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## Integrity and Identity

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Eileen Hanson

"Integrity and Identity"

Philosophy of personal identity has traditionally focused on answering a few key questions: What constitutes personal identity? How do we, or how should we, consider questions of re-identification and individuation? Most personal identity philosophy has, however, begun with a misleading view of persons. Both those theories which assert bodily identity, and those which assert a kind of psychological identity, mistake the nature of persons as objects from which individual parts can be removed, bit by bit. By treating the question of personal identity in the same way as the identity of objects, philosophers have developed theories of personal identity that are either circular or not sufficiently personal to be significant answers to the question.

Philosophy of personal of identity must involve aspects of personhood not previously considered in much of philosophy. Persons are distinctive among other objects in the world. Persons have complex psychological structures, whose nature it is to develop over time. This continual change makes it difficult to assign identity in the same way we can to objects such as tables and chairs. Persons have a history of experiences that determines how each new experience will be had. The beliefs about, desires regarding, and memories of, those experiences also impact each new experience. Any attempt to make experiences or memories something apart from one's identity (i.e., to give a non-personal account) begins with improper assumptions about persons. Personal identity cannot be dependent on any particular characteristic, but must rather be dependent upon the whole framework of a psyche. A proper recognition of this fact requires some revision in our view of persons.

However, a theory that properly accounts for the interconnectedness of each person's experiences is one that cannot hold to the traditional strong non-circularity conditions. Such strictly held conditions would require that any definition of personal identity be capable of being given in wholly non-circular terms. For instance, identity would have to be defined in terms which do not involve any understanding of "mine," "yours," "his" or "hers," as these terms intrinsically rely on some notion of identity. The strict holding of such conditions results in identity theories that cannot say anything significant about personal identity. I believe an "integrity" view of identity is the best solution to the question of personal identity because it reflects a view of persons as complex and changing. "Integrity" recognizes the nature of personal experiences as interconnected and interrelated events.

In an everyday sense, the most ready answers to questions of re-identification and individuation are based on bodily criteria. One recognizes others immediately by their outward characteristics. Events are claimed as mine that happen to my body. But these explanations prove unsatisfactory when we get beyond the simplest experiences. Everyone would agree that I am still the same person, even after my body has been irreparably damaged in an accident. Support for a psychological account of identity is often evident in literature or science fiction, where we can

imagine *ourselves* existing in a foreign body. In such a case, whatever it is that we believe gives us our identity is retained.

A psychological account of personal identity seems to come much closer to the way we actually conceive of ourselves. We assume that we are the same person as when we were children, not because our bodies have maintained any similarity to that time, but because there is some connection now with our experiences then. We remember things that happened to us in the past in a way that we do not remember things that happened to other people. Locke's theory of personal identity extends as far back as consciousness of past thought or action (Locke, "Of Identity and Diversity," in Perry, 39). This theory of identity relies essentially on memory. The memory of an experience assures identity with the person who had the experience.

The problem with this theory is that in order to give a full account of memory, as distinguished from belief or fantasy, we must assume identity. Its circularity is the fact that I must presume the identity of a person in order to ensure that they are in fact having a memory and not merely imagining an experience. Identity is what distinguishes a belief about a past experience from an accurate "memory" of that experience. Apart from its circularity, this account seems to give the best answers to questions of re-identification and individuation. Because this view comes so close to answering these questions, it has been defended in various forms in much of personal identity philosophy.

Perhaps the best and most extensive treatment of a psychological account of personal identity has been given by Derek Parfit. In *Reasons and Persons*, he gives a detailed defense of his psychological connectedness/continuity theory of identity. Parfit tries to give an account of personal identity, based on psychological connectedness, that avoids Locke's circularity.

Parfit begins by arguing that a Cartesian view of the self, as a separately existing entity, is unacceptable. He believes that the only true alternatives are what he calls "reductionist" views. A reductionist believes that "the fact of a person's identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more particular facts" (Parfit, 210). These facts might be concerning either the existence of parts of the brain, or the existence of certain psychological states.

