

2011

An 'Asia Model'? A Relationist View on Regionalism and China's Regional Identity

Shelle Shimizu
Macalester College

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors

Recommended Citation

Shimizu, Shelle, "An 'Asia Model'? A Relationist View on Regionalism and China's Regional Identity" (2011). *Political Science Honors Projects*. Paper 33.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/33

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

Honors Project

Macalester College

Spring 2011

Title: An 'Asia Model'? A Relationist View on
Regionalism and China's Regional Identity

Author: Shelle Shimizu

An 'Asia Model'?: A Relationalist View on Regionalism and China's Regional Identity

Abstract:

In an increasingly interconnected global order, governments are experiencing growing pressures to engage in cooperative and integrative processes. Indeed, regionalism has become a primary objective for all regions. East Asia is no exception. Using the "European Union" as a model, scholars generally regard East Asian regionalism as a "failure." With an emphasis on 'process' over 'progress' East Asian regionalist institutions lack the institutional formality and accountability mechanisms valued by Western standards on regionalism. I do not dispute these claims about East Asian regionalism so much as to propose a different interpretation allowed by applying a different theoretical lens. I subscribe to a relationalist framework that emphasizes relations vis-à-vis networks and identity, instead of a substantialist framework (the study of physical institutional entities). This allows me to analyze the ways in which relational processes in East Asia are changing the very identities and objectives of member nations. I analyze foreign policy speeches and documents released by the People's Republic of China during the span of 3 essential time periods: the Mao Zedong era, the era of reform led by Deng Xiaoping, and the current administration of President Hu Jintao. In these documents I examine particular shifts in China's guiding foreign policy ideology in order to observe a growing Chinese 'regional identity'. Through this I defend the idea that there is a dynamic and differentiated 'East Asian' Model' of regionalism.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: *The 'Distinct or Deficient' Debate over East Asian Regionalism*

Chapter 2: *'Naming' The Dragon: The Debate Surrounding Chinese Identity*

Chapter 3: *A Relationalist Model for a Regionalist Process*

Chapter 4: *Relational Processes of Identity Formation and the Evolution of China's Regional Identity*

Conclusion

Bibliography

Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
APEC	Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
EU	European Union
PRC	People's Republic of China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperative Organization

INTRODUCTION

With the perceived success of the European Union, regional integration has become a highly discussed and debated issue. This discussion of whether to undertake the project of *regionalism*, referring to government-led initiatives towards integration, comes at a time when states find themselves embedded into the political narrative of globalization and interdependence. Thus there exists an external pressure for governments to engage in cooperative and integrative processes in order to adapt to the increasingly interconnected global order.

The same pressure from above has been felt in East Asia¹. Given the attention bestowed on economic and security issues in East Asia, an increasing amount of literature has been devoted to analyzing the processes of regionalism that have been undertaken and the impediments to a “successful” integration. However, the impediments identified by this literature are based on a Western, primarily European experience and cannot be easily applied in a region with such a complex political, social, and cultural composition. Furthermore, this literature applies a “substantialist” theoretical lens that focuses the study of regionalism on essentialized entities and institutions rather than on the *relations* that constitute the identities and interests of actors. In doing so, the literature on regionalism has failed to address the interstices between relations, identity, and regionalist processes.

I. Relationalism vs. Substantialism

¹ For the purposes of this paper East Asia refers to the members of ASEAN Plus 3 that includes Indonesia, Laos, Singapore, Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Vietnam, Japan, China, and South Korea.

In their work, 'Relations Before States', international relations scholars Patrick T. Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon describe the ways in which contemporary sociological theory is divided between 'substantialism' and 'relationalism'. The arguments presented within this debate help to explain why regionalist scholars primarily focus on regionalist institutions and discount the importance of regional relations.

According to Jackson and Nexon, substantialism maintains that the ontological primitives of analysis are physical or material entities.² More importantly substantialism assumes a sequence in which entities exist prior to interaction and that the very definition of relations should be viewed as interactions between pre-given entities. A majority of IR theories are substantialist in nature, focusing mainly on entities such as the state. The idea of the state as the primary actor assumes that relations occur among pre-existing entities, objectifying relations and to subsuming them under characteristics of states. In other words states are seen as *possessors of identity, norms, and preferences*. Objectifying conceptions of identity, norms, and preferences ignores the underlying relations that compose them.

While substantialism maintains that the ontological primitives of analysis are visible entities, relationalism instead argues that relations shape identity conceptions that in turn generate particular norms and preferences. While substantialism assumes a sequence in which entities exist prior to interaction and that the very definition of relations should be viewed as interactions between given entities,

² P. T. Jackson and D. H. Nexon. "Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 5.3 (1999): 291-332.

relationalists argue that interactions exist logically or analytically prior to entities, and can in fact create and transform the entities themselves. The divide between substantialist and relationalist IR theory suggests that scholars should attempt to resist the temptation to objectify and reify relations into state and entity analysis, and must instead focus on the processes behind relations. Two terms used by Jackson and Nexon—process, and yoking—help capture the ways in which relationalism can be used to re-interpret world affairs.

By treating all processes as being under the ownership of certain entities, scholars fail to study how processes alter relations between entities. For example, Jackson and Nexon use the example of the spreading of a rumor to demonstrate the pitfalls of treating processes as properties of entities.

If we study the rumor as an owned process we are not really studying the ‘spread’ of the rumor. Rather we are studying how interactions of individuals changed the rumor...this is not particularly useful if we want to study how the process, which is the spreading of the rumor, alters the relations...the bonds between group members, the separation between members of the group and those outside of it.³

This analogy accurately conveys relationalism’s emphasis on the study of process. Instead of focusing on the *product* or outcome (the rumor), Jackson and Nexon advocate that scholars should study the *spreading* of the rumor and the ways in which interaction between members alter the rumor itself. It also demonstrates how framing processes as owned entities overemphasize the control and influence of the parties involved. Instead of focusing on member’s abilities to change and influence the direction and nature of the process in question, the study of any interactive process requires an examination of the relations between members and the ways in which relations alter the members involved.

³ Jackson and Nexon, pg. 302

Jackson and Nexon's process of *yoking* refers to ways in which configurations of relations take on agent properties. The core of the idea is that 'sites of difference', which are culturally and dialogically negotiated, create spatial notions of 'inside' and 'outside'. Such sites of difference can be viewed as processes that signal differences within a given site in relation to other sites. Additionally, it is within 'insides' that processes of Weberian rationalization occur, thus creating agent properties⁴. The important conclusion in terms of conceptualizations of the 'self' vis-à-vis the other is that "boundaries come before the entities which they bound and the relations of 'inside' and 'outside' precede supposed substances like 'the state' and help to produce the effect of substantiality."⁵ In a relational view of identity, then, the 'self' and the 'other' are not presupposed as material manifestations or entities, but rather relations that precede entities, shaping and transforming their properties and conceptions of identity.

II. Regionalism and the China Case

Thus, instead of using formal institutions, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as the object of analysis, I apply a relationalist lens to the study of regionalism, observing the ways in which on-going East Asian *relations* cultivate and promote a 'regional identity,' that shifts norms and preferences. Relationalist theory can be applied to regionalism by examining the ways in which relations induce the creation of an internalized regional identity within member nations. In this, I follow constructivist

⁴ Jackson and Nexon, pg. 314

⁵ Jackson and Nexon, pg. 315

thinkers. Constructivist scholars have long held that the composition of a nation's identity defines its national interests, legitimizing and influencing its foreign policy. As Lisbeth Aggestam notes, conceptions of national identity and the consequence of its articulation and internalization becomes integrated in a cognitive framework or "prism" through which the political reality informing foreign policy is interpreted and determined⁶. At the same time, examining the effects of identity on foreign policy requires thinking in terms of mutual feedback processes between relations and contexts. Therefore, the ability of relations to define a nation's identity in regional terms reinforces the application of a relationalist framework in explaining not only a specific nations foreign policy, but also regional dynamics as a whole⁷.

I use China as a case study for several reasons. First, China's precipitous rise and growing influence in the international system has generated an enormous amount of scholarly and governmental attention. It's political, economic, and societal actions have placed China not only at the center of the mainstream media but also at the forefront of IR scholarship. Secondly, China embodies the many interstices that exist between identity, relation, and regionalism. As we shall see, China continuously engages in processes in which it re-imagines and re-invents its 'self' in order to produce grand ideologies and strategies to guide its domestic and foreign policy. China has also increased efforts to improve relations with other East Asian countries making it an ideal study for the ways in which regional relations

⁶ Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price. *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda*. London: Macmillan, 2000.

⁷ As Hettne elaborates, the relationship between region and actor reveal that regions are composed of the practices of the regional community that are in turn defined by identity. B.Hettne, , *Regionalism and World Order*. In Farrell et al. (Eds.) *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*. (2005) Pluto Press: Ann Arbor MI.

cultivate a regional identity. Finally, having studied abroad in Beijing at Peking University, I've had the opportunity to engage not only with Chinese scholars but have also continued to develop my study of the Chinese language. Focusing my project on China has allowed me to incorporate primary documents written in Chinese with interviews I conducted with Professors at Peking University that have greatly contributed to my study.

In this project, I analyze foreign policy documents and speeches that span across three key time periods in recent Chinese history: the Mao Zedong era, the era of reform led by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, and the current administration led by President Hu Jintao. In reading these documents, I use a model, which I will discuss further below, to examine conjunctural shift-points in China's guiding foreign policy ideology in order to observe the ways in which relational processes in East Asia are changing the very identities and objectives of member nations.

Indeed, using China as a case study, I find that the observed flaws of East Asian regionalism do not indicate a failure or stagnation of the East Asian project of integration, but rather signal the creation of a differentiated regionalism model. Through an analysis of particular shifts in Chinese foreign policy ideology, I argue that, in applying a relationalist model, there is evidence demonstrating that relational processes have led to China's gradual internalization of a 'regional identity' that has in turn influenced its foreign policy ideology and behavior.

III. Methodology

In order to analyze the processes by which regional *relations* have instilled a growing 'regional identity' within China's self-conceptualization and geopolitical

consciousness, this study will primarily utilize a thematic and chronological analysis of two major shifts in China's East Asian foreign policy. I will engage in a text-based content analysis of translated speeches, government White Papers, and other PRC issued documents to illustrate a temporally shifting narrative from the late- Mao to the current Hu Jintao era. In comparison with a policy analysis, a textual analysis of these documents allows for a deeper study of Chinese identity read through expressed policy preferences or actions, transcending mere realist notions of interests, motives, or intentions. These texts function as windows into a 'national psyche,' where we are able to examine Chinese notions of 'self' and 'other' and the complex schemas by which China identifies itself in relation to the East Asian region.

Klaus Krippendorff defines content analysis as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use." He identifies key rules by which content analysis can be used in studying policy issues⁸. First he lists three main characteristics of text-based content analysis⁹:

1. A close reading of a relatively small amount of textual matter;
2. The rearticulation (interpretation) of given texts into new (analytical deconstructive, emancipatory, or critical) narratives that are accepted within particular scholarly communities that are sometimes opposed to positivist traditions of inquiry; and
3. The analyst acknowledges working within hermeneutic circles in which their own socially or culturally conditioned understandings constitutively participate.

Following these rules, Krippendorff argues that content analysis should be applied to a limited number of documents and used to interpret these texts according to a

⁸ Klaus Krippendorff. *Content Analysis: an Introduction to Its Methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004.

⁹ Krippendorff, pg. 17

theoretical narrative that is accepted within the scholarly community.

Since this project will draw inferences from a reading of Chinese speeches and documents it is important to ground such inferences in a methodological framework according to these three principles. Text-based content analysis lends itself particularly well to this purpose as it requires the analyst to draw on “Knowledge of the empirical relationship between these speech acts (the correlations that connect one to another) and the strengths (prelocutionary forces) or particular utterances,” and, most importantly, the network of connections that leads from texts to inferences regarding the research question at hand.¹⁰ This emphasis on a ‘network of connections’ embodied within documents is especially well-suited for a relational study that seeks to observe the effects of dynamic and multi-dimensional, regional relations. The second characteristic in particular allows for a relationalist lens to serve as a ‘new narrative’ by which one may rearticulate and interpret given texts.

Furthermore, the analysis of Chinese speeches and texts are particularly appropriate in examining Chinese identity, as Allen Chun argues, since Chinese writing and key terms serve as a form of expression of identity in Chinese culture:

The point of the matter is that terms are important, not only for what they mean semantically but for what they mean pragmatically, as well--that is to say, given the speaker's intended usage. Moreover, meanings change in spite of the fixed character of the words themselves; thus, the authority of language can be understood not only as a function of a speaker's implicit interpretation but also as a purposive strategic act...That is to say, behind the message itself, it is more important to know who is really speaking, how statements are produced and disseminated, how they relate to the ‘other’¹¹.

This passage hints at the important contributions that a relationalist, content-based analysis can add to the study of Chinese identity. As Chun states, Chinese terms and

¹⁰ Krippendorff, pg. 34

¹¹ Allen Chun, "Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity." *Boundary 2* 23.2 (1996): 111.

writing are windows through which we may observe how China relates to a perceived 'other'. A serious engagement and rearticulation of Chinese texts and terminology allows us to transcend assumptions about the fixed nature of particular terms; this invites a deeper investigation into changing definitions of terms within changing contexts. In sum, content analysis provides a methodological framework by which we may extract inferences (in this case on Chinese identity) by linking textual data to the theoretical narrative and context posited by the relational theory of regional dynamics.

While this study does make use of a variety of secondary sources, most of the primary documents were collected while on a research trip to Beijing in the winter of 2010. These documents were originally in Chinese and were then translated by a Chinese aide and myself. Reading these documents in the original language is an essential part of this research because this is primarily a study of identity and how China views itself. The ways in which we conceptualize identity are often dictated and guided by the language in which we are able to narrate our own schemas and streams of consciousness. Furthermore the Chinese language poses an interesting challenge when conducting any textual analysis, as many English translations often miss the many nuances that are difficult or nearly impossible to capture in English. In addition, government speeches or documents often employ diplomatic formalities and thus English translations may not capture slight differences between documents that are often times identical year to year except for a few key changes. Thus reading these documents in Chinese allows us to draw a more accurate portrayal of Chinese identity that is defined in terms that are not exogenously applied.

Though many documents emerge out of regional forums, the forums in which

these documents were presented represent particular institutions, such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), that according to a relationalist view serve as mediums and channels through which countries like China may negotiate and express their own identities. Thus the institution itself is not the primary concern in reading these documents, but rather serves as a setting in which we can observe articulations of (regional) identity. Speeches given by foreign ministers and Chinese leaders, government position papers, and presentations at regional forums comprise the majority of the documents within this study. The speeches are primarily foreign policy speeches as they are often useful in constructivist studies on identity. As Lisbeth Aggestam writes:

Foreign Policy speeches often reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural group that are related to specific customs, institutions, territory, myths, and rituals. These expressions of identity indicate how foreign-policy makers view past history, the present, and the future political choices they face.¹²

These documents are collected across a range of forums—within the mentioned time period—to include speeches and documents from APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3 conferences, bi-annual white papers, and even speeches between Chinese officials and United Nation’s leaders. Including speeches from a variety of forums is important in order to examine a Chinese identity that is not overly influenced by the particular setting in which any specific document is produced or presented. In other words, the textual analysis conducted within this study seeks to reveal commonalities and a degree of robustness in the themes across these documents.

In order to de-

limit my case study, the first component of my methodology is the selection of two

¹² Lisbeth Aggestam, and Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price. *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda*. London: Macmillan, 2000.

primary shifts in China's periphery policy. The two junctures chosen were: (1) the shift and from Chairman Mao's leftist (*zuo*) policy to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin's 'Good Neighboring Policy' (*mulin zhence*) and adherence to the principles of 'Peaceful Coexistence;' and (2) the shift from the Deng/Jiang era towards the 'New Security Concept' and the 'Harmonious World' vision espoused by China's current leader Hu Jintao.

Chinese foreign policy has for decades been dictated by grand, guiding ideologies that are often associated with the Chinese leader of the time. By analyzing shifts from one guiding principle or ideology to another we are able to observe internal processes of identity negotiation. At these historical junctures new leaders are re-envisioning Chinese foreign policy while simultaneously redefining conceptualizations of 'self' vis-à-vis the 'other'¹³. These junctures at which China is engaging in identity negotiation are also significant in that (as noted above) identity formation is not an entirely state-owned process. Exposure and relations with an identified 'other' are also integrated into an internal consciousness, and thus relations between self and other become inseparable from this process of identity negotiation. Thus if the purpose of this study is to analyze the ways in which East Asian relations have cultivated a sense of 'regional identity' within China, these historical junctures are sites at which external relations are influencing and interacting with internal processes of identity formation.

While the importance and significance of these two shifts will be discussed in later chapters, it is worth noting the reasons that justified these two specific

¹³ For further investigation on the ways in which historical junctures serve as a points of contestation and identity negotiation see: Ikenberry, John G. "Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement." *Idea's & Beliefs, Institutions, Foreign and Political Change Policy*. Ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane. New York: Cornell UP, 1993.

junctures as the primary focus of this study and why they are appropriate for this study's methodological framework. First, these two shifts span across three key time periods in modern China's foreign policy, primarily the late 1970's and early 1980's which marked the beginning of China's market-oriented reform and opening to the outside world (*gaige kaifang*) and the late 1990's going into the beginning of the 21st century which was characterized by a dramatic increase in China's relations with its East Asian neighbors. Secondly, these particular shifts in China's foreign policy lend themselves quite well to the investigation of key themes. These two particular historical shifts were significant in that they took common themes such as security and development and redefined them to align with the guiding ideology of the time, thereby shifting identities. Thus I interweave within the larger chronological narrative surrounding China's regional identity the themes of security and development.

