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**Schumann, Barthes and Deleuze: Three Strangers**

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Schumann, Barthes, and Deleuze: Three

Strangers

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Music Department Honors Project

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Introduction

The “tortured artist” is one of the most enduring archetypes in our perception of art. It is often an incomplete, oversimplified, and reductive way of viewing artists and their lives without taking into account the full scope of human complexity. However, the traditional idea of such a figure—plagued by addiction, depression, and financial instability, misunderstood by an ignorant public and innovation-averse critics—is not entirely without legitimacy. Many of history’s most celebrated artists have, in fact, been tortured: internally by mental illness, externally by horrific conditions, or both. Still, the chicken-and-egg question remains: are tortured people more likely to express their pain through art, is society hostile to creative people to the point of torture, or both? Are artists even more tortured than other people, or do they simply express their suffering more outwardly, using art as a means of coping with their struggles, while being content to let their happiness be? These question reveals the shortcomings of the “tortured artist” idea. Still, this notion remains one of the predominant frameworks through which scholars and music lovers have conceived of German composer Robert Schumann (1810-1856), one of the most beloved and celebrated composers of the Romantic period. Schumann’s art was closely tied to his lifelong struggle with mental illness. Many scholars have speculated that the symptoms of this illness are indicative of schizophrenia, a fact which Roland Barthes (1915-1980) likely had in mind when referring to fellow French theorist Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), who wrote extensively about schizophrenia, as a “Schumannian.”
At the same time as he exemplifies the “tortured artist,” Schumann also explodes this trope, exposing where, in becoming a cliché, it ceases to be true. Though his schizophrenia led to much misery throughout his life- paranoia, suicidal depression, alcoholism- these undermined his ability to create, just as much as they fueled his fiery, self-dissolving drive to generate art. Yes, he was tormented by unheard melodies being played in his head, which kept him up late at night, and which he turned to bouts of heavy drinking to quell. And yet, he was also soothed during the lowest moments of his life, even on his deathbed, by such melodies. This paradoxical status of schizophrenia in Schumann’s life- as artistic impetus and as hindrance, as affliction and as comfort- shows at once the truth to be found in, and the incompleteness of, the “tortured artist” trope. Ultimately, though Schumann was undoubtedly tortured, and undoubtedly an artist, we will have to discard the “tortured artist” cliché- its merits are not enough to salvage its deficiencies. This paper will explore Schumann outside the scope of this archetype, and, in particular, his connection to two theorists who have either written about him, or put forth ideas reminiscent of those underlying his music. To Barthes, the pain that Schumann expressed in his music, the pain that is the source of his reputation as an archetypical “tortured artist” is “certainly a madman’s pain. [...] Only the mad… quite simply *suffer*” (Barthes 296). It is this madness- and not just suffering- which Barthes considers the essence of music, and the mark of the composer.

Barthes’ aforementioned reference to Deleuze as a “Schumannian” is not explained by Barthes himself, but a number of aspects of Schumann’s music and life can illuminate this assertion. Schizophrenia is one link, of course, but throughout this
introduction and the body of the paper, I will identify the other main areas in which Deleuze’s theory is reminiscent of Schumann’s music: notably, the transcending of seemingly oppositional relationships between man and nature and Self and Other. I will also examine a tendency in Schumann’s music identified by Barthes, a relationship to the figure of the mother that abides not by Freud’s Oedipus complex, which is dualistic in structure, but is rather anti-Oedipal in the Deleuzian sense that identifies the Oedipal relationship as a triangle.

At the outset of his life, Schumann would have seemed an unlikely candidate for musical greatness. Unlike many canonical composers, such as Mozart and Beethoven, he was not born of a musical pedigree or raised to create music. His father was a publisher, and, though he enjoyed playing and writing music from a young age, he was equally passionate about literature. Robert studied law in university and initially planned to become a lawyer. His love for, and remarkable gifts in, music triumphed, however. He initially hoped to be a piano virtuoso, but, after mutilating the webbing between his fingers in an attempt to increase his reach, his playing abilities were forever compromised, and he turned his focus towards composition. His self-harm in pursuit of artistic glory has been reckoned with by many biographers and theorists, including Roland Barthes, who considered Schumann’s to be a self-destructive music. Barthes even referred metaphorically to his self-disfigurement in his assertion that “virtuosity itself, which certainly existed in Schumann’s time… has suffered a mutilation” (Barthes 294). Given Schumann’s family background and his foiled aspirations to virtuosity, it
would have been reasonable (for someone unaware of his remarkable talent, of course) during his young adulthood to assume his interest in music was bound to be fruitless.

Though Schumann’s external conditions may have pointed towards many other paths besides that of a composer, his internal life was always conducive to his eventual pursuit of writing music. As a young man studying law, he wrote in his diary of almost nightly insomnia, lying awake in bed and hearing unwritten melodies playing in his head. He heard such melodies throughout his life, and, as he got older, also heard voices and experienced paranoid delusions. Barthes wrote that the composer is fundamentally mad, an assertion which will be explored in more depth later. Schumann’s mental illness (which led to him being institutionalized multiple times throughout his adulthood, and his eventual death in a mental institution at the age of fourty-six, two years after a suicide attempt) was described rather vaguely as “madness” or “melancholia” during his lifetime. Scholars and psychologists have since asserted that the symptoms he experienced could be described as schizophrenia, a diagnosis which itself evolved out of the archaic dementia praecox, with which Schumann was diagnosed1. Thus, although the external conditions of Schumann’s life may not have indicated his musical genius, his internal life certainly did. Barthes wrote that the composer is necessarily a madman, that music entails madness, and, within that framework, Schumann’s schizophrenia was always conducive to his eventual accomplishments as a composer.

Gilles Deleuze, who Barthes described as a Schumannian, analyzed schizophrenia through a social framework along with Felix Guattari (1930-1992) in the seminal *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, a 2-volume tome comprised of *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. Guattari was a psychologist, while Deleuze had more of a strictly theoretical background. When they collaborated, their different fields mutually informed each other, and in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, they put forth a system of thought called Schizoanalysis. This way of thinking was informed by the psychoanalytic tradition. Though Deleuze and Guattari criticized Freud harshly and Lacan less harshly, they still modeled their theory on the analytical methods of psychoanalysis, despite disagreeing with the conclusions drawn by Freud and Lacan via these methods. Deleuze, though he never wrote about Schumann specifically, was a lover of music who wrote about other Romantic composers. This fact, combined with his insights on schizophrenia, means that their theory is applicable to Schumann, as a Romantic composer who suffered from what was likely schizophrenia. This paper will focus primarily on the insights developed in the first part of this work, *Anti-Oedipus*, and its relationship to Schumann’s life and music.

The work in which Barthes alludes to the connection between Schumann and Deleuze is *The Responsibility of Forms*, a compilation of essays written throughout the 70s and published in 1985, after Barthes’ death. The final two essays in this collection are “Loving Schumann” and “Rasch.” Both analyze Schumann's music, the former in the context of prevailing cultural assessments of Schumann, and the latter in a more theoretical and semiological sense. In “Loving Schumann,” Barthes makes a fascinating
comment regarding Schumann’s reputation. He writes that his historical “period grants [Schumann] what is doubtless an ‘honorable’ place (of course he is a ‘great composer’), but not a favored one (there are many Wagnerites, many Mahlerians, but the only Schumannians… are Gilles Deleuze, Marcel Beaufils, and [himself])” (Barthes 298). This assertion will serve as the basis for this paper’s investigations into Barthes’ and Deleuze’s theory and Schumann’s music.

Because of Barthes’ inclusion of Deleuze as opposed to Guattari, this paper will focus primarily on Deleuze. Barthes’ remark is made in service of his larger point that “loving Schumann… inevitably leads the subject who does so and says so to posit himself in his time according to the injunctions of his desire and not according to those of his sociality” (Barthes 298). Deleuze (by proxy via Schumann) therefore stands for cultural obscurity in this reference. To be a Schumannian (which, for Barthes, Deleuze is) is to abide by one’s desires at the expense of the social repute enjoyed in musical circles by the Wagnerites, Mahlerians, and the devotees of other composers who Barthes sees as “favored”. Barthes thus uses Deleuze to attest to Schumann’s position at the fringes of the Romantic canon. Deleuze himself, though he was an influential and well-respected thinker, also tends to occupy a place of relative obscurity within the canon of theory. I will explore the esoteric nature of both Schumann’s music and Deleuze’s thought, and the relevance of schizophrenia (as a personal experience for Schumann, and as a topic of study for Deleuze) to both.
While Schumann is absolutely a widely enjoyed and performed composer, and undoubtedly canonized, Barthes is still correct that his place in the canon is far less central than that of Wagner or Mahler. Schumann may be canonized, but he has been canonized as marginal, for the purposes of existing at the outskirts of the canon. Barthes’ reference to Deleuze as a Schumannian occupies a tertiary position in the structure of his argument: it is evidence to support his assessment of Schumann as less culturally championed than other canonical composers, which is in turn the basis for his larger point about what it means to love Schumann. To Barthes, music is madness, but Schumann’s madness was stark even among the ranks of composers- all composers engage in an act of madness when they compose, but not all of them displayed symptoms of mental illness as outwardly or prominently as Schumann. There is, in the theoretical sense used by Barthes, an underlying madness to the very medium of music, but this does not mean that every composer has been mentally ill in the clinical sense. Schumann’s particular iteration of madness, which has often been seen as schizophrenia, is thus particularly relevant, both to Deleuze’s schizoanalysis, and to Schumann’s own marginality in the canon (which is not unrelated to the social marginality of the mentally ill, especially in the 19th century).

Deleuze himself is invoked by Barthes as an indicator of Schumann’s cultural obscurity, and his name is relegated to a single mention in parentheses. His name is synonymous with obscurity. He exists only as a demonstration of the lack of Schumannians. Deleuze wrote theory that is esoteric and strange even by the standards of theorists, and tended to be overlooked or derided by the academic establishment of his
day, so it makes sense that a culturally marginal theorist would be brought up as an indicator of Schumann’s own cultural marginality. He is still, however, out of place in the trio of Barthes, Beaufils, and Deleuze. Beaufils is discussed at length throughout the essay, and the reason for his inclusion is obvious— he had written multiple works regarding Schumann, including one with Barthes. It makes sense as well, of course, that Barthes would include himself among the few “Schumannians” of whom he’s aware.

The addition of Deleuze to this group, however, indicates a deeper analysis. There is no immediately evident connection between Deleuze and Barthes or Deleuze and Schumann, of the sort that exists among Barthes, Beaufils, and Schumann. There is, however, much in Deleuze’s work that could be called “Schumannism,” if we are to follow Barthes’ understanding of what Schumannism would entail.