Ultimately Parfit gives an account of personal identity that is much like Locke's. It relies on a certain connection with an experience in order to ascribe continuing identity. Parfit tries to amend this theory using a concept he calls quasi-memory. In doing so, he hopes to give a non-personal account of memory, to avoid Locke's circularity. He says that:

I have an accurate quasi-memory if (1) I seem to remember having an experience, (2) someone did have this experience, and (3) my apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of way, on that past experience (Parfit, 220).

He uses a thought experiment, *Venetian Memories*, to illustrate what he is saying. He imagines Jane, a friend of Paul's, who has never been to Venice. Paul was recently in Venice. They have agreed to undergo a procedure to transfer some of Paul's memories to Jane. This is to be accomplished by neurosurgery that will copy the

memory trace from Paul, and transfer it to Jane. After the surgery, Jane apparently remembers places and streets in Venice. She has an especially vivid memory of lightning striking the church tower of San Giorgio (Parfit, 220). Because she has never been to Venice, Jane does not immediately assume that the memory is her own. The question of ownership of the experience is, in a way, left open. Quasi-memory avoids the problem of circularity because the question of whose experience is being remembered remains unanswered. It need not presuppose identity. Thus, because memory can be given a non-personal account that does not presume identity, it can be used as a basis for personal identity.

There have been many challenges to the theory of identity put forward by Parfit. The concept of quasi-memory that he introduces is a particular point of controversy. Marya Schechtman's 1990 article, "Persons and Personhood," presents a challenge to quasi-memory. She argues that quasi-memory does not fulfill the role Parfit supposes that it does, nor can it ever do so (Schechtman, 79). Schechtman also questions the overall approach to personal identity that this field of philosophy has employed. In attacking Parfit's account, she is using his theory only as a central figure, in order to reveal the assumptions common to most theories of personal identity.

Schechtman's main objection to quasi-memory lies in the claim that it gives a non-personal account of memory. She cites an example of a long, somewhat detailed memory of an ordinary experience. The example is taken from a book by Edward Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study*. Casey remembers a rather ordinary experience with his family.

I recall going to the movie *Small Change* a few weeks ago--exactly when, I am not certain.... Anticipating a large crowd, we arrived early and were among the first to purchase tickets.... The children were especially restive and had difficulty staying in the line that had formed--Erin attempting some gymnastic tricks on the guardrail by the entrance, Eric looking at the posted list of coming attractions.... Once inside, we sought seats approximately in the middle of the theater, settled there, and interchanged positions a couple of times to adjust for the height of those sitting in front of us. The lights dimmed, and *Small Change* began directly. (Or was there not a short feature first?--I cannot say for sure.) The film was in French, with English subtitles. I have only a vague recollection of the spoken words; in fact, I cannot remember any single word or phrase, though I certainly remember the characters as *speaking*.... Of the music in the film I have no memory at all--indeed, not just of *what* it was, but *whether* there was any music at all.... While I am recollecting this uneven and incomplete sequence of filmic incidents, I find myself at the same time remembering my own children's ongoing reactions to the film.... These reactions are as intrinsic to the memory as is the unfolding of the film itself; so too is the mixture of pleasure and exasperation which I felt being located, as it were, *between* children and film (Casey, 25-26; quoted in Schechtman, 80).

Because this memory, with its vivid inclusion of some minor details, and the exclusion of many more details, is quite typical of the way we actually remember experiences, Schechtman uses it to point out where Parfit (and others) have gone wrong.

For Casey, the important and most distinct impressions were of his children, and him in relation to them, not of the movie itself. As Schechtman notes, this seems to be exactly the kind of memory that would be important in terms of personal identity. If quasi-memory is to be of any help in terms of a personal identity theory, this is the very kind of memory that must be able to be given a non-personal account. In the case of Casey's memory, we begin to see the difficulty of merely removing the name tag from the memory. The fact that it is Casey's memory is bound up in the entire memory itself.