These two themes are continued throughout the proceeding chapters for two reasons. First, the documents analyzed primarily speak to issues of Chinese and East Asian security and economic development. This is unsurprising as issues of security and development are top priorities of any developing country. The second reason is theoretical in that focusing on security documents in particular allows for an interesting exploration of identity since both security and identity are relational concepts that, "Imply the existence of an 'other' against which the notion of a collective self and insecurity are articulated."¹⁴

When analyzed within a larger narrative of identity formation, these two

¹⁴ Ronnie D. Lipschutz. *On Security*. New York: Columbia UP, 1995: 217.

junctures (that emphasize security and development) demonstrate how China's ideological shifts vis-à-vis its East Asian foreign policy reveal a growing regional consciousness and a gradual internalization of a regional identity. Furthermore it simultaneously demonstrates how China's relations with its East Asian neighbors have played an integral role in this transformation. Where the collective 'we' was once primarily inward-focused and unwaveringly Sino-centric, Chinese identity has evolved to include a 'we' that has transformed 'East Asia' into 'East Asian', where a geographical space has essentially been transformed into a concept encompassing a collective of common interests, responsibilities, and joint development. Perhaps even more telling is the transformation of a China that was once content to maintain peace in order to "put order in the backyard"¹⁵ and develop independently, to a China that has assumed a more active role in sending out a call to its East Asian neighbors that '*we* are all in this together'.

Roadmap

This project is presented in 5 chapters. In chapter 1, I begin with a review of the current literature and dominant perspectives on East Asian regionalism. This review of the literature will address current critiques of the East Asian regionalist project, while simultaneously arguing that such critiques are based on Western, overly substantialist standards. In the second chapter, I introduce the case of China by discussing the current scholarship surrounding Chinese identity and its foreign

¹⁵ You Ji and Jia Qingguo, "China's Re-emergence and Its Foreign Policy Strategy," in *China Review*, Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed. Chinese University Press: Hong Kong, 1998.

policy. Chapter 3 will then include a description of my relationalist model that depicts the relational processes of regional identity formation and foreign policy behavior. In chapter 4 I present a chronologically organized narrative that examines key shifts in China's guiding foreign policy ideology that illustrate the applicability of this model. By tying the two shifts discussed above, to the three stages of my relationalist model, I attempt to show how increased and evolving relations with its East Asian neighbors have influenced China's gradual internalization of a regional identity. I will conclude with a discussion the implications of this relational model and narrative on the study of East Asian regionalism and the discourse on regionalism. Through this discussion I advance the possibility of an Asian regionalist model and suggest that future studies on regionalism incorporate relationalist theory into the study of regionalist dynamics.

CHAPTER 1:

The ‘Distinct or Deficient’ Debate on East Asian Regionalism

In the following section I discuss the dominant and overly pessimistic perspectives of scholarly works on East Asian regionalism as a political, economic, and societal project. This review of the literature responds to current critiques and offers an alternative analysis of East Asian regionalism that will be divided into three sections. First I frame the current debate surrounding East Asian regionalism by highlighting the critiques of regionalist scholars. In doing so I identify key impediments to East Asia’s regional project while addressing important counterarguments to such criticisms. Next, drawing on ‘relationalist’ IR theory, I demonstrate the need for further research on the ways in which relations have the capacity to define an Asian Regionalism Model, prompting states to construct an identity based on conceptualizations of a regional community.

I. Key Impediments to East Asian Regionalism

Scholars have diagnosed two primary impediments to the East Asian regionalism project: (1) a fragmented and conflict-filled East Asian historical narrative; and (2) the lack of a common regional identity. The following section considers such impediments in relation to their explanatory role in the characterization of East Asian regionalism as an agglomeration of inadequate efforts and insurmountable obstacles. However, globalization has altered the East Asian landscape, producing new levels of economic interdependence and political collaboration. These current trends within East Asia challenge such critiques and

perhaps push the dominant perspective of a defunct East Asian regionalism project into antiquity.

The Historical Narrative Impediment

Scholars such as Tobias Nischalke identify the existence of a common or unifying historical narrative as an integral facilitator of regionalist enterprises¹⁶. Or, as Takashi notes, a region's history can render it hostile or welcoming to regionalist processes¹⁷. Several reasons are given: if a region consists of states that have consistently engaged in cooperative projects, or that have banded together to face a common threat, they are more likely to attempt to further regionalism within the area. Areas with histories that are filled with deep-rooted power rivalries, inward-oriented policies or little history of cooperation will be less likely to engage in the processes of regionalism¹⁸.

Scholars point to East Asia as a historically hostile region lacking significant progress in creating a supra-national enterprise¹⁹. The history of East Asia, spanning from the mid-19th century and the 150 years following, has generated a state of fragmentation due to global and regional forces of colonialism, Western influence, and military conquests encouraged inward-oriented, nationalistic policies within the

¹⁶ Tobias Nischalke. "Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community." *Pacific Review* 15 (2002): 89-117.

¹⁷ Takashi Terada. "Constructing an 'East Asian' concept and growing regional identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3." *The Pacific Review* 16 (2003): 251-77.

¹⁸ Karen Wigen. "Culture, Power, and Place: The New Landscapes of East Asian Regionalism." *American Historical Review* 104 (1999): 1183

¹⁹ Markus Hund, "ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptics Appraisal." *Pacific Review* 16 (2003): 383-417.

region²⁰. Preceding the Cold War, Asia, with the exception of Japan and Thailand, was composed of disparate colonies under Western rule. Japan itself acted as an imperial power during the Meiji Restoration period, and by 1864, had established an empire that included Taiwan, Manchuria, Korea, and other parts of Northern China. The Sino-Japanese rivalry also intensified during this period, as the first Sino-Japanese war was fought in response to Japan's control of Korea, resulting in China being forced to cede parts of Manchuria and the island of Formosa to Japan. The second Sino-Japanese war saw the rape of Nanjing and numerous violations of state sovereignty continued to promulgate violence well into World War II²¹.

In the years following WWII this fragmentation continued with the new political order brought forth by the Cold War and de-colonization. As former colonies—from the Philippines to Indonesia—gained political independence they concentrated their efforts on nation-building and protecting their newly acquired sovereignty²². Whereas the European post-WWII narrative saw an increase in attempts at European integration, East Asia found itself disengaging as newly independent countries remained hostile towards their former regional and global colonial masters²³. In the Cold War period, the fragmentation of East Asia was exacerbated by numerous conflicts within the region. In China, Mao's victory in 1949 incited the country's isolation vis-à-vis United States and its Asian allies; the Great Leap Forward from 1958-1960, the dispatching of the Red Guards in the 1960's, the

²⁰ For more on the history of East Asian regionalism see: T. J Pempel, *Remapping East Asia The Construction Of A Region* (Cornell Studies in Political Economy). New York: Cornell UP, 2004.

²¹ Pempel, pg. 11

²² Pempel, pg. 9

²³ John Ravenhill, "A three bloc world? The new East Asian Regionalism." *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 2 (2002): 167-95.

Tiananmen massacre²⁴, and decades of internal conflicts brought forth not only internal destabilization, but also isolated China from the East Asian region²⁵. In Korea, the two peninsular governments operated as hosts for the United States on one side and the USSR on the other. Indochina was plagued by warfare at the hands of the French and then by the Americans before falling into internal disputes. Guerilla movements separated the Philippines, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Thailand. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge regime annihilated an estimated 20% of the country's population²⁶. In sum, 'East Asia' during this period was a conglomeration of states united by geographical proximity but divided by warfare, external influences, and varying stages of state development.

Literature on East Asian regionalism regards this historical context as an underlying impediment to promoting greater cooperation as East Asian countries, it is said, "never forget."²⁷ This characterization is not without merit, however, as these deep-rooted hostilities are still expressed through the ways in which individual populations view one another. For example in the 1990's, past atrocities served as an excuse or reason to espouse nationalistic fervor as Japanese nationalism targeted China and North Korea, China aroused itself against Japan, and South Korea continued to foster contempt for its former Japanese colonial masters²⁸. Not surprisingly, the literature suggests this historical narrative of East Asia is an

²⁴ While the Tiananmen massacre occurs after China's isolationist period and promoted greater economic openness, the event represents an internal conflict that deflected state attention inward in terms of security.

²⁵ Fu Ying, "China and Asia in new period," *Foreign Affairs Journal*, (Beijing), No. 69, September 2003, p. 1-7.

²⁶ Pempel, pg. 10

²⁷ Hund, pg. 110

²⁸ Markus Thompson. "Whatever Happened to Asian Values?" *Journal of Democracy* 12 (2001): 154-65.

underlying cause of strong nationalistic, inward-oriented, sovereignty-respecting attitudes that often weaken attempts at strengthening regionalism in the area²⁹. The claim that regionalism in East Asia is ineffective and slow to progress is linked to states' unwillingness to relinquish their political sovereignty given their past historical experiences³⁰.

While the literature on East Asian history proves useful in explaining the origins of East Asian political ideologies regarding sovereignty, past histories are insufficient in predicting future behavior. Past animosities have given way gradually to the creation of new norms and ideologies. For example, China intensified its support for regionalist initiatives with the release of its New Security Concept, advocating for peaceful coexistence and cooperation along its periphery³¹. Japan shifted from pushing for a *kyodotai* (Japan dominated) community to accepting a more equal form of regionalism with the rise of China and the collapse of its "bubble" economy³². Despite historical hostilities and the strong reverence for state sovereignty, recent events have demonstrated East Asia's potential to overcome its hostile historical past and engage in regionalist policies. Though such a narrative may be insufficient in explaining the impediments to the project of East Asian regionalism, it is true that past events may have impeded the creation of a regional identity or sense of an Asian community.

The Lack of an "Asian Identity" or Community

²⁹ Markus Hund. "ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptics Appraisal." *Pacific Review* 16 (2003): 383-417

³⁰ David L Shambaugh. *Power Shift China and Asia's New Dynamics*. Berkeley: University of California, 2009.

³¹ Shambaugh, pg. 120. See also: Christopher M. Dent. *East Asian Regionalism*. London: Routledge, 2008.

³² Gilbert Rozman, *Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2004.

Asian regionalist scholars, such as Samuel Kim, have commented on the absence of an “Asian Identity”³³. Kim attributes this to the previously discussed history of East Asia, arguing that consistent warfare, followed by periods of isolation and disengagement, have hindered the formation of a united identity or the identification of particular “Asian values.” Scholars such as Gilbert Rozman suggest that unless East Asia is able to create a shared identity, the countries within the region will be unlikely to form a common vision as to the future of East Asia and regionalism will remain stagnant³⁴.

The importance of a common identity is often associated with constructivist theories, that suggest that the composition of a nation state’s “identity” often influences its behavior towards external entities³⁵. According to constructivist literature an “identity” can include such aspects as religion, cultural and social norms, political structures, or national and global perceptions. The problem within East Asia, according to this criteria, is that there is little uniformity in the region when it comes to most of these categories. Within East Asia there exist numerous different religions or faiths, and political structures, ranging from the democratic to the authoritarian³⁶. Furthermore, the hotly debated issue of what countries should be included in the region has also hindered the formation of an Asian identity. For example, the presence of countries such as Australia or India who have strong ties to

³³ Samuel S. Kim, "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4 (2004): 39.

³⁴ Rozman, pg. 113

³⁵ Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way." *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 100-11.

³⁶ Kim, pg. 39

South East Asia have prompted debates as to whether traditionally non-East Asian states should be included in a formal regional arrangement.

Debate over the boundaries of 'inclusion' represents more than a political issue in which states vie to be included, instead also capturing the degree to which states and their citizens identify with the East Asian region. Drawing boundaries simultaneously develops a regional consciousness in which states must visualize a geopolitical space that creates notions of 'us' and 'them' ³⁷. Takahashi found that in Japan and China, the two countries most poised for a leadership role in a regionalist order, only 26 per cent and 30 percent respectively of those surveyed identified themselves as being "Asian" when offered other choices such as European, Chinese, Islamic, and Other³⁸. Furthermore a study done by Tobias Nichalke examined the impact of ASEAN operations and norms on an "ASEAN" identity. His survey found that there was little evidence to suggest a shared identity since over 60 percent of his sample of ASEAN elites state that they could "Not trust other countries in Southeast Asia to be 'good neighbors' " and would thus continue to depend on extra-regional entities to ensure their security³⁹. Given the constructivist criteria, it seems that both power rivalries, especially between China and Japan, and a general distrust of other countries within the region have impeded the creation of an "Asian Identity".

While there is evidence to suggest the lack of a common "Asian Identity" or "Asian Values" according to constructivist standards, it is possible that these

³⁷ This concept of 'regional consciousness' builds upon the work of Ashis Nandy, who in describing the relationship between the 'self' and 'other' vis-à-vis India and British colonial rule, describes a process wherein the presence of an external 'other' becomes internalized in the processes by which one develops and views their own identity. For more on this see: Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* ; with a Postscript by the Author. Oxford Univ., 2010.

³⁸ Takahashi, pg. 260

³⁹ Nichalke, pg. 110

assertions are based on a substantialist and essentially Western notion of what comprises a 'common identity'⁴⁰. While many scholars cite homogenous political structures in Europe as a facilitating factor in the success of the EU, the idea that uniform government structures indicate a shared identity is based on the primacy that Western states accord to legal processes and institutions. As will be discussed later, this also highlights that the discourse on regionalism focuses on material entities such as institutions, viewing them as primary observable manifestations of a regionalist project. This is shown in the manner in which East Asian institutions such as the ASEAN Plus Three have come under attack, with many scholars attributing its weaknesses to the differing political and economic structures within the region⁴¹. Furthermore, there appears to be a growing pattern in the literature of emphasizing common institutional, political, and economic structures as the main impetus for a shared identity⁴². Such an emphasis is once again influenced by EU standards, where member states were mainly liberal democracies and possessed similar economic structures at the time of integration.

Though East Asia may be politically heterogeneous, there is evidence, according to Singaporean academic, Simon Tay, a significant amount of cross-cultural exchange between the countries of East Asia⁴³. Cultural phenomena such as 'J-Pop', Chinese films, and Korean Soap Operas are spreading at an extraordinary rate and have served as an effective means to connect the people of various East

⁴⁰ Kim, pg. 39

⁴¹ Evelyn Goh. "Great Powers and the Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies." *International Security* 32 (2002): 113-57.

⁴² The failure of ASEAN and its Chiang Mai Initiative to develop a common currency and exchange rate system is also viewed as evidence of weak institutions who lack the ability the advance their agendas to fruition.

⁴³ Simon Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, and Hadi Soesastro. *Reinventing ASEAN*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001.

Asian countries⁴⁴. Indeed Tay suggests that the growing common regional identity need not be found in institutions; it can also be found, “In the streets of Shanghai, Shibuya in Tokyo, and Singapore,” thus constituting a bottom-up formation of an Asian identity⁴⁵. Thus scholars such as Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill are correct when they assert that East Asian regionalism is more than just economic cooperation and ‘product cycles’⁴⁶. Economic cooperation not only leads to an increase in the exchange of goods between states, but also to an increase in cross-cultural exposure. This provides individuals with a means to connect with their East Asian neighbors and may contribute to a growing ‘Asian Culture’ that might serve as the basis for regionalism.

Or East Asian countries might form a top-down regional identity that is based on shared responses to processes of modernization such as globalization. Instead of an identity based on past historical experiences, common internal structures, or norms and ideologies, an East Asian vision might be shaped by the contemporary historical juncture, a specific point in a historical timeline that can promote cooperation between countries⁴⁷. This observation is not without historical merit. While some scholars suggest that it was a common “European Identity” that helped to form the EU, clearly it was also in large part a response to the position that European countries found themselves in after WWII. Similarly, the idea of regionalism gained momentum in East Asia after the Asian Financial Crises in 1997⁴⁸.

⁴⁴ Kim, pg.51

⁴⁵ Tay, pg. 139

⁴⁶ Mitchell Bernard, and John Ravenhill. "Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia." *World Politics* 45 (1995): 179-210.

⁴⁷ Pempel, pg.15

⁴⁸ Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, "Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: the Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East." *Asia Europe Journal* 6.2 (2008): 375-77.

In these cases, it was a particular historical juncture that encouraged states to work with one another. Thus countries within East Asia might forge a common identity based on the common challenges that they face.

It is difficult to deny East Asia's turbulent history and tenuous regional identity. However, the effects that such impediments have had on the East Asian regionalist project have been overstated, ignoring the evolving and increasingly interconnected landscape brought forth by globalization.

II. Solingen on the Flaws of East Asian Regionalism

Despite the perceived absence of an Asian identity or a historical narrative that promotes cooperation, East Asian states have engaged in numerous regionalism efforts. However, these efforts have been criticized as flawed and inefficient. Just as the identified impediments to further regionalism are overstated by the literature, the flaws identified in existing institutions by authors such as Etel Solingen are also based on Western standards that hold institutionalization and legal rule-based Weberian states as the *modus operandi*⁴⁹. In her work, Solingen describes two prominent and frequently articulated defects of East Asian institutions: informality and consensus-based procedures.

Informality and the Institutional Dilemma

⁴⁹ Solingen, Etel. "East Asian Regionalist Institutions: Characteristics, Sources, and Distinctiveness." *Remapping East Asia*. Ed. T. J. Pempel. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2005.

Solingen's first critique holds that East Asian institutions emphasize process over progress, relying on personal relations, open dialogue, and "soft" power diplomacy instead of established, bureaucratic, rule-based institution. According to Solingen and other skeptics of East Asian regionalism, this informal setting allows for states to refuse to raise contentious issues, avoiding confrontation at the cost of producing any substantive agreements. The result is general codes of conduct and principles rather than concrete and specific initiatives to enforce regional policies. This informality is also present within the structural framework of ASEAN itself for example. Critics claim that ASEAN's small secretariat is nothing more than a coordinating mechanism among national secretariats void of any real formal authority or a power to seriously influence state agendas⁵⁰.

