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Staying Off the Bottom of the Melting Pot: Social Welfare, Post-9/11 Policy, and Self-Sufficiency in Somali Refugee Resettlement

Ihotu J. Ali

Macalester College, ihotu.ali@gmail.com

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Macalester College

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Social Welfare, Post-9/11 Policy, and Self-Sufficiency
in Somali Refugee Resettlement

Author: Ihotu Ali

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Staying off the Bottom of the Melting Pot:

SOCIAL WELFARE, POST-9/11 POLICY, AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN SOMALI REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

IHOTU J. ALI

An Honors Thesis Submitted to the International Studies Department at
Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA
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ABSTRACT

As global migration *intensifies* and diversifies, policy-makers take up border control with heightened security, visa restrictions, and limitations on non-citizen rights. Refugees arrive at the invitation of liberal nations such as the United States; however, even “protected” refugees feel the effects of increasing economic and social conservatism at all levels of governance. This interdisciplinary field research documents the social networks and coping strategies of Somali refugees in the Twin Cities as they face rising challenges of adaptation and integration in the era of fiscal conservatism and national security. Findings suggest that the current “refugee climate” causes Somalis to turn inward for support, whereas successful resettlement and integration in the sense of a *broadened belonging* requires compromise: a balance of self-sufficiency, religious accommodations, and cross-cultural education.

CHAPTER ONE

Global Transitions: Migration Policy and Global Context

I. The Phenomenon

In October 2002, a once-thriving economy and Franco-American town was in decline. Lewiston, Maine, took a serious hit when its textile mills closed and thousands of residents lost their jobs; however, the recent arrival of Somali refugees arguably had an even greater impact. Mayor Larry Raymond wrote an open letter to the Somalis urging them not to invite any more relatives to Lewiston as it needed “breathing room” and was “maxed out, financially, physically, and emotionally.”¹ Somali refugees had come to Lewiston, either directly from refugee camps or from “war-zones” in inner-city Atlanta, to escape violence and settle in a town where housing was affordable and “seemed like a good place to bring up kids.”² Their children attracted federal dollars into Lewiston schools and, with local university degrees, many Somalis worked in Lewiston hospitals and opened small businesses to employ one another.

Nevertheless, perceptions of “maxed out” public benefits and increasing crime were attributed to the Somalis and many native Lewiston residents joined the Mayor in asking them to leave.³ Hollywood’s release of “Black Hawk Down” intensified the memory of Maine soldiers who had died in Somalia and incited protesters to take to the streets. Their signs displayed photos of Somalis, ostensibly eating the flesh of American soldiers and posed the question: “When will Lewiston become like Somalia?” Hostilities continued to rise through early 2003, when Lewiston prepared for an anti-Somali rally led

¹ Bouchard, Kelley. “Lewiston Somalis bewildered.” *Kennebec Journal*. Oct. 5, 2002.
See Appendix A for full text.

² Greenway, H.D.S. “Standing up to prejudice.” *Boston Globe*. Aug. 1, 2006.

³ Ibid.

by the white supremacist group, World Church of the Creator. Fortunately, massive police mobilization and overwhelming support for a “Many In One” counter-rally for diversity and tolerance diffused much of the volatility in Lewiston.⁴

Although direct violence was averted, city officials claim that Lewiston is not an isolated example of the potential negative consequences to follow refugee resettlement, particularly the resettlement of black African and Muslim refugees whose home nation is associated with failures in U.S. foreign policy. Mayor Raymond voiced a concern that is felt around the country when he said:

We're looking for [Somalis] to give us a break here. We've done a great job trying to deal with the people that have come. There are thousands of other cities and towns where they could go. We can't take any more...But everybody is so politically correct, nobody wants to say anything.⁵

In Lewiston, Maine, as in Portland, Seattle, Columbus, and Minneapolis, resettled Somalis are at risk of being singled out for terrorist connections, unfairly receiving public assistance, and overall, being seen as not deserving the full rights due to “Americans.” Only one generation ago, this may not have been the case; over the past decade U.S. legislation and elected leaders have increasingly restricted social and civil rights from certain non-citizens by limiting their use of public benefits, rolling back the social services budgets that often serve them, deporting and suspecting their loyalty to the nation, and targeting them as “not deserving” or “not earning” the rights and privileges that they do receive.

Somali refugees entered the United States at a precarious moment. They arrived in the thousands since the late-1990s, many as penniless refugees in the midst of

⁴ *The Letter*. Dir. Ziad H. Hamzeh. Film. Hamzeh Mistique Films, 2003.

⁵ Bouchard, Kelley. “Lewiston Somalis bewildered.” *Kennebec Journal*. Oct. 5, 2002.

shrinking welfare programs, as *xijaab*-wearing⁶ Muslims in the aftermath of September 11th and Global War on Terror, and as taxi drivers and hotel staff in a period of social criticism and competition over low-wage and illegal labor. Somalis defy America's social categories as black, Muslim and Arab-African immigrants, and many of their ways of cooking, family structures, religious duties, and communication styles challenge U.S. cultural norms, workweek schedules, and apartment occupancy rules.

Stereotypes and assumptions abound of how Somalis behave and assimilate, and how the United States should treat and assist the refugees invited to its shores. Thus, an already difficult task of cross-cultural community building is made all the more complex in the context of U.S. policies and messages of exclusivity: that only certain "Americans" qualify for full citizenship and social and civil rights. This research project focuses on Somalis in the Twin Cities of Minnesota as a unique case through which to view the health of the nation in maintaining its values of tolerance, respect for diversity, and willingness and capacity to welcome newcomers into an integrated United States.