A quasi-memory of such an experience would be difficult to imagine. The recipient (for instance, Jane as above) will not recognize any of the surroundings in the experience. Neither will she recognize any of the people involved in the memory, whom Casey remembers as his wife and children. There may be simple ways to account for these differences, but the alien nature of this memory does not stop at just a few features.

If Jane speaks fluent French, then the experience of reading subtitles will be puzzling. And if she happens to have acted in this movie, or to be a musician, then her failure to recognize herself, or to remember whether there was any music, will be very disturbing (Schechtman, 82).

These differences get at the very differences between Casey and Jane.

If quasi-memory is supposed to be able to give a non-personal account of a memory, there are two alternatives for accounting for the differences in the memory experiences of Jane and Casey. It might be imagined that Jane will have the same kind of visual memory of the experience as Casey actually had. Jane will remember standing in line, watching children play while they wait. She will remember the visual images of the movie that Casey recalled. But, when Casey recalls his children watching playing, he remembers a certain feeling toward them. When he remembers the movie, not knowing French, he cannot recall any words or phrases. When Jane remembers the experience, she has no such feelings. Is this then a real alternative? If the content of Casey's memory in Jane is so empty, there is no reason to say that it still is Casey's memory. Only the bare structure of Casey's memory survives in Jane's quasi-memory.

"The second possible way to imagine this case," argues Schechtman, "is to imagine Casey's memory reproduced in Jane exactly, with all of its personal elements" (Schechtman, 83). For her quasi-memory to be anything close to accurate, Jane would have to remember the experience as something wholly different from the way she normally experiences the world, and not be alarmed by this aspect of the memory. Jane would have to remember the restaurant and theater not as the foreign places they are to her, but as the hometown places they are to Casey. Jane must

believe, as Casey does, that the children she sees are her own. "If these [personal elements] are included, however, then the desire [or memory] will fail to satisfy the requirement that it not presuppose facts about who has it, and it will be delusional" (Schechtman, 85).

While Jane's quasi-memory might contain all the same elements as Casey's memory, on either alternative, a non-personal quasi-memory cannot truly reproduce the way in which Casey remembers the experience. The ownership of the experience appears to be part of the very content of the memory, if it is to be sufficiently similar and yet be non-delusional.

The broader point that Schechtman brings out with this example is the view of persons that quasi-memory, like most theories of identity, presupposes. It assumes that an experience is separable from the person who experienced it. However, when the personal aspect, the "mineness," of a memory is removed, the significance of the memory in terms of personal identity is also removed. This means that a truly non-personal account will be impossible, and with that, the possibility of a strictly non-circular theory of identity. Clearly in Casey's case, his memory was entirely bound up with his prior experiences of his wife and children, his knowledge of his town, his own talents, likes and dislikes. The problem of plucking this memory trace from Casey and replacing it in Jane lies in this whole web of conditions that are part of his memory. In order to maintain a psychological view of identity, we must revise the way we conceive of the psychological. We must revise our view of persons to recognize the vast interconnectedness of memories, beliefs, desires and experiences.

I will argue that what is important about identity is the overall interaction among all of a person's memories, along with her beliefs, desires, thoughts and experiences. This involves a view of persons, briefly outlined in Schechtman's article, as "subjects, agents, creatures with a way of experiencing the world and with affect and volition" (Schechtman, 87). The integrity or coherence of this "way of experiencing the world" is ultimately going to be the basis for personal identity.

A theory of personal identity that does not depend on the holding of any particular belief or memory will more easily account for the kinds of things we hope and expect persons to engage in. The significance of an experience is not specifically the memory of it, but how it relates to and affects other experiences of the person. A memory, a belief, or a desire does not merely fill a conceptual space within a person. It is not like the color of an object that we can imagine changed without detriment to the whole. This framework is a highly integrated set of beliefs, desires, thoughts and experiences. To alter memories or belief is to change the fitting together of all one's experiences. Any particular set of experiences influences how new experiences will be incorporated. What beliefs one already holds will influence how and what new experiences will be had. One's particular desires will affect the way one experiences an event.

