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Spring 2009

Title: New Rhetoric, Old Practices: Combining Old and New Diplomacy in 1919

Author: Natasha Leyk

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Signature:  **Date:** 4/30/09

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New Rhetoric, Old Practices

Combining Old and New Diplomacy in 1919

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Defended 22 April 2009

Abstract

The idea of a "new world order" based on peace, justice and democracy is not unique to the post-Cold War era. President Woodrow Wilson utilized the same rhetoric when discussing the end of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Wilson's "new world order" provided a foundation to his conception of New Diplomacy. Yet 1919 was not the start of a "new world order" based on New Diplomacy. The Treaty of Versailles, negotiated at the Paris Peace Conference, became considered a harsh treaty that was not based on New Diplomacy. How did New Diplomacy fail in 1919, particularly regarding the Treaty of Versailles, and yet maintain a position within the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States?

I explore the puzzle by examining the inclusion of the rhetoric of New Diplomacy with the practices of Old Diplomacy using a historical institutionalist framework. This analysis is conducted in two significant sections after presenting of the framework and the literature. The first details the development of Old and New Diplomacy as opposing institutional paths within the institution of diplomacy. The second section explores the way the practices of Old Diplomacy were combined with the rhetoric of New Diplomacy within the Treaty of Versailles. The incorporation of Old and New Diplomacy is particularly evident in four major sections: the Paris negotiations, the war guilt and reparations clauses, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Mandate system. Ultimately, this paper concludes that New Diplomacy failed to become a new dominant path in diplomacy after 1919. The inclusion of the rhetoric of the New in 1919, however, provided the basis for its current use in contemporary United States foreign policy rhetoric

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I am forever indebted to my family for all their moral support throughout the entire writing process, as well as in my other academic goals. I know I have the unconditional support of my family throughout all my academic trials, including the completion of this project. To my mother, Dawn, I am most grateful for she has continually supported me and my ambitions, including my decision to work on this project and to continue my studies in diplomatic history. I feel such relief knowing my mother is there for me.

I am also grateful to my committee members, Professors Andrea Robertson Cremer, David Blaney and Peter Weisensel, as well as the other faculty and staff that have helped me along in this process by reading drafts, listening to my frustrations, or prompting me to talk about my work. I am especially thankful that Professor Cremer agreed to be my adviser for this project, despite its scope as a diplomatic, early twentieth century paper, while her expertise is early American cultural history. I also appreciate the efforts of Professor Itzkowitz, who read various drafts of my project despite being in England on sabbatical. I am also grateful to Professor Blaney who not only advised me during an independent study to complete a chapter of the project but also read numerous drafts of the paper. All three of these professors have also encouraged me to continue my education in diplomatic history with the aspiration of becoming a professor.

Finally, I am very grateful to the friends who have helped me through the various stages in the process of completing this paper, from senior seminar drafts in the fall to thesis drafts and defense in the spring. I have the most gratitude toward my roommate, Rebecca Solano, for listening to me complain about the project, helping me to find the perfect word or phrase, and undertaking the final copy editing process prior to the submission of this paper.

Thank you all so very much.

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Introduction

> Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the *sturdy alliances and enduring convictions*. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use. Our security emanates from the *justness of our cause*; the force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint. We are the keepers of this legacy, guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort, even *greater cooperation and understanding between nations*.[1]
>
> President Barack Obama, 20 January 2009, Inaugural Address

President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address utilized the history of American foreign policy, specifically the necessity of "cooperation and understanding between nations," to suggest the means for the United States to retain its status as a world power. The emphasis on "cooperation and understanding between nations," coupled with the importance of "the justness of our cause," echo President Woodrow Wilson's conception of American foreign policy during the Great War (1914-1918).

Although President Obama's words addressed the current international diplomatic environment, the key elements of this quotation easily resonate in the diplomatic climate of the Great War, particularly when considering President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points Address of 1918. Wilson's Fourteen Points, aside from providing the basis of United States foreign policy rhetoric, exemplified New Diplomacy. Under the framework of New Diplomacy, which developed during the Great War, acts of aggression were no longer justifiable without wide moral support. Another central tenet of New Diplomacy

[1] President Barack Obama's Inaugural address 20 January 2009. Emphasis added. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2

was the "community of nations," first conceptualized as the League of Nations, later to become the United Nations. Building on the "community of nations" was the intention to promote peace among world powers through cooperation and understanding. These goals remain central to American foreign policy thinking.

The question of a "community of nations" engaged in dialogue to promote peace and prosperity resonates in the foreign policy of both President Barack Obama and President Woodrow Wilson. The emphasis on the "community of nations" and democratic diplomacy defined Wilsonian idealism and American foreign policy rhetoric in the ninety years since the Fourteen Points Address, which served as New Diplomacy's defining document in January of 1918. Conservatives and liberals have co-opted elements of Wilsonian foreign policy, thus dominating American foreign policy since the United States became an actor on the world stage beyond the Western hemisphere. The principles of New Diplomacy retained their significance in American foreign policy rhetoric since its creation during the Great War.

Before the ink dried on the Treaty of Versailles, bureaucrats and negotiators became disillusioned with the events and outcomes of the Paris Peace Conference. By 1920, various criticisms of the Treaty of Versailles, which intended to exemplify Wilsonian New Diplomacy, were published and widely read, spreading disillusionment from those involved in the negotiations to a wider audience. By the start of World War II in 1939, New Diplomacy was considered a complete failure. Despite this disillusionment, the rhetoric of New Diplomacy remains in American foreign policy and even in the larger international environment, including the "community of nations" that became the United Nations in the aftermath of World War II. Why did New Diplomacy fail in 1919 but

remain the rhetoric of diplomacy throughout the Cold War and into the post-Cold War era?

New Diplomacy itself was a response to the perceived causes of the Great War. Various social and political groups developed the principle elements of New Diplomacy, which were eventually utilized by President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points Address. Popular support of New Diplomacy based on "self-determination," a "community of nations," open covenants, and democratic diplomacy increased as the horrors of the war devastated Europe. By the end of the war, casualties amounted to 1,800,000 German soldiers, 1,384,000 French, 1,290,000 Austro-Hungarians, and 743,000 British (plus 1,384,000 for the rest of the empire), aside from the civilian devastation on the various home fronts.[2] The Great War provided the impetus for calls for altering the institution of international diplomacy. As disillusionment with the devastating war grew, various populations throughout European began to support the synthesis of New Diplomacy personified by President Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points Address of 1918. In response to public support, the rhetoric of New Diplomacy became the dominant language of the Paris Peace Conference despite the skepticism of various politicians at the negotiations. The Paris Peace Conference was intended to create a "new world order" of peace and prosperity on the basis of Wilsonian New Diplomacy. Yet, as stated before, New Diplomacy failed in 1919 only to remain in the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States.

The evolution of American foreign policy throughout the Great War and into the Paris Peace Conference remains salient in current diplomacy and academic scholarship.

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[2] MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: six months that changed the world.* New York: Random House, 2002. p. xxvi.

The importance of President Wilson in not only bringing the United States out of its isolation in the Western hemisphere, but also defining the key principles of that foreign policy has been the subject of numerous books, articles and dissertations. These scholars have, since 1920, looked at the role of Old Diplomacy and New Diplomacy in the formation of the Treaty of Versailles and the events at the Paris Peace Conference. None, however, have examined Old and New Diplomacy as rhetorical tools that influenced popular perception of the events between the start of the Great War and the signing of the various treaties that emerged from the Paris Peace Conference. The distinction between Old and New Diplomacy, when considered as rhetorical tools rather than analytical categories, is particularly important when applying the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism to this specific case as it provides a better understanding of the failure of New Diplomacy in 1919.

Historical institutionalism understands significant changes in policy direction as a result of changes in institutional culture. The theory relies upon two key elements: path dependency and critical junctures. Path dependency is a self-reinforcing process that encourages replication of a specific theory until the institutional culture changes to a new path due to an outside event, the critical juncture. Within the case of Old and New Diplomacy in the creation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Great War provided a possible critical juncture in the institution of diplomacy formation. Two paths emerged, the Old Diplomacy of empire perceived to cause the war and New Diplomacy intended to prevent future wars. Ultimately, I argue that New Diplomacy, as espoused by Wilson and embraced by a variety of social groups throughout Europe and North America, failed to become the dominant form of diplomacy in the aftermath of the signing of the Treaty of

Versailles and the Paris Peace Conference because Old Diplomacy remained the dominant practice, despite the popularity of the rhetoric of New Diplomacy. Although New Diplomacy failed to become the dominant path in diplomatic policy formation in 1919, the diplomatic institutional culture adopted the rhetoric of New Diplomacy enabling the same language of 1919, though deemed a failure, to be utilized in the present day.

The World's Desire. "Punch." 159 [1919]

Framing the Old and the New:
The Theoretical Framework of Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism provides a useful context for understanding change and stability in policy formation, particularly the development of Old and New Diplomacy by various social groups during the Great War and the failure of New Diplomacy in the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference. Historical institutionalism, one of several "new institutionalism" theories, emerged in the 1980s as a tool for understanding changes in policy formations within various governmental institutions. The literature surrounding historical institutionalism marked a return to earlier iterations of institutional theory by emphasizing the importance of policy-making bodies in political decision-making. New institutionalism on a whole differed from classical institutionalist theory, however, by incorporating the roles of individuals and institutional culture itself as important factors in the decision-making process. Early conceptions of the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism returned to emphasizing the role of institutions in ensuring some order in an anarchically prone international political environment.[3] Specifically, this framework attempts to understand why certain policy decisions were made, as well as the influence of those decisions on future events by looking at the particular conditions that occurred when similar political issues diverged into different policies.[4] The theory relies on the assumption that institutional constraints and structures, which are part of the historically created institutional culture, influence the behavior of those involved in the

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[3] Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44 (1996). p. 743
[4] Hall and Taylor, p. 743

policy-making process.[5] While institutional culture reinforces stability in policy-making, it is not immune to change.

Pierson and Skocpol identify three key characteristics that set historical institutionalism apart from other new institutionalisms and theoretical frameworks. These characteristics include studying historical events and actions, tracing changes through a specific period of time, and analyzing the context of institutional changes.[6] The idea that historically created constraints shape the behavior of political actors and interest groups within the policy-making process underlies many studies utilizing historical institutionalism.[7] While individual actors are important to understand policy development within an institution, as well as shifts in policy, they are not completely independent from the institutional constraints that structure their actions.

Historical institutionalism, however, does not maintain a narrow definition of institution. Although institutions can be formal policy-making bodies, such as Congress, they can also be identified as the set of procedures and norms that have become so ingrained as to become its own action-shaping structure, as is with methods of conducting diplomacy. The theory also situates these institutions in broader contexts by examining factors such as socioeconomic changes, ideological flows, and actors' interests and strategies.[8] With this focus on policy formation and institutional culture, the theory elaborates how specific characteristics of institutions influence historical processes,

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[5] Beland, Daniel. "Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective." *Social Policy & Administration* 39 (2005). p. 1

[6] Pierson, Paul and Theda Skocpol. "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science," in Ira Katnelson and Helen V. Milner (eds) *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. New York: Norton, 2002. p. 713

[7] Beland, p. 1

[8] Ma, Shu-Yun. "Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic Implications of Historical Institutionalism." *International Political Science Review* 28 (2007). p. 63

thereby providing a more complex understanding of institutional stability and change through the use of institutional history.[9] This understanding posits that institutional culture structures the behavior of bureaucrats, elected officials and interests groups during decision-making processes.[10]

Historical institutionalists examine the behavior of bureaucrats, elected officials and interest groups through the concept of path dependency. Path dependence is the self-reinforcing process in a political system that encourages replication of a specific policy until the institutional culture changes, often through a new "path."[11] The path is based on the importance given to historical precedents in policy creation by the continual behavior of participants in the process. Paths include the rhetoric utilized to develop the policy within the institution as part of the creation of institutional culture, which constrains policy formation to ensure the continual use of a specific language for framing various policies. Path dependence is not deterministic as altering decisions remain possible when new outcomes seem to be following a "new path." However, changing policy direction can be difficult as the policy becomes ingrained in institutional culture. Where change does occur, new paths similarly reinforce new patterns of behavior into the future.[12]

Historical institutionalism, therefore, utilizes a dual model of institutional development through the characterization of relatively long periods of path-dependent stability and brief phases of critical junctures when dramatic change is possible.[13] Path dependence is the primary causal mechanism in historical institutionalism with stable

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[9] Hall and Taylor, p. 743
[10] Beland, p. 3
[11] Pierson and Skocpol, p. 699
[12] Pierson and Skocpol, p. 699
[13] Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism." *World Politics* 59 (2007): 341-69. p. 341

paths beginning, and ending, with critical junctures.[14] Given the importance of path dependency to historical institutionalism, many theorists argue that the timing or actual sequence of events within the process is important, as even slight changes in the circumstances could change policy, thus placing the institution on a completely different path.[15] Some scholars have criticized reliance upon path dependency since analysis capabilities in historical institutionalism are often weakened by the failure to precisely argue the causal factors that underpin path dependency and its influence on eventual outcomes.[16] Nevertheless, historical institutionalism, particularly the language of path dependency and critical junctures, is a useful tool for understanding how policy changes in both institutional and individual settings. I use the framework of historical institutionalism to analyze the creation of New Diplomacy as an alternative to Old Diplomacy during the Great War and the subsequent failure of the New after its inclusion in the Treaty of Versailles.