Deleuze understood schizophrenia as essentially a social phenomenon: even when it is hereditary, or caused by other physiological factors, the form it takes reflects social circumstances. Schizoanalysis posits schizophrenia as a means of seeking logic in a fundamentally illogical world, of attempting to make sense out of nonsensical conditions. When schizophrenic people experience the common paranoid delusion that they are being watched, it is, for Deleuzians, because they are being watched— not in the delusional sense that an actual malicious figure is stalking them, but in the sense that the market tracks everything one does. This delusion takes a truth— that, under capitalism, everyone is surveilled— and renders it concrete, makes it easier to grapple with by transforming the abstract watcher of the market into a tangible human watcher. Thus, though Schumann’s

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schizophrenia was likely caused by some combination of genetics and archaic 19th-century medicine (the mercury he was prescribed to deal with already-emergent symptoms only made them worse), Deleuze’s understanding of schizophrenia as corresponding to social factors is still applicable to Schumann.

It is difficult to distill Deleuze’s insights into concisely expressed ideas, because each of his ideas is so intricately embedded in the overall contour of his thought. Anti-Oedipus is hard to quote, especially with brevity, because it is not written like a conventional work of theory. Even within the opaque, structurally flexible, sometimes fanciful world of theory, Deleuze writes with a particular aversion to structure, simplicity, and overtness. He does not formally introduce his points at the beginning of the book then go on to methodically bolster them; rather, his points cascade wildly throughout the entire volume, with no clear indication of where they begin and end. He writes rhizomatically- a term coined by Deleuze himself, whose meaning will be elaborated on later in this paper, but which, in short, refers to a structure whose components are not clearly delineated because they all exist in terms of their relations to each other, inextricable from the structural position they occupy within a larger network. Anti-Oedipus is riddled with sentiments reminiscent of those expressed in Schumann’s music, but teasing these out of the densely woven fabric of schizoanalysis is like filtering salt from the ocean.

Deleuze’s explosively whimsical style of writing makes it especially significant that one of his ideas is actually introduced with clarity and brevity within the first few
pages of Anti-Oedipus: his skepticism of the (in his unnecessarily gendered terms) man-nature dichotomy. He asserts very straightforwardly that he makes “no distinction between man and nature: the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man become one within nature in the form of production or industry, just as they do within the life of man as a species” (Deleuze 4). Compared to much of Deleuze’s writing, this is remarkably digestible. To assert it so plainly, he must have believed it was vital to the elaborately multifaceted system he’d construct throughout the rest of the book. The uncharacteristic directness indicates the significance of this point to Deleuze’s overall theory, and therefore to Schumann’s work. Deleuze’s refusal of this supposed dichotomy is relevant to Schumann, and to Barthes’ interpretation of him. Much of this paper will focus on said dichotomy. I will later analyze Schumann’s “Haunted Spot,” from the collection Waldszenen, as an example of Schumann’s alignment with Deleuze on the relationship between nature and humankind.

Opposition to the man-nature dichotomy is likely one of the prominent points of alignment between Deleuze and Schumann that Barthes may have been identifying. Though Schumann lived during a time of industrialization in Germany, Barthes argues that- unlike, for example, Beethoven’s- Schumann’s music “is not in the service of a dual, oppositional organization of the world.” (Barthes 297). Though the social conditions under which he wrote his music were those that put forth the man-nature dichotomy, he was writing music that flouted the ideological dictates of these conditions. For Barthes, this disjointedness between Schumann and his circumstances is possible because of Schumann’s madness. He was too mad in his own head to give in to the false
consciousness that was implanted from external sources in the psyches of his contemporaries. Barthes extrapolates this point into a general assertion that “loving Schumann, doing so in a certain fashion against the age… leads the subject who does so and says so to posit himself in his time according to the injunctions of his desire and not according to those of his sociality” (Barthes 298). Schumann, therefore, wrote music that rejected the man-nature dichotomy, which, as observed by Deleuze, was enforced by the circumstances of industrialization under which he lived.

Barthes’ belief that the Schumannian rejects the prevailing ideological ordinances of their time is not only relevant in the sense of Schumann rejecting the man-nature dichotomy, but also because he writes that these are rejected in favor of desire. Deleuze also wrote a great deal about desire, arguing that the same conditions (i.e. capitalism) that engender the perceived man-nature dichotomy also structure desire according to the process of production. Crucially, he differs from Freud’s understanding of repressed desire, arguing instead that desire is channeled into production. Two machines in a factory are connected to each other, perhaps by a conveyor belt, as part of the process of production. So too are these machines connected to the factory workers by the relation of wage labor which obliges them to come into the factory day after day, and so too is this relation connected to their desires- for food, clothing, shelter, as well as luxuries to make their lives more enjoyable, and therefore for money- which oblige them to participate in wage labor under circumstances where wage labor is the only means of fulfilling these desires.
All of these connections, therefore, are part of the process of production, and none of them is separate from nature. After all, industry is not non-natural but rather an outgrowth of nature. People create machines using materials ripped from the Earth, and technological knowledge acquired through scientific observation of the Earth’s natural processes. As Deleuze writes:

From one point of view, industry is the opposite of nature; from another, industry extracts its raw materials from nature; from yet another, it returns its refuse to nature; and so on. Even within society, this characteristic man-nature, industry-nature, society-nature relationship is responsible for the distinction of relatively autonomous spheres that are called production, distribution, consumption. But in general this entire level of distinctions… presupposes (as Marx has demonstrated) not only the existence of capital and the division of labor, but also the false consciousness that the capitalist being necessarily acquires, both of itself and of the supposedly fixed elements within an overall process. For the real truth of the matter… is that there is no such thing as relatively independent spheres or or circuits: production is immediately consumption and a recording process (*enregistrement*) without any sort of mediation, and the recording process and consumption directly determine production. (Deleuze 4).

Thus, the supposed man-nature dichotomy is a function of capital, which also incorporates desire into the process of production.

When Schumann rejects the man-nature dichotomy, as identified by Barthes, he also unshackles desire from its circumscription into the process of production. Barthes
writes that Schumann’s “music, by titles, sometimes refers to concrete things: seasons, times of the day, landscapes, festivals, professions. But this reality is threatened with disarticulation, dissociation, with movements not violent (nothing harsh) but brief and, one might say, ceaselessly ‘mutant’: nothing lasts long, each movement interrupts the next” (Barthes 295). Distinctions between both natural things and human conventions (which, to Deleuze, are also functions of nature) are thereby dissolved in favor of a desire unbridled by the dictates of the profit motive. Schumann does not free desire from the repression identified by Freud and other psychoanalysts, but from the reappropriation of desire identified by Deleuze and other schizoanalysts. This reconciliation of desire with its natural objects (rather than merely a resurrection of desire from a repressed state), and Schumann’s dissolution of boundaries between humankind and nature, illuminate what Barthes meant in saying that “Schumann lacks conflict” (Barthes 298).

Though Schumann lacks conflict, his music is certainly not lacking in duality, in paradox, in opposition even. The means by which opposites confront each other, however, is not through conflict- though not exactly through reconciliation either. We can again look to Deleuze for illumination. Both he and Schumann were disbelievers in the man-nature dichotomy- a disbelief which, in Schumann’s case, exemplifies his lack of conflict- but neither took a unipolar approach. Deleuze’s rejection of this dichotomy was also a rejection of two predominant- and oppositional- means of understanding the relationship between nature and people. Deleuze opposed the anthropocentric cheerleaders of unremitting scientific advancement, who saw civilization, society and technology as vestiges of man’s superiority over, and mastery of nature. In the same
breath, he also opposed the idealist environmentalists who saw the human species as vicious plunderers of the Earth’s natural bounty. To Deleuze, the former group, for whom mankind’s scientific achievements exalt us above nature and draw us ever closer to enlightenment, are arrogant, while the latter, for whom the very development of the human species past apehood, are humble to the point of abjectness.

Deleuze understood the paradoxical truth that humans, no matter how much our civilization develops, are still fundamentally at the mercy of nature, and that our lives are frail and susceptible to being whisked away by natural calamity, and yet nature is simultaneously at our mercy, and far too delicate to withstand our rabid expropriation of resources. Deleuze’s rejection of these two conflicting groups was thus a sort of dialectical synthesis, which lacks conflict (like Schumann does, according to Barthes)-not because the conflict has been resolved, but because the conflicting thesis and antithesis need no resolution within the dialectical structure. In Schumann, too, dualities operate in this manner: coexisting and mutually contradicting without invalidating each other.

Another of these dialectical dualities in Schumann- an especially salient one- is the reversal between the Self and the Other. In Schumann’s music, the Self is strange, often unknown, while the other occupies a position of closeness, of affinity. This is quite likely related to his own experience with schizophrenia, in which he heard voices that seem to come from foreign beings in his own head, and experienced his own subjectivity at a distance, his consciousness aloof and disjointed from the Self, and permeated by the
Deleuze’s understanding of schizophrenia is also related to this relationship between Self and Other. This relationship will be the basis for much of the paper’s musical analysis: of “The Stranger” from Schumann’s *Album for the Young*, of 3 movements (“Eusebius,” “Florestan,” and “Papillons”) from *Carnaval*, and of the “Hastig” movement of *Humoreske*. In Schumann’s music, the Self and the Other exist simultaneously and in parallel. There is selfhood in the Other, and otherness in the Self.

Schumann’s ability to swap the Self and the Other likely had to do with his schizophrenia, of course- his alienation from his own perception and subjectivity, and the presence of seemingly foreign voices and visions in his head. Schumann biographer Peter Ostwald- whose background is in psychology- can perhaps elaborate on his portrayal of each side of the dialectical duality. His ability to make the Other seem close and personal was certainly related to his passionate interest in history and literature, and particularly his penchant for identifying with historical and literary figures- i.e. making strangers part of his selfhood. The two sides of his personality, Florestan (named after both a prince and the protagonist of Beethoven’s only opera *Fidelio*) and Eusebius (named after an ancient Greek historian), are notable examples of this, especially given that they were modeled after a fictional duo. Florestan and Eusebius will be explored in more depth later, but it is worth noting that Eusebius wrote a lot on martyrdom, which likely piqued the interest of Schumann, as someone who struggled with suicidality throughout much of his life.
Schumann’s self-destructive tendencies also manifested themselves in his excessive drinking, his self-mutilation, and the self-starvation that ultimately killed him in 1856. All of these were related to his pursuit of music: drinking made him hear melodies more intently, and he wrote much of his music drunk, he mutilated his hand in the hopes that it would help him achieve virtuosity, and he wrote his final piece, the *Ghost Variations*, as he withered away in a mental hospital, on the verge of death. These facts align with Barthes’ assessment of Schumann’s work as a point “where life and music changes places, the one being destroyed, the other constructed” (Barthes 295). His desire to kill himself was in many ways a desire to render his Self distant, to construct the half of the dialectical duality that corresponded to the intimate Other- but, in typical dialectical Schumann fashion, it was also its own opposite. As Ostwald writes, “his leap into the Rhine had been suicidal, to be sure. But… his self-immersion in the ‘majestic Father Rhine… a German God,’ as he described this body of water in his adolescence, may also have symbolized rebirth” (Ostwald 274).

