The Political Economy of American Military Aid and Repression

Lukas Matthews
Macalester College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/87

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
The Political Economy of American Military Aid and Repression

Lukas Matthews       Advisor: Lisa Mueller       Political Science

May 1, 2019
Contents

1 Introduction 7

2 Regression Analysis 19

3 Process Tracing Analysis 35

4 Conclusion 59

5 Appendix 67

All footnotes and citations are hyper-referenced in electronic form.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC African National Congress (South Africa)
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Sahel)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency—United States of America
CIRI In reference to Cignarelli and Richards; a dataset of human rights abuses between 1981 and 2011.
DAC Development Assistance Committee (only includes European members in this analysis)
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambique Liberation Front
GWOT Global War on Terror
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OAU The Organisation of African Unity
PTS Political Terror Scale
RENAMO Resistência Nacional de Moçambique, Mozambique National Resistance
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TIV Trade indicator value; a metric developed by SIPRI
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USSR Soviet Union
Matthews Thesis

Figure 1: A contemporary map of Africa, to provide context for current military aid, repression, and geographical location of the case studies. All visual creations are the author’s own.
Chapter 1

Introduction

"There are no opponents in Zaire, because the notion of opposition has no place in our mental universe. In fact, there are no political problems in Zaire."

– Mobutu Sese Soko

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union sent military equipment and personnel to what was then the Congo–farther than it had ever sent aid before. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union after a United Nations peacekeeping force proved incapable and uninterested in expelling Belgian paratroopers from resource-rich provinces of the country. Support arrived too late to stop the worst of the violence, and the Soviet presence was criticized by the army and President Kasavubu for being too propagandistic. Two provinces seceded with the support of Belgium; combined with Lumumba’s expulsion from the cabinet, all signs suggested that partitioning of the country was imminent. Just months after independence, the Congo seemed poised to fragment and lose its potential as the star of Central Africa (Wrong 2001).

Enter Joseph Mobutu, Lumumba’s former secretary during the independence negotiations and now Army Chief of Staff. He had Kasavubu and Lumumba removed from office to give them time to settle their differences. Soviet personnel were given 48 hours to leave. Meanwhile, the responsibility and urgency of completely removing Lumumba from political office shifted from Congolese operatives to the United States Central Intelligence Agency
Ordered to poison Lumumba, CIA agents faltered, but eventually a Belgian pilot and firing squad flew Lumumba into an opposition stronghold, shot him, then dismembered and dissolved his body in acid. American, Belgian, and British insistence on setting up the right man to lead the Congo emboldened Mobutu to rule the country as a military dictator for thirty-two years \cite{Wrong2001}. However, American support for Mobutu was contingent on access to the country’s vast mining and rubber operations, and as a staging ground for American and French intelligence operations throughout the region \cite{Hochschild1999}. Mobutu was undoubtedly emboldened by the dual purpose of his mandate: to lead the Congo for the Congolese and to intertwine Congolese and American interests.

Mobutu’s loyalty to his Western supporters was well-documented in his many visits to Washington D.C. and Europe. Even more striking than his tailor-made leopard skin hat was how warm and amicable Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were towards one of America’s "most valued friends" \cite{Hochschild1999}. United States aid was continuous throughout Mobutu’s rule, but so were Mobutu’s constant demands for the torture and assassination of political opponents, and diversion of Congolese wealth towards his own enrichment \cite{Wrong2001}. The exploitation of Congo’s resources for personal luxury produced uncanny parallels between Mobutu and his predecessor, King Leopold of Belgium \cite{Hochschild1999}.

Mobutu’s ascendancy to power in Congo is one particular case of American military involvement, but the story seems to be one in a pattern rather than an extreme incident. American military involvement is frequently connected to adverse political outcomes worldwide. Domestic legitimacy in the Congo was deeply compromised as a result of covert American and Belgian operations. But what happens in lower-profile, direct assistance that the United States Armed Forces and Intelligence branches provide? Are there different observable implications, and more importantly, might American aid have more dire consequences if government legitimacy is already compromised? This thesis addresses one hypothesis: that American military aid is directly correlated with repression. This introduction provides
opening remarks on the puzzle, hypothesis, causal mechanisms, and methodologies of this analysis.

1.1 The Argument

I hypothesize that the more American military aid a country receives, the more likely its incumbents are to adopt repressive policies in later years. Many incumbents worldwide observably rely on external legitimacy to support their administrations while frequently prioritizing the interests of external stakeholders over security and well-being of their citizens (Chabal, 2002; Turner, 2002; Adam, 2002; Honwana, 2002; Mueller and Matthews, 2016). Regardless of the degree to which the government provides security and services to citizens, international actors are all too willing to support regimes that lack domestic legitimacy (Mampilly, 2011; Englebert, 2009; Kakande, 2018). The United States currently receives the most criticism for this unconditional support because of its oversized global involvement in recent decades. While support may be philanthropic (MacQueen, 1997; Newitt, 2002; Wood and Wright, 2016), a more cynical group of scholars identify most aid—including humanitarian aid—as a strategic investment meant to influence incumbents in the recipient country. Similarly, analyses of the struggle for Cold War domination between the United States and Soviet Union reveal the extent to which each country’s exercise of productive power shaped world events for forty years (Lukes, 2004; Fischer, 2010; Ikenberry, 2010; Gleijeses, 2010; Roseberg, 2010; Costigliola, 2010; Savranskaya and Taubman, 2010; Latham, 2010). Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been the world’s only military superpower, dramatically outspending and outmaneuvering its wartime foes—real or imaginary—for nearly three decades. The power of American security agendas to influence incumbent success or demise has been documented throughout the Global War on Terror (Smith, 2010; Kinsella, 2011; Devji, 2008; Keenan, 2009; Paull, 1982).

This argument is based on two categories of related studies. The first set find that inde-
dependent variables similar to American military aid also result in observable repression. These related independent variables include foreign direct investment [Kishi, Maggio and Raleigh 2017] and foreign friendly or peacekeeping military involvement [Peksen 2012; Dube and Naidu 2015]. The authors find a positive and significant association between their respective independent variables and an increase in repression (operationalized as human rights abuses). The second set of studies, although seemingly unrelated to American military aid, suggest that increases in repression can be attributed to causes as disparate as a rapid growth in youth population to the occurrence of a natural disaster and associated humanitarian aid [Urdal 2006; Das 2017; Wood 2008; Wood and Wright 2016]. Even in previous analyses that make a direct association with some form of military engagement and increased repression, macroeconomic controls including GDP and oil rents per capita are included because of their demonstrated correlation and causality with repression [Ross 2013]. One could reasonably argue that this relationship may work in reverse—that observable increases in human rights violations might result in increased American military aid—and in some cases, it might. By examining the natural sequence of events leading to increased repression in three process tracing analyses, I demonstrate strong evidence that my hypothesized order is more plausible than not.

This analysis does not intend to distract from other, alternative explanations for repression. As I see it, the central contribution is to introduce and provide evidence for the causal explanations and magnitude of this particular relationship. Few analyses have proposed that a series of causal mechanisms leads American military aid to result in an observable increase in repression. While several of the above studies have demonstrated the utility of statistical methods to estimate the relationship of their respective variables to repression, none have tested the magnitude of the effect of American military aid on repression. Inserting this analysis within decades of studies on the United States military and repression worldwide represents a needed effort to incorporate contributions from security studies, peace studies, and human rights analyses that can act in concert.
1.2 Theorizing main variables

Repression

Repression is the act of subduing someone by institutional or physical force in order to more readily fulfill a political objective (Gibney et al., 2017; deMeritt, 2016). Because physical force is more visible, major indexes of repression primarily document what are called physical integrity violations–torture, unlawful detention, and extrajudicial killings. These rights are protected under common law, meaning that state and non-state actors are expected to not violate them, regardless of whether or not they have ratified major international humanitarian covenants. Conversely, when force is applied vis-à-vis institutions, there is no common law to prevent the repression of civil rights. The only civil liberty protected under common law is that of religious freedom or expression. Otherwise, protections for journalists and protesters are not universally guaranteed, even if there are negative consequences for government actors that do violate these rights.

Governments opt to repress because they wish to survive or so that they can implement policy preferences without challenge (deMeritt, 2016). Two core findings are central to studies of repression: internal dissent incentivizes state repression, and repression varies with domestic institutions (deMeritt, 2016). From here, we can ask such questions as: At what level of dissent will an incumbent opt for repression? Why would incumbents in democracies use different repressive tactics than incumbents in autocracies? Although the level of repression can be used to categorize regime type, the reverse is consistently more accurate. Repression is more costly in a democracy than an autocracy, because citizens in a democracy have established other avenues–namely, participating in governance and contesting incumbent decisions–to challenge the state and protect civil liberties (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). DeMeritt also provides evidence for the hypothesis that repression peaks in the middle of these two regime types. Citizens of democracies will dispose of repressive agents through existing institutions, while citizens of autocracies are less likely to challenge
repression because doing so is more costly (deMeritt, 2016). In the middle, it is equally likely that repressive agents are booted from office or citizens are completely subordinated to the repressive state.

Recognizing an observable act of repression is not difficult; what can be difficult is measuring and exhaustively operating the magnitude of repression, even if it is visible. Coding even one instance of repression can be challenging. Witnesses may not remember information clearly, or the only witnesses may be the victims or perpetrators of an abuse. If the event is a killing or disappearance, then the only witnesses are the perpetrators. As such, many indexes are not based on event-count measures but rather on qualitative reports of existing practices and conditions (deMeritt, 2016). This lends itself to an ordinal approach, wherein information from data points is characterized in terms of more or less relative to other data points. Social scientists also utilize ordinal measures for categorizing non-countable, conceptual events such as freedom of movement or women’s economic rights (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). Ordinal measures introduce the coder’s own subjective impression of general information. Without particular, specialized knowledge of a concept or context, the coder may erroneously introduce variation by not controlling for their own subjectivity. The principal limitation of this ordinal category approach to indexing repression is that it cannot hold up when considering dynamic hypotheses about the potentially endogenous relationship between repression and dissent. Thus, I balance the limitations of measuring repression quantitatively with process tracing, a qualitative supplement.

American Military Aid

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2017 American military expenditure was valued at $610 billion, the largest in the world and greater than the next eight country’s expenditures combined. The value of American arms exports in 2016 was valued at $10 billion, and the total sum between 1976 and 2016 was $433 trillion dollars. In the same period, annual military assistance provided through the United States
Agency for International Development ranged from a few hundred dollars to $13 trillion (Vietnam in 1973). Although these figures establish the US as a uniquely influential military aid donor, I will further differentiate American aid from two other donors, the European Union and the People’s Republic of China. Much of this investigation will be accomplished by providing an historical account of American military policy in the process tracing chapter. I argue that American military aid constitutes a highly plausible explanation for variation in repression throughout the world, further evidenced by noticeable differentiation between the Cold War and post-1989 periods of history.