As part of the so-called "new institutionalisms," historical institutionalism accepts a broader use of the term "institution." Not only does the definition of "institution" include policy-forming bodies, such as Congress or the League of Nations, it also includes "both formal and informal procedures, norms and conventions."[17] These procedures and norms include the very language in which policy is formulated, such as the use of Old Diplomacy and New Diplomacy in Wilsonian political terms. In this way, both Old and New Diplomacy are seen as competing institutional cultures as well as rival

[14] Capoccia and Kelemen, p. 342
[15] Pierson and Skocpol, p. 700
[16] Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lange. "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change." *International Organization* 49 (1995): 627-55. p. 628
[17]Ma, p. 63

terms for a specific understanding of international relations.

As opposing elements of political rhetoric, Old and New Diplomacy could not exist together. Change was necessary in the diplomatic community, particularly as Wilson, most notably, identified elements of Old Diplomacy as the causes of the Great War, while New Diplomacy would prevent all future wars through the creation of the League of Nations. The framing of diplomatic rhetoric in terms of Old and New Diplomacy further enhanced the creation of a specific institutional culture defining a particular path during the creation of the Treaty of Versailles.

The two significant features that define historical institutionalist theory, path dependence and critical junctures, are applicable to the specific case of Old and New Diplomacy in the Treaty of Versailles. Historical institutionalism elaborates why New Diplomacy did not immediately change the diplomatic culture in the 1920s, while providing the foundation for later changes in diplomatic institutional culture. The primary institution during the creation of the Treaty of Versailles was diplomacy itself, particularly the diplomatic rhetoric utilized by politicians and bureaucrats. By 1919, the politicized rhetoric of New Diplomacy provided an opposing path to Old Diplomacy for diplomatic policy formation. The possibility for New Diplomacy to replace Old Diplomacy as the dominant diplomatic institutional culture occurred because of the disruption of traditional policy formation, a critical juncture. The critical juncture prior to the development of Wilsonian New Diplomacy was the disruption to the international diplomatic community caused by the Great War. The language of Wilsonian New Diplomacy came to dominate the Paris Peace Conference. The actual application of the Treaty of Versailles, however, did not fulfill the goals of New Diplomacy and often

reverted to the status quo understood as Old Diplomacy. Reconciling the complexities surrounding Old and New Diplomacy in the aftermath of the Great War requires a deeper look at the literature and text regarding the Treaty of Versailles.

The Peril Without. "Punch." 159 [1919]



The Peace Queue. "Punch." 159 [1919]

Understanding Paris 1919
A Historiography

Variations of Old and New Diplomacy continue to be utilized after the Paris Peace Conference in the literature surrounding the Treaty of Versailles. The first set of literature was published shortly after the signing of the Treaty in 1919 and through the beginning of World War II in 1939. The second set of literature developed in the early stages of the Cold War, from the 1950s-1970s. After 1949, the subfield of diplomatic history gained prominence, particularly with the United States as a superpower. The importance of United States foreign relations encouraged a wealth of scholarly literature, much of it surrounding the events that brought the United States to superpower status. The Cold War, as well as the politically conservative governments of both the United States and Great Britain, influenced the third set of literature, from the middle of the 1980s. The fourth set of literature, from the 1990s through recent scholarship, grew out of the end of the Cold War and the search for the role of the United States in the post-Cold War era. Each section of the literature provided increasingly nuanced analyses of Old and New Diplomacy, although the literature on a whole failed to grasp the importance of Old and New Diplomacy as rhetorical devices utilized in 1919.

Early Literature: 1920s and 1930s

The early literature of the 1920s and 1930s took two forms. The first was an optimistic view of the "new world order" proposed by Wilsonian idealism and New Diplomacy. The second grew out of disillusionment with the final text of the Treaty of Versailles. The pessimistic outlook came to dominate the literature as war threatened Europe in the late 1930s. Not only had the League of Nations failed to protect the

principles enshrined in the Covenant, but also Germany was regaining military might, even taking over territory in central Europe given independence by the Paris Peace Conference.

One of the earliest works published after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the completions of the Paris Peace Conference was John Maynard Keynes's *The Economic Consequences of Peace* (1919). Keynes, a member of the British delegation, was highly disillusioned by the manner in which the treaty was created, as well as the seeming harshness of the final text of the Treaty.[18] Although Keynes dwelled on the economic aspects of the reparations, his more interesting sections included the characterization of the three main figures of the Paris Peace Conference: aggressive Clemenceau, the "Welsh Witch" Lloyd George, and a "bamboozled" Woodrow Wilson.[19] Keynes was not the only diplomat disillusioned with the Conference; his fellow delegate Harold Nicolson was also disenchanted. Nicolson also wrote a scathing critique of the Peace Conference along with the publication of his diary of the Conference (first published in 1939).

Nicolson criticized the idealism of Wilson, stating that Clemenceau and Lloyd George had to find the middle ground "between the desires of their democracies and the more moderate dictates of their own experiences, as well as a middle way between the theology of President Wilson and the practical needs of a distracted Europe."[20] Later in the text, Nicolson stated that "we arrived determined that a Peace of justice and wisdom should be negotiated: we left it, conscious that the Treaties imposed upon our enemies

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[18] Stevenson, D. *The First World War and international politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. p. 317.
[19] MacMillan, p. 181.
[20] Nicolson, Harold George. *Peacemaking, 1919*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1939. p. 4-5.

were neither just nor wise."[21] Nicolson continued to reveal his cynicism by stating that Wilson's New Diplomacy was not an original idea in and of itself, but unique because "for the first time in history you had a man who possessed, not the desire merely, not the power alone, but the unquestioned opportunity to enforce these ideas upon the whole world."[22] Although he did not utilize the language, Nicoloson suggests that 1919 was a critical juncture for diplomatic policy formation. However, the United States did not enforce those ideas upon the world or even within the full text of the Treaty, thus, arguably, condemning the elements of New Diplomacy incorporated in the Treaty to failure.

George Creel, an American who worked closely with President Wilson, was not as disillusioned when he wrote *The War, The World and Wilson* in 1920. Creel, a former journalist, used poetic language to describe that it was Wilson alone who sought to remedy the problems in Europe, for it was "out of his soul's rebellion against the sorry drama of despair and futility he harked back for the innate idealism of the race and brought forth his proposal for a League of Nations, a world partnership of self-governing peoples in the interests of justice, liberty, and a peace of permanence."[23] He also insisted that the Great War was not about democracy at the beginning of the war or even when the United States entered in 1917. Instead, "trade imperialism ruled the world in 1914, and the breakdown of civilization was the logical result of the theories of government that put weakness at the mercy of greed," which was the cause of the war that Wilson meant to

[21] Nicolson, p. 153-154.
[22] Nicolson, p. 157-158.
[23] Creel, George. *The war, the world and Wilson*. New York: Harper & Bros. 1920. p. 220.

fix.[24] Creel also insisted that the sole purpose of the Paris Peace Conference was "the settlement of the war and questions arising out of the war," not the creation of a "new world order" that became identified with the Conference, the Treaty of Versailles in particular.[25] Although Creel defended the stance taken by the main statesmen of the Conference, that being the creation of a treaty, he maintained that the idealism of Wilson was justified in the context of the devastation of the traditional diplomatic methods of the European powers.

Other early works also attempted to justify the actions of the statesmen, particularly in the creation of the League of Nations. Sir Frederick Pollock's *The League of Nations* (1920) was one of the earlier works theoretically establishing the League of Nations in the diplomatic community. He stated that the purpose of the text was to "give a practical exposition… to understand the conditions under which the League was formed and has to commence its work."[26] He described the precedents in European history for the establishment of the League, while insisting that the League was an innovative way to conduct international policy in a modern world. Both the historical examples utilized in the text as well as the recent events of World War I helped to popularize the League of Nations as part of the New Diplomacy.

By the end of the 1930s, exemplified by the obvious failures of the League of Nations and New Diplomacy, the theme of disillusionment with the Paris Peace Conference, New Diplomacy and the League of Nations became increasingly common. This literature and feeling would lead to the criticisms of Wilsonian idealism common

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[24] Creel, p. 120.
[25] Creel, p. 189.
[26] Pollock, Frederick. *The League of Nations*. London: Stevens and sons, 1920. p. vii.

throughout the rest of the literature. In 1939, E. H. Carr published *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, a book that eventually revolutionized the study of International Relations. Carr, particularly through this text, became one of the fathers of the theory of realism, the pre-eminent theory of international relations in the post-World War II world. *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, aside from its importance in realism and the discipline of International Relations, critiqued utopianism in international relations. Carr begins with the idealism embodied in the League of Nations at the end of World War I but ultimately demonstrates that these utopian goals were undermined by the instability of the international security situation, which prevented cooperation because of state competition and the importance of state survival. Although Carr's analysis condemned the idealist elements of the Treaty of Versailles, ultimately deemed failures, he did suggest the possibility for future improvement. This improvement was not possible in 1919, despite the use of idealistic rhetoric condemning what were viewed as out-dated practices in diplomatic policy formation.

Early Cold War: 1950s-1970s

Scholars have often criticized the failure of the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations in the language of realism and idealism, condemning Wilson as an idealist in an imperfect world. Later scholarship began to focus on the details of the failure to implement New Diplomacy policies. For example, scholars began to reexamine security policy in the League of Nations, such as the possibility that it was the reluctance of individual powers to intervene on behalf of areas such as Manchuria or Ethiopia in the

1930s, rather than problems with collective security itself.[27] This argument countered the realist criticism that collective security is not a possibility in the world system. Other scholars attempted to explain the origins of a new path toward diplomatic policy formation within the rhetoric of New Diplomacy, particularly as demonstrated by President Woodrow Wilson's speeches. Three key works studied the decision-making of Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau as well as the development of New Diplomacy as a viable alternative to Old Diplomacy during the Paris Peace Conference.

Arno Mayer wrote several books pertaining to the influence of the Russian Revolution, particularly of Bolshevism, on the creation of New Diplomacy and its use in the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles. His book the *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy* (1959) detailed the development of Wilson's conception of New Diplomacy prior to, during and after the Great War, including the influence of Bolshevism on that development. Mayer argued that "both Russia and America stepped forward to champion the New Diplomacy; the former from a position of weakness, the latter from a position of strength. Even after Russia's Bolshevik Government left the war, it continued to deny America sole sponsorship of idealistic aims like open diplomacy, self-determination, and popular control of foreign policy."[28] Mayer outlined the origins of New Diplomacy, including liberal internationalism, as the basis for Wilson's Fourteen Points, the preeminent synthesis of New Diplomacy. Mayer analyzed the Fourteen Points one by one to understand the various motives of their inclusion in relation to the Leninist

[27] Walters, F. P. *A History of the League of Nations*. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.
[28] Mayer, Arno J. *Political origins of the new diplomacy, 1917-1918*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. p. 35.

doctrine.[29] For Mayer, the inclusion of New Diplomacy in Wilsonian rhetoric represented an attempt to deflect any support for Bolshevism in the overarching international community.

A second important work that discussed the origins of Old and New Diplomacy, although under the terms of Old and New Systems, was N. Gordon Levin's *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics* (1968). Levin argued that Wilson viewed the United States as an exceptional power, one that could change the diplomatic community by suggesting and utilizing New Diplomacy. Levin stated that "in Wilson's completely liberal ideology, imperialism and militarism were seen as essentially European phenomena associated with a past America had escaped." [30] Therefore America had a duty to "disseminate the progressive values of liberal-internationalism and to create a new world order."[31] Levin, like Mayer, discussed the importance of the various revolutions that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Great War as possible critical junctures in the diplomatic environment. However, Levin identified revolutions within the context of Wilson's goals for a "new world order," particularly because "while radicals sought a revolutionary break with the past, Wilson wished to reform the past more gradually by transforming it within the liberal institutional framework of the present."[32] The gradual change would occur through the League of Nations, "an orderly legal structure within which the existing elements of world politics could be reformed."[33] Levin concluded his work on the role of American exceptionalism in the creation of Wilson's "new world order" by

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[29] Mayer, p. 358-366.
[30] Levin, Norman Gordon. *Woodrow Wilson and world politics; America's response to war and revolution.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. p. 2.
[31] Levin, p. 2.
[32] Levin, p. 250.
[33] Levin, p. 250.

stating that, for Wilson, "the Paris Peace Conference represented the fulfillment of America's liberal-exceptionalist mission to liberate oppressed peoples and to reform the traditional war-producing diplomacy of the European balance-of-power."[34]

Howard Elcock's *Portrait of a Decision: The Council of Four and the Treaty of Versailles* (1972), took a different approach to the creation of the Treaty of Versailles. Instead of looking at the underpinnings of the various positions of Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson, he studied the conflicts surrounding the decision-making process. Elcock's emphasis on the actions of individuals differed from other works, which looked at the underlying rationale for New Diplomacy. Although Elcock devoted analysis to the events that influenced the outcome of the Treaty's text, his focus remained on the Council of Four, where the majority of decisions regarding the Paris Peace Conference treaties took place. Throughout his work, Elcock contended that the creation of the Treaty of Versailles marked a critical juncture in European diplomatic history as "the Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was largely swept away and replaced by the world of twentieth century, complete with the Third World, international arbitration, and nation states."[35] Elcock concluded his work with "The Treaty was the result partly of circumstances- the Allied victory, war-weariness, economic chaos and the threat of Bolshevism- but it was the work, ultimately, of three men. ... individual men were indeed the deciders of the world's destiny."[36] This view reflects the importance of institutional culture and historical circumstance in the creation of the Treaty of Versailles.