Ostwald also wrote on the dualities within Schumann that “he had what seems to have been a severely divided self, with conflicts centering around dependency vs. independence” (Ostwald 305). This indicates a complicated relationship between a self-contained iteration of Self (independence) and links to the Other (dependency), one exacerbated by the already-murky bounds of Schumann’s Self. This division, so intimately connected to his madness, precludes Schumann’s music from having any singular, strictly designated meaning independent of madness. Barthes’ repeated characterization of music as a madness, as a medium inherently mad in its means of
expression, is related to Schumann’s madness, but its basis is Barthes’ comparison of music to writing. He argues that, unlike writing, music operates outside the realm of semiotics, preventing it from dealing in meaning: while signs are the units of meaning in writing, music has no signs. I will expand upon this later in the paper, with a brief note about Saussure. Thus, while Schumann wrote music inspired by literature and music that represented concrete things, he was prohibited by music itself from ascribing any meaning (in the theoretical sense) to these phenomena: perhaps the reason his music ended up being so much more celebrated than his youthful forays into poetry was because he was too mad to be a poet, and just mad enough to compose.

Deleuze does not extensively analyze music as an art form in *Anti-Oedipus*, but he does describe writing as a medium in a way that is consistent with Barthes’ view of it. He establishes his interest in distinguishing between means of expression in regards to social conditions, writing that “while representation is always a social and psychic repression… this repression is exercised in very diverse ways, according to the social formation considered… the type or genus of social inscription, its alphabet, its characteristics” (Deleuze 184). He later characterizes writing through this same lens, asserting that “the arbitrariness of language establishes its sovereignty, as a servitude… visited upon the ‘masses’” (Deleuze 207). As established earlier, Barthes sees Schumann- and therefore the lover of Schumann- as a sort of social renegade, who rejects their circumstances and these circumstances' prevailing notions of artistic merit, in an act of what could be considered madness. This rejection is also a rejection of the servitude which, for Deleuze, is imposed by language itself. Barthes and Deleuze may have dealt
in language, then, but as Schumannians, they are bound to strain against the confines of language.

We can now put forth a preliminary understanding of the basis for Barthes’ inclusion of Deleuze in his list of Schumannians. We know that Deleuze analyzed schizophrenia from a materialist perspective, situating it in the context of social conditions via a critical lens he termed “schizoanalysis,” and that Barthes understood Schumann’s schizophrenia through a critical and context-sensitive lens as well. We also know that, to Barthes, music is madness, and Schumann’s music is therefore his madness: a term which refers (without stigma) more to Barthes’ understanding of music as a particular art form than it does to a given composer’s mental state, though it comes with an understanding that Schumann’s unique mental state was concordant with his musical gifts. In Barthes’ analysis, the Schumannian rejects their existence as a social being and abides by their desire instead (as Schumann himself did). Schumann’s refusal of the prevailing social directives of his time was also a rejection of the conditions which, according to Deleuze (who, as a Schumannian, makes a similar refusal), create the perception of a dichotomy between man and nature. In addition to dissolving this false dichotomy, Schumann also dissolved the (often real) dichotomy between Self and Other, inverting the positions of the two and infusing each with some facet of the other. It is with this reversal that I will begin my analysis.
The Known Stranger

*Album for the Young* (1848) was written by Schumann for his young daughters, and in general to serve as instructional material for beginner pianists. Because of the pedagogical nature of the work, and the corresponding simplicity of the pieces, it has not been the subject of much analysis. As a work written for young people and neophytes, however, it is deeply indicative of Schumann’s understanding of how musicality develops, and can thus be just as fruitful to analyze as any of Schumann’s “great works.”

*Album for the Young* consists of 43 pieces, many named for archetypal figures or vignettes that they represent. One notable gem among these 43 is “Fremder Mann” (“The Stranger”). In this piece, we find the portrayal of the Other (in this case, the Stranger) as an intimate figure that, as discussed above, is a crucial element of Schumann’s reversal between the Self and the Other.
The right-hand part of “The Stranger” is constructed primarily from triads and thirds, with some denser chords. Any melody woven from single notes occurs only in the most direct and economical possible way, and only in circumstances where motion is eminently necessary in order to avoid harmonic stagnation. The left hand is nearly all in octaves, and mostly provides root notes, and the soprano voice is usually harmonized within the right hand as well. The harmonic motion consists largely of cadences- not only does every phrase end in a cadence, many phrases move only between the tonic and dominant. Though “The Stranger” moves with determination through various keys (more on this later), its modulations are accomplished either through secondary dominants or fleeting pivot chords that occupy a robust place in both the original and the new key. This makes the introduction of new keys feel like referential connections to already-established territory, not movements into unfamiliar terrain.

“The Stranger”’s straightforward, declarative style does not conjure any of the mystery- neither of the thrilling or the eerie sort- that the idea of a stranger would seem to evoke. Rather, “The Stranger” announces itself with the overtness of an old friend. There are a few hints of the discomfort that usually accompanies unfamiliarity, in the frequent dotted rhythms, and the wiggling sixteenth note whispers. However, the discomfort elicited by these moments is tempered by the fact that both rhythmic motifs- the pervasive dotted notes and the sixteenth-note section- fit within the overall cadential nature of the pieces. Not only this, but their repetition throughout renders them more normal within context. This recalls Barthes’ reference, in “Loving Schumann,” to Beaufils, one of the 3 “Schumannians” along with Barthes himself and Deleuze, who
“shows [rhythm’s] importance… through the generalization of syncopation” (Barthes 297). Thus, these rhythms declare themselves with such regularity that they become natural, as if incarnating into the Schumannian body (that body described by Barthes in “Rasch”) the oxymoronic closeness of a stranger. Even the performance direction, “Stark und kräftig” (Strong and energetic), requires that the performer presume welcomeness. The titular Stranger seems here to be well-acquainted, if not synonymous, with the self.

Key changes happen in “The Stranger” with this same confidence: not hastily, but resolutely, with no hesitation. In the fifth measure, after two cadential phrases in the tonic of D minor, the melodic line begins ascending and hits a B natural. By this point, the piece is already on its way to A minor, though it takes another two bars to resolve to the I in this new key. The first of these bars sees the B natural (which confirms to the listener that the piece has, in fact, moved away from d minor) resolve up to a sixth (E to C) that, given the octave on C in the left hand, implies C major. The F# and G# of the next bar’s left-hand walkup, however, establish A melodic minor, and the consistent cadential movement of the ensuing 5 measures (which resolve solidly to the i) confirm A minor as this phrase’s key. Thus, by the time the A minor chord actually arrives, the key change has already happened. The tension, the trepidation, the nervousness that would accompany the conventional understanding of a stranger is absent.

This boldly declarative style of modulation exemplifies Schumann’s tendency in this piece to introduce new keys as if referring to an already-accepted premise. He makes the unknown familiar. Schumann does not rush to assert the A minor, but with the B
natural in measure 5, he certainly introduces the new key with determination. The melodic and rhythmic pacing of “The Stranger” is neither the nervous speed of urgency nor the crawl of timidity- when Schumann changes chords, he does so outright but avoids heavy-handedness. He doesn’t hint coyly at upcoming key changes, nor does feel the need to overstate them to the listener, but simply expects his audience to accept new melodic and chordal directions. In short, there is neither the insecure self-explanation of a stranger who feels compelled to justify their actions lest they be misjudged, nor the tentativeness of a stranger unsure what is acceptable, but the purposefulness of someone entirely at ease. The anxiety of foreignness can be found in the dotted rhythms, emphasizing that the piece is, in fact, portraying a stranger, but the harmonic confidence makes it clear that this is no typical stranger. Even in a piece titled “The Stranger,” Barthes’ description of Schumann’s piano music as “intimate (which does not mean gentle), or again, private, even individual” (Barthes 294) still holds.

The timing of the phrases in “The Stranger” operates on much the same principle as the harmonic progression. Each phrase begins (with a dotted-eighth to sixteenth pickup) and ends (with a strong hit on the tonic on beat one) the same way, but their lengths vary greatly. When a phrase begins, it conveys tension to the listener, who then must wait to see whether it is resolved quickly (some phrases are only a bar long) or continues to build before finding its way back to an old or new tonic. Here, again, as with the slightly odd rhythms mentioned in the previous paragraph, the piece flirts with the eerie before dispelling any doubt. It evokes, not by heavy-handed statement but by subtle suggestion, uncanny feelings- not in the Freudian sense, but in the sense of
strangeness, conducive to a more straightforward image of a stranger. However, the strong resolutions at the end of each phrase rebut these forays into the bizarre, and re-establish that this stranger is not a distant, unknown, or unknowable one. One can always trust, even if a phrase is taking some time to resolve, that it will find its way back to a root note, and not get so caught up in meandering that it wanders out into the realm of the truly strange. Gradually, the logic by which the phrase lengths abide becomes clear, and it becomes easier to predict how long a phrase will take to reach the ending that Schumann takes great care to establish as inevitable. Unlike the usual idea of a stranger, Schumann’s “Stranger” comes from a place of sameness, not difference.

In measure 25 of “The Stranger,” a phrase which has occurred before in the piece is modified: instead of resolving to the tonic of D minor, it resolves to D major. This is not an establishment of a new tonic in the parallel major, but rather a new dominant in a minor key adjacent on the circle of fifths. It could also be seen as an instance of mode mixture, but the next 4 bars of the piece take place in g minor, and mostly consist of movement between gm and D7, so the foray into the iv, and the cadential movement within this key suggest that Schumann was briefly changing keys and simply foregoing modulation. In measure 29, however, with no dominant to introduce it, a D minor chord occurs somewhat abruptly, only two beats after a D major, voiced identically (triad in first inversion for the right hand and octaves on A for the left), resolves to a gm. This is a striking moment, in which the minor chord seems to lack tact in placing itself so forcefully and unexpectedly into the structural position previously occupied by its major counterpart. The chord change is almost hasty, but it is worth noting that Album for the
Young (hence the name) was written for children without advanced piano abilities. It is not likely that Schumann simply dispensed with the usual process of modulation because he expected no one to notice (after all, children playing pieces from this book would likely have piano teachers and/or parents who would take note of how surprising the key change was). Rather, the decision to change keys so explicitly and assertively was probably made in order to speak to the impatient brain of a child, and not to the sharply honed training of a musically experienced adult.