"Aid" is a misleading term because in a military context, it is hardly ever philanthropic. Military aid usually involves the transfer of a valuable military asset to a recipient country in exchange for monetary compensation or permission for the stationing or free movement of American personnel. To be clear, the exchange is procured between two defense forces, while sales from an outside arms corporation are independent of American congressional donors. For the purposes of my analysis, I am interested in aid that the recipient country implements itself—arms, training, intelligence, and American expertise. Although direct conflict intervention does aid the recipient country militarily, it is not managed by the host country and is oftentimes unilateral. This means that the American troops on the ground, airstrikes, and/or unsupported drone strikes will not be incorporated into my analysis. The presence of Special Operations forces within a country remains an ambiguous case in several ways: While there are American personnel with fighting capabilities on the ground, they sometimes act in concert with domestic troops or do not provide combat assistance at all. Special Ops intelligence, training, and expertise is continuously exchanged for domestic intelligence and insight on the operations context, suggesting more of an equal exchange.¹

¹Despite clear reasons for including SOF operations, currently there is not sufficient public data on this type of aid.
1.3 Mechanisms

Misuse of disbursements for civilian policing

When agencies such as the Department of Defense request funds for disbursement to a particular country, the justification does not necessarily have to support specific military objectives in the recipient country. For example, the United States began sponsoring foreign militaries that pledged to engage in the narcotics war in the 1980s. This principally affected South and Central American countries, in several observable ways. In Chile for example, computer hardware donated for policing potential narcotics suspects was easily applied towards constructing larger, civilian databases that kept opposition to Pinochet’s government at a minimum (Klare et al., 1981). And Dube and Naidu (2015) provide evidence that American military aid in Colombia during the late 1990s and 2000s resulted in political violence at the hands of paramilitary groups in the name of policing. These examples show just how easy it is for recipient governments to turn the support from the Defense Department into offensive, repressive weapons. As Klare et al. (1981) note in their analysis, there is no accountability mechanism in place that requires recipient governments to produce proof that the disbursement was used as intended. Many American-made weapons are either donated to or purchased by a recipient government as part of an aid disbursement, and then applied to civilian and political policing rather than against contraband or violent opposition.

Juridical sovereignty

Any recipient government hoping to successfully redeploy military disbursements towards greater repressive capacities must also hold a high degree of legitimacy in order to do so. Otherwise, they risk numerous groups contesting the application of repressive measures. If resistance is strong enough, repression will become more costly than concession. One way that the balance of power can favor incumbents is if legitimacy is provided from an outside
source. Juridical sovereignty secondarily referred to as international legal command.

most commonly cited by scholars of African politics (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Englebert 2009; Mampilly 2011; Warner 1999), can help explain how American military aid may further legitimate a recipient government. Englebert (2009) identifies the three main characteristics of juridical sovereignty: Non-national actors and governments essentially grant leaders the right to rule, this right is distributed throughout all levels of state bureaucracy, and because it is exogenous, juridical sovereignty persists even when the state cannot fulfill its domestic obligations. I argue that the provision of American military aid acts similarly to juridical sovereignty, but moreover it requires an existing degree of juridical sovereignty. American military aid introduces an element of legitimacy that is distinct from recognition at the United Nations or any forum of international diplomacy. Security investments directly legitimate the recipient state because its security interests are joined with American security interests. The provision of military aid to a country underscores incumbent desires to maintain or elevate their domestic or international status (Iqbal and Starr 2008). A country may become embroiled in conflict if its neighbors are, thus American efforts to prevent that eventuality; and, investing in a country’s military rather than stationing American troops elevates the perceived strength and legitimacy of the recipient government. American aid also signals to regional enemies to American interests that this particular country will receive American support as long as there is a security risk.

Security/resistance discourse

As I have derived from Kinsella (2011) in her discussion of three discourses—gender, innocence, and civilization—a discourse is a "confluence of political, moral, and legal judgments" that conditions appearances [of what is being discussed] with "indisputable gravity and authority." She utilizes Michel Foucault’s framework of "series" in identifying historical moments when each of these three discourses converge, enabling her to demarcate the difference between the concepts of combatant and civilian. Discourse can be produced by any number of

2 Also referred to as international legal command.
relevant actors: sub-national, national, regional, or international spokespersons, executives, scholars and experts, and perhaps others. As it relates to security, these discourses will define military and non-military objectives in relation to the scope and magnitude of identifiable threats. I will analyze security discourse in each of my cases before and after aid has been disbursed, and in the case of no aid disbursement I will look for open hostility or condemnation of the (non)recipient government by the United States. The power of American military aid might also be framed in relation to any military support provided by other international actors. A lack of military support for the regime from other global actors, especially during periods of conflict, would signal an over-reliance on American military support to help entrench domestic legitimacy. I also expect contrasts between American non-condemnation and international actor’s condemnation to be vital to distinguishing American military aid as a legitimating force. By contrast, American military aid and foreign legitimacy might not be rejected by the incumbents but rather by civil society and activists in a recipient country. This would arise in direct opposition to discourses of national security. Opponents might believe that incumbents will be held guilty for any future wrongs resulting from collaboration with the United States, or even that with a loud enough resistance, incumbents will be forced to alter their attitude towards American assistance. There are several rhetorical labels that signal strong opposition to combined American and recipient incumbent national security discourse: capitalist, imperialist, violation of sovereignty, extractive/neo-colonial, etc. I will provide a more exact description of how I operationalize each discourse in the chapter on process tracing.

1.4 Regression analysis

The first of two methods I will implement in this analysis is an ordinary-least squares regression analysis of global data on over 6,400 country-year cases ranging from 1976-2016. As I noted above, there is an apparent dearth of quantitative analysis of the effects of
American military aid—most analyses are qualitative accounts or summary tables. Data analysis is an incredibly persuasive, easily-interpreted tool that may have outcomes beyond the written contents of this thesis. The data combine several macroeconomic variables, election and polity information, and other select control variables with their corresponding repression scores. Summary tables will quantify the extent of this principal relationship, while separate models will check for robustness with alternative independent and dependent variables. A discussion of results and a comparison to the hypothesized relationship will conclude the statistical analysis.

1.5 Process tracing

I implemented a model for process tracing analysis in order to establish the causal direction of the relationship between American military aid and repression. This involves tracing the historical evolution of processes relevant to the development and actualization of the three mechanisms outlined above. Each case includes a brief historical context, examination of events a decade before aid disbursement, and then the outcome of repression two years later. I hypothesize that the impact on repression is not immediate, partially because the disbursement is not made immediately but also because the consistency of any effect of American military aid on repression will require some time to develop. I created three groups encompassing zero, low, and high levels of disbursement. From these, I attempted to control for relevant competing explanatory variables—namely GDP per capita and conflict. Because each case was in conflict when aid was disbursed, I incorporated relevant dimensions of these conflicts into my analysis, namely the context of civil war, the Cold War, and the War on Terror. Each of these conflict-related conditions affected the availability of juridical sovereignty within the years immediately after aid was disbursed.
1.6 Thesis outline

The remainder of the thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter 2 details the composition and regression analysis of the data, with summary tables included for the principal independent and dependent variables. Chapter 3 summarizes process tracing in three case studies, with independent evaluations and a cross-case comparison to the theorized causal pathway. These cases draw directly from the three proposed causal mechanisms to demonstrate how an increase or decrease in military aid precipitated a chain of causal events leading to a corresponding change in repression. I make note of any events or processes that support secondary results as well. Lastly, Chapter 4 provides concluding remarks that summarize the contributions of this thesis while reminding the reader of the limitations and areas of improvement for this analysis.
Chapter 2

Regression Analysis

For decades, theoretical and observational evidence has guided studies of American military aid and repression worldwide. While these anecdotal accounts may be persuasive in particular contexts, they are not generalizable. My knowledge of political economy methods and a growing adeptness with statistical analysis led me to supplement these accounts with an analysis of a universe of cases, in order to more thoroughly evaluate the validity of my hypothesis. Statistical analysis can be persuasive, both for estimating how aid affects repression and isolating its impact from other related variables. Many scholars have taken advantage of public American military aid data to summarize trends using descriptive analysis, but few have applied it towards estimating outcomes with statistics. Presenting a veritable estimate of this relationship is paramount to informing policy and advocacy efforts as the United States continues to be pressured to defend its international posturing.

This chapter analyzes a dataset of US military aid, repression indexes, macroeconomic development indicators, and a slew of additional control variables. First, I briefly evaluate the data integrity and describe how variables have been compiled into my dataset. Next, I introduce the specific parameters of the OLS regression, and then I motivate the inclusion of each control in my analysis. Finally, I conclude with a presentation of my results in tabular and summary form.
2.1 Data Sources

Political Terror Scale (PTS)

The principal measure of repression I will use in my analysis is the Political Terror Scale. This dataset deals with one specific violation of human rights, the physical integrity rights of the person. The dataset indexes political terror based on a 5-level scale that quantifies the level of physical integrity rights violations, with more severe violations introduced at higher levels (Gibney et al., 2017). Sources include yearly reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and United States’ State Department Reports. There are several reasons why I favor using PTS over other possible indexes, proxy variables, or any other attempt to operationalize repression. The first is that data are the most widely available, beginning in 1976 up until 2016. CIRI, the rival measure of repression and detailed below, contained a surprising number of NAs given that it draws from the same source documents to code repression. And lastly, PTS is, at present, the only consistently updated repression index, despite its limitations. The principal criticism relevant for my analysis and hypothesized mechanisms is that it assesses the human conditions of these rights, and not outright government practices and policies. This means that non-government actors can perpetrate political terror that will be included in that country-year’s PTS score. The individual condition of rights also presupposes a Western framework of human rights based on individual civil liberties. This idea is demonstrably not as compatible in low-income and non-Western nations, where community well-being and basic individual livelihood security dominate philosophical thought (Gyekye, 1996; Wiredu, 2004; Devji, 2008; Taylor, 2011).

Repression: Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI)

The advantage of the CIRI is that it includes data on four types of human rights violations: 1) Physical integrity of the person encompassing freedom from torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and political imprisonment; 2) "Empowerment" rights encompassing
seven separate rights: freedom of movement (domestic and foreign), speech, assembly, religion; workers’ rights; and electoral self-determination; 3) Women’s economic, political, and social rights (disaggregated, unlike the above two indexes); 4) Freedom of the judiciary (Cingranelli and Richards [2010]). What CIRI compensates for in this variety of repression indexes is an otherwise questionable level of data integrity and utility compared to PTS. The most important issues is that CIRI data mildly limit the degrees of freedom in my analysis, most clearly because CIRI only covers 1976-2011. Additionally and surprisingly, the physical integrity index is far less complete than PTS, despite identical coding sources—State Department and HRW reports. CIRI is losing relevance in the wider repression literature, and no updates are planned for the near future. Lastly, unlike PTS’ 5-level coding scheme, CIRI indexes and subindexes vary in how they are scored. Physical integrity is scored from 0 to 8, while empowerment rights are scored from 0 to 14 and women’s rights are disaggregated. This does not facilitate comparison between indexes within the dataset, let alone to external indexes. The difference between a 5 and a 6 in physical integrity might be significant, while it might be slight and inconsequential for empowerment rights. I will include CIRI’s physical integrity and empowerment rights indexes in my analysis as a robustness check for PTS (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay [2014]). Of the non-physical integrity violations, empowerment rights like freedom of assembly, speech, and religion are all possible evaluation points for repression, even if universal understanding and emphasis on these rights as fundamental human rights remains contentious.

Since the end of the Vietnam war, the United States has selectively committed combat-ready troops. Lost American lives and visible hostility towards American troops abroad are equally costly as incumbents try to maintain support for the American military’s strategic vision. As aid in the form of financial, intelligence, and hardware disbursements becomes preferable, understanding how aid impacts political outcomes—not just security objectives—becomes paramount.
US Military Aid: USAID Greenbook & SIPRI

The Greenbook covers all US economic and military assistance to countries that have received over USD 500,000 in assistance. Assistance is broadly conceived and includes grants, loans, equipment donations, and other miscellaneous expenditures. This dataset covers both historic and current grant programs, and normalizes historical dollars as adjusted for inflation. Values in the original dataset are listed as a total aid figures, but I did some modifications to this variable for my analysis. The first is that after compiling the data to corresponding country-years, I modified any NA values to zero aid disbursed. The rationale for this is that all aid disbursements are publicly reported to Congress, both in every proposed budget and after the disbursement has been made. Any country that did not have an aid disbursement listed accordingly received zero aid dollars in that year, otherwise the disbursement would have been reported. This was a welcome conclusion after some research, both both because listing aid as zero allowed for the largest \( n \) possible, but also to successfully take the natural log of this raw aid value because of the high skew—nearly two thirds of cases in the final sample did not receive any American military aid. While this is certainly the most comprehensive dataset for examining American military aid, contemporary aid generally includes more intelligence and support roles than conventional guns and troops on the ground, with few exceptions.

