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Abstract

Ethnic diversity has historically created conflict in many nation-states throughout the globe. From the era of nation-state formation to the present, states have had various strategies for dealing with this diversity. These strategies can be divided into three distinct categories: assimilation, integration and pluralism. Because of the increasing strength and importance of the global indigenous peoples’ movement, relations between states and indigenous peoples are transforming away from assimilationist models toward integration and symbolic support. Why would governments nominally or symbolically support programs to preserve and revive indigenous culture? To answer this question, I compare government support for intercultural-bilingual education programs in Peru and Guatemala. I find that both states have reached a state of institutional paralysis in their implementation of intercultural-bilingual education. A comparative historical overview of both countries finds that internal conflicts were turning points in the states’ relationships with their indigenous peoples. Contention between the government and its populations resulted in transformation, either through co-optation or negotiation. Despite these distinct trajectories of change, both countries experience institutional paralysis when it comes to multicultural policy as a result of states’ efforts to maintain their authority through law, in accordance with the bureaucratic nature of nation-states.
State strategies to address issues of ethnic diversity can be divided into three general categories: assimilation, integration, and pluralism (Raxché 1996). Integration and assimilation attempt to incorporate different peoples into a national identity, disregarding the diversity of cultures present within a country. Though both integration and assimilation reach the same goal, assimilation involves coercion and force where integration features more subtle methods. Integration feigns respect of the culture of a people while maintaining the same goal of their assimilation into dominant society. Cultural diversity is acknowledged and even supported, but the driving motivation is still to incorporate the non-dominant group into a pre-existing national identity. Pluralism – paralleling indigenous peoples’ goals of self-determination – presupposes a value for and appreciation of the diversity of a state by its people as well as its government, and a desire to incorporate this diversity into the national identity. In the past, states have generally attempted to assimilate indigenous peoples into the national identity, all but wiping out the culture with which they identify. In the last twenty years, however, a shift from assimilation to integration can be observed in many countries. How can this shift from assimilation to symbolic support or integration be explained?

An examination of language policy helps understand this shift. Due to its importance both to indigenous movements and to states, language is a particularly insightful policy area to study. Language can unify indigenous peoples – as a marginalized group whose language is not the state’s official language – and serve to build the nation-state by creating community (Anderson 1983). The Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP), approved by the United Nations in 2007, provides for indigenous peoples’ right to language preservation, indicating its importance on an international level (DRIP 2007, Articles 13 and 14). Since state-mandated education significantly affects language acquisition and use, this paper explores states’ shifts to
intercultural-bilingual education programs in greater depth. Despite governments’ proclamations of the importance of intercultural-bilingual education, these programs lack the resources to be truly effective. This “implementation gap” is puzzling, since states could cite a variety of reasons (such as cost and impracticality) for not advancing these programs. Because of the highly symbolic importance of a common language to the state, we might expect either no change at all or a major change from the state, but instead we see an intermediate shift to symbolic support. What social processes have brought about this shift to symbolic support of intercultural-bilingual education programs, instead of no support or full support?

Since we can see these types of shifts occurring in multiple countries, analysis should account for the range of potential influences on policy change. Scholarly work on multiculturalism in practice offers helpful insight about the internal dynamics that could result in policy change; however, other factors outside of the state may also influence policy. Perspectives on nation-state formation are useful for determining what forces, inside and outside the state, may factor into state actions. Accordingly, I draw on competing theories of nation-state formation to inform potential explanations for changes that could result in pressures that change state-indigenous relations. Since its rise in the 19th century, the nation-state has become the dominant form of political, social, economic and cultural organization (Tilly 1990). Due to its prevalence, sociologists have advanced knowledge of how nation-states formed and came to be such a dominant form of organization (Tilly 1990; Giddens 1984; Mann 1984). Additionally, sociological studies explain how boundaries, an important part of nation-state development, are altered through war and revolution (Hironaka 2005; Skocpol 1979). Further, studies point to the significance of identity formation in the process of nation building. In light of these studies, we know much about nation-state formation, but less about how these nation-states internally
transform after their initial creation.

Examining ethnic diversity within countries promises to extend knowledge about processes affecting nation-states. State-indigenous relations provide a unique vantage point for how states internally transform since these relations do not come about due to regime collapse. Rather, the global indigenous peoples movement has sought to renegotiate state-indigenous relations through legal means (Anaya 2004). Considering the proliferation of law as an organizing principle of the nation-state in global culture (Boyle and Meyer 1998) studying nation-state transformations in the context of law is particularly important. Additionally, that indigenous peoples' main claim to identity is due to their prior inhabitation of the land compared to the dominant culture of the nation-state makes their claims to separate identity legitimate in the international sphere, but also of interest to theoretical debates (Niezen 2003). Finally, the importance of boundaries to the formation of nation-states, and the indigenous peoples' location within these contemporary boundaries, makes their claims of distinct identity a particularly interesting case to examine in relation to the project of nation-state identity formation.

To answer the research questions about the change in state-indigenous relations and the symbolic support of intercultural-bilingual education programs, I compare two Latin American countries. Programs to preserve Quechua languages in Peru and Mayan languages in Guatemala have reached a point of stagnation; however, despite their similar outcomes, their origins pose an empirical puzzle. While both governments nominally support the programs, they provide no resources for their successful implementation. Additionally, programs generally end after the third year of primary school, after which Spanish becomes the language of education, contributing to castellanización, integrating indigenous children into Spanish-speaking society. Despite a difference in the strength and organization of indigenous movements in both countries,
the sheer number of Quechua (20-40% of the population) and Maya people (50-60%) in each
country makes their language preservation an important issue. In Guatemala an organized
indigenous movement resulted in institutional paralysis, while in Peru a less-organized and
smaller movement achieved the same outcome. Through what processes have both countries
reached this same institutional paralysis despite different internal pathways to reform?

I explore these two interrelated questions – the general shift from assimilation to
symbolic support and the institutional paralysis in Peru and Guatemala – through comparative-
historical research as well as analysis of archival and interview data. The comparative-historical
research explains the timing and reasons for the shift in state-indigenous relations, while the
interview data describes the institutional paralysis as a result of the shift. Internal conflicts
experienced by both countries in the second half of the 20th century provided the impetus to shift
the states’ dealings with indigenous peoples. In Peru, the government co-opted indigenous self-
organization to resist rebel forces, while in Guatemala the government came to see negotiation
with indigenous peoples as a more effective means to promote counter-insurgency efforts. In
both instances, the participation of marginalized and international groups, not just the
government, were crucial to the changes, implying that the process was not merely a top-down
restructuring, but a dynamic, contentious process involving multiple parties. Despite the
difference between the cases and the potential for contingency in the process, the legacy of state
formation, which historically advocates the creation of homogenous national identity, means the
support of realistic multicultural policies may be a disadvantage to states seeking to maintain
their bureaucratic authority. This bureaucratic nature of the state may make far-reaching change
difficult because it allows for the implementation gap. While the discourse may shift toward a
more pluralistic stance, bureaucracy permits poor implementation, stagnating progress.
In this paper, I will first review previous sociological work that explains nation-state formation. By describing how states initially rose to power, these theories may help explain how states maintain that power. Additionally, I review models of multiculturalism in nation-states to understand how some states deal with ethnic diversity; these theories elucidate possible state motivations for promoting multiculturalism. My findings detail the circumstances of the internal conflicts which led to the transformation in state-indigenous relations, and then, through analysis of archival and interview data, describe the results of the shifts in each country. I find a process of contention, leading to negotiation or co-optation, and eventually stagnation. In each case we see a gap between the declarations of desire and the declarations of reality. States have been able to shift to a discourse of tolerance and pluralism, but bureaucracy allows for institutional paralysis, making progress slow, if there is progress at all.

Theoretical Perspectives

Sociological explanations of nation-state formation often suggest that a single unified identity reflects a strong nation-state (Tilly 1990; Gellner 2000). In the contemporary era, however, ethnic division, immigration, and other forms of cultural pluralism seem to challenge these accounts (Soysal 2000; Bloemraad et al 2008; Dahlin and Hironaka 2008). Examining contemporary transformations in state-indigenous relations contributes to two theoretical debates. First, debates about how nation-states formed remain central to comparative-historical and political sociology. Applying these theories to state-indigenous relations highlights more recent shifts and enduring processes of nation-state operations. Second, a variety of perspectives on understanding multiculturalism in practice continue to animate scholarly disagreements and offer further explanations to describe the shifts that are taking place. Scholars suggest that
societies will have to come to value "deep-diversity" in order to be truly multicultural (Kymlicka 1998). Examining how states actually transform promises into law helps us understand the particular forms multiculturalism takes and the processes through which it emerges. Since states rely on bureaucratic authority, they adjust the way they operate through the creation and implementation of new law. To gain support in times of unrest, states may alter laws to incorporate more of their population into the dominant political and social spheres.

Formation of States and National Identity

Accounts of how nation-states formed and how they became the most common model for political and economic identity provide a foundation to explain the dynamics of state-indigenous relations. The four theories I summarize in this section offer predictions for the possibilities for why these relations could change, based on strategies and processes of initial nation-state formation. Although these theories focus on nation-state formation, they provide some guidance about what happens to national identity within a state after it has been established. Social conflict and difference within a nation-state might serve as the basis for long-standing claims or grievances; however, the critical questions are how changes to state-citizen relations and related ideas of national identity arise and what the effects of such changes are. The cultural community theory explains the importance of language and education to maintaining and transmitting national identity; bellicose and historical-institutional theories suggest that contention generally and war, in particular, might result in changes to the relation between a state and its populace; and world polity theory suggests emerging international norms might result in changes within nation-states.

Cultural Community Theory This theory suggests that a strong cultural community,
commonly observed through language, is the string holding together a nation-state. Benedict Anderson describes how language helped to form states during the nationalist movements in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. He describes states as "imagined communities" in which community is formed among large groups of people because of certain commonalities, including language (Anderson 1983). The formation of nation-states began with the breakdown of the greater religious communities - to which he traces the foundation of cultural communities - and the proliferation of the vernacular. This perspective would predict that the weakening of the basis of these imagined communities by the ethnic diversity of an integrated group would change the community imagined by the state. The revival of indigenous languages would then challenge the imagined cultural community, causing different languages to compete, breaking down the cultural link holding the community together and threatening the authority of the state. By standardizing education, and in particular the language of education, states could combat this threat.

Bellicose Authority Theory This theory suggests governments deliberately and violently homogenized the populace in order to maintain authority so that states would remain militarily strong against external challenges. Charles Tilly suggests that such a homogenization was probably strategic on the parts of the governments of the European countries that became successful nation-states in the 19th century. The nation-state was achieved through homogenization, making such states more powerful than rival states. Culture depended on the state in which one lived more than ever before, while states had an interest in homogenizing populations' language and education to build loyalty to the central government's activities (Tilly 1990: 115-116). This model would suggest that a shift could take place if the power of authority weakened due to an outside threat, requiring bargaining by the state. The proliferation and
increased power of indigenous movements throughout the world might threaten government authority, causing states to compromise in order to maintain their political authority over all citizens in the face of external threats.