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[34] Levin, p. 255.
[35] Elcock, H. J. *Portrait of a decision: the Council of Four and the Treaty of Versailles*. London: Eyre Methuen, 1972. p. 324.
[36] Elcock, p. 324.

During the Cold War: 1980s

The literature surrounding the Paris Peace Conference shifted in the 1980s, in light of the changing political climate of the decade. As David Stevenson remarked, "The inter-war years... were a period of extreme disorder in international economic and political relations... only in the 1950s did a new equilibrium emerge, later in its turn to come under strain."[37] Although Stevenson wrote his text toward the end of the 1980s and the end of the Cold War, other texts from this time period reflected a criticism of the instability caused by the end of the old ways at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, as the Great War provided a critical juncture in diplomatic policy-formation with no new clear path established.

Robert Ferrell's 1985 text, *Woodrow Wilson and World War I,* attempted to explain how the United States in particular became involved in the war and why US involvement was important. Not only was the US influential during the war but the influence remained well into the creation of the Treaty. Ferrell's text was more home-front based, instead of detailing the events in Europe. Ferrell also detailed the changes within the United States because of the war, such as the evolution of civil rights and civil liberties during the war. Ferrell's treatment of the role the League of Nations was to play in Wilson's "new world order" was particularly interesting. Ferrell placed the League of Nations as the "intellectually halfway station... between militaristic German imperialism and a radical Bolshevik revolutionary world."[38] This understanding somewhat paralleled the current events of the Cold War with the United States on one side and the Soviet

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[37] Stevenson, p. 1.
[38] Ferrell, Robert H. *Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921.* The New American nation series. New York: Harper & Row, 1985. p. 147.

Union on the other with the United Nations in-between.

Ferrell is not critical of Wilsonian New Diplomacy and the "new world order," in comparison to F. S. Northedge in *The League of Nations* (1985). Northedge utilized a realist framework adopted from International Relations theory to criticize the use of collective security as a deterrent for aggression. Although Northedge does not use the language of Old and New Diplomacy, what he described exemplifies aspects within those categories. He discussed the role of balance-of-power politics played by an elite group of foreign policy makers as the causes of the war. He also discussed the limited influence of the populace on the decision makers as "the affairs of nations were carried on in throne rooms and Cabinets, in embassies and chancelleries, without regard to them, and without much regard either for the minor members of the international cast."[39] However, Northedge's most condemning remark against the League was that "states played much the same kind of diplomatic game as they had done before the League was born, only now there were rather more rules and the resort to force was hedged about by rather more restraints."[40] The Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations did not fundamentally change the path of diplomatic policy-formation; nor would the United Nations at the end of the Cold War.

Arthur Walworth's text, *Wilson and his Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference 1919* (1986), provided a comprehensive study of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Walworth detailed the rise of the idealism for a "new world order" at the end of the war and into the beginnings of the

[39] Northedge, F. S. *The League of Nations: its life and times 1920-1946*. Leicester University Press, 1985. p. 20.
[40] Northedge, p. 53.

Peace Conference, to the compromises forced for a comprehensive treaty to be created and into the disillusionment that followed the finalization of the Treaty of Versailles. Although Walworth concluded with the disillusionment of the Americans, as well as the Europeans, with the failure for a "new world order" of peace and stability, he stated that "the foundation for a *Pax Americana* that survived the threat of world war longer than did the fragile truce that followed the unfinished business of 1919" was based on the principles and ideas outlined by President Wilson's trip to Paris.[41] Walworth's emphasis on the use of Wilsonian New Diplomacy as the foundation for the United States as a future superpower is interesting, particularly as it contrasts with the view espoused by Northedge that the conference did not fundamentally change the world order.

Lloyd Ambrosius's *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition* (1987) returned to the ideological underpinnings of Wilsonian idealism. Ambrosius, however, rejected the division of Old Diplomacy and New Diplomacy, utilized by Mayer and Levin as well as others, as the language of President Wilson. Instead, he discussed the changes in diplomacy through "interdependence and pluralism." Although Ambrosius emphasized the treatment of the Treaty in the United States, particularly the fight between Congress and the President over ratification, he characterized the disagreements in terms easily related to the Old and New Diplomacy of Wilson, Mayer and Levin. Ambrosius provided a more complex understanding of Wilson's goals and aims in Paris, portraying the President as both idealistic and practical. In "identifying his own country's interests with the world's, the President combined isolationist and internationalist

[41] Walworth, Arthur. *Wilson and his peacemakers: American diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*. New York: Norton, 1986. p. 562.

elements in his foreign policy," thereby satisfying the demands of American citizens.[42] Wilson also compromised during the Peace Conference, particularly to ensure the inclusion of the League of Nations. Throughout the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson as an individual was able to alter the formation of the path of New Diplomacy. Within Ambrosius's framework, the rejection of the labels of Old and New Diplomacy emphasized the artificiality of utilizing Old and New Diplomacy as purely analytical terms. Both Old and New were utilized as rhetorical devices in 1919, a distinction not utilized throughout much of the literature on the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles.

David Stevenson's 1988 text *The First World War and International Politics* attempted "to explain why Governments decided to resort to violence in the pursuit of their political objectives; why the conflict that resulted expanded from its European origins to become a global one; why it failed to be ended by compromise; and why the peace settlement that resulted took the form it did."[43] Stevenson emphasized the role of the British in the creation of the final text of the Treaty, particularly the League of Nations. He also focused on the other aspect of the Treaty of Versailles that gained attention after the signing in 1919: the reparations clauses. Stevenson's emphasis on the role of the European powers added another layer to the understanding of the creation of the Treaty of Versailles at the Paris Peace Conference. Interestingly, Stevenson's text pinpoints the role compromise played in the creation of the Treaty of Versailles although he does not suggest that the compromise between the rhetoric of New Diplomacy and

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[42] Ambrosius, Lloyd E. *Woodrow Wilson and the American diplomatic tradition: the treaty fight in perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. p. 51.
[43] Stevenson, p. v.

practices of Old Diplomacy itself caused the failure of the "new world order" proposed in 1919.

Post-Cold War: 1990s-Present

The 1990s, like 1919, saw a change in the international order. The bi-polar system of the Cold War collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1990s, the United States attempted to find a new place in the world through the creation of another "new world order." Scholars have often looked toward history for parallels to comprehend the contemporary. For the end of the Cold War, the parallel was with the dynamic changes after the Great War. 1994 was also the seventy-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, prompting literature to commemorate the event and address the misconceptions that have taken hold in current society regarding the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty. The literature of this time, although written about specific events, continued to reflect the themes of Old and New Diplomacy in understanding the text of the Treaty of Versailles.

Thomas Knock's *To End All Wars* (1992) was a "study of the impact of ideas and events upon a statesman who, for weal or for woe, attempted to shape the course of the history of the modern epoch."[44] Knock focused on the moral language of Wilson's religious upbringing as the basis for the development of a new path to promote a "new world order" at the end of the Great War. Although Knock acknowledged the outside influences on the creation of a definitive New Diplomacy, he maintained his focus on the President as the principal theorist of New Diplomacy, especially as Wilson criticized

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[44] Knock, Thomas J. *To end all wars: Woodrow Wilson and the quest for a new world order*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. p. vii.

"European imperialism, militarism, and balance-of-power politics."[45] Nevertheless, Knock noted the various influences on the Fourteen Points, particularly as he elucidated the purpose of each point within the events occurring when the speech was made. Knock's work followed in the tradition of analyzing the influences on Wilson and his conception of New Diplomacy in the wake of the war. However, Knock does not provide an argument on the failure of New Diplomacy after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

In 2002, Margaret MacMillan provided a recounting of the Paris Peace Conference with her *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World.* Although her text was aimed at a popular audience, she utilized the great wealth of literature on the Paris Peace Conference. In some ways her division of the events at the Conference was overly neat as she simplified complex issues that permeated the negotiations. Nevertheless, her text provided a comprehensive vision of the creation of the Treaty of Versailles and the development of a "new world order." MacMillan also engaged in the revisionist literature challenging the popular misconceptions of the Treaty as she stated that "although historians are increasingly coming to the conclusion that the burden was never as great as Germany and its sympathizers claimed, reparations remain the preeminent symbol of the peace made in Paris. While most of the 440 clauses of the Treaty of Versailles have long been forgotten, the handful dealing with reparations stand, in what is still the received view, as evidence of a vindictive, shortsighted and poisonous document."[46] The Treaty of Versailles in particular, and the Paris Peace Conference in general, expanded beyond the narrowness of Old Diplomacy, although the practices of the Old defined much of the

[45] Knock, p. 115.
[46] MacMillian, p. 181.

document by engaging in rhetoric identified with New Diplomacy.

Most recently, Zara Steiner included a section on the influence of the Paris Peace Conference on the world and international affairs in her tome on the interwar years, *The Lights that Failed* (2005). Steiner emphasized the creation of a "new world order" under a New Diplomacy when she argued that "the statesmen met in Paris at a moment of high dislocation in the international order." This upheaval provided a critical juncture for "systemic change, when it was possible to contemplate a new international regime to replace the one that had so spectacularly collapsed."[47] She explained that a completely different system was not developed. Instead, and I will also argue, New Diplomacy incorporated many aspects of the Old, particularly as the treaties "reflected the claims of state sovereignty and individual and often conflicting national requirements" as well as the democratic principles.[48] Steiner also included the new precedent of American involvement in international affairs in her section on Wilson's role at the Paris Peace Conference. This inclusion not only followed previous scholarship but explained why the Paris Peace Conference and the Great War continued to be important in the current age: the beginnings of the United States as a Great Power started with the end of the Great War.

Conclusion

Within the vast literature on the Treaty of Versailles and the Paris Peace Conference, one significant flaw is apparent. The majority of the literature utilizes Old and New Diplomacy as analytical terms when, in fact, they were both rhetorical tools

[47] Steiner, Zara S. *The lights that failed: European international history, 1919-1933*. Oxford history of modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 15-16.
[48] Steiner, p. 16.

utilized by activists and politicians throughout the Great War. As rhetorical devices, the language of Old and New Diplomacy itself was highly politicized to serve a specific purpose, particularly the creation of New Diplomacy as an opposing "path" in foreign policy formation. With the exception of Steiner, the recent literature on the Treaty of Versailles has yet to reanalyze the failure of the Treaty, particularly regarding the inability of New Diplomacy to become the dominant method of diplomatic policy formation. Approaching the Treaty of Versailles through a new theoretical framework, specifically one of historical institutionalism with its methods of path dependency and critical junctures, returns to the overarching question of the failure of New Diplomacy in 1919.

The Great War was an important critical juncture in diplomatic history as the American giant became involved in the affairs of Europe, albeit under the auspices that once would be enough. Under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson, the United States, separated from traditional European entanglements, was in the perfect position to create a "new world order" based on the "path" of New Diplomacy to ensure a permanent peace. Although the peace did not occur and criticism of the Treaty arose almost immediately, the basic goals of New Diplomacy resonate today in the continued quest for a "new world order" under American leadership.

PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIVARI.—April 23, 1919.

THE RECKONING.

Pan-German. "Monstrous, I call it. Why, it's fully a quarter of what *we* should have made *them* pay, if *we'd* won."

The Reckoning. "Punch." 159 [1919]

Viewing and Changing Diplomacy
The Political Rhetoric of Old and New Diplomacy

The quest for a "new world order" of peace and prosperity is not unique to the post-Cold War, post-September 11 world. The use of these ideals in the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States began well before the 1990s and 2000s. As early as 1918, with the end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson articulated conceptions of a "new world order" based on democracy, justice and peace. His Fourteen Points address, given to Congress but directed to an entire world still at war, exemplified the New Diplomacy of democracy, the New Diplomacy for a "new world order" to replace the failure of imperial Old Diplomacy with the conclusion of the Great War. Although Wilson and New Diplomacy had wide-ranging support in 1919, New Diplomacy failed to become the dominant diplomatic policy-forming path. In order to understand why the transformation between the paths of Old Diplomacy and New Diplomacy failed to take place in 1919 despite the great promise for New Diplomacy, a detailed explanation of Old and New Diplomacy, particularly one situated within the events of the Great War, is necessary.

The Great War

The Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June 1919,[49] finalized the end of the most destructive war at the time. The Great War was the first total war in the modern sense, as both sides of the conflict devoted intense civilian and military preparations to the conflict

[49] Five years to the day after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke's whose death set into motion the conflict to become known as the Great War.

from June 1914 until the 11 November 1918 Armistice Agreement.[50] The Great War devastated much of Europe; trenches ruined the fertile soil throughout Belgium and northern France, while nearly a quarter of France's male population was maimed or died on the front. Economically, nearly all European powers were in debt, particularly to the United States, while also facing weak, often devastated, domestic economies. Social unrest, caused by the disillusionment with the war and European civilization, added to the domestic concerns of European leaders.

The Great War, later rechristened World War I, was unlike any of the wars that occurred across the European continent in the ninety-nine years after the defeat of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna. Instead of belligerents fighting over territory or unification, such as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the Great War embroiled the vast majority of the continent into conflict through various treaty obligations to one another. The oft-taught "causes" of the Great War began with the assassination of an Austrian archduke.[51] A Serbian nationalist assassinated the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne on a warm day in Sarajevo. In response, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia. Serbia's ally, (Imperial) Russia declared war on Austria-Hungary, prompting Germany, Austria-Hungary's ally, to declare war on Russia and invade Belgium and France as a pre-emptive strike. France, an ally of Russia, declared war on Germany and brought the vast British Empire into the conflict. Ultimately, twenty-nine states would become involved in the conflict, including the United States and the vast

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[50] Stevenson, p. 1.