It is clear that this kind of theory will not hold to the strong non-circularity conditions. It presumes that experiences one will have are shaped by experiences one has had in the past. But those past experiences are also shaped by the set of beliefs, desires and experiences one had at that time, and one's reflection upon them now. One's identity is subject to a lengthy regress of influences. While this view does not

meet the conditions of strong non-circularity, I believe that, given some further explanation, it will be shown to be the most acceptable view of persons.

### **Integrity**

What is important about identity is the integrity of a person's particular set of experiences. By integrity, I mean something like the second notion outlined by Martin Gunderson as

...desires and values which do not irremediably conflict. This sense of "integrity" has to do with wholeness and might be called integration. A person can be integrated at a particular time, with desires and values that do not produce unresolvable conflicts.... One can also be integrated over time in that the desires and values continue over time and are not abandoned without good reason. New desires and values are integrated with current desires and values (Gunderson 1994).

It includes the coherence of experiences, thoughts and memories, as well as desires and values. Integrity is the general coherence of these experience and beliefs. It does not require that there exist no inconsistencies, but that an overall framework for incorporating new experiences exists. This framework is not necessarily a conscious process dictated by desires and beliefs; it is as primary as the way a particular brain processes information. Daniel Dennett's concept, which he called the Multiple Drafts Model, will be explored further (Dennett 1991, Part II).

This kind of integrity is what is important about identity, because a person's identity involves the entire framework of a psyche, not just particular beliefs or memories. The web of connections between and involving these particulars is the important factor. When this kind of integration changes very dramatically, or is missing altogether, we question personal identity. This is not to say that these particulars are not important. Obviously the vast connections that exist could not be without memories and experiences, but neither would those experiences exist--in the way that they do--without the particular web that they are embedded in. That is why the larger whole is more fundamental to identity. It shapes the very experiences that will be had, which impact who a person is.

Early on, many of the experiences that will shape this framework are outside of one's control. Environment may affect, or choices might be made regarding, the most fundamental elements of the way one will conceive of the world. For instance, a person (usually) has only one native language. One does not choose what this language will be (even to speak of it as the parents' choice seems a bit awkward). But this fact of one's experience is primary to the way one receives the rest of experience. Other things that fundamentally shape the way we will subsequently understand the world are a product of our own choice. Often our beliefs, things we have chosen for ourselves, which affect the way we view the world, are what we consider most important to our identity.

There is a kind of hierarchy of the psyche that places certain features in more prominent positions than others. That is, if they are removed or altered, some very

significant changes will occur in the whole interaction. Other pieces, while they fit into this larger scheme, have fewer, less important connections and can therefore be changed or removed without significant loss to the person. Where particular pieces fit in the overall structure, and their degree of connectedness, is something that is continually changed as persons experience new things. As new beliefs are formed, some experiences will gain new meaning, and therefore become a more integral part of the whole.

The degree to which a set of experiences can shift and change without dissolution is a fact that is determined by the experiences within that set. Accommodation of new, often very different thoughts and beliefs may be accomplished within a particular framework. A vital characteristic of an integrated set of beliefs and experiences is the capacity to accommodate new experiences and change.

An example will help clarify why integrity and coherence of a whole set of beliefs and experiences is more important to identity than any particular belief or memory. The conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus is often mentioned as a striking example of how one can be fundamentally changed.<sup>1</sup> The question of Saul's continuing identity is a real one. Saul, a first-century Jew in Palestine, was known for his persecution of the newly formed Christian sect. As Paul, a Christian, he becomes the sect's foremost proselytizer. Is this the same man who once persecuted Christians? Or is the taking of a new name a sign of some deeper change in Saul's identity?