**Historical Institutionalist** While this perspective shares with the bellicose theory an emphasis on political contention as an important causal element, it places greater emphasis on localized influences (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). While Wimmer and Feinstein conclude that wars fought within a territory or empire create a political opportunity structure for nationalists to promote nation-state formation, they also describe a contagion effect as influencing the spread of the nation-state. Bordering nation-states act as models for yet-to-be-formed states, establishing the possibility of change for the region. Thus, rather than being external threats, neighboring states offer blueprints for dealing with internal challenges to state authority. This model would suggest that shifts in state-indigenous relations occur when regimes are weak and when neighboring countries have experienced similar changes.

**World Cultural Models** This model presumes states conform to emergent international norms. John W. Meyer points out that international trends have an increasingly important influence over policies enacted by governments throughout the world (Meyer 2004: 42). Though their official conformity may turn out to be hypocritical, states do want to appear as though they are following global norms. States want to look like they are trying to be like good liberal democracies, even if in reality they are not following through on their word. Law fits into this picture as a way to manifest the conformity. "Individuals derive their identities and interests from some perceived natural order and create legal systems to reflect these higher 'platonic ideals'" (Boyle and Meyer 1998: 213). Since international law has no real jurisdiction in the way that national law does, the conformity of national legal systems becomes a way for international
law to become standardized on a national level. This model would predict a change in state practices when practices that are considered to be legitimate on a global scale change. This model differs in source and scale of change from the regional focus of Wimmer and Feinstein's historical institutionalist model. A possible shift in world culture can be observed with the growth of the transnational indigenous peoples movement and the increased implementation of law to comply with the movement's demands.

Each of the theories of state formation predicts different sources of change in national identity. Cultural community theory would predict that a change in the underlying state-populace relation would result in changes in language and education policies. Bellicose theories would anticipate that states able to secure support by granting concessions would be stronger in the face of external conflict. Historical-institutional theories would predict regional and local change influences domestic change. Finally, world polity theory would anticipate decoupling, as state changes might reflect global pressures rather than domestic influences.

Models of State-Indigenous Multiculturalism

While theories of state formation offer possible explanations for why state-indigenous relations might change, theories of how states respond to indigenous multiculturalism provide a possible starting point for understanding how shifts in state-indigenous relations are implemented. These models generally observe multiculturalism from the top-down perspective, looking at how states adjust to the increased volume of the voice of subordinated social groups. This one-sided perspective does not account for the ways that indigenous groups also adjust and compromise according to state action. Keeping this in mind, in conjunction with nation-state formation models, it may be possible to gather ideas about how states transform through the
years, due to evolving internal dynamics.

Some scholars examine the effects of multicultural policies from a critical perspective, noting the political nature and power dynamics of multiculturalism. Wendy Brown argues that multiculturalism as a form of tolerance separates and marginalizes minorities by marking them "as deviant, marginal or undesirable by virtue of being tolerated" while elevating the status of those who tolerate to a position of superiority (Brown 2006: 14). Behind the moral justifications of tolerance politics, there is a deeper political motivation to regulate and control, leading some scholars to conclude that multiculturalism requires tyranny to enforce both a single state and distinct identities between many people (Walzer 1980: 6). If these perspectives are correct, states' moves to establish indigenous intercultural-bilingual education merely mask existing power relations and continue the marginalization of indigenous people by dominant state actors. This perspective, however, anticipates that multiculturalism is fully implemented, rather than explaining why there would be an implementation gap. Additionally, this perspective predicts that states would originate efforts at promoting intercultural-bilingual education in order to stay and control any possible indigenous movements.

Scholars studying state-indigenous relations have noted that states in the contemporary era may benefit from promoting an international image that incorporates one or more indigenous populations. Due to the importance of tourism in this rapidly globalizing world, creating an exotic national identity through selective multicultural policy would bring favorable national attention (Tilley 2002). Li notes that states with such a motivation seek only to promote those people that fit into the "tribal slot." That is, indigenous people that conform to standard scripts of what indigenous people look and act like are encouraged to maintain some cultural distinctiveness, but only "of the song and dance variety" for external audiences (Li 2000: 154).
This perspective observes a multicultural policy limited to the cultural sphere in order to create an identity which would be favorable to the international audience. It does not, however, account for what benefits there might be for indigenous groups to an at least limited support of multiculturalism. Though it may only be support of those superficial elements of culture, it accounts for a starting point that could lead to greater multiculturalism. Lightfoot describes states that have been “overcompliant”: states that have not actually ratified documents like ILO Convention 169 or the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but express this desire to reinvent a national identity, one that includes the indigenous identity (Lightfoot 2008). There may be a variety of interests coming into play here – material, cultural, political – but nevertheless this desire to incorporate the indigenous identity into the national identity causes increased support for multiculturalism.

While these models of multiculturalism usefully consider pressures that could influence state shifts in policy, they are problematic in that they only view multiculturalism as a top-down, state-led process, rather than as an interactive process. They only take into account the state’s interest in fostering multiculturalism, rather than understanding how shifting state-indigenous relations may result from contentious processes in which states have to make concessions or surrender some authority to indigenous peoples. From the perspective of bellicose and historical institutionalist theories, we would expect policy changes to take place as a result of a process of adaptation of multiple parties – state leaders, indigenous peoples, and professionals – reacting to new models of relations. From this perspective, the compromise and negotiation that may take place when states feel threatened, either internally or externally, could have led to symbolic multiculturalism as a way to appease international, as well as domestic demands.
Methods

To assess the competing explanations about how state-indigenous relations transform and the effects of these transformations on policies, I use a comparative, mixed method approach. Comparative-historical analysis of the internal conflicts in Peru and Guatemala uncovers the processes of a shift from assimilation to symbolic support for multicultural policy, as well as explains the timing of these shifts. Archival documentation and interviews provide evidence about the implementation of language policy.

To establish the institutional paralysis and explore how individual actors perceive the implementation of intercultural-bilingual education policy, I use interviews that I conducted in Peru and Guatemala, as well as historical and archival evidence. The eight interviews – conducted with government officials, educators, and indigenous activists – provide context and a human perspective for the first part of my research. The interviews not only establish the outcomes of a nominal support of education policy, but they offer insight into how different actors with different goals implement new policy in light of new models of state-indigenous relations, as well as how these different actors perceive the shift and the new policy as a result of this shift. The historical evidence points to a shift in policy in conjunction with the shift in state-indigenous relations, as explained with the comparative-historical analysis. The archival evidence provides an international perspective, showing how the institutional paralysis is perceived by an international audience, like the United Nations, and what steps are being taken to improve implementation as a result of the transformation to symbolic support and institutional paralysis.

Peru and Guatemala provide ample ground for comparative analysis of state-indigenous relations and implementation of intercultural-bilingual education. Both Peru and Guatemala have
large populations of indigenous peoples that trace their origins to pre-Columbian empires. 50-60% of the Guatemalan population is indigenous (Fischer 1996: 9) and the most commonly spoken Mayan language, of the 22 different dialects spoken in Guatemala, has around 1 million speakers (Warren 1998: 13). In Peru, 20%-40% of the population identifies as indigenous (Puerta Peña 2008: 1) and an estimated 8.5 to 11 million people throughout South America speak a range of Quechua dialects (Encyclopedia of World Cultures 1996: 285-286). Quechua and Mayan languages are the two most widely spoken indigenous languages in Latin America, but despite these large numbers, the actual number of speakers has been rapidly declining in the 20th and 21st centuries.

The Quechua and Maya movements vary in their relative strength and prominence within the international indigenous movement. The Peruvian Quechua movement has been notably absent from the story of indigenous activism. The relative absence of land rights issues due to the lack of currently valuable resources on Quechua land and a precedent for valuing class identification over race is largely attributed by Andeanist scholars for a lack of Quechua organization and mobilization (Degregori 2000; Skar 1982). By 1976, leftist President Juan Velasco Alvarado had redistributed 25 million acres of land from the rich landholders to the Quechua workers (Skar 1982: 51). Because of this land reform, in conjunction with Marxist attempts at promoting class identity over racial identity, the Quechua people of Peru have not used their indigenous identity for political mobilization. In contrast, the indigenous movement in Guatemala has been strong throughout the last decade. Language has been an important unifier for the movement because, despite differences between dialects, all are considered Mayan languages, and thus create a community of speakers. Language has become a political tool, and, working within the legal framework set up by the Guatemalan Constitution, the maintenance,
revival, and expansion of Mayan languages play an important role in the demands of the Maya Movement (Fischer and McKenna 1996: 14). That Peru and Guatemala would each reach a point of institutional paralysis and symbolic support for multicultural policy despite such different processes makes some of the predictions drawn from nation-state formation theories individually problematic when using them to help explain nation-state transformation.

For my comparative-historical analysis, I focus on the internal conflicts that took place in both countries in the second half of the twentieth century. These conflicts defined the context in which changes in state-indigenous relations occurred. This period of turmoil and violence in both countries is largely related to class and ethnic conflict during which civil wars between the state and guerrilla organizations marked history in both countries. Although here I call them internal conflicts, there was involvement by foreign governments (the U.S.) and by international human rights advocates. As a result, there may have been more going on to cause a shift than a top-down forced maintenance and legitimation of power by the states, as the bellicose and historical institutionalist theories might suggest.

To address the questions about how the shift in state-indigenous relations influences language and education policies, I draw on two types of data. First, government reports, particularly those submitted to the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination display states’ representations of the logic of policy. Second, I conducted interviews in Peru and Guatemala with people working in the field of intercultural-bilingual education. The sample includes educators, government officials and indigenous activists. Interview questions concerned how these different actors approached intercultural-bilingual education, how they assessed these programs, and how they related to other actors in the field of indigenous rights and intercultural-bilingual education. I selected interview subjects by targeting
government officials and indigenous organizations that have an international presence, and by using references from people in-country about other possible participants with on-the-ground experience. The goal of this sample is not to be representative, but to understand the experiences of different types of actors in the field of intercultural-bilingual education.

Findings

Shifts in state-indigenous relations occur when dynamics between states and citizens begin to change. We can better explain and measure these shifts through a more focused look at policy. As bureaucratic authorities, states use law to exert their authority over citizens, so accordingly law will be influenced by shifting relations. Although very similar outcomes of shifts from assimilation to symbolic support occurred in Peru and Guatemala, there are important differences to note. In Peru the government co-opted indigenous strategy during the internal conflict. In Guatemala the process of change was more two-sided, with negotiation and compromise, which characterizes the current policy situation. By observing these different trajectories we can see different ways of arriving at symbolic support. In accordance with the nation-state formation theories, governments were able to take advantage of shifting relations in order to gather leverage over rebel threats. Because of the prevalence of violence, however, this leverage had to be reached through “friendlier” tactics, resulting in symbolic support of multicultural policy.

Peru: Co-optation and Faux Multiculturalism

From the time of colonization through the 20th century, the model for state-indigenous relations in Peru was violent assimilation. Since the arrival of Francisco Pizarro and his Spanish troops and the subsequent conquest of the Incan empire in 1532, racial mixing and forced
assimilation into the dominant Spanish society were the most prominent themes in state-indigenous relations (Galeano 1973). By the twenty-first century, though, Peru had shifted to a policy of symbolic support, in which the political discourse supports multiculturalism while implementation remains inadequate.

The point at which policy shifted can be traced to the internal conflict during the 1980s. In Peru this conflict took place between the Maoist Communist guerrilla organization *Sendero Luminoso* (SL) and the government. Guerrilla and government fighting largely occurred in the provinces of Junin and Ayacucho, areas with a high proportion of Quechua people (Kruijt 1999: 33). SL became publicly violent in 1980, during the first democratic civilian elections after military dictatorship in the 1970s. SL’s stated program included converting “backward” areas into bases of revolutionary support and using violence to conquer and expand this base of support (Palmer 1986: 129). Under this framework, SL wreaked havoc in the extremely impoverished area of Ayacucho until 1992, when several leading members were arrested. Because of the group’s dependence on the charisma of its leaders, after the arrests SL became increasingly inactive throughout the 1990s (Kruijt 1999:42).

Notwithstanding SL or government proclamations about goals to improve the lot of impoverished rural dwellers, the consequence of the internal conflict was the death of thousands of Quechua people at the hands of both the military and SL. In 1992 Quechua representatives presented a complaint to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), illustrating the Quechua peoples’ position in the middle of the war.

The indigenous peoples are the principal victims of this war, and are subject to permanent violation of their human rights. Of the 23,000 civilians deaths from political violence and the 3000 disappeared, the majority are Indians... We state that the subversive groups and the Peruvian state are using the indigenous communities... violating the Geneva Conventions regarding the
protection of the civilian population in the situations of war (Informe sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos de los Pueblos Indígenas de Perú 1992)."n

Both the government and SL assumed the Quechua people to be allied with the other party. SL in particular used harsh strategies of humiliation and murder in an attempt to garner support from the indigenous peoples (Kruijt 1999: 41).

The government gains in the civil war, specifically the arrest of SL leaders, however, were possible because of the realization that indigenous people could be more useful to them alive than dead. Although government leaders suggested that social programs and economic development would help bring about the end of the conflict, these programs were never developed (Poole and Réqué 1992: 8). Instead of social programs, economic development or a respect for human rights, government leaders turned to civilian defense patrols as the most successful strategy for bringing an end to the violence. In Peru these mandatory civilian defense patrols evolved as a result of similar voluntary organizations that were created in the highlands as a way for farmers to protect crops and livestock from guerilla fighters (Poole and Réqué 1992: 68). Because of SL’s violence toward highland peasants, it began to lose support. At the same time, the government saw the utility of the Rondas Campesinas and co-opted them to make them their own. While campesinos were given a government-mandated ability to protect themselves, the civilian defense patrols were also a way for the government to continue controlling the population. When they were first implemented civilians were expected to defend themselves with slings, sticks, knives and homemade rifles, but eventually President Fujimori (1990-2000) provided them with hunting rifles (Poole and Réqué 1992: 69). He even went so far as to declare the mandatory civilian defense patrols the “semi-institutionalized fourth branch of the armed forces” (Kruijt 1999: 42).

1 Unless otherwise noted, I translated all material from Spanish.
By co-opting the indigenous defense patrols, the government was able to take advantage of this large population that they had been trying so hard to assimilate for hundreds of years. With the indigenous population on their side, the government would have much more support throughout the country. It is evident that this shift was also realized from the perspective of the Quechua, who banded together to express grievances to the United Nations in 1992, an unprecedented event in Peru. They saw an opportunity to express their voice, in the hopes that the government would listen.

*Guatemala: Contention, Negotiation and Compromise*

Guatemala’s history is similar to Peru’s in that descendants of the once powerful Mayan empire also experienced its destruction and colonization at the hands of the Spanish empire. Hernan Cortés arrived in 1519 and shortly after the Mayan empire, already largely under the influence of the Aztec empire, fell apart completely (Chasteen 2001). *Mestizaje*, the concept of mixed races, is prevalent in Guatemala in the same way that it is in Peru. Until the global indigenous movement became more powerful, the Guatemalan state was able to conduct its agenda of assimilation with little problem, but it had to adjust strategies to conform to international expectations, as well as to maintain control of the population.

Like Peru, state-indigenous relations seem to have changed in Guatemala during its internal conflict. In a similar turn of events, the government only began to be victorious against the guerilla organizations when it began to use the indigenous people through mandatory civilian defense patrols. Before the peace accords, signed in 1996, guerrilla violence had been a constant presence in Guatemala since the 1960s. During the most violent period of the internal violence, the 1980s, the Mayan people found themselves caught in the middle. Early guerilla fighters came
from the ousted political regime of President Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954), who was forcefully removed from office with the assistance of the United States because of his “socialist” politics, including a land reform which interfered with the business of the US company, the United Fruit Company (Jonas 2000). Though this period of insurgency was put down by the army with little trouble, the legacy of guerilla violence influenced the state’s increasingly violent reactions to the resurgence of guerilla fighters in the 1980s (Kruijt 1999).

The reappearance of a guerilla movement in the 1980s was largely due to economic and social factors which led to difficult living conditions for the poor, both indigenous and ladino. Guerilla organizations grew from labor movements of the 1970s, involving indigenous and ladino, from the city and the country, because of such universally poor working conditions (Sigel and Yates 1983). The two guerilla organizations to emerge in the early 1980s, EGP (*Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres*) and ORPA (*Organización del Pueblo en Armas*), garnered support from indigenous peoples living in the highlands, unlike the largely ladino guerillas of the 1960s (Jonas 2000: 21). This indigenous support also differs from the support of SL in Peru, since indigenous involvement in Guatemala was higher than in Peru (Kruijt 1999).

Guatemala’s response to the insurgency of the 1980s consisted of “intimidation, attack, violence, torture and blind destruction” (Kruijt 1999: 47). Between 1980 and 1985, approximately 100,000 civilians were killed due to the army’s “scorched earth” policy; 450 villages and hamlets were completely destroyed; 500,000 campesinos migrated abroad; and several thousands were disappeared (Kruijt 1999: 49). After this period of extreme violence, often considered genocide, the URNG (*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatamalteca*), a consolidation of the EGP and ORPS, seemed to be defeated.

The URNG reemerged in the late 1980s, but with a different strategy. Guerilla leaders
understood that the suffering and death toll had been too great on the civilian populations during the first wave of violence; therefore they looked to a strategy of negotiation to reach a compromise with the government which became feasible only after a transition back to democracy and civilian rule after the 1986 elections. By 1990 it had become apparent to both sides that the war could not be won by either of them, and after much negotiation they were able to reach a peace agreement, which was signed in 1996 (Jonas 2000). The most important piece of the accords in terms of indigenous rights is the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples Accord, which contains provisions for overcoming the years of discrimination and marginalization, allowing indigenous peoples to be protected through education, as well as making discrimination against the law (Jonas 2000: 75).

As in Peru, when the government began to use civilian defense patrols, they began to succeed in putting down guerilla violence. After the intense violence of 1980-1982 as a means to wipe out civilian support for guerillas, the government decided to try a different tactic for controlling the possible guerilla sympathizers. General Hector Gramajo, in a 1990 interview, reportedly said, “Rather than killing 100 per cent, we provided food for 70 per cent [of war refugees] while killing 30 per cent” (Kruijt 51). In exchange for participating in the civilian defense patrols, villages received food and infrastructure, while the alternative to participating was death. An important difference, however, is that there is no direct co-optation in this story. The civilian defense patrols were mandated by the government first, with no precedent of campesino organization. The indigenous people found themselves forced into the middle of the internal conflict, forced to declare loyalty to a side (Eckhardt 2006: 33). Society became militarized, and the side which could win support from the majority of the Maya people would win. At this point both sides of the war de-escalated their use of violence, as the tug-of-war
opened the possibility for expression of an indigenous voice.

Since the peace accords of 1996, physical violence toward indigenous groups in Guatemala has declined, but the government continues to practice a kind of symbolic violence by continuing to exclude them from society, while declaring to support their inclusion in the national identity. The Maya Movement emerged in visible strength only after the peace accords. It began expressing grievances as Mayans rather than campesinos. At this point in time, indigenous identity had become a useful tool in the international political sphere. By listening to this voice, even if only a little bit, the government was able to gain favor, decreasing support for any challengers.

The notable differences of these two stories help explain the pictures of policy implementation that we see today. In Peru, the organization created by the indigenous groups themselves was co-opted by the government. There was little direct negotiation with the government, and the internal conflict ended by and large when SL leaders were arrested, not in a series of negotiated peace accords. In Guatemala, however, there was more negotiation and compromise with the government. The process was much more two-sided than in Peru, opening up a political opportunity structure for the Maya Movement. The two-way process of change diverges from many nation-state formation theories, which describe a top-down restructuring. Though the processes in Peru and Guatemala were different, we see contention in both cases, indicating a more interactive process of change. Keeping these differences in mind, we can look at how the shifts in relations that occurred with the end of internal conflict have influenced changes in policy, by looking directly at implementation of intercultural-bilingual education.
The civilian defense patrols helped to bring about the end of the armed conflict, even if all of the actions of the civilian defense patrols were not always in the best interest of the people. The "voluntary" nature of the patrols gives the illusion of civilian participation. Because the governments viewed the guerilla organizations as largely ethnic insurgencies, the patrols became a way to control ethnic groups and stay any possible ethnic movements. By making laws that protect indigenous rights, the state could claim compassion for indigenous groups, without needing to provide realistic means for carrying out the laws. The implementation of mandatory communal defense patrols in Peru and Guatemala is not only a turning point in the context of the internal conflicts of both countries, but also in the context of state-indigenous relations. Up until this point, governments had supported policies of assimilation and castellanización through education. Bilingual education was originally a means to give indigenous people a better opportunity to learn Spanish. At this turning point in the civil war, the mindset of the government moved from assimilation to integration. The discontinuation of intercultural-bilingual education programs after only a few years of schooling displays this shift. The programs as they currently are may help with the more general issue of illiteracy by giving indigenous children more educational opportunities, but they nevertheless contribute to castellanización.

Peru and Guatemala have both seen some sort of bilingual education since the 1960s and 1970s, but the programs have progressed and changed since their origins, largely due to the social context in which they have been experienced by indigenous citizens. In Guatemala, the campaign for intercultural-bilingual education has gained strength as a piece of the agenda of the Maya Movement. In contrast, due to the lack of concrete organization by Quechua groups, many
of the demands for education reform in Peru have come from activists and external organizations, concerned with the situation of human rights there. Though the programs have formed and developed under different circumstances, both countries currently experience a state of institutional paralysis with regard to their education programs.

In Peru, the first bilingual education reform came with a wide-ranging education reform in 1972 and 1973. At this time, the programs were understood as only bilingual, the word intercultural still absent. These reforms meant that non-Spanish speaking people would learn two languages, Spanish and their maternal language, and Spanish-speakers would continue learning only Spanish (Hornberger 2000). Quechua went from being a national language in 1975, to being a language “in official use in the zones and forms established by the law” after a speedy demotion (Freeland 1996: 8). The goal of the programs of the 1970s was for the indigenous person to first learn in his or her maternal language in order to then learn Spanish better, thereby improving his or her living conditions and social status (Zuñiga and Gálvez 2002). At this point assimilation was still the end goal.

In the 1990s, the policy moved toward generalization of the bilingual education programs as a way to “look for unity in diversity” (Zuñiga and Gálvez 2002: 14). The programs, ideally if not in actual practice, were meant to be for everyone, indigenous or ladino, so as to create a respect for the diversity of the country. Though this trend has continued, in reality intercultural-bilingual education only reaches 10% of the schools in indigenous areas and is only present in primary schools in rural areas (Zuñiga and Gálvez 2002: 16). Progress has been made, but, due to opposition for many years from indigenous people themselves, pressure on the government has largely come from international organizations. María Elena García’s study of rural bilingual education demonstrates how Quechua parents did not want their children learning Quechua in
school because, due to years of discrimination, they believed Spanish would be more useful to their children (García 2003). Although the activists and teachers I spoke with are all Peruvian, all are mestizo (mixed race) and from the city.

Education reform began earlier in Guatemala. In the 1960s, programs were being developed first for speakers of Maya Ixil, and later for K’iche, Kaqchikel, Q’eqchi and Mam, the most commonly spoken Mayan languages (DIGEBI 2009). At this time, the programs were called Programas de Castellanización, meaning that the goal was assimilation, rather than preservation or valorization of indigenous languages. The 1965 constitution declared Spanish the official language and went as far as to say that it was the state’s responsibility to integrate indigenous peoples into the national culture (Becker Richards and Richards 1996: 210).

In 1985, in the midst of widespread state and guerilla violence, the Proyecto Nacional de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural (PRONEBI) was made an official part of the Ministry of Education. As a concession by the government, it acted with relative autonomy, but lacked support from the government and the Ministry (Becker Richards and Richards 1996). In 1995 PRONEBI became La Dirección General de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural (DIGEBI) and under law is a permanent institution of the government (DIGEBI 2009). These departments are important because they are largely run “for Indians by Indians” (Becker Richards and Richards 1996: 214), but still must operate within government rules and with monetary support from the government, which has proved insufficient.

Despite these slightly different trajectories, from an outside perspective the institutional paralysis appears to be the same in both countries. Reports from the United Nations Committee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination (CERD) exemplify this perspective. The documents include reports from the government (in both cases, these reports were submitted significantly behind
schedule) on how they are providing for the elimination of racism, as well as reports from the Committee and from indigenous groups, which critique the government’s efforts.

Reports from the Committee note that while the governments made laws to eliminate discrimination, these laws have no provisions for their function in the real world. They are grand statements, rather than effective measures toward the elimination of racism. The report from the government of Peru contains many such statements, including provisions for intercultural-bilingual education.

The EIB (educación intercultural-bilingüe) develops its job considering the right of indigenous peoples and rural communities to educate themselves in their own language and culture. Meaning, learn their language and in their language, in addition to Spanish as a second language, achieving in this a cultural education (Government of Peru 2009: 47).

Despite these declarations, the CERD response expresses some uncertainty. “The Committee remains concerned that a high proportion of persons among the indigenous peoples continue to suffer in practice from racism and structural racial discrimination in the State party” (CERD 2009: 2). CERD seems to be aware of the nominal and symbolic support that the state is giving to indigenous rights, and suggests more thorough provisions, recommending that, “the State party find out why the use of indigenous languages has declined...and the speedy adoption of the bill on the preservation and use of the native languages of Peru” (CERD 2009: 4).

CERD reports in Guatemala display a similar situation to that in Peru. While reports by the country to CERD provide long lists of laws that have been set up to ensure equality, indigenous activists argue that “they are good will declarations that are not accompanied by operative plans that allow their real implementation” (Organization of Indigenous Groups Guatemala 2010: 7). The laws lack practical provisions for carrying them out.

In contrast to Peru, however, in the state report by Guatemala to CERD, state
representatives are more honest in admitting their actual priorities. “We are therefore bound to
admit that, with some exceptions, matters relating to indigenous peoples and other human rights
issues regrettably do not figure prominently in those agendas” (Government of Guatemala 2007:
3). This confession gives us a picture of the symbolic nature of the laws. Though their existence
could be considered an important move forward, as one interviewee did comment, the
enforcement of the laws is clearly not the top priority of the state. As of 2010, in Guatemala only
4% of the recommendations by the state have been fulfilled, which includes the adoption of two
instruments: the ILO Convention 169 and the National Policy against Racism, two symbolic
decrees (Organization of Indigenous Peoples Guatemala 2010: 6).

Keeping these international reactions to policy changes in mind, it is useful to now
consider the personal perspective of people involved with intercultural-bilingual education.
These interviews not only build on this establishment of an institutional paralysis, but they offer
insight into how the implementation is perceived by varying actors within the field. Interview
data from government officials, indigenous activists and teachers in the two countries
demonstrated that all responded in similar ways regarding the state of bilingual education in Peru
and Guatemala. Despite some differences, it is the similarities that make the cases important and
of interest. These similarities are surprising in light of the difference in the trajectories of change
in the two countries and variation in the relative importance of language to the movements in the
countries.

A key theme across responses was the way in which government had changed its
discourse, but not really its implementation of policy, exemplified by the name change (bilingual
to intercultural-bilingual). To one activist, this change in itself is a positive step forward. “Well,
maybe the change from there being nothing to there being something, for us that is already a
success.” However, even a government official admitted that this change had been ineffective. “There are few schools. First, second maybe third grade, but not more than that. Because there is not much support [from the government] for bilingual education.” Another activist commented, “There are declarations of desire and declarations of reality.” As observed in the CERD reports, the governments are very good at making these declarations of desire, but need improvement in their declarations of reality.

The goals of intercultural-bilingual education programs are very generally to instill in the next generation a respect for all cultures, and especially a respect for the multicultural nature of Guatemala and Peru. It is because of these more recently defined goals that the programs are now called intercultural-bilingual education programs. The intercultural element has become increasingly important in light of the continued discrimination toward indigenous peoples. An activist explained, “there are social goals that there be no marginalization, that there be no discrimination. We want that: a country without discrimination.” A government official’s perspective was similar. “Relations between the cultures are not very good...so there is a necessity to build respect, tolerance, dialogue, understanding.” While different agents seem to understand the main goals of intercultural-bilingual education, their strategies for carrying out these goals continue to be different. This declaration of desire from the government official demonstrates the discourse, without the implementation.