[51] Of course, the literature on the origins, causes, etc. of the First World War is extensive. The causes themselves, while debatable and prime material for a dissertation (and have been the topic of many theses), are not within the focus of this paper, however. Instead, the public perceptions of the causes of the Great War are more important. Thus, the simplified version of treaty obligations and nationalism will suffice as the "cause" of World War I despite being only an aspect of the conflict.

majority of European states.[52] The empires of Austria-Hungary, Germany and the Ottoman Empire fought against the Allied Powers, the more democratic France, Great Britain and, later, United States. Russia, originally on the side of the Allied Powers, withdrew when revolution and civil war destroyed its home front in 1917.

The Great War proved exceptionally destructive. By the end of 1914, after six months of fighting, France alone had 900,000 dead or wounded.[53] In 1915, another 330,000 French soldiers died on the battlefield with approximately one million wounded.[54] 1915 also saw 170,000 deaths and 680,000 wounded on the German side and 73,000 British troops killed with 240,000 wounded.[55] By the end of the war, an all too human cost became apparent as casualties amounted to 1,800,000 German soldiers, 1,384,000 French, 1,290,000 Austro-Hungarians, and 743,000 British (plus 1,384,000 for the rest of the empire).[56] The sides were evenly balanced throughout the majority of the four years but, by 1918, war-weary populations on both sides, coupled with American entry into the war in 1917, aided the Allied Powers to victory. The utter destruction of Western Europe, the supposedly most civilized part of the world, shocked its citizens and destroyed any confidence they had in their own superiority. Only the Americans, involved for the first time in a European war on European soil, were not disillusioned with civilization. The United States, however, was an ocean away and did not have to see reminders of the destruction strewn across the countryside. The very map of Europe changed with the Great War.

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[52] Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. *The origins of World War I.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 10.
[53] Knock, p. 31.
[54] Knock, p. 31.
[55] Knock, p. 31.
[56] MacMillan, p. xxvi.

Toward the end of the war, after years of frustrated fighting, the autocratic empires collapsed: revolution overran the vast Russian territory; Austria-Hungary dissolved during the ensuing Paris Peace Conference; and the Ottoman Empire, often considered "the sick man of Europe," finally collapsed. Democracy became the entitlement of the people, particularly with the end of the autocratic empires in the wake of the hardships of war and defeat.

The populations of Europe clamored for peace, especially the peace espoused by the speeches of President Woodrow Wilson, to ensure the development of a "new world order" without war. The clash of the old ways of empire and foreign policy elite with the new ways of democracy and populism provided a unique context for the treaty to develop. In Wilson's conception of a "new world order," democratic diplomacy, particularly open treaties, was to replace the failed imperialistic diplomacy. Peace was to become the norm, aggression outlawed and resisted in the international community. Yet, twenty years later, another war occurred in Europe. Wilson's plan for peace, his New Diplomacy, the hope of millions of war-weary citizens, failed because Old Diplomacy was not erased by the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Great War, nonetheless, proved to be a critical juncture regarding diplomacy formation and international relations. Even before Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points, citizens throughout Europe and America insisted on the creation of a "new diplomacy" for the democratic twentieth century. Although these peace and justice movements temporarily declined after the start of the war, the war eventually "accelerated their growth, until by November 1918 they had surpassed their prewar

strength."[57] These citizens and groups laid the foundation for a new diplomatic policy-formation path, although it did not become a viable option until Wilson's Fourteen Points Address in 1918.

By the time Wilson came to embody the New Diplomacy, a large popular base supported his endeavors to fundamentally alter European power politics. Some European bureaucratic elites, notably within the British foreign service, supported New Diplomacy, although others utilized the rhetoric as political propaganda. Nevertheless, New Diplomacy was poised to become the way to conduct international relations in the "new world order" after the Great War. Old Diplomacy was an old policy, the out-dated way of power politics no longer considered relevant to international relations. The Great War provided the opportunity for New Diplomacy to overtake the Old and, for a time, the New seemed possible in international relations.

Wilson himself synthesized the elements of Old and New Diplomacy from a variety of sources, particularly liberal groups from the US and Europe. Within the US, ideas of American exceptionalism propagated Wilsonian idealism.[58] The dichotomy between Old and New was used in texts immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, as well as in the more recent literature, although not without criticisms. The terms Old and New Diplomacy remain important concepts to define, particularly in relation to the role of the war in altering the visions of both Old and New Diplomacy.

Imperial Old Diplomacy

The conception of Old Diplomacy was rather contentious as there really was no

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[57] Mayer, p. 6-7
[58] Ambrosius, p. xii.

unified Old Diplomacy. Instead, critics applied the phrase to the existing structures inherent in the European international system. Thus, there was no discernable difference in the minds of those promoting "New Diplomacy," such as Wilson, between the imperial policies of the 1880s and the events that lead to the outbreak of war in 1914. Old Diplomacy became synonymous with the diplomacy of imperialism and the elite, despite this itself being a simplification of the various diplomatic events. Under this view of Old Diplomacy, European diplomacy relied upon maintaining a balance-of-power against other European powers, particularly in the quest for national interest through territorial possessions. Thus, Old Diplomacy was the diplomacy of Old Europe, of statesmen and empire, not of democracy and the people. The four main elements of the institutional culture of the path of Old Diplomacy- secrecy, balance-of-power politics, annexation of territory, and the importance of the elites- garnered much criticism as the causes of the Great War, during the war, as well as after the Paris Peace Conference.[59]

Critics of Old Diplomacy argued that secret treaties encouraged the escalation of the Great War.[60] In an early 1915 speech by future British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, he stated that "there was not a man in the Cabinet who thought that war with Germany was a possibility under present conditions. Our relations had improved. There was not a diplomatic cloud over the German Ocean."[61] There was no warning that Europe would erupt in war in 1914. The quarrel was originally between Austria and Russia, not the rest of the European states. However, Germany invaded Belgium and attacked

[59] Mayer, p. 54.

[60] Again, whether or not this is accurate, the perception that secret treaties escalated a conflict into the Great War is more important. There were obviously a variety of other reasons as to why the Great War started and escalated but that is not the focus of this particular paper.

[61] Lloyd George, David, and F. L. Stevenson. *Through terror to triumph; speeches and pronouncements of David Lloyd George, since the beginning of the war*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915. p. 47.

France, provoking further actions against the aggressor states, which brought other European powers into the conflict because of secret treaties. Preventable conflicts escalated into devastating wars through various treaty obligations and calculated decisions.

The purpose of the secret treaties among the European powers was to maintain a balance-of-power between the European states. Germany, relatively recently acquiring the status of empire, threatened France. Germany found an ally in the empire of Austria-Hungary to check the dominance of France and Britain. France looked to Britain, a sea-power, and Russia, on the eastern edge of Europe, to balance the imperial alliance in central Europe. Balance-of-power politics and rivalries occurred throughout much of European diplomatic history, particularly with the "selfish national interests" of imperialism and nationalism reinforcing various alliances.[62] With the emphasis on empire and imperial rivalry, the larger, more powerful European states became the principal actors. The smaller states, such as Belgium, were often neglected, unless geo-strategically important. The hope was that maintaining a balance-of-power among the great powers would serve as a deterrent to future wars and threats to various political and economic interests.[63]

The annexation of land for the home country was also an impetus for war. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 essentially declared the rise of the German Empire as a viable power in Europe, as Germany fought France over the border territories of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar River basin. These territories had mixed populations, some identifying with one country over the other, but the annexation of the territory to either

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[62] Mayer, p. 56.
[63] Mayer, p. 56.

side was not the population's decision. Annexation for the material gain of the empire was not confined to the European Continent; the practice was common throughout Africa and the spheres of influence in Asia. However, the European territory was the most contentious as it created buffers between the powers, invasion of which was often construed as a form of aggression, particularly between France and Germany where bitter histories played an important factor in rivalry and enmity.[64]

The annexation of territory without regard for the population reflected the structure of the elites who created foreign policy. Diplomacy was a secret even within the home countries; the populace had nothing to do with the formation of foreign policy. Elites within the government created the policies carried out by the specialized diplomatic corps, as well as the military. The elites thought in terms of the interests of their homeland as a whole, not for the people immediately affected by territorial changes.[65] The control of the elites, combined with the creation of secret treaties, maintenance of balance-of-power politics and the annexation of territory became highly criticized by opponents of imperialist practices, particularly as the duration of the Great War exceeded expectations.

The various phrases used to describe the cause(s) of the Great War by opponents included "power politics," "secret diplomacy," "armaments races," "trade wars," "colonial rivalries," and "annexations," all of which were perceived as elements of the Old Diplomacy.[66] By 1919, if not before, "Old Diplomacy" became vilified as the cause of the Great War. Various peace, justice, and socialist groups, among others, across

[64] MacMillan, p. 31-2.
[65] Knock, p. 38. MacMillan, p. 84
[66] Mayer, p. 57.

Europe demanded the formation of the New Diplomacy for the new century. The devastation of the Great War only added to the clamor for New Diplomacy in the face of the obvious failure of Old Diplomacy to serve the demands of increasingly democratic (European) societies. As the world grew weary of war, Woodrow Wilson emerged to world prominence as the embodiment of New Diplomacy. The American President delivered his Fourteen Points Address on 8 January 1918. Before the Fourteen Points Address, however, various social and political organizations had already voiced the key elements of New Diplomacy to European and American populaces. Thus, the main aspects of New Diplomacy need to be elaborated before the discussion of Wilson's Fourteen Points can be undertaken.

Democratic New Diplomacy

In line with the four main characteristics identified as Old Diplomacy, New Diplomacy specifies four alternatives to ensure the creation of a world "safe for democracy." New Diplomacy developed from various social and political organizations, particularly the British organization created at the start of the war, the Union of Democratic Control. The key elements of New Diplomacy- open covenants, a "community of nations," self-determination and democratic policy formation- are particularly important in understanding the support for New Diplomacy.

Open covenants, the first point of New Diplomacy, intended to end the secret treaties utilized by various European powers throughout imperial expansion. Open covenants intended to increase the transparency of diplomacy to both the domestic population and foreign governments, whether friend or foe. The view was that open

covenants would deter the occurrence of war by providing direct knowledge of the loyalties of the various powers. Miscalculations of the possible neutrality of a country vastly altered the outcomes of wars.

Within the context of the Great War, had the struggle remained in Eastern Europe, specifically between Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Imperial Russia, the war would not have been as devastating as it ultimately became. Instead, the treaties signed by Germany to aid Austria-Hungary, while France assisted Russia, altered the very course of the war, moving it from Eastern Europe to the Western front. Open covenants, wherein everyone on the European continent would have known about the various treaties among the powers, would have changed the course of the war itself, according to proponents of New Diplomacy.

The second aspect of New Diplomacy was the creation of a "community of nations" as a form of an international court or institutional body to arbitrate between opposing factions in the attempt to avoid military aggression. The "community of nations" would replace the "balance-of-power" system as the dominant form of foreign policy creation and implementation. Not only would the "community of nations" provide a place for the settlement of disputes between states, it would enforce the open covenants necessary to ensure peace and stability. This institution would also allow smaller powers, those without as much military or economic influence, to have a voice in international events, as opposed to following various great powers.

The agency of smaller nations allotted in the "community of nations" reflected, in some ways, the importance of democratic control over foreign policy formation. By allowing an international forum to exist where disputes could be debated and settled

among equal states instead of decided through military strength, smaller states would be able to voice their own concerns instead of simply following, or avoiding, the various European great powers. Thus, on an international level, decision-making itself would become increasingly democratic. The changes in the international system followed the increasingly democratic governments of the European (and American) powers. Within nation-states, public opinion became increasingly important. The idealistic supporters of the New Diplomacy thought that if the domestic populations had a voice in what their (representative) governments did on the international stage, wars would no longer exist. The people had no incentive for war, no need for military conquest, no desire for the death and destruction following military defeat. Following this logic, the people would prevent their states from entering treaties and obligations that did not serve the public's interest in peace.

Popular support for democracy also played a role in the increasing support for "self-determination." While the concept itself was never satisfactorily defined, the idea stemmed from the rise of "nationalistic politics" throughout Eastern and Southern Europe. Support for "self-determination" outside of Europe was non-existent, however. The victorious European empires had no desire to dismantle their power-bases nor did the colonial powers believe that the colonized populations could rule their own territory. Self-determination was only available to those who could govern themselves under European standards, thus excluding all overseas possessions. Territory on the European continent would exchange hands through an expression of popular consent and self-determination with the use of plebiscites and population studies, however flawed the application itself became.

All the elements of New Diplomacy relied upon the existence of increasingly democratic societies and governments in Western Europe. All four points relied upon openness and transparency for both the governments and the populace, domestically and internationally. While these were the key aspects exemplified in the Fourteen Points and the rhetoric of the Treaty of Versailles, the evolution of New Diplomacy did not stem simply from Wilson's speech in early 1918. Instead, the creation of New Diplomacy began in 1914, shortly after the start of the Great War, as social and political groups began to formulate the basis of the path of New Diplomacy as an alternative to the status quo in diplomatic institutional culture.