Scholars similarly claim that the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is inefficient due to its structural informality. The APEC began as an informal dialogue but has evolved into a regional institution promoting economic cooperation and free trade agreements. APEC is not modeled after such formal agreements as the U.S-Canadian agreement however; it has no coercive enforcement mechanisms and instead relies on voluntary commitment⁵¹. Furthermore, like ASEAN, APEC also possesses a small and limited secretariat whose job is to provide an advisory, technical and operational role rather than one of strong leadership. According to Solingen, " Many consider it too weak to support a more dynamic agenda, even one not focused on trade liberalization...but political operation⁵²."

⁵⁰ Solingen, pg. 38.

⁵¹ Richard Stubbs, "ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?" *Asian Survey* 42 (2002): 442.

⁵² Solingen, pg. 34

The informality of East Asian institutions is not surprising due to the commitment to principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the region. This commitment is exemplified in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) agreement, the most significant attempt by East Asian countries to create a regional order. The informal mechanisms within the APT have been referred to as the “ASEAN way,” emphasizing accommodation, consultation, reciprocity, and informal diplomacy⁵³. Due to the primacy of national secretariats over the ASEAN secretariat, scholars often criticize ASEAN for its lack of enforcement mechanisms and the absence of any sort of binding or precise legal obligations. This was further shown when the APT created an East Asian Vision Group to deliberate on the goals of East Asian cooperation and an institutional framework. While the report outlined over seventy proposals to address concerns such as regional poverty and to create a regional identity, it failed to mention the creation of any form of supra-national institution and thus failed to establish anything more than a rhetorical commitment. As John Ravenhill writes, “significant change or any form of collective trust between states is rendered impossible when states are free to renounce their obligations⁵⁴. Thus most scholars hold that if regionalism is to succeed in East Asia, countries must be willing to move past dialogue and begin to institutionalize specific and binding rules upon its member states.

Much of the literature concurs that attempts at regionalism, primarily in the form of APT, have been stagnant or ineffective due to this lack of institutionalization. This assertion implies that a successful regionalism model must emulate the

⁵³ Solingen, pg. 35

⁵⁴ Ravenhill, pg. 19

“adversarial posturing, majority vote, and other legalistic procedures in Western multilateral organizations.⁵⁵” It seems doubtful that this model can be applied in East Asian states whose strong emphasis on state sovereignty would discourage them from taking part in an organization based on confrontational and legally constraining principles.

Viewed more positively, however, the informality of APT processes allows for greater flexibility in dealing promptly with pressing issues that a highly bureaucratic organization would be unable to address. Furthermore, because the APT relies on extensive dialogue, holding over 700 meetings a year, East Asian regionalism is enshrined in a commitment towards the settlement of disputes through peaceful means, establishing confidence within states that their sovereignty is unthreatened and consequently forming a sense of community⁵⁶. Since its creation, no ASEAN member has been involved in a major armed confrontation with another member state, which further attests to its dedication to peaceful resolution⁵⁷. By allowing states to engage in an *n-x procedure*—allowing them to choose what commitments they are to engage in—APT also has rendered cooperation that would otherwise be non-existent, possible. For example, had strong enforcement mechanisms and sovereignty encroaching policies been present in the APT, countries such as China would have been less likely to engage with the institution or agree to trade agreements with ASEAN⁵⁸.

⁵⁵ Amitav Acharya. “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia,” *International Herald Tribune*, November 8–9, 2003.

⁵⁶ Stubbs, pg. 442

⁵⁷ Dent, pg. 30.

⁵⁸ Bernard and Ravenhill, pg. 180

Consensual, Fragmented and Indecisive Policies

Critics also claim that the informal and passive nature of these institutions not only creates weak and essentially unenforceable agreements, but also prevent these organizations from setting a more relevant regional political agenda. More specifically scholars have pointed to consent-oriented decision-making procedures that often fail to create any multi-lateral or decisive policies⁵⁹. This is evident in the large number of bilateral and preferential trade agreements (PTA) in comparison to an extremely limited number of significant *multi-lateral* agreements in the region. In fact, attempts at creating multi-lateral agreements such as an Asian Monetary Union or currency exchange program have failed in the region for the most part due to the objection of member countries such as China. As a result East Asian countries not only prefer to engage in bilateral agreements with neighboring countries but extra-regional states as well⁶⁰. Scholars claim that regional agreements are therefore extremely fragmented, resembling a 'hub and spoke- model' or creating an over all "noodle bowl" effect—a collection of disparate bilateral agreements with no multi-lateral linkages⁶¹.

Due to this observation, many scholars within the field of economics recommend that East Asian countries expand their existing bilateral agreements into larger multi-lateral arrangements in order to pressure otherwise unwilling states to

⁵⁹ Nischalke, pg. 94. See also Solingen, pg. 41

⁶⁰ Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia." *International Security* 18 (1993): 22.

⁶¹ Paul Evans, 'Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent EastAsian Institutional Identity' in T.J. Pempel ed. *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

engage in regional cooperation⁶². This suggestion closely resembles the notion of the “domino effect,” a theory proposed by Western scholars that was used to describe how the European Union was able to grow from a smaller economic cooperation agreement inevitably encouraging other countries to follow suit eventually in a large scale regional cooperative enterprise⁶³. While this model is based on Western rather than Asian constructs, scholars believe that it would allow East Asian countries to build upon their numerous bi-lateral agreements and establish a foundation for the creation of an integrated and multi-inclusive regional arrangement.

III. From “Noodle Bowl” to Regionalism Network

Many authors conclude that the chances of a successful multi-lateral economic or security-oriented agreement are quite low⁶⁴. With this conclusion the question becomes: will East Asian policies then remain stagnant in the disoriented “noodle bowl” model? While many authors have dismissed the possible effectiveness of the existing economic and political agreements between the APT countries, it is in large part due to the perception that multi-lateral arrangements are uniquely more effective in promoting regional cooperation. However, it may be the case that bilateral agreements within East Asia have the potential to facilitate regionalism in the area due to the indirect networks that they create. While there exists no significant multi-lateral trade or security arrangements, almost every country within

⁶² James Cotton. "The "Haze" over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement." *Pacific Affairs* 72 (1999): 331-51.

⁶³ Takashi, pg. 262

⁶⁴ Hund, pg. 122, and Stubbs, pg. 317

East Asia shares trade partners with other member countries and are thus inadvertently connected. The informal network formed by the presence of numeral bilateral and mini-lateral agreements can deter conflict among all participating countries. Country *x* need not have a direct alliance with Country *y* for in such a network both countries inevitably share alliances with other powers within the network. This may deter either from pursuing aggressive policies towards the other, due to the risk of harming other alliances.

Another possibility lies within the current 'hub and spoke' model. This model can be improved if the APT secretariat plays the role of the hub, meaning that while states can still engage in bilateral agreements, they can use APT to monitor and regulate these arrangements; in this way states can essentially 'defer' enforcement procedures, which could lead to conflict, to a third party. The APT's importance would not be as an institution determining the direction and agenda by which East Asian regionalism should develop. Rather the actual relations and agreements between states would define the regionalist project, with the APT serving as a conflict mitigator as well as a connecting point to promote a greater sense of security⁶⁵.

IV. Impediments to East Asian Regionalism: A Discursive Problem?

The literature on East Asian regionalism suggests that regionalism efforts within the area have been ineffective and stagnant due to its emphasis on dialogue over coercion, soft power over hard power, and 'process' over 'progress.' According to this argument, East Asia suffers from a history that hinders rather than promotes

⁶⁵ Christopher M. Dent, and David W. F. Huang. *Northeast Asian Regionalism: Lessons from the European Experience*. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002. See also Shambaugh, pg. 13.

cooperation. In addition, the region lacks a common identity, preventing individual countries from uniting in a shared vision of the future. Due to these impediments, Etel Solingen has laid out the main flaws of current East Asian regional institutions, highlighting their informality and unenforceable nature. Thus critics of East Asian regionalism view the policies and agreements set forth by the institutions such as APT or APEC as lacking any real authority.

However, these characterizations are based on Western standards—usually drawing on the EU model—that may be unsuitable for the cultural, political, and economic conditions in the East Asian region—a region whose identity will not be shaped by the presence of homogenous political or economic structures but by regional exchanges. Furthermore, historical juncture analysis shows that East Asia may unite in a common vision not in response to shared beliefs or the presence of “Asian Values,” but in a response to modernity and a globalist political narrative largely controlled by the West. Finally, applying new perspectives on the configurations of regional identities that include cross-cultural interaction potentially shifts our vision to a more contemporary narrative that acknowledges regionally sensitive responses to worldwide trends such as globalization. Western regionalism models ignore such possibilities that could produce a more optimistic view on East Asian regionalism, due to its emphasis on institutional efficacy and policy enforcement. When one abandons the Western regionalism model, it is possible to see that current initiatives undertaken by APT members may indicate the formation of a distinctive, rather than deficient integrative model; a non-Eurocentric model that focuses on diplomacy, negotiation, and emphasizes peaceful resolution techniques.

Perhaps one of the most significant explanations for the critiques of East Asian regionalism lies not within the actions of states themselves. Perhaps it instead lies in a predilection within the discourse on regionalism to focus on substantialist material 'entities' (particularly regional institutions) rather than on the (relationalist) networks of relations that define the East Asian regionalist project. As previously discussed, Western models often define a successful regionalist project as an arrangement in which individual states cede (at least partially) certain aspects of their sovereignty in order to form a regional enterprise which has the power to advance a collective agenda and promote regional security and prosperity.

Thus the scholarship on East Asian regionalism has been largely shaped by substantialist analysis. Samuel Kim defines regionalism as 'the actions undertaken by states to promote regional cooperation and to attain regional goals'. This suggests that regionalism is a byproduct of the state, and that it is the action of states that creates regionalism. In treating regionalism as a process owned by states, scholars tend to view the relations between states as controlled mechanisms by which states are changing the relations not vice versa. This is exemplified by the usual implementation of network theory in the study of East Asian regionalism. East Asia is treated as a composition of various networks, with various nodes representing states and regional institutions. However such theory tends to focus primarily on the nodes (or actors) within networks, often treating the ties between such nodes as static 'things' like the 'ties' existing between concrete physical entities⁶⁶.

Contrary to substantialist analysis, these ties or networks are not static but fluid and dynamic. During interaction it is not the physical configurations of states

⁶⁶ Jackson and Nexon, pg. 305

that change but rather their norms, preferences, and identities. This suggests that such norms and preferences are not 'possessed' by states/nodes themselves but are rather embedded within ties and relations in which states participate. Thus the formation of norms and preferences can exist as an un-owned process, consistently evolving with continuous interactions and influencing and transforming the states themselves. This suggests that we can no longer simply view regionalism as an owned process that is in the complete control of states. Rather it is a series of relations organized into a network of nodes and ties, where the ties between entities are constantly changing and in-turn shaping the state nodes themselves.

Critics of East Asian regionalism, like Kim, often argue that regionalism has failed due in large to the lack of a pre-existing collective identity. However the very conception of identity has been largely substantialist and studies have not focused on the relational processes that compose identity. Scholars writing on regional identity within the region generally focus on factors endogenous to states themselves or the regional institutions in which they operate. For example, in his attempt to examine the construction of an 'East Asian' concept and growing regional identity, Takashi Terada studies the ways in which individual state identities impeded the success of such organizations. However, he neglected to examine the ways in which the individual identities were in a dialogical transaction with other actors and institutions, and the ways in which such relations affected not only the institutions, but were actually shaping the very identities of the states themselves.

The IR literature on identity commonly treats identity as an owned characteristic from which relations are then affected. In other words, states are possessors of identity, and they in fact shape their identity by attributing

characteristics to themselves in relation 'to' rather than 'with' the other. Alexander Wendt describes the ways in which two forms of identity, corporate and social are formed, arguing that corporate identity depends on how the state defines itself in relation to the other, which is connected to social identities which are sets of meanings that an actors attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object⁶⁷. However in describing identity formation in this way, identity becomes a controlled process, one that is changed as perceptions by the state changes. This undermines the processes in which identities are created not only in opposition to one another in an identity-alterity nexus but are dialogically linked to relations with other actors.

In studying regional identity within East Asia, analyzing and observing the actions undertaken by states and regional institutions is inadequate if scholars are to understand the underlying processes that are changing identities. Interpreting the actions and statements of entities as representations of a preexisting identity may no longer be sufficient in that processes, rather than observable actions, reveal the ways in which state identities are changing or moving towards a regional collective identity. Despite the fact that the policies and actions of East Asian states vis-à-vis regional institutions such as APT or the EAEC may be interpreted to represent a lack of commitment towards regionalism, the relations between such organizations and entities may suggest that state perceptions of 'self' and 'other' are changing and moving towards a more cooperative rather than oppositional configuration. In other

⁶⁷ Alexander Wendt. "Collective identity formation and the international states." *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 384-96.

words, relations between East Asian countries are shaping state identities by influencing states to see themselves as part of a cooperative enterprise, rather than as a fragmented collection of states in realist state of anarchy.

The above section has attempted to show that the East Asian regionalist project has in large part been deemed a failure due to a substantialist lens that has dominated the discourse on regionalism. Defining a 'successful' regionalist project in substantialist terms has placed the EU model at the apex of regionalist endeavors, overemphasizing the importance of institutional capacity and formal procedures and agreements. Applying a relationalist lens in analyzing East Asian regionalism suggests that there are other measures of 'success': if regional relations can cultivate a sense of a 'regional identity' within member states that encourages each member state to engage in greater collaboration, cooperation and coordination with its East Asian neighbors, then it does not matter as much whether such relations occur formally or informally, or in or outside an institutional arena. In this way, the East Asian regionalist project can be perceived not as a failed endeavor, but rather as a non-Eurocentric, pioneering regionalism model.

As discussed earlier, in order to observe these regional relations and their influence on 'regional identity' and regional foreign policy I will be using China as a case study. In doing so I offer an alternative analysis to expand the East Asian regionalism literature by elucidating the ways in which East Asian relations create a sense of regional identification. The next section will demonstrate that such a study is needed since scholarship on Chinese identity vis-à-vis foreign policy has focused on essentially 'labeling' China according to constructivist-realist or liberal perceptions.

CHAPTER 2:

'Naming' The Dragon: The Debate Surrounding Chinese Identity

China presents itself as an ideal case study of the ways in which regional relations create, direct, and reinforce processes of self-identity formation. As Emilian Kavalski states, China's regionalist project reveals "a world of relational process, a world which much must be studied in relational terms."⁶⁸ David Kang goes further, arguing that China's future and the impacts on those within its spheres of influence depend not on power politics, but instead arises from a deeper concern with national identity and its relation to foreign policy behavior⁶⁹.

In regards to foreign policy and East Asian regionalism, the literature surrounding Chinese identity has largely focused on answering three questions. First, what defines and determines China's identity? Second, in relating Chinese identity to a contemporary context, is the state of China's identity stable and fixed or in a period of transition and transformation? Finally, how does China's self-identification affect its East Asian foreign policy initiatives? In answering these questions, the literature—while generally constructivist—displays a strong bifurcation along realist-leaning and liberalist interpretations of Chinese identity. While constructivist-realist theory claims that China sees itself as a 'Rising Great Power' poised for hegemonic rule, Neoliberal theory views China imagining itself as a 'Good Neighbor' striving for stability and peace.

⁶⁸ Emilian Kavalski. *China and the Global Politics of Regionalization*. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009.

⁶⁹ David C. Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*. New York: Columbia UP, 2007.

I. Fixing Chinese Identity?: Rising Power' or 'Good Neighbor'

In answering the first question, some constructivist theory has identified China's self-identification as a 'Rising Great Power', emphasizing China's belief in Realpolitik power dynamics, China's historical narrative of return to greatness, and its growing influence in the world economy. Scholars such as Maria Hsia Chang center the discussion of Chinese identity around the idea of a long-held 'victimization mentality' (*shouhaizhe xintai*): China's 150 years of humiliation at the hands of Western powers challenged the long-held Middle Kingdom ideology which placed China at the center and apex of the universe⁷⁰. More importantly, in line with Kenneth Waltz's seminal work on political realism, events such as the Opium War demonstrated to China the importance of power and security in defending China's autonomy and sovereignty⁷¹. In this context China constructs its ultimate goal as reestablishing and redefining itself as the world's Great Power.

This desire to regain Great Power status has in turn fostered a Chinese identity grounded in a realist paradigm in which Chinese perceptions of 'self' and 'other' are construed using a Western power as the primary frame of reference. According to Ni Feng, China has long viewed itself as a victim of a uni-polar political structure dominated by the West, finding itself placed at the outskirts of the international system and condemned to its Asian periphery⁷². Supporting this view,

⁷⁰ Maria Hsia Chang. *Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001.

⁷¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security* 25.1 (2000): 5-41.

⁷² Feng, Ni. "Political and Security Structures of East Asia." CNKI (2001).

American scholars have assigned China “an outlier status outside the peaceful Great Power group,” which is defined by a “shared in-group identity.”⁷³ According to Deng, China’s out-group identification has fueled its desire to identify itself as a non-Western power that is capable of accumulating enough status and power to protect its sovereignty.

In addition, China’s integration into the world economy and its rapid economic growth has also prompted it to self-identify as a rising power, fighting for membership within the Great Power elite. In a nationwide survey conducted in 1995, the popular newspaper *China Youth Daily* asked its young readers to comment on how they viewed themselves relative to the rest of the world. Most recognized China’s ‘economic backwardness’ as the main detriment in its ability to compete for great power status in the international arena. Today, China’s average GDP growth ranges from 7 to 10% annually, while most of the Western world, including the United States, has experienced growth barely reaching 3%. Foreign capital is steadily flowing into Chinese markets while the rest of the world attempts to launch massive macroeconomic policies to encourage investment. As a result, China’s growing economic influence has increased its confidence in identifying as a rising world power to such an extent that scholars such as Kang argue that the very legitimacy of the CCP depends on its ability to maintain China’s economic growth relative to the rest of the world.

