy is that all three had read it.
8. Recollecting the title of the influential work edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
9. The portions of Somalia which do have functioning institutions, Somaliland in the northeast and, to a lesser extent, Puntland, fare better than the stateless zones in the eyes of many observers. Hussein Adam, personal communication.
10. This point resonates throughout the collection of essays evaluating democratization after its first decade assembled by Richard Joseph, ed., *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
11. Cited in R.D. Pearce, *The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy, 1938–1948* (London: Frank Cass, 1982), 23.
12. William B. Cohen, *Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 167.
13. Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 213.
14. John D. Hargreaves, *The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1979), 41.
15. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 402.
16. Jiri Peters, *The Nigerian Military and the State* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 63.

17. For examples, see Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Leroy Vail, ed., *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Jean-Loup Amselle and Elikia M. Bokolo, eds., *Au coeur de l'ethnie: Ethnie, tribalisme et état en Afrique* (Paris: Editions de la Découverte, 1985).
18. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 117.
19. Tony Killick, *Development Economics in Action* (London: Heinemann, 1978).
20. William Graf, *The Nigerian State: Political Economy, State, Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial Era* (London: James Currey, 1988), 205.
21. Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, eds., *Towards Socialism in Tanzania* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 19–45.
22. Sekou Toure, *Towards Full Reafricanization* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1959), 28.
23. Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State*, 288.
24. For abundant detail, see Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).
25. Extracts from the report may be found in Lionel Cliffe, ed., *One Party Democracy: The 1965 Tanzania General Election* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), 438–465.
26. Cited in Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 12.
27. Carl K. Eicher, “Africa’s Food Crisis,” *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Fall 1982): 151–174.
28. Young, *The African Colonial State*, 4.
29. Naomi Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969–1982* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1982), 334–335.
30. Jean-François Bayart, *L’Etat en Afrique: La politique du ventre* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 314–315.
31. Vail, *The Creation of Tribalism*, 2.
32. For evidence, amongst the abundant coverage of both conflicts, see especially A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), and Francis M. Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995).
33. For chilling detail, see Lemarchand, *Burundi*.
34. Aili Mari Tripp, “The Political Mediation of Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Tanzania” in Crawford Young, ed., *The Accommodation of Cultural Diversity: Case-Studies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 44.
35. This useful notion originates in Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens, GA.: University of Georgia Press, 1980).
36. One may note the evolving emphasis in two important collections inspired by Naomi Chazan in 1988 and 1994, each originating in a conference at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem about three years previous; Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988), and John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

37. World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981).
38. For some detail, see Joan M. Nelson, ed., *Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990); Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1993.
39. Subsequently published in Patrick Chabal, ed., *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 17–29.
40. See, for example, my own positive treatment in *Ideology and Development*, 124–141. There was some critical writing from the far left end of the spectrum, and a few skeptical works, but the overall image of what was still known as “the Algerian revolution” remained favorable.
41. See, for example, the article by World Bank official Pierre Landell-Mills, “Governance, Cultural Change, and Empowerment,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (December 1992): 543–567.
42. The writing spawned by the democratic wave is now immense. Let me cite a handful of sources I find particularly useful: Richard Joseph, ed., *State, Conflict, and Democracy*; Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jennifer W. Widner, *Economic and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).
43. Larry A. Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (1996): 20–37.
44. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (1997): 22–43.
45. Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996), 131.
46. Richard Joseph, “The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth Century Africa,” *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*, 57–80.
47. This observation originates with the classic Peter Ekeh article, “Colonialism and the Two Publics: A Theoretical Interpretation,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, no. 2 (1975): 91–112.
48. See the masterful and comprehensive examination of electoral systems in culturally plural countries by Ben Reilly and Andrew Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999).
49. See the engaging intellectual history of this analytical school in Francisco J. Gil-White, “How Thick Is Blood? The Plot Thickens . . . : if Ethnic Actors Are Primordialists, What Remains of the Circumstantialist/Primordialist Controversy?” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 5 (September 1999): 799–820.
50. For analysis of these analytical schools and their sources, see Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1998); Crawford Young, ed., *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).

51. William F.S. Miles, *Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 1, 19.
52. Sabo Bako, "Muslims, State, and the Struggle for Democratic Transition in Nigeria: From Cooperation to Conflict," in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, eds., *Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1998), 284. See also, Umar M. Birai, "Islamic Tajdid and the Political Process in Nigeria," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 184–203.
53. For detail, see Joel Barkan and Njuguna Ng'ethe, "Kenya Tries Again," in Larry Diamond and Marc N. Plattner, eds., *Democratization in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 184–200.
54. This point is argued in greater detail in Crawford Young, "Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Democracy in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 63–79.
55. Mustafa Mirzeler and Crawford Young, "Pastoral Politics in the Northeast Periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as Change Agent," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, forthcoming, 2000.
56. William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
57. Lt. Col. Kalifa Keita, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 1998.
58. Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence* (Athens, Oh.: Ohio University Press, 1997).
59. See the eloquent testimonials by former Sierra Leone child soldiers in Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, "Youths in Sierra Leone: 'Why We Fight,'" *Africa* 68, no. 2 (1998): 183–210. See also, Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," *African Affairs* 98 (1999): 5–36, and Robert Gersony, "The Agony of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field-Based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda," (Kampala: USAID, 1997).
60. Remy Bazenbuissa-Ganga, "The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville," *African Affairs* 98 (1999): 54.
61. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 155–183.
62. See the various essays in Crawford Young, ed., *Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Inquiry* (London: Macmillan, 1998). See also the evidence supplied by Ted Robert Gurr showing that ethnic warfare across the world has decreased in the 1990s, a remarkable development he attributes to political learning, in "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 3 (2000): 52–64.
63. See the intriguing evidence provided by Michael Lambert, "Casamance: Ethnicity or Nationalism?" *Africa* 68, no. 4 (1998): 585–602.