The Evolution of New Diplomacy

Various political organizations in fields as diverse as labor, peace and socialism, developed basic formulations of what was to become New Diplomacy.[67] Disgruntled members of the British Liberal and Labour parties along with intellectuals and peace activists organized one such group in August 1914. This political organization's sole purpose was to demand the end of hostilities and the creation of a democratic, open foreign and military policy. The organization, the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), blamed Germany and the British Foreign Office, as well as the French and Russian ministries, for the "drift to war."[68] To members of the UDC, the government's policies of secret diplomacy and balance-of-power politics were as responsible for causing the Great War as Germany's invasion of Belgium or the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke by a Serbian nationalist. While the members included various peace activists,

[67] Knock, p. 33.
[68] Knock, p. 37.

top intellectuals and political figures initiated the movement. These included Norman Angell,[69] J. Ramsay MacDonald,[70] Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson,[71] Betrand Russell[72] and E. D. Morel,[73] among others.[74] The members of the UDC published their Manifesto in November 1914, the first synthesis of the New Diplomacy.[75]

Their first major point reflected the language of self-determination as "no territory shall come under the control of any government unless it be with the consent of the population of the territory in question."[76] Again, the importance of nationalism and popular opinion, particularly within democratic countries, remained significant in the creation of this point. The change in the role of the media and public opinion encouraged the inclusion of popular consent through parliamentary representation, even in factors such as nation formation.

The second point in the UDC's manifesto reflected this change: "the Government of Great Britain shall enter into no treaty without the consent of Parliament; machinery shall be created to thus insure the democratic control of foreign policy."[77] Not only was British foreign policy to come under the jurisdiction of the representatives of the people, but the creation of an outside institution to enforce this democratic control of foreign policy was deemed necessary. The distrust of the British government's foreign policy

[69] Angell was a journalist best known, in 1914, for authoring *The Great Illusion* which argued that as the Great Powers were extensively economically dependent upon one another, a great war would be devastating to both victor and vanquished. *The Great Illusion* was published in 1910 and eventually translated into twenty-five languages. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933. (Knock, p. 36)
[70] MacDonald was a British politician and future (first) Labour Prime Minister in 1924.
[71] Lowes Dickinson was a historian at Cambridge University. He eventually wrote an influential treatise on the League of Nations in 1920, ultimately helping shape public opinion regarding the new international institution. (Knock, p. 37)
[72] Famous British philosopher and historian, as well as the Third Earl Russell.
[73] Influential British journalist and social activist.
[74] Knock, p. 37.
[75] Mayer, p. 55; Knock, p. 37.
[76] Mayer, p. 55; Knock, p. 37.
[77] Mayer, p. 55; Knock, p. 37.

tactics, particularly the secret diplomacy before the outbreak of war in 1914, was so prevalent that political organizations not only demanded change on an international level, but also demanded the alteration of the foreign policy structure within the domestic government.

Not only was the internal structure of foreign policy creation in Great Britain to change, but the practice of diplomacy on the international stage needed to evolve. The third point of the Union of Democratic Control's November manifesto demanded that "the foreign policy of Great Britain shall eschew alliances for the purpose of maintaining the 'Balance-of-power'; rather, it shall be directed toward concerted action between the [Great] Powers determined by public deliberations in an International Court."[78] Although not phrased as the "community of nations" or christened the "League of Nations" yet, the UDC's "International Court" intended to have the same purpose as the League of Nations by preventing war through arbitration not armed conflict. This point also identifies the balance-of-power system as one of the "causes" of the Great War, at least in the minds of the (influential) members of the UDC.

The condemnation of the balance-of-power system correlated to the armaments race that accompanied the "drift to war." The fourth point, that "as part of the peace settlement, Great Britain shall propose drastic reductions in armaments and the general nationalization of the manufacture of armaments by all the nations of the world," was co-opted into other peace plans.[79] The armaments discussion, either in encouraging or deterring war, remains influential in current foreign policy rhetoric.

The fifth point from the Union for Democratic Control's manifesto, added after

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[78] Mayer, p. 55; Knock, p. 37.
[79] Mayer, p. 55; Knock, p. 37.

the initial publication, remains an important one. The UDC argued that "economic warfare cannot continue after the present military conflict has ceased; the British Government shall promote free commercial intercourse among all nations by expanding the principles of the Open Door."[80] Free trade, members of the UDC believed, would reduce the possibility of war because, if the states were economically interdependent, they would have less reason to declare war on each other.

In 1914, as the war began and the hopes of a quick victory remained, the Union for Democratic Control did not have extensive popular support outside the various peace activist groups already active in Britain. By late 1917, as the populace became increasingly weary of the war, the British coalition government needed to regain the support of the population. In response to public views, the British Labour party published a "Memorandum on War Aims" on 28 December 1917. The Memorandum declared that continuation of the war was no longer justified except "that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy" through the creation of a "community of nations" to ensure that "there should be henceforth on earth no more war."[81] This language echoed the manifesto of the Union for Democratic Control and reappeared in the rhetoric of President Woodrow Wilson, particularly through the emphasis on creating a world "safe for democracy."

Prime Minister Lloyd George delivered a speech on 5 January 1918 to the British Trades Union League at Caxton Hall. Lloyd George declared that "first, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and last-some, we must

[80] Mayer, p. 55; Knock, p. 37.
[81] Knock, p. 142.

seek by the creation of some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war."[82] These three statements, delivered by a politician attempting to regain popular support for the war effort, co-opted the basic tenets of the Union for Democratic Control and other peace organizations. The expressed motivation for the Great War changed with the Memorandum and Lloyd George's Trades Union League speech. Lloyd George argued that although the war was caused by Old Diplomacy, secret treaties and balance-of-power, it would be fought to create a better world, a world "safe for democracy" based on the principles of New Diplomacy. Lloyd George's speech, however, would be overshadowed by an elaborate speech that redefined international political ideology.[83] The speech was President Wilson's Fourteen Points Address, delivered on 8 January 1918.

Wilson's Fourteen Points: Exemplifying New Diplomacy

To correct the problems of Old Diplomacy, the American savior, Woodrow Wilson, brought Europe his New Diplomacy, which developed from ideas of American exceptionalism and the American liberal internationalists. This popular characterization, however, is an exaggeration. As we have seen, the key tenets of the New Diplomacy- open treaties, a community of nations, self-determination, and democracy- developed in several European political groups, often left leaning, as a criticism of Old Diplomacy, as the manifesto of the Union for Democratic Control demonstrated.[84] Nevertheless, Woodrow Wilson's speeches, particularly the Fourteen Points, exemplified New Diplomacy to a world at war, in 1919 as well as 2009.

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[82] Knock, p. 143.
[83] Knock, p. 33.
[84] Knock, p. 37; MacMillan, p. 85.

The Fourteen Points[85] would eventually become synonymous with New Diplomacy, as well as a new path of diplomatic policy-formation. Wilson's speeches encouraged the war-weary populaces of the European powers to demand the adoption of New Diplomacy, particularly as increasing amounts of the population became frustrated with status quo statesmen and their diplomatic policies. Wilson's speech became so influential that Germany eventually sued for peace under the conditions of the Fourteen Points. [86] While Wilson did not devise the Fourteen Points and New Diplomacy on his own, he did propagate a grand synthesis of what he termed New Diplomacy, a "new international ideology."[87]

Wilson's personal beliefs influenced the development of his synthesis of democratic diplomacy. In Wilson's mind, American values were identical to "universal progressive liberal values."[88] That belief compelled Wilson's vision of the exceptional United States leading the world into an orderly and civilized international society.[89] These beliefs, connected to Wilson's own religious convictions,[90] greatly influenced his moral objections to the Old Diplomacy.[91] This strong moral conviction, coupled with Wilson's confidence in the efficacy of (American representative) democracy, led him to

[85] See the Appendix for a list of the actual Fourteen Points.
[86] Wilson delivered his address to a joint session of Congress on 8 January 1918, only three days after Lloyd George's similar speech to the British Trades Unions League. Lloyd George was actually quite upset upon hearing Wilson's address. Perhaps he had a reason to be. History often only remembers the eloquent and elegant Fourteen Points Address delivered to Congress by the American executive, not the relatively impromptu speech of the British Prime Minister delivered to an economic interest after the publication of a political memorandum.
[87] Knock, p. 33.
[88] Levin, p. 03.
[89] Levin, p. 03.
[90] Wilson's father was a Presbyterian minister. Before politics, Wilson was a professor of political science at Princeton University, eventually becoming the President of the University before running for the office of the Governor of New Jersey. From that position, Wilson launched his bid for the US Presidency as the Democratic candidate. He won because Teddy Roosevelt fragmented the Republican party in a third party bid against William Howard Taft.
[91] Knock, p. 33.

demand the establishment of a democratic international community.[92]

The first five points were familiar to the various groups that supported New Diplomacy and a democratic foreign policy.[93] These included the first point of "open covenants of peace" to "proceed always frankly and in the public view," echoing the first point of the Union for Democratic Control's manifesto. The following two points related to economic issues such as "absolute freedom of navigation of the seas, outside territorial waters" and "the removal… of all economic barriers." These also reiterated the 1914 UDC manifesto, particularly the importance of free trade.

The fourth point called for an armaments reduction, again echoing the UDC manifesto as well as those of other political organizations. The fifth point called for "a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon… the interests of the populations concerned… [and] the equitable claims of the governments whose title is to be determined." In other words, the fifth point provided the beginnings of the concept of self-determination, itself not a strictly Wilsonian concept. This point did not indicate an abandonment of overseas colonies but indicated an adjustment of the claims. The division of territory in "advanced" areas would not be through military conquest alone, but must take into consideration the populations within the territory. Although Wilson's vision of self-determination was not as idealistic as often purported, it certainly fit into his political framework of ideals and democracy.

The sixth through thirteenth points dealt with specific territorial claims and issues. These included Russia, even after the Bolshevik revolution and abandonment of the Allies (VI), the sovereignty of Belgium (VII), French territory including the German

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[92] Knock, p. 33.
[93] Knock, p. 144.

military evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine (VIII), the northern Italian border (IX), the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire (X), the independence of Rumania, Montenegro and Serbia (XI), the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire with an independent Turkey and free access through the Dardanelles (XII), and the (re)creation of an independent Polish state in Eastern Europe (XIII). These issues intended to placate various Allies while providing an incentive for subjugated people within the German and Austro-Hungarian empires to refuse to fight for their alliance. These border disputes would, however, greatly affect European stability for the rest of the century.

The final point, however, became the most important for Wilson.[94] Eventually, the hopes of millions of people throughout Europe and the United States would be pinned on the Fourteenth Point to end all wars. Wilson called for "a general association of nations … formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." This would become the League of Nations, the "community of nations" to replace the destructive and belligerent balance-of-power system that had dominated European politics for most, if not all, of its history.

After Wilson delivered his address, support for New Diplomacy spread beyond liberals and pacifists to European political and diplomatic elites.[95] The President of the United States eloquently elaborated and synthesized New Diplomacy, expounding a creed easily adopted by European elites and commoners alike. Earlier developments of New Diplomacy were forgotten, replaced by the American Scholar-President's address. Wall posters in Europe declared, "We Want a Wilson Peace;" in October 1918 Germany

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[94] Knock, p. 144.
[95] MacMillan, p. 15.

sued for peace under the Fourteen Points.[96] The international community would not be the same after the Fourteen Points Address. Diplomatic policy-formation seemed poised to change paths from the so-called imperial Old Diplomacy to the democratic New Diplomacy.

Conclusion

The Great War disrupted traditional methods of diplomacy. Intellectuals, politicians and common citizens alike perceived the status quo of the path of imperial Old Diplomacy as the cause of the war itself. As the war became increasingly devastating, perceptions of war as the glorification of country changed into views of war as a brutal event. As popular support for the war waned, the path of a democratic New Diplomacy rose to the forefront as an alternative in diplomatic policy-formation. However, not until Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points Address in January 1918 did New Diplomacy seem to become the dominant path of diplomacy formation. New Diplomacy, particularly Wilson's synthesis, developed as a criticism of the "practice, theory and objectives" of Old Diplomacy, intended to dramatically alter international diplomacy and relations.[97] The Great War provided the juncture for diplomacy to change paths and develop a new institutional culture by causing disillusionment with the practices of the Old and allowed for the rise of the rhetoric of the New. However, the practices of the Old remained entrenched as the dominant method of diplomatic policy-formation, while the rhetoric of the institutional culture changed to that of the New.

[96] MacMillan, p. 15.
[97] Mayer, p. 54.



The Easter Offering. "Punch." 159 [1919]



Home from Home. "Punch." 159 [1919]

Combining the Old and the New

The Paris Negotiations and the Treaty of Versailles

New Diplomacy was supposed to begin in 1919. Wilson believed that the United States itself was in a unique position to alter the affairs not just of Europe but the entire world. Specifically, he believed that the United States in 1919 would be the change necessary to transform the international system from "chaos and imperialism to orderly liberal rationality."[98] The ills and chaos brought on by the militaristic, imperialistic policies of European powers would become regulated by his "community of nations," the League of Nations, the central part of the New Diplomacy under Wilson's politicized rhetoric. In the years following the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles and the establishment of the League of Nations, the goals of New Diplomacy, particularly the emergence of a "new world order," failed to take hold in diplomatic practices. Wilson had "clearly failed to transform the Old World" and the traditional Old Diplomacy.[99]

Although it did not change the diplomatic environment and policy formation immediately, the Treaty of Versailles did incorporate the rhetoric of New Diplomacy. The rhetoric of the New competed with the traditional practices of Old Diplomacy during the creation and after the adoption of the text of the Treaty of Versailles. Since New Diplomacy was a competing path for diplomatic policy-formation, the inclusion of its rhetoric with the practices of Old Diplomacy condemned New Diplomacy to failure in the period after the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles.