In summary, according to the constructivist-realist framework, China’s historical narrative of victimization and a reevaluation of its current economic and

⁷³ Yong Deng and Sherry Gray. "Growing Pains--China Debates Its International Future." *Journal of Contemporary China* 10.26 (2001): 5-17.

political capabilities has generated a national identity defined by its pragmatic desire to attain Great Power status.

While the Realist-influenced conception of Chinese identity emphasizes a western-centric system of anarchy, victimization, and a fundamental desire to accumulate power, other constructivists, such as David Kang contend that China has instead identified itself as a liberal 'Good Neighbor' (*mulin youhao*). According to Kang the construction of Chinese identity involves more than traditional power politics and when analyzing Chinese foreign policy, it is necessary to consider more than the material logic of interstate Realpolitik. What is needed instead is an examination of processes of self-identification, social identity, and self-image not in isolation, but in interaction with informal and formal linkages between exogenous relations and endogenous factors. Instead of victimization, 'Good Neighbor' China emphasizes obligation, where the PRC must not seek to expand its power but rather to use its influence to promote a cooperative and peaceful coexistence. As scholars such as Barme articulates, 'Good Neighbor' China attempts to "make friends in every quarter, trade goods, learn from each other and enjoy respectful interaction, (*guang jiao pengyou, hutong youwu, bici xuexi, li shang wanglai*).⁷⁴"

Diverging from frameworks centered on the West as other, constructivist-liberals contend that this Western-oriented identity cannot be used to describe the ways in which China and East Asia in particular interact⁷⁵. Instead of feeling 'condemned' to its periphery, China has embraced its East Asian neighbors advocating for multi-lateral, cooperation across the region. Instead of seeking to

⁷⁴ Geremie Barmé. *The Forbidden City*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008.

⁷⁵ Kang, 12

accumulate power and exert its influence, the PRC has attempted to strengthen relations and restrain any perceptions of itself as a hegemon within the region. In other words China has attempted to define itself in relation to East Asia, internalizing an in-group identity as a stabilizer and responsible member of the East Asian community. In this respect, the construction of Chinese identity vis-à-vis its foreign policy is more than a quest towards the upper echelons of international status, but rather a quest towards “identification” (*rentong*) with and “fusion” (*rongru*) into the regional community⁷⁶.

It is worth noting that other scholars have attempted to fuse constructivist-realist and constructivist-liberal interpretations of Chinese identity. This fusion of ideas contends that China has neither constructed an identity that can be solely defined as that of a ‘Great Power’ or a ‘Good Neighbor’. Instead, both realist and neoliberalist-constructivist ideas have manifested themselves in a Chinese identity built upon the notion of a ‘Responsible Power’, where China is attempting to socialize peacefully as a new power into an existing regional order⁷⁷. Accordingly, while China does not necessarily desire to establish itself as a regional hegemon that *determines* and *controls* the regional order, the PRC still desires to work with its East Asian neighbors in creating a peaceful and cooperative community in which it can assume a leadership role. In this way such scholars have attempted to emphasize the realist-neoliberalist overlap between “two distinct systems of rule, two different ways of conceiving power, two sets of practices—which may be distinguished, not

⁷⁶ Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang. *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

⁷⁷ Sö, Chae-jöng, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson. *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2004.

only analytically, but also normatively,” and most importantly, “two different ways of imagining space.⁷⁸”

The Pursuit of Chinese Identity: Stasis vs. Transformation

The second question that scholars on Chinese identity have sought to answer considers the fixed or variable nature of a guiding, national identity. To put it differently, has China already determined and internalized an observable and fixed identity that may explain its foreign policy behavior? Or is the PRC still in a period of active pursuit of a sense of identity, wherein Chinese self-identification is in a fluid and dynamic process of transition and transformation? Such questions are imperative in analyzing the process of identity formation. If China’s identity is presupposed and fixed then the self-identification process lacks an evolving temporal dimension in that identity is already endogenously determined. On the other hand, assuming variability in China’s self-identification allows for the possibility of a temporal process in which both endogenous and exogenous factors are interacting to shape Chinese identity.

Scholars such as Yan Xuetong argue that China’s identity is not about transformation, or realization, but rather of revitalization⁷⁹. Accordingly, China’s identity resembles not that of a quest but has already been determined and conditioned by an ideology placing China at the center of the international arena.

⁷⁸ Adler, Emanuel, and Patricia Greve. "When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance." *Review of International Studies* 35.S1 (2009): 59.

⁷⁹ Yan Xuetong, "The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes." *Journal of Contemporary China* 10.26 (2001): 33-39.

Stutter reiterates this point, arguing that China has always identified itself as the central player within the East Asian arena. However, given its experiences with Western hegemony during the Opium War and later through U.S hegemony within the East Asian region, China has since been unable to reawaken its identity as a Great Power. As the following commentary by a close associate of former PRC President Jiang Zemin suggests, China's current political and economic position has since allowed for a revival of the 'sleeping dragon'⁸⁰:

A rising China will never be a nation that is satisfied with only food and shelter. Her development and progress will definitely make contributions to peace and prosperity of the world. China was such a [nation] in the past for several thousands of years, it will definitely become such a nation again in the next millennium...our nation used to be a crucial player on the playground of international politics. [Its] enhancing economic capabilities, and its status of being a major nuclear power and a permanent member on the UN Security Council, will give our nation a larger and larger role in world affairs. Our nation enjoys a position as an irreplaceable major world power (Jieming 1997).

This statement conveys a finality of China's perception of itself, as China appears resolute in its belief that it is an "irreplaceable" world power. Deng Yong echoes this point when he suggests that China has concluded its self-identification process and is currently attempting 'live up to' its role as a rising, responsible power. In other words, China's identity has long been fixed and conditioned by its nationalist sentiments and feelings of entitlement to be recognized as a global center of power: their quest is not in search for something new or an 'identity' but rather to

⁸⁰ Scholars such as Zhang Yuming argue that, until the late 1990s China, was still in active pursuit of a coherent sense of identity since China was still uncertain about its role in the East Asian region. However, Zhang contends that China's growing economic and political clout have dispelled such trepidations, thus ending its quest for self-identification and allowing the PRC to ascertain and construct a clear and confident national identity. (From personal interview by author of Professor Zhang Yunming at Peking University, Beijing, China)

regain the international status that they had lost. As Joseph Nye writes, China's 'rise' is really the product of a misidentification of its return to power⁸¹.

However, other scholars such as Kang argue that characterizing China's identity as preconditioned and essentially static ignores current exogenous relations and factors that are in a continuous interplay with China's endogenous identity construction mechanisms. In addressing China's identity Kang states that the globalized nature of economics and culture has made China's self-identification processes "subject to a number of influential dynamics" and there is no immutable "Chinese mind-set."⁸² In other words, any attempts to elucidate the construction of China's identity must resist characterizing such processes as a quest to regain a past great power status or produce a given sense of identity. Rather it is an ongoing and fluid journey of adaptation versus atrophy.

More importantly, Kang has opened the door for new views on Chinese identity that recognize the importance of internally determined endogenous factors while simultaneously acknowledging that the construction of China's identity is not entirely an internally owned process. Rather, it is a process in which identity is constructed on more than a Realpolitik vision: a constant state of transition as the world system and the relations that comprise it are directly and indirectly exerting their influence on China's self-conceptualization.

Chinese Identity and its Implications for the East Asian Regional Order

⁸¹ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

⁸² Kang, pg. 201

Finally, in answering the third question regarding Chinese identity vis-à-vis East Asian foreign policy, the literature appears to accept the theory of the politics of identity. This view acknowledges that national identity includes a “particular set of ideas about political community that policy-makers use and draw on to mobilize a sense of cohesion,” which shapes its foreign policy behavior⁸³. For example, proponents of the ‘China Threat’ theory, such as Bernstein and Munro, assert that China is the sole threat to US security as its identification as a great power has led the PRC to project its economic and political influence until it gains a seat on the ‘in-group superpower table’⁸⁴. Other scholars such as Kurlantzick claims China’s identity as a ‘Rising Great Power’ by leads it to direct its soft-power policies towards Southeast Asia, characterizing China’s relations with SEA as a ‘charm offensive’⁸⁵. As part of this ‘charm offensive’, Chinese identity has generated internally constructed feelings of entitlement as the region’s leader. In this way, China’s identity is presupposed and used as a fixed variable to explain its foreign policy behavior. As previous critiques outlined above have shown, China’s identity is continuously being influenced by a vast network of relations and thus scholars would be mistaken to ignore the reality that China is being influenced by its neighbors through the same temporal process in which it is exerting its own influence.

While it is tempting to argue that China exhibits certain behaviors because it has internalized a particular identity that necessitates such behavior, such an

⁸³ Lisbeth Aggestam. *A European Foreign Policy?: Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany*. Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Political Science, 2004.

⁸⁴ Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. *The Coming Conflict with China*. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1997.

⁸⁵ Joshua Kurlantzick. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*. New Haven: Yale UP, 2007.

analysis oversimplifies the relations that exist from the beginning stages of identity formation to a realized foreign policy agenda. By automatically assuming a given identity that is utilized to comprehend and explain China's foreign policy, this view ignores the process of identity formation that is inextricably embedded within a temporal process in which foreign policy only serves as an observable proxy for the relations that underpin Chinese identity.

Thus the literature has little consensus. The realist-constructivist framework over-emphasizes endogenous factors comprising national identity; when referring to external relations, this view focuses mainly on the West or an abstract notion of the 'international community' while under utilizing China's East Asian periphery as a frame of reference. In contrast, the liberal-constructivist interpretation of identity centers primarily on the importance of relational processes in shaping identity but neglects to elucidate a temporal process to conceptualize the interaction between relations and identity construction mechanisms. China's foreign policy may be less a product of a specific identity and more a result of a temporal sequence comprised of relations and feedback loops, self-perception and contextualization, and processes of reinforcement. In order to illuminate this temporal sequence, the following chapter will articulate a relationalist model that isolates particular stages of this processual narrative.

Chapter 3:

A Relationalist Model for a Regionalist Process

The study of International Relations is generally dominated by a substantialist vernacular and thus it becomes exceedingly difficult to avoid reified notions of 'states' or 'institutions'. It is important that such entities not be treated as actors solely on the *assumption* that they are the ontological primitives of analysis.

Relationalism argues that relations shape conceptions of identities that in turn generate particular norms and preferences. The same way in which Foucault argues that states do not own power but that power is made up of a series of relations that in turn help to form states, relational theories argue that identity, norms, and preferences are also made up of series of relations that shape the composition and principles of the state project. Relationalists argue, then, that interactions exist logically or analytically prior to entities and can in fact create and transform the entities themselves⁸⁶.

Applying a relationalist lens that regards entities as observable proxies for relational interaction helps to illuminate a process in which such relations create a sense of regional consciousness, identity, and policy. Such a relationalist model, while still cognizant of the usefulness of notions of the 'state' and 'state behavior', highlights the ways in which an actor, operating as a series of previous relations, perceives and distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous influences. These

⁸⁶ As Charles Tilly's work on state formation suggests, states are merely configurations of relations of capital and coercion⁸⁶ (Tilly 1975).


perceived differences between exogenous and endogenous influences then generate a sequence of stages in which these influences are in consistent interplay.

In previous chapters, I argued that the formation and internalization of a 'regional identity' follows a temporal process that redefines notions of 'state', 'identity', and 'foreign policy' as social manifestations or projections of a series of relations. My conception of this process builds upon Jackson and Nexon's concepts of yoking and ownership and should be modeled as a temporal sequence that explains how Chinese identity is created, internalized, and projected.


In this chapter I articulate a relational model to elucidate processes of identity negotiation. This model (see figure 1) depicts the formation and internalization of a regional identity through three stages: Stage 1, draws upon the China's reformist movement at the end of the Qing Dynasty to demonstrate the initial stage of contextualization and re-evaluation. During this initial stage, external cues or events initiate a rethinking of the 'self' within a current environment or context. The result is a developed 'frame of reference' or perceived 'other' by which the 'self' is to be compared. Stage 2 takes the example of the Reformist movement a step further, demonstrating how relations generate interplay between endogenous and exogenous influences that can then produce a regional identity. This regional identity then generates particular interests, goals, according to a particular role conception. Finally stage 3, demonstrates an internalization of a regional identity as a merging of 'self' and 'other'. This internalization then produces certain policy behavior that can be observed in changes in policy or ideological shifts.

Figure 1.1- A Relationalist Model of a Regionalist Process


1.1.a Stage 1: Contextualization and Re-evaluation



1.1.b Stage 2: Regional Identity Formation



1.1.c Stage 3: Internalization/ Merging of Self and Other



Stage 1: Contextualization and Reevaluation

The first stage, as displayed in *figure 1.1 a*, involves a process of contextualization in which an actor assumes a receiver role and attempts to gather signals from its environment in order to determine its own position vis-à-vis other actors within the given subsystem⁸⁷. Borrowing from Ashis Nandy's concept of 'consciousness', the primary stage of this relationalist model involves the creation of a contextualized *regional* consciousness, a sense of 'self' based on current observations of an endogenously-determined 'other' that exists due to a recognition of the 'self' as a part of a larger organizational system⁸⁸.

The stimulus behind this stage and model can range from a particular event, with enough significance that it necessitates a reevaluation of an actor's environment, to paradigmatical shifts that transform the political, economic, and social narrative in which actors find themselves deeply embedded. There is no identifiable 'beginning' to this stage, however, as actors at any given time are social embodiments of prior relational processes. Rather actors at any given point in time may be induced into this process of contextualization; since there are no predetermined time-duration conditions, this process is particular to the actor and circumstance. Characterizing historical events or shifts in paradigms as potential stimuli helps to avoid the objectification of particular events or historical junctures. Rather than substantiating or simplifying these occurrences as 'causes' of certain phenomena, a

⁸⁷ An 'environment' is a system of which an actor perceives itself to be a part, whether it be due to geographic proximity, ethnic similarities, religion, etc. Such an environment could be micro, or macrocosmic in size, ranging from regional subsystems to a global structure.

⁸⁸ Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* ; with a Postscript by the Author. Oxford Univ., 2010: 40.

relationalist model emphasizes their role as initial stimuli to a larger sequence of relational processes that generates observable phenomena.

A primary example within the East Asian regionalism literature is the movement towards a more integrated economic regional order that emphasized cooperation and coordination between countries. Many scholars, such as David Marshall, are tempted to explain such as phenomena as a result of the East Asian financial crisis which *caused* countries to reevaluate their economic policies⁸⁹. In this way, the East Asian financial crisis is substantiated as a 'cause' rather than a stimulus that provided the impetus to a larger, more dynamic sequence of relations. For example, as mentioned earlier, Southeast Asian countries that have long histories as victims of colonization have aggressively protected the principles of state sovereignty. Thus, the East Asian crisis did not *directly* cause countries to reevaluate their economic policies. Rather, the crisis indirectly stimulated a rethinking of policy by first initiating a process in which Southeast Asian countries grappled with their identities as sovereign countries who had gained freedom from colonial rule and their current role as a members of a closely connected regional system. This is not to say that regionalist scholars have ignored completely the importance of the relations that occurred between East Asian countries due to the crisis, but rather that relational *processes* and potential models in which these processes are organized have not been explored in depth by the literature as seen in chapter 1.

Relying on particular occurrences or events to explain current structures or narratives also renders the literature susceptible to overemphasizing prodigious

⁸⁹ David Marshall, "Understanding the Asian Crisis: Systemic Risk as Coordination Failure," Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspective, (1998) Third Quarter, 13– 28.

events and underemphasizing more nuanced or hard to observe processes in which gradual and evolving relations play a primary role. For example, the Chinese Reformist and Self-Strengthening movement during the late Qing dynasty tends to be viewed as a struggle between modern intellectuals and an antiquated ruling government. Scholars point to the role that the movement played in setting the stage for collapse of the Qing dynasty and the founding of a Chinese Republic. However, the movement was really a manifestation of relations between the 'self' and 'other', a process of contextualization in which Chinese intellectuals developed a global consciousness that allowed them to see the backwardness of the Chinese state relative to the affluence of its Japanese and Western counterparts. Political thinkers such as Kang Youwei and his disciple Liang Qichao engaged in numerous studies abroad and in doing so were influenced by the remarkable growth and wealth experienced by other countries while watching as famine and corruption ran throughout the dynasty.

Thus simplifying the Self-Strengthening movement as a 'cause' for the demise of the Qing dynasty underemphasizes its role as an embodiment of relations that occurred between Chinese intellectuals and the outside world. This relationship between intellectuals and their external environment signaled China's 'backwardness' and engendered a reevaluation and re-contextualization of China vis-à-vis the Western world. Furthermore, this preoccupation of using the West as comparison marks the creation of a 'frame of reference' in which the West became an unavoidable 'other'.

Stage 2: The Formation of a 'Regional Identity'

The second stage, as shown in *figure 1.1.b*, represents an interplay between endogenous and exogenous influences in which a sense of regional identity is formed and obligations and interests in relation to such an identity are generated. It is important to note that what counts as 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' are determined internally by what is perceived to be the 'self' and 'other' at a particular point in time. It is critical to the model that such conceptions of endogenous and exogenous remain variable rather than fixed, emphasizing a dynamic rather than static process of engagement. Stated more simply, what was considered to be 'traditionally Chinese' during certain periods in Chinese history could be quite different from what is considered traditionally Chinese today.

