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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR AND BY GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Johan Galtung

I. Introduction: Diagnosis, Prognosis and Therapy?

It is a great honor, following the excellent keynote address on the future of the UN, to be the first one out, taking up the challenge by the organizers in the shape of four concerns, the first aiming at a diagnosis, the second at some prognosis, the third at some therapy, and the fourth at the very basic question of who are the carriers of those therapies. Since the major part of my paper is devoted to the problem of basic UN reform, I will deal only briefly with these questions as introduction to one of the possible therapies.

• What is the nature of this time of transition and globalization? Of course, any time is a time of transition since everything human possesses historicity. Is “globalization” going on? Yes, at least in the trivial sense of obvious communication and transportation changes, which move sense impressions close to the speed of light and the body close to the speed of sound. We have had similar changes before expanding the effective range of control by the powerful beyond the horizon, toward the perimeter of the nation.

But does that mean that world-building is going on in the same sense as had nation-building in earlier phases, including the slow building of national democracies? Possibly. The bulk of this paper is about some of the ways of approaching global democracy by introducing mechanisms of accountability for, hopefully, soft institutions for global governance.

Extended range of control does not mean unopposed control, however. There is a dialectic in all of this: force begets counter-
force. Globalize capital even more (it has been fairly international for a long time) by breaking down such barriers as socialist states, and there will be a reaction in the shape of effective global trade unions (not so likely) and much more effective global consumers’ unions (quite likely). The tariff and non-tariff barriers at the borders of countries served some function; the new barriers may be inside countries, in people’s minds, around households, and in local communities. We shall see. People may like the market, but they may also base their buying decisions on factors broader than quality and price—the number of miles a product has traveled with obvious environmental implications, whether the company practices equal opportunity, and a preference for locally produced goods, for example.

The same be true for nation, referred to by some as “ethnicity.” Obviously, pressure for global identity may stimulate the reemergence of alternative identities—regional, national, and local. When Other comes too close symbolically or in person, other Selves may be called to the rescue of the person. People may rediscover identities they thought they had forgotten. Some of these nations may coalesce into supernations such as the current Western Europe. In political terms, regionalization is probably much more likely. There are some regional solidarities around—some based on the class position under globalization, some on national similarities—but we are still far away from a global solidarity at a level high enough to treat all Others like Ourselves.

- What are the critical global forces driving the world into the twenty-first century? They consist of anybody’s list of basic human needs: the threat to human survival from war and violence in general; the threat to human well-being from the misery suffered by perhaps 2 billion fellow human beings, much of it caused by exploitation on a global scale; the threat to human freedom from neglect of (first-generation) human rights as open and subtle forms of repression flourish; and the threat to human identity from the processes of cultural invasion from basically one powerful center in the West. Add to this the threat to ecological balance, with the increasing likelihood of eco-disasters around the world as well as perhaps the most frightening phenomenon of them all: the ubiquitous social disintegration, the
dissolution of the social fabric itself, reducing humans to a set of cost-benefit calculating monads (Leibniz), cut off from meaningful interaction with almost everybody else.

- **Make some suggestions.** Let me focus on the process of arriving at suggestions rather than on concrete proposals. I agree that such processes have to be global in scope even if there are more gaps than bridges in that global “system,” and I will take the basic stand that the scope of global democracy must be increased before other global processes go too far and present us with an increasing number of irreversible facts. The loss of a species would be one example, but what about the loss of a local or national culture, or of a local or national production capacity, de-skilling, de-learning?

- **Identify the social forces, groups, or states that must come together to make the transition less destructive and more amenable to a viable human civilization.** As a peace researcher, I think they can be identified, but as correlations and tendencies rather than in absolute terms. Take the key fault lines of the human condition and simply ask: By and large, given that there are peace forces trying to reduce destructiveness everywhere, where do we find more, most?

**Humans vs. nonhuman nature.** I would, nevertheless, gamble on humans; somewhere there is some capacity for learning. An intuitive “proof” is that, so far, humanity has muddled through.

**Gender.** Experience points to women as peace carriers.

**Generation.** Maybe for women, age matters less. For men, the guess would be the young and the old, avoiding the middle.

**Race.** As such, it is correlated with (almost) nothing.

**Class.** If the upper classes are nationally defined and always maximize national interests (often the same as their interests) and the lower classes have no alternative to obedience, then the upper classes will order the lower classes to kill each other, to engage in economic aggression, to repress others, and to destroy nature. The alternative is the (educated?) middle class.

**Nation.** Nations come in two varieties: (a) the hard nations, which exclude others and see themselves as above the rest, and (b) the soft nations, which are more inclusive, see themselves as
equal to others, and are not chosen for leadership. I prefer soft nations.  

**Territory.** Territories also come in two varieties—big and small—but the problem is not so much the size as the nature of the core, the state, and the administration. The bigger the territory, the more closed, arrogant, secretive, and unaccountable it tends to become. If it has an army, it may become very dangerous. I would gamble on small states and even on smaller territorial units that are not states, such as municipalities.  

**State vs. Civil Society.** Especially in the bigger states, I would gamble on civil society, both in the shape of peoples organizations and just as people, unorganized. It is all about people, is it not? States tend to focus more on accumulation of power for its own sake.  