An additional proxy for US military aid is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Trend-Indicator Value (TIV) Export Data. TIV is a calculated sum based on the known production cost of a particular military hardware, or a value estimate based on the electronics, payload, year produced, level of use, and other estimation strategies. It is not the actual financial value of the military exchange. This is a good supplement to military aid for two reasons: American military hardware sales have been shown to correlate with repression, while distinguishing between American private-sector and government sales to foreign countries is a difficult or impossible task \cite{Klare et al, 1981}, and these data are comparable to TIV exports from other foreign sources. TIV exports are a proxy for US
military aid and for the control variable of military aid from other sources.

2.2 Sample

Approximately 6,400 country-year cases in this dataset include values for both US military aid and PTS score, beginning in 1976 and ending in 2016. The sample includes zero values for US military aid, but not null values for PTS score. As mentioned above, this is because disbursing zero aid dollars can be a selective choice on the part of American aid donors. By contrast, null PTS scores usually reflect a total disruption in state capacity or otherwise unreported and therefore uncoded level of political terror in that country. Because this analysis is interested in observable i.e. quantified repression, all NAs for PTS were excluded. As mentioned above, I used CIRI’s empowerment rights index and physical integrity index as robustness checks.

2.3 Analysis

The relationship between total military aid and level of repression

After running a bivariate analysis, I then ran an ordinary least-squares regression by including controls related to repression. My baseline equation for estimation is as follows:

\[ Y_i = \beta_i \times \ln(X_i + \varphi_i) + \beta_i \times C_i + \alpha_i + \epsilon_i \]

Where \( Y_i \) is the outcome of interest, level of repression in a given country-year, \( \beta_i \) represents the respective coefficients for each variable, \( X_i \) is the total monetary amount of military aid received from the American government, and \( C_i \) is a vector of control variables accounting for other possible explanations of repression. \( \varphi_i \) is a constant of 0.001 included to correct for zero values when taking the log of American military aid, \( \alpha_i \) is the constant and \( \epsilon_i \) is the

\[ ^1 \text{See the Appendix, Table 5.3 for a full description of data sources, including controls.} \]
error term. This regression used panel-corrected standard errors and I ran separate country and era-fixed effects. Fixed-effect results are summarized in the Appendix. I took the natural log of all skewed variables, which include many macroeconomic development indicators and non-American military disbursements.

2.4 Controls

As I suggested in the literature review, this analysis is complicated by evidence for confounding explanatory and outcome variables. In this section, I restate the motivating factors behind including each control and attribute each variable to its data source.

The World Bank Development Indicators form the largest group of control variables and include population, GDP per capita, oil rents per capita, natural resource rents, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, and male youth as a percentage of total population. They are included in my analysis to replicate the statistical analyses in related studies. Each has been tested and correlates with repression, unrest, and/or political violence and conflict in various studies [Das 2017, Kishi, Maggio and Raleigh 2017, Ross 2013, Urdal 2006]. All data are available by country-year on the World Bank website and can be downloaded in file forms compatible with multiple statistical software programs.

Humanitarian aid from two principal sources—the Development Assistance Committee and USAID—is included as a competing explanation for repression, and as a proxy for natural disasters and conflict events. Humanitarian aid could be implemented by NGOs, in which case state power might be threatened and repression of NGOs would result, or state power could be weakened by a disaster; consequently, NGOS would experience less repression in their demands to incumbents for better accountability [Apodaca 2017, Wood and Wright 2016]. Alternatively, state actors could be the principal beneficiaries of humanitarian aid. Because of semi-regular aid cycles in the wake of frequent natural disasters, actors might neglect to update disaster preparedness mechanisms. When a disaster does occur, aggrieved
citizens might renew demands for state-provided security and other services. Consequently, state actors would repress rather than acquiesce to maintain the semi-regular benefits of humanitarian aid \cite{Apodaca2017}. Indonesia is one example of a polity where disaster preparedness mechanisms remain woefully non-existent or inadequate and frequent tsunamis and volcanoes result in regular humanitarian aid provisions.

Data on national-level elections are included from the Varieties of Democracy version 8 dataset and are coded as a sum of national executive and/or legislative elections. Incumbents may be likely to increase repression of political opposition during election seasons, as was the case during Niger’s 2016 presidential and legislative elections \cite{Mueller2016}. Conflict will also be controlled for using aggregated data from the Uppsala Conflict Database. These data include any conflict in which the state is a principal actor. Conflict is likely to lead to repression in a manner similar to disaster, in that civil policing capacity will be reduced and citizens are highly likely to lament or suffer from government incapacity to provide security. These conflict data also partially control for the presence of foreign military involvement within the state territory \cite{Peksen2012}. Two data sources from the Center for Systemic Peace are included—major terrorist bombings (greater than 15 casualties) and the Polity IV regime type score. Similar to disasters or conflict, terrorist bombings strain existing state security capacities and allow dissident voices a rallying point to lament grievances against the state.

The level of ethnic homogeneity within a nation-state is sometimes correlated to the level of stability within a country, which could be a related to the adoption of repressive policies \cite{Hoffman2015}. Although I recognize the literature relating ethnicity to a wide range of political outcomes, ethno-linguistic fractionalization scores do not measure the political relevancy of ethnic groups, and the ethnic power relations dataset is an absolute rather than relative measure. It does not allow for easy study of the comparative evolution of ethnic relevancy between country-years \cite{Driessen2008}. Notwithstanding the theoretical and empirical limitations of attempting to test ethnicity, I believe that the political relevance of ethnicity is already included in my other controls—ethnicity might result from or produce election violence, conflict, or inequality, among others. Without a strong and readily applicable theoretical justification for including a measure of ethnicity, I acknowledge this literature and maintain focus on other controls.
2.5 Results

Accounting for all models, the relationship between American military aid and repression was robustly negative and statistically significant, contrary to what I had anticipated. First, I will summarize key findings from the models, and then I will discuss the limitations of this analysis. This is separate from suggesting alternative hypotheses or areas for improvement, which will be discussed in the conclusion.³

In Table 3.1, models 1-4 report a robustly negative and significant association between American military aid and repression across all models. Other robust variables include population and American and DAC humanitarian aid, while countries in conflict were more likely to be repressive and countries with a higher Polity score were naturally less repressive. While the positive association between humanitarian aid and repression may seem surprising, earlier sections noted how aid can be easily diverted by incumbents to achieve political purposes (Apodaca 2017). Alternatively, humanitarian aid is so frequently disbursed that it reflects a weak disaster response infrastructure that is a product of low incumbent accountability to citizens (Wood and Wright 2016); in fact, the case study of Mozambique in the next chapter (and many others on the African continent) demonstrates the capacity of incumbents to siphon humanitarian aid to legitimate their rule (Newitt 2002; Adam 2002).

Table 3.2, models 5-8 contain robustness checks that estimate the coefficient representing the relationship between other foreign military contributions and repression. Once again, population is a robustly positive and significant variable. These models introduce trade-indicator value (TIV) weapons sales from a particular country to a purchasing country, a variable drawn from UCDP’s TIV search query. As mentioned above, TIV represents the estimated value of weapons disbursed through cash sales to another country, not the actual amount exchanged. I queried this value for the United States, Soviet Union, China, and the same European DAC countries included in the humanitarian aid variable. Interestingly,

³See the Appendix, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for additional robustness checks using CIRI’s physical integrity index as the measure of repression. Overall, results were consistent with the principal models using PTS, and they are therefore not included in the principal results section.
although we might expect that American and Soviet weapons sales supported repressive regimes, models 5 and 6 found no significant association between these two TIVs and repression, and recipients of Soviet weapons were more likely to be repressive the higher their oil rents per capita. Part of this can be attributed to a low sample size: Soviet data would have only been available for 14 years, and unlike American military aid, direct weapons sales by other foreign companies are not necessarily publicly disclosed. The same results held for Chinese military assistance, which took the form of both aid and weapons exports. Worth noting is that Chinese weapons distributors did not export to any country that had a meaningful percentage of its wealth derived from natural resource rents—Chinese military support must come with fundamentally different objectives. Like the Soviet Union, this sample is also limited in size to only 12 years. Lastly, Model 8 yielded no association between military aid from European DAC members and repression, although recipients of European weapons were 0.015 units more repressive for each percent increase in their male population.

Country fixed-effects and year effects were also recorded. Country fixed-effects relates the average level of repression in Afghanistan (the first country in the dataset) to the average level of repression in each respective country. The null hypothesis is that repression in another country is significantly different than average repression in Afghanistan. Of all countries, Colombia, Iraq, Korea–People’s Democratic Republic, South Sudan, and Sudan all had a p-value lower than 0.001, meaning that these countries had a level of repression that was not significantly different from Afghanistan—the fact that these countries are not Afghanistan does not entirely explain their different levels of repression. Year fixed-effects were designed by era, which naturally divided the years in my analysis into three groups: the Cold War, the 1990s, and the Global War on Terror. Overall, average repression worldwide increased with each change in era. Exact coefficient results are reported in the appendix.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ln(US mil aid)</td>
<td>−0.005***</td>
<td>−0.008***</td>
<td>−0.007***</td>
<td>−0.007***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Population)</td>
<td>0.580***</td>
<td>0.525***</td>
<td>0.629***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP per capita)</td>
<td>−0.014</td>
<td>−0.014</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI as % of GDP</td>
<td>123.076</td>
<td>109.950</td>
<td>95.293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(76.427)</td>
<td>(76.369)</td>
<td>(73.765)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource rents</td>
<td>−123.072</td>
<td>−109.946</td>
<td>−95.289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(76.427)</td>
<td>(76.369)</td>
<td>(73.765)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Oil per capita)</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>−0.013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male pop ages 15-24</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(US Hum aid)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(DAC Hum aid)</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In conflict?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.610***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>−0.025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity score</td>
<td>−0.027***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist bombings</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>−0.028</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>6444</td>
<td>3531</td>
<td>3531</td>
<td>2909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Principal results models relating the natural log of American military aid to aggregate PTS score. Models 2-4 include macroeconomic controls, while humanitarian aid and then regime characteristics were included in Models 3 and 4, respectively. Several control variables had statistically significant results, while American military aid was significant and negatively associated with PTS score.
Table 2.2: Secondary results relating alternate foreign military contributions to aggregate PTS score. Each model reports a different foreign source: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and European donors. Oil per capita, GDP per capita, and male population ages 15-24 were all significant in at least one model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ln(US aid)</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(US TIV)</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Population)</td>
<td>0.835***</td>
<td>1.859***</td>
<td>1.825*</td>
<td>0.651***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.425)</td>
<td>(0.968)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP per capita)</td>
<td>-0.198***</td>
<td>-0.143**</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI as % of GDP</td>
<td>-89.711</td>
<td>6010.765</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-406.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1012.705)</td>
<td>(89061.675)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(1141.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource rents</td>
<td>89.714</td>
<td>-6010.631</td>
<td>406.254</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1012.705)</td>
<td>(89061.679)</td>
<td>(1141.423)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Oil per capita)</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.109*</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male pop ages 15-24</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(USSR TIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(China TIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(China aid)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(DAC TIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
2.6 Discussion

These results and the accompanying robustness checks in the Appendix directly conflict with the hypothesis that more American military aid is correlated with more repression. I will spend some time here discussing the limitations of the statistics and data available, and then explain how process tracing analysis in the next chapter can still add nuance to these results. The concluding chapter of the thesis will discuss possible areas for future studies in more detail based on secondary findings, and will incorporate examples from the process tracing case studies.