In referring back to the Self-Strengthening movement, we begin to see how variables considered to be 'endogenous' to the 'self' during the late Qing dynasty were in constant relational-interaction with external influences generating a sense of regional identity. The political thinking of Kang Youwei is a personification of larger processes that were underway during late Qing dynasty leading up to the May 4th movement⁹⁰. Leading up the movement, traditional Confucian ideology characterized traditional Chinese thought, providing the ethical direction and justification for various aspects of society. Kang was in many ways a traditional Chinese scholar who was well versed in the Confucian classics. His time abroad in Japan brought forth a realization that if China was to attain the same levels of economic growth and affluence, China would need to break free of antiquity and

⁹⁰ Kang Youwei is regarded as the father of the Self-Strengthening Reformist movement. His political thinking also had a significant impact on future leaders, such as Mao Zedong, who often required his commanders to read Youwei's seminal work the *Datongshu* (大同书).

embrace modernity. A universalist and Utopian, Kang Youwei sought to bring about reform through a complete rethinking of society in its entirety, necessitating a reevaluation and reconciliation of Confucian ideology with the needs of the Chinese people in modern times. However Youwei did not attempt to replace what he and other intellectuals perceived to be traditionally Chinese (Confucian guiding principles) with Western ideas. Instead he intended to expand the *dao* (道), the Confucian Way, so that Western ideas and techniques could develop not so much alongside Confucian ideology, but *within* Confucianism itself. In this way Kang Youwei's thinking perfectly represents how relations between external influences and ideological structures considered to be endogenous are in a consistent process of interplay in which conceptions of 'self' and 'other' are attempting to reconcile with the needs of the time⁹¹.

Perhaps more importantly, in recognizing China's 'backwardness' and incorporating the advancements and promises of the modern world into what was viewed as "traditionally Chinese", Kang Youwei and the Reformist movement produced a Chinese identity that was being pushed away from an isolationist identity as the 'divine center of the universe' towards a more encompassing identity as a "great nation amongst nations". Utilizing Kang Youwei as an individual example to represent a larger relational process also reiterates that 'China' as a nation exists as a social manifestation of a vast network of interconnected relations: relations between individuals and their environment, between the ideological and the pragmatic, and between that which defines the 'self' and that which is created (as

⁹¹Bary William Theodore De and Richard John Lufrano, and Wing-tsit Chan. *Sources of Chinese Tradition*. New York: Columbia UP, 2000.

other) against which to construct such definitions.

The result of the second stage in this relationalist model is the formation of a broader 'regional/global identity', an identity that can differ from a 'national identity'. In determining national identity, constructivist scholars often point inward, towards political, economic, and societal structures and ideologies asking such questions as: Are we democratic or socialist? Capitalist or communist? A Christian nation or a secular society? However, a 'regional/global identity' is an identity that recognizes and is defined by a perceived and internalized set of values, interests, practices, and responsibilities bounded within a particular region. It also considers the role in which a particular actor plays in a larger system, and how an actor views itself vis-à-vis those within the system. It is also important to note that not only can regional and national identities differ, but they can also be at odds with one another. Thus, the degree to which an actor identifies with a 'regional identity' vis-à-vis its national identity is equally as important as the regional identity it adapts, for both have crucial implications for its regional behavior.

Stage 3: Identity Internalization and Foreign Policy

The third stage of the relational-regionalism model, represented in figure 1.1.c, demonstrates how what was once considered 'exogenous' or belonging to the 'other' has become a part of endogenous self-identification mechanisms. During the second stage of the regionalism process, the interaction between 'exogenous' and 'endogenous' influences produces a regional identity in which the 'self' and 'other' become inextricably intertwined in that one cannot exist without the other (in the third stage).

For example, by the end of the Reformist era and the subsequent founding of the Republic of China, external relations (as seen in the relationship between Chinese intellectuals and their foreign education) fused with classical Confucian teachings to produce the concept of a 'self strengthening' movement. This movement, as reflected in the term *self-strengthening*, was often referred to as a purely Chinese construct and a reflection of a new Chinese identity. In this way, foreign relations were internalized and merged with ideas of the 'self' and the founding of "New China".

The creation of a regional identity generates new obligations and interests that are then manifested in an actor's foreign policy behavior. In other words, foreign policy behavior serves as an observable proxy for relational processes; it allows international relations scholars to observe a dynamic process of relations in which an actor has internalized an identity and is attempting to realize the goals that have been generated in relation to this identity. As stated earlier, it is often tempting to treat foreign policy solely as *evidence* of a particular 'regional identity', but while foreign policy behavior is represented as an outcome within the third and final stage of the model, it is by no means an end point that summarizes and concludes the process. Rather, the third stage represents the mutually reinforcing nature of this relationalist model, where foreign policy behavior is not only being projected outward but generating other relations from an actor's environment that then feed back into the actor's national/regional identity conception. Furthermore, evaluating foreign policy solely to prove the existence of particular pre-existing identity oversimplifies the process of relations in which such an identity is created and is continuously evolving.

This chapter has attempted to explain the essential components of a relationalist model that incorporates processes of relations and regional identity construction. While the example of Kang Youwei and the Reformist movement is useful to illustrate the model, the model is not limited to classical examples in Chinese history. The model can also be used to explain contemporary regionalist dynamics. Thus, the next chapter will apply the relationalist model to focus on specific points of contestation in China's foreign policy ideology that have engendered a chronological narrative in which relational processes have played an essential role.

Chapter 4

Relational Processes of Identity Formation and the Evolution of China's Regional Identity

As discussed in the previous chapter, applying a relational model to explain the evolution of China's regional identity involves narrating such an evolution through three stages: (1) contextualization and re-evaluation; (2) regional identity formation, and (3) internalization/merging of self and other through foreign policy projection. The two main shifts discussed in this chapter will show the process of China's regional identity formation as evolving through these three stages. First, the shift from Mao Zedong's leftist ideology to Deng Xiaoping's principles of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'good-neighboring' represent a transition from stage 1 to the beginnings of stage 2. The first section of this chapter begins with a general depiction of the Mao Zedong era to serve as a baseline to observe the magnitude of the shift into the Deng Xiaoping era. Next, the era of Jiang Zemin and the New Security Concept will serve as a transitional phase signifying the end of stage 2, and Hu Jintao's vision of a 'Harmonious Society' will serve as a demonstration of stage 3 and the continuous, on-going nature of this regionalist process.

I. From Mao to Deng

On the eve of the founding of "New China", Mao Zedong wrote a series of articles describing his determination that China would make a fresh start (*chongqi luzao*) in the foreign policy arena. He declared that China would advance the principle of "starting anew" and "putting the house in order before inviting guests".

This launched what was known as the “leaning-to-one-side” (*yibiandao*) policy that defined China’s peripheral policy in the beginning stages of the Cold War. This policy was also referred to as Mao’s ‘leftist’ policy, as it meant that China would ally and identify with other countries on the basis of socialist ideology. Mao’s guiding policy did include an internalized ‘other,’ though this other was not the East Asian region but rather the Soviet Union. It is because of this that during this period China was often referred to as a “regional power without a regional policy”⁹² and Beijing was unable to formulate an integrated policy vis-à-vis its East Asian neighbors who during this time were subsumed under the general term *zhoubian guojia*, which simply meant a country that was in China’s periphery or ‘rim’⁹³.

Scholars give several explanations for the absence of a Chinese regional policy during this period. First, domestic policies enacted by Chairman Mao, such as the infamous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, generated frequent internal turmoil and policy change. These events severely limited China’s foreign policy and generated minimal consideration of a regional policy. Second, many Chinese scholars, such as Ma Ying and Zhao Gancheng, describe a traditional ‘cultural complacency’ and legacy of Sino-centrism in which China’s focus pointed undeniably inward⁹⁴. Finally, scholars such as Steven Levine argue that China’s ‘ambiguous position’ in Asia was “more than merely a regional actor, but still less than a global

⁹² Levine, “China in Asia,” p. 107. Denny Roy, in a book of 1998, still believed that “China has no apparent ‘Asian policy’.” Denny Roy, *China’s Foreign Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 8.

⁹³ It is key to point that the Chinese term ‘periphery’ or *zhoubian*, differs from its English equivalent. During this time ‘periphery’ was an all encompassing term that was used to describe regions located along its ‘rim’ or border (such as Hong Kong or Taiwan) as well as the ‘Asian region’ as a whole. Zhao, S. “China’s Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors.” *Security Dialogue* 30.3 (1999): 335-46

⁹⁴ Ma Ying, and Gancheng Zhao. “The Evolution of the Guiding Principles and Strategies of China’s Periphery Policy.” *International Review* 29.19 (2009): 19-33.

power,” relegating them into uncertain and at times uneasy relations with East Asian neighbors. This was further complicated by its global position, suspended within a triangular relationship between the US and the USSR.

These factors, while partially responsible for explaining China’s lack of a regional policy, only provide for a surface account of why China lacked an identity that included a regional, East Asian identity. In order to gain a deeper understanding of why the Mao era lacked a clear regional identity, it is imperative to briefly address relational processes of identity negotiation that were unfolding during this period.

First, China’s foreign relations during this period were defined primarily by its alliance with the Soviet Union and its ‘leaning-to-one-side’ principle that limited its diplomatic relations to countries with socialist ideologies. Thus China’s negotiation of identity during this period involved a conceptualization of ‘self’ and ‘other’ that were largely based on the ideological demarcations between the Socialist Block and the ‘rest’. During this era, China had yet to normalize frequent or stable relations with its East Asian neighbors, and its geopolitical position in the bipolar Cold War system forced China to view its ‘self’ and security in global rather than regional terms. Furthermore, the East Asian region is comprised of countries with varying political structures, cultural customs, and religious beliefs. Because it was nearly impossible for all East Asian countries to fall into ‘one side’, China’s policy of ‘leaning’ did not encourage the relations necessary between the PRC and East Asian countries to form a regional identity⁹⁵.

⁹⁵ Ma Ying and Gancheng, pp. 21.

Deng Xiaoping and the 'Peaceful Coexistence' (和平共处五项原则)

Of 'Good Neighboring' (睦邻政策)


This “leaning” to one side policy began to change in the late 1970s as Deng Xiaoping assumed leadership and, after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, launched market-oriented economic reforms and initiated China’s ‘opening up’ (*gaige kaifang*) to the rest of the world⁹⁶. During this time China’s triangular relationship between the USSR and US began to ease as the two superpowers reached a *détente* and moved toward the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the bipolar world system led to the development of regional blocs that provided Chinese leaders with the opportunity to take advantage of a new collectivism that would help to deter and counter the ‘West’. In response, China started to cooperate with neighboring countries on transnational security issues such as illegal immigration, organized cross-border crime, drug-trafficking and environmental pollution⁹⁷. This provided the impetus for stage 1 of the relationalist model, in which China began to reevaluate itself in regards to a changing environment. The collapse of a bipolar world structure and renewed relations with its neighbors served as an ‘external stimulus’ that initiated stage 1 of the relationalist model by forcing Chinese leaders to contextualize and re-evaluate Chinese principles

⁹⁶ It is key to mention here that despite Deng Xiaoping’s claim that he would continue the foreign policy advocated Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai (as seen in an Excerpt from a talk with an economic and trade delegation of the government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar), such statements were indicative of Deng’s strategy of gaining legitimacy domestically by appealing to the perceived success and almost deification of Chairman Mao, rather than representative of China’s actual foreign policy during this time. (Yongtao, Gui. "Chinese Political Reforms, with Professor Gui Yongtao at Peking University." Personal interview. 10 Jan. 2011)

⁹⁷ Wu Baiyi, “The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 27 (May 2001): 278.

and residual Maoist influences according to a new political landscape

Stage 1: Contextualization and Re-evaluation



At the same time, in looking within the circle in *figure 1.1.a*, Deng Xiaoping committed himself to halting the political turmoil that had plagued domestic Chinese politics. Most importantly China abandoned the 'leftist' ideology and proceeded to formulate an integrated regional policy (*zhoubian zhengce*) based on 'good neighboring' and a continuing commitment or reiteration of the 5 principles of peaceful coexistence (*heping gongzhu wu xiangyuanze*).

The 5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were formed through a series of agreements between the PRC and India in 1954 during the Mao era, but didn't become China's guiding foreign policy ideology until the transfer of power to Deng Xiaoping. The principles were formed within the context of decolonization and held that independent countries would demonstrate⁹⁸:

⁹⁸ M. Chaubey, "I Establishing a New International Order on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: Deng Xiaoping: III Documents." *China Report* 30.2 (1994): 267-79.

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression against anyone
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful Coexistence

Though produced during the Mao era, these principles later represented a rethinking of Chairman's Mao's anti-imperialist rhetoric by aligning it with the current post-colonialism discourse. The emphasis placed on these principles during the Deng Xiaoping era signaled that China was beginning to 'narrow' its self-identification down from a global and ideological perspective to, instead, identify with the 'third world' or a group of developing countries. Despite the fact that Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Nehru composed the agreements bilaterally between India and China, these 5 principles were then triumphed as the guiding light of China's foreign policy, economic development, and international relations and signaled the beginnings of an integrative regional policy.

A study done by You Ji and Jia Qingguo describes three main trends frequently associated with China's decision to formulate an integrative regional policy⁹⁹ entering into the 1990s. First, You and Jia point towards Beijing's belief in the prospect of a 'Pacific Century' in which China hoped that it could capitalize on the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific and revitalize China's economy and thus became determined to integrate itself within the regional economy. Second, the emergence of

⁹⁹ You Ji and Jia Qingguo, "China's Re-emergence and Its Foreign Policy Strategy," in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., *China Review*, 1998 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998), p. 128.

a 'new Asianism' held that the success of Asian modernization lay in its unique values and cultural practices. This 'Asianization' as a rationalization behind economic development was particularly appealing to Chinese leaders who wanted to challenge Western 'ideological and economic centrality' and thus sought to further advance this trend by working closely with its Asian neighbors.

Despite the accuracy of these descriptions, the reasons used to explain China's dramatic shift in its regional policy are all overtly realist and interest-based, under-emphasizing the constructivist framework through which interests are viewed as by-products of identity. Scholars' discussions of concepts such as the 'Pacific Century' or 'New Asianism' do not provide adequate attention to the relational processes that gave rise to these concepts. Furthermore, a change in the polarity of the international system is an *impetus* that initiated processes of identity negotiation. Addressing only the impetus rather than this process of identity construction is insufficient in fully elucidating China's reconceptualizations of 'self' and 'other'. For example, on December 21, 1988 excerpts from Deng Xiaoping's conversation with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India were published and entitled '一种新的国家秩序建立在和平共五原准' or 'A New International Order Should be Established with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as norms' in which he articulated a response to the changing world order¹⁰⁰.

¹⁰⁰ The general world situation is changing, and every country is thinking about appropriate new policies to establish a new international order. Hegemonism, bloc politics and treaty organizations no longer work. Then what principle should we apply to guide the new international relations? I have talked about this matter recently with some foreign leaders and friends. Two things have to be done at the same time. One is to establish a new international political order; the other is to establish a new international economic order...and we shall go on talking about it.

In this speech, the immediate and most important impact of the shift away from a bipolar world structure was not necessarily to instill a sense of ‘opportunity’ to counter the West. Instead, this shift initiated a process of internal reevaluation within the PRC. As we see China is not only attempting to think about new ‘appropriate policies’ but also is attempting to construct a grand principle or ideology to serve as its guide for future international relations. What is particularly significant is the emphasis on how this shift has sparked conversation and dialogue between China and its ‘friends’ and the way that Deng Xiaoping is utilizing a multilateral institution such as the United Nations as a forum for discussion (a trend that began during the Deng Xiaoping era and continues today). Furthermore, Deng ends his speech by proclaiming, “And we shall go on talking about it” calls for a sustained and constant dialogue. Thus the change in the world system, coupled with China’s internal reform were impetuses that gave rise to both external and internal reflection, dialogue, and most importantly initiated a wave of relations between the PRC and neighboring countries.

Deng’s New Policies vis-à-vis Security and Development

This new wave of relations impacted Chinese foreign policy particularly in the areas of security and development. During this period, China made unprecedented efforts not only to engage in dialogue with its neighbors to solve disputes, but also began to link security and development when it espoused goals of ‘joint development’ and ‘mutual trust’.

As China began normalizing relations with its neighbors it also began to integrate a new sense of 'peripheral consciousness' into its national identity. Recognizing that isolation was both impossible and unfavorable, Chinese leaders constructed a China that acknowledged its position as a 'neighbor amongst neighbors'. This in turn influenced the ways in which Chinese interests were manifested and negotiated within its regional foreign policy. This is particularly evident in the ways in which China's 'Good Neighboring' policy influenced its processes of dispute settlement and security policy vis-à-vis its neighbors. For example, China began to initiate creative approaches in "laying aside disputes and engaging in joint exploitation" (*gezhizhengyi gongtongkaifa*) for the peaceful resolution of disputes between the PRC and periphery countries, particularly those within the South China Sea. In regards to the territorial and sea disputes that became prominent with new developments in the international system, Deng Xiaoping proposed a new way of thinking about joint development which he believed could eliminate the problems accumulated for years.

As Liu Huaqiu, the CPC's director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office stated in 1997:

China advocates dialogues and negotiations with other countries as equals in dealing with the historical disputes over boundaries, territorial lands, and territorial seas and seeks fair and reasonable solutions. Disputes that cannot be settled immediately may be set aside temporarily as the parties seek common ground while reserving differences without letting those differences affect the normal relations between two countries¹⁰¹.

¹⁰¹ Liu Huaqiu, "Zhongguo jiang yongyuan zhixing dudi zhizhu de waijiao zhengce" [China Will Always Pursue Peaceful Foreign Policy of Independence and Self-determination], *Qishi*, no. 23 (December 1997): 38.