**Capital vs. Civil Society.** For the same reason, I would trust civil society more, both as organizations (trade unions and consumer unions) and just as people. Capital tends to focus more on the accumulation of capital for its own sake, but a case could probably be made for the smaller corporations.  

**State vs. Capital.** Both possess enormous power, which is easily abused. There could be a message in that: How can that power be harnessed for the sake of peace (the negation of violence), development (the negation of disintegration and misery), and the environment (the negation of eco-distaster)? That is the basic theme: global governance and global democracy.  

Who will be the carriers of such processes? Humans, probably; women more than men; and, to ensure that all age and race categories are present, democratically represented; based on soft nations (including soft religion); smaller states and local units; smaller corporations; and, above all, peoples organizations of all kinds. All others are also in it. We are all equal in front of these problems. But perhaps some are more equal in the struggle than others.  

### II. Global Governance: Some Preliminary Considerations

With the evaporation of the Cold War came the idea that the time is ripe for some kind of global governance. Frequent use of the big power veto, an expression of Cold War conflict, was
sometimes cited as having stood in the way. With the Cold War—the “East-West” conflict—over, there could be a “new beginning.” The North-South conflict would constitute no impediment as no country in the South has veto power, and China conceives of herself as neither North nor South, as neither East nor West. The Gulf War, under UN Security Council Resolution 678 (China abstaining), was used as an example of how the UN was intended, exercising governance in a broadly based coalition, but this was not governance if we define “governance” as “soft government”: gentle but very explicit persuasion with mainly positive incentives. It was government in the sense of enforcing central will on a country, a Member State, in matters of “peace” (not “development” and “environment”) and as decided by the Security Council (not by the General Assembly). The Council quickly abandoned persuasion and positive incentives and escalated from negative incentives (e.g., embargoes and economic sanctions) to military intervention “with all necessary means.” If such measures were used inside a country by its central government, we would probably have described it as a “civil war.” So, maybe the Second Gulf War was exactly that: a war, or at best extremely “hard governance.” In what follows, the focus will be on governance in the sense of “soft government,” and not on government in the sense of “hard governance.” In saying so, a line is drawn between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

A governance based on Security Council consensus is wrought with two major problems. First, given the top-heaviness of the UN, this will be power exercised against the small; the permanent members will protect themselves (and their clients) with a veto. Second, there is also a high probability that new cleavages will open up among the big powers: the U.S., the European Union (EU), Russia, Japan, India, and China; four of them have veto powers (one, the EU, even has two), two of them do not. Global governance should not be based on a shaky consensus used for dubious geopolitical principles. In addition, the great conflicts of the age, and not necessarily limited to interstates, include the following:

- Humans vs. non-human nature—the environment problematique, within and between countries, possibly with wars over
such scarce resources as oil, water, fertile soil, space as such, and clean air.

- Gender conflict — with the disappearance of millions of women annually, in various ways and stages of their life cycle.
- Generation conflict — with increasing marginalization of the aged, and possibly also with the use of “death assistance.”
- Race conflict — particularly cruel on the Red and the Black, and with Whites becoming an ever smaller (desperate?) minority.
- Class conflict — producing starvation in the South and unemployment in the North in a very badly managed world economy.
- Nation conflict — producing apparently endless cycles of violence in the pursuit of autonomy, independence, and nation-states.

III. Global Democracy: Some Preliminary Considerations

All of this has to be well articulated for conflicts to be adequately handled, and the best tested approach in the world today is democracy. As the title of this paper indicates, global governance is seen as having global democracy both as a cause and as an effect. Only by evolving together in mutually supportive processes can we obtain valid results, serving all human beings on Earth, by promoting development-environment and security-peace. I, then, define democracy as rule by which rulers have the consent of the ruled. If that consent is withdrawn, then the rulers have to stop ruling. Consent can be obtained either by the age-old method of dialogue until differences have been evened out or by the more modern method of debating and then calling a popular vote on issues, not only having elections of officials. The concept of “rule by consent” is deeper than the method of obtaining the consensus or the method of ascertaining the level of consent. Democracy can be based on both processes.

Why is democracy so important? Because human beings are important. Over time we should be entitled to assume that a
democratic country will evolve in the directions the citizens want because the policies are expressions of the “general will.” More particularly, we would assume democracies to be best at handling domestic problems where people are more in charge. But, development-environment and security-peace today have heavy global dimensions and affect social classes differently. In a democracy, domestic policies will be better attuned to the needs of all classes; in a nondemocracy, rulers will favor their favorites. This world is not a global democracy.

The world as a political system combines anarchic features of nonrule with hierarchical features of nondemocratic rule, and the world as an economic system is based on hidden rule. As a consequence, development-environment policies tend to hurt lower-class people in lower-class countries badly, and security-peace policies tend to be in the interest of upper-class countries, launching, for instance, international crime tribunals against marginalized people in marginalized countries. The world is not a democracy, which means that not everybody can be given a voice; there is little or no dialogue toward consensus, and the majority will of humans or even states play a minor role.

The error of equating the sum of domestic democracies with global democracy is surprisingly common. Clearly, there are two different levels involved. It is not difficult to imagine a federal country where states, republics, and cantons are democratic but the center not. The center can wipe out any democratically agreed upon policy in the periphery through “intervention.” We would not expect the benefits of democracy to accrue to that population since democracy, obviously, has to apply to all levels.

In human history, there have probably always been enclaves of democracy, perhaps particularly of the dialogical, consensus-oriented variety. The problem is to extend this pattern to ever broader circles of human organization without forgetting the inner circles, including the most important—the capacity of the individual human being for inner dialogue and doubt.

There are several reasons why democracies do not necessarily behave democratically or peacefully at the world level, and why they might behave more peacefully if we had more global democracy.

Johan Galtung
1. Western democracies have come out of individualistic, competitive, and even aggressive cultures, which, to some extent, are still there.

2. Western democracies have a history of inflicting trauma upon others (e.g., slavery and colonialism), and, harboring fears of victims who want revenge, they act accordingly.

3. Western democracies are at the top of the world socio-economic pyramid and may harbor fears of those lower down wanting revolutionary changes; thus, they act accordingly when those at the bottom of the pyramid make the slightest move.

4. Some Western democracies have problems—(2) and (3) above—within their own countries and might want to preempt any revenge or revolution in the world system for fear of domestic spillover.

5. Democracies share decision-making with the people, but people are not necessarily peaceful. They may be the carriers of “chosen people” complexes and unresolved conflicts of all kinds, predisposing them to negative behavior and attitudes toward conflict.

6. Democracies are generally better at implementing human rights, but that may also make it easier for the governments to invoke human duties, e.g., to “defend your country.”

7. Democracies are based on competition for power, letting the people name the winner. Aggression at the world level might be used to gain elections.

8. Democracies are generally more peaceful domestically because people have had their way (or more of it), but that also means that the military, not fearing a revolt at home, has nothing else to do and can leave the country for a war abroad.

9. Democracies tend toward high levels of self-righteousness—“being democracies, our policies cannot be wrong.” Three conclusions emerge from these reflections.
First, democracies are probably better than nondemocracies at reaching all four objectives — development-environment and security-peace — at home where the majority counts. Heavy
gains should be possible if more countries become democracies to the extent that cause-effect cycles are domestic. Second, to the extent they are not, but like environment and peace are clearly indivisible, respecting no borders, democracies are not necessarily better in their world (“foreign”) policies, and particularly not where peace is concerned. They may be worse. Third, for the linkage between democracy, peacefulness, and other benefits to accrue in the world, there has to be democracy at the world level, global democracy. Nobody would expect that to happen very soon. After all, the democracies as we know them are not perfect either, being, in fact, more parliamentocracies than democracies, with the remarkable exception of Switzerland.8

There are processes toward more democracy; more can be done. Consider one important example of how far away the world is from the benefits we might expect from democratization: income distribution. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report 1992,9 “the richest 20 percent of the world’s people get at least 150 times more than the poorest 20 percent.” But, if the comparison is based on the richest and poorest countries only, disregarding the maldistribution within countries, “in 1960, the richest 20 percent of the world’s population had incomes 30 times greater than the poorest 20 percent. By 1990, the richest 20 percent were getting 60 times more.”10 In other words, a scandalous situation is getting even worse. A more democratic world would not have tolerated this.

IV. Building Blocs for Democratic Global Governance

If the goal is the evolution of a more democratic global governance, then there are many basic questions to be asked. For instance:

- What kind of power should be exercised? Cultural/normative (moral authority)? Economic/exchange (rewarding those who conform, sanctioning those who do not)? Military/coercive (punishing those who do not conform, but not those who do)? Political/decision power (if only in the form of resolutions)?
How much power should be exercised? Similar to a unitary state, binding on all citizens and in all fields? Similar to a federation, binding on all parts but not in all fields? Similar to a confederation, binding on all parties in any field, but only if all agree? Or, even looser, similar to the present UN, i.e., more like recommendations except under very special circumstances?

What is the source of legitimacy for global power? Big power concert? One-state-one-vote? One-human-being-one-vote?

What should be the building blocs of global governance, or, who are the world citizens? Territorial units such as states in the inter-state system? Collective units such as voluntary associations or economic organizations? Individuals organized in constituencies as in a country? All of the above?

Since the focus will be on the fourth question — who are the world citizens — I would like to first make some remarks concerning the other three. The first question has to do with the range of power, how many kinds, how broad or narrow; the second with the depth of power, how deep or shallow; and the third with that elusive quality making even coercive power legitimate and not only in the eyes of the power-wielders.

This gives us the following four well-known combinations:

1. Broad and deep power: unitary or federal systems;
2. Broad but shallow power: confederal systems;
3. Narrow but deep power: regimes; and

The combination preferred here for global governance is the second: broad but shallow power. Let all kinds of power come into play but homeopathically. Power is at its best in small quantities. Governance can be extended over the whole spectrum of human issues, persuading gently, using incentives — mainly positive — here and there with a velvet glove, and taking time for a consensus to emerge. If power cuts too deep, getting into details and microcontrol — and, in addition, with an iron fist — chances are good that the exercise of power will become counterproductive. There must be some flexibility, even the option of withdrawal. Peace is not kept or enforced by creating a
cemetery, as Tacitus remarked. Governance is not a goal itself. Human livelihood is.

The best guarantee seems to be legitimacy vested in democracy, meaning one world citizen—territorial, collective, or individual—one vote. The positive argument has been set forth above, but there is also a negative argument. Nondemocratic legitimacy such as veto-based Security Council resolutions will be challenged. Democratic culture is so widespread today that people all over the world will challenge undemocratic procedures. They may accept some nondemocratic procedures for some time, such as a big power-run UN, but they will increasingly demand processes in a more democratic direction, involving all “world citizens” and at the world level. They will demand global democracy.13

V. A Mini-Theory of Democracy

In order for democracy, that is, rule with the consent of the ruled, to function, the citizens have to articulate their concerns continuously, not only in election years and as total programs. The concerns have to be received by those in command. There has to be communication and, beyond that, dialogue involving the citizenry. The process for arriving at decisions, whether based on consensus or voting, must be legitimate. Only then can democracy bear the fruits: better attention to the concerns of everybody with nonviolent solution of problems and conflicts.

This holds for domestic as well as for global democracy. For domestic democracy, the citizens are those who satisfy the conditions for participation in elections. For global democracy, it is more complex for reasons that also reflect on domestic democracy—there are important loopholes in democratic theory.

Who are these “world citizens” referred to as building blocs above? A frequently encountered conceptualization of modern society may be useful here. There are three components: State (the governing organizations), Capital (the economic organizations), and Civil Society (all the other, countless organizations according to kinship, vicinity and affinity, interest [“workship”], and value [“worship”]). Then, there are People, some of them running State and Capital but mainly in Civil Society. Political science specializes in State, economics in Capital, sociology in
Civil Society, and psychology in People. Integrated views are rare.

Given four kinds of power (normative, exchange, coercive, and decision power) and three components of society, how is power divided among the components? Is there some specialization? In fact, all three components occasionally exercise all four kinds of power, including parents in families run by adults, particularly males, but there are also specializations.

Thus, the classical State with a legislature for decisions, an executive with military and police, and a judiciary for normative power is the seat not only of decision-making but also of normative power, laying down what is right and wrong, and of ultimate coercive power, the ultima ratio regis. But, the State also accumulates economic power through taxation, customs, and its own businesses; and it is criticized by some for having amassed too much of the power assets and by others for having too little.

Capital obviously possesses economic power, perhaps not enough to buy the State (except for some smaller ones) but enough to buy some of the people running the state, possibly the key formula for corruption. In addition, however, they decide which products, goods, and services to put on the market, meaning heavy decision power. Of normative and coercive power, there is little.

What kinds of power does Civil Society/People possess? If the State has monopoly on ultimate coercive power and Capital over economic power, then what is left to associations and people? Ultimate normative/moral power, legitimacy, and decision-making — the very foundations of democracy. This does not mean that people are better morally than their rulers and their merchant-providers; but if “he who has a hammer sees the world as a nail,” and Civil Society possesses neither armies nor capital, then problems are seen as moral rather than military or economic, in need of basic choices and new departures. How is the democratic program of communication-dialogue-decision realized in the triad State—Capital—Civil Society? Not so well. Democracy works in only one pair, State—Civil Society. The legislature is the communication link between Civil Society and the executive part of the State, the legislature, in principle, having the upper hand at least in long-term policymaking. In practice,
the elected legislators handle the cross-pressure between Civil Society and Executive more or less well.

Missing both in theory and practice is the dialogue between Capital (producers/distributors) and Civil Society (consumers), and between Capital and State. Capital should ideally be organized in a more democratic and transparent manner, with open channels of communication for dialogue both with Civil Society and with State. As they all depend upon one another, there will be communication anyhow. Capital and State will accommodate each other, often using legislators under cross-pressure. The result: massive corruption.

The facile answer that the marketplace is the communication channel between Capital (seller) and Civil Society (households and buyers) misses the basic point: the open dialogue for joint decisions. Capital can study market behavior with observations, interviews, and questionnaires and arrive at conclusions about consumer preferences, but this is spying on people rather than dialoguing with them, similar to what the Executive often does with polls. Democracy leaves Capital out in the cold in the name of the freedom of the free market, and Civil Society is usually let in only every four years or so. In the end, they both operate behind the scenes, organizing lobbies to influence State decision-makers.

Traditionally, the Church has been the seat of ultimate moral power. The State and Civil Society have been fighting for control over the Church because the Church can bestow transcendental legitimacy. The doctrine of the separation of State and Church divided the top of society, allowing for more power to Civil Society, while the doctrine of economic enterprise as a kind of sacrament invited Capital into the moral body of the society — on top — just as the doctrine of democracy devolved ultimate decision-making to the bottom, the people. The doctrine of free market behavior even gave Capital godlike attributes: Man (and Woman?) proposes, Capital disposes. In theory, at least.

In classical feudal society in Europe, the prince made all important decisions, especially in military and economic matters, there being no independent Capital or Civil Society. The only challenge was the Church. The battle over ultimate power was ferocious, ending with an agreement on mutual noninter-
vention (concordat), but universal religion came back as ideology.

In the socialist construction that came to an end in Europe in Fall 1989, the Party made all important decisions, including military and economic matters, there being no independent Capital or Civil Society. The only challenge was the State, and after 1989 power ultimately devolved from the Party to the State with more or less Civil Society/People participation (democracy).

Maybe the general moral of the story is as follows. There is no simple solution with four components having one kind of power each. So, we had better draw upon all of them, let them play against one another, and have a maximum of dialogue and some central mechanisms for arriving at final decisions.

For complex problems and the problems of modern society and the modern world, only complex structures will do. Since direct, open communication and dialogue can involve only a limited number of citizens directly, the Media have to enter as one more component, doing exactly what the name indicates: mediating communication. Inserting themselves into the quadrangle State—Capital—Civil Society—People, they risk being controlled by a censorious state, being economically dependent upon Capital advertising and takeover, being used by special interest groups in Civil Society, and being dependent on People for sales, meaning catering to sensations rather than being carriers of dialogues. An almost impossible situation, and yet some media manage. One formula for survival is probably to play on all corners of the quadrangle, giving a little to each and never everything to any one. In that way, good media become a reflection of a working democracy—keeping a balance yet remembering that nothing in the world is more precious than life and that sooner or later some decisions have to be made, reflecting the interests of life.

Remove the Media from the democracies in the world today and we would be back to local democracy with village bulletin boards and town meetings. However attractive, this is insufficient for the reasons argued above: democracies cannot survive in the long run if the supersystems they are parts of are not democratic, nor can they survive if the subsystems they are composed of are not democratic. The Media are part of it to the point that national democracies are only as good as the national media and global
democracy is only as good as global media, which today are run essentially by the single military and media superpower.

VI. A Road to Global Governance and Democracy: Improving the UN

Let us now use these reflections to design a democratic system of global governance, taking the United Nations as a point of departure. Regional and functional governance may emerge in many places, but it is hard to see how an improved system of global governance could emerge except by building on, improving, and democratizing the UN system. The building blocks would be the “world citizens,” the world-system counterparts of the four components of modern society. They are as follows:

- Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) are the world version of the State: the “Aegis,” the United Nations system above the Aegis, the UN General Assembly (UNA, which could be renamed as the UN Governments’ Assembly) above the UN, the Security Council above the UNA in security matters (Article 12), and the veto powers above them all.
- The Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are the world version of Capital: the “Tics,” with no particular organization on top.
- The Interpeople Organizations are the world version of Civil Society: the “IPOs” (also known as the Nongovernmental Organizations, or “NGOs”), with no particular organization on top.
- The People are still the world version of People: with formal equality but with the heads of the other three components above the 5.6 billion human beings in the world today.

Together the states-Aegis, corporations-Tics, associations-IPOs, and People are the world citizens, the building blocks for any system of global governance. The states-Aegis are best at articulation, but if we want democratic global governance, they all have to be in it, one way or the other. The set of all Aegis cannot constitute a world government, however; but if that set had a structure with a coordination council, we would come closer. We could imagine the heads, or representatives, of all Aegis participating in that coordination council, like ministers represent-
ing their ministries in a cabinet government. Most of the UN Specialized Agencies, etc. are functional Aegis or can be seen as such, but the heads of the UN Specialized Agencies do not form a world cabinet—rather a coordination committee at most, the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC). There is no global governance legitimacy nor any real interest in exercising global governance. Why?

One answer is that if they had that legitimacy and interest, they would compete with the Member States; the UNA, in general, and the Security Council with veto powers, in particular. Territorial legitimacy still ranks above functional legitimacy; regionalism above functionalism; state power above capital, above professionalism in general and even above moral power.

However, this means that we have two roads to global governance based on the state system, devolving power upward from States: (a) the territorial way of organizing the Heads of States or their representatives with Heads of Big Powers as special case and (b) the functional way of organizing the Heads of Aegis with Heads of UN Agencies as special case. The former makes Member States the building blocs while the latter makes the Aegis the building blocs. The latter plays down the States, but also creates more distance from the People. A citizen who has something to articulate has a shorter distance to the top through his own government than through the IGO delegation of his own government.

In the European Union, a regional organization so far composed of approximately 6 percent of humankind, these two roads lead to the European Council for the Heads of State and Government with the Council of Ministers as their representatives (foreign or EU affairs) by using the territorial approach; and, using the functional approach, to the European Commission with intricate relations among them and the other two major institutions, the Court and the Parliament. No doubt the double-track EU experience will play a major role in any future formulation of global governance as positive and negative models and scenarios.

One important point can be noted immediately: the commission is much more than a committee of heads of functional agencies, similar to ministries at the state level. It is composed with a view to function as a body with a president who becomes the
de facto EU president. At a minimum, the UN could equip the ACC with a similar function (e.g., with a UN deputy secretary-general as president, possibly even the secretary-general himself).

We encounter the same two roads in connection with Civil Society. People could come together in a World Assembly as they do in democracies, electing representatives from constituencies. In theory, the world could be one constituency, but the simplest solution today would be to let each country or people (for the indigenous peoples or noncountry people in general) be a constituency with the right and duty to elect, say, one representative per country or people up to one million members and then one additional participant for each one million members. The assembly of these participants could then constitute a United Nations People’s Assembly (UNPA), the Second UN Assembly.

The second road to the top passes via the Interpeople Organizations. The heads or representatives of all IPOs could also constitute an assembly (like the Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations, CONGO, at present). There is no domestic parallel with general social power, only trade union and interreligious councils of organizations in the same field.

For Capital, one homologue would be branch councils, from the guilds of earlier ages, to set standards, regulate competition, protect the branch against outside pressure, and negotiate deals. Theoretically, all economic organizations in any one country could come together in a national Chamber of Commerce and elect a representative to a World Assembly, but the Tics, being transnationally integrated, are probably more important building blocs. A world TNC assembly would bring together enormous capital power that would not necessarily be more competitive than states.

If we now assume that a global governance worthy of the name would have to bring together for articulation, dialogue, and final decision-making world versions of State, Capital, Civil Society, and People, then we are approaching something with adequate complexity. The state system will still play the major role for some time, but moribund remnants of feudalism such as big power veto, voting power according to capital, and the fixed location of the UN in a major big power can gradually be abolished. Those defending feudalism define themselves out of...
court by demonstrating contempt for democratic values however “realist” they may sound. The States, being successful but also potentially dangerous, should become better world citizens by being locked into democratic global governance.

People should certainly not be disregarded but rather have a direct impact on any democratic global governance, not, however, via the State (a governmental organization, or “GO”) or some IPOs. There is no alternative to world direct elections, supplemented by world initiatives and referenda, which are bound to come sooner or later.

Having said all of this, then, why not also include Capital as partners in democracy? Why all this talk about corporate states and fascism the moment the argument is made that corporations should also participate in articulation, dialogue, and decision-making openly arrived at? Given their enormous significance for all life on earth, it is imperative to make them more responsible and responsive, and, above all, more accountable. A world assembly of Tics would not be the ultimate power in the world but a force to reckon with, an untapped reservoir of world citizens; highly relevant to the four major world concerns.

The recommendation/conclusion so far would include a World Assembly of States, a World Assembly of People, and a World Assembly of Tics, with a World Assembly of Aegis, a World Assembly of IPOs, and a World Assembly of Chambers of Commerce in the background, as consultative bodies. How can these building blocs be woven together?

The position taken here is to graft them onto the infant global governance that already has accumulated experience in its two incarnations in this century—the United Nations building upon the League of Nations. In practice, this means adding to the UNA for governments (the World Assembly of States) a Second Assembly, UNPA (for People), including indigenous people, and a Third Assembly, UNCA (for corporations).23

So, the three major components of global governance would be the following:

• **United Nations General Assembly (UNA),** already in existence;
• **United Nations People’s Assembly (UNPA),** as a Second Chamber; and
• United Nations Corporate Assembly (UNCA), as a Third Assembly.

This raises questions of conditions for membership and of the interrelationship in decision-making power among the three. Applicant states have to be recognized by the current Member States in order to become members of the UN. Actually admitted is the government, not the people, since very few governments ask their people whether they want to join. They are assessed by other states. Here are some possible criteria for a non-territorial “world citizen” wanting to be admitted to UNPA or UNCA.

1. Is the organization internationally representative? Does it have members in a sufficient number of countries distributed over a sufficient number of continents, preferably across cultural and political in addition to geographical divides?

2. Is the organization sufficiently democratic? Is the leadership of the organization accountable to the members? Can the leadership be changed through a process of election?

3. Is the organization concerned with human interests? Or, is the focus on rather narrow interests of rather special groups?

4. Is the organization capable of reflecting world perspectives? Or, is the perspective highly circumscribed (e.g., regional, national, etc.)?

5. Does the organization have a certain permanence? Or, is it rather ephemeral, something that easily withers away?

Imagine that we now apply such reasonable criteria to states. Point one would favor multicultural states, provided the rulers are capable of reflecting that kind of diversity. Point two would favor democracies. Point three looks for a general human solidarity as opposed to solidarity with own gender, generation, race, class, and nation only. Point four focuses on world interests, not only on promoting limited state (national) interests. Point five favors states with proven permanence.

Of these five tests, many states would pass only the last, “permanence,” interpreted as territorial control, which means that neither secession nor revolution are around the corner. If they were, recognition could be withheld, but that criterion is possi-
bly the least meaningful for the IPOs, undergoing fission and fusion, coming in and out of existence, all the time, operating as they are in an unlimited functional space, not constrained by the finiteness of world territory. In choosing criteria such as the five mentioned, we would in fact be judging IPOs more severely than we judge states. But then, why not? Why should the criteria remain constant? To demand of a president or secretary-general that she or he have the members fully “under control,” with no minorities seceding or revolting, would certainly undermine the marvelous flexibility of IPOs.

Would these criteria also apply to Tics? A TNC is often internationally representative and relatively permanent, but far from democratic. Maybe it should be democratic? Maybe production for basic human needs and world perspectives beyond size of assets and turnover should have priority, including employing as many people—not as few—as possible?

Delegates to UNA will continue to be selected by the governments, but to UNPA and UNCA, they should ideally be democratically elected. Imagine, then, that we have UNA, UNPA, and UNCA well constituted. How do they relate to one another? Using the modern society as a model with the usual division of state power in executive, legislative, and judiciary, then UNA (corresponding to the European Union Council of Ministers) is one executive as a government exercising (soft) governance and the Specialized Agencies (corresponding to the European Commission) another, albeit in very embryonic form. The legislature, in even less than embryonic form, would be the UNPA, with both the UNA and the Specialized Agencies being accountable to the United Nations People’s Assembly. (The World Court and the International Court of Justice [ICJ] would play the role of the judiciary.) This is what parliamentary democracy, as we know it, with the addition of the two executive heads corresponding to the territorial and the functional tracks, would inspire us to construct at the world level. Does it make sense?

Certainly, if we take democracy, including its weakened, indirect, parliamentary form, seriously. That the resistance against curtailing power and privilege is considerable (as it was once upon a time in the House of Lords) and that the road will be twisted and complex is obvious, but somehow this is the road the world will have to go. At any rate, it is the road it will proba-
bly go given the power of domestic governance as a model for global governance. Power will not be easily ceded to the people. Even in the European Union, the European Parliament has mainly consultative status, probably to be expanded in the near future.

In fact, the state system model is probably likely to be the EU, with its shortcomings and achievements. A major achievement of the EU is peace among the members, at least so far. A major shortcoming is the threat of collision with outsiders, particularly with unions of states like itself. The peace achievement would be highly useful for the world even if it is only inter-state, and the shortcoming less of a problem if we assume the whole world to be on the inside and no outsiders in the galactic system. Actually, full democratization is not necessary for some of the peace effects of governance to show up.

The conclusion/recommendation would be a gradual transfer of ultimate power from UNA to UNPA and, at the same time, a UN Commission of Heads of Agencies to balance the territorial, state-oriented leadership of UNA at the functional, specialized level. There is something fascinating in positing the specialist against the generalist and then having the People’s Assembly as the final arbiter (and the ICJ to supervise it all). What, then, happens to the United Nations Corporate Assembly?

One model would be similar to the UN Economic and Social Council (of the General Assembly), but the UNCA could also participate in an advisory capacity and develop its own internal procedures for how corporations can contribute not only to development and the environment but also to security and peace. Such plans could be presented to both the UNA and the UNPA for dialogue, approval, and follow-up. The incentive for participation would be increased legitimacy for the corporations that follow such rules, whether they are UNCA members or not, overcoming left-wing suspicion and right-wing enthusiasm for capital.

VII. Conclusion: No Global Governance without Global Democracy

A system of this kind would bring in all four types of power and all four components of the modern world. The interplay would
be complex, but, as argued, nothing less than a complex global governance can ever cope with a very, very complex world. However, adequacy through complexity is only one side of the story; democracy is the other. What we have seen of UN governance since the end of the Cold War, including the Gulf and the Bosnia operations, Somalia, Rwanda, and the ongoing operation of the Bretton Woods institutions as a de facto world Ministry of Finance, reminds us more of highly autocratic regimes than of what would have been tolerated inside functioning democracies. Even a world government entitled to overrule Member States may be too much, a problem the European Union is running into, probably increasingly so. Global governance, not world government; central authority, not central government.

How does one continue on this road? One continues by experimenting with world assemblies of transnational corporations and international peoples’ organizations, having the UN do the selection to begin with. They could meet during the summer to discuss the UNA Agenda for that coming session and be on call as consultants. Then comes the emergence of a World Assembly of People, based on direct election from countries that are ready for this and direct selection from others, the understanding being that over time the condition for membership in the Second Chamber UNPA is democratic election of delegates. The UNPA will offer well-seasoned inputs to a UNA gradually liberated from big power veto. In short, a gradual rather than a dramatic scenario.

Notes
1. The conflict was actually between the world Northeast (the socialist countries) and the world Northwest (the capitalist democracies) with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members from the world Southeast (Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) joining the latter. By far, most of the countries in the South, East, or West were nonaligned. The term “East-West” conflict is Eurocentric, or “North-centric.” This has important political ramifications, such as overestimating the significance for the world as a whole of conflict formations and conflict transformations in the North while at the same time underestimating their significance in the South.
2. Of course, that was already some time ago. The governments of the world were caught unprepared by the Cold War evaporating before their eyes and had no blueprint for peace or global governance ready. In the meantime, some of that momentum was lost, but there will be more “new beginnings.”
3. The conflict is actually between the world Northwest, as defined in note 1, and the world Southwest, meaning Latin America, the Caribbean, West Asia, the Arab World, Africa, and South Asia. With the ex-socialist countries increasingly acquiring a role in the world economy similar to that of the Third World countries, rather than “North-South” conflict, we should talk about “Northwest and Southeast-Southwest and Northeast” conflict, reflecting the two growth poles in the world at present, the Northwest and the Southeast (East and Southeast Asia). Again, this is a point filled with political ramifications as the lineup in any organization for global governance may be different from what it was during the Cold War.

4. To this might be added a Slavic/Orthodox big power crystallizing around Russia and an Islamic big power crystallizing around Turkey, both of them outcomes of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which was, in many ways, a multicultural society. Among the six, only four would have veto powers, the EU even having two vetoes. Far from being a big power concert, major conflict formations are already visible in the U.S.-Japan dyad and the EU-Russia-Turkey triad. See Johan Galtung, “The Emerging Conflict Formations,” in Restructuring for World Peace: On the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century, ed. Majid and Katherine Tehranian (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1992). In the article, a number of combinations are spelled out as future possibilities, sometimes crystallizing around religions. Thus, in the pan-European space at present, including Turkey and the Central Asian republics of the ex-Soviet Union, Catholic and Protestant Christianity are relatively integrated, and Judaism has been almost eliminated by genocide in Christian countries. However, the Catholic-Orthodox schism of 1054 has not been healed, and the Christian-Muslim divide is probably widening. Of course, there are always other factors, such as class in the sense of the reality or fear of being repressed and/or exploited, expansionist tendencies of certain states, traumas from the past calling for revenge, etc. More particularly, the Catholic-Protestant Christianity-Orthodox Christianity-Islam triad has contained the raw material for conflict for generations, even centuries, contained so far by the authoritarian regimes of the ex-socialist countries. They all converge in Bosnia-Herzegovina, aggravated by the sense of being border people, on the religious dividing line. This is only one example of the naïveté of any analysis assuming that with the end of the Cold War the total conflict material in the world decreased.

5. Some might even go further to say “all life on earth,” in other words, biocracy, not only democracy. In either case, the future would be included as future generations.

6. Dialogical democracy is often associated with African and Oriental political structures, debating/voting democracy with the Occident. Voting is based on head-counting, in other words, on assumptions of individualism and on winners and losers. Dialogues can be based on collectivism and organicism, conceiving of the polity as corpus mysticum within which dialogues take place to the benefit of all parts of the “body politic,” with no winners or losers. One great advantage of a dialogue, i.e., brainstorming, is the emergence of new ideas; one great advantage of voting (in elections, referenda, etc.) is to provide
a stop signal for a debate, regardless of how big the group is. To press one type of democracy onto a culture based on the other is, of course, cultural colonialism; neither of them has a monopoly on the idea of democracy. The interesting problem is how they can be combined.

7. The Russian word for “giving voice” is glasnost.

8. Of the approximately 500 national referenda carried out in the world this century, 300 took place in Switzerland, meaning that a country with about one per mile of the world population has 60 percent of the democracy as measured by that indicator.


10. *Op. cit.*, p. 1. It is worth noting that the worst national disparity, Brazil, with “26 times between the richest 20 percent of the people and the poorest 20 percent according to their per capita income” is still far better than that of the world (p. 3).

11. I am indebted to Professor Toshiki Mogami of the International Christian University, Tokyo, for his analysis of UN legitimacy in terms of generations (although he does not explicitly add individual-based democracy). See his *The Problem of Legitimacy in the UN* (Tokyo: International Christian University, 1993).

12. This is also known as the Westphalian model from 1648 but is anarchic and/or hierarchical/feudal with no global (or regional) governance.

13. There is an interesting parallel to the decolonization after the Second World War, presumably fought for democracy: colonialism was untenable afterwards. In the same vein, big powers at the top of the world pyramid, arguing very well for democracy and (first generation) human rights all over the world, undermine their own hegemonic position in the world system. World feudalism increasingly becomes untenable.

14. One perspective is that corruption is implicit in what has been said in the text: when good, legitimate channels for dialogues are absent, Capital will do what it is good at—lobbying and bribery. Not all of that will disappear with better channels of communication, but some will.

15. Organizations of guilds based on profession (crafts, trades) rather than kinship existed in Europe in the Middle Ages and Early Modern periods. One major function was mutual protection. They were hardly transparent and democratic and may be one reason why assemblies of economic organizations, or corporations, have a bad name, being associated with “corporatism” and fascism. However, the problem of inadequate or nonexisting communication channels while “adequate” channels are nontransparent and conducive to massive corruption remains and has to be solved regardless of flawed concepts and practices in the past.

16. For the important role played by these parts of Civil Society, see Johan Galtung, “Eastern Europe Fall 1989 — What Happened and Why? A Theory Sketch,” *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 14 (1992): 75 – 97. Had the state system in the Cold War “theater” functioned in a democratic manner, these organizations would hardly even have existed, not being
needed. The strength of a society is very much a function of such reserves for action in times of crises.

17. Max Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is in this category.

18. Some would argue that animals (and potentially other forms of life) should be added to this list of world citizens, possibly as represented by human ombudsmen or -women, each one (or a committee) representing one species.


20. Another formula would focus on nations rather than countries, bringing up the whole problematique of nonrepresented nations and indigenous peoples. One formula might build on existing organizations working toward a United Nations Assembly of Nonrepresented/Indigenous Nations.


22. These are usually called “NGOs,” but that term is avoided here, as it appears to refer to people as “nongovernment.”

23. UNPA and UNCA could, in the first run, be admitted to the UN system under Article 22: “The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.”

24. Switzerland did so for UN membership in March 1986, and the answer was no. As of Fall 1994, only three governments of the twelve presumably democratic Member States of the European Union (Denmark, France, and Ireland) have had a referendum over something so fundamental as the Maastricht Treaty.

25. From the author’s *United Nations, United Peoples* (forthcoming).

26. In practice, a transition period of ten or twenty years may be in order with a governmental pledge to work for a system of election rather than selection, or appointment of delegates.

27. This would be similar to an Orthodox-Slavic union of Russia, Byelorussia, (Eastern) Ukraine, and (Northern) Kazakhstan, and a Muslim-Turkish union of Turkey and the five ex-Soviet Muslim republics with Turkish languages (all except Tadzhikistan). It should be noted that the European Union consists mainly of Catholic/Protestant–Roman/Germanic countries.

28. Subsidiarity would be the general rule, as much downward autonomy as possible, including local-level governance and democratic governance at all levels.