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Nena T. Davis

"Revising The Lockean Memory
with the Discovery of the Lockean Unconscious"

Contemporary Philosophers of Mind, when studying John Locke, tend to focus on his Memory Theory of Personal Identity. Most find Locke's contention that if one forgets a past action, he or she should not be held responsible for it as a moral agent, to be counter-intuitive. At the same time, however, many philosophers realize that Locke was "on to something" when he said that our memory was related to our identity as persons. There has been a general debate within the discipline since Locke wrote his *Essay concerning the Human Understanding* as how to best revise Locke's theory so that it gives a better picture of memory and its relation to our lives as moral agents, or persons.

While this debate is rather interesting, in this paper I am more concerned about Locke's general conception of the mind and its relation to memory. In the first half of this paper, I will show that Locke's conception of the mind and memory is not, as Locke likely thought, a comprehensive account for either how we truly gain ideas or extensive knowledge. I will argue that without a comprehensive understanding of memory, according to Locke himself, his theory of the human understanding is severely flawed. The purpose of the second half of my paper is to begin a revision of the Lockean Memory, such that Locke's general theory becomes more plausible.

For Locke, memory is simply the power that the Mind has, at its will, "to revive Perceptions, which it once has, with the additional Perception annexed to them that it had them before" (Locke: II, X, 2). He uses the idea of memory as a repository of past ideas, but only as a metaphor, and explicitly says that this is a metaphor and is not to be taken literally. I will show that without a repository of some sort, it is unclear how the memory really works. Since, according to Locke, any perception of the mind is, by definition, conscious, how do we "will" a past idea to become conscious again, if we cannot "tell" the faculty of the mind in control of memory that we want to recall a particular idea or piece of knowledge? It is clear that if we already knew what memory we wanted to remember, then we would not be asking our Mind to recall it. Expanding this argument, I will show that the Lockean Memory, as it stands, is a big mystery and simply cannot work. Without a feasible memory, according to Locke himself, his whole theory of the understanding is incomplete. Without a coherent picture of memory, one gets a very incomplete picture of the understanding and of human knowledge.

After establishing the flaws of the Lockean Memory and their implications for Locke's theory, I will give a Reductio Ad Absurdum (RAA) which allows us to deduce that there must be an unconscious aspect to the Lockean Mind. When we assume that Ideas, once they fade from the Mind, leave without a trace, we realize that memory becomes some magical power which can produce specific Ideas from nothing at all. This contradicts the basis assumption that something cannot come from nothing; hence, memory must involve traces of Ideas which have faded from the Mind. These "traces" from past Ideas make up an unconscious. In other words, the Lockean

Unconscious consists of potential ideas, which the Lockean Memory has the power to transform into real ideas that are perceived. Once it is clear that there is an unconscious aspect of the Mind, then makes sense that it "'tis the business ... of the Memory to furnish to the Mind those dormant Ideas, [for] which it has present occasion" (Locke: II, X, 8). These "dormant" Ideas must actually be potential ideas which can be revived to real ideas by our ability to remember.

My paper is divided as follows. Section one discusses Locke's general understanding of the mind, or what ideas are and how the mind deals with its ideas. Section two focuses on Locke's discussion of Memory. Section three provides arguments for why, based on what was discussed in sections one and two, the Lockean Memory does not make any sense. Section four gives my RAA argument for the Lockean Unconscious. Section five develops my revision, focusing on how the addition of an unconscious can provide a more coherent and comprehensive account of memory within the Lockean Mind. Section six discusses the main criticism that could be made of my revision--that it is not Lockean enough--and my replies. Section seven is a brief conclusion, which mentions ways in which this Lockean Unconscious needs to be explored further.