As this passage demonstrates, Deng's regime raised an unprecedented issue regarding whether China could engage in joint development, while compromising on the issue of sovereignty in dispute settlements. Most importantly, this initiative not only revealed new solutions for resolving territorial issues but also helped to engender normalized relations between China and peripheral countries by promoting dialogue, cooperation, and negotiation.

This move would also influence future relations in the decades to come as, for example, in 2002 when China laid the foundation for the peaceful resolution of issues regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and played a pivotal role in assuaging tensions by signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Additionally, the agreements between China and Vietnam on the delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf and fishery cooperation, coupled with its agreement with the Philippines and Vietnam oil companies on joint exploration of oil reserves in the South China Sea also displayed and reinforced China's commitment to lay aside disputes for joint exploitation.

Increased 'country-to-country' relations also began to redefine China's stances on security and economic development. China began to consider the principles of peaceful coexistence as the main impetus behind its overall goal of peaceful development. Whereas Chairman Mao advocated 'cleaning the house before inviting guests', Deng believed in a synergy between economic development and a foreign policy that would reinvigorate relations, improve security cooperation between China and its periphery, while still bestowing primacy on economic growth and domestic stability. As he stated on December 21, 1988, without development and

cooperation, there would be “No genuine Asia-Pacific century or Asian century”¹⁰². As a result China became more active in regional and international forums such as the United Nations, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and taking a leadership role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China also displayed noteworthy initiative during this period, collaborating with ASEAN to publish the Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues in order to safeguard regional security and stability, while also becoming the first regional power to formally join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

China's Inward Gaze Towards Economic Growth

The shift from Mao's 'leftist' *yibiandao* policy to Deng Xiaoping's policy of adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and 'Good Neighboring' signaled that China no longer viewed itself in relation to other countries solely on the basis of ideological divisions but instead was becoming more integrative in that the way it identified with the rest of the world.

However, despite the significance of this shift in China's conceptualizations of identity and its changes in foreign policy, it did not necessarily demonstrate China's internalization of a regional or East Asian identity. While it did convey China's willingness to reach its diplomatic hands outward, its gaze was still primarily inward and focused on attaining domestic stability through economic growth. As Deng Xiaoping stated on February 22, 1984, while visiting with a delegation from the

¹⁰² From his speech 'A New International Order Should be Established with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as Norms'.

Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., China would continue to “observe” the international system, due to the fact that China would need “at least twenty years to concentrate on our domestic development”. Furthermore on March 3rd, 1990 Deng Xiaoping gave a speech to leading members of the Central Committee stating¹⁰³:

The crucial factor is economic growth, which will be reflected in a gradual rise in living standards. Only when people have felt the tangible benefits that come with stability and with the current systems and policies will there be true stability. No matter how the international situation changes, so long as we can ensure appropriate economic growth, we shall stand firm as Mount Tai.

From this passage the primacy given to economic growth and domestic stability is strikingly apparent. This prioritization of economic growth, as Suisheng Zhao stated, undoubtedly influenced China’s periphery policy¹⁰⁴. This was evident in their efforts to coordinate diplomacy along with the inception of market-oriented reforms in-line with “serving domestic economic construction” (*waijiao fuwu yu guonei jingji jiangshe*)¹⁰⁵. Furthermore, the last sentence of the passage indicates Deng Xiaoping’s belief that economic growth will afford China an immunity to any challenges brought upon by changes in the “international situation”. In this way, Deng creates a degree of separation between China and the ‘international’, demonstrating China’s movement away from an identity that is defined global terms. Finally, by invoking the image of Mount Tai, one of China’s foremost sacred mountain and a symbol of birth and renewal, Deng Xiaoping eludes to the birth of a new, improved, China.

¹⁰³ Deng Xiaoping. "The International Situation and Economic Problems." Talk with Leading Members of the Central Committee. China, Beijing. 3 Mar. 1990.

¹⁰⁴ Suisheng, Zhao. “China’s Periphery Policy and Changing Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Matthew Evangelista and Judith Reppy, eds., *The United States and Asian Security*, Cornell University Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper #26, May 2002

¹⁰⁵ Liu Tsai-ming, “Zhuanfang xing waijiaobuzhang” [A Special Interview of New Foreign Minister], *Wenhui Bao*, June 27, 1998, p. A3.

Thus with its gaze inward, though with an outreach strategy that was as much regional as it was global, it is unsurprising that Chinese-East Asian relations, while improving, lacked the robustness and dynamism necessary to cause China to prioritize the development of an 'East Asian Community', a comprehensively tailored East Asian regionalist policy, or internalize a regional identity. Under Deng, China made a concerted and unprecedented effort to involve itself in East Asian forums and affairs, yet while China no longer defined itself solely on ideological or global power terms, its relations with East Asian countries did not lead to a re-evaluation of 'self' and 'other' in which 'East Asia' became a part of China's self-conceptualization and identity. East Asian countries were still very much an 'other' amongst many, albeit an 'other' with whom China would strive to live in 'peaceful coexistence'. In other words, while China began to develop a 'periphery consciousness' (the outcome of the external impetus on internal dynamics in stage 1) it was yet to fully develop an 'East Asian consciousness' (which we see in stages 2 and 3) within its processes of identity construction.

II. The New Security Concept (新安全观) and the Beginnings of Change

With the deterioration of the Cold War world structure and Deng Xiaoping's reforms well underway, Jiang Zemin succeeded his predecessor on March 27th, 1998. Under Jiang, the PRC began a process in which it reconciled its unique position as "more than a regional actor, but less than a world power," beginning to define itself in regional rather than global terms. This was enabled by the normalization of relations between China likewise and various East Asian countries that occurred during the 1990s. China normalized relations with influential countries in Southeast

Asia during the early 1990s: Indonesia (August 8, 1990), Singapore (October 3, 1990), Brunei (September 30, 1991), and Vietnam (November 1991). China then turned its attention northwest as it formalized diplomatic relations with South Korea on August 24, 1992.

As China's regional relations increased, the PRC began to transform 'regional involvement' into 'regional commitment' and began to move away from Deng Xiaoping's 'Observer' status towards the role of regional actor, often describing itself as an 'active participant'. In 1996 President Jiang Zemin released what is hailed as the 'New Security Concept', which held that, given the precipitous rise of non-traditional security issues, the changing nature of the Asia-Pacific region, and China's commitment to the region, China would put forward the initiative that countries in the region should cultivate a new concept of security focusing on enhancing trust through dialogue and promoted security through cooperation¹⁰⁶.

At the core of China's New Security Concept was the idea that such a regional commitment should include mutual benefit, equality, mutual trust, coordination and most importantly, promoting confidence-building interactions. In order to attain such goals China called upon countries within the region to build their national and regional security policy on the basis of the following¹⁰⁷:

To conduct cooperation on the basis of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other widely recognized norms governing international relations, and give full play to the leading role of the United Nations;

To peacefully resolve territorial and border disputes and other controversial issues through negotiations;

To reform and improve the existing international economic and financial organizations and promote common prosperity in line with the principle of

¹⁰⁶ From the PRC's 2002 Position Paper on the New Security Concept.
¹⁰⁷ " "

reciprocity and mutual benefit and common development;


To place emphasis on non-traditional security areas such as combating terrorism and transnational crimes, in addition to the traditional security areas like preventing foreign invasion and safeguarding territorial integrity;

To conduct effective disarmament and arms control with broad participation in line with the principle of justice, comprehensiveness, rationality and balance, prevent the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, uphold the current international arms control and disarmament regime and refrain from arms race.

In these five goals we are able to see how the 'New Security Concept' reiterated components of Deng Xiaoping's 'Peaceful Coexistence' by continuing to advance the peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes, an important role for the United Nations, and a commitment to economic prosperity based on principles of mutual benefit and joint development. However we are also able to see, especially in the last two objectives, that China is not only adhering to Deng's core principles, but is also taking the initiative on regional issues regarding non-traditional security concerns and arms control.

In the New Security Concept, we can see how the prior increase in relations shift identity and strategy. Jiang Zemin's New Security Concept builds upon commitments generated by the normalization of relations between China and its neighbors through Deng's 'peaceful coexistence' and 'Good Neighboring' policy. In this way, we begin to see the interplay described in stage 2 of the relationalist model, between influences that are thought to be endogenous (core values of Deng Xiaoping's era of reform) with external influences (regional security concerns).

Stage 2: Regional Identity Formation



However in comparison with Deng's guiding ideology of 'peaceful coexistence', the New Security Concept does not place China's economic security and development solely at the forefront. The New Security Concept represents more than an effort to create a peaceful environment to promote China's development. Instead it signals that China has identified with the region and subsequently has begun to view its own interests as inextricably intertwined with regional conditions. In this way, we see how China's initiative conveys a sense of 'responsibility' that is attained through in-group identification.

Finally, the significance of the term 'confidence-building' is worth addressing as it is frequently mentioned during various speeches that China has delivered to regional forums such as APEC and the ARF, and is referenced within its government White Papers. The New Security Concept advocates participating in 'confidence-building dialogue', establishing 'confidence-building mechanisms', and promoting policies that 'build confidence'. Confidence-building is undoubtedly a central tenet of the New Security Concept, but its importance lies within the question of 'confidence in whom or what?' This question is later answered in China's 'Position Paper on The New Security Concept' where China details how its actions have promoted confidence-building interactions across the East Asian region. For example, the PRC stated¹⁰⁸:

China sees the economic exchange and interaction as an important avenue to a lasting security in its surrounding area. As an active participant in regional

¹⁰⁸ PRC Foreign Ministry, "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept," August, 6, 2002

economic cooperation of various kinds, China is working closely with other countries in the region for a multi-channel, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted new economic cooperation in this part of the world. The development of the regional economic cooperation mechanisms as spearheaded by the 10+3 cooperation in East Asia have not only brought real and tangible economic benefits to the countries concerned, but also enhanced the mutual exchange, mutual trust and cooperation between all parties involved, thus contributing to the security and stability of the region.

In this passage we can see how China is attempting to enhance a confidence or faith within regional relations and interactions. The Chinese word for confidence (置信) is synonymous with the English word 'faith'. The term 置信 refers to faith or confidence in *something* or *someone* and is necessarily a relational term. The 'confidence' that China is attempting to build is directed towards the East Asian region and regional cooperation mechanisms. Its goals are 'mutual' and 'regional' in nature, suggesting that all countries within the region share common goals, interests, and the benefits of regional peace and prosperity. Finally the use of the verb 'build' (*jianshe*), as opposed to 'promote' or 'encourage', signals an on-going process or project rather than an endorsement or tacit acknowledgement, as well as a new identity as a an active 'builder'. China's emphasis on 'processes' and relations that build confidence in an Asian Security Community indicates its identification with the region and the development of an 'East Asian consciousness'. Furthermore, by identifying issues, interests, and responsibilities that are *East Asian*, we are able to observe the products of regional identity formation (stage 2) in which a regional identity works to redefine national interests into regional objectives.

For example, the beginnings of China's internalization of a regional identity can be observed through its relations with ASEAN and the ARF. Following normalization

of relations with a number of Southeast Asian countries, China was then invited to attend the ASEAN post-Ministerial Conference in 1991 and later became ASEAN's comprehensive dialogue partner in 1996. Since then China has been an active participant in what Chinese leaders have termed the "*shanhui jizhi*" (three meeting mechanism) of the ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, Enlarged ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, and the ARF¹⁰⁹.

The continuing influence of normalized and increased relations between China and Southeast Asia on China's regional policy was especially evident during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. During the crisis many East Asian countries, especially those within Southeast Asia, suffered from slumping currencies, devalued asset and stock prices, and a rise in private debt. While China was not unscathed by the crisis, it emerged as the stable force within East Asia. Many speculated that China would devalue its currency, initiating competitive devaluation and 'beggar thy neighbor' competition across the region. The devaluation of the RMB would have devastated recovery efforts and exacerbated the vulnerable condition of the economies of those countries most affected by the crisis. Despite economic pressures, premier Zhu Rongyi assured that China would maintain the value of the RMB. Chinese leaders then committed itself to a 'stand-by Asia' policy and committed billions of dollars to afflicted Southeast Asian countries¹¹⁰.

China's decision to maintain the value of the RMB was not simply a rhetorical or strategic maneuver; it demonstrated a sense of 'Asian solidarity', and revealed

¹⁰⁹ Yan, *Zhongguo de Jueqi* [The Rise of China], p. 287

¹¹⁰ Elizabeth Economy, "China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States." *Journal of Contemporary China* 14.44 (2005): 409-25.

China's identification and commitment to the region. As stage 2 of the model shows, identity influences foreign policy decisions by producing a particular configuration of interests, goals, and responsibilities related to the existing identity. As discussed earlier, for the last few decades China's top priority has undoubtedly been sustained economic growth. Rejecting the economic opportunity to capitalize on the crisis and potentially further advance its position in the world economy conveyed a sense of 'togetherness' to East Asian countries. This simultaneously engendered further relations between the PRC and Southeast Asia that served to propagate a notion of an East Asian 'shared responsibility' and 'mutual dependence'. China's aid tacitly required Southeast Asian countries to work alongside China and maintain a degree of transparency when discussing or planning economic recovery reforms¹¹¹. At the first ASEAN-plus-1 summit in December 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin met with the nine leaders of ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur and published a joint declaration to establish a mutual-trust partnership oriented towards a 21st century of 'good neighboring'.

The ASEAN example highlights how Chinese interests and responsibilities were viewed and redefined as *East Asian* interests and responsibilities. Its 'Stand By Asia' policy demonstrated its willingness to embrace the responsibilities generated by an internalization of a regional identity rather than giving into domestic economic interests and pressures. Critics skeptical of China's motivations are quick to dismiss China's commitment to Southeast Asia as a purely strategic maneuver to increase

¹¹¹ Michael Glosny. "Heading toward a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in China's Policy toward Southeast Asia." *Asian Security* 2.1 (2006): 24-57.

Chinese influence in the East Asian region¹¹². However, such a view ignores the previously elucidated narrative in which China's increased and improved relations with Southeast Asia before the crisis helped to cultivate a strengthening regional identity. China's Southeast Asian foreign policy was not purely strategic, when considered in relation to a regional identity; the relations that precipitated the crisis played an important role in re-enforcing a regional identity, compelling China to adapt its 'stand by Asia' policy, and precipitated the beginnings of stage 3 of the relationalist model: Internalization/Merging of Self and Other through Foreign Policy Projection.

Into the 21st Century: Hu Jintao's 'Harmonious world'

China's internalization of a regional identity has had the most observable influence on China's foreign policy during the Hu Jintao era that began in 2002 when Hu assumed the role of General Secretary of the Community Party of China before assuming the role of President of the People's Republic of China in 2003. At the time of Hu's ascension, I have argued that China had already internalized a regional identity that encapsulated notions of shared East Asian interests, values, and responsibilities. This was projected and can be observed through China's grand foreign policy during the Hu Jintao era as iterated in a variety of regional forums.

For example, in 2002 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan presented a speech at the ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea Foreign Minister's Meeting where he stated:

China is member of Asia as well as the largest developing country in the region of East Asia. Some countries tend to portray East Asia as a source of frictions and

¹¹² Evelyn Goh. "Great Powers and the Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies." *International Security* 32 (2002): 113-57.


conflicts. In fact, for a long period of time, and even in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, East Asia has enjoyed the fastest economic growth in the world, and seeking economic development has always been the central task for the relevant countries in the region. The strengthening of regional cooperation will provide a continuous impetus to East Asian development. I am fully convinced that as long as we make joint efforts to enhance cooperation and promote development, we will realize lasting peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia.

He later went on to speak at the 12th annual APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in 2004, delivering a powerful speech in which he called upon East Asian leaders to remain committed to their responsibilities:

In short, the vast expanse of Asia and the Pacific is our common home, and ensuring its continued development and prosperity our shared responsibility.

Within these excerpts of speeches, we are able to observe a rhetoric that contains the palpable ‘in-group’ identification expected during the third stage of the relationalist model. As seen in the figure below, an internalization of an “East Asian” identity exists when East Asia is no longer ‘outside’ the circle, or just an external influence, but rather has become part of an endogenous sense of ‘self’.

Stage 3: Internalization/ Merging of Self and Other



As discussed in earlier chapters, this is in direct comparison with the ‘out-group’ identification that scholars have commented on vis-à-vis China’s identification with global superpowers. The constant reiteration of ‘East Asia’ and ‘East Asian’ development evokes a strong sense of togetherness. This is reinforced by China’s

assertion that “some countries tend to portray East Asia as a source of frictions and conflicts” which conveys a degree of separatism from those ‘other countries’ and their misguided attempts to depict ‘East Asia’. Where it was once China alone who would stand firm as Mount Tai, guarded from the international situation, China no longer solely identified itself as a ‘sacred mountain’ made strong by economic growth. Instead it began to view itself as East Asian, “a force to be reckoned with in today's world from political, economic, cultural and geographical perspectives.”

China under Deng Xiaoping believed that regional relations and dialogue would help to foster *China's* economic growth. And as previously discussed, when referring to regional cooperation, the PRC used such terms as ‘mutual development’, ‘joint exploitation’, or the ‘development of the East Asian region’. Within this passage China chooses instead to state, “the strengthening of regional cooperation will provide a continuous impetus to *East Asian* development”. The notion of ‘East Asian development’ in contrast with ‘the development of the East Asian region’ transcends a definition of regional development characterized by a shared geographic location. Instead a region has now become a ‘common home’ with shared goals, interests, and responsibilities.

This regional identification was not only conveyed through regional forums but through domestic channels as well. Government White Papers on China's Defense policy utilizes nearly identical rhetoric to advocate its goal of “加深地区安全合作具有亚洲特色的” or “deepening regional security cooperation with *Asian*

characteristics” (emphasis added)¹¹³.