New Diplomacy and Old Diplomacy represented different "paths" toward policy formation after the devastation of the Great War. The Great War itself seemed to create a

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[98] Levin, p. 5.
[99] Ambrosius, p. 135.

critical juncture for the opportunity for a shift in the diplomatic community. The institutional culture of the path of Old Diplomacy seemed discredited as New Diplomacy began to gain prominence among citizens and diplomatic elites alike. Despite the growing dislike toward the methods of Old Diplomacy, as defined by critics of the path, the practices of the Old remained ingrained in the diplomatic community as the dominant path for diplomatic policy-formation. The result was that, though incompatible, the rhetoric of New Diplomacy and the practices of Old Diplomacy were incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles. The text reflected the lofty rhetoric and idealism of New Diplomacy to placate the liberal internationalists, particularly President Wilson, while the traditional concerns of the European powers, especially the imperial prerogatives of Britain and France, remained in actual practice after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Treaty of Versailles utilized the rhetoric of New Diplomacy throughout the text. The Covenant of the League of Nations, an important element of New Diplomacy, comprised the first twenty-six articles of the text of the Treaty. Despite the inclusion of the liberal internationalist agenda through the rhetoric of the League of Nations, the actual practices that developed from the Treaty of Versailles reflected the traditional practices of imperialism that characterized Old Diplomacy. Thus, diplomatic policy did not change immediately upon the inclusion of the language of New Diplomacy in the Treaty of Versailles. Instead, diplomatic institutional culture remained path dependent; it changed gradually and slowly through alterations in the institutional culture of diplomacy, well after the Treaty of Versailles was discarded as a complete failure. Four examples from the Treaty of Versailles display this combination of New Diplomacy rhetoric with Old Diplomacy practices. The first was the Paris Conference that drafted the

Treaty of Versailles, the second the inclusion of war guilt and reparations clauses, third the League of Nations itself and, finally, the Mandate System.

The Paris Conference

Wilson left the United States in the middle of his second term to assist in the development of the Treaty of Versailles, the key document to create the "new world order" of his New Diplomacy.[100] Wilson believed that his slogan "peace without victory" would only become firmly established if he assisted in the negotiations. Despite his promises of negotiations open to public opinion, the bulk of the Treaty of Versailles was decided through closed-door negotiations among French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Wilson himself. The three met daily from January 1919 until the end of June, the only exception being mid-February through mid-March when Wilson returned to the United States and Lloyd George to Britain.[101] They ignored petitions and pleas from other groups, including smaller nations or leaders of people clinging to Wilson's own phrase "self-determination."[102]

The Council of Four, consisting of French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, American President Woodrow Wilson, and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando, made the majority of decisions. The Great Powers, in charge of the Council, also handled their own territorial claims through such

[100] Wilson was the first sitting US President to go to Europe *during* his term in office.
[101] MacMillan, p. 37.
[102] One such example was the young kitchen assistant at the Ritz who sent a petition asking for independence from France for his native country. The petition was too obscure to receive a response. The kitchen assistant was Ho Chi Minh, his homeland Vietnam. (MacMillan, 59)

meetings or in *ad hoc* committees.[103] The smaller allies, even devastated Belgium, and neutral nations were not invited to assist in the decision-making process.[104] The Germans were not present in any manner at the drafting of the Treaty; they were only at the final Peace Congress to sign the Treaty of the victors.[105] The Great Powers effectively served their own interests before the collective, refusing to admit any lesser allies or even defeated Germany in the Paris Peace Conference. Although this practice was a traditional element of Old Diplomacy, for the victors wrote both the treaties and the history, it starkly contrasted with New Diplomacy's emphasis on the equality of states. The meetings were often closed, again reflecting Old Diplomacy secrecy in contrast to the promises of New Diplomacy's openness.

Three men essentially wrote and determined the "new world order" enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles. President Wilson preached his positions and expected the European leaders to accept his ideas, much to their dislike. Wilson's chief problem, aside from his pontificating, was that he lacked the stamina of either Clemenceau or Lloyd George. Wilson was also unfamiliar with crucial points of detail in areas that did not strike his imagination, particularly the economics questions that haunted the Council of Four throughout much of the Paris Peace Conference.[106] As a result, he allowed his experts to pursue American economic nationalism, particularly refusing to assist in the reconstruction of the devastated Europe. As the Conference continued, Wilson no longer seemed "as idealistic or as cunning" as he was thought to be.[107] The most damning trait,

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[103] Stevenson, p. 244.
[104] MacMillan, p. 53.
[105] Elcock, p. 80.
[106] Stevenson, p. 245.
[107] Mee, Charles L. *The end of order, Versailles, 1919.* New York: Dutton, 1980. p. 57.

however, was Wilson's narrow-sightedness regarding the League of Nations. Once the League was established and accepted by the other Great Powers, Wilson told his chief advisor, Colonel Edward House, "nearly all the serious difficulties will disappear."[108] However, the difficulties among the European powers did not disappear with the inclusion of the League of Nations. Despite disagreements and policies that did not follow his Fourteen Points, such as the reparations clauses, Wilson agreed to their inclusion in the final text, under the belief that the League of Nations would correct any errors made at the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson believed that the cornerstone of New Diplomacy, the League of Nations, would mitigate the practices of Old Diplomacy.

The French proved particularly stubborn during the negotiations. The British and American delegations became "exasperated with what they saw as French intransigence, French greed and French vindictiveness."[109] The British, across the Channel, and the Americans, across the Atlantic, however, had not suffered as France had at the hands of Germany. France also had the most at stake in the Treaty of Versailles. A secure France relied upon a defeated Germany at its eastern border. Clemenceau was particularly well suited to maintain these French concerns. He exhibited profound French patriotism, relief at French victory and the apprehension of a revived Germany looking to expand into French territory.[110] Clemenceau's demeanor partly reflected his nature, particularly regarding his views of Germany, but partly a performance for the French citizens, especially as the domestic constituency became increasingly important during the

[108] Stevenson, p. 245.
[109] MacMillan, p. 28.
[110] MacMillan, p. 36.

negotiations as part of the democratic New Diplomacy.[111]

Britain achieved most of what it wanted prior to the beginnings of the Peace Conference. The German fleet remained in British hands through the Armistice Agreement, thereby securing the British navy and, through secret negotiations, many of the major German colonies were to become part of the British Dominions.[112] Lloyd George remained loyal to the importance of Britain's colonies, protectorates and dominions, as well as the importance of a strong British navy in control of the seas.[113] Arguably, Lloyd George wanted reparations money, if included in the final treaty, but mostly because he promised it to the voters back in Britain.[114] Of course, Lloyd George knew Britain was heavily indebted to the United States and the reparations would provide a source of payment for loans to the American government and private banks. However, the need to adhere to public opinion to maintain political support remained a clear impetus for the individuals at the Paris Peace Conference.

Public opinion, itself an element of New Diplomacy, became a deciding factor on several issues at the Paris Peace Conference, most notably the necessity to develop the League of Nations and the inclusion of the reparations clauses in the final text of the Treaty of Versailles. Groups outside the delegations of the Great Powers assumed that the negotiations would be conducted under public scrutiny and expected that the populace would bring common sense to international relations.[115] Public opinion did not serve this purpose. Clemenceau and Lloyd George also knew their constituencies demanded the

[111] Mee, p. 54.
[112] MacMillan, p. 31.
[113] MacMillan, p. 36.
[114] Mee, p. 56.
[115] MacMillan, p. 85.

reparations clauses, whether or not their inclusion would be beneficial for Europe in the long term. These articles have been the most criticized element of the Treaty of Versailles since the signing in June 1919.[116]

Various committees, created by the Allied Powers' foreign offices, drafted sections of the Treaty. They did not debate the issues they were given nor did they speak with other groups drafting other sections of the Treaty. The result was a Treaty of Versailles that was never published in its entirety until the final Peace Congress demanding the signing of the treaty. Prior to the final Peace Congress, none of the leaders of the Allied and Associated Powers read the full text of the Treaty. Instead of revising the terms of the Treaty, Wilson remained assured that all discrepancies would be settled in a civilized manner by his beloved League of Nations. Thus, on 28 June 1919, on the anniversary of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo in 1914, Germany and the Allied Powers signed the Treaty of Versailles.

The result was that Wilson's conception of New Diplomacy did not fully prevail in the Paris Peace Conference itself. Instead, the treaties, Versailles included, retained the importance of national interests and imperial prerogatives along with the incorporation of self-determination, democratic ideals, and collective security.[117] Ultimately, the Treaty of Versailles represented a victor's peace as it was "framed to punish and constrain the Germans and to vindicate the Allied sacrifices," even as it intended to create a "new world order" through the League of Nations.[118]

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[116] For a more detailed account of the literature surrounding the Paris Peace Conference, see the Historiography section of this paper.
[117] Steiner, p. 16.
[118] Steiner, p. 69.

War Guilt and Reparations

The inclusion of war guilt and reparations arose because "the domestic politics of the democratic nations complicated the task of international diplomacy."[119] Lloyd George and Clemenceau favored reparations while Wilson remained opposed.[120] Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau knew they had to insist that Germany pay for the war to whatever extent possible if they wanted to remain in any position of domestic power.[121] Although Lloyd George himself did not view a weak Germany as beneficial for Europe as a whole and, in fact, he was skeptical of extensive reparations, he was also a politician elected by his populace. That populace demanded that Germany pay for the destruction of the war. While France and Belgium received the most physical destruction, Britain paid more than the other two nations. Clemenceau had no doubts that Germany had to compensate France for the physical destruction caused by the war. Clemenceau did not need reminding that a victorious Germany had demanded an indemnity in 1871 that seemed huge to the French citizens.[122] The French feared a strong Germany, with good reason, and could only feel secure with Germany permanently weakened. The Lloyd George-Clemenceau front regarding reparations relied upon British stabilization policy and the strategic needs of the French.[123]

The American experts that accompanied President Wilson to Versailles agreed on the illegitimacy of reparations. They argued that the principle of indemnities and reparations had become "invalidated by the development of an industrial complex in

[119] Walworth, p. 180.
[120] Stevenson, p. 261.
[121] Walworth, p. 170.
[122] Walworth, p. 170.
[123] Stevenson, p. 261.

western Europe."[124] The American delegation denied the "unlimited right of the victor to impose a punitive indemnity upon the vanquished" as punitive indemnities reflected the practices of Old Diplomacy, not the path of New Diplomacy.[125] Wilson, after reading a persuasive memorandum from General Smuts, overrode his advisors and ultimately agreed to the inclusion of an undefined sum of reparations payments.[126] The sum determined at later meetings by financial advisors was much higher than the estimates of German capabilities by American and British financial advisors. In fact, the reparations sections disillusioned many in the British delegation, including John Maynard Keynes.[127] The disillusionment extended beyond the reparations clauses to the entirety of the Treaty of Versailles, including the League of Nations.

The League of Nations

The majority of the Covenant of the League of Nations was British in inspiration, although it did pay homage to Wilson's Fourteen Points. Despite the popular misconception, Wilson did not arrive in Europe with the entirety of the League of Nations planned. When the time to develop the centerpiece of the Treaty of Versailles, outlining the heart of New Diplomacy, South African General Jan Smuts, part of the British Dominions delegation, wrote the majority of the Covenant, based on a memorandum of the key points Wilson wanted included.

Smuts developed the basic structure of the League of Nations. He decided that

[124] Walworth, p. 171.
[125] Walworth, p. 171.
[126] Stevenson, p. 260.
[127] Keynes later wrote a scathing paper against the Treaty of Versailles, damning it as the "Carthaginian Peace" developed by the "vengeful, grasping Clemenceau, the pusillanimous, vacillating Lloyd George and the pathetic, broken Wilson." *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919) turned the tide of British and American public opinion against the final text of the Treaty of Versailles. This is detailed in the historiography section of this paper. See MacMillan, p. 181.

there would be three main bodies: the Assembly for all members, the permanent secretariat for administrative purposes, and the Council for the majority of decisions.[128] Smuts also suggested that the Council comprise the five great powers in attendance at the Paris Peace Conference, Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan, with four other positions on the Council available for other, lesser member states to be appointed on a rotating basis.[129] The final version of the Treaty of Versailles included a League of Nations developed from Smuts' initial proposals. The primary change added to Smuts' proposal was the provision that most League decisions had to be unanimous.[130] The Great Powers included this provision because they were afraid that smaller powers would unite to outvote them. This provision was later blamed for the League's ineffectiveness as a governing body.[131]

While the majority of the Covenant of the League of Nations developed from General Smuts' proposal, Article X was wholly Woodrow Wilson's, even as the European politicians knew it would not be effective.[132] Article X stated:

> The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.[133]

Not only did Article X respect territorial sovereignty, it provided the beginnings of collective security. Even though the League of Nations did not have any real power, a

[128] Steiner, p. 41.
[129] Steiner, p. 41.
[130] MacMillan, p. 94.
[131] MacMillan, p. 94.
[132] Walworth, p. 116.
[133] Treaty, p. 83.

fact that would become all too clear in the space of twenty years, Article X differed dramatically from the traditional methods of war and diplomacy in Europe. Article X promised a new institutional path and remained an important milestone in the development of collective security, however ineffectual the League proved to be during the interwar period.

The Covenant of the League of Nations itself combined much of the rhetoric of New Diplomacy with many of the traditional practices of the Old. The executive Council developed by Smuts' plan included the permanent members of the Great Powers with four weaker states, thus allowing the Great Powers to maintain the upper hand in international relations. Balance-of-power politics from Old Diplomacy was incorporated along side the equality of states from New Diplomacy. The other key incorporation came in the form of the Mandate System to mediate between colonial annexationist claims and the "self-determination" promised by Wilson and New Diplomacy.

Mandate System

Smuts also developed the Mandate System with the help of Colonel Edward House, a member of the American delegation.[134] Both delegates knew they needed to mediate between the Old ways of annexation and colonialism and the New promises of "self-determination" and international supervision. None of the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference actually believed that the colonies would gain independence or "self-determination." Although Wilson himself did not believe "self-determination" could be extended beyond the European continent, annexation of territory through conquest went against several key principles of his synthesis of New Diplomacy. To further complicate

[134] Walworth, p. 76.

matters, several of the European powers secretly promised each other various territories in Africa, Asia and the Middle East both during the war and for support in various Conference negotiations. The individual actors involved in the diplomatic policy-formation would not work outside of the institutional culture constrained by the established and existing path of Old Diplomacy.

In response to the difficulty in devising a manner to allow the European powers to get the territory they wanted but without appearing annexationist, British and American negotiators worked together to develop a palatable system acceptable to the Council of Four.[135] The division of the former German colonies and, later, the division of the Ottoman Empire became contentious topics, especially between the French and the American delegations. The French, Clemenceau in particular, became increasingly impatient with the American sentiment of anti-colonialism[136] in general and with President Wilson specifically.[137] However, once Smuts and House presented the Mandate System, the British, Dominions included, accepted it, followed by the American delegation. The Japanese, promised islands in the Pacific, disliked the stipulations of the Mandates but followed the British. The French also accepted, although Clemenceau became concerned over the inclusion of international oversight. Other colonial powers also become concerned with international oversight, originally limited to the Mandates but possibly extending to other colonies. This concern, however, diminished as the Mandate System became one of "*de facto* [...] protectorates and colonies."[138] The

[135] Walworth, p. 76.
[136] That being the American rhetoric of anti-colonialism, in contrast with the history of American imperialism.
[137] Walworth, p. 78.
[138] Stevenson, p. 252.

compromise on the creation of the Mandate System reflected the path-dependent nature of policy-formation established by the institutional culture of Old Diplomacy. Although the language of the Mandate System utilized the language of New Diplomacy, the System maintained the practices of Old Diplomacy.

The German Response

Germany had lost its colonies in Africa and the Pacific to the British Dominions, France and the Japanese. The German navy was no longer existent. Reparations, whether affordable or not, were included in the final Treaty, despite the promise of "peace without victory," and war guilt was assigned to the defeated nation, whether justified or not. All of these decisions regarding the German Empire were made without German presence in any of the negotiations. The settlement itself was piecemeal, not stemming from a central treatment of Germany as a whole. The final terms shocked much of the British and American delegations when viewed in its entirety on 7 May 1919.[139] The victors of the Great War determined the peace.

The German reaction to the Treaty of Versailles, presented on 7 May 1919, was that it was 'unfulfillable and unbearable,' and went against the Armistice agreement, especially Wilson's Fourteen Points.[140] Yet the Germans had little authority to alter the text of a Treaty created by four men and their delegations in five months.[141] Much of the German frustration and anger became directed at Wilson. No longer was Wilson

[139] Stevenson, p. 276.
[140] Stevenson, p. 275.
[141] The chief German delegate, Brockdorff-Rantzau, gave his speech denouncing the harshness of the Treaty while seated in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles. This action, coupled with inept translators and the harshness of Brackdorff-Rantzau's voice, infuriated both Clemenceau and Lloyd George.

Germany's savior; overnight, Wilson became a hypocrite who destroyed an independent Germany.[142] Wilson's promise of "peace without victory" had fallen to the wayside in the scramble to punish Germany.

War Guilt and Reparations

The Allied and Associated Powers attached reparations and war guilt clauses to the Treaty of Versailles, charging Germany with starting the war that devastated much of Europe. Article 231 stated:

> the Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.[143]

When the Germans requested an impartial investigation into the origins of the war, the Allies and American refused it "as not worthy of consideration."[144] Later scholars have argued that the German war aims at the start of the Great War reflected an attempt to gain prominence as a European imperial power.[145] Even if Germany was not guilty of causing the war, it was guilty of extending the frontlines into Belgium and France as part of a military strategy. In 1919, the Allied Powers, Wilson included, believed that Germany had created a war, on an unprecedented scale, because of intense military aggression. They also agreed that Germany had to be punished, although they differed on how. Although war guilt was not a contentious issue, traditional outcomes of both war guilt and defeat posed greater problems to the writers of the Treaty of Versailles. Specifically,

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[142] MacMillan, p. 465.
[143] *The Treaty of Versailles and after: annotations of the text of the treaty*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. 1947. p. 413
[144] Elcock, p. 122.
[145] Fischer, p. 4.

the war guilt clauses justified the demands for reparations.

Reparations demands, given to the victors by the defeated for the cost of the war and damages done during the conflict, were contentious even among the Allies. Wilson had declared that there would be a settlement without "annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages," while Lloyd George's slogans included "Make Germany Pay" and the French depended upon German funds to avoid national bankruptcy.[146] The French press inflamed the already contentious matter as headlines proclaimed "Either France or Germany must be ruined."[147]

The European powers were in debt to the United States government and private American banks, as well as each other and their own citizens.[148] At the end of the war, Wilson's legal adviser David Hunter Miller said, "Europe is bankrupt financially and its governments are bankrupt morally."[149] Before the war ended, the Allied Powers devised a plan to pool Allied "credit, food, raw materials and ships to undertake relief and reconstruction" under an inter-Allied board.[150] The Americans, however, refused to join such a committee, particularly as they knew the majority of supplies would be American, but also because Wilson suspected that Allied control over relief supplies would be used to pressure enemy states.[151] Instead, Wilson insisted on placing the American Herbert Hoover in charge of the Allied relief administration despite the misgivings of several European leaders.[152]

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[146] Elcock, p. 123.
[147] Stevenson, p. 257.
[148] MacMillan, p. 10.
[149] Quoted in MacMillan, p. 10.
[150] MacMillan, p. 61.
[151] MacMillan, p. 61.
[152] Lloyd George complained that Hoover would become the "food dictator of Europe." Lloyd George also found Hoover to be "tactless and brusque" along with humorless. More the irony when some Valentine's

Ultimately, the actions of Clemenceau and Lloyd George reflected both "moral, punitive motives" and a "desire for reconstruction aid."[153] Similarly, Old practice in Western Europe reserved "the unlimited right of the victor to impose a punitive indemnity upon the vanquished."[154] Although the American delegation disagreed with the right to impose reparations upon a defeated Germany, Wilson eventually overrode his advisors. General Smuts persuaded Wilson, especially as the problem of paying war debts became the primary motivation for the inclusion of Article 232:

> the Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto. ... this amount shall be determined by the Reparation Commission...[155]

The reparations were limited to "damage done to the civilian population," the amount would not be determined until a later date. The language itself reflected a moralizing tone by insisting that Germany must compensate the Allied Powers because of "belligerency" and "aggression."

Nearly everyone at Paris, including Wilson and Lloyd George, believed Germany was guilty for starting the war. Several of those also agreed that Germany had to pay, both literally with cash to Allied states and symbolically with the inclusion of the war guilt clauses.[156] While the inclusion of war guilt absolved the consciences of those who fought on the side of the Allied and Associated Powers, the inclusion of reparations

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Day cards in 1917 read "I can Hooverize on dinner/ But I'll never learn to Hooverize/ When it comes to loving you." MacMillan, p. 61.

[153] Stevenson, p. 257.

[154] Walworth, p. 171.

[155] *Treaty,* p. 425.

[156] MacMillan, p. 160; Steiner, p. 29.

developed from a need to secure the economies of the European powers in debt to the United States. The inclusion of the reparations clauses, no matter how well justified, contradicted one of Wilson's own principles of a "peace without victory," thereby limiting the effectiveness of democratic New Diplomacy based "world order" in the post-war era.

Despite the public sentiment against Germany, as well as French suspicion of a strong Germany, Lloyd George and Wilson knew that Germany could not be submissive forever. A truly devastated Germany could, quite possibly, become Bolshevik through revolution. The failure of an eventual revival of German industry, once the best customer and supplier to most European states, would jeopardize the economies of all of Europe.[157] The committee in charge of the reparations had to find a delicate balance between satisfying the demands of the Allied powers, including the increasingly prominent public opinion, and the capacity of what Germany could reasonably afford. This, however, was an impossible mission. The reparations, demanded by the public, became the symbol of greed and failure of the Treaty of Versailles.

Despite the perceived failure and greediness of the reparations clauses in the Treaty of Versailles, the practice of reparations and the repayment of wartime loans changed. Most significantly, the end of World War II, with a Europe more destroyed than after the Great War, saw the inclusion of a plan to restore the devastated European economies and forgiveness of the Allied debt through the Marshall Plan. Although not Wilson's intended consequence, New Diplomacy as an institutional method for policy formation succeeded. American diplomatic advisers recognized the damage caused by

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[157] Walworth, p. 163.

reparations during the interwar period and did not want to repeat history by following the institutional culture established by the path of Old Diplomacy. Also after World War II, another key element of New Diplomacy was transformed from the idealistic "community of nations" and failed League of Nations into the United Nations.

The League of Nations

The League of Nations, Wilson's fourteenth point and the heart of his New Diplomacy, was to be the guiding light for the "new world order." The League was a "community of nations," devoted to peaceful mediation of various conflicts and the guarantee of self-determination and national rights. Prior to the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson made a speech to the United States Senate where he asserted that "there must be, not a balance-of-power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."[158] Although he did not devise the concept of the League of Nations or a "community of nations," Wilson was the first major statesman to espouse the ides of the New Diplomacy of liberal internationalism.[159] More significantly, Wilson developed a penetrating critique of European imperialism, militarism and balance-of-power politics, calling for self-determination, collective security and the "community of nations" to replace the failed European system.[160]

Despite the skepticism of European leaders like Clemenceau and Lloyd George, the "community of nations" became a requirement for a successful Peace Conference in the eyes of the increasingly watchful public. The public became aware that peace allowed for trade and industry to flourish; the public was also aware that a monarch or

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[158] Quoted in Knock, p. 112.
[159] Knock, 33.
[160] Knock, 115.

small elite was no longer the sole image of the nation.[161] The people demanded a change in the international political environment, the change envisioned by Wilson, most notably the "community of nations." Thus, with public support, the League of Nations became one of the central issues in the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles. Upon Wilson's insistence, the first twenty-six articles of the Treaty of Versailles were devoted to the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League, however, remained under the control of the Great Powers, who acted in a manner similar to the balance-of-power politics that marked European diplomacy prior to the Great War.

The central feature of the League of Nations was the Council, which "consist[ed] of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League."[162] Within the Council, "each Member of the League [...] shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative."[163] The rhetoric of New Diplomacy called for the inclusion of small and weak nations, placing them at the same level as the Great Powers that traditionally dominated European affairs by explicitly including them on the international stage.[164] However, only a select few small nations would be on the Council with the Great Powers and, although they had an equal vote in the Council, the Great Powers retained influence and control. With similar roles as those prior to the League of Nations and the Great War, many countries continued to follow the path of Old Diplomacy with more rules and restraints.[165]

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[161] MacMillan, 84.
[162] *Treaty*, p. 79.
[163] *Treaty*, p. 80.
[164] Mayer, p. 366.
[165] Northedge, p. 53.

Arguably, Wilson did not want a revolutionary break from the traditional methods of diplomacy; instead, he sought a transformation within an institution developed from New Diplomacy.[166] This view of Wilson rests upon his willingness to compromise on many contentious issues so long as the League of Nations remained enshrined in the treaties of the Paris Peace Conference. However, this willingness to compromise was in contrast to the public rhetoric Wilson became famous for immediately after the war. The League of Nations itself was a radical departure for traditional diplomatic practice.[167] Wilson placed a great deal of faith in the League to solve any future problems among the European and (few) other powers. His faith in the League of Nations was particularly peculiar, especially since the Covenant was not solely his creation but an Anglo-American partnership, mostly of British origin, and was also a vision not shared by other world leaders.[168]

The South African Jan Smuts devised many of the proposals included in the creation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as listed above.[169] Two key characteristics of the Covenant reflected Smuts' nuanced vision regarding the tensions between Old and New Diplomacy and the role an individual had in shaping future institutional culture. One aspect was his attempt, through the creation of the Council, to balance the realities of great power politics with the equality of states, a key concern for all the supporters of New Diplomacy.[170] In this manner, Smuts utilized the rhetoric of New Diplomacy with the traditional practices of the Old. The authority within the League

[166] Levin, p. 250.
[167] Steiner, p. 40.
[168] Stevenson, p. 251.
[169] Steiner, 41.
[170] Knock, p. 204.

of Nations, tempered by the inclusion of unanimous voting, appeared to equalize all nations. The inclusion of unanimous voting, however, greatly weakened any authority the League of Nations might have had in the interwar period. The other major aspect was the creation of the Mandate System to negotiate the differences between Old Diplomacy annexations of conquered territory and New Diplomacy goals of self-determination.

The Mandate System

New Diplomacy forbade annexation of territory.[171] Forcible annexations inflamed nationalist tendencies of the subjected people, as well as perpetuating the acceptance of imperialism.[172] President Wilson hoped that the Mandate System developed by the South African General Jan Smuts and American Colonel Edward House would end imperialism and the traditional forms of colonial exploitation by providing indigenous groups "political self-development toward independence under the disinterested tutelage of advanced countries."[173] Wilson had no intention of immediately altering the status quo of the European empires, particularly with the threat of Bolshevism that loomed on the eastern horizons of the European Continent. Instead, he had faith that the League of Nations, including the Mandate System, would alter international politics over time as small changes would eventually change the institutional culture that bound diplomatic policy-formation. The goal of small-scale change in the overall diplomatic institution was reflected in the Mandate System of Article 22:

> To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand

[171] Mayer, p. 7.
[172] Mayer, p. 55.
[173] Levin, p. 245.