We again see Schumann’s “Stranger” as intimate in the way he writes for the sensibilities of a beginner, a child either in the literal or perhaps in the metaphorical (a musical beginner with their sense of wonderment and discovery intact) sense. As Barthes puts it, “To play Schumann implies a technical innocence very few artists can attain” (Barthes 294). Children learning piano, especially in Schumann’s time (before the advent of Hal-Leonard) were probably used to playing pieces written by composers who, even when writing basic music, could not repress the depth of their musical knowledge. They were expected to become familiar with musical convention by playing pieces that followed conventions, even before they knew why convention was conventional. In short, they probably played many pieces that felt somewhat alien, the mechanisms of whose composition were beyond their comprehension. Schumann introduces measure 29’s return to d minor in a child-friendly way, not instructively but demonstratively. He does not invoke any musical idioms in order to teach them to children, but simply gets right to the point, with no pleasantries needed. He composes not as pedagogue, but as confidant. Thus, to a child playing this piece, the music would not seem like that of a
stranger, but of a close and trusted associate with whom a comfortable rapport already exists.

We can now ask: who is this stranger? Is the stranger portrayed by the piece, or simply referred to by it? Or, perhaps, is the piece itself tantamount to the titular stranger? Once again, we have a question that merits some thought on the Album for the Young as a whole. It is by no means a particularly well-known or celebrated work of Schumann’s. In much Schumann scholarship, the simplicity of a collection of pieces for children would preclude them from serious analysis. This paper, however, is concerned not only with the musical substance of Schumann’s work, but also with his psyche, and the reflections of this psyche to be found in his music. The mental state of any adult evolves from that of a child, and it would be foolish to assume that Schumann’s childhood experiences are irrelevant to the mental illness of his later years. They are especially relevant when exploring the links between Schumann and Deleuze, who- in Anti-Oedipus and elsewhere- wrote extensively about the relationship of a child’s psychic life to that of their adult self. It is, then, of course worthwhile to analyze “The Stranger.” Although it is largely inconsequential to the broad history of music, it is very significant in terms of Schumann’s own mind.

It can be safely assumed that when writing this collection of pieces, Schumann was- consciously, subconsciously, or both- thinking about his own youth, and process of learning piano. Of course, he was aware of the knowledge and practice surrounding piano pedagogy, but this doesn’t mean he wasn’t also informed by his own experience.
In setting out to write music that would be instructive to young piano students in the early stages of their work with the instrument, it certainly would have occurred to him to consider what might have helped him develop his piano abilities as a child. Barthes argues against the notion that “Schumann wrote so many short pieces *because he didn’t know how to develop*” (Barthes 300). This criticism is clearly preposterous. In the case of “The Stranger,” Schumann didn’t develop because development would have served no instructional purpose. After all, one could say, in accordance with the same logic, that in *Album for the Young*, Schumann wrote simple pieces for beginners because he didn’t know how to write complex music for advanced musicians. Schumann wrote many short pieces that lacked development, yes, but these do not constitute all of his work. It is worth analyzing “The Stranger” in all its simplicity largely *because* Schumann could have easily chosen to write more intricate, advanced pieces for adults rather than spend time creating *Album for the Young*, and yet- among the other figures to be found in this collection of pieces- the intimate stranger he portrayed was clearly of enough significance to him that it warranted portrayal in an intentional simple piece for kids.

During Schumann’s own childhood, his parents and older siblings initially view his interest in piano as a harmless lark, a childish game that would provide an entertaining diversion for a few years before Robert would grow up and naturally turn his interests to more serious pursuits. As he got older, and his interest in piano deepened, they began to worry and disapprove. His family’s dismissal of music as a frivolous pursuit certainly made its way into many of his pieces, which retain the whimsy and innocence ascribed to music by a family who couldn’t see the more serious facets,
alongside the technical and creative brilliance of someone who worked seriously on music. To Schumann during his childhood, therefore, music occupied the place of the oxymoronic intimate stranger. Schumann’s infatuation with music struck his family much the same way that it would if their child had struck up an inexplicable (to them) friendship with a stranger, someone foreign and a bit bizarre. They initially indulged what was to them a strange but tolerable interest. Then, when this stranger (music) who had been invited into their home overstayed its welcome, and Robert grew more serious about his connection with the stranger, the family’s passive wariness turned into active disapproval. Thus, music remained always a stranger, and yet one profoundly close to Schumann. “The Stranger,” then, is perhaps music itself, and Schumann made this ostensibly alien figure so intimate as a sign partially to other young musicians, and partially to his own younger self, who may not have even known why he felt such comfort in the presence of a stranger like music.

It may seem odd to ascribe such significance and depth to Schumann’s experiences as a child, but Deleuze writes that “the child does not wait until he is an adult before grasping… the reactionary or the revolutionary tenor of a familial group with which he is already preparing his ruptures and his conformities” (Deleuze 278). Music was certainly the primary source of such ruptures in Schumann’s life, even as a child. While his literature-loving father encouraged his love of novels and poems, and his mother was his primary emotional confidant into his young adulthood, Ostwald writes that “the fact that [his mother] did not fundamentally approve of his desire for an identity as a musician was a source of recurring distress for him” (Ostwald 47). It is thus
reasonable to assume that, when writing for children, as in “The Stranger,” Schumann would have expressed thoughts and feelings from his own childhood, such as his portrayal of music as the titular “Stranger,” both foreign and deeply close to him.

In “Rasch,” Barthes characterizes music in a way that aligns with this understanding of it as a stranger, but a bizarrely familiar one. He compares it in terms of signs and signifiers to writing, a comparison to which Deleuze can contribute with his analysis of writing. Both theorists are building here upon terms coined- and relations uncovered- by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913). Saussure was not the first thinker to reckon with the concept of signs- the smallest unit of meaning; any entity whose purpose is to indicate something else- but he revolutionized this concept by identifying the relationship between signifier and signified. In Saussure’s schema, the signifier is the means of expressing an idea, the thing that stands for the idea, while the signified is the idea itself. Meanwhile, the referent is the actual thing, the idea of which is signified. Take the example of someone pointing out a tree to a friend, saying “that’s a nice tree over there.” The sign is the combination of letters and corresponding phonemes that form the word “tree.” The signifier is the socially agreed-upon fact that this word indicates the presence of a tree. The signified is the idea evoked in the friend’s head that there is a tree nearby, and the referent is the actual tree, standing tangibly in the ground. As Deleuze says, “The signified is precisely the effect of the signifier, and not what it represents or what it designates” (Deleuze 209), meaning that the signified is not the tree (that would be the referent), but rather the knowledge that the tree is there.
Both Barthes and Deleuze operate within this Saussurian framework: Barthes argues that “music… belongs to semantics (and not to semiotics), since sounds are not signs. [...] Music is a language which has a syntax but no semiotics” (Barthes 311), but the basis of this analysis is still semiotics. Barthes can only argue that music is semantics because it is not semiotics- because, though it has a signifier, a signified, and a referent, it lacks signs. Considering the referent of music to be the body, Barthes asserts that “the body passes into music without any relay but the signifier. This passage- this transgression- makes music a madness: not only Schumann’s music, but all music.” (Barthes 308). Thus, his understanding of music as madness (and, correspondingly, of Schumann’s music as the music of Schumann’s madness) is based on his understanding of signs as a necessary facet of meaning, and of music as “a field of signifying and not a system of signs, [where] the referent… is the body” (Barthes 308). In signifying, rather than communicating meaning in the form of signs, music is abstracted from any concrete meaning, anything circumscribed into a category. It is thus a sort of stranger, in its distance from the referent. This body is not incarnated in signs, as units of meaning, but signified from a separate vantage point. In fact, Barthes goes so far as to argue that, while the writer must deal in meaning, the composer cannot. However, the body as referent makes this stranger- this system of signifiers- deeply personal, since what is signified is the physical incarnation of the Self, which is almost impossible to render in the form of signs. Schumann’s portrayal of music as the stranger-made-known is thus perfectly conducive to Barthes’s understanding of music as fundamentally mad in its lack of signs as a means by which the signifier can signify the referent.
Deleuze can perhaps help elucidate this complex relationship between writing and music, between signs and signifiers:

Writing has never been capitalism’s thing. Capitalism is profoundly illiterate. The death of writing, like the death of God… was settled a long time ago, although the news of the event is slow to reach us, and there survives in us the memory of extinct signs with which we still write. The reason for this is simple: writing implies a use of language in general according to which graphism becomes aligned on the voice, but also overcodes it and induces a fictitious voice from on high that functions as a signifier (Deleuze 240).

To Deleuze, capitalism (which, as discussed previously, is the source of the illusive man-nature dichotomy) is incompatible with the sort of archaic signifiers that arose from divinity (when invoked by writing) and perished along with God. This death has circumscribed the scope of writing within the bounds of meaning identified by Barthes.

To Deleuze, writing is inscribed on the voice, and to Barthes, music is inscribed on the body, but Deleuze’s insights regarding writing are applicable to Barthes’ regarding music. Barthes compares writing to music in terms of meaning, arguing that writing is restricted to meaning (hence the relation to the voice), while music (whose referent is the body) is precluded from meaning. Deleuze’s portrayal of writing is therefore compatible with Barthes’ portrayal of music. The main difference is between signs as the currency of writing’s meaning and signifiers as the means of music’s expression- or, as Barthes calls them, the “figures of the body… whose texture forms musical signifying” (Barthes 307).
For Deleuze, writing employs signs, but it evokes the impression of an imagined signifier. For Barthes, music is already operating on the plane of signifiers. Under capitalism, writing is dead, but people write with the ghosts of signs. The signifier, however, has never been fully alive, which is why the composer, as a purveyor of signifiers rather than signs, can never write with meaning the way the writer does. Rather than use concrete signs to summon a celestial signifier, the composer uses signifiers to render the body, thereby reversing the usual relation. The body and the voice (indicated by signs) are forms of the Self, and the divine (the signifier) is, of course, the Other. The two abide by meaning in writing, where the signs bring the signifier. In music, however, meaning is exploded when the field of signifiers (i.e. the Other) employed by the composer constructs the body (i.e. the Self). Capitalism may have killed writing, relegated it to a practice of dealing in memory, but music—at least Schumann’s music, in which the Self and the Other are reversed, survives. Deleuze’s understanding of writing and Barthes’ of music thus inform each other, each constituting a necessary half of the full picture of Schumann’s reversal between Self and Other.