Despite previously discussed scholars who have identified the lack of shared ‘Asian characteristics’ as an impediment to East Asian regionalism, China’s statements suggest that China has internalized a conceptualization of itself as determined by ‘Asian Characteristics’. This term is also significant in that China employed a similar concept or notion of ‘*Chinese Characteristics*’ during the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era when Deng’s often hailed his reforms as ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’¹¹⁴. This is not to say that Asian characteristics have replaced Chinese characteristics’ or that Chinese characteristics have transformed into Asian characteristics. Instead this term highlights the shift from Deng Xiaoping emphasis on Chinese solidarity and characteristics towards the 21st century that saw a gradual embracement of an East Asian identity.

The beginnings of the 21st century also saw a merging of the Chinese ‘self’ and East Asian ‘other’—as described in stage 3 of the relationalist model—within processes of identity construction. China’s relations with its East Asian neighbors were steadily increasing and improving; as a result, the concept of an ‘Asian Community’ was no longer simply a *goal* to work towards but a *reality* to improve upon. As previously discussed, East Asia was still very much a recognized ‘other’ during the Mao and Deng eras. While Hu Jintao and the PRC still recognized the differences between itself and its East Asian neighbors, its identification with the East Asian community became an inextricable influence on the ways in which China

¹¹³ Translated by author from China’s 2002 White Paper on National Defense. "Full Text" of white paper issued by the PRC Information Office of State Council on 9 December, 2002: "China's National Defense in 2002"

¹¹⁴ From Professor Sidney J. Gluck’s presentation at the Philosophy Conference Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing China held on October 30 and 31 2000.

viewed itself.

In an interview with professor Qingmin, professor of Political Science and CPP member at the University of Beijing, he stated that during the 21st century China has begun to move away from a tendency to view itself in opposition with its East Asian neighbors. Instead, he claims, China's East Asian relations have helped to engender a Chinese identity constructed through identification rather than juxtaposition of a perceived 'collective' or 'regional' identity¹¹⁵. Qingmen also reiterated that the CCP supported and remained committed to former Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir's statement that, "East Asian is not just East Asia geographically—it is also culturally East Asian"¹¹⁶. Finally professor Qingmin referenced Ma Ying and Zhao Gancheng's argument that China has become "a China of its periphery", and that a periphery should no longer be viewed solely as "a periphery of China"¹¹⁷. In this way China has incorporated itself *into* its a periphery (and likewise the periphery as become a part of itself), rather than viewing its periphery as outside itself.

Thus, the beginnings of the 21st century saw two significant developments: the transformation of 'East Asia' from a geographic space into a shared identity comprised of *East Asian* characteristics and the internalization of this regional identity as seen in PRC statements of its interests, commitments, and responsibilities. Just as in the earlier story of Kang Youwei and the Reformist movement, influences from a 'Western other' merged with a traditional Chinese 'self' to form a "new China" committed to curing its "backwardness". This merging of the

¹¹⁵ Translated by author from an interview done in the Spring of 2010 while author was studying at the University of Beijing, China.

¹¹⁶ Mahathir, Mohamad. Interview with Mohamad Mahathir, *The Daily Yomiuri*, March 24, 2007, p.3.

¹¹⁷ Ma Ying and Zhao Gancheng, "Evolution of China's Guiding Principles and Strategies of China's Periphery Policy". Accessed at < [http://www.siis.org.cn/en/zhuanti view](http://www.siis.org.cn/en/zhuanti_view)>

'other' into process of 'self' construction is apparent in the shift from Deng Xiaoping's 'Peaceful Coexistence' to Hu Jintao's vision of a 'Harmonious Society'.

Building A 'Harmonious World' (和谐世界)

Hu Jintao's vision of a 'Harmonious World'--China's most recent guiding ideology--represents not only a significant departure from Deng Xiaoping's 'Peaceful Coexistence,' but also represents an 'ideological shift' and 'policy projection' (produced as in stage three of the relational model) of China's internalization of a regional identity. Since 2005, China has articulated and promoted the concept of 'building a harmonious world' (*Jianshe hexie shijie*) as the core tenet and guiding principle of its foreign policy¹¹⁸. The concept, which is derived from ancient Confucian teachings, was introduced by Hu Jintao at the Summit of the APEC forum in Busan in November 2005, where it was hailed as China's new "preferred model of regional cooperation and community building"¹¹⁹. Such a world, according to Hu, would be based on multilateralism, dialogue, and mutually beneficial cooperation that would ensure lasting peace and prosperity within the region.

Following the unveiling of China's 'Harmonious World', the PRC engaged in a concerted effort to extol the concept in both regional and domestic forums. Since 2005, domestic media and government speeches and policy documents have identified China's 'harmonious world' as a defining characteristic of its ideal

¹¹⁸ President Hu Jintao first floated the idea of 'building a harmonious world' at the United Nations World Summit on September 15th 2005.

¹¹⁹ Zhou Shengping and Tian Zhaoqing, '*Jianshe hexie shijie: zhongguo waijiao sixiang de xin fazhan*' (Building A 'Harmonious World': New Development in China's Foreign Policy Approach). *BanYueTan* (China Comment), no. 16 (2006).

society¹²⁰. Furthermore, in December 2005, the Chinese government released a White Paper entitled 'China's Peaceful Development Road' in which it declared that 'building a harmonious world' was (中国的崇高目标) '*the lofty goal of China*' (emphasis added)¹²¹. President Hu Jintao began promoting his vision at various regional forums held in Seoul and Hanoi in late 2005. This was later followed by Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi's visit to the second Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation (NAEC) Forum held in Jilin Province in 2006. In her address to a group of East Asian foreign ministers, she expressed China's "firm commitments to construct a harmonious and prosperous Northeast Asia"¹²².

Despite the attention paid to Hu Jintao's vision of a harmonious world, the meaning of 'harmony' (和谐) within China's new guiding foreign policy ideology remains ambiguous. Although 'harmony' is regarded as the defining feature of traditional Chinese philosophical teaching, it lacked 'conceptual clarity' and 'systemic theorization'¹²³. The original texts that first articulated the concept have been scattered throughout a number of classical works in which the concept of 'harmony' has been employed within the varying religious contexts of Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Hence despite the goals and methods of action

¹²⁰ Hu Jintao, '*Zai Sheng bu ji zhuyao lingdao ganbu tigao goujian shehuizhuyi hexie shehui nengli zhuanqi yantaoban shang de jianghua*' (Speech at the Special Workshop of Provincial and Ministerial Leaders on Improving Capability to Build Socialist Harmonious Society), 19 February, 2005. <[Http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-06/26/content_3138887.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-06/26/content_3138887.htm)>.

¹²¹ *China's Peaceful Development Road* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 22 December, 2005), 17pp.

¹²² Wu Yi, '*Zhongguo yuan yu geguo gongtong goujian fangrong he hexie de dongbeiyi*' (China Wants to Build a Prosperous and Harmonious Northeast Asia together with Other Countries), 3 September, 2006.

¹²³ Zhang Qingmin. "Interview with Professor Zhang Qingmin of Peking University." Personal interview. Mar. 2010.

promoted by Hu Jintao's vision, the meaning behind a 'harmonious world' itself remains ill-defined.

Despite the conceptual ambiguity of the term 'harmony', Hu Jintao's 'Harmonious World' represents a significant ideological development that contributes to the study of regional identity, the relational model described by this study, and East Asian regionalism for two essential reasons. First, building a harmonious world represents a significant step forward and away from Deng Xiaoping's principles of 'Peaceful Coexistence' and Jiang Zemin's 'New Security Concept'. For example, Hu Jintao's vision placed an unprecedented emphasis on multilateral dialogue and cooperation. In the past China developed its relationships with neighboring countries primarily on a bilateral basis¹²⁴. As the 21st century progressed, earlier attempts to engage in regional forums in the late 90's were greatly enhanced and valued by Chinese leaders. Furthermore, in previous eras China focused primarily on its political relations with its East Asian neighbors, emphasizing its *own* security and economic development. However, President Hu built upon his predecessor's belief, extending it to include shared East Asian responsibilities, interests, and goals by emphasizing *regional* security and economic cooperation. This unprecedented effort towards regional cooperation was geared not only toward building a peaceful or amicable neighborhood (*mulin*), but also a 'tranquil neighborhood' (*anlin*) and a mutually 'prosperous neighborhood' (*fulin*)¹²⁵.

The concept of a 'harmonious world', like Jiang Zemin's 'New Security Concept', represented an embracing of China's role as a an 'iniator' rather than a

¹²⁴ Zhang, pg. 22

¹²⁵ 'East Asian Community Now Possible', *Beijing Review*, 30 October, 2003, pp. 40-1

mere 'observer' or 'participant' (as in the Deng Xiaoping era). However unlike Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao's vision not only conveys a China that is obligated to take regional initiative in solving regional issues, but a China that has the intention and ability to influence regional norms on East Asian cooperation, coordination, and dialogue. Lastly, the regional order proposed by the 'Harmonious World' represents an internalized sense of regional 'togetherness'.

The new regional order articulated by Hu Jintao depicts a model of integration and community-building that is East Asian and in direct opposition to a European 'other' and the European Union regional model. As Dr. Zhang Jian states, the Chinese vision of a 'harmonious' regional community:

Represents a different understanding of and approach to regional integration and community-building from that associated with the development of the European Union. While the substance of the concept of a harmonious world is still developing, Beijing's recent active and successful engagement with its neighboring countries and regional multilateral institutions demonstrates its increasing intentions and ability to influence both the normative structure of emerging regional interactions¹²⁶.

Dr. Zhang's argument suggests that East Asian regional integration does not resemble the European Union model. More importantly, he suggests that this represents more than a difference in approaches or 'structures' but in the very ways in which East Asian countries understand and define regional integration. Thus, unlike previous eras, Professor Zhang proposes that Hu Jintao's 'Harmonious World' concept represents one of the first attempts of the PRC to think of 'regionalism' (地方主义) in a conceptually normative and structurally formative way.

While Deng Xiaoping and his successor Jiang Zemin emphasized the importance of regional relations, it was not until Hu Jintao's goal of building a

¹²⁶ Zhang, pg. 10

harmonious world that China began to promote a guiding ideology that could be thought of as a model for East Asian regionalism. For example, critics of East Asian regionalism have often argued that regionalism has been unsuccessful in the region due to the overwhelming political, social, economic and cultural differences between East Asian countries. As discussed in Chapter 1, this argument holds that because of these differences, East Asia will be unable to achieve the “success” attained by the EU. China’s ‘Harmonious World’ suggests a regionalist model that does not seek ‘harmony’ in institutionalized uniformity, but rather seeks to promote ‘*he er bu tong*’ (harmony without sameness). According to this view, ‘sameness’ (*tong*) is perceived as leading to ‘disharmony’: according to Confucius’ famous dictum ‘*jun zi he er bu tong, xiao ren tong er bu he*’, the gentleman seeks harmony not uniformity, while a vulgar man seeks uniformity not harmony. As former PRC president Jiang Zemin stated¹²⁷:

That is to say, harmony but not sameness; reserving differences without coming into conflict. Harmony promotes co- existence and co-prosperity; whereas differences foster mutual complementation and mutual support.

In this way, China’s ‘Harmonious World’ transforms what regionalist scholars have identified as an impediment to regionalism into a vital component of achieving harmony within the East Asian region. Instead of attempting to resolve differences bilaterally through political relations, China under the leadership of Hu Jintao began instead to advance an ideological framework by which differences can be resolved and state sovereignty respected within larger regionalist relations. Thus, the articulation of a ‘harmonious world’ is not only a declaration of China’s intentions

¹²⁷ Jiang Zemin, ‘Speech by President Jiang Zemin At George Bush Presidential Library’, 24 October 2002 <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3719/3721/t19082.htm>>

regarding its behavior in regional affairs but is also an articulation of its preferred regional order¹²⁸. While the 'harmonious world' can not be defined solely as an 'East Asian' policy, it is China's first guiding ideology that proposes a broad regional framework and a particular way of thinking about regionalism while also thinking about itself in regional terms.

The second reason that Hu Jintao's Harmonious World is of great significance is that it demonstrates the ability of relations to generate a regional identity that can then be observed through 'policy projection' and ideological shifts. While many skeptics dismiss China's 'harmonious world' as another propagandistic effort to mask its overall goal of accumulating power and influence, Chinese academics take the idea quite seriously¹²⁹. According to most Chinese scholars, building a 'harmonious world' is not merely a result of China's rising influence or economic clout. Instead, it is a 'projection' of goals, principles, and values that were generated through increased relations with its East Asian neighbors. Thus, the very idea of a 'harmonious world' has grown out of Beijing's "increasing confidence derived from the positive experiences of its recent engagement with neighboring countries"¹³⁰. According to Dr. Zhang, China's East Asian relations have promoted a "growing convergence of norms concerning regional community-building between China and respective regional countries involved"¹³¹. In this way China's vision of a 'Harmonious World' is not merely an impetus or framework for future relations, but

¹²⁸ Zhang, pg. 8

¹²⁹ Wang Yiwei, "hexie shijie" guan gaibian guoji guanxi shijiao' (The Concept of "Harmonious World" Changes Perceptions of International Politics). *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), 2 December, 2005, p. 11; Zhou and Tian, 'Jianshe hexie shijie: zhongguo waijiao sixiang de xin fazhan'.

¹³⁰ David Shambaugh, 'China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,' *International Security* 29, no. 3 (2004/05), pp. 64-99; Brantly Womack, 'China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership and Normalcy,' *Pacific Affairs* 76, no. 4 (2003/04), pp. 529-48.

¹³¹ Zhang, pg. 15

rather is a product and projection of an ideological shift generated by relational processes of regional identity construction and internalization.

As previously discussed, the concept of a 'Harmonious World' can not solely be explained either by endogenous factors—Chinese philosophy, Confucian teachings—or by exogenous shocks to Chinese identity. Instead it represents a fusion of classical concepts with an identification with the East Asian region, the influence of external relations, and a merging of the 'other' within internal conceptualizations of 'self'. This merging of 'self' and 'other' exemplifies Jackson and Nexon's concept of 'yoking'. As discussed in earlier chapters, 'yoking' argues that in a relational view of identity, the 'self' and the 'other' are not presupposed manifestations generated by entities. Instead, since relations precede entities, constructs of 'self' and 'other' can change and merge within developing relations.

Accordingly, China's academic and policy community are in a general agreement that Hu Jintao's 'harmonious world' is not only vision of how China is to guide its foreign relations, but is more importantly a 'projection of the Chinese dream'¹³². For example, in 2006 the China Association of International Studies and various Chinese institutions organized a conference on the 'harmonious world'. During this conference, Wu Jianmin, the President of China's Foreign Affairs hailed the 'harmonious world' as a '*Chinese dream*' in which China shares its opportunities and development with its neighbors¹³³.

Hu Jintao's 'harmonious world' incorporates and promotes ideas of mutual

¹³² Zhai Kun, 'Zai 'hexie yazhou' de da mubiao xia' (Under the Grand Goal of 'Harmonious Asia'), *Liaowang xinwen zhoukan* (Outlook Weekly), 27 June, 2006.

¹³³ 'China has a Dream...and Shares It With World', *People's Daily Online*, 3 April, 2006 <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200604/03/print20060403_255466.html>.

cooperation, multilateral dialogue, the peaceful resolution of difference, and an identification with the East Asian region. This concept can not simply be defined as a *foreign policy objective of China*. Instead it is a part of a larger vision and process in which an internalization of a regional identity has generated a formative regionalist framework that not only guides East Asian relations but is also produced by them.

From Mao to Hu and the Relational Model

The above narrative has attempted to show how China's relations with other East Asian countries have contributed to the formation of a regional identity that has subsequently generated China's East Asian interests, commitments, and responsibilities. As stated previously, the above narrative was also intended to demonstrate how a relational model can be applied when attempting to revise standard interpretations of East Asian regionalism and China's regional identity construction.

The shift from Mao's leftist (*yibiandao*) policy to Deng Xiaoping's principles of 'peaceful coexistence' demonstrates the model's initial stage of contextualization and re-evaluation. Just as the foreign experiences of Chinese political thinkers and reformers, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, initiated a movement in which China could no longer ignore its 'backwardness' in relation to the West, Deng's coming to power and increasing periphery relations revealed that China could no longer remain in relative isolation.

Jiang Zemin's 'New Security Concept' marked the beginnings of stage 2, during which China was beginning to demonstrate an identification with East Asia, not only as a geographic region but as a 'common home' in which members shared *East Asian*

values, goals, and responsibilities. This era, in which Deng Xiaoping was still a prominent influence, demonstrates what stage 2 referred to as an interplay between 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' influences. While China still retained some of Deng Xiaoping's 'inward gaze' towards achieving domestic stability, relations with its neighbors were steadily improving and creating a sense of 'Asian togetherness' (as seen in China's 'Stand By Asia' approach during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis). Thus, just as Kang Youwei and the Reformist movement reshaped Chinese identity from that of the 'divine center of the universe' towards a more regional identity as a 'great national amongst nations', the 'New Security Concept' (also the product of endogenous and exogenous influences), represented a movement away from a China that was 'of the East Asian region' towards a country that was *East Asian*.

The third stage of the relational model is represented in the formulation of Hu Jintao's 'harmonious world'. As previously stated the concept of building a harmonious world represents an internalized regional identity and a merging of prior constructs of 'self' and 'other'. However, it is key to remember from chapter x, and the arguments of Jackson and Nexon that the 'harmonious world' is not simply an 'owned' concept. Instead it is generated and influenced by the increasing and improved relations between China and its neighbors. Furthermore, as stated in earlier chapters, policies and guiding ideologies such as the 'New Security Concept' and the 'harmonious world' are not only significant for the particular values and goals they espouse. As the temporal narrative in the previous chapter demonstrated, improved relations and constant dialogue and cooperation with its East Asian neighbors have served as a continuing impetus, initiating identity negotiation and engendering ideological shifts. In terms of the relational model, the 'harmonious

world' represents a policy projection of the larger process of regional identity formation and internalization, and thus the significance lies within the within the 'process' rather than the 'product'.

