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# Gus Kripke Wittgenstein Minds on on on

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"Gus Kripke Wittgenstein Minds on on on"

In his postscript, "Wittgenstein and Other Minds," Saul Kripke portrays Wittgenstein as holding a somewhat rare brand of skepticism about the possibility of discovering other minds. He claims Wittgenstein is adopting a position very much like the skeptical Hume-Lichtenberg view of the subject: not denying minds outright, but doubting "the very *meaningfulness* of the ascription of sensations to others" (Kripke, 126). Further, Kripke claims that Wittgenstein seems to be "...doubtful that we could *have* any 'belief' in other minds, and their sensations, that ought to be justified" (Kripke, 116). Kripke later explains that this view supposes a high degree of uncertainty about the existence of other minds, and suggests that an awareness of one's own mind is problematic, if not impossible (Kripke, 134). On the surface, this seems a strange position for anyone to hold. As Descartes so adamantly argued, that "I" exist seems to follow indisputably from the fact that I think, doubt, walk, talk, or do anything. Further, for Wittgenstein specifically, this position would be problematic if he is arguing--as he is frequently taken to be--that the meaning of terms is determined by the collective act of sensible and subjective individuals using these terms. It would be strange to claim that a group of non-existent entities could do anything, let alone determine linguistic meaning. If Wittgenstein is really skeptical about the existence of other subjective entities, it would be an odd argument that a group of them determine the meaning of language by their use.

Despite this apparent tension between the view which Kripke is attributing to Wittgenstein (which I will call HL or subjectivity skepticism) and inter-subjective use-determined meaning (which is quite commonly attributed to Wittgenstein), Kripke presents considerable evidence to support his view that Wittgenstein is sympathetic to Humean/skeptical view. Nonetheless, the tension is substantial and poses several problems for Kripke's interpretation. Kripke himself, however, has been misled by the problem. The belief which fuels the tension between HL and inter-subjective use-determined meaning is the feeling that claims about subjective events either require or presuppose a metaphysical justification of the subject's existence. This is itself misguided and conflicts with Wittgenstein's overall theory. The solution, which Kripke has missed, can only be attained by joining with Wittgenstein and fully discarding the practice of equating first-person experience with the meaning of any term, including those describing subjective states. Wittgenstein is not skeptical of subjective selves in the way one might be skeptical of unicorns or jackelopes, as it seems Kripke suggests, but rather of justifying inference about selves and subjective states within one's self.

I will argue that, as Kripke suggests, Wittgenstein does in fact hold a view of selves very much like that of Hume and Lichtenberg. Further, this view not only does not undermine his argument for public determination of meaning, but is actually used as a supporting premise of that very argument. Yet, where I will differ from Kripke is in the depth of skepticism that I will attribute to Wittgenstein. In several passages,

Kripke seems to forget that for Wittgenstein all words, including those which describe mental states, should be taken first and foremost as terms in a particular language game. Occasionally Kripke seems to suggest that Wittgenstein means to be advancing a particular philosophy of mind and should be read as using the words to refer directly to the inner sensations they name. Having made that move, it is understandable that he seems drawn back to the conclusion that Wittgenstein is illustrating another paradox of understanding. This is not to say Kripke is guilty of this misinterpretation throughout this section of his book. I believe that Kripke, following in the spirit of the rule-following paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein, tends to attribute an overly skeptical view of other minds to Wittgenstein. The specific level of agreement between Kripke and myself, however, is only of accidental importance; for regardless of Kripke's position, I will make my own argument for the following claim: HL is a good basis for interpreting the *Investigations,* but within that framework, the less skepticism about minds and mental events, the more accurate the interpretation. Further, I will illustrate how this approach can and should rule out both crude behaviorism and solipsism as correct interpretations for Wittgenstein's private language argument.

As I suggested earlier, the view of selfhood that Kripke correctly ascribes to Wittgenstein can best be understood as a version of the position originally argued for by David Hume. Hume's position is generally regarded as a skeptical one because of his adamant objection to Descartes' seemingly indisputable *cogito* argument. This may at first seem an impossible position to defend, but with closer examination we can quickly find its merits. Taking a version of the cogito as " 'my ego' thinks" we find it does follow that " 'my ego' exists." While this does follow very matter of factly, it also follows very trivially. What exactly is this ego whose existence thinking has confirmed? What are its properties? One might hope to round out this *a priori* argument for the ego with some *a posteriori* evidence about its character; yet, here is where Hume's insight plays its role. No experience presents the subject of that experience. To understand why this is the case, one need only imagine trying to take a picture of the lens of the camera he/she was using, or perhaps a nice shot of the shutter door or the film-winding spools. Wittgenstein himself offers a number of such analogies of the impossibility of catching the subject in that subject's own inter-subjective experience in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [TLP].* This view is expressed in the section beginning with 5.62 and continuing to 5.6331 (*TLP,* 57). Similarly, Wittgenstein associates life with the entirety of the world and death with the end of it in sections 6.431 and 6.4311 (*TLP,* 72). Perhaps the best exposition of this view, however, is given by the illustration in section 5.6331:

> 5.6331    For the form of the visual field is surely not like this
> (*TLP,* 57):

Eye —

Here the analogy is very much like the one I presented with the camera. We cannot focus on our peripheral vision, nor can we get a good look at the inside of our iris. In fact, (without mirrors) our own eyes are not visible to us at all.

Wittgenstein carries this skepticism of "perceiving one's own consciousness" into the *Philosophical Investigations [PI]* as well. In section 417 he discusses both the futility and meaninglessness of observing one's own consciousness. He states:

> Do I observe myself, then, and perceive that I am seeing or conscious? And why talk about observation at all? Why not simply say "I perceive I am conscious"? --But what are the words "I perceive" here for?--why not say "I am conscious"?--But don't the words "I perceive" here shew that I am attending to my consciousness?--which is ordinarily not the case.--If so, then the sentence "I perceive I am conscious" does not say that I am conscious, but that my attention is disposed in such-and-such a way.
> But isn't it a particular experience that occasions my saying "I am conscious again"?--*What* experience? In what situations do we say it? (*PI* #417, 125)

Wittgenstein's own emphasis on *"What* experience" reaffirms his denial, a special act of directing one's consciousness towards itself. These observations, like Hume's criticism, draw attention to the peculiarity of the claim in the cogito. As a result, we are in fact left with a rather queer conclusion. We might grant that something exists, but what is it? It seems to be a totally non-descript something,[1] or as Wittgenstein says in the *Investigations*, "it is not a something, but it is not a nothing either!"

Kripke claims that this view of the self is not only evident in the *Tractatus*, but even more explicit in the *Investigations* and the writings, letters, and conversations leading up to it. While I cannot be sure about the writings, letters, and conversations, we can test his claim against the *Investigations*. He claims that HL suggests why "imaging someone else's pain on the model of one's own" is "none too easy a thing to do":

> We are supposed to imagine another entity, similar to "me"--
> another "soul," "mind" or "self"--that has a toothache *just like*

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[1] If the ego could be anything, could it be everything? Perhaps this strange sort of universal introduction is what gives rise to passages 5.63 ("I am my world"), 5.621 ("The world and life are one"), and 6.431 ("So too at death the world does not alter, but come to an end"), all of which seem solipsistic and out of character for an argument whose first and only premise is that language is determinate. How might this be the case? For any experience I might choose to examine, my existence follows equally trivially from all of them, and from no one of them particularly. As a result, the best candidate to receive the first-person pronoun name may be the entirety of the experience.

this toothache, except that it (he/she?) "has" it, just as "I have" this one. All this makes little sense, given the Humean critique of the notion of the self that Wittgenstein accepts. I have no idea of a "self" in my own case, let alone a generic concept of a "self" that in addition to "me" includes "others." ...What are we supposed to abstract from this situation to form our concept of an event which is like the given paradigm case of "it toothaches," except that the toothache is not "mine," but "someone else's"? (Kripke, 125)

Wittgenstein aggressively defends this claim that mental concepts like "pain" cannot be extrapolated from the personal case to a general case. As Kripke suggests, Wittgenstein does hold a view with much in common to HL. Beginning with a discussion of the private element of reading in 376 and continuing into the 400s with a discussion of the *"concept* 'pain' " (*PI* #384, 118), Wittgenstein attacks the possibility of inferences "from my own case." In many of these sections, his interlocutor attempts to argue that private mental sensations are images in one's mind, which one can in turn, imagine being in other minds. While the interlocutor attempts to explain what this process is like, Wittgenstein continues to bash the interlocutor's alleged ability to "imagine" mental processes. He brings light to the impossibility of grasping the *objective* sense of *one's own* mental images[2] and the subsequent difficulties for the interlocutor's position. Wittgenstein addresses this difficulty in section 386:

> The difficulty is not that I doubt whether I really imagine anything red. But it is *this*: that we should be able, just like that, to point out or describe the colour we have imagined, that the translation of the image into reality presents no difficulty at all. Are they so alike that one might mix them up? ... [C]an I ask: "What does a correct image of this color look like?" or "What sort of thing is it?"; can I *learn* this?
>
> (I cannot accept his testimony because it is not *testimony*. It only tells me what he is *inclined* to say.) (*PI* #386, 118)

He further asks in 388, "How do I know from my *image*, what the colour really looks like?" The problem for the interlocutor is that the act of imagining does not serve as the kind of method of projection his argument would require. This is because the image being imagined (in the case of 388, the color red, and in sections 392 and 393, the feeling of pain) is not sufficiently clear without some form of public expression: " `When I imagine that someone who is laughing is really in pain, I don't imagine

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[2] The above-quoted section #417 is also relevant here. In that section Wittgenstein questions both the act of focusing one's own attention on one's own conscious state, and one's ability to derive meaning from that act. In the following sections, he denies that direct perception alone can provide objective meaning to subjective terms like "pain" and "red.

any pain-behavior, for I see just the opposite. So *what* do I imagine?'... I do not necessarily imagine *my* being in pain" (*PI* #393, 118-125). Throughout the *Investigations* he is unwilling to concede even the possibility of finding the correct use of a concept or term by projecting a personal experience on others via the imagination.

Further, HL, which illustrates why abstracting a general concept from a personal instance is impossible, provides the necessary presupposition to the "5 o'clock on the sun" analogy presented in section 350, as well as the "earth below me" analogy in 351, and the explanation of the naming process of pain described in 257. Most directly, however, this view also offers a natural explanation of the above mentioned 5 o'clock on the sun analogy. Section 350 reads as follows:

> "But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had."--That gets us no further. It is as if I were to say: "You surely know what 'It is 5 o'clock here' means; so you also know what 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock."--The explanation by means of *identity* does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there "the same time," but what I want to know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and there (*PI* #350, 111).

To assert that it is a particular time of day on the sun is to confuse the standard of interpretation with that which is being interpreted. In a similar fashion, if I were to try to infer a concept of pain from myself and apply it as a generic concept, I cannot help but confuse the standard case with my own case, for I have no information about the particular relationship I hold with my experience. I also have nothing to compare it to. Thus, I am both the standard of measurement and that which is being measured.

It is important to note that these arguments against personal case abstraction are of considerable importance to the private language argument as a whole. If it were the case that mental terms could be apprehended by an individual and then later applied to others, then the meaning of those terms would have private origins. Rather than having the use of the term fix the meaning of these terms, as he argues, the private sensation could fix their meaning. In recognizing HL's insight that mental events are not themselves directly apprehended, however, Wittgenstein has good reason to be skeptical of one's ability to learn terms in this fashion. Thus, accepting Wittgenstein's belief in HL, we have a natural explanation for not only the impetus to reject a sort of Cartesian view of the origins of meaning and certainty, but consequently for the private language argument as a whole.

Since this view is in such clear contrast with a number of philosophical explanations of minds and selves which, like the Cartesian view, use extrapolation from one's own case as the basis to justify ascribing particular mental states to others, one might be tempted to believe that holding HL entails some version of a behavioristic or solipsistic view of the mind, which does not rely on such extrapolations. Kripke certainly seems to think so. He claims:

I think that it is at least in part because of this kind of consideration [HL] that Wittgenstein was so much concerned with the appeal of solipsism, and of the behavioristic idea that to say of someone else that he has a toothache is simply to make a statement about his behavior. When he considers the adoption of Lichtenberg's subjectless sensation language, attributing of sensations to others gives way to expressions like "The body A is behaving similarly to the way X behaves when it pains," where "X" is a name for what I would ordinarily call "my body" (Kripke, 125).

It seems Kripke is suggesting that Wittgenstein, in believing HL, cannot help but advocate either a behaviorist or solipsist position by claiming that public expression define mental states. Kripke goes on to describe Wittgenstein as passing into a "verificationist phase," in which he describes Wittgenstein as finding it "...hard to avoid the conclusion that since behavior is our sole method of verifying attributions of sensations to others, the behaviorist formulation is all that I can mean when I make such an attribution." This interpretation may seem further strengthened by Wittgenstein's general argument that everything must have a public expression to be meaningful (*PI* #398, 120-121). Wittgenstein, however, speaks for himself on the subject of solipsism and behaviorism. In section 420 he denies even the possibility of imagining the solipsist position, saying: "--the idea is perhaps a little uncanny. But just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, say!" (*PI* #420, 126). His disownership of behaviorism is often even more explicit. First, in section 244 he states that pain does not mean the same thing as its corresponding behavior (*PI* #244, 89), then in section 306 he agrees that it would be absurd to deny mental events and in 307 responds specifically to the charge that he is a behaviorist as follows:

> 307. "Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren't you at the bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?" --If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction (*PI* #306 and 307, 102-103).

Taking him at his word, I believe we can safely conclude that if HL is a view of minds that does in fact entail either solipsism or behaviorism, Wittgenstein would not accept it as a part of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

The tension in this interpretation is apparent. How can Kripke be correct in his attribution of HL to Wittgenstein, as I believe he is, without attributing inconsistent claims to Wittgenstein? The most immediate answer is to reject HL as a view expressed in the *Investigations*. I have attempted to take this position quite seriously, but I believe that it provides such a natural explanation for Wittgenstein's rejection of abstraction of mental entities from self to others (as I argued above, based on sections 350, 386, 388, and 393) that such a position would be unfortunate. I believe this tension, however, is the result of an inappropriate insistence that

Wittgenstein must follow the naive consequences of HL. Instead, I will attempt to show that neither solipsism nor behaviorism need follow from the demand for the public expressability of concepts explained by HL; the feeling that they do follows from a misreading of Wittgenstein by Kripke, and not from HL itself.

The mistake begins by attributing the statement "the body A is behaving similarly to the way X behaves when it pains" (Kripke, 125) to Wittgenstein. I believe that this passage represents a slight misapplication by Kripke of the lesson learned from passages 350 and 302. While Wittgenstein may have been concerned with solipsism and behaviorism, I believe he has in fact found a way out for himself with the view of language he is presenting in the *Investigations*. Kripke does not think so. Of Wittgenstein's position, he states: "This is a crude behaviorist ersatz for imagining the sensations of others on the model of my own: attributing a sensation to A in no way says that something is happening that resembles what happens when I am in pain (or, rather, when it pains)" (Kripke, 125). I have a difficult time making sense of this statement. The suggestion in this passage seems to be that awareness of one's own private sensation of "pain" is important to the meaning of the term. Although I cannot imagine the pain of others, what pain *is* is what I feel. This would make pain a private term, and, excepting Wittgenstein's rejection of private language, it would make the term meaningless. This interpretation would go beyond crude behaviorism all the way to solipsism.

As a result, I believe Kripke's perplexing statement would be better formed as a conditional statement: "If I am to imagine the sensation of others (if that is somehow important to the meaning of sensation language) on the model of my own experience, then I am left with a crude behaviorist ersatz." It seems to me Kripke has himself explained exactly why imagining someone else's pain from that of "my own" pain is at worst impossible and at best the wrong approach. He states: "I have no idea of a 'self' in my own case, let alone a generic concept of a 'self' that in addition to 'me' includes 'others' " (Kripke, 121). I find this latter explanation, that one cannot imagine someone else's pain from their own case, all the more irresistible since I read it as being directly related to Wittgenstein's own claim in 302 that if one must imagine from his/her own experience, he/she is in for a hard time (*PI* #302, 101). Now, if we are to believe Wittgenstein's private language arguments at all, the statement becomes trivial. I do not, and cannot, imagine a sensation of others from the model of my own experience. Moreover, it is not important. Wittgenstein makes this claim quite consistently throughout the *Investigations*. Keeping with the "freeing the fly from the fly bottle" spirit of the private language argument, Wittgenstein is attempting to show why these concerns are poorly founded.

The temptation to which I believe Kripke succumbs is to take HL out of the context of the private language argument as a whole and treat it as a premise in its own argument about the existential status of minds and mental objects. One might think, naively, that because the Cartesian view of meaning posited the reality of mental states, then HL, a view skeptical of the Cartesian claim, must be denying the reality of such states. Further, the difference between "x is y" and "x fixes the meaning of y" is easy to overlook, especially when expressed in the following way: "Pain is pain behavior" and "pain means pain behavior." In this light, it seems correct to attribute "a crude behaviorist ersatz for imagining the sensations of others

on the model of my own..." (Kripke, 125) to Wittgenstein, as Kripke does. Further, the subject of the experience seems extraneous. It seems natural to see Wittgenstein as being skeptical of the *existence* (not merely the meaning) of both subjective states and the first person authors of those states. We are left with a "crude" (as Kripke describes it) behaviorist formulation. Pain must exist in an subjectless fashion: "pain exists" in the body A when "the body A is behaving similarly to the way X behaves when it pains" (*ibid.*).

While interesting and perhaps even compelling in its own right, this is not Wittgenstein's position. While it may be that the subject of a particular sensation is not of particular importance to the meaning of the name of the sensation, this fact alone need not lead to skepticism about the existence of such a subject. It is important to remember that the *Investigations* advances a theory of language, and not a science of the psyche. The latter, which Kripke believes is akin to Wittgenstein's position, is fundamentally different in character from the former. Scientific verification is generally an empirical matter; for Wittgenstein, verification dependent on grammar. In section 353 Wittgenstein states: "Asking whether or not a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking 'How d'you mean?' The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition" (*PI* #353, 112). Associating verification of a proposition with grammar is considerably different from the kind of verification generally accepted in the sciences. Behaviorism, especially in its early stages, is no exception. While young behaviorism carefully crafts its ontology to fit its empirical subject matter, ontology *is* Wittgenstein's subject matter. For Wittgenstein, the task is examining all words in an attempt to discover how they become associated with their meanings. For the Behaviorist, only the words which describe his/her data are useful. The Behaviorist of the Lichtenbergian sort has a relatively, and deliberately, limited ontology: If the word does not refer to empirical data, then it does not exist in the behaviorist universe of discourse. Thus, "mind" and mental terms like "pain" will exist in the behaviorist discourse *only if* the referents of the terms have empirical consequences; the meanings of the terms *are* those empirical consequences. Wittgenstein's universe of discourse is larger. Any word that the public uses has some meaning associated with it. "Mind" and "pain" are certainly terms used by the public, and as such, must have some meaning. Thus, for Wittgenstein, in some sense, minds and pains must exist: They have a use. They are their use.

The distinction between a Behaviorist ontology, which may or may not include minds, and Wittgenstein's ontology, which must include them, is easily muddled by the repercussions of Wittgenstein's assertion that all linguistic terms are "public." Kripke suggests that "publicly verifiable" is the same (or at least could, in theory, be the same) as scientific verification. This would make Wittgenstein's view very much like a Behaviorist view. Working our way back through Wittgenstein's position, we can see this similarity, and perhaps how Kripke has arrived at his misinterpretation. While Wittgenstein is not arguing that the existence of pain demands that it be verified by scientifically measurable behavior, he is claiming that the meaning or referent of "pain" cannot be something in a subjective consciousness. This must be the case because all language, and thus these terms too, must be public. This is further established by section 305, in which he addresses the issue explicitly:

"But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place."--What gives the impression that we want to deny anything? ...The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the "inner process." What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember." We say this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the world as it is (*PI* #305, 102).