II. Research Questions

This study is guided by the following key question: *How does successful resettlement and integration occur in the context of the United States today?* This is the overriding question throughout the entirety of this work; however, several preliminary questions are answered first in pursuit of this larger goal:

1. Under what policies and forces have Somali refugees settled in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota?
2. Why have they chosen this location?

⁶ *Xijaab* is the Somali equivalent of the hijab, a veil or covering worn by many Muslim women.

3. In what positive and negative ways have Somalis impacted Twin Cities communities since their arrival?
4. Conversely, what impact has Minnesota had on Somali refugees, in empowering or weakening their will and ability to integrate?
5. How can the situation be improved for both the refugees and for Minnesota, according to the definition of “successful resettlement” given by each?
6. Finally, what lessons might the Somali refugee case study offer to other non-citizens in different cities?

This research paper argues that conservative-shifting legislation and social climate, although perhaps cyclical throughout U.S. history, now threaten to contradict national values as a “nation of immigrants” and equal opportunity “melting pot” by additionally and unfairly burdening Somali refugees with the tasks of resettlement and integration. I consider the key “high risk” areas in which Somali refugees have been made most vulnerable, as well as their tendency to turn inward for support – resisting integration – in order to become self-reliant despite deepened vulnerabilities. Somali refugees make an interesting case as a population at risk of being “burned” on the bottom of the proverbial melting pot and yet, their diasporic and cultural strength allows them to model the social cohesion and self-development necessary to still achieve a form of “successful resettlement.” Finally, the paper concludes with a normative view of resettlement in the Twin Cities, and proposal for a collaborative “social contract” between resettled migrants and their new communities.

III. Relevance of this Study

Migration has surfaced as a global concern over the past two decades and is discussed across academic disciplines, in diplomatic circles, and in broad public debates. Highly-publicized human crises including terrorist attacks and riots in European, Middle Eastern, and American cities have each made a critical statement. Certain rallies called attention to immigrants' plight, while acts of violence have undermined immigrants' credibility and exposed the potential volatility of excluding entire communities from mainstream society. Concerns over national security and human rights frame a controversial debate over the appropriate role of the state in serving native citizens as well as integrating immigrant minorities.

However, these debates are too often limited in depth and focused on relatively simple questions such as who are the new immigrants, whether they "contribute" to the host country, and what policies should be enacted to best serve national interests.⁷ Little debate occurs around the effectiveness of existing or proposed policies, and rare is the attempt to bridge the divide between polarized conservative and liberal opinions, suggesting a more nuanced position. This thesis looks deeper into the evidence of both perspectives in order to join the major concerns of each and advocate for a collaborative project supportive to both state needs and immigrant needs.

IV. Methods and Techniques

This nine-month long research was tri-pronged in its: 1) review of immigrant and integration models, 2) analysis of major U.S. policy shifts between 1996 and 2006, and

⁷ Hollifield, James F. "The Politics of International Migration: How can we 'bring the state back in?'" *Migration Theory*, eds Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield. Routledge: New York; 2000. 137-185.

3) synthesis of field research on Somali refugee communities in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota.

Overall, the research sources included review of academic literature, national policy briefs, community publications and documentaries, graduate dissertations, and reports and data collected from U.S. census and immigration records and local resettlement organizations. Field research in Minneapolis-St. Paul consisted of 12 interviews with administrators of six different resettlement organizations, two focus groups (male and female), participant observation in the above mentioned organizations, and attendance of periodic community panels and discussions on immigrant and refugee resettlement.

Risks to the participants and to the researcher were minimized by strict anonymity and confidentiality in all interviews. All interviews were conducted in English, and focus group discussions were translated from Somali⁸.

V. Interests and Experience of the Researcher

As both the child of a bi-cultural family and an engaged student researcher on human rights, social welfare, community development, I acknowledge that my interest in pursuing this study is both personal and intellectual. The marriage of my parents, one from rural Nigeria and the other from suburban Minnesota, represents the same process of cooperation and adaptation that occurs in a situation of immigration. Communication, compromise, and flexibility are critical elements to the success of both a multicultural

⁸ Two focus groups were conducted with the assistance (in recruiting participants and translation) of New Americans Community Services in St. Paul. The groups were separated by gender and composed of 6 women and 6 men of middle age or older, and most had lived in the United States between three and eight years.

marriage and multicultural community, and much of my interest lies in identifying why and how these elements ultimately succeed or fail.

I have always been drawn to models of empowerment and self-sufficiency on individual, family, and community levels, particularly in marginalized populations. This early interest led me to design a similar study on Sub-Saharan African undocumented transit migrants in Morocco and their individual and collective coping strategies for dealing with the intense challenges they faced, ranging from social isolation and poverty to a perpetual threat of deportation. I quickly recognized the key role played by state policy in legitimizing exclusionary rhetoric, and thus emboldening border police, business owners, and other Moroccans to discriminate and mistreat migrants. The Moroccan state sets a powerful example – one that is followed by local government bodies and individuals – and determines the possibilities for outreach and collaboration on one hand, or exclusion on the other. As a developing and resource-poor country, Morocco couldn't realistically support its growing populations of Congolese and West African migrants; however, there are non-material ways in which the strained relationship between migrants and the host communities could be improved. Insight into this Moroccan experience then led me to consider the role of the state and policy for *legal* Somali migrants in a resource-rich country such as the United States.