If in Schumann’s music the Other is familiar, it follows that the Self should be an alien being. He was known for adopting personas under which he wrote both music and music criticism, in a magazine he co-founded (along with Friedrich Wieck, his teacher and the father of his future wife Clara, and his friend Ludwig Schunke) called Neue Zeitschrift für Musik (New Journal of Music). Two of the most famous of these personas are Eusebius and Florestan. These two figures, “obviously modeled after ‘Vult and Walt’
from Jean Paul’s *Flegeljahre*” (Ostwald 78), represented contradictory aspects of his personality. Eusebius was reserved, mild-mannered, and pensive, while Florestan was wild, vigorous, and passionate. It is significant that Schumann chose the names of people he’d never met (Eusebius was a Greek historian in the 200-300s A.D. and Florestan was a French nobleman about 25 years older than Schumann) as vessels of his own artistic identity. He also based them on fictional characters- not just Vult and Walt, but also Florestan from Beethoven’s only opera, *Fidelio*, with which Schumann was enamored. This identification with historical and literary figures (dare I say strangers) signifies this externality of his selfhood.

*Carnaval* (1835), one of Schumann’s most celebrated and frequently performed works, is a series of short pieces that depict all sorts of people, ideas, and small scenes, including Schumann’s own two sides. In observing the “Eusebius” and “Florestan” movements of this collection, we can more clearly see the dialectical reversal between the self and the other. Of the thirty-two bars of “Eusebius,” 28 include either quintuplets or septuplets. This already gives the piece a strange, unfamiliar feel, exacerbated by the contrast between these rhythms in the treble and those in the bass, which mostly consist of a quarter-note feel, with two measures of quarter note triplets. These unusual tuplets also mean that the 4 measures of eighth notes, scattered in isolated spots throughout the piece, feel odd in comparison. The listener has gotten so used to 7-note and 5-note phrases that a simple series of 4 eighth notes loses the familiarity it would otherwise have. This tactic recalls Barthes’ argument that “rhythm, in Schumann, is a violence…
but (as with pain) this violence is pure” (Barthes 297). Thus, “Eusebius” renders the known foreign.
The “Eusebius” movement of *Carnaval*
“Florestan” begins with a motif reminiscent of that which pervades “Eusebius,” albeit a far more rhythmically conventional iteration: 5 notes in close proximity to each other, moving up, then down twice, then up again, before leaping to a higher register and briefly descending stepwise. This invocation of the previous movement already constitutes in itself a dialectical reversal of “Eusebius”’s mechanisms. The motif which had been unusual in “Eusebius” takes a much more intimate form here, both because the audience is already acquainted with it, having heard it before, and because it is written in eighth notes in 6/8, rather than using the quintuplets from “Eusebius”. The left hand accompaniment, which has its foundation in the classic waltz feel (a low root note followed by two chords voiced higher up), emphasizes this intimacy. In contrast to the restraint and moderation of the previous movement, which adhered to that motif throughout, “Florestan” uses the motif as a springboard to launch a flurry of exuberant runs. This variety, and the strong contrast in dynamics and tempo between the different sections of this movement express the unleashed fervor of the Florestan persona, in opposition to the constancy of the “Eusebius” movement.
The first section of the “Florestan” movement
In the “Florestan” and “Eusebius” movements of *Carnaval*, we encounter an important fact regarding the dialectic of the self and the other. Although it may seem that both movements occupy the same place within this dialectic, they in fact constitute their own thesis-antithesis structure, in terms of the respective sides of Schumann they represent. When Schumann writes as Eusebius, Florestan exists in diametric opposition, and when he writes as Florestan, the opposite is true. There are flashes of “Eusebius” in “Florestan,” in the form of the motif mentioned in the previous paragraph, but these are transformed from ruminations into exuberant outbursts. There are hints of “Florestan” in “Eusebius,” too, with the growing density of the left-hand accompaniment, but this occurs with more restraint and discipline. Therefore, by bisecting his personality, he has constructed a scenario in which, no matter which manifestation of himself he embodies, there will always be an alien component to the self, i.e. the other of the two personalities. The foreignness of the self in Schumann is expressed not only through the content of both the “Eusebius” and “Florestan” movements, but also by the very fact that both of them approach the same duality from opposite directions: “Eusebius” makes the familiar uncanny, and “Florestan” makes the uncanny familiar.
Dualities and Triangles: Oedipal and Anti-Oedipal

At first, Barthes’ assertion that Schumann lacks conflict may seem incompatible with all these dialectical relationships in his music. However, these theses and antitheses do not confront each other within the music itself. Schumann’s music is that of already-resolved dialectical opposition, not of opposition that is worked out through the music itself. The dialectical relationships in his music having already been established is what allows them to be so totalizing, to embody the purity identified by Barthes in “Loving Schumann,” as “pure pain without object” (Barthes 296). Thus, Schumann’s reversal of the Self and Other can be quite easily reconciled with Barthes’s argument that “Schumann is truly the music of solitary intimacy, of the amorous and imprisoned soul that speaks to itself… in short of the child who has no link other than to the mother” (Barthes 293-294). In Schumann, the self is so multifaceted that it invalidates any need for conflict. Conflict can only arise between opposing forces or agents, and in Schumann, the self and the other are not clearly defined and delineated enough to produce this opposition.

What, then, constitutes the mother to which Barthes refers? Barthes being a theorist who wrote about psychoanalysis, notably in 1957’s Mythologies, one might be inclined to assume this mother is that portrayed by Freud’s theory of Oedipus. However, Deleuze, one of the three aforementioned “Schumannians,” takes issue with the classical Freudian conception of the Oedipus complex (hence the title Anti-Oedipus, and his derogatory references to “Oedipalists” throughout). Not only does Barthes’ allusion to Deleuze as a Schumannian indicate that his understanding of Schumann is aligned with
Deleuze’s, rather than Freud’s, understanding of the mother, the Deleuzian understanding is more conducive to Barthes’ views on Schumann anyway. An Oedipal relationship, Deleuze argues, is not a natural stage of psychic development whose foundation lies in the subconscious (as Freud would say), but rather an externally imposed normalizing force. There is nothing inherently Oedipal about people, to Deleuze, but rather something Oedipal about capitalism, which is imposed on the capitalist subject.

For Deleuze, “Oedipus implies… an entire reactionary and paranoiac investment of the social field that acts as an Oedipalizing factor” (Deleuze 365). The Oedipal triangle is therefore a social formation which a subject must internalize in order to be incorporated into the process of production, not a natural phenomenon beyond which one must progress in order to be psychologically well. To Deleuze, Oedipus is not even a person per se, but “only a reactional formation, a formation that results from reaction to desiring-production. It is a serious mistake to consider this formation in isolation, abstractly,” and Deleuze accuses psychoanalysts of this exact serious mistake: overlooking the social context of desiring-production (i.e. the ways in which desires are circumscribed within economic bounds, commodified, made part of the process of capitalist production).

The “child with no link other than to the mother” is therefore neither Oedipal nor pre-Oedipal. The child-mother structure proposed by Barthes has only two facets, and Deleuze takes great care to establish Oedipal relationships as Oedipal triangles. In relationships between two people, entities, or concepts, there is no external third force,
which in Deleuze’s schema would be needed to Oedipalize the relationship. Deleuze often- but not always- personifies this force as the father, even asserting directly that “from the point of view of regression… the paranoiac father Oedipalizes the son” (Deleuze 275). He takes care not to universalize this standpoint, stating as well that from “the point of view of the community… in the common social field, the first thing that the son represses… is the unconscious of the father and the mother” (276). Thus, though the father is not always the Oedipalizing force in Deleuze’s analysis, both points of view—regression and community—require the father as a third member of the Oedipal triangle (precluding Barthes’ child-mother relationship from such a description), and some external social compulsion to impose the structure of this triangle (demonstrating further that the relationship Barthes describes as one of “solitary intimacy” cannot be Oedipal in the Deleuzian sense).

Only in the Freudian sense would Barthes be constructing the child-mother relationship as Oedipal- and Barthes, by his own admission, is one of the few Schumannians, along with Deleuze. To Freud, dualistic relationships can be Oedipal, but to Deleuze (and therefore to Barthes, who aligns himself with Deleuze via Schumann- or Schumannianism), only triangular ones can. Barthes’ reference to Deleuze demonstrates that his child is thus not a Freudian child who is either approaching, experiencing, or moving beyond the Oedipal stage of development. Rather, the arsenal of Oedipalizing pressures have not reached this child. Perhaps, in the conflict-bereft subjectivity of Schumann, they never will. After all, Barthes argues that Schumann’s madness made him almost immune to the external pressures of his time (hence the Schumannian’s
exaltation of desire over social conditions), and it is external pressure that, to Deleuze, Oedipalizes a subject. To Freud a child with no link other than to the mother may be Oedipal, but to Deleuze and Barthes (and therefore Schumann), it is Anti-Oedipal.

Schumann’s music, in Deleuzian terms, therefore exists at the place occupied by a child at the outset of their life, when:

The child has a wide-ranging life of desire- a whole set of nonfamilial relations with the objects and machines of desire- that is not related to the parents from the point of view of immediate production, but that is ascribed to them (with either love or hatred) from the point of view of the recording of the process. […] It is amid partial objects and within the nonfamilial relations of desiring-production that the child lives his life and ponders what it means to live, even though the question must be ‘related’ to his parents and the only possible tentative answer must be sought in family relations. (Deleuze 48)

Thus, when Barthes (who, given his identification of Deleuze as a “Schumannian” likely had the Deleuzian understanding of parental relationships in mind) describes a child with “no link other than to the mother,” he does not mean that this child’s existence consists only of a maternal relationship, but that its contents are structured only via such a relationship. The link to the mother is not an Oedipal one but in fact a pure one.

The nature of the sort of relationship described above, where the Other is a single, unifying figure, is oneness. As Barthes says: “in this fragmented world, distorted by whirling appearances (the whole world is a Carnival), a pure and somehow terribly
motionless element occasionally breaks through: pain. [...] Such pain cannot be
expressed musically… but music can fleetingly express, if not pain, at least purity”
(Barthes 296). In Barthes’ schema, Carnaval is not just a collection of short pieces, but
the foundational image that structures Schumann’s world. Amidst this chaos (which lives
structurally within Deleuze’s “wide-ranging life of desire”), the pain that shines through
is what constitutes the notion, advanced by Barthes, of the child-mother relationship.
This relationship, of course, could not occupy the position it does in the world of the
carnival, were it not for the purity expressed by Schumann’s music- after all, as an
Anti-Oedipal relationship, it exists independent of- its purity unmarred by- the
Oedipalizing factors of the outside world.