In the case of Saul, it is certainly accurate to say that he is different. But to limit personal identity, in a way we limit the identity of objects, by merely matching certain attributes is to miss a fundamental feature of persons. Saul's religious belief changed dramatically on the road to Damascus; something he believed central to his identity was changed. I would argue, however, that the very way that this change happened is a part of Saul's identity. Paul the Christian has a great deal of connectedness with Saul the Jew. This is not merely due to particular memories of various Jewish customs or experiences, but to connectedness with Saul's very outlook on the world (obviously shaped by such customs and experiences). Saul is a first-century Jew who, through whatever dramatic conversion, came to believe in Christianity. As his letters often show, Paul retained a particular way of experiencing the world, closely connected to his identity as a Jew, and as a particular person, Saul. Saul shows the kind of thing I mean by integrity: what the identity of actual persons consists in. Some investigation of how the mind perceives and experiences will further support this view.

There is now one theory of mind that lends some support to an "integrity" view of the mind and persons. The result of its argument is that all experiences are distinguished from the experience of other persons in the very way that they are perceived--in the way that they are immediately integrated into a set of beliefs, desires, memories and thoughts.

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<sup>1</sup> This example, also cited by Gunderson, can be found in the 9th chapter of Acts, The Holy Bible.



Daniel Dennett's Multiple Drafts Model is an alternative to what he calls a Cartesian Theater. "The Cartesian Theater is a metaphorical picture of how conscious experience must sit in the brain" (Dennett, 107). Most people have some common-sense idea that because there is a point (namely, where the observer is) where sound and light arrive in order to be perceived, there exists some analogous point in the brain where sensations arrive and become conscious. After citing a number of experiments investigating when sensations become conscious, Dennett concludes that there is no such point. There is no "theater" in which sensations come together and become conscious. Each part of the brain discriminates sensations.

That is, once a particular "observation" of some feature has been made, by a specialized, localized portion of the brain, the information content does not have to be sent somewhere else to be rediscriminated by some "master" discriminator (Dennett, 113).

The reason this is important to an identity theory founded on integrity is because it shows how even sensations are continually interwoven. It shows that it is difficult to imagine even quasi-perceptions of another person, let alone quasi-memories. Perceptions themselves include a personal, perceptual signature that cannot be separated from the experience itself.

One patient, described by Dr. Oliver Sacks, demonstrates clearly how past experience determines perception ("To See and Not To See," in Sacks, 108-52). Virgil had been blind since early childhood, due to cataracts. His doctors also believed that he had a hereditary condition that slowly deteriorates the retina. Because of the believed low probability that Virgil would see, even with the cataracts removed, surgery was never performed. However, when Virgil was in his fifties, his fiancée convinced him to see her ophthalmologist. She was convinced that surgery to remove the cataracts was worth a try.

When Virgil finally agreed to have the surgery done, the doctors removed the cataracts on his right eye. After the bandages came off, there was no cry of excitement, as one might expect, from Virgil. Although his eyes were opened, the cataract removed, he looked blankly into the room. Finally, when the doctor questioned him about the success of the operation, he looked over and finally realized that "this chaos of light and shadow was a face--and indeed the face of his surgeon" (Sachs, 115). Along with Virgil's story, Sacks recounts similar stories of people whose sight was restored late in life. All had a similar experience, not *of seeing* when they awoke, but of confusion and blurriness.

Virgil seemed to do best at recognizing shapes and colors. He had trouble taking in an overall picture of something, but would instead focus on an angle or corner of it. He stared at the ears of his cat, in order to learn the visual pattern that would distinguish it, by sight, from his dog. Otherwise, he would use his tactile sense, as he had when he was blind, to distinguish objects. Virgil, like the patient in this case, had trouble "seeing" when he could not use his tactile sense to corroborate his visual input:

We led him to the glass case, which was closed, and asked him to tell us what was in it. He was quite unable to say anything about it, except that the nearest part was a handle.... S.B. was allowed to touch the lathe.... He ran his hands eagerly over the lathe, with his eyes tight shut. Then he stood back a little and opened his eyes and said: "Now that I've felt it, I can see" (Sacks, 133-34).