The Lockean Mind

With his methodology of introspection, Locke forms a theory of the Human Understanding. Locke, while defining most of the important words of his essay, does not explicitly define possibly the second most used term, the word, "Mind" ("Ideas" being the most used word). Without a clear definition, it is somewhat difficult to get good grasp of the Lockean Mind. But I feel that spread though out his *Essay* is a conception of what the Mind is. On my interpretation, the Lockean Mind is a thing, Locke thinks that it is likely part of an immaterial substance (Locke: II, XXVII, 25), which has several capacities. These capacities have the primary purpose of "managing" or dealing with the Ideas, which are perceived by the Mind.

The main capacities of the Mind are Perception, Retention, or Memory, Discerning, Reason, and Judgment. All of these capacities of the Mind deal with Ideas. This is likely due to the very general meaning of the word "Idea." An Idea, by definition, is "that Term, which...[stands] for whatever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks; [it is whatever] it is, which the Mind can be [employed] about in thinking" (Locke: I, I, 8). So, in essence, an Idea is that which is being perceived by the Mind at any given time. All Ideas come attached to them a degree of Pleasure or Pain, which is important for determining the Will, which is power of the Mind (and will be discussed later). It is with the faculty of Perception or "Thinking in general" (Locke: II, IX, 1) that one comes to have Ideas, and it is with the various types of Discerning that we are able to make sense of our Ideas.

On my interpretation of Locke, Knowledge, Reason, and Judgment all involve types of Discerning. Discerning is the general faculty of the Mind which finds relations and **connections** between Ideas.

Another Faculty...is that of *Discerning* and distinguishing between the several Ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused Perception of something in general: Unless the Mind

has a distinct Perception of different Objects, and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little Knowledge (Locke: II, XI, 1).

Knowledge is "the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas" (Locke: IV, I, 1). In other words, Knowledge consists of having Ideas and using our faculty of Discerning, which, again, finds connections between Ideas. Reason is Knowledge writ large. It is the faculty of the Mind which enables the Mind to complete long deductive and inductive proofs, which involve the connection and relation of long premises that are made up of several Ideas. Reason, since it involves making complex the **connections**, can be seen as a special type of Discerning.

When we are unable to secure Knowledge, we often still make Judgments. Judgment is the faculty of the Mind "which is putting Ideas together, or separating them from one another in the Mind, when there is certain Agreement or Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so" (Locke: IV, XIV, 3). Judgment is also a type of Discerning, because when one is using it one is making guesses about **connections** between Ideas.

Another important faculty of the Mind is the Will. "The Will is [*sic*] a power in the Mind to direct the operative Faculties of a Man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction" (Locke: II, XXI, 29). In other words, the Will is the power of the immaterial Mind to somehow bring about chosen movements in our material Bodies. The Mind's motivation to will in "every particular instance...[or to will] this or that particular Motion or Rest" (Locke: II, XXI, 29), "is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness" (ibid.). "This Uneasiness [is a] Desire [or] an uneasiness of the Mind for want of some absent good" (Locke: II, XXI, 31). This desire derives from the Pleasure of Pain one feels about certain Ideas. In general, if one feels that Idea X is pleasurable, and Idea X involves some movement or rest, then one has a desire to have X come about, or an uneasiness about not having X. So, one will "will" movement or rest as necessary to cause the pleasure of Idea X to come about. The most pressing uneasiness determines the will, i.e., what the Mind wills at any given time is that which it reasons will satisfy its greatest desires (at that time) (Locke: II, XXI, 31).

The Lockean Memory

The Lockean Memory is one of two types of retention. The first type of retention is simply Contemplation, where one keeps thinking about an Idea longer than the Mind would without a conscious effort to do so.

The other way of Retention is the Power to revive again in our Minds those Ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of Sight; And thus we do, when we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being removed. This is *Memory*, which is as it were the Store-house of our *Ideas*. For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having many *Ideas* under View and Consideration at once, it was

necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those *Ideas*, which at another time it might make use of (Locke: II, X, 2).

This section just quoted gives one the impression that Memory is a warehouse of Ideas. But the Ideas in this warehouse are not being perceived and the essence of an Idea is to be perceived. In order to make it clear that he is not contradicting his own definition of Idea (Malcolm, 195-96), Locke goes on to write,

But our *Ideas* being nothing, but the actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this *laying up* of our *Ideas* in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many cases, to revive Perceptions, which it once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it had them before (ibid.).

According to this passage, Memory is simply the ability to recall past memories at will. There is no memory bank, or repository where our past, our old Ideas and piece of Knowledge go.

And in this Sense it is, that our *Ideas* are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually no where, but only there is an ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were paint them anew on it self, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the Assistance of this Faculty, that we are said to have all those *Ideas* in our understandings, which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the Objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible Qualities, which first imprinted them there (ibid.).

This faculty, known as memory, somehow just recalls the past, occasionally, as one Mind wills. But, it is not clear how this faculty really operates, within the Lockean the Mind, (which will be the topic of the next section.)

According to Locke, memory is central to his theory of the Human Understanding. Locke writes in the chapter on memory that:

Memory, in an intellectual Creature, is necessary in the next degree to Perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our Faculties are in a great measure useless: And we in our Thoughts, Reasoning, and Knowledge, could not proceed beyond present Objects, were it not for the assistance of our Memories (Locke: II, X, 8).

In Book IV, which focuses on Knowledge, he writes,

a Man may be said to have know all Truths, which are [lodged] in his Memory, by a [past] clear and full perception, whereof, the Mind is assured past doubt, as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. **For our finite Understandings being able to think at once, if Men had no Knowledge if any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: And he that knew, would know but one Truth, that all he being able to think on at one time"** (Locke: IV, I, 8; bold emphasis mine).

This passage is referring to the fact that Knowledge is, if the reader recalls, "the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas" (Locke: IV, I, 1). This means that, without Memory, there could never be knowledge concerning two Objects, or Ideas, one which was perceived in the past and one currently in our thoughts. If we cannot recall and then compare and contrast a past Idea in our Minds with a current one, then we can never find a relationship between them. Without Memory, one can also make but few Judgments and would use one's Reason rarely, since Judgments and Reason, as was mentioned in the first section, both involve using various types of Discerning and making connections between different Ideas, just as basic Knowledge does.

How the Lockean Memory Does Not Work

Now that we understand the Lockean Memory and its importance, how does this faculty of the Mind work within the Lockean Mind? How does the Mind use this faculty to recall a previous thought at the Will of the agent? All Ideas, by definition, must be conscious. Memory is the ability to bring an Idea into the Mind again without the aid of an external Object which represents that Idea. The first question that comes to mind is, once one has had a given Idea, what happens next such that the Mind is able to recall or "revive" that Idea at a later time? If the Idea completely fades from our Minds without a trace, then we would not have anything to remember or "revive" at all, because there would be **nothing** at all in the Mind which relates to that past Idea. In other words, nothing comes from nothing, or something cannot come from nothing; a previously had Idea cannot reappear in the Mind like magic. When one wants to recall Idea X, then if there is not a trace of Idea X in one's Mind, then how does the Mind recall that Idea X? Locke does not tell us how past Ideas can be "revived" again, once they are no longer being perceived, once they are no longer Ideas. The Lockean Memory, based on what Locke tells us, is a big mystery.

This mystery becomes more confusing when we ask, what does the Mind "tell" its Memory to remember? Certainly not a specific Idea, which would be the very Idea which one is wishing to recall. If the Idea was already in our Mind we would not have a wish to recall it. So, perhaps the Will can give the Mind a general Idea, an Abstract Idea which relates to the specific Idea that one wishes to recall.