Limitations

In discussing limitations, I find it helpful to revisit the characteristics of the dataset and several key variables. The data represent an entire population of country-year cases, but analysis is limited to 41 country-years beginning in 1976. This misses key military aid years during the Cold War, including the entirety of the Vietnam and Korean wars. Although American military aid is consistently reported based on disbursements made through US-AID, this does not include any covert aid to recipient countries. This might include CIA intelligence, Special Operations forces and activity, or other top-secret contributions. As the United States continues to delegate itself to primarily intelligence and support roles rather than coordinating activities with recipient militaries, accounting for this type of support will become more pertinent \cite{News24, 2019}. The population of cases also included most high or medium income countries where foreign military assistance is intended to maintain diplomatic alliances rather than unilaterally advance American security interests.

PTS remains the preferred measure of repression based on its data robustness, temporal extent, and regular updates, but, the data has several noteworthy limitations. The most glaring of these is the bias towards a Western i.e. liberal conception of human rights that upholds democratic values, institutions and participation in governance at the individual level. There are two problems with this framework for coding repression. The first is that
despite the assumption that strong democratic institutions prevent human rights abuses, examples abound of Western regimes hypocritically denying human rights in their own territory and worldwide. Highly publicized examples include South-North immigration to North America and Southern Europe, and the use of torture by the United States in detention centers worldwide [Devji 2008]. The second problem is that polities around the world have conceptions of human rights that differ dramatically from the individual rights framework employed in the West. Gyekye (1996) and Wiredu (2004) note that in most Ghanaian societies, an individual’s worthiness is evaluated based on how much an individual is able to contribute to their community. This framework has been employed to devastating effect in multi-ethnic nations like Ghana, where stereotypes allow a political majority to justify their own mandate while excluding other minority groups from governance. The consequence of this political process can be a diffusion of targeted exclusionary acts or even violence against minority groups, as has been the case in Rwanda, Bosnia, Myanmar, Peru and other polities throughout the years of analysis.

Two smaller objections to the way human rights abuses are coded at present are that more authoritarian countries and countries in conflict are automatically coded as more repressive—controlling for conflict and regime type is essentially redundant with the way these variables were reported in PTS. Similarly and perhaps directly challenging to my hypothesis is the fact that many countries that do not receive American military aid are coded as more repressive because of the absence of political liberties in socialist and communist economic systems. Many cases that did not receive American military aid would have been coded as highly repressive based on the fact that their economic systems are not compatible with the Western human rights framework mentioned above.

In relation to the statistical analysis, one key limitation is that I was not able to use the most recent advancement in panel-corrected standard error functions within R studio. The "pcse" function or similar versions of it in other statistical programs are now the standard for any econometric analysis, yet I was unable to debug its persistent error with my
dataset. Similar to what the "plm" function I settled for does, "pcse" would have grouped the "country" and "year" variables to produce an error term correcting for the likelihood that the outcome of repression in country A in year X is related to repression in A in year X-1. At first, the error with this function seemed to indicate that there were cases in my dataset that did not have any observations for "country" or "year," or that some cases had a value for one variable but not the other. The next issue to debug seemed to require a reference dataset that was the same length as the model, which is impossible given the fact that degrees of freedom in a model is equal to one less than the total number of cases. After consulting with my statistics and thesis advisor on these issues, we ultimately abandoned use of "pcse" in favor of "plm." This solution has been described to me as "hackish," but at present I cannot justify any long-term, likely fruitless efforts to debug "pcse."

A macro-level criticism of this statistical analysis is that its components are not nearly advanced enough to be considered definitive. At earlier stages of my analysis, it had been suggested that I include an instrumental variable as a causal identification strategy and falsification tests. While I conceptualized an instrumental variable, researching and implementing it would have been at least as much work as process tracing, if not more to adjust for the learning curve inherent in coding this in R studio or ArcGIS. I sidelined this initiative for what I already knew and was able to work on, which was the theoretical framework and the case selection in preparation for process tracing. My methods background is originally in comparative historical sociology and archival research, so continuing to independently study statistical methodology beyond simple regression analysis proved incompatible with fulfilling each component of the project. There is also certainly omitted variable bias in my analysis, but some of that can be corrected for in the next chapter on process tracing.

Moving forward: Justification for process tracing

In pre-specifying my analysis, I anticipated that process tracing would compliment statistical findings that supported the hypothesis that more American military aid is correlated
with more repression. The statistical results did not support this hypothesis, as coefficients for American military aid were robustly negative and significant. With these results, one could consider dropping the process tracing entirely; however, I believe that there is some merit to including both despite the altered intentions of these two analyses. Process tracing can still determine the causal direction of this relationship, even if this contribution remains theoretical rather than directly applicable to the present statistical analysis. Another advantage of process tracing is that within small-\(n\) analysis, I will explore a wider range of possible control variables influencing the repression than were controlled for in regression analysis. Examining individual cases will investigate the degree to which they vary from the theoretical and observed average association between American military aid and repression.
Chapter 3

Process Tracing Analysis

Appearances can be deceiving, as was the case with the Ghanaian-American military agreement signed in 2018. On the surface, the Ghanaian Armed Forces would receive $30 million and renovated facilities in exchange for open permissions for American troop and equipment movement throughout the country. When opposition leaders leaked the agreement to the public and even a year after it was signed, many viewed the agreement as permitting an American-operated military base. Demonstrations and a boycott of the vote on the agreement took center-stage, but behind the scenes, a much more nefarious politics of "equalization" was taking place (Bob-Miliar 2018). The ruling New Patriotic Party quietly began investigations into the supposed double salaries National Democratic Congress members received during their incumbency, but these investigations were sidelined in exchange for opposition silence on the military agreement (Asante 2018). Some even speculated that the $30 million was not the only money paid to the Ghanaian government (Ghana Web 2018, Asante 2018). Academic and civilian observers dismiss the issue because of its secondary importance relative to human security concerns, while security experts maintain that the future of Ghana’s security involves substantial assistance from the United States (Danso and Okyere 2018, Tsegah 2018, Kotin 2018, Anonymous 2018). Whichever position Ghana adopts, incumbents remain poised to benefit from growing international stature at the expense of their political opponents as
recent and present processes result in the silencing of dissenting voices.

This chapter motivates the use of process tracing as a causal identification strategy. Scholars who utilize process tracing provide explanations of how an independent event came to be while minimizing quantitative estimation or prediction of the relevancy of the processes leading up to the event. In addition to providing a more robust explanation for an observable implication, process tracing also attempts to confirm the causal direction of independent processes leading to the observable outcome (Schimmelfennig, 2015; Bennett and Cheek, 2015; Mahoney, 2003). Process tracing was a necessary addition to my analysis because instances of repression could hypothetically lead to an outcome of increased American disbursements. Although process tracing does contradict the statistical analysis in two of my cases, this was likely to occur with a smaller sample. Rather than contribute to the debate between large and small-\(n\) analyses, I focus on interpreting what I have discovered with process tracing, separately from the statistical results. In each case, there was still observable evidence of theoretical mechanisms and related processes leading to observable increase in repression, regardless of the level of American military aid.

Process tracing is inherently a small-\(n\) analysis, and combined with a one-year deadline for completion of my research I limited myself to three representative case studies: Angola, 1997; Mozambique, 1994; and Niger, 2014. Each of these corresponds to low, medium, and high levels of American aid disbursements, respectively. The years represent an intentional end point for process tracing analysis. My goal is not to examine the entire evolution of aid disbursements and observable repression (moreover, this would be a chronological evaluation), but rather I argue that the requisite processes occurred in the years building up to the particular country-year.

Schimmelfennig (2015) outlines several key components to conducting efficient process tracing. In relation to in-case analysis, he stresses that only processes that directly influence principal and competing theoretical or empirical mechanisms should be included. Schimmelfennig also notes that the most effective process tracing pre-specifies the principal causal
mechanisms during research design, which I have done in the next section. These suggestions address three problematic tendencies of process tracing analysis: waste of resources, the temptation of storytelling, and the lack of generalizability [Schimmelfennig 2015; Mahoney 2003]. After introducing the intermediate mechanisms and how I intend to observe each, I will justify my case selection and the rationale for comparing these three. I then describe how these processes and mechanisms manifested in each case. I conclude with a descriptive summary of findings and compare the key similarities and differences in each case, accounting for as much variation as is possible, briefly.

3.1 Mechanisms and Observations

As Figure 4.1 details and as theorized in Chapter 1, I hypothesized that there are three central intermediate steps that lead American military aid to result in a change in repression. I will reiterate each step and then summarize observable implications. First, military aid is appropriated for civilian policing capacities. Next, juridical sovereignty is either available or it is not. If juridical sovereignty as provided by security cooperation with the United States or the legitimacy established through existing international partnerships is missing, then we would expect to see that incumbents do not act on an military aid disbursement, and if they do it is because the cost of repression remains lower than the cost of concession. The last step, when juridical sovereignty is available, predicts whether repression increases or decreases. Some form of resistance would be expected to challenge the discourse of national security presented by incumbents and their American partners. With resistance, the cost of repression would increase and we would accordingly expect incumbent concessions, while a lack of or well-suppressed resistance would make repression less costly, leading to increasingly severe repressive policies. Now that I have outlined the general connectivity of these mechanisms, I will revisit the theoretical strengths and limitations of each mechanism, and I will outline what I was examining in my review of each of the three cases.
Figure 3.1: The proposed causal pathways through which military aid may or may not lead to an observable increase in repression.
Misuse of disbursements

American military aid may directly lead to repression when disbursements are instead applied to civilian policing capacities. This could take the form of military intervention in civilian affairs, or the application of military-grade hardware or intelligence to civilian policing. Since the end of World War II, "national security" threats have also been internal as the sanctity of an international system based on nation-state governance remains entrenched (Mampilly, 2011; Bilgin, 2017). Recent examples of military intervention against internal threats include protestor casualties in Nicaragua, Israel, Cameroon, and Nigeria (Lakhani, 2018; Amnesty, 2018, 2019; Searcey and Akinwotu, 2018). While some of these actors may not have purposed American military aid to repress, military hardware was likely acquired from some supplier, which consequently gave the military circumstantial capacity to use these weapons. American financial military aid grants the spending government free choice on how to strengthen the military, whether through increased personnel, enhanced weapons systems, or intelligence partnerships. The United States military was heavily criticized during the narcotics wars of the late 1990s and 2000s because this financing unmistakably trained and supplied militaries to conduct policing duties (Dubé and Naidu, 2015). The (non)intersection of military and policing capabilities is a central process to be examined within each of my cases. The pathways and final recipient of weapons systems sometimes remain unverified and cannot be retraced once the disbursement is made (Klare et al., 1981). And even some technology donations intended for general use could be easily repurposed to enhance monitoring capabilities, as was the case with computer systems donations to Chile and Bolivia in the 1970s (Klare et al., 1981).

Juridical sovereignty

In Chapter 1, I argued that American military aid does function as an extension of juridical sovereignty, but principally it requires preexisting juridical sovereignty. A country might have observably high levels of juridical sovereignty if it regularly welcomes or needs
foreign intervention to stabilize its security forces; if it regularly struggles with commodity provision to its citizens; or if its exports are deeply intertwined in some exchange relationship with an international partner—likely a highly unfavorable one to the country. The provision of military aid to a country underscores a desire by incumbents to maintain or elevate their domestic or international status (Iqbal and Starr, 2008). Security investments can legitimate otherwise illegitimate recipient states because of a process related to the next causal mechanism, security discourse.

Security/resistance discourse

Discourse may be produced by any number of relevant actors: sub-national, national, regional, or international spokespersons, executives, scholars and experts, and perhaps others. Instances of American support through discourse may be transparent ("we welcome cooperation with X government to win the hearts and minds of potential enemies"), or they may evidently praise the goodness of an agreement, the charisma of an incumbent executive, or otherwise publicly demonstrate a positive shift in perception towards a recipient country. A change in incumbent support for American security cooperation may be less observable because of apprehension about what a public alliance with the US demonstrates. Rather than publicly accept an alliance with the United States and its corresponding regional security agenda, incumbents are likely to reframe any American partnership as necessary for bolstering the recipient government’s national security. While I found evidence of comparable incumbent discourses in two of my cases, this significantly dwarfed its complimentary resistance discourse.

By contrast, resistance movements propagate their own discourse that labels American military assistance as undesirerale and unwelcome. Although the exact labeling has varied over time, the general sentiment is that the United States is a global hegemonic force and its (military) interactions with any country are intended to expand its grand strategy agenda. As stated by resistance movements, this may include anti-Muslim policies and
military intervention, natural resource acquisition, a pro-capitalist consumer agenda, and an unshaking desire to become/remain the world’s only empire. In contrast to the limited analysis resources for security discourse at the national level, resistance discourse may take several different forms. This could include collective societies and mobilization movements, mobilizations events such as protest, and even political opposition boycotts.

3.2 Case selection

I opted for a diverse case selection strategy to choose three representative cases, well-summarized by Seawright and Gerring (2008). This strategy seeks to maximize analysis along variation in either the dependent or independent variable, or along the relationship between the two. Seawright and Gerring recommend selecting cases at natural break points in the distribution of values. In the dataset, the independent variable (PTS score) values are normally distributed, but the dependent variable of US military aid is quite skewed and case counts fluctuate across the whole range of values. Two natural breaks are apparent, however: aid values greater than zero, and values greater than USD 8.88 million. Selection within each range was different for all three categories. For zero values, I randomly selected Angola, 1997 with an aggregate PTS score of 4. For the middle range, I selected the median of non-zero values: Mozambique, 1994 with a PTS score of 3. I identified the upper range as all values above the natural break point of USD 8.88 million, at which point the range of values between histogram counts expands, and each count range is several hundred smaller than counts in the medium range. The range peaks at USD 11 billion. From this range, I randomly selected Niger, 2014 which received USD 9.8 million in aid and an aggregate PTS score of 2.5. In sum, a diverse case selection strategy obliged me to classify the data using

1I took two steps to progressively randomize selection: I first selected a year, then a random letter of the alphabet represented in this range (18).
2The median of the whole dataset is still a zero-value. The mean of the dataset or the mean of non-zero values is not preferable, because it is skewed as a result of a few dozen instances where multiple billions of dollars were disbursed. The mean value falls above the second natural break point of 8.88 million as well.
3Similar to the randomization process in the low range, I randomized by year and then along number of alphabet letters represented in this range (18).

3.3 Analysis

Angola, 1997

"For these people, revolution means bringing people together and holding demonstrations, even when not authorized, to insult, to denigrate, to cause disturbance and confusion, with the intention of obliging the police to act and for them to be able to say there is no freedom of expression and no respect for rights."

—Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos in a speech to the MPLA central committee

The first two cases of Angola and Mozambique were both Portuguese colonies and therefore follow similar timelines immediately preceding the outbreak of their respective civil wars. In the 1960s as European powers were transferring governance of African colonies to African nationalists, Portugal refused to do so. Independence for Portugal’s African colonies was out of the question. The Portuguese economy was underdeveloped relative to its European counterparts, and existing industry would not have survived without a forced labor regime that was the leading policy of the Portuguese dictatorship [Chabal 2002, Newitt 2002]. This lead Africans under Portuguese rule to stage wars of liberation. Eventually, military officers in Portugal staged a coup and in 1975, all of Portugal’s colonies were granted independence [MacQueen 1997, Schmidt 2013]. At that moment, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) government was in control of the capital city of Luanda and had remained in control despite a Zairean-backed secessionist movement, two opposing liberation movements the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), and a South African expeditionary force [Birmingham 2002]. The liberation movement that would be recognized as the ruling government of Angola would be the one in control of Luanda on independence day, and
MPLA remained in control after sustained fighting and the assistance of Cuban soldiers and armaments (Turner 2002).

Of course, independence did not end the hostilities between rival movements, and the MPLA still had a South African invasion force to contend with. Once the MPLA government was recognized by international actors, the Soviet Union was able to transport additional Cuban troops to repel the South African invasion force (Gleijeses 2010). After their withdrawal, South African involvement became minimal, primarily forming a training ground for UNITA troops in Southwest Africa. The conflict became a binary struggle between UNITA and MPLA. While MPLA would occasionally best UNITA soldiers for several months at a time, the primary victims of the war were civilians with mass casualties on either side (Minter 1994). Both movements were so successful in swaying civilians to their cause that they remained loyal despite complete lapses in safety from attacks and widespread livelihood insecurity (Pearce 2015). War had exploited the slightest differences in livelihood between Angolans to produce a deep enmity that fueled the conflict for nearly three decades after independence.

The active role of the United States and Soviet Union in the Angolan conflict was the dominant factor in the failure to broker a lasting peace agreement until 2002 (MacQueen 1997). American involvement in Angola dates back to the wars of liberation when official policy remained a rather passive support for Portugal (MacQueen 1997; Birmingham 2002). A brief interlude during the Kennedy administration led to support of the FNLA and rejection of MPLA requests for militar assistance, which would establish a precedent of denying military support to MPLA throughout the following decades. After independence and the onset of fighting between MPLA and UNITA, the United States switched its support to UNITA in accordance with its strategic interest in opposing Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA. This is why Angola received zero American military aid in 1997, both because of precedent and the backsliding into conflict after a failed 1994 electoral process (Gleijeses 2010). Much of the direct support for UNITA was done through the CIA and through
proxy governments in South Africa and Zaire. Weapons were regularly disbursed except for several years when the United States Congress blocked any financing of the war in Angola until Ronald Reagan became President and had the amendment repealed (Birmingham 2002). Soviet support peaked during the years immediately surrounding independence, but a healthy cadre of military advisors remained until the late 1980s. Oil financed the MPLA’s search for international weapons, diamond profits supported UNITA. Many European diamond cutters actively ignored the source of their "blood diamonds" and American oil rather hypocritically invested in extraction in MPLA territory, thus some Americans were financing both sides of the conflict.

The political and economic dynamics between international actors, coupled with the direct involvement of South Africa, all conspired to reduce the legitimacy of the MPLA but ultimately favored its governance over UNITA. MPLA incumbents were able to persuade Angolans through relocation and targeted propaganda that they were the true custodians of prosperity, and that UNITA had done irreconcilable damage to the physical and psychological infrastructure of the Angolan nation (Pearce 2015). This campaign culminated with the death of UNITA party leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002 and subsequent negotiations for peace led by and for Angola’s elites (MacQueen 1997). The failure of the earlier Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements, coupled with a haphazard international presence during the contested and inconclusive elections of 1994, served as justification enough for the Angolan elites to collaborate on a peace agreement although it overwhelmingly favored MPLA incumbents (Turner 2002). Peace on MPLA terms was the final nail in the coffin of the effort to legitimate a unitary Angola—a process of actualization that was and remains by any means necessary.

Since the 2002 Peace Agreement, opposition activists and parties have implemented dis-

---

4This is not to say that international commodities trade was the sole motivating consideration for elites in both movements. Billon (2001) notes that while diamonds and oil remained big-ticket items in the political economy of war, everyday commodity provision—including security—kept civilians loyal on both sides of the battlefield. Through mobilization of identities in Angola and some semblance of goods provision, Billon (2001) effectively argues that civilians under each movement felt that their interests were more likely to be protected by staying where they were (Mampilly 2011; Pearce 2015).
courses of resistance to challenge MPLA’s policy shortcomings and its sustained claims to be the sole representative of the Angolan people (Pearce, 2015). Part of this resistance has come with the sustained repression of UNITA as an opposition political party, but some of it remembers the civil war and the lack of elite concern for rural and displaced Angolans within and outside of the country. The MPLA government also justifies much of its legitimacy and policy decisions by returning to the civil war. In an effort to combat public dissent, incumbents and security forces has returned to the old moniker of *confusão*, a wartime euphemism for violence that now carries more sinister connotations than its English translation of confusion. Essentially, the MPLA has and continues to employ discourse to blur the line between a protest and a security threat to political and social order. The continual references to the war and the MPLA victory provided sustained grounds for dismantling the legitimacy of any non-MPLA political and social forces. It was the MPLA that secured peace through an accepted imposition of its vision for a unitary Angola, and any challengers to this status quo were equated with the violent warmongers who challenged MPLA legitimacy for many decades.

Although no American military aid was disbursed in 1997, there were clear explanations for this in Cold War dynamics and internal desires for peacekeeping. The United States simply had no interest in supporting a former proxy of the Soviet Union and had hedged its bets on the victory of UNITA. With the collapse of apartheid South Africa and Zaire in the late 1990s, the United States lost its two proxies to UNITA. American policymakers naturally avoided direct, bilateral contributions to a dying war after a failed peace agreement that they had helped broker. However, the lack of disbursement did not exclude the MPLA from adopting a more repressive agenda in later years.

Although juridical sovereignty had not been afforded to Angolan incumbents *vis-à-vis* the United States, they still opted to repress because the cost of repression was far cheaper than concession (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). During the civil war, the cost of concession was the mandate to rule and all the associated benefits of statehood (Allina, 2012; Mampilly).
Matthews Thesis

Once UNITA’s wartime capacity had been sufficiently exhausted and the war concluded on MPLA’s terms, there was nothing for incumbents to concede. They had rightfully won the right of governance and eliminated their most serious threat. The reason incumbents in Angola continued to repress dissenting voices relates to a need for a balance of in/security (Bilgin 2017; Woldemariam 2018). Without any form of insecurity to the nation, incumbents would be exposed as unaccountable to their citizens in terms of goods provision. The security discourse in Angola allowed the government unrestrained use of repression in order to protect a newly confirmed national identity—and the security of their own rule, of course (Pearce 2015; Sankaran 1999).

Mozambique, 1994

Like Angola, Mozambique also fought a long and protracted war of liberation with Portugal that transitioned into civil war after independence. To facilitate comparison between these two similar cases, and to understand the effect of a modest American military aid disbursement, I will touch on how the two conflicts differed in three crucial respects: in-fighting of liberation movements; external actor participation; and natural resource endowments.

The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was conceived of as a socialist movement and was therefore comparable to MPLA in its liberation ideology. It was not nearly as forceful a test to Portuguese control as the three-faction war in Angola, and lacked strong support throughout much of the rural countryside (Newitt 2002). Because independence was a result of the coup in the metropole and not political or military victory against rival liberation movements, FRELIMO lacked total legitimacy from the beginning of its post-independence existence. Moreover, international actors in addition had conspired to fund a branch of the Rhodesian Special Forces to undermine FRELIMO’s effort to lead the Mozambican state. This group would remain highly militarized, numbering in the tens of thousands and maintained a consistent supply of arms throughout the war (Gehrke 1991; Finnegan 1992); after independence it became the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RE-
NAMO) and aspired to displace FRELIMO on account of its failure to fully incorporate the rural masses into the liberation struggle. War after the conclusion of the post-independence war was similarly inevitable in Mozambique as it was in Angola, due to global, regional, and historical factors (Funada-Classen 2013).

South Africa was again involved in the civil war of its other Lusophone neighbor, this time exclusively as a supply source for RENAMO. Until the defeat of Rhodesia and the formation of Zimbabwe, South Africa was able to supply RENAMO with tools and directives of war. One of these initiatives was a targeted guerrilla campaign against the major transportation and communications networks of FRELIMO, which further isolated FRELIMO’s base in the south of the country from its hinterlands in the north and central regions—RENAMEO was able to freely operate throughout these areas throughout the war. Apart from South African supplies for RENAMO, the Armed Forces did not invade Mozambique as they did in Angola. This was partially a consequence of FRELIMO’s negotiable position on apartheid rule in South Africa. Although initially publicly supportive of the African National Congress (ANC), RENAMO’s successful guerrilla campaign left Mozambique no choice but to maintain direct economic ties with South Africa’s apartheid regime for import and export purposes (Newitt 2002).

Like in Angola as well, American strategists developed their policy positions based on opposition to communist hegemony in the country and region. A weak narrative constructed Mozambique as another "domino" that had already fallen to communism because of FRELIMO’s ideology and lack of a viable anti-communist challenger (Costigliola 2010 Minter 1994 Chabal 1992). Moreover, there was no consistent and substantial support from the Soviet Union or Cuba like in Angola—most of the international support from fellow communist countries came from other Eastern Bloc nations or China. FRELIMO was also well-connected to Western particularly Nordic countries because of a supply of humanitarian aid during the war of independence (Schmidt 2013 Gehrke 1991), and actively sought a balance of relations with the East and West after independence. Evidence of this bal-
ance took place even with the United States, which periodically donated non-military aid to the FRELIMO government and resisted right-wing pressure from within its government to supply RENAMO. Presidents Reagan and Chissano met in 1987 and reportedly got along amicably, leading to the largest disbursement yet of American aid to Mozambique (Newitt, 2002). When the Soviet Union collapsed the already weak description of Mozambique as another domino that had fallen to socialism was finally revoked. This further permitted American assistance towards Mozambique despite its socialist origins, as these were already weakening in the face of substantial humanitarian need and low levels of ideological diffusion into the countryside (Honwana, 2002).

Neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO had access to consistent or substantial natural resource endowments or international support. FRELIMO demanded a supply of oil as a consequence of successful RENAMO efforts to cut oil pipelines and major supply lanes apart from South Africa (Finnegan, 1992). Financing of either side was at the behest of a few generous donors. As a result, both sides sought to maximize the utility of civilian support to their cause. RENAMO recruitment was conveyed as anti-FRELIMO politics that actually favored rural interests, even if what rural Mozambicans wanted anecdotally was to be left alone after centuries of conflict with the Portuguese and now other Mozambicans (Finnegan, 1992; Geffray, 1990). Conversely, FRELIMO cut its losses with the socialist program and began to appeal to calls of modernization. Its position as the only internationally legitimate political entity allowed it to offer impressive incentives to urbanites seeking to escape rather than reform their rural livelihoods (della Rocca, 1998; Newitt, 2002). But the greatest consequence of few natural resources was the utter destitution that both sides had reached in the early 1990s, when drought and famine left both groups unable to fight anymore (Gehrke, 1991). With the recognition that neither side would ever garner the resources, international support, or domestic legitimacy to govern Mozambique alone, a diplomatic solution was proposed.

Although a United Nations peacekeeping supervisory force in Mozambique monitored the transition to peace, it was fatigue combined with RENAMO’s desires for internationally
recognized political legitimacy that allowed for a successful peace agreement (della Rocca, 1998). RENAMO leader Dhlakama came in second place in executive elections, but in the national assembly the replicated result meant that RENAMO was a powerful and only slight political minority (Newitt, 2002). Unlike Savimbi in Mozambique, Dhlakama was obliged to accept the election results due to international pressure and exhaustion, and he was more psychologically prepared to do so than Savimbi. The United Nations had learned a lesson about the consequences of minimally supervised elections in Angola, and accordingly supplied ample election monitors and peacekeepers to Mozambique (Honwana, 2002). The combined increased international recognition, sharing of resources, and joint agenda for a peaceful Mozambique brought collective relief as the country never regressed into partisan violence.

RENAMO’s contentious and military origins excluded the possibility that it alone could govern Mozambique after a military victory (Newitt, 2002). But because it challenged FRELIMO in an apolitical manner, the response required the use of force for FRELIMO’s fledgling government. Without definitive diplomatic direction or strong international support, force in response to RENAMO was the only viable option to immediately addressing the chaos created by the disruption in transportation and communications networks. This had the effect of reducing FRELIMO’s legitimacy which then allowed RENAMO leaders time to establish an insurgent political agenda that would contribute to and challenge FRELIMO’s national project. Strong support for RENAMO existed throughout the rural countryside as a result of FRELIMO’s empty promises of well-being through socialism for all Mozambicans, a policy of "villagization", and FRELIMO distrust of traditional authority as conspirators with the Portuguese throughout the war of independence (Geffray, 1990). Rumors existed of re-education camps that only a few anthropologists had any evidence of (Geffray, 1990; Minter, 1994; Finnegan, 1992), and these only added to the allure of RENAMO as a force of liberation from FRELIMO’s failed efforts at socialist unification.

Although a modest amount of American military aid was disbursed to Mozambique,
it was not until elections were promised and a comprehensive international effort to bring about peace that military support was provided. This may have been the consequence of an effort to legitimate a potentially unified Mozambican military, but it may also have been in preparation of any electoral violence if Dhlakama and RENAMO rejected the election results. Aid was likely related to Cissano’s newly formed relations with the United States and a hastily formed pro-FRELIMO direction for President Bush’s government. In any case, there was no observable trend towards repression after the disbursement occurred. This is largely because of the timing as Mozambique was already halfway to peace, but also because of a lack of juridical sovereignty or resources to continue repression. The process from aid disbursement to repression followed the theoretical pathway without juridical sovereignty, and FRELIMO incumbents were exhausted to the point where they had to concede to RENAMO claims to political power. Continuing to fight the war was not only more costly, it was outright impossible given the lack of international support for a military victory, domestic legitimacy, and resources of war. Concession and co-opting of opposition elites may have actually legitimated FRELIMO more than any appeals to military victory would have (Allina, 2012; Mampilly, 2011; Englebert, 2009).

Niger, 2014

Distinct from Angola and Mozambique temporally, spatially, and colonially, Niger 2014 also presents itself as the only aid recipient where the security discourse mechanism also became applicable. Niger was a former French colony and like most other Francophone African nations it was subject to regular interventions from its former colonizer (Chafer, 2002). Generally, these interventions were in opposition to expanding Anglophone or Arabic influences, or to otherwise protect friendly regimes from internal threats. Research on Francophone Africa has noted that the successful creation of a French sphere of influence immediately after "independence" in its former colonies elevated the likelihood that they would remain welcoming of foreign assistance and intervention for decades (Schmidt, 2013; van Walraven,
Since independence, Niger has regularly alternated between unsuccessful efforts at civilian rule and military dictatorship. As recently as 2010, a coup was staged against lame duck President Tandja, who refused to back down from his efforts to pass a referendum allowing him to modify the constitution to serve a third term (Idrissa and Decalo 2012).

Apart from an inconsistent effort to balance civilian and military governance, the strongest demonstration of Nigerien legitimacy is the government’s efforts to regulate the practice of Islam. In 2013 the Nigerien government announced that it would transfer supervision of Islamic clerics, mosques, and buildings from one national Islamic council to a new, separate council that was created with the explicit purpose to support Islam in line with the national culture of Niger (Elischer 2015). The context for this control was an increase in violent incidents between Salafi and Sufi Islamic groups in cities throughout Niger. Imams used radio programming and Friday mosque services to portray Sufi elements as incompatible with Islam and Niger as a whole, so a system was established to issue and revoke prayer licenses. Beyond this, the government under President Tandja also began to appraise the content of Mosque services, deployed state forces against radical Islamic elements in urban centers, and heavily restricted the creation of any new Islamic associations. Few other countries on the African continent have stuck such a widely accepted balance between professed religiosity and a high level of regulation of the practice of religion (Elischer 2015). This also has the added benefit of creating a natural cooperation between incumbents and a strong non-political ally that can be used to deflect civil society challenges to state. For example, in protests against a proposed finance law, these same Islamist organizations supervised by the state called for a return to "serenity" and labeled the protests as "antisocial politics." (Elischer and Mueller 2017).

Several recent events or persistent conditions have endowed Niger’s incumbents with substantial juridical sovereignty. In addition to a history of French intervention and unpredictable domestic political events, Niger benefits immensely from any foreign investment because it is consistently one of the poorest countries on earth—in 2014, Niger had the eighth
smallest GDP per capita in the world at under $430 per person. Its uranium mines provide
one third of the fuel necessary for French nuclear reactors and as of about 2008 the country
began to receive consistent financing, training, and troop support from the Pentagon [Idrissa
and Decalo, 2012]. These are the two largest external revenue sources for Nigerien, and in-
cumbents are therefore tied to any conditions associated with this international investment.
Purely symbolic "transfers" of support in the form of validation of elections and visits by
state officials and top generals are especially effective in Niger and for any regime complicit
with American security agendas (Paul 1982; Keenan 2009; Englebert, 2009).

The context for millions of dollars of American military aid to Niger is the global war on
terror (GWOT). Although the original "war on terror" began under President Reagan as an
effort to combat Soviet-inspired political movements, the new war on terror has been explicit-
ly directed at radical Islamist militancy. In the African context, the focus has transitioned
from recruitment to terrorist cells in the Middle East and Southeast Asia to active mobiliza-
tion within African countries (Lake and Whitman 2006). Niger has consistently been at risk
of challenges across its territory, not just from the likes of Boko Haram along the southern
border with Niger, but deep in the Sahara where al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
has operated against civilians and armed forces of Niger, Libya, Algeria, and Mali (Chafer,
2002; Abdulla 2009). These destabilizing and potentially deligitimizing forces, coupled with
the reliance on France for economic support and the recent alliance with the United States,
have made Nigerien incumbents quite disposed to international legitimacy in the face of
faltering or non-existent domestic legitimacy (Mueller and Matthews, 2016).

The disbursement of American military aid in 2012 and matched PTS score of 2.5 in 2014
is closely connected with uncertainty and a search for stability in President Issoufou’s new
civilian government. The first major security test came in 2011, when the Nigerien military
successfully prevented heavily armed militants from entering Niger after their brief stint as
mercenaries in a chaotic Libya (Abdulla 2009). This would have created a major power
struggle, as manifested in Mali. Armed separatists empowered splinter Islamic groups and
without a rapid response from the French military, the Malian government and army would have collapsed entirely. The Nigerien army was slightly more prepared for a conflict, but thanks to its initial efforts to secure its northern border it avoided a similar calamity. Since then, collaboration with American and French soldiers on reconnaissance and patrol missions has led the Issoufou administration define stability as alignment of its national security agenda with the broad American regional agenda. And in return, Issoufou’s government began to receive what Keenan (2009) refers to as "terrorism rents"—a pretext to shutter any forms of opposition civil society and to continue to receive (military) aid for as long as a credible terrorist presence exists (Elischer and Mueller, 2017).

Just a few years into American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, defense strategists developed an implausible theory of how terrorists from Afghanistan had traveled first to East Africa and then the Sahel region bordering coastal West Africa and the Sahara desert (Keenan, 2009). This theory, the kidnapping of several tourists in the Algerian desert (kidnappings possibly orchestrated by Algerian special forces), public Defense Department desires for expansion of military programs in Africa, and a supposed agenda of "new imperialism" bent on strategically winning a new Scramble for Africa for the lion’s share of the continent’s natural resource wealth collectively led to a decade-long escalation of the American military presence across the Sahel and into Niger (Lake and Whitman, 2006). Resistance to this American "invasion" was directly associated with increased militarism throughout the region. This was a defensive rather than offensive reaction, precisely because governments across the Sahel and into Niger continue to discriminate against pastoral, nomadic, and smuggling-based lifestyles (Idrissa and Decalo, 2012; Keenan, 2009; Abdulla, 2009). AFRICOM operations in the early 2000s and the growing publicity of the supposedly wide extent of the Islamic militancies successfully lead to a sense of insecurity throughout the region (Keenan, 2009), which allows the collaborative relationship between the American military and Sahelian governments to continue unabated.

Despite recent downscaling of the American Armed Forces presence in Niger, the effect
of concentrated aid in the late 2000s and early 2010s has supported a consistently high level of repression. The drone base has been completed and is now operated and maintained by the CIA, and a major operations center in the south of the country has been gifted to the Nigerien Armed Forces (News24 2019). American troops on the ground have been reduced in favor of intelligence and Special Operations forces, especially after the ill-prepared and botched Tongo-Tongo raid resulted in four American casualties (Cooper, Gibbons-Neff and Schmitt 2018). Increasing gifts of intelligence have not necessarily correlated with rapid learning or easy implementation of American-backed technology, as is frequently the case with advanced surveillance technology (Göpfert 2016). The promotion of the partnership with Niger has already had a lasting effect on repression in the years immediately after 2014. Niger is now one of the more active members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in joint security operations, whether against Boko Haram or AQIM. This has led to more reliance on Nigerien Armed Forces rather than partners in Mali, Nigeria, and Chad. Domestically, Issoufou has also been able to consolidate power and repress opposition without a ripple of international backlash. Hama Amadou, the leading opposition candidate in the 2016 elections, was detained for the entirety of the 2016 elections and opposition protests against Issoufou’s security agenda were violently disrupted, resulting in civilian casualties on several occasions (Mueller and Matthews 2016). The United States and France called the reelection results free and fair, despite the opposition casualties and election irregularities.

Niger is heavily endowed with both American military aid and juridical sovereignty. More importantly, Issoufou and Tandja’s calls for increased national security vis-à-vis increased foreign military investment have resoundingly triumphed over any opposition discourse for an independent and self-sustaining Niger. This includes both opposition to the American "invasion," but also sustained yet quiet opposition to French economic hegemony over Niger’s mineral wealth. While the country’s PTS score remained low in 2014 relative to previous years, it spiked in the build-up to the 2016 elections with Amadou’s arrest and the use of
lethal weapons against non-violent civilians. These increasingly repressive acts have not mer-
ited any reconsideration of additional military support for Issoufou’s administration, as his
country received tens of millions of military aid each year since his election. With increased
American opposition to the deployment of troops on the ground, aid might actually increase
in the coming years. The consequences of this uncritical support could be devastating, both
for Issoufou or other politician’s ambitions for political power and for civilians attempting
to supplant the security discourse their leaders relentlessly advance.

3.4 Conclusion

Across the three cases, I discovered that each had a different observable amount of re-
pression despite some basic similarities. Each case occurred after the Cold War, was a former
colony on the African continent, and was in conflict two years after aid was disbursed and
the same year a PTS score was assigned. Angola and Mozambique’s decolonization story and
progression into civil conflict bare marked similarities to each other, while Niger’s history
of French intervention and a cycle of coups and civilian governance resembles similar stories
throughout Francophone Africa and invites additional case-study testing.

Regardless of the fact that the American military aid had distributed zero dollars to
MPLA—the otherwise internationally recognized government of Angola—some juridical sovereignty
had been provided by a combination of Cuban soldiers, Soviet military aid, recognition by
the OAU, and oil investors. In fact, while these actors were supplying the Angolan govern-
ment with international recognition, the United States maintained support for its wartime
opponent UNITA through its regional proxies. The collapse of apartheid South Africa and
Mobutu’s Zaire in the late 1990s resulted in an increasingly desperate war by UNITA. After
Jonas Savimbi died in battle, UNITA leadership had little choice but to concede that the
movement was defeated. This peace process occurred after the cutoff study year of 1997,
but because of the MPLA’s control of the state and international legitimacy it never truly
established accountability for the civilians in its territory—apart from security. This had dire consequences as incumbents in the MPLA party maintained that most political dissent (*confusão*) was equatable to wartime guerrilla violence. In the years immediately after 1997 and the 2002 peace, few had the audacity to challenge the MPLA’s deeply repressive, anti-UNITA rhetoric and rule.

The case of Mozambique was similar to Angola in terms of historical build-up to a civil war between self-proclaimed socialist and anti-socialist movements and a peace effort after the end of the Cold War. I identified three key areas of difference from Angola apparent throughout the conflict: in-fighting between liberation movements, international actor participation, and lack of natural resources. Without a decisive military victory over competing liberation movements, the FRELIMO government did not immediately warrant strong consideration for international support. Its strongest aid donors were humanitarian and infrastructural aid from Nordic countries and China, donors supportive of Mozambique’s non-aligned position throughout the Cold War dynamic. Ultimately, it was the lack of natural resources that forced FRELIMO and RENAMO to reconcile with each other once they had reached total destitution. A successful UN peacekeeping mission temporarily reduced FRELIMO’s sovereignty while inviting RENAMO into the political scene, but the outcome of the elections in favor of Chissano and FRELIMO combined with Dhlakama’s acceptance of electoral defeat created the conditions for lasting peace. The bulk of the repression in Mozambique had occurred before American military aid was disbursed, but it coincided with pending elections and improved relations between Mozambican and American Presidents rather than as an effort to end the civil war in FRELIMO’s favor. Whether aid was disbursed with the promise of unification or the possibility of post-electoral violence remains unclear, but in any case it was preventative, insignificant, and unassociated with repression after the successful peace process.

In Niger, a substantial disbursement of American military aid followed several successive years of disbursements and direct support for President Issoufou’s stance as an American ally
in the war on terror. Nigerien incumbents had been highly receptive of any international investment in their country for decades, as empirical sovereignty remained minimal and French decolonization efforts had left Niger available to foreign intervention and support of friendly regimes. To justify his increasingly repressive stance towards political and civilian opposition, President Issoufou maintained that the American agenda for regional security was parallel to Niger’s national security interests. This rhetoric resoundingly rejected Nigerien commodity and electoral-based protests in 2014 and in the build-up to the 2016 elections, and the result was often violent clashes with non-violent protests and seemingly unlawful detention of political opponents. Repression definitively increased after Issoufou justified its implementation in the interest of national security. Meanwhile, American donors kept writing checks and looking the other way with the Nigerien security force’s human rights record. Their endowed support for Issoufou leaves an entire toolkit of repressive options available for use.

Cumulatively, these three cases reached two separate outcomes in the proposed causal pathway, despite the absence of American military aid in Angola (Figure 3.1). Substantive documentation of the processes leading to various incumbent decisions left little room for ambiguity or bias towards a desirable interpretation of the different causal pathways. The Angolan and Mozambican civil wars are two of the most well-studied on the continent, both because of their duration and the high level of atrocities committed against civilians. And Niger, apart from being an iconic case of American counterterrorist involvement in Africa, has been a personal interest for over three years—I remain well-informed of the characteristics and events of Issoufou’s presidency. Again, the evaluation of these cases was not intended to intentionally validate multiple causal pathways in varied outcomes of repression, but rather to establish that in none of the cases American military aid was the outcome of an incumbent’s use of repression. Angola presented the possibility that legitimacy by other means could result in increased repression, Mozambique demonstrated that American military aid can be unaffiliated with repression, and Niger demonstrates that security discourse by incumbents
combined with the necessary weapons and international support can lead to a public increase in repression.
Chapter 4

Conclusion

I would be remiss to not recognize that the most important methodological contribution to this analysis was a pilot research trip to Ghana that inspired the entire project, and the results of which I have referred to periodically throughout this work. The practice of conducting on-the-ground field research was immensely rewarding and yielded a more nuanced understanding of phenomena that I could have researched from afar. Social scientists studying the African continent are notoriously content with rarely or never visiting the locales they claim to be "experts" on. I wanted to break with this convention, both for the betterment of the present research and to position myself as ideologically committed to a more personal practice of African Studies in the future. However, I intentionally minimized the inclusion of these findings—selecting the Ghanaian case not only would have biased my results, but it would have made for a less holistic growth in my research capacity. The methodological contribution of the interview process was essentially to discourage cherry-picking cases and to keep my perspective and motivations at the center of my research, regardless of whether or not the evidence supported my normative concerns for increased American military involvement in Ghana and West Africa more broadly.

I have argued that a mixed-methods approach was necessary to offer preliminary results testing the relationship between American military aid and repression. I noted a lack of
quantitative estimates or causal inference about how these two variables might be related. Based on a theoretical framework utilizing the mechanisms of misuse of military aid, juridical sovereignty, and security discourse, I hypothesized that more American military aid would be associated with more repression. To test this hypothesis, I conducted regression analysis of a compiled dataset of American military aid, humanitarian aid, macroeconomic indicators, foreign weapons sales, repression indexes, and other controls. After compiling results in several models and conducting robustness checks, there was robustly negative and statistically significant relationship between American military aid and repression, directly challenging my hypothesis. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that American military aid generally is limited in the number of international pariahs it supports. Another possibility is that reported American military aid has decreased as time has progressed, and that covert and Special operations are more detrimental to domestic opposition and supportive of incumbent legitimacy. Lastly, the analysis point may be too far removed from what actually matters: the availability of juridical sovereignty and an accompanying struggle between different domestic discourses. In future analyses, indexes that measure the availability of juridical sovereignty and the prominence of security discourse would be invaluable to understanding the interaction with an aid disbursement.

I then continued with my intended plans to comparatively analyze three cases representative of the spectrum of American military aid—Angola, 1997; Mozambique, 1994; and Niger, 2014. These three cases were similar because of their low GDP per capita at the time of disbursement, conflict, and all randomly happened to be former colonies on the African continent. Using the same theoretical mechanisms and after identifying plausible pathways from aid disbursement to an observable change in repression, I researched relevant historical processes leading up to aid disbursement in each of these countries. I determined that Angola’s lack of American military aid did not stop its incumbents from implementing repressive policies, because it still held juridical sovereignty with the recognition that its liberation movement faction had won the war for independence. The Soviet Union and OAU
were two major supporters of the MPLA government, but oil companies also had a stake in legitimating MPLA and its wartime practices. Mozambique’s incumbents received some military aid but did not alter their repressive stance because aid was disbursed during the peacemaking process. Moreover, Mozambique was a recipient of multinational financial and humanitarian aid, not military tied up in a Cold War power struggle like the civil war in Angola. Without juridical sovereignty and after years of psychological and financial exhaustion, repression would have been immensely costly and nearly impossible to justify because an outright military victory seemed impossible. Lastly, in Niger an extended history of juridical sovereignty left the country open to American payments in the form of "terrorism rents" that have directly financed President Issoufou’s capacity to repress and win elections. The United States and France symbolically transferred legitimacy to President Issoufou by describing the 2016 elections as free and fair despite irregularities, violence, and detention of leading opposition figures. They have praised Issoufou as a savvy statesman and the Nigergien military as a powerhouse in regional counterterrorism initiatives. This praise enabled Issoufou to state that national security interests would be indefinitely tied up in American and international security interests, and any dissidents would be opposing a multinational counterterrorist cohort. These three cases represent two of the four proposed causal pathways I designed in my theoretical framework.

Although the quantitative results seemed to disprove the theoretical framework I had initially posited, there are several limitations to this analysis. One possible limitation is that I am lacking an interaction between two variables—military aid disbursement and juridical sovereignty. The United States may provide military aid, but without a representation of how responsive each country is to external rather than internal legitimacy I have not yet fully represented the observable and presently quantifiable phenomena in my study. It has been suggested to me to see if there is a way to operationalize Bill Easterly’s data on declassified CIA interventions, which may not be relevant for the timespan of this analysis but could be included in a revisionary analysis. Other data limitations included correcting for the error
produced by analyzing a panel of data: a fundamental principle of statistical analysis is that all observations are independent of each other, but each country may relate to itself in previous years. The newly vetted panel-correction function in R studio did not function with my dataset, so I settled for an alternative that produced a less accurate error term. Lastly, I noted some reporting issues in the principal measure of repression PTS, and that throughout my analysis, my data were restricted to sovereign nation-states and not insurgent, non-state political entities.