These patients clearly demonstrate that seeing is not a matter of merely having visual contact with an object. Because Virgil had no visual experience with which to connect his new experiences, he could not even make them out. Only by incorporating a sense with which he had much experience could he gather enough connections between the light, shapes and lines his eyes met, and his previous experience of the world.

Even as a perception occurs, it takes a place within the already existing set of experiences. In Virgil's case, his visual set was so diminished that he had trouble perceiving visually, even though he could, in a physical way, "see." Through a general description of "integrity," and the support of Dennett's theory of mind, I have shown how and why "integrity" is better suited as a basis for identity. The last section of my paper is devoted to examples of how I see "integrity" functioning as a theory of personal identity.

There are some interesting questions that an "integrity" view of identity raises. As for all theories of personal identity, one must look seriously at the ethical implications of an "integrity" view of identity. I will conclude with a case from Ronald Dworkin's book, *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual Freedom*, and with another brief example from Dr. Sacks.

The case of Margo, an aging Alzheimer's patient, is described in Dworkin's book. Margo is a woman who has given an advance directive not to give life-saving treatment when she has entered the late stages of the disease. Her identity is in question because in this advanced stage of Alzheimer's, she is described by her doctor as "one of the happiest people I have ever known" (Dworkin, 221).

At some time before the disease had destroyed much of her ability to make and recall memories, Margo had given this advance directive. Presumably, there was a slowly diminishing effect of Margo's abilities. A certain medical student, Andrew Firlik, began to visit Margo at her apartment and observe her condition. By this point Margo was indeed in the later stages of Alzheimer's and had little if any connection with her previous self. The observations that Firlik makes, and Dworkin repeats, may not give us Margo's psychological state in full detail, but they do give some indication.

Firlik seems to think that whoever Margo now is, she has no memory of her advance directive. He describes her as happy, and gives no indication that she expresses otherwise. For the sake of clarity, let us say that Margo is the woman who

has lived fifty-four years as a competent person. The question remains whether this person is still Margo (and should abide by Margo's decisions).<sup>2</sup>

If identity is dependent upon the existence of some integrated coherent set of experiences, then this current Alzheimer's patient (I will call her Muriel, for now) does not appear to operate with the same set. Muriel is a woman who, however simple these desires are, likes peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwiches, reads mysteries (in a manner) and goes to painting class. It is not just that Margo's memories are no longer present; the things she may have enjoyed are not the activities that Muriel now seems to enjoy.

Muriel has a different "way of experiencing the world." It has a much shorter history and may entail simpler desires, but she does have a way of understanding the world. Her web of connections, while it may not always contain such specifics as the name of the young medical student, exists as a simple pattern for experiencing things. The most convincing, and possibly the most crucial, fact deciding on their separate identities is that even important core beliefs are not retained, or even missed. It is crucial that she has no memory of Margo's directive (or even the recognition of something lacking), because this shows that even the bare structure of Margo's psyche--without particular memories--does not even exist. If the basic structure was retained, there would be some feeling of loss of the particular missing memories. It is unfortunate that such a fundamental piece of one's self can be lost like that, and that no one can really be sure when it has happened; but clearly Margo has already ceased to exist. There is no reason for Margo's advance directive to be followed if Margo, as a set of coherent memories, beliefs, desires and experiences, no longer exists.<sup>3</sup>

Another of the stories recounted in *An Anthropologist On Mars* is the story of a painter who loses his ability to distinguish color. It shows the other aspect of "integrity" as a basis for identity. Integrity of the whole preserves personal identity when a reductionist view, resting on particular characteristics of a person, might not achieve as easily.

Mr. I., as the patient is known, was a rather successful artist who was in a car accident a few months before contacting Dr. Sacks. As an artist, he had been famous for his use of abstract color. For Mr. I., color was fundamental to the way he experienced the world. This man, who has conceived his whole world in terms of

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<sup>2</sup> Whether or not the patient is a "person" could also be called into question, depending upon one's conception of personhood. I would certainly classify her as a person, but not necessarily the same person. A possible criterion for personhood might be related to what qualifies as the same person. Whether or not an individual has an integrated set of memories, beliefs, desires and experiences is a possible determination of personhood.