In this description of Schumann’s music as pure, Barthes compares the monolithic
nature of Schumann’s tonality to the elaborate intricacy of Chopin’s. It’s not that
Schumann’s tonality is less complex than Chopin’s, but it is more all-consuming: while
Chopin explores obscure reaches of the human psyche with his forays into delicate,
remote musical spaces, Schumann renders the purity described by Barthes above in his
comprehensive tonality. It doesn’t expand because it’s already expansive. It doesn’t
meander because it already has covered all possible territory. It’s singular. In the first
movement of Schumann’s Fantasie in C, op. 17, for example, the right hand plays a
simple melody that is mostly in octaves (with some denser chords and inner-voice thirds
here and there), accompanied by whirling sixteenths in the left hand. This
accompaniment, rather than harmonizing the melody according to a particular set of
chords, fills in all possible harmonic territory, with stepwise motion that makes gleaning
triads or even seventh chords rare. Even when there seems to be contrast between keys, or between collections of pitches, Schumann makes sure to unify them via the very mechanisms of contradiction at play in his work. It is these very dialectical oppositions that allow seemingly conflicting aspects of his tonality to be, perhaps surprisingly, cohesive. This is exemplified in Kreisleriana, where Barthes hears “no note, no theme, no contour, no grammar, no meaning, nothing which would permit [him] to reconstruct an intelligible structure of the work” (Barthes 299), because Schumann’s has so thoroughly exhausted every tonal possibility that nothing stands out among the sea of all possibilities.

Barthes’ quote about pure pain amidst the disarray of the Carnaval is perhaps then a description of this same phenomenon: “the tonal range [having] the value of a single sound” (Barthes 296). In the “Papillons” movement of Carnaval, the unified pain which pierces the chaos of the Carnival is evident, as are the reasons Barthes found the Carnival to be such a salient representation of Schumann’s music in general. In his early days of composing, Schumann was mostly “a composer of bright, short piano pieces, which he called ‘butterflies’ (Papillons)” (Ostwald 57). He collected some of these in his opus 2, but the “Papillons” movement of Carnaval is not one of these early pieces. Perhaps, however, it is a rumination on the somewhat paradoxical ways in which his early flights of compositional whimsy grounded him, constituting the sole patch of solid terrain on which he could stand amidst the uncertainty of his life as a law student, displaced from his home, family, and childhood friends and thrown into an academic milieu that did not interest him.
“Papillons” barrels through a barrage of chromatic ascents and descents at breakneck speed. The constant sixteenth notes, which shift from one hand to another but rarely let up, are usually comprised of chromatic movement in one voice, while another voice either complements it with a pedal point or with movement in the opposite direction. They are accompanied primarily with 5ths and 3rds that harmonize the chromaticism in ways that alternate between establishing tonality and throwing in unexpected dissonance. Though the tonal restlessness and sheer chaos of this texture certainly bring to mind Barthes’ image of the Carnival, each of the few breaks in the deluge of sixteenth is a quarter note (or an eighth notes followed by an eighth rest) at the end of a phrase. In these moments, the wavering tonality of the chromatic motion settles on chords that pierce the madness with distinct purity. The first two of these instances see a half-beat of sixteenth that outline a C major triad resolving to a solidly struck major third (F and A), implying cadential movement. The next 5 all have an F major chord (sometimes with a dominant 7th) resolving to the tonic of Bb Major. Thus, amidst a sea of chromaticism, this clean circle-of-fifths motion (from C to F to Bb) supports Barthes’ understanding of Schumann’s tonality as pure. There is something Deleuzian here as well, in the rejection of linearity, the explosion in countless different directions, that somehow also culminates in a purity.
The opening section of “Papillons”
Of course, there are dialectical contradictions at play in “Papillons” as well. The oneness of its tonality is accomplished not just through the cadential resolutions that pierce the madness, but also through the general texture of rapid chromatic motion. Hence the title, and the reference to Schumann’s lighthearted early pieces, “Papillons” is a flight of whimsy- yet, paradoxically, there is great seriousness to this whimsy. It is the most technically demanding movement of Carnaval. The right hand must hold eighth and quarter notes with the thumb while the other fingers simultaneously play rapid sixteenth notes with finger-contorting chromaticism. The left hand, in addition to having its own share of sixteenth notes, also has grace-note fifths that leap up in octaves, and the two hands have to trade with each other a great deal. Papillons is thus the gatekeeper movement that excludes many pianists who would otherwise be able to play the entire piece. It is perhaps fancifully technical: Schumann indulged his own penchant for complex music with zest. Thus, “Papillons” unites the putative opposites of caprice (necessary to write the piece) and discipline (necessary to play it). Perhaps, in making the title a reference to pieces he’d written as a young man, Schumann was not only invoking the youthful gusto of writing music for fun, but also his dreams of virtuosity. In the frenzy of “Papillons,” there may be a touch of wistful nostalgia for the young Schumann who had so eagerly accepted Friedrich Wieck’s promise to “make… Robert, with his talent and his fantasy, into one of the greatest living pianists” (Ostwald 66).

The singular nature of Schumann’s tonality, and the corresponding lack of conflict in his work, can be reconciled with the proliferation of dialectical opposites partly via the
medium of music itself. Barthes writes about Schumann’s tonality that “its simplicity is an insistence. […] The tonic is not endowed with a ‘cosmic widening’… but rather with a massiveness which insists, imposing its solitude to the point of obsession” (Barthes 296-297). The notion of solitude being imposed seems contradictory-imposition implies an external force, so how can solitude be imposed? This, however, is where the alien Self arises. The solitude of Schumann’s music is imposed from outside, as the word imposition implies, but the imposer is none other than the Self, divorced from its own selfhood and placed in a position of externality from which it is able to impose. In keeping with the aforementioned dialectical reversal, this solitude is imposed on the Other, albeit an iteration of the Other that has been rendered personal, and given the subjectivity necessary to experience solitude. This relationship is evident in the uniform tonality of Papillons. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, “Papillons” weaves a texture of near-relentless sixteenth notes that transgress the bounds of traditional tonality, but tonality that occasionally shines through is distinctly straightforward. Thus, the prevailing deluge of sixteenth isolates these moments of tonality from the overall fabric of the piece, effectively imposing solitude on said instances of tonality. These brief and isolated tonal moments are relegated by the constant sixteenth notes to small self-contained spots where they cannot form links to other tonalities. These moments, as exceptions to the general feel of the piece, are othered by the generalized sixteenth-note feel, but occupy an intimate place. Meanwhile, this very sixteenth-note feel, which constitutes the Self of the piece, is alien in its own defiance of convention.
Barthes’ comparison of Schumann as composer to the apocryphal figure of the writer suggests that dialectical relationships such as that in Papillons can be rendered so cleanly specifically because of the nature of music itself. Schumann was the son of an author and publisher, and was himself an avid reader who not only wrote much of his music inspired by literature, but also frequently tried his hand at writing poetry and fiction. His literary endeavors, however, were not received with the same awe as his compositions. The oxymorons and oppositional logics which structure his musical work simply do not translate into literature. When writing, one can absolutely portray paradox, but not in the way Schumann does. One cannot freeze a dialectical process at the moment of reversal: in writing, the process must move, and conflict must resolve. Schumann makes opposites coexist in the very stillness of his tonality, in the lack of conflict that is so important to Barthes’ analysis. Barthes writes in “Rasch” that music “is an image, not a language, in that every image is radiant. […] The musical text does not follow (by contrasts or amplification), it explodes: it is a continuous big bang” (Barthes 301-302). This argument does not contradict his earlier assertion that Schumann’s tonality is monolithic, or that his music expresses the purity of pain. It explains how Schumann can distill such complex and contradictory ideas into a monolith, with purity.

Barthes’s analysis opposing music (as image) and language is not confined to the art forms themselves, but also those who produce them. He asserts that “in relation to the writer, the composer is always mad (and the writer can never be so, for he is condemned to meaning)” (Barthes 308). This is related to Barthes’ previously discussed understanding that music, in its lack of signs, is precluded from the realm of meaning,
and therefore of semiotics, and therefore of sanity. Schumann’s personal mental health issues are well documented, as are those of many other composers whose mental states would seem to support the idea of the composer as necessarily mad. Barthes, however, systematizes these individual cases, subsumes them into a broader schema of madness. He does not base his belief in the madness of music on specific cases of composers who were mad, but on a conceptualization of music itself as mad, and as demanding madness from its creators. There have, of course, been many celebrated writers who were mad. Their art, however, was not that of their madness— they still had to convey meaning clearly and overtly, or at least via signs. Schumann’s music is not just the work of a madman: it is the work of his madness. A composer of music deals in an artistic medium whose relation to meaning is that of the madman. When writers choose to flout meaning, they do so purposefully, and the lack of meaning takes on significance in relation to the expectation of meaning, whereas musicians are barred from meaning (in the sense used by Barthes) by the very substance of music. Deleuze might say music is rhizomatic; Barthes certainly echoes the structure of the rhizome in his description of music (quoted in the previous paragraph) as an image— a big bang— characterized by radiance.

Before delving deeper into the concept of the rhizome, another quote from Barthes will help further illuminate the special relationship between music and madness, and why no such relationship exists between literature and madness. Barthes argues that music “is what struggles with writing. When writing triumphs, it takes up where science, impotent to restore the body, leaves off: only the metaphor is exact; and it would suffice that we be writers for us to be able to account for these musical beings, these corporeal
chimeras, in a perfectly scientific fashion” (Barthes 308). The term “corporeal chimeras” indicates another dialectical opposition: between music as bodily (Barthes discusses the “Schumannian body” at length in Rasch) and as transcendent (a common understanding of music). This is one of the many contradictions that can, in music, be suspended prior to the point of synthesis. As with the reversal between the Self and the Other, in Schumann’s music, the contrast between material and immaterial does not need to be resolved. Rather, these two opposing versions of music exist simultaneously, not in parallel, but occupying the exact same musical and theoretical space. In writing, oxymorons cannot coexist so identically: if opposites are not reconciled, they must be juxtaposed, placed in different parts of the structure. In music, meanwhile, they can occur in the same structural position, not sharing it, but both existing in full without compromising for the other. The ability to create art in such a medium must be madness: this is why, as Barthes says, the composer is always mad.

Schumann’s madness is that paradoxical madness which refuses to reconcile the material and immaterial, and which reverses the Self and the Other. In this reversal of the Self and the Other, Schumann satiates the self-destructive nature of his madness (e.g. his aforementioned suicide attempt in 1854): “Madness here is incipient in the vision, the economy of the world in which the subject, Schumann, entertains a relation which gradually destroys him, while the music itself seeks to construct itself” (Barthes 295). Or, as Schumann himself put it, in a diary entry: “music, how you disgust me and repel me to death” (Ostwald 77). The real Eusebius wrote a number of history works regarding martyrdom: A Collection of Ancient Martyrdoms, On the Martyrs, On the Martyrs of
Palestine, and a biography of Pamphilus of Caesarea, a friend of Eusebius who was martyred in 307 AD. In his biography of Schumann, Ostwald notes that “Eusebius’s interest in martyrdom… may also have appealed to… suicidal elements in Schumann’s personality” (Ostwald 79). Thus, the madness that played phantom melodies in Schumann’s head when he lay awake at night is the same madness that drove him to attempt suicide, and to his other self-destructive behaviors such as alcoholism and self-mutilation in pursuit of virtuosity. Schumann’s musical genius was intimately bound up with his self-destruction, and, as Barthes points out, the madness inherent to music is one that destroys the creator of music. A human being cannot remain intact amidst such violent contradictions (e.g. between the Self and the Other) as those necessary to music, particularly Schumann’s music. The nature of music- described two paragraphs ago as “radiant” in Barthes’ words, and “rhizomatic” in Deleuze’s- rends the composer into pieces.

Deleuze takes the term rhizome from botany: before being given a theoretical definition by Deleuze, the word rhizome referred solely to an underground plant stem from which many roots and shoots explode, forming a network that connects to other plants. Deleuze considered the rhizome to be a salient image on a conceptual level partly because of his opposition to the notion of a dichotomy between nature and humankind. When human society and civilizations are inevitable outgrowths of nature, there is no reason why relations between people and technology cannot abide by the same structural logic as relations between plants. In fact, there is a well-known Deleuzian anecdote (discussed in more detail in the following paragraph) that situates a human being within
nature, neither as a man exalted above nature by the power of enlightened human knowledge, nor as a frail mortal being at the mercy of natural forces beyond his comprehension and control, but as an aspect of nature.
Dialectical Reversals

Similar sentiments to Deleuze’s understanding of the rhizome, and his disbelief in the distinction between nature and humanity can be found in Schumann’s *Waldszenen* (Forest Scenes) is a collection of 9 short piano pieces. The 4th of these 9 pieces, “Verrufene Stelle” (The Haunted Spot), is a particularly striking example: it is based on an excerpt from *Böser Ort* (Evil Place), a poem by Friedrich Hebbel, which describes a spot in a forest where an unnamed violent tragedy occurred. Among the sea of white flowers in the woods, a single flower in the “haunted spot” grows red because of the blood that was shed there. This recalls Deleuze’s depiction of what is often referred to as the “schizophrenic stroll.” Though *Anti-Oedipus* is written in such sprawling, expansive prose that it’s often hard to distill its theory into concise points, the few moments of brevity gain more significance when taken amidst the rhizomatic vastness of Deleuze’s thought. For example: the punchy quip, often quoted as a rebuttal to traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, that “a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch (Deleuze 2). The example he gives of this comes from *Lenz*, an incomplete novella written by Georg Büchner in 1836. Deleuze specifically describes a scene in which the titular character, a schizophrenic man, takes a walk in the park, and “has projected himself back to a time before the man-nature dichotomy, before all the coordinates based on this fundamental dichotomy have been laid down… there is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other” (Deleuze 2).
Deleuze’s version of Lenz’s walk through the park is interesting because it does draw a sort of distinction between man and nature in the notion that one is produced within the other. His rejection of the supposed dichotomy is not rooted in the belief that the two are synonymous, but rather that they are continuous. They are not identical, but they are inextricable components of the same process of production. The same is true in the poem that gave rise to Schumann’s “Haunted Spot.” The flower that grows red to reflect human bloodshed is, of course, separate from the rest of the flowers— the nature undisturbed by human activity. However, its growth is a process of production, in which a physical incarnation of human suffering is produced within the plant. It is important to remember here that, although Deleuze did analyze the capitalist mode of production in the sense of industry, this was far from the only phenomenon that he recognized as production. Part of his understanding of industry as fundamentally inseparable from nature was the stance that industry was not only derived from natural materials, and given to spit its waste back in the face of nature, but also a logical outgrowth of the world’s natural history. Humans are natural creatures, and our discovery of agriculture was a natural reaction to environmental conditions, and it was only natural that the primitive agrarian economies which arose from this would give way to feudalism, which would in turn give way to capitalism and industry. Thus, industrial production is not unique as production: to Deleuze, flowers are growth-machines, just as birds are flight-machines. Industry is not only natural, but every aspect of nature has a mechanical function. The growth of the blood-red flower, therefore, is the production of man within nature. And, given that music is produced by humans, Schumann produced nature through his portrayal of it in “Haunted Spot.”
The musical substance of “Haunted Spot” parallels the dialectical synthesis of humankind and nature to be found in Deleuze, and, in its dissolution of the false dichotomy between the two, exemplifies Barthes’ insight that Schumann lacks conflict. The first six measures of the piece are comprised virtually entirely of double-dotted eighth notes and thirty-second notes. These are not syncopation per se, but certainly constitute a disruption of steady rhythm, which, along with the syncopation that does exist in the piece, would seem to suggest that “Haunted Spot” is one of those pieces in which Schumann “exhausts rhythm by generalizing syncopation” (Barthes 298). The subsequent three measures (mm. 6-8), however, pose an antithesis to this thesis, with their steady sixteenth notes. However, the generalized syncopation, and the dotted figures, creep back in, first in the form of a break in the sixteenths between beats 3 and 4 of measure 6. Then, in measure 7, the same thing happens again, except that this time, the dotted rhythm persists into measure 8, as another voice takes up the sixteenth notes. This texture, in which the generalized syncopation overlaps with the steady sixteenth notes that answered its rhythmic jaggedness with regularity, is a sort of synthesis between the two. It is a synthesis, one could say, between the natural growth of flowers and the disturbance of human bloodshed, between the natural order of rhythmic constancy and the unnatural syncopation which disturbed it, and yet which was naturalized, just as the aforementioned bloodshed was naturalized in the form of the red flower.

The tonality of “Haunted Spot” constructs the same sort of dialectical synthesis as its rhythm. Barthes connects his understanding of Schumann’s lack of conflict (such as
between man and nature) to his madness, writing that this madness “arises... from the
fact that he ‘lacks’ a conflictual... structure of the world: his music is based on no simple
and one might say no ‘natural’ (naturalized by anonymous culture) confrontation”
(Barthes 297). Here Barthes is in accordance with Deleuze that “natural” need not refer
only to “nature” in the sense of animals, plants, geological features, etc. Schumann’s
non-conflictual world does not set up enmity between the natural and unnatural, because
the natural is not only the ecological, but also the culturally and socially immutable.
Only in such a world can violence between humans be expressed via the growth of a
flower. The tonality of “Haunted Spot” sees unnatural-sounding and distinctly human
dissonance- e.g. the frequent fully-diminished seventh chords- infiltrate otherwise natural
music, in the same way that the blood shed in the forest infiltrates the natural field of
flowers.

Cadential movement always feels natural. It is customary, usually to be expected
even in Romantic-era pieces, and immediately satisfying to the ear. The final 11
measures of “Haunted Spot,” see a motif that lends itself to cadential movement
penetrated by a dissonance that situates itself amidst this movement without disrupting it,
much like the red flower that situated itself amidst the sea of white ones. This motif,
which occurs earlier in the piece as well (it is notably explored in several different
interactions throughout measures 3-5), is reintroduced in measure 25. It uses the
double-dotted eighth to thirty-second note rhythmic figure that is so prominent
throughout the piece, and resolves to the tonic of D (“Haunted Spot” is in d minor) via a
walkdown from the minor third of F, acting as a pickup to the downbeat, which lingers on E for the duration of the double-dotted eighth note.
First 8 measures of “Haunted Spot” (note m. 3-5)

Measures 24-31 of “Haunted Spot” (note m. 25-29)
This motif is harmonized in several different ways throughout the piece. When it is first introduced, in measures 3 and 25, it takes place in the two outermost voices, with the inner voice holding a minor third between G and Bb. Thus, the motif which, melodically, is a minor walkdown to the i, takes on a different form in harmonic context, being structured around Gm rather than Dm. The F is not the third of i, but the 7th of iv.; the E is not a passing tone or a suspension that resolves to the i, but the major 6th above a minor chord that gives it a dorian feel (perhaps, given the lack of a D in the chord, it can also be heard as a ii diminished triad in first inversion, but the context of the surrounding chords makes it easier to hear the E as a major sixth that briefly colors the iv); the D is not the resolution that might be expected but rather the 5th of a resolution to the iv that prolongs the tension. The F (which, as mentioned above, is a 7th above the root note of G) forms what could be considered a minor seventh chord. It could also be seen as functioning as a non-chord-tone, though not as strong of one as the E.

The second time the motif occurs, in measures 4 and 26, the harmonic context remains the same for the F and the E, but when the melody resolves down to D, the harmony resolves with it. Landing on the i, but from elsewhere than the V hints at cadential motion. The next version of this motif (measures 5 and 27) sees the 3-note walkdown harmonized first as entirely part of a i chord, then entirely part of another chord- a v in measure five, and a VI in measure 27. The first time this happens, the piece then moves on to different material in measure 6: the aforementioned v chord, having deviated from the harmonic minor, indicates that neither resolution nor continuation of the motif is yet available. The second time, measure 28 continues with the same motif,
again harmonizing it as part of a i chord, before beats 3 and 4 land on a iv-V progression, suggesting that the motif will finally take shape above a cadence, which the ear is eager to hear (after all, stepping down from the second scale degree to the i is very often accompanied by a cadence). The left hand does its part of ending the motif on D (even adding an octave below it), which could easily be complemented by a right-hand voicing of the chord. However, just as the seemingly natural field of flowers is permeated by a blood-red bud, this seemingly natural cadential resolution is permeated by a surprising dissonant chord in the right hand, an A fully-diminished 7th (though the Gb is written as an F#, which establishes a relation to the D and foreshadows the D major chords which will take the place of the expected dm in measure 32). This chord happens again in the following measure, after a near-cadence that resolves an augmented second (Bb and C#) to dm, cementing its place in the piece as a sort of interloper that stands starkly amidst the various tonal harmonizations of the walkdown motif, disrupting the would-be cadential purity, like the red flower standing starkly against a field of white, disrupting its purity.

Schumann takes two relationships- the Self to the Other, and humanity to nature- that are often seen as mutually exclusive, and renders them dialectical, reversing their positions in order to arrive at a synthesis that does not collapse all distinction, but that requires each thesis to exist in the other. Man in nature, nature in man, Self in Other, and Other in Self. The man-nature side of this is explicitly addressed by Deleuze in *Anti-Oedipus*, and, although he does not overtly discuss the relationship between the Self and the Other, we can connect Schumann’s portrayal of this relationship to Deleuze, via Schumann’s schizophrenia. For this, we must recall that, as discussed in the section on
“The Stranger,” this intimate stranger was likely music itself. The other side of this dialectic, the alien Self, can then perhaps be inferred to be the lack of music. In one of Schumann’s works, “Humoreske,” the lack of music plays this exact role, in the form of an *innere stimme* or “inner voice” that is written but not played throughout the first 24 measures of the second movement. The title of Ostwald’s biography, “Schumann: The Inner Voices of a Musical Genius” is clearly referring both to this *innere stimme* and to the voices Schumann heard in his own head, symptomatic of his schizophrenia (the madness that, for Barthes, precluded Schumann from the sort of strict meaning of a writer).
The section of “Humoreske” which is accompanied by the *innere stimme*
The performance direction for the first movement of “Humoreske” (not the movement that contains the *innere stimme*) is “einfach” (*without affectation*). In contrast, the second movement’s direction is “hastig” (*impetuous*). It’s hard to imagine a starker opposition between impersonal and personal. In the first movement, the performer is supposed to repress their emotions, and in the second (where the *innere stimme* is), they can let their emotions run wild, even at the expense of technical exactness. Neither performance direction sounds entirely positive- one can easily imagine a negative review of a performance in which the critic writes disapprovingly that the performer lacks affectation, or plays impetuously. Schumann, however, wants the performer of “Humoreske” to play the first movement with such mechanical precision that the performance might sound impersonal, and the second movement with such unbridled passion that the performance might sound brash. When Barthes writes that “Schumann lets his music be fully heard only by someone who plays it, even badly” (Barthes 294-295), he is perhaps referring, in part, to this tendency to give the performer directions whose execution may bewilder an audience that isn’t privy to the directions behind what they hear.

Barthes’ quote about Schumann being fully heard only by the performer is particularly relevant to the *innere stimme*, which accompanies the “impetuous” section of “Humoreske”. The notes of the *innere stimme* can all be found somewhere in the texture of the two staves that are played, but only the performer sees the attention that is drawn to these specific notes. The right hand primarily plays steady sixteenth notes, but notably holds out the notes to be found in the *innere stimme* (with the exception of the E in
measure 5) as eighth notes, while the *innere stimme* holds each of these for a full beat, or two. Also notably, each of these eighth notes occurs a quarter of a beat after the note is written in the *innere stimme*, where each note falls on a downbeat. “Hastig,” which can also be translated as hasty (it’s a cognate), thus seems to apply more to the *innere stimme*, in which each note precedes the appearance of that note in the played staves. However, although the notions of haste and impetuousness seem to imply a thoughtlessness, the *innere stimme* serves only the purpose of meditation. Though it depicts an impulsive, urgent version of the piece’s texture, it- as an unheard written line- functions primarily to inspire contemplation of the notes it emphasizes and their function in “Humoreske.”

We can now return to the dialectical reversal between Self and Other. The deeply personal nature of “impetuous” as a performance direction (especially in contrast to the direction of “without affectation”), and its application to the *innere stimme* (as the unheard voice that anticipates the heard one) specifically, reinforce the conclusion drawn earlier that, if music is the familiar Other, the lack of music is the alien Self. There is, of course, an intimacy to the *innere stimme* in the privacy of its communication to the performer, the inability of the audience to hear it, but the alienness lies specifically in the fact that it is unheard. Despite the familiarity of the notes written, the *innere stimme* must be encountered at a distance from the music. It is thus an exemplar of Barthes’ argument that “interpretation is… the power to… reveal the network of accents beneath the tonal, rhythmic, melodic rhetoric. The accent is the music’s truth, in relation to which all interpretation declares itself” (Barthes 303). He did not mean accents in the strictly literal sense of notes played with more emphasis (although these absolutely *can* constitute
accents in his definition) but rather, a meaning of accents related to his understanding that Schumann’s music lacks an “intelligible structure,” recalling his words on *Kreisleriana*. To Barthes, the accents are the notes that, amidst an expansive (we remember: he wrote that Schumann’s tonality is comprehensive) texture (he also described Schumann’s music as carnivalesque), carry the meaning, even if this meaning must be meticulously extracted from a densely populated world of other notes.

The *innere stimme* is a particularly overt way of drawing attention to what Barthes termed “accents.” In other Schumann pieces, notes are not so clearly lifted out of the texture and singled out for attention- but this is precisely what makes the *innere stimme* so emblematic of the alien Self. It is alien, because it is not played- it is separate from the music- and yet it speaks directly to the performer (not the audience) at the level of the Self. The performer is not required to discern the accents, because they have been identified already by the *innere stimme*. This way of speaking directly to the performer of the piece, of readily offering the secrets of “Humoreske”’s depth in a way Schumann rarely does, without even being manifested auditorily, makes the *innere stimme* emblematic of the alien Self. The “hasty” or “impetuous” performance direction is almost oxymoronic. It encourages the performer to play the piece rashly, and thus fail to pay attention to the substance. Yet, it also admits that, because the *innere stimme* so overtly presents aspects of this substance that would otherwise be buried within the density of the texture, one can understand the piece more quickly.
Conclusion

The innere stimme in “Humoreske” constitutes one side of the dialectical relationship between Self and Other: it addresses the performer directly, giving a personal message lifted from an impersonal texture, but distantly, being unheard in the actual music. The performance direction of hastig not only indicates the intimate nature of the innere stimme, but also recalls the movement of Carnaval named for the hasty and impetuous side of Schumann’s personality: “Florestan.” This movement accomplishes the same thing as “Humoreske”: defamiliarizing the known. The “Eusebius” movement, meanwhile, provides the other side of the dialectical duality between Self and Other (and the other side of Schumann’s dual personality): the unknown made familiar. “The Stranger,” from Album for the Young, does this as well, portraying music itself as the stranger, yet paradoxically close in its foreignness. This music-as-intimate-stranger is exactly opposed to the lack of music, the alien self, of the innere stimme.

The remoteness and obscurity of Schumann’s own consciousness even to himself, and the constant presence of seemingly external voices, thoughts, sounds, and ideas in his mind, both symptoms of his schizophrenia, were clearly a component of this reversal of Self and Other. This reversal, and his general penchant for opposites and dualities, likely spawned the two iterations of his personality, Florestan and Eusebius. These two are at once alien selves (in being aspects of Schumann’s personality abstracted from his real self by their conceptualization) and intimate strangers (in being figures external to Schumann adapted as descriptors of Schumann himself). Deleuze’s understanding of schizophrenia involves the breaking down of seeming dichotomies: not only between the
Self and the Other, as in the inevitably fraught Self of any schizophrenic person, but also between man and nature, as in his description of Lenz’s walk through the park.

In “Haunted Spot,” Schumann echoes Deleuze’s rejection of the supposed man-nature dichotomy. The piece is a depiction of a poem in which humanity and nature are produced within each other, in the form of a flower growing red to signify human bloodshed. In “Haunted Spot,” the natural and the unnatural (i.e. the manmade) are also produced within each other, abiding by the same Deleuzian logic. This reversal- and that between Self and Other- is characteristic of Schumann’s madness, and that of the archetypical composer. In rejecting the social and economic conditions that, to Deleuze, falsely divide man and nature, Schumann’s “radicality has some relation to madness” (Barthes 295). This madness separates the composer from the writer, the semantics of sign-less music from the semiotics of meaning-bound writing.

The repudiation of social injunctions that comes with Schumann’s madness, and that allows him to break down seemingly immutable dichotomies, is what, to Barthes, characterizes a Schumannian. Deleuze, as a renegade among theorists (hence Barthes’ invocation of him as an indicator of Schumann’s obscurity), and as himself a skeptic of the dichotomies torn down in Schumann’s work, is therefore a Schumannian. His understanding of writing is not just compatible with, but also informative of, Barthes’ comparison of writing and music, and the semiotic logic of each upholds Barthes’ view of the composer as mad. Deleuze’s schizoanalysis, an understanding of schizophrenia situated in social context through a materialist lens, helps apply this general point to
Schumann specifically. Though “madness” carries a negative connotation, it was frequently ascribed to Schumann in his own time, with a variety of intentions, some benevolent, some neutral, and some malevolent. I do not use the term as a criticism of Schumann, but rather in the sense that Barthes does: as a description of a particular relation between signifier and referent, which characterizes music as an art form, and Schumann’s music especially saliently.

I also use the term “madness” in the sense that Schumann’s contemporaries used it to describe his schizophrenia. Deleuze takes great care to avoid either demonizing those with schizophrenia or glorifying the condition itself, and I hope I’ve done the same. It would be foolish to ignore the role that Schumann’s mental state played in his art—after all, what artist does not reflect their own experiences, thoughts, perceptions and emotions in their work? Still, my dispensation with the “tortured artist” stereotype is partly because of the tendency of its proponents to glamorize the struggles of such artists, and ascribe their artistic genius to these struggles. Schumann would have been a brilliant composer had he not suffered from auditory hallucinations, paranoid delusions, suicidal thoughts, and addiction, but that does not mean his music can be understood independently of these mental tribulations. Deleuze’s analysis of schizophrenia echoes deeply with the ways in which Schumann’s schizophrenia found its way into his music—particularly through the dialectical relationships he portrayed between Self and Other (and thereby between music and the lack of music), and between man and nature. Barthes was thus profoundly correct in declaring Deleuze a Schumannian.
Despite these dualities in Schumann’s music, or perhaps because of them, there is also a distinct oneness, a purity identified by Barthes. He compared this to the relationship between a child and a mother, which to many scholars steeped in Freudian psychoanalysis would immediately evoke thoughts of Oedipus. However, in Schumann’s music- and Barthes’ description thereof- this relationship is *anti*-Oedipal. Deleuze establishes throughout *Anti-Oedipus* his belief that Oedipal relationships are not dualities, but triangles, with the Oedipal aspect enforced by capitalist production- the third point in the triangle. The relationship described by Barthes is not a triangular one, nor one influenced by the outside world, but one of (as quoted earlier) “solitary intimacy” (Barthes 293). The relationship cannot be Oedipal because it lacks the Oedipal structure identified by Deleuze (with whom Barthes has already aligned himself via his list of Schumannians). This critique of Oedipus being foundational (and titular) to *Anti-Oedipus*, one can say: not only are Barthes and Deleuze Schumannians, but Schumann and Barthes are Deleuzians.
Bibliography