The principal limitation of process-tracing is that I was not able to fully maximize my archival research methods by combing through records of the cases that I did study. These records would have provided much more detail on anecdotes of misuse of American military aid and the discourses being employed by incumbents and opponents in the years after American military aid was disbursed. The cases I did select were grouped into like cases, but although they controlled for important commonalities their universality is questionable. Studying three cases on the African continent unintentionally put me in a tough position to defend the representativeness of my analysis. Luckily, the disparate results for different amounts of aid collectively supported the causality that I proposed wherein American military aid precedes repression. Even in Angola and Mozambique where American aid was not associated with repression, juridical sovereignty by other means lead to MPLA to repress after peace in Angola, and repression had concluded with the war in Mozambique by the time American aid was disbursed. Although process tracing necessitates a small-\(n\) analysis to facilitate comparison, I would have preferred to analyze four cases at a minimum, but due to time constraints this was not possible.

Based on the statistical results and the political economy focus of the present study, the most salient area for future study is that of humanitarian aid. Wood and Wright (2016) and Apodaca (2017) have already noted a significant association between humanitarian aid in the event of natural disaster, but analysis seems to become readily more complicated in conflict zones. In Mozambique for example, humanitarian aid did not result in a wider spiral
into conflict, but during the same time period as the Mozambique peacekeeping mission, conflict persisted in Somalia despite a major UN humanitarian and peacekeeping initiative (Honwana, 2002; Adam, 2002). Part of this may be that because during conflict, aid provision may never be completely partial. The causality of the relationship between humanitarian aid and repression remains somewhat unclear and would require a different causal identification strategy to resolve its own endogeneity problem. Without establishing causality, my analysis and the statistically significant positive association found between humanitarian aid and repression has contributed to existing empirical accounts of the capacity of incumbents to manipulate well-intentioned humanitarian aid donors into receipt and therefore control of aid. Humanitarian aid remains understudied and few authors have attempted to analyze a universe of aid recipient cases or even a sample of them. Any future analysis of aid will encounter the same limitation I did, which is that outside of public reporting by USAID, humanitarian aid from European and Chinese donors remains spottily consistent at best.

Another possible extension for future studies is investigation into growing military and development aid battles between the United States and China on the African continent (Bi, 2011). These confrontations and new spheres of influence have been referred to as a new Scramble for Africa, or even a new Cold War. Efforts at evaluating Chinese aid worldwide like the Global Chinese Finance Dataset are crucial to more thoroughly criticizing these international dynamics. This dataset does include all known forms of developmental assistance by country-year, therefore one could include Chinese developmental aid in comparison to these results. Many have already noted how this may be worthwhile precisely because developmental aid can endow incumbents with increased domestic legitimacy, and with China being the leading development investor Chinese disbursements may have a higher impact than disbursements from other donors (Zhang, 2011). In Niger and throughout West Africa, many oppose the increased risks associated with a greater American military presence, but many more oppose Chinese investments in their country’s development as a precursor to commercial development (Kotin, 2018; Bob-Miliar, 2018). Limited African trust stems from
an ambiguous understanding of whether China’s intentions in international trade and diplomacy will benefit or exploit developing countries.

Some studies suggest that China’s ability to procure investment deals with international pariahs may actually reduce repression in the long-term ([Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small] 2008). In fact, China was one of the only countries able to apply diplomatic pressure on Sudan and Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s, but it primarily did so to maintain positive relations with Western powers while staying true to its geo-economic plans for investment, development, and extraction, particularly on the African continent ([Zhao] 2011). The Chinese conception of human rights is also distinct from Western human rights, in that it guarantees the provision of basic rights—food, shelter, economic development, and security ([Taylor] 2011). Sovereignty is referred to as a "guarantor" of human rights, but not civil liberties within that sovereign nation. China’s approach to human rights is undoubtedly more compatible with African philosophical thought, both in relation to the importance placed on community and the deprioritization of civil liberties in favor of basic security ([Gyekye] 1996; [Wiredu] 2004; [Taylor] 2011). This may lead incumbents in "quasi-states" on the African continent to maintain their clientelistic networks and simply change funding sources to China, forming a wider net of developing nations supporting and investing in each other ([Jackson] 1987; [Taylor] 2011).

With ambiguous understandings about the intentions of any foreign involvement on the African continent comes a pertinent need to evaluate all international partnerships—including American military aid, international humanitarian aid, and Chinese development—remain transparent, and serve as many in need as possible. As evidenced by the disparate understandings of humanity between Western, Islamic, Chinese, and African philosophical thought, growing divisions create a growing need to reset and attempt to understand our differences ([Devji] 2008; [Taylor] 2011; [Gyekye] 1996; [Bhawoh] 2017; [Bilgin] 2017). With my analysis, I intended to fulfill as many of these objectives as possible while following best social science practices. Although my statistical results do not condemn American military involvement,
support for my theoretical framework after process tracing analysis may contribute to generalizable understandings of how to interrupt the processes leading to repression, a process that implicates many interconnected international actors (Young, 2006). Seemingly disparate understandings of human rights abuses may intersect, or better their differences might produce dialogue and learning that moves us away from animosity and closer to peaceful coexistence, one that does not require any American military aid at all. Regardless of whether or not American aid has any direct bearing on basic human rights, we as scholars and social citizens of the world have an obligation to resolve our individual differences for the improvement of the broader human community we belong to.
Chapter 5

Appendix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ln(US mil aid)</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Population)</td>
<td>-1.087***</td>
<td>-0.965***</td>
<td>-1.363***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP per capita)</td>
<td>0.194***</td>
<td>0.194***</td>
<td>0.083**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI as % of GDP</td>
<td>-6.722 (165.410)</td>
<td>18.962 (165.501)</td>
<td>101.088 (158.677)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource rents</td>
<td>6.716 (165.410)</td>
<td>-18.968 (165.501)</td>
<td>-101.093 (158.677)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Oil per capita)</td>
<td>-0.135***</td>
<td>-0.135***</td>
<td>-0.058**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male pop ages 15-24</td>
<td>0.029 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.027 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(US Hum aid)</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(DAC Hum aid)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.018* (0.010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In conflict?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.250***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.062***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist bombings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>2616</td>
<td>2616</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table 5.1: Robustness checks using the CIRI physical integrity rights index instead of aggregate PTS score. Higher scores are less repressive, therefore we see a change in the direction of the relationship across all variables.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>(12)</th>
<th>(13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ln(US mil aid)</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
<td>0.018***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Population)</td>
<td>−1.804***</td>
<td>−2.125***</td>
<td>−2.681***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP per capita)</td>
<td>0.384***</td>
<td>0.387***</td>
<td>0.160***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI as % of GDP</td>
<td>466.691**</td>
<td>459.600**</td>
<td>366.280*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(230.513)</td>
<td>(230.683)</td>
<td>(202.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource rents</td>
<td>−466.676**</td>
<td>−459.586**</td>
<td>−366.272*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(230.513)</td>
<td>(230.683)</td>
<td>(202.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Oil per capita)</td>
<td>−0.267***</td>
<td>−0.270***</td>
<td>−0.116***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male pop ages 15-24</td>
<td>0.099***</td>
<td>0.100***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(US Hum aid)</td>
<td>−0.000*</td>
<td>−0.000***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(DAC Hum aid)</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>−0.030**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In conflict?</td>
<td>−0.173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity score</td>
<td>0.291***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist bombings</td>
<td>−0.070***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>2624</td>
<td>2624</td>
<td>2508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Robustness check model using CIRI’s empowerment rights index which aggregates availability of civil liberties. Some variables have lost significance or robust sign direction as compared to indicators of physical integrity violations.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 5.3: Year-fixed effect results, grouped by three eras: The Cold War, the Global War on Terror, and the 1990s. Interestingly, we see that repression has significantly increased on average between eras, likely reflecting many civil conflicts in the 1990s.

Table 5.4: Probit test explaining any missingness in macroeconomic development indicators. While it was expected that much missingness would be associated with conflict, this was not the case: being in conflict was associated with more complete data in relation to population and oil rents per capita.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Purpose and Description</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American military aid</td>
<td>The total dollar value of US military aid, excluding arms transfers. Funding categories include international training, financing, counter-drug funding, peacekeeping operations, cooperative threat reduction, and unspecified assistance.</td>
<td>1946-2016</td>
<td>USAID Greenbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression-physical integrity violations</td>
<td>This measure exclusively details the human condition of physical integrity rights, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and indefinite detentions. Unlike CIRI, this index does not distinguish between different sources terror–non-state actors can contribute to the perceived terror in a population.</td>
<td>1976-2016</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression-multiple physical types</td>
<td>Repression is equivalent to human rights abuses, measured across four categories: physical integrity, civil rights and liberties, women’s rights, and freedom of the judiciary. Each is divided into sub-categories, and these are then coded and scored along a different continuous scale for each freedom.</td>
<td>1981-2011</td>
<td>CIRI Human Rights Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese aid disbursals</td>
<td>This dataset includes all public Chinese aid disbursals across different sectors. This analysis will exclude commercial development aid as I do not view this as a competing explanation for state-sponsored repression.</td>
<td>2000-2011</td>
<td>Global Chinese Finance Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict</td>
<td>This dataset details country-year conflict events where at least one party involved was the state. One of many datasets produced by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.</td>
<td>1989-2017</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Total GDP of a state in a particular year (logged for analysis)</td>
<td>1960-2017</td>
<td>World Bank, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Purpose and Description</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Data Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Stock</td>
<td>FDI stock accumulated by a given state in a given year as proportion of total GDP</td>
<td>1960-2017</td>
<td>World Bank, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource rents</td>
<td>The value of unprocessed natural resource exports, including minerals, fossil fuels, and forestry, as a proportion of total GDP</td>
<td>1960-2017</td>
<td>World Bank, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil revenue</td>
<td>The value of oil exports as a proportion of total GDP</td>
<td>1960-2017</td>
<td>World Bank, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development publishes various datums on aid donations from a variety of donors and for various purposes. Of these, I include data on humanitarian aid both as a competing aid source and as a proxy for natural disasters and conflict. Data are available from the Development Assistance Committee, a group of principally European and some East Asian donors.</td>
<td>1995-2016</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>Although the United States is a member of the DAC, its aid agencies also provide humanitarian aid separately from the DAC. This is an additional humanitarian aid source and potentially competitive to US military aid, while also aiding in efforts to control for natural disasters and conflict. For compatibility and potential merging with DAC Humanitarian aid, I only include data from the same years.</td>
<td>1995-2016</td>
<td>USAID Aid Explorer, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>A continuous dataset converted into three categories: autocracy, democracy, and anocracy. A competing explanation to be interacted with American military aid.</td>
<td>1976-2016</td>
<td>Polity IV Index</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.3: Variable Descriptions, cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Purpose and Description</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military weapons</td>
<td>The trend-indicator value of total military hardware exports to recipient countries for a particular country year. Included are exports from the United States, Soviet Union, China and the sum of 17 European member-states of the DAC. These exporters are included for continuity and comparison temporally (Soviet Union from 1976-89, China from 2000 to present) and to serve as a proxy for military aid from DAC countries.</td>
<td>1950-2017</td>
<td>SIPRI TIV Importer/Exporter Tables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>A composite score representing the number of national (legislative and executive) elections in a given country year. Controls for potential election-related repression and conflict.</td>
<td>1976-2016</td>
<td>V-Dem 8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist bombings</td>
<td>An edited country-year aggregate representing number of terrorist attacks with greater than 15 casualties in a given country year. Reflects possibility internal shock disrupts policing capacity and rallies dissidents.</td>
<td>1990-2016</td>
<td>Systemic Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie and Andrew Small. 2008. “China’s new dictatorship diplomacy.”


Tsegah, Francis. 2018. “Interview by Lukas Matthews.”. Former Ambassador to Spain, Francis Tsegah warmly welcomed me to his office at the Centre for Democracy and Development. Date: Aug-17.