Through this narrative spanning across the eras of Chairman Mao Zedong and current President Hu Jintao, we are able to see the importance of mutually reinforcing relations, shifting conceptualizations of 'self' and 'other', and the use of ideological shifts and policies as projections of points of identity negotiation and contestation, all of which are central components of the relational model of regional identity formation.

CONCLUSION

On October 30th 2010, East Asian leaders met in Hanoi, Vietnam at the 5th annual East Asia Summit. The events and details of the summit were covered by the official Chinese news source *Xinhua*. *Xinhua*'s article describing the summit included a powerful image of participating leaders standing in a line spanning across a large stage, arms intertwined. Over the picture a heading that read "Chinese Premier Calls for Deepening East Asian Cooperation" was displayed prominently before describing the discussions that occurred between East Asian leaders. During the summit, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated China's commitment towards coming together to solve *East Asian* concerns, goals, and responsibilities.

The summit was hailed as a 'success' amongst Chinese leaders, yet it reflected many of the characteristics that regionalist scholars have identified as impediments to the East Asian regionalist project. Dialogue on issues spanning from security to environmental protection were prioritized over talks of enhancing enforcement or accountability mechanisms within regional institutions. Leaders expressed their concerns and displayed a willingness to discuss East Asian issues at length yet no formal multi-lateral agreements were produced.

While the summit may reaffirm the skepticism expressed by regionalist scholars, its focus on 'deepening' relations further demonstrates the appropriateness of applying a relationalist lens to the study of East Asian regionalism. I have argued that analyzing the efficacy and effectiveness of regional institutions and agreements may not be the most suitable way of understanding the East Asian regionalist project. During the periods examined here, we see not only the importance of elucidating processes of 'regional identity' construction and internalization, but also

ways in which the study of regionalism can be expanded beyond substantialist assumptions.

While East Asian regional institutions have not displayed a strong commitment to regional institutionalization and diverge from the 'European Union' model of integration, in this respect the cultivation of a 'regional identity' within and amongst member states is significant to the study of East Asian regionalism. As shown in the case of China, the internalization of a 'regional identity' influences the interests and actions of member states.

This conclusion has several implications for both the study of East Asian regionalism and the study of regionalism as a discourse. In regards to the former, this study suggests that regional *institutions* should not serve as the primitives of analysis in and of themselves, but rather should be analyzed through an exploration of the *relations* that surround them. In this way East Asian regional institutions are not the only indicators by which we can measure "success" or use for direct comparison with the 'European Model'. Instead institutions may be viewed as visible manifestations of relations that must be studied and observed independently—as proxies for what is a relational process.

As my narrative describing China's ideological shifts has shown, China's regional identity was not generated merely by the *act* of participating in regional institutions. Instead, relations that were engendered through this participation shaped the ways in which China viewed and thought about itself, initiating processes of identity re-negotiation. Just as Hu Jintao's vision of a 'harmonious world' cannot be dismissed simply as a product of China's rising political and economic clout, Jiang Zemin's 'New Security Concept' cannot be solely explained by China's growing

participation in regional institutions such as ASEAN and APEC. Rather both ideological shifts are products of a relational process in which regional relations have altered conceptualizations of 'self' and 'other' influencing particular foreign policy preferences and behavior.

Thus, the degree to which a member nation identifies with a region can serve as an alternative measure of 'success' in a regionalist project. The East Asian region is characterized by constantly changing contexts and institutions often slow to react and change to changing contexts due to bureaucratic mechanisms. Thus analyzing the efficacy of East Asian institutions may not provide the most accurate reflection of current regionalist dynamics. It is imperative instead, to examine relational processes that are more responsive and sensitive to changes in changing contexts and relations in the region. It is not my intention to argue that the East Asian regionalist project is a "success", but rather to suggest that the majority of the literature has attempted to assess regionalism in East Asia on the basis of institutional efficacy and formality alone. Nevertheless, it is completely possible that China's goals of promoting mutual trust and cooperation through informal dialogue may be in fact more successful in ensuring peace and prosperity than highly formalized agreements or codified institutions.

While more research on cases other than China is obviously needed to evaluate East Asian regionalism according to a relationalist lens, the model described in figure 1.1 could be applied to other members states. In order to apply this model a few considerations should be kept in mind. First, future studies may continue to utilize points of contestation or important historical junctures as key moments in which countries are rethinking their roles and identity vis-à-vis a particular region.

Second, this study focused on ideological shifts due to the importance placed on guiding ideologies within Chinese foreign policy. However, points of contestation may also be seen in particular times of crisis, important historical developments, or other major shifts in a countries' regional behavior. It is also necessary to determine if these conjunctures produce internal reflection instead of only a superficial projection of certain principles to an external environment. This study has focused on ideological shifts precisely because they are represented in both domestic and regional forums and discussions. Simply analyzing foreign policy behavior, an external projection, does not necessarily indicate 'self'-reflection. Finally, though my model focuses on a 'political identity' that is considered to be determined by state leaders, it could be expanded to include socio-cultural components such as pop-culture other societal influences.

My project was motivated in large part by the overly substantialist nature of current regionalist literature. The theoretical debate between relationalist and substantialist IR theory has served as a reoccurring theme throughout this paper, and it is through this debate that this study has attempted to rethink the ways in which scholars approach discussions of regionalism and regionalist processes. As discussed earlier, focusing the study of regionalism on regionalist institutions and other regional entities may be not only unsuitable for regions such as East Asia but also engenders a static, dominant, Western vision of a "successful" regionalist project. Most importantly, the study of regionalism must include an emphasis on the importance of relations instead of only on regionalist 'entities'. Relations must not be subsumed under complete ownership of regional institutions or dismissed as foreign policy tools by which countries promote their own agenda. The importance of

relations vis-à-vis political identity and foreign policy behavior should not be overlooked by regionalist scholars. If we visualize political identities as a complex web of shifting cables attempting to make sense of incoming signals, we see that these signals are transmitted via interactions between the web of cables and external factors. Thus, relations not only influence the ways in which signals from the external environment are understood and internalized, but more importantly, alter the ways in which the web is reconstructed.

As the political narrative of globalization and interdependence continues to dominate our geopolitical landscape, regionalist efforts will undoubtedly increase. As regional relations form dynamic networks of intertwined relations and constantly changing contexts, alternative regionalist models and methods to observe regionalist processes will be needed to elucidate the growing complexities of regionalism in the 21st century. The possibility of an 'Asian' regionalist model, and the application of a relationalist lens to the study of regionalism, is a step forward towards this endeavor.

Bibliography

Secondary Sources

- Aggestam, Lisbeth. *A European Foreign Policy?: Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany*. Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Political Science, 2004.
- Aggestam, Lisbeth, and Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price. *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda*. London: Macmillan, 2000.
- Acharya, Amitav. "China's Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia," *International Herald Tribune*, November 8–9, 2003.
- Adler, Emanuel, and Patricia Greve. "When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance." *Review of International Studies* 35.S1 (2009): 59.
- Ba, Alice. "China and ASEAN: Reinvigorating Relations for the 21st Century," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (July/August 2003), pp. 622–647.
- Barmé, Geremie. *The Forbidden City*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008.
- Beech, Hannah. "Obama in Southeast Asia: Mending Fences in a Key Region." *Time Magazine* 14 Nov. 2009: 1.
- Bernard, Mitchell, and John Ravenhill. "Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia." *World Politics* 45 (1995): 179-210.
- Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. *The Coming Conflict with China*. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1997.
- Chaubey, M. "I Establishing a New International Order on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: Deng Xiaoping: III Documents." *China Report* 30.2 (1994): 267-79.
- Chang, Maria Hsia. *Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001.
- Chirathivat, S. "ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: background, implications and future development", *Journal of Asian Economics*, 13 (2004): 671-686.
- Cotton, James. "The "Haze" over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement." *Pacific Affairs* 72 (1999): 331-51.

- Deng, Yong, and Sherry Gray. "Growing Pains--China Debates Its International Future." *Journal of Contemporary China* 10.26 (2001): 5-17.
- Deng, Yong, and Fei-Ling Wang. *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
- Dent, Christopher M., and David W. F. Huang. *Northeast Asian Regionalism: Lessons from the European Experience*. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002. See also Shambaugh, pg. 13.
- Economy, Elizabeth. "China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States." *Journal of Contemporary China* 14.44 (2005): 409-25.
- Friedberg, Aaron L. "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia." *International Security* 18 (1993): 22.
- Fu Ying, "China and Asia in new period," *Foreign Affairs Journal*, (Beijing), No. 69, September 2003, p. 1-7.
- Fu Ying, "Strive to open new prospects in China's periphery," (Beijing) *Foreign Affairs Journal* 70 (December 2003), p. 19-24.
- Geoffrey Barker Bangkok, 'APEC heads unite in war on terror', *Australian Financial Review*, (22 October 2003), p. 1.
- Glosny, Michael. "Heading toward a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in China's Policy toward Southeast Asia." *Asian Security* 2.1 (2006): 24-57.
- Goh, Evelyn. "Great Powers and the Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies." *International Security* 32 (2002): 113-57.
- Hettne, B, *Regionalism and World Order*. In Farrell et al. (Eds.) *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*. (2005) Pluto Press: Ann Arbor MI.
- Hund, Markus. "ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptics Appraisal." *Pacific Review* 16 (2003): 383-417.
- Hund, Markus. "'From "Neighbourhood Watch Group" to Community? The Case of ASEAN Institutions and the Pooling of Sovereignty"' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 56 (2002): 99-122.
- Ikenberry, John G. "Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement." *Ideas & Beliefs, Institutions, Foreign and Political Change Policy*. Ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane. New York: Cornell UP, 1993.

- Jackson, P. T., and D. H. Nexon. "Relations Before States:: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 5.3 (1999): 291-332.
- Johnston, Alastair. "China's International Relations: Political and Security Dimensions," in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), *The International Relations of Northeast Asia* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p. 65-109.
- John Wong and Sarah Chan, "China ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Shaping Future Economic Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May/June 2003), pp. 507-526.
- Jones, David, and Michael Smith. "Is There a Sovietology of South-East Asian Studies?" *International Affairs* 77 (2001): 843-63.
- Kavalski, Emilian. *China and the Global Politics of Regionalization*. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009.
- Kim, Samuel S. "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4 (2004): 39.
- Klingner, Bruce. "'Peaceful rising' seeks to allay 'China threat,'" *Asia Times Online*, March 12, 2004.
- Klaus Krippendorff. *Content Analysis: an Introduction to Its Methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004.
- Kurlantzick, Joshua. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*. New Haven: Yale UP, 2007.
- Levine, "China in Asia," p. 107. Denny Roy, in a book of 1998, still believed that "China has no apparent 'Asian policy'." Denny Roy, *China's Foreign Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 8.
- Liu Huaqiu, "Zhongguo jiang yiongyuan zhixing dudi zhizhu de waijiao zhengce" [China Will Always Pursue Peaceful Foreign Policy of Independence and Self-determination], *Quishi*, no. 23 (December 1997): 38.
- Liu Tsai-ming, "Zhuanfang xing waijiaobuzhang" [A Special Interview of New Foreign Minister], *Wenhui Bao*, June 27, 1998, p. A3.
- Mahbubani, Kishore. "The Pacific Way." *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 100-11.
- Ma, Ying, and Gancheng Zhao. "The Evolution of the Guiding Principles and Strategies of China's Periphery Policy." *International Review* 29.19 (2009): 19-33.

- Marshall, David, "Understanding the Asian Crisis: Systemic Risk as Coordination Failure," Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspective, (1998). Third Quarter: 13– 28.
- Nandy, Ashis. *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* ; with a Postscript by the Author. Oxford Univ., 2010: 40.
- Nischalke, Tobias. "Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community." *Pacific Review* 15 (2002): 89-117.
- Nischalke, Tobias. "'Insights From ASEAN's Foreign Policy Cooperation: The 'ASEAN Way', A Real Spirit or Phantom?'" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22 (2000): 89-112.
- Nye, Joseph S. *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
- Paul Evans, 'Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional Identity' in T.J. Pempel ed. *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
- Pempel, T. J. Remapping East Asia The Construction Of A Region (Cornell Studies in Political Economy). New York: Cornell UP, 2004.
- Perlez, Jane "Across Asia, Beijing's Star is Rising," *The New York Times*, August 28, 2004.
- Perlez, Jane "As U.S. Influence Wanes, A New Asian Community," *New York Times*, November 4, 2004.
- Pomfret, John. "In its own neighborhood, China emerges as a leader," *Washington Post*, October 18, 2001
- Ravenhill, John. "A three bloc world? The new East Asian Regionalism." *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 2 (2002): 167-95.
- Ravenhill, John. "Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing Incentives." *Asian Survey* 35 (1995): 850-66.
- Shambaugh, David L. *Power Shift China and Asia's New Dynamics*. Berkeley: University of California, 2009.
- Shambaugh, David, 'China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,' *International Security* 29, no. 3 (2004/05), pp. 64-99.
- Sø, Chae-jøng, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson. *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2004.

- Solingen, Etel. "East Asian Regionalist Institutions: Characteristics, Sources, and Distinctiveness." *Remapping East Asia*. Ed. T. J. Pempel. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2005.
- Stubbs, Richard. "ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?" *Asian Survey* 42 (2002): 442.
- Stubbs, Richard. "Signing on to Liberalization: AFTA and the Politics of Regional Economic Cooperation." *Pacific Review* 13 (2000): 297-318.
- Stutter, Robert. "China's recent approach to Asia: Seeking long-term gains," *NBR Analysis*, vol. 13, no. 1, March 2002, p. 20-21.
- Suisheng, Zhao. "China's Periphery Policy and Changing Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Matthew Evangelista and Judith Reppy, eds., *The United States and Asian Security*, Cornell University Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper #26, May 2002
- Tanner, Murray. "China Rethinks Unrest," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 137-156.
- Terada, Takashi. "Constructing an 'East Asian' concept and growing regional identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3." *The Pacific Review* 16 (2003): 251-77.
- Thompson, Markus. "Whatever Happened to Asian Values?" *Journal of Democracy* 12 (2001): 154-65.
- Tilly, Charles. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Vatikiotis, Michael and Hiebert, Murray. "How China Is Building an Empire," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (2003): 30-33.
- Wain, Barry, "Regional Security: ASEAN Apathy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 6, 2004.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security* 25.1 (2000): 5-41.
- Wang Gungwu, "The Fourth Rise of China: Cultural Implications," *China: An International Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 2004), pp. 311-322.
- Wang Yiwei, "'hexie shijie' guan gaibian guoji guanxi shijiao" ('The Concept of "Harmonious World" Changes Perceptions of International Politics). *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), 2 December, 2005, p. 11

- Webber, Douglas. "Two Funerals and a Wedding? The ups and downs of regionalism in East Asia and Asia Pacific after the Asian crises." *The Pacific Review* 14 (2001): 339-77.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Collective identity formation and the international states." *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 384-96.
- Wigen, Karen. "Culture, Power, and Place: The New Landscapes of East Asian Regionalism." *American Historical Review* 104 (1999): 1183
- Womack, Brantly. 'China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership and Normalcy,' *Pacific Affairs* 76, no. 4 (2003/04), pp. 529-48.
- Wu Baiyi, "The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution," *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 27 (May 2001): 278.
- Yan, Xuetong. "The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes." *Journal of Contemporary China* 10.26 (2001): 33-39.
- You Ji and Jia Qingguo, "China's Re-emergence and Its Foreign Policy Strategy," in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., *China Review, 1998* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998), p. 128.
- Zhai Kun, 'Zai 'hexie yazhou' de da mubiao xia' (Under the Grand Goal of 'Harmonious Asia'), *Liaowang xinwen zhoukan* (Outlook Weekly), 27 June, 2006.
- Zhao, S. "China's Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors." *Security Dialogue* 30.3 (1999): 335-46
- Zhou Shengping and Tian Zhaoqing, 'Jianshe hexie shijie: zhongguo waijiao sixiang de xin fazhan' (Building A 'Harmonious World': New Development in China's Foreign Policy Approach). *BanYueTan* (China Comment), no. 16 (2006).

Primary Documents

- Deng Xiaoping. "China's Foreign Policy." Excerpt from a Talk with Javier Perez De Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations. 21 Dec. 1982.
- Deng Xiaoping. "The International Situation and Economic Problems." Talk with Leading Members of the Central Committee. China, Beijing. 3 Mar. 1990.
- "Full Text" of white paper issued by the PRC Information Office of State Council on 9 December, 2002: "China's National Defense in 2002".

'East Asian Community Now Possible', *Beijing Review*, 30 October, 2003, pp. 40-1.

'China has a Dream...and Shares It With World', *People's Daily Online*, 3 April, 2006.

Hu Jintao. "APEC Anniversary." 12th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting. Thailand, Bangkok. 21 Nov. 2004.

Hu Jintao. Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity. New York: Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the United Nations' 60th Session, September 15 2005.

Jiang Zemin, 'Speech by President Jiang Zemin At George Bush Presidential Library', 24 October 2002

Mahathir, Mohamad. Interview with Mohamad Mahathir, *The Daily Yomiuri*, March 24, 2007, p.3.

PRC Foreign Ministry, "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept," August, 6, 2002.

Tang Jiaxuan. Speech by Foreign Minister At the ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea Foreign Ministers' Meeting. 8 Aug. 2002.

Interviews

Gui Yongtao. "Chinese Political Reforms, with Professor Gui Yongtao at Peking University." Personal interview. 10 Jan. 2011

Zhang Qingmin. "Interview with Professor Zhang Qingmin of Peking University." Personal interview. Mar. 2010.