It is likely that the Mind "instructs" its Memory to "revive" an Idea which relates to an Abstract Idea being perceived, i.e., Memory likely works by 1) figuring out which past Idea to recall by looking at the Abstract Idea currently in one's

thoughts, 2) recognizing the similarities between the Abstract Idea and this old Idea, and then revive the correct old Idea. Since we know through introspection that when we try to remember something we do not consciously recall all of our past Ideas until we come upon the one we are looking for, our Memory must have some way of knowing what past Idea goes with our current Abstract Idea, such that it remembers what we wish it to very quickly and accurately. It would seem that the Mind is rather efficient in remembering the right Ideas which are more specific versions of one's Abstract thought. But, in order to be so efficient and accurate, the Mind would have to use its abilities to compare and contrast, such as its abilities to make Judgments, Reason, and/or produce Knowledge in order to bring to itself those which more specifically **relate** to the currently perceived Abstract Ideas. It would have to compare and contrast the current Abstract Idea with a more specific Idea in order to come to any type of conclusion that this is the Idea that we likely want to remember. But here, again, the Mind would have to be conscious of the very Idea it wishes to remember in order to compare it to the Abstract Idea and conclude that it is the past Idea that one wishes to remember. Moreover, it would seem that the Mind would need to have **all previous Ideas** conscious in order to compare and contrast them to this current Abstract Idea. This, though, is clearly not the case, and recall that Locke even reasons that our Minds are too narrow recall everything at once. (In fact, the purpose of memory is to deal with this inability.) So, again the question arises, how *is* the Mind ever able to recall past Ideas?! We know that our Minds can do this, but, as the exploration of this paragraph shows, the Lockean Mind and Memory do not, as they stand, account for it.

Without a coherent account of Memory, one must conclude that Locke's whole theory of the Human Understanding is rather shallow. Since, without Memory, no extensive Knowledge, Judgments etc. can follow, Locke provides us with a severely incomplete picture of the Understanding. The Lockean Memory in the Lockean Mind just does not make any sense. "How *does* it work?!" It looks as if it is impossible for the Lockean Mind to remember an Idea, which means that the Lockean Mind is almost void of all Knowledge and Judgments. But we know that our Minds do have extensive knowledge about Ideas of the past and present, and we are usually able to recall past Ideas at our Will. The question now is, how can we revise Locke so that get a more a complete picture of our lives, which are filled with extensive knowledge.

Logically Necessary Revision of the Lockean Memory

The Lockean Memory is only a faculty of the Mind to recall memories and not an actual memory bank of past Ideas. In order for this faculty to work, I hold that it must involve a repository of potential Ideas. Without something in the Mind which specifically relates to the past Idea, we could not revive a past Idea because there is literally nothing to revive. When the Mind has a new Idea, and then it fades from perception some aspect of it must be saved so that it is able to revive that specific Idea later. So, if Memory is to be the ability to bring past Idea X into the Mind anew, there must be something like, or related to, past Idea X somewhere in the Mind. These items which are related to past Ideas make up an unconsciousness of the Lockean Mind.

The argument which logically proves the existence of an unconscious is an *Reductio Ad Absurdum*. There are three main assumptions with which to begin. We assume that something cannot come from nothing, and Locke's definition of Memory. Now, let us assume that Ideas fade from the Mind without a trace. This means that specific Ideas supposedly fade from the Mind without a trace once they are no longer perceived by the Mind. Memory is the power to make specific Ideas be perceived again, i.e., exist in the Mind again. This leads to the first conclusion that Memory is the power to make specific Ideas which fade from the Mind without a trace be perceived, i.e., exist in the Mind again. We also understand that if something does not leave a trace, this means that it does not exist in any sense. But, if something does not exist in any sense, then it is nothing. So, specific Ideas which fade from the Mind without a trace are nothing (at least within the Mind in question). Therefore, Memory is the power to make something come from nothing.

This conclusion about Memory would be fine, if it was possible for something to come from nothing. But we know that it is impossible for something to come from nothing. Moreover, Locke would not accept the idea that we, as finite beings, have Minds which can make something from nothing. (I am uncertain if he would have argued that God could even make something from nothing.) But one might think, "Wait, the Lockean memory does not make something from nothing; it has the Abstract Idea to go on." This, though, is actually the same as saying that the Mind can make something from nothing. We could not make a specific Idea be transformed from an Abstract Idea of the Mind *without the specific aspects* of the Idea lodged somewhere in our Mind. Otherwise, we would have some magical power to make specific Ideas with their specific aspects come from Abstract Ideas which lack these specific aspects. So, even when we focus on the fact that we use our Abstract Ideas to somehow revive specific Ideas, our Memory would still be some magical power which contradicts the basic presumptions of both the natural sciences and Western philosophy; it supposedly makes something, and a very specific something at that, from nothing.

Because nothing can come from nothing, we must negate the assumption that Ideas fade from the Mind without a trace. Therefore, Ideas do not fade from the Mind without a trace. These "traces" are things which have the potential to be revived to specific Ideas by our Memory. And Memory is the power to transform potential Ideas, or the "traces" which Ideas leave in the Mind into copies of the very Ideas which left those traces. [Note that these "copies" can be of high or poor quality. In Book II, Chapter X, which is on Retention, or Memory, Locke even discusses the fact that as time passes, it is harder to recall past Ideas with good accuracy (see sections 4-6).]

Exploring the Lockean Unconscious

Now that I have established that there must be potential Ideas in the Mind, let us take a closer look into how the Lockean Memory likely works. Now, that we know about potential Ideas, Memory is the faculty of the Mind which 1) shifts through a real repository of things which have the potential to be Ideas, 2) picks out the one(s) which have the potential to be the Ideas that we wish to recall, and then 3) makes these potential things actual revived Ideas, which are, of course, perceived by

definition. This entails that there are potential Ideas which are not being perceived somewhere in the Mind. But this does not contradict the definition of Ideas, which are "whatever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks; [it is whatever] it is, which the Mind can be [employed] about in thinking" (Locke: I, I, 8). This is because these are things which have the potential to become Ideas, rather than Ideas *per se*.

The essence of an Idea is to be perceived, while the essence of potential Ideas are not to be perceived. In order to avoid confusion, I shall call the potential "Ideas" in the "memory bank," Semi-Ideas, and Memory will be seen as involving some form of Semi-Perception. I call it Semi-perception because, here, the faculty of the Mind called Memory, would actually be able to, in a sense, perceive all the Semi-Ideas, and shift though them, and have knowledge about them, but it is not Perception itself because the Mind as a whole would not perceive it. So, while one cannot perceive without perceiving that one does perceive, one will never perceive that one Semi-Perceives. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible for one to perceive that one Semi-Perceives because, within Locke's theory, this would entail a perception of all past Ideas in the memory bank. According to Locke, one cannot perceive without perceiving all of the Ideas being perceived, so if we perceived Semi-Perception itself (and not simply its concept), we would have to perceive all past Ideas. There is at least one thing wrong with this thought: we simply know that we never perceive all of our past Ideas at once. So one never perceives Semi-Perception and we can view Semi-Perception as a special faculty of the Mind, which can interact with our Perception and can respond to its needs.

Semi-Perception would, in essence, be the Lockean Unconscious, but it is still an aspect of the Mind and is under the control of the Mind, which is, in turn, under the control of our Will. Recall that Locke says that the Will is determined by one's uneasiness, and we "will" any action in order to relieve our uneasiness. In terms of the Semi-Perception, or unconscious, our Will would force our Memory with its Semi-Perception to retrieve any past Ideas which we are interested in recalling consciously. Say, for some reason, we wish to recall a childhood event of going to the beach with our family. It was a very happy event and would relieve some of the uneasiness we are feeling due to some other events in our current lives. Moreover, until we recall this memory, we have an uneasiness about not recalling and perceiving it now. This uneasiness prompts our Memory, i.e., our Will "tells" this faculty to recall, or to use its Semi-Perception to first shift though our past memories and then bring to our Perception past event in question. Unlike with the old Lockean Memory, this Memory with its Semi-Perception can compare, and hence, have the knowledge that the Abstract thought about a past event on a beach is related to more specific Semi-Ideas of a past event on the beach that occurred in exactly such and such a way.

We should not overlook the fact that sometimes our Memory can err. Occasionally, the Memory may pick out the wrong past event. Continuing with the example given, perhaps our Memory has us mistakenly recall an similar event on a beach with our family, but this event is not the one we wish to recall. I believe that I can say it is a fact of life that sometimes we are trying to recall something, but recall something else instead. In this case, the uneasiness would still remain or even increase, due to our annoyance of remembering the wrong event, and we would will

that our Mind continue to try to remember the event in question and our Memory would try again until it got it right. A similar chain of events would occur when trying to remember some mathematical fact, or any other Complex or Simple Ideas.

Memory with the Unconscious: Is it Lockean Enough?

The main criticism that one could give against my revision is that it is simply not Lockean enough. This criticism focuses on the fact that Locke is a rigorous empiricist, who used the empirical methodology of introspection **only** in order to find out what the Mind and the Memory are like. Using Locke's method of introspection, we simply never find facts that lead us to the Idea of Memory with Semi-Perception. One could never know that Semi-Perception, as an aspect of Memory, existed. It would have to be some aspect of the Mind which it was not aware of directly. When we introspect, one of the Ideas of Reflection is not Semi-Perception. When we will our Mind to recall a past event, we never have the realization that this entails a Semi-Idea, which essence is not to be perceived. Moreover, this idea of Memory entails that the Mind, in a sense, does have the ability to recall all past Ideas at once, but, for some reason, either cannot or is not willed to do so. In sum, a critic could argue that this Memory with Semi-Perception entails a Mind which is too unlike the Mind found through introspection. Given that Locke's empirical method for discovering what the Mind is introspection, he would not and could not accept this revision of Memory.

My first reply to this argument is that this idea of Memory with Semi-Perception is an inferred Idea of Reflection. If one thinks about how, if Memory is simply seen as a faculty of the Mind which produces specific Ideas without a trace, we realize that this leads to contradiction. Without a repository of potential Ideas, Memory is some magical power which makes us transcend what is logically impossible and re-makes specific Ideas from nothing. Though an RAA deduction, we learn that there must be unconscious Semi-Ideas and Semi-Perception.

Some critics may point out that the reality of Semi-Ideas leads to the conclusion that one, **in principle**, could perceive all of his or her past and present Ideas at once. Since all of the potential information is there, the Memory could make all of our Old Ideas be perceived at one time. But we know that this never occurs, and Locke argues that our inability to do this is the purpose of our Memory. These critics may argue that Locke would disagree with the contention that the Mind, **in principle**, could perceive all of its Ideas at once. But one can provide a Lockean analysis to explain why, although we can, **in principle**, perceive all of our past and present Ideas at once, we will never actually do so for one very good reason: the uneasiness which would result from such a mental act.

When Locke introduces the concept of Memory, he says that memory is necessary due to the limits of the human Mind: "For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas, which at another time it might make use of." It could be the case that the Mind is actually "capable of having many Ideas under View [but not have the ability to have many Ideas under] Consideration at once." The reason that we never find this actually occurring is that if the Mind were to actually do such a thing, we would become highly uneasy.

Thought introspection, Locke's methodology no less, we know that whenever we begin to think about too many things at once, we stop, and just think about one thing at a time. I would say that during such events, we do become highly uneasy about what is going on "in our heads." In such cases, we had several Ideas in our heads at once but we cannot organize them and draw the knowledge we wanted from them due to lack of organization, we become annoyed, and consciously stop thinking about some of these things until another time. In other words, our uneasiness about this mental situation prompts our Will to "tell" our Minds to stop thinking or perceiving so much; we "will" some thoughts away in order to get some mental peace. So, while we **can** have several Ideas on our Minds at once, in fact, all of our past and current Ideas in our heads at once, this will never occur, because of the uneasiness that it would cause; we **will** not ever let this occur.

While these are the responses I would give to defend my revision of the Lockean Memory, some would hold that it still could not be accepted by Locke or any Lockean who is a rigorous empiricist and uses introspection as **the** methodology for learning about the Mind and how it works. Locke assumes that one can look into one's own Mind and learn all that there is to know directly about the Mind from our experiences. He never infers any positive fact about the Mind and the way that it operates, but constantly asks us to introspect and reflect upon our own conscious experiences to know that his theory is right. But in order for one to come to accept his view of the Mind and Human Understanding, one has to infer that it is the case that Semi-Ideas exist in order for Memory to work within Locke's theory. Some would argue that the only reason we have realized that Memory involves an Unconscious is because we assumed that introspection does not hold all the answers to how the Mind works. We realize that we are not going to learn everything that there is to know through introspection, while Locke did not. Some harsh critic of Locke might find these good grounds for rejecting Locke's entire theory and any form of Lockeanism. "Locke's theory is based on the ridiculous contention that the Mind is transparent to itself; that introspection works; that his theory is coherent, not to mention a host of other bad assumptions not even considered within this paper. We must reject Locke, his methodology, and his theory. And it is about time."

I disagree with those who would argue so strongly. Just because Locke did not realize the shortcomings for introspection and strict empiricism does not mean that we should reject his entire theory and methodology. Introspection, or the process of reflecting on our mental lives, can lead us to some insight as to what is going in our Minds. Therefore, if one wants to say that Locke's insights are incorrect or incoherent, he or she must then argue for each particular insight is incorrect.

Unlike Locke, though, we must ask whether or not a particular insight gained through reflection is giving us a coherent picture of our mental lives. Given that an unconscious is a logical part of the Lockean Mind, if Locke were to have asked how memory really worked, he would have had to have come to the same conclusion. One might even say that Locke did not introspect enough and ask how this or that faculty of the Mind really worked. If he had, he would have found the Lockean Unconscious and its role in the Lockean Mind. As Lockean, who have asked these questions, one can say that one 1) must accept the existence of the Lockean Unconscious and 2) must assume that Locke, if he had asked these deeper questions, being a rational person

who can do an RAA deduction, would have come upon this unconscious as well. The Lockean Unconscious is a logical necessity which can be seen if anyone, even Locke, asked the right, the deeper, questions.

This resolution to the criticism against my revision, leads me to my conclusion. The main point of this paper was to show that the Lockean Mind logically, through an RAA deduction, must have an unconscious. This unconscious is made up of Semi-Ideas, and the Semi-Perception is the aspect of the memory which deals with these potential Ideas, and picks and transforms those potentials into actual Ideas and the ones we were likely hoping to remember. I explored how this Unconscious gives us the ability to use Abstract Ideas to figure out what specific Ideas need to be revived and how, **in principle**, all past Ideas could be perceived at once, though the uneasiness of this mental event prevents its occurrence. With the unconscious, with Semi-Ideas, Memory works. This means that it is possible for us to have extensive knowledge about the past and present, as well as make judgments and use our reason in order to relate complicated Ideas of the present with to complicated Ideas of past Ideas.

The realization that an unconscious is a logical part of the Lockean Mind and Memory can lead us to explore how other types of memory work within the Mind. I focused on remembering at one's will, when one actively tries to recall something. But, most often, we recall things without consciously trying to recall it at all. Perhaps our Memory is generally on "automatic-pilot" and it just naturally tries to revive any Semi-Ideas that seem to relate to some Ideas currently in our Mind. This issue, and issues relating to any other types of memory, and how the unconscious relates to them, warrants exploration elsewhere. [Professor Joy Laine points out that speaking one's language involves some type of remembering.]

In terms of Locke's theory itself, the entire *Essay concerning the Human Understanding* ought to be reinterpreted with the Lockean Unconscious in mind. It is possible that many problems of Locke will fade away with this new insight, but it is also likely that some difficult issues will arise. Those resolutions, new problems, and new insights are topics for new essays; the task of this essay is complete.

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