It is important to note, however, that scientific empirical data is a more restrictive set of visible phenomena then the set of all events that people might discuss. Some of these "non-scientific" descriptions of events may even have falsifiable conditions. One such example is the expression, "love is in the air." This is an expression most English speakers have heard, but certainly not an expression of a scientific sort. Although no scientist has ever found the stuff "love" in the nitrogen and oxygen mixture colloquially known as air, most who have heard this expression have an idea of what it means and under what conditions it is a true statement. We certainly know when it is false. If an English soldier in the trenches of World War I were to say, "it looks like love is in the air," sarcasm would immediately be understood. In that case, love is NOT in the air. Because this is a publicly used expression in English, English speakers know what it means even if no formal scientific theory can handle it.

Clearly Wittgenstein is aware of this non-scientific, yet meaningful, possibility of language, as a considerable portion of the *Philosophical Investigations* is dedicated to this very point. In fact, *PI* is probably the first, most important, and most articulate expression of the possibility of different language games. The beginning of the *Investigations* is the beginning of the now famous language game discussion. In section 3 Wittgenstein takes St. Augustine's description of the world as an example of a distinct language game. He describes the "appropriate," but "narrowly circumscribed region" of discourse in which an Augustinian system of communication has meaning. Both Scientific language, which relies on a strict methodology to determine the truth conditions of its statements, and colloquial talk of love and good feelings, which relies only on common experiences, fit the Augustinian example. Both offer "an appropriate description," but each in their own area. We would not expect to find love on the periodic table of elements, and (despite what eliminative materialists might claim) we would not want to use terms like PbNO4 or NaCl to describe our moods.

Thus, when Wittgenstein adopts the subjectivity skepticism of HL, he is not so skeptical of mental objects that he wishes to deny their existence in an ontological sense; rather, he denies that they are always publicly observable. Therefore, they cannot serve as the referent of any term in a language. A term such as "pain" is defined by the use of the word, rather than by either little neuronal sparks in the head or manifest behaviors. For the philosophical behaviorists of Wittgenstein's day like Watson or Lichtenberg, however, mental terms needed to be epistemologically clear enough to carry the weight of an objective/scientifically defined name to secure existential status for the objects they name. This is in further conflict with

Wittgenstein's view, as expressed in the *PI*, that a tight name/object relationship is not a universal fact of linguistic terms. In fact, he argues at some length that terms whose meanings are tied to objects are but one kind of linguistic expression; and, èven in those cases, the meaning does not equate objects with names, it is a serendipitous consequence of the use of that term.[3] Though Wittgenstein and Watson might agree that pains and other subjective terminology cannot be effectively studied through introspection, the linguistically reductionist behaviorist agenda is not Wittgenstein's. Wittgenstein is concerned with all language as it is, not with language as it might be bent to fit a young science. He is not a behaviorist.

Thus, when considered in the proper light, we see Wittgenstein is not using the insights of HL to deny the existence of minds and mental events; he is only denying one's ability to abstract objective meaning from the existence of these subjective states. This in itself, however, does not seem to answer the question specifically raised by Kripke: *Are there really minds or not?* Wittgenstein's answer is, "How d'you mean?" If the question is, do English speakers know what is being talked about when someone uses "mind" in a sentence like "I have a lot on my mind," or "she is intelligent and strong-minded," then the answer is, of course they do. If the questions is, what element are minds made up of, or what causal efficacy do minds have, then we may find that we are using the term in the wrong domain. This does not mean we need to be skeptical about the "TRUE" and "REAL" existence of minds. Just as the belief in the existence of love is not contingent on a chemist's examination of the air, the existence of minds need not be contingent on a behaviorist's lab report. I suggest that we join with Wittgenstein and briefly contemplate the peculiarity of the assertion that there are no other minds:

> Suppose I say of a friend: "He isn't an automaton".--What information is conveyed by this, and to whom would it be information? To a *human being* who meets him in ordinary circumstances? What information *could* it give him?...
> "I believe he is not an automaton," just like that, so far makes no sense (*PI*, II, iv, 178).

Wittgenstein suggests that this is simply not a problem which confronts most human beings. And isn't that just correct?

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[3] While there is no singular section that best surmises this position, it is entailed by Wittgenstein's lengthy argument against Augustinian-type ostensible descriptions of language and Frege's idea that every assertion contains an assumption (*PI* #1-35, 2-17).

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