Because of this lack of real, concrete support from the government, those involved are able to point out many problems that must be solved in order for the programs to be successful. These problems include, but are not limited to, a lack of government funding, insufficient teacher training, continued discrimination toward speakers of indigenous languages, and the discontinuation of intercultural-bilingual education after the third year of primary school.
Overwhelmingly, subjects responded that if more money was channeled toward education in general, and especially intercultural-bilingual education, the goals of this type of education would be met more easily. An indigenous activist said, “There can have been intentions to do bilingual education in the country, but what there has not been is the will to give economic support to perform bilingual education.” What money the government does have has not been channeled toward intercultural-bilingual education programs.

While the governments are aware of the need and desire for money, officials state that there is no more money to go toward education. A government official said, “The few resources that there are...go to other areas. Defense, police.” An indigenous activist in Guatemala informed me that from the national budget, about 2% goes to education and about 5% of that 2% goes toward intercultural-bilingual education. “5% is almost nothing...for the demand that there is: to train teachers, make materials, carry out various processes.” There is a feeling of a lack of tangible support from the government.

With so little money provided by the government, NGOs and schools are not able to reach all of the areas that they want to, and as a consequence many schools and regions are neglected. In Guatemala, because there are 22 different Mayan languages, not all of the languages get the attention that they need. Similarly in Peru, Quechua language texts are being sent to Amazonian communities, where Quechua is not spoken as the maternal language. Another consequence that may stem from lack of funds or other government inefficiencies is that the programs only last up until about the third year of primary education. After this, students learn only in Spanish and consequently much of the work they did to learn indigenous languages in the first few years of school is lost quickly in favor of Spanish. An activist commented,

What happens is that when they pass onto fourth, fifth and sixth grade, now the little boy or the little girl does not want to talk in the
maternal language...there is psychological breaking...and it makes it so that they do not want to talk of their culture or their language.

Children become integrated into Spanish-speaking society, which surrounds them.

Both official documentation from the United Nations and personal stories indicate a situation of institutional paralysis in Peru and Guatemala. State co-optation in Peru could be viewed as more in-line with theories critical of multiculturalism, because of its seemingly top-down and faux nature. In Guatemala, the process has been more contentious, with the government compromising and negotiating with indigenous groups. Although the process has been slightly different, the implementation gap is the same in both countries, suggesting that the gap comes not from the motivations for policy but how these policies intersect with bureaucracy. This shift from assimilation to symbolic support can be observed in both countries, and explained through historical context, official documents and personal accounts.

Conclusions

In Peru and Guatemala shifts in state-indigenous relations were motivated by internal threats to governmental authority. By transitioning from assimilation to symbolic support, states were able to win support from marginalized groups and maintain their bureaucratic authority. Though the specific details of this transition differ in Guatemala and Peru, these differences can be attributed to the relative strength of each indigenous movement. In Guatemala, an organized indigenous movement, in conjunction with an indigenous-backed guerilla insurgence resulted in negotiation with the government. In Peru, strategies of a weaker indigenous movement were co-opted by the government. Despite these differences, we can see the importance of domestic contention in causing policy shifts, in accordance with cultural community and historical institutionalist theories. In contrast to bellicose and world polity theory, however, international
pressure or influence is less apparent. Neither country felt compelled to announce the shift on an international level, made evident by their late submission of reports to the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, though they had in fact transitioned from assimilation to symbolic support well before their eventual submission.

Though the influence of global norms and culture predicted by world polity theory does not seem apparent in these cases, the outcome predicted by world polity theory, decoupling, is apparent in both cases. The examples of Peru and Guatemala highlight the weaknesses of bureaucratic authority, because legal change has not led to any real resources or implementation. Bureaucratic authority puts the power for change in the hands of the government. While individuals or groups can petition the government for change, once taken up by the government it leaves their control to a certain extent. It is up to the government to implement policy change, and in the cases of Peru and Guatemala we can see how governments are able to avoid implementation by blaming a lack of resources, which is presumably beyond their control. In Peru and Guatemala the source of this problem may come more from the underrepresentation of indigenous groups in the government. If there were more people supporting the interests of the more marginalized groups, like the Quechua and the Maya, then maybe we would see more progressive change in their favor. However, this more complete representation of the citizenry may be exactly what those in power do not want.

The movement toward integration instead of pluralism makes sense because of the importance of law in making change in contemporary nation-states. Law generally reflects the dominant social and political group, so if non-dominant groups are allowed to have more influence on the dominant group, the interests of the dominant group may be challenged. Additionally, because nation-states depend so heavily on a cohesive national identity, pluralism
might complicate this identity, causing a division of power. Because of this division of power, we may even see a breakdown of the bureaucratic authority. Integration, then, is better for a state hoping to maintain its bureaucratic authority. The state is able to express a change to more multicultural policy through discourse rather than action, allowing them to stay non-dominant ethnic groups and protect their own interests.

Despite these outcomes, the adoption and implementation of multiculturalism is, in fact, an interactive process, not merely a top-down restructuring. The calls for change from the indigenous peoples themselves were integral in creating change for it seems that without this states would not have felt the pressure for a shift in policy. Perhaps because of the interactive nature of it, change is more limited in already formed nation-states than it was for yet-to-be-formed nation-states. Change in nation-states is legally based, which causes stronger barriers to reform. If bureaucratic authority creates opportunities for implementation gaps, then political gains won through contentious processes could be severely limited, and become symbolic rather than progressive. Under these conditions, declarations of desire will abound and declarations of reality will remain scarce.
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