<sup>3</sup> A case of Alzheimer's, such as Margo's, is different than respecting one's dying wishes (in the ordinary sense) because if she had simply died, there would be no risk of interrupting a happy person's life.

color (even hearing music and associating vivid color images in his head) can no longer distinguish anything but four basic shades of grey.

What does this brief example say in terms of identity based on some notion of integrity, and a "way of experiencing the world"? I believe it brings out a point, like the other examples, about how far "integrity" extends; where identity ceases and when it is reasonably in question.

Mr. I. has obviously lost something that is crucial to the way he comprehends the world. This fact makes it reasonable to question whether the man, who now sees tomato juice as black, and fruit as leaden grey (Sacks, 3 and color plates), is the same man as the famous artist. The intervening months of depression following the accident demonstrate that Mr. I. himself was dealing with questions of his identity.

Somehow, though, I think the very disturbance that these new events cause him are evidence that his former framework is still somewhat intact. He retains something of the previous forms or coherent structure in his mind. Unlike Margo, he realizes something is deeply wrong. He does not just miss those things which any person would lack in his situation. He misses the joy of listening to music because of his colorblindness. It is not that he is altogether ignorant of color; quite the contrary, he has nearly memorized the color charts he used as an artist. What Mr. I. misses is a very significant portion of *his* abilities. However, enough of his framework has been preserved so that he realizes that it is *his* dog that now appears dark grey. He feels the particular anguish of seeing *his* wife as statue grey (Sacks, 7).

As Mr. I. lives in this greyish world of diminished contrast, he begins to change. It is especially evident because he is an artist. Even after his accident, he feels the need to express what he sees and feels through art. His first painting after his accident is entitled *Nuclear Sunrise*. He paints it after driving to work, seeing a black sunrise on the horizon. This is an experience Mr. I. could probably never have had if he had maintained full color vision.

People judging this work might think it was done by an entirely different artist than his earlier paintings. However, I would argue that his identity continues, because even given this tremendous change, that change has been accommodated within a single, coherent set of beliefs and experiences. This new experience has dramatically reordered those experiences, but the process for accommodating them has been fixed by all his prior experience.

Jonathan Glover conceives of identity as a connectedness that "tends to make life like a novel by a single author" (Glover, 152). Even the story of Mr. I.'s accident and visual impairments would be told differently if told by another author or artist, as it were. Mr. I.'s story may be radically different at beginning and end, but, to some degree, this is a feature we hope for in actual persons, even more so that we do in characters in novels. Mr. I. has so many connections to that experience, before and after, that to focus only on the differences of the extreme ends of the story is to overlook the narrative in between: this vast web of experiences, beliefs and desires.

A proper conception of persons, and one which will be helpful in determining identity, cannot be held if the interconnection of experiences is ignored. To remove or displace one aspect of experience brings with it many connections within a person. An "integrity" view of personal identity best captures the complexity of persons. It allows for varying degrees of development and growth. It accounts for

our intuitions about the psychological basis of identity, and yet it views persons as subjects of many different thoughts, beliefs, desires, memories and experiences. When so much is displaced that there ceases to be the same (or any) coherent set of experiences, capable of integrating new experiences, that person ceases to be. As Schechtman argues, in order to maintain a view of persons that will be significant in terms of personal identity, one must abandon the condition of strong non-circularity. Although an "integrity" view assumes that previous experience will greatly affect new experience, it still outlines a workable theory of identity.

I have tried to illustrate the working out of such a theory in the various examples of Margo, Saul and Mr. I. These examples exhibit the situations when real questions of identity arise. Each is his or her own coherent, integrated system of experiences. How this interacts and changes in the world involves the identity of the person. Identity comes into question when something central to the whole is strongly affected. An "integrity" view of identity helps answer how and why each is a person, and at the same time when each might cease to be the same person.

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