> by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples from a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.[174]

Mandates would be under the oversight of "a permanent Commission [...] constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates."[175] The former German colonial possessions were divided among the victors but only under international supervision, despite how nominal the actual supervision would be.

In August 1920, Britain, France, Italy and, nominally, the United States formally divided the mandated territories into the A, B, and C Mandate categories. The categories and the territories were, in fact, divided by the Council of Four during the 1919 Paris Conference. The territories considered A Mandates were from the collapsed Ottoman Empire and would receive "only administrative advice and assistance prior to independence," while B Mandates were the former German colonies in Africa and would be under direct rule.[176] The last category, C Mandates, were in Pacific islands, as well as Southwest Africa, and to be "governed as integral portions" of the assigned country.[177]

While this policy seemed to be a compromise between the goals of self-determination and the traditional method of colonial administration, in actuality the League's supervision was confined to an annual report, making the Mandates System a "*de facto* one of protectorates and colonies."[178] Even in January 1919, as the Mandate System was debated among the members of the Supreme Council, French journals

[174] *Treaty*, p. 93.
[175] *Treaty*, p. 94.
[176] Stevenson, p. 252.
[177] Stevenson, p. 252.
[178] Stevenson, p. 252.

interpreted mandates as "a euphemism for acquisition of territories by the [G]reat [P]owers," while other editors expounded the threat of international interference in colonial affairs.[179] In fact, the division of the mandates "generally followed the lines of military occupation and confirmed the colonial bargains struck during the war."[180] Prior to the Paris Conference, Wilson had agreed that Germany would lose all overseas possessions.[181] The French government believed that the right to retain all territories that were under occupation at the end of the conflict was acceptable.[182] Included in the wartime bargains were the British aims to take German East Africa, which became several B Mandates, as well as strategic areas of the former Ottoman Empire. Prior to the Paris Peace Conference, Prime Minister Lloyd George thought about making a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire. He hoped that by settling with the collapsing Ottoman Empire, France would rush to secure its interest in Syria, thereby leaving Palestine under British protection and colonial interest.[183] Britain and France eventually came to a secret agreement, one that was adopted into the division of the Mandatories.[184]

Another promise made by the Allied Powers prior to the end of the war concerned the German island territories in the Pacific. In 1917, Great Britain promised the German islands north of the equator to Japan in exchange for Japan's support in the British Empire's claims on the islands south of the equator.[185] During the Conference meetings, Australian Prime Minister William Hughes and New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey, not Clemenceau or Lloyd George, demanded the annexation of territory as

[179] Walworth, p. 78.
[180] Steiner, p. 44.
[181] Stevenson, p. 252.
[182] Walworth, p. 70-71.
[183] Rothwell, 238.
[184] MacMillan, p. 43.
[185] Walworth, p. 69-70.

essential to their own security. While Wilson did not champion self-determination outside of Europe, he could not allow the brazen imperial annexation of territory demanded by Australia and New Zealand.[186] Massey "argued that the difference between a mandate and annexation was that between a leasehold and freehold tenure."[187] Massey went on to observe, "no individual would put the same energy into a leasehold as into a freehold."[188]

The arguments over annexation or Mandates continued for several days within the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference with Wilson alone against the British Dominions, the Japanese and the French.[189] Wilson firmly believed that any future problems, regarding all forms of international politics, would be resolved by the League of Nations, a sentiment not fully embraced by the European leaders. Thus, placing the Mandate System under the authority of the League of Nations mediated the demands of Australia and New Zealand with the opposition to annexation and imperialistic aims. The claims made by Australia, New Zealand and Japan were allowed as C Mandates, becoming "integral portions" of the assigned country. In fact, the inclusion of this language in the C Mandates placated the Australian delegation. Once Australia was willing to accept the terms of the Mandate System, the British and Japanese delegations agreed to the entirety of the mandates, accepting a system of de facto annexation under the oversight of a newly created international body.

The push for annexation and imperial aims, however, was not limited to Australia and New Zealand. Britain claimed the need to retain harmony among its dominions in

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[186] Wilson's position regarding self-determination contrasts to Leninist support of self-determination throughout the world as part of the anti-imperialist doctrine of Marxist-Leninist socialism.
[187] Walworth, p. 73.
[188] Quoted in Walworth, p. 73-74.
[189] Walworth, p. 75.

support of Australia and New Zealand's aims for expansion. France, itself an imperial power, agreed to the Mandate System, although it objected to several restrictions placed upon imperial governments.[190] The B Mandates, the former German colonies in Africa, were divided along colonial interests already established on the continent. German Southwest Africa went to the Union of South Africa[191], German East Africa[192] to Great Britain, while Britain and France reached separate agreements regarding Togoland[193] and the Cameroons. Belgium gained the territories of Ruanda and Urundi, which were on the eastern borders of the Belgian Congo.[194] Even Portugal claimed a mandate in Africa, the Kionga triangle, an area adjacent to Mozambique.

The establishment of the A Mandates began after the United States withdrew from both the League of Nations and active participation in treaty developments. Wilson attempted to allow some forms of self-determination among the people of the collapsed Ottoman Empire.[195] France and Britain, however, failed to cooperate with Wilson's sentiments, particularly because the mandates carved from the former Ottoman Empire went to either France or Great Britain. France was assigned Syria and Lebanon while Britain received Palestine and Mesopotamia.[196] Egypt gained independence, while the Arabian Peninsula was divided among various semi-nomadic tribes in the region.[197] The sentiments of leaders and the people of the regions in question were ignored, most

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[190] Wright, p. 44.
[191] German Southwest Africa, modern-day Namibia, only gained independence from South Africa in 1990.
[192] German East Africa includes the current countries of Uganda and Tanzania.
[193] French Togoland became the independent nation of Togo, while the British territory became part of Ghana.
[194] Ruanda and Urundi became Rwanda and Burundi after gaining independence. The Belgian Congo has gone through several name changes including Zaire and the DRC.
[195] Wright, p. 45.
[196] Wright, p. 46.
[197] Write, p. 46.

notably the report stating that Syria and Palestine desired to be united and placed under the guardianship of Great Britain. France, however, refused to give up authority over Syria.[198]

Although the new system reflected pre-war traditional imperialism, it also incorporated the "new world order" of liberal internationalism by including state accountability to an international body, however ineffectual the League of Nations truly was.[199] Nevertheless, the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles did not provide a clean break with the Old Diplomacy of imperialism; instead, the Treaty included the key elements of Wilsonian New Diplomacy but maintained the practices of Old Diplomacy.

Conclusion

By all accounts, the Treaty incorporated Old and New Diplomacy, as "the traditional means of securing peace after victory were combined with new proposals for managing inter-state relations."[200] The inclusion of reparations and war guilt, as well as the incorporation of *de facto* imperialism with the Mandates System, did not further the goals of the liberal internationalists. The three leaders of the Great Powers on the victors' side wrote the Treaty of Versailles utilizing the rhetoric of New Diplomacy but following many of the practices of Old Diplomacy. The inclusion of Old and New failed to create a "new world order" of Wilsonian idealism immediately after World War I. The inclusion of both Old and New within the Treaty of Versailles ensured the persistence of the Old Diplomatic systems without giving the New a secure basis in the diplomatic environment. While the New permeated the text of the Treaty of Versailles, the practices in the post-

[198] Wright, p. 45.
[199] Steiner, p. 44.
[200] Steiner, p. 69.

war period remained that of Old Diplomacy. Thus, in the aftermath of another world war and a Cold War, the Treaty of Versailles was deemed a failure.

Despite the initial failure of Wilsonian idealism, the basis for the creation of a new diplomatic policy seeped in the rhetoric and institutional culture established in the Treaty of Versailles. Although New Diplomacy did not become the dominate "path" immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the goals of New Diplomacy became increasingly important after World War II. New Diplomacy did not take hold in twenty years; instead, it took forty for New Diplomacy to emerge and a "new world order" to rise. Although not explicitly stated as part of New Diplomacy, several key characteristics of Wilsonian rhetoric and the liberal internationalist agenda are firmly established in the current diplomatic culture. Self-determination has, since the end of World War II, liberated many of the former colonies into (legally) independent states. The "community of nations" envisioned by Wilson remains an important institution in international politics. Thus, the institutional culture of New Diplomacy has finally replaced the primary aspects of the Old, long after the relevance of the Treaty of Versailles itself has passed.

PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIVARI.—March 26, 1919.



OVERWEIGHTED.

President Wilson. "Here's your olive branch. Now get busy."

Dove of Peace. "Of course I want to please everybody; but isn't this a bit thick?"

Overweighted. "Punch." 159 [1919]



The Debtors. "Punch." 1922.

Conclusion

> What we demand in this war is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.[201]
>
> President Woodrow Wilson, 18 January 1918, Fourteen Points Address

The principles of New Diplomacy developed in response to the Great War continue to have prominence in the present. Wilson's Fourteen Points have come to exemplify more than just a synthesis of New Diplomacy. His foreign policy, particularly his rhetoric, remains important in the post-Cold War, post-September 11 era, and is often an unspoken source of current foreign policy rhetoric. Although Wilson referred to the Great War in his desire for a new "community of nations," contemporary rhetoric emphasizes the symbolic importance of the United Nations and politico-economic alliances among member states for current conflicts among the world's countries. Although the initial optimism felt in 1919 became disillusionment and perceptions of failure by 1939, the rhetoric of New Diplomacy is the crux for contemporary foreign policy language. Why did New Diplomacy fail in 1919 but remain an important element of current American foreign policy rhetoric?

The framework of historical institutionalism clarifies how New Diplomacy failed in 1919 even as it became entrenched in contemporary diplomatic institutional culture. Within the case study of the Paris Peace Conference, the Great War itself provided a

[201] Wilson, Woodrow, and Mario R. Di Nunzio. *Woodrow Wilson: essential writings and speeches of the scholar-president*. New York: New York University Press, 2006. p. 404.

critical juncture for policy change within the institution of formal diplomacy. The Great War polarized social and political groups within Europe, particularly as the conflict grew longer and more costly. These groups identified an amorphous Old Diplomacy to blame as the cause of the Great War while promoting a New Diplomacy intended to create a future of peace and prosperity. The elements of Old Diplomacy, particularly secret treaties, balance-of-power politics, annexation of territory through conquest, and elite policy formation, were demonized as the cause of the devastating war. Critics of Old Diplomacy, followed by politicians and other elites, responded to the antagonism against Old Diplomacy by creating and synthesizing New Diplomacy, based on open covenants, a "community of nations," self-determination, and democratic diplomacy.

Despite the use of New Diplomacy rhetoric as an opposition to Old Diplomacy, the practices of the Old remained entrenched in the Paris Peace Conference and subsequent Treaty of Versailles. The Paris negotiations themselves were practices of elite diplomacy, even though public opinion greatly affected the decisions and positions of the elites. The inclusion of war guilt and reparations clauses also utilized the rhetoric of the New but the practices of the Old. Clemenceau, as well as the French citizens, remembered the demeaning punitive clauses included in the peace settlement ending the Franco-Prussian War, demanded compensation for the German acts of aggression by way of reparations. The central piece of the Paris Peace Conference, included in the beginning of the Treaty of Versailles, was the Covenant of the League of Nations. While the League embodied the idea of a "community of nations," it also reinforced the balance-of-power politics identified as practices of Old Diplomacy. Included in the Covenant, the Mandate system facilitated and explicated the fate of the defeated powers' colonial possessions.

The Mandate system not only legitimated Allied Powers control over Germany's colonies, but also provided a method to circumvent New Diplomacy's forbiddance of territorial annexation. Each aspect of the Treaty of Versailles demonstrated inclusion of the rhetoric of the New while utilizing practices of the Old, thus condemning New Diplomacy to fail in the period after the Great War. However, it was this inclusion and incorporation of New Diplomacy in the Covenant, which situated the rhetoric of New Diplomacy in international relations, particularly with reference to the rhetoric of the American executive.

The rhetoric of the New, considered a failure by 1939, permeates contemporary diplomatic institutional culture. The mission of democracy promotion, an integral part of American foreign policy rhetoric, has its basis in Wilson's goal of making "the world safe for democracy" during and after the Great War. The language of a "new world order" after the end of the Cold War and the emphasis on cooperation among nations in the aftermath of September 11 invoke Wilsonian New Diplomacy. Although New Diplomacy failed to become the path of diplomacy formation in 1919, the use of its rhetoric during the Paris Peace Conference and in the text of the Treaty of Versailles established an institutional culture that emphasized the key principles of New Diplomacy, a "world be made fit and safe to live in."[202] Ninety years after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, despite the widespread condemnation of the Treaty of Versailles and, by extension, New Diplomacy, the very language and ideals expressed by Wilson in the Fourteen Points and other addresses remain prevalent. In the course of those ninety years, despite the wide-ranging course of events, diplomatic rhetoric retains the principles once

[202] Wilson, p. 404.

deemed a failure. The contemporary diplomatic institutional culture has not progressed much beyond the rhetoric of 1919. The present remains immersed in the past.



Ghosts at Versailles. "Punch." 159 [1919]

Appendix: the Fourteen Points

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable

lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

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