This thesis is the culmination of several years of coursework, research, and community involvement in the areas of African migration, displacement and social marginalization, and community empowerment. Previous academic experiences that have prepared me for this project include coursework in Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology, and French. I also completed semi-directed research projects

under the Council on African American Affairs in Washington, D.C., and the Center for Cross Cultural Learning in Rabat, Morocco, where I was advised by Professor Khadija Elmadmad, UNESCO Chair of Migration and Human Rights. I have also been able to establish strong community links to immigrant organizations in the Twin Cities as the Immigrant and Refugee Volunteer Coordinator for the Civic Engagement Center at Macalester College.

VI. Globalizing Migration

This thesis focuses primarily on a specific legal category – “refugee” – as a small sub-set of a much larger phenomenon of human movement within and across state boundaries. Up to two million Somalis have been displaced since 1991; however, few of these Somalis cross international borders to become refugees, and fewer still are selected for resettlement in the United States.⁹ According to the International Organization for Migration, over 191 million people (3% of the global population) currently live outside their country of origin, and an additional 23.7 million are displaced within their countries of national origin by war, violence, and other forms of persecution. Of these broad figures for migrants, 8.4 million are officially designated “refugees” and given rights and protections according to international law.¹⁰ The majority of Somali refugees, as with most groups of refugees, resides in refugee camps or is repatriated following the end of conflict. Only a select group of these refugees is accepted into third party countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, or other European nations.

⁹ “Displaced Somalis in protection limbo.” Global IDP Project: Relief Web. 20 June 2003. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/be4d48a785f80d0fc1256d4e0035f5bd>.

¹⁰ “Global Estimates and Trends.” International Organization for Migration. <http://www.iom.int/jahia/page254.html>. Figures taken from 2005 data.

In a “classical immigration” country such as the United States, refugees are admitted among many other types of foreigners. Numerous legal distinctions divide immigrants and visitors; however the following four categories identify most non-citizens in the United States:¹¹

Non-immigrant temporary visitors: Foreigners¹² who enter the country on temporary visas for business, pleasure, or to enroll in educational training.

Immigrant: A loose term used to apply to all non-citizen residents (including refugees and asylees) with the probable intent of permanent residence.

Legal permanent residents (LPRs): Temporary residents who are given permission to take up permanent residence and are able to work and travel using “green card” identification documents.

Refugee: A person granted asylum outside of his or her country of origin who, due to well-founded fear of persecution by race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is unable or unwilling to return.¹³

Asylee: A person who first entered the country as a visitor or other non-immigrant, then

¹¹ My study focuses on the intersection between nationality and legal status: Somali refugees. This is not a cleanly defined category – Somalis may enter as immigrants or may lose or shift their status to undocumented or citizen – and I will occasionally refer to other groups of refugees or the circumstances of non-refugee Somalis, but nonetheless this is the primary focus of my analysis. The majority of Somalis in the Twin Cities is currently refugee (although many will be applying for citizenship in the coming years), thus I have chosen this category as a baseline from which to draw larger conclusions about the welfare and coping strategies of an entire *refugee community*.

¹² Official legal definitions generally use the term “alien” to refer to non-citizen visitors and residents. I have chosen not to use this term for its negative connotation, using “foreigner” instead.

¹³ Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1. 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Note also that refugees and asylees refer to more vulnerable immigrants, because of the sensitive nature of their reasons for seeking asylum in a host country. Thus, refugees and asylees are considered to be under the responsibility of their countries of asylum and are entitled to more public benefits than other immigrants, particularly in their first few years of transition. This paper uses the term “refugee” to denote all legal refugees and asylees as more vulnerable immigrants; however, there are occasional exceptions to this assumption: some refugees are relatively “high functioning,” while some immigrants may qualify as refugees, but entered the United States as students or sponsored by family, and thus are not entitled to the same benefits they would have had, were they legally considered “refugees.”

applied for and was granted refugee status under the definition listed above.

(Refugees are defined as such and contracted for resettlement *before* entering the country.)

Undocumented worker: A person who enters a new country of residence without legal sanction or documentation and is unable to work or apply for naturalization.

Similar to the movement of capital and ideas, the movement of people in the midst of contemporary globalization increasingly defies national borders and conceptions of bounded community. Migration is a historic process, yet is currently in a state of dramatic change: global trends of widespread civil violence, disparities in economic development, and new technologies in travel and communication are rapidly changing the faces and politics of migration. Stephen Castles and Mark Miller claim that “globalizing” migration is now marked by five unprecedented trends in the history of modern migration:¹⁴

A. Globalization of Migration

Migration now affects a greater number and diversity of regions, as post-colonial sending and receiving country patterns shift and broaden. In the United States, immigrants increasingly relocate outside of typical “gateway” states such as California and New York to Midwestern states and suburban and rural towns.¹⁵

¹⁴ Castles, Stephen and Mark Miller. *Age of Migration, 3rd ed.*. Guildford Press; New York. 2003.

¹⁵ Taken from U.S. 2000 Census, see *New Neighbors, New Opportunities: Immigrants and Refugees in Grand Rapids*. Dyer-Ives Foundation. Grand Rapids, Michigan. 2003.

B. Acceleration of Migration

Migration of all types is increasing in volume and speed as the “push-pull” factors and means of migrating become more compelling and accessible. According to the International Organization for Migration, there were an estimated 176 million migrants worldwide in 2000; five years later this figure had grown to 191 million migrants.¹⁶

C. Differentiation of Migration

Several types of migration - labor, refugee, and permanent settlement – now occur simultaneously, complicating the singular concept of an “immigrant.” Most 19th century immigration into the United States was labor-motivated, yet today’s new immigrants are increasingly family members of citizens and permanent residents.¹⁷

D. Feminization of Migration

More women and children are present in all types of migration (particularly refugees), whereas the flows had previously been dominated by able-bodied men. Women now make up nearly half of global migrants, and up to 80% of global refugee flows.¹⁸ Of refugees resettled in the U.S. in 2005, approximately 49% were women and 37% were under the age of eighteen.¹⁹

¹⁶ “Global Estimates and Trends.” International Organization for Migration. www.ion.int

¹⁷ Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller. *The Age of Migration*. 3rd ed. Guilford Press: USA. 2003.

¹⁸ “From the Foreign Land.” UN High Commissioner for Refugees. No. 16; March 2002.
http://www.unhcr.pl/english/newsletter/16/world_of_refugee_women.php

¹⁹ Jefferys, Kelly. “Refugees and Asylees: 2005.” *Annual Flow Report*. Homeland Security. May 2006.

E. Politicization of Migration

Migration increasingly affects and is affected by political interests, multilateral relationships, and national security concerns. Greater emphasis is placed on state “control” or “management” of migration than ever before.²⁰

As the demographics and needs of migrants change rapidly and enter into new communities without a history of immigration, *adaptation* is crucial. Established U.S. models of immigration placed the burden of adaptation on immigrants alone; however, citizens like those in Lewiston now question the capacity of their states adapt to new immigrants: to absorb new labor into economies, to provide economic and medical assistance to women and children refugees, and to “melt” diverse cultures, languages, and religions into a cohesive national identity. These new questions of socio-economic and cultural adaptation between immigrants and host communities currently drive global debates over immigration and immigration policies.

VII. Policy Dilemmas: Miami, Milwaukee, and Toronto

There is no established “correct” way to adapt to the landmark changes in international migration. Nations with little previous history of managing migration are suddenly overwhelmed with new concerns, and “classical immigration countries” – United States, Canada, and Australia – struggle nonetheless with new populations entering into old demographic structures. Refugees and asylees typically require more public assistance, medical care, and education than other immigrants and these services place additional

²⁰ Hollifield, 2000.

financial burdens on the state.²¹ Thus, in the absence of a single strategy for “migration management,” each national government devises its own rules and regulations based on internal politics, national identity, and available resources. For example, in the United States, refugee resettlement is brokered at the federal level, yet is facilitated by state and non-profit organizations on more local levels. Yet because of public controversy over immigration, widely supported policies and programs are difficult to construct, and even more challenging to implement. The policies that are passed may have unexpected negative effects on different immigrant populations, depending on their community needs, access to resettlement agencies, and legal status. The following examples demonstrate potential pitfalls in policies for refugee communities similar to Somalis in the Twin Cities: Haitians in Miami, Hmong in Wisconsin, and Somalis in Toronto. These brief case studies suggest common refugee experiences in liberal democratic societies and the difficulties of constructing effective policies to serve these communities.

Haitians in Miami

In Miami, Florida, the population of Haitian refugees has grown in Miami-Dade County for more than thirty years, throughout the “Papa Doc” and “Baby Doc” Duvalier regimes.²² As French- and Creole-speaking black immigrants, Haitians are already isolated from other English- and Spanish-speaking communities, yet new legislation in 2001 effectively denied refugee status to all Haitian applicants, identifying them as

²¹ The United States admits refugees (and approves of applications for asylum) on the assumption that these migrants are more likely to be physically and/or psychologically traumatized as a result of fleeing persecution and in need of more assistance than non-refugee immigrants. Some literature (see George Borjas) suggests that non-refugee immigrants tend to be younger and healthier, and U.S. refugee programs operate on this assumption, allocating public assistance much more liberally to refugees.

²² Kretsedemas, Philip. “Avoiding the State: Haitian Immigrants and Welfare Services in Miami-Dade County.” Ed. Philip Kretsedemas and Ana Aparicio. *Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Poverty of Policy*. Praeger: Westport, Connecticut. 2004. 107-133.

“undocumented” and subject to deportation back to Haiti. The law was intended to prevent further immigration; however, large – and now undocumented – Haitian communities continue to expand in Miami-Dade County. Their legal vulnerability only intensifies their isolation from public services, jobs, and educational opportunities.

Since the late 1990s, a national trend of federal devolution has increased the autonomy of state and local governments, and the Florida social services have since become the most decentralized in North America. “One-stop centers” for resettlement orientation and assistance were established for all immigrants in Miami-Dade County, but language, culture, and legal barriers prevent most Haitians from accessing these services. Having “fallen through the cracks” of public support systems, Haitians began founding their own resettlement organizations in which more established Haitians aid newer immigrants. Community innovation and interdependence help Haitians survive, yet it also allows them to operate outside of established systems and “best practices” of health care, education, and the labor force.

Hmong in Milwaukee

Hmong refugees from Laos have been resettled in the United States since the 1980s as both a humanitarian and political act; many Hmong risked their lives by fighting on the U.S. side of the Vietnam War.²³ Milwaukee, Wisconsin is now home to large Hmong communities, of which Hmong elders, young children, and those with physical or mental illness depend on community organizations and public assistance for their livelihoods.

When national welfare was reformed in 1996, refugees such as the Hmong were allowed

²³ Rai, Kalyani. “Community –Based Participatory Action Research: Offering Hmong Welfare Recipients’ Voices for Dialogue and Change.” *Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Poverty of Policy*. Ed. Philip Kretsedemas and Ana Aparicio. Praeger: Westport, Connecticut. 2004. 187-203.

to keep their benefits, but they were required to look for work and limited to five total years of benefits.²⁴ A joint project between a welfare-to-work agency and Hmong community organization sought to discover the full effects of this policy change and asked welfare recipients to draw pictures to describe the impact of welfare reform on their lives. One participant expressed a widespread sentiment of ongoing frustration, saying:

[Welfare] is like a door of opportunity. When you enter this door, it is a dark room... The first barrier is language. The second is education. Next is the work history because none of [refugees] have any work history. In addition to that, they have medical problems, then [they struggle through the] employment search. Then, at the end of the employment search, they are hanging on a thread because they cannot really find a job on their own without any hope and no connection. Here is the pit of the sixty months (the pit of fire). After those sixty months, I don't know what they are going to do. If they do get over that little hump with that extension, they might climb up a little bit to try to get to the green side of [welfare], where they become self-sufficient. But some of them are not really in the green side because they do get jobs but they are only surviving. So, it is not as green as we think it should be.²⁵

Welfare-to-work programs in Milwaukee are successful in increasing employment rates among low-income persons and refugees such as the Hmong. However, many of the refugees' poor educational and English backgrounds made finding a steady job with living wages especially stressful and difficult.

Another participant explains the myriad barriers that Hmong face in Milwaukee and the additional struggle of finding a job under pressure:

Here is everything that I have to overcome. I have language, feeling of isolation – that's the first step. Then I have the culture – what my culture tells and what I have to do in America is different. What should I do? And then I am really afraid of everything. Then I overcome that, I have financial problem. I have no money and no education. So then I tried to overcome that (this is barb wire and very difficult). Then I have to come to [welfare]... Then I have health problem. I have problems with transportation. Then there is a little opening... If I can come to this side, it is green, birds, clean air – meaning there are jobs and hopes.²⁶

²⁴ Prior to reform in 1996, welfare was a program of entitlement, wherein any family that qualified at a certain level of low income (regardless of legal status) received public assistance. See Chapter Three for a more detailed description of this program and the effects of 1996 reform on refugee populations.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 194.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 196.

This research revealed the unforeseen negative effects of national welfare reform, despite the policy's success in lowering overall unemployment rates. Refugees across the country suffered unexpectedly from the distinct barriers they faced in securing steady employment.

Somali Women in Toronto

Forty percent of the population of Toronto, Ontario, consists of non-citizens. Canada had historically funded a comprehensive system of public assistance and integration programs for new immigrants, yet 1980s federal devolution and attempts to reduce the national deficit negatively affected this resettlement "infrastructure." Projects in job creation and training, welfare assistance, and affordable housing lost key public funding, hitting women, children, and those without full legal benefits the hardest.

In over 75,000 Somalis residing in Toronto, many are under a "conditional undocumented" status according to Canadian law. Refugees who arrive individually must prove their identity with travel documents, but since thousands of Somalis arrived from rural areas or refugee camps, they lacked or had lost their documents and were admitted under this provisional status. Somali women, who make up the majority of Somalis in Toronto, express acute frustration around the limitations their status places on their opportunities for continuing education, starting businesses, and sponsoring family members to visit or settle in Canada. Dependent on meager welfare checks and overcrowded in low-income public housing, these women report experiencing food insecurity, loss of family and community support, deteriorating physical health, and

anxiety, depression, and extreme nervousness.²⁷ One woman, Ferhat, explains the disillusionment she feels about resettling in Canada:

Before we came to this country, we used to work and manage our lives like any other human being. Now, we are not allowed to work, to struggle for the well-being of our children, to get access to education, and to get loans. Why did they welcome us to their country with open arms only to make life more miserable for us?²⁸

Some women in the study likened their lives in high-rise apartments to “living in hell” and others claimed that they discovered racism in Toronto that they hadn’t believed existed. Funding cuts in public support systems and their legal status created a stagnant socio-economic environment where advancement and hopes were diminished, even in a wealthy resettlement nation such as Canada.

Migration and policy struggles like these exist not only in Miami, Milwaukee, and Toronto but may very well be in many other cities in the United States and beyond. Policies, in particular, have a “trickle-down power” in that they set a tone – even if at the international or national level - which inevitably manifests in at least subtle effects on the grassroots level. As the above case studies illuminate, the real outcomes of immigration and social welfare policies are difficult to predict and thus may impact communities in unexpectedly negative ways. This paper takes a critical view of public policies, arguing that effective policies, particularly effective migration policies, require a thorough and informed consideration of all possible scenarios and impact. Because of the swiftly changing nature of international migration, truly effective policies are difficult to construct without the input of non-state actors such as community organizations, interest groups, multi-disciplinary research, and the voices of immigrant and host communities.

²⁷ Herman, Arlene and Neita Kay Israelite. “Resettlement Experiences of Somali Refugee Women in Toronto.” *Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Poverty of Policy*. Ed. Philip Kretsedemas and Ana Aparicio. Praeger: Westport, Connecticut. 2004.

²⁸ Ibid.

For the case study of Somali refugees in the Twin Cities, suggestions for more successful multi-level policies will be given at the end of this paper.

VIII. Organization of the Project

This paper is organized into five chapters, wherein Chapter Two introduces a literature review of key theoretical concepts including global migration, national identity, diaspora, citizenship, and adaptation. The third chapter reviews recent U.S. policy debates and changes in welfare programs, family reunification and sponsorship requirements, and anti-terrorism measures following the 2001 World Trade Center attacks. A description of the international process of refugee resettlement is also given in this chapter. The case study of Somali refugees in Minneapolis-St. Paul is detailed in Chapter Four as well as an overview of the major barriers they face in securing adequate employment, housing, and education. I then describe the unique “resettlement infrastructure” of public and community programs that help guide Somalis toward self-sufficiency and adapting to new lifestyles and attitudes in the Twin Cities. Finally, Chapter Five outlines the paper’s concluding findings and policy recommendations for improved relations between refugee and host communities in the United States, according to an original theoretical model of successful resettlement as “broadened belonging.”

CHAPTER TWO

Pathways to Citizenship: Migration & Adaptation Theory

I. Models of Migration

After decades of dictatorship under President Siad Barre, violence and disorder engulfed Somalia in 1991. President Barre was driven out of the country, and struggle over the state spawned the exodus of over 500,000 Somalis from their homes. As refugees and migrants, Somalis' diaspora is immense, stretching from refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia to the United Arab Emirates to Australia, Scandanavia, and across several European and North American communities.

Somalis in Minnesota comprise the largest Somali population in the United States.²⁹ Estimates suggest that over 30,000 Somalis inhabit the Twin Cities, where many are seen today as taxi drivers, airport employees, and small business owners along the revitalizing neighborhoods of Riverside Avenue, Lake Street, and University Avenue.³⁰ However, the first handful of Somalis in the Twin Cities arrived years prior to the population today, as international student in Minnesota colleges and universities. Civil war and resettlement programs throughout the 1990s brought Somali refugees into the United States, and this refugee population grew rapidly as those resettled elsewhere in

²⁹ A burgeoning area of literature and local study in Minnesota covers growing immigrant populations in rural, rather than urban areas. Increasing numbers of immigrants and refugees have relocated to rural areas to take unskilled jobs in factory plants; however, this locale is not the focus on my study. This research aims to consider the welfare and response of refugees in urban areas, where the most "resettlement infrastructure," public supports, and social networks already exist.

Shandy, Dianna J. and Katherine Fennelly. "A Comparison of the Integration Experiences of Two African Immigrant Populations in a Rural Community." *Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Social Work*. 25(1): 23-45. 2006.

³⁰ Census data perhaps undercounts Somalis because of non-response bias (due to language barriers or mistrust of the government) and broadly constructed categories that count persons by race instead of national origin. Some Somalis estimate the population to be as high as 55,000, although the accuracy of any figure is uncertain.

See Woessner, Paula. "Size of Twin Cities Muslim Community Difficult to Determine." Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota, Community Dividend. No. 1; 2002. <http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/cd/02-1/population.cfm>.

the country sought out Minnesota to reunite with family and for opportunities in education and employment.

Somali refugees' arrival in the Twin Cities was sudden and robust: the first 121 refugees were directly resettled in Minnesota in 1993, yet by the year 1999, over 1500 Somalis were being resettled in the Twin Cities annually and hundreds more were relocating from other states.³¹ The population has grown particularly since 2004, when nearly 2500 Somalis were resettled annually (not including secondary migration). Yet, as the Somalis are still a new and growing community, it is uncertain how they will adapt and settle in the Twin Cities, among native white communities and communities of color, large immigrant communities such as the Mexicans, or next to other refugee groups such as the Hmong and the Karen from camps in Thailand. This section of the paper will review the major concepts within immigrant resettlement and offer possible academic models through which to view Somali resettlement in the Twin Cities.

Studies and models on migration have become increasingly interdisciplinary over the past several years, incorporating analysis from economic as well as sociological, historical, and most recently, political and legal perspectives. Recent research had focused almost exclusively on migration policies, but the scope is slowly broadening to include new issue areas and expanding migrant populations such as Africans and South Asians. Policy reports, as well, had offered more constrained cost-benefit analyses of migration with a focus on providing "solutions" to regulate the flows, but new studies are

³¹ Although each state tracks the number of refugees resettled directly into their state each year, refugees can choose to relocate to other states within the country at their will; this is known as "secondary migration" and is not recorded. Most Somalis were directly resettled in warmer climate states, such as Georgia or Texas, but as strong ethnic communities developed in other areas, secondary migration likely became an even greater force than primary migration attracting Somalis into "favorite" locations such as Minnesota, or Lewiston, Maine. See *The Letter*, 2004. Minnesota Department of Health, Refugee Health Program. Primary Refugee Arrivals to Minnesota 1975 -- 2005. See Appendix B.

gradually filling the dearth of descriptive and analytical literature on migration. These newer studies look beyond a “politics of control” to a broader conceptualization of how and why migration occurs, irrespective of the laws that attempt to bind it.³² Scholars claim that this analysis must occur across disciplines, as the phenomenon of migration is complex and requires multiple lenses with which to explain its various levels and sites of manifestation.³³ This research has also diverged from the common policy view of migration as uniformly “good” or “bad” by identifying the nuances of its impact on different communities.

In my own interpretation, the essence of migration is change. It represents the physical movement that reorganizes social demography, and often demands a critical response from the regions that it touches – whether because human capital has left or has been added, to the perceived benefit or detriment of the region. Migration causes a sense of upheaval for both migrants and receiving or sending regions, as social structures are transplanted, modified, and perhaps made less cohesive (or more exclusively cohesive) in the process. Yet migration is a source of immense controversy for the state, as it provides economic benefit as well as social tension, and reacts unexpectedly to the ways in which policies attempt to harness it.³⁴

James Hollifield illustrates this divide between academic and policy analysis in his description of three approaches that are often taken in migration theory: political

³² Zolberg, Aristide R. “Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy.” *Becoming American, American Becoming*, ed. Douglas Massey. Russell Sage; New York. 1999.

³³ Brettell, Caroline B. and James F. Hollifield. “Migration Theory: Talking across disciplines.” *Migration Theory*, eds Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield. Routledge: New York. 2000. 1-26.

³⁴ Heisler, Barbara Schmitter. “The Sociology of Immigration: From Assimilation to Segmented Integration, from the American Experience to the Global Arena.” *Migration Theory*, eds Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield. Routledge: New York; 2000. 77-97.

realism, transnationalism, and international political economy (IPE).³⁵ Political realists claim that states are the lone, sovereign actors controlling migration flows, thus their policies reflect their national interests, in the context of the global inter-state system. In this approach, migration is viewed as having a direct impact on the balance of power between states and on internal concerns such as national security, economic growth, and socio-political stability.³⁶ Given the nature of contemporary immigration into developed liberal societies – increasingly lower class, female, and non-European – realists argue that high levels of immigration may lead to the economic, cultural, or political destabilization of previously homogenous, affluent, and European-descendent populations.

Myron Weiner refers to a “threshold of tolerance” to hypothesize that each society has a set capacity to absorb newcomers.³⁷ Immigration can occur, but once this limit is passed, additional immigration may destabilize the society. Some of these concerns were present among the residents of Lewiston, Maine; they feared that by allowing Somalis into Lewiston, the entire town might “become like Somalia.” In Franco-American pride, they echoed the mayor in setting an informal policy that the town was “maxed out” and could no longer accept additional Somalis. This follows the realist theory that states can and should set policy to regulate migration in the best interest of the state and its constituents.

³⁵ Hollifield, 2000.

³⁶ Hollifield, 2000.

Huntington, Samuel P. “The West: Unique, not Universal.” *Foreign Affairs* 75/6: 28-46. 1996

Borjas, George J. *Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy*. Basic Books: New York. 1990.

Weiner, Myron. *The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights*. HarperCollins: New York. 1995.

³⁷ Coined by former French President Francois Mitterand, See Hollifield, 2000 (155); Weiner, 1995.

However, transnationalists argue that this approach to migration falsely assumes that states and governments have adequate power to control the actions of migrants.³⁸ Transnationalists claim that, despite state policy, migration occurs in response to international networks, economic interests, and other factors. Growing out of Wallerstein's world-systems approach, the transnationalism thesis rejects realists' account of the sovereign nation-state and instead claims that the state is weakened by unregulated transnational movement of goods, services, and people.³⁹ Because states are no longer the sole authorities in global affairs, migration flows have also gained autonomy and occur in many ways independent from, or even contrary to, the interests and policies of states. Therefore, transnationalists view migration as a response not to policy, but to "push-pull factors" such as poverty or persecution, transnational social networks, and recruiting employers – factors that "push" migrants out of one place while "pulling" them into another.⁴⁰ This theory is also rooted in the economic principles of supply and demand, suggesting that people, especially those with family or friends already there, will migrate by any means possible if they achieve overall economic, security, or otherwise personal benefit by working and residing in a new community.

A third and emerging international political economy (IPE) perspective in migration theory synthesizes the realist and transnational views to consider the salient,

³⁸ Hollifield, 2000.

³⁹ Sassen, Saskia. "The Repositioning of Citizenship." *People Out of Place*, eds Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir. Routledge: New York. 2004: 191-208. See also Hollifield, 2000 (155); Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Politics of the World-Economy. The States, the Movements and the Civilizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984.

⁴⁰ Sassen, Saskia. *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ. 1991.

Massey, Douglas, et al. "Theories of International Migration." *Population and Development Review*. 25;2: 303-2. 1993.

Portes, Alejandro and Ruben Rumbaut. *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1996.

yet relative influences of all sub-national, national, and transnational interest groups in facilitating migration. This integrates state policy, the effects of globalizing capital and ideas, international institutions such as the International Organization on Migration, and pro- or anti-immigrant political coalitions into a collective portrait of the decentralized international political economy of actors affecting migration. The IPE theory of migration is the latest and least developed, thus my paper tests and follows this approach to analyze both state and non-state actors at various local, national, and international levels as they contribute to migration, resettlement, and integration processes.⁴¹

II. National Identity vs. Diaspora

The conceptual clash that exists between national identity and diaspora illustrates the social tension that I wish to highlight and analyze in this paper. Both nation and diaspora refer to a collection of people that have been socially constructed or “imagined” as a unified community. The basis on which this community is formed may refer to racial or ancestral commonalities among the members, or a shared geographical space in which all members reside.⁴² In the United States, national identity is defined first by a bounded territory, and secondly of a set of ideological values including liberty, individualism, and features such as Protestantism, heterosexuality, or Anglo-Saxon ethnicity. Flows of immigration have also come to define part of American national identity, as the United

⁴¹ Hollifield, 2000.

Note that not all migration flows are fully “unregulated”: refugee flows are regulated by governments in primary migration, yet then become unregulated in the case of secondary migration. Thus, I will still consider refugees flows influenced by push and pull factors and myriad non-state actors, but as “semi-regulated” flows the more decentralized migration occurs once they arrive in the United States.

⁴² Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed., London: Verso. 1983 [1991].
Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Age of Revolution : Europe 1789-1848*. Weidenfeld & Nicholson: New York.1962.

States is considered a “nation built by immigrants” and claims to welcome the world’s “tired and poor” still today.⁴³

However, the “nation of immigrants” identity of the United States is quite unique; migration generally undermines national cohesion by transplanting new forms of national identity and social demographics into the nation. Whether or not migrants arrive in a new country of their own volition, they arrive as vestiges of foreign nationalisms and their loyalties, or simply their presence, may threaten the national identity of the new host country. Historically, the United States has employed different conceptions of “America” in order to include new waves of migrants into its national identity, including its “whitening” of ethnic European immigrants in the post-WWII period. Thus, national identity can be a tool for national unity and inclusion, but is easily challenged by the sudden presence of immigrant foreigners who defy constructions of “national” features, values, and behaviors. Particularly due to the “browning” of immigrant flows since 1965 and the social anxieties released after September 11th, 2001, the future relevance of racially-based identity in the United States has come under intense debate.⁴⁴

Translated from Greek, ‘Diaspora’ literally refers to a scattering or sowing of “seeds” and refers to the collective, forced dispersion of an ethnic people, culture, and religion away from the original homeland.⁴⁵ Commonly used to describe past victims of persecution and forced migration, diaspora is often used to identify Jews or descendants

⁴³ The full inscription on the Statue of Liberty reads: “Give me your tired and your poor, your huddled masses yearning to break free. The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, the tempest-tossed, to me: I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”

⁴⁴ Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.
Massey, Douglas S.. The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States. *Population and Development Review*. 21;3:1995. 631-652.

⁴⁵ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/diaspora>.
Van Hear, Nicholas. *New Diasporas: The mass exodus, dispersal and regrouping of migrant communities*. University of Washington Press: Seattle. 1998.

of African slaves “scattered” across Europe, the United States, the Middle East, and Latin America. The Somali diaspora, albeit smaller than that of Jews or Africans, extends from the East African refugee camps to resettled communities across North America, in the United Arab Emirates, European cities, and in Australia and New Zealand.⁴⁶ Yet because their diaspora is relatively new and, for many, is the result of forced migration, Somalis may still strongly identify with their traditional ethnic and national communities and may resist the national identity of their host countries.

This conceptual “clash” between national identity and diaspora is common in the contemporary United States, couched in rhetoric surrounding national security policies and heightened screening for immigrants. The basic assumption of this “clash,” however, is that national identities are mutually exclusive. This paper challenges that assumption of competing identities; instead, I suggest the possibility of Somali and American co-existing identities in Somali immigrants, as well as the possibility of a paradigmatic shift in U.S. national identity to broaden national belonging to include Somalis.

III. Social Citizenship vs. Self-Reliance

In its most constrained form, citizenship⁴⁷ denotes a legal status and official association with the laws, customs and population of a particular nation-state. Scholars, however, find this definition limited and thus have come to understand and analyze citizenship as a label of membership in a social, political, or economic community. Citizenship has evolved with the construction of the nation-state, yet it traditionally functions in two

⁴⁶ These are mere examples of the many locales in which Somalis have established communities; it is not meant to be an exhaustive list.

⁴⁷ I intend this section to be a discussion of the broader forms of citizenship and social citizenship that should be considered from a scholarly perspective. However, beyond this section, I will refer to “non-citizens,” “citizens” or “citizenship” throughout this paper according to their legal definitions

ways: 1) to define and unify a civic community, and 2) to endow its members with certain entitlements or rights.⁴⁸ The post-WWII Marshallian theory of rights expanded on the second function of citizenship by introducing different “generations” of rights. T.H. Marshall argued for the centrality of the third generation of “social rights” such as the right to a minimum standard of living, adequate health care, and opportunities for education and advancement.

Marshall advocated for a liberal welfare state in order to ensure these citizen rights; however, his work and principles of social liberalism have recently been challenged by neoliberal theorists. The Thatcher-Reagan era and concurrent wave of economic and social conservatism in many western liberal democracies changed the ways in which many viewed citizenship, social rights, and the welfare state. Following the principle of neoliberalism, many political conservatives in the United States now emphasize the necessity of duties or obligations to complement Marshall’s citizen rights. This philosophy of rights accompanied by duties, suggestive of Rousseau’s social contract, now outweighs Marshallian social rights in contemporary policies, particularly with regard to non-citizens.⁴⁹

Current narratives surrounding immigration often refer to success and social mobility as “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps” or following the principles of “rugged individualism” to achieve the American Dream. Some scholars argue that this wasn’t always the case – that earlier immigrants actually received considerable government support – but national policies nonetheless require self-sufficiency in most immigrants and their families. A public charge doctrine sets a limit on the amount of

⁴⁸ Kymlicka, Will. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford University Press: New York. 1995.

⁴⁹ Rousseau. *On the Social Contract*.

public assistance immigrants can receive before being subject to deportation as “public burdens” on the state. Others may be refused entry on this principle, if it is likely that they will become public burdens once in the country.⁵⁰ The concept of self-sufficiency, that a person can and should achieve “success” by his or her own effort without assistance, is a founding value of the United States and by extension, a founding value of what it means to become American. In order to receive assistance, it is expected that one first offers a contribution, and one might be negatively labeled weak or dependent. Self-reliance, the freedom and capacity to support oneself, is a critical value in contemporary American society, and increasingly guides our social and immigration policies, as I will argue in the following chapter.⁵¹ Refugees, albeit legally exempt from a strict standard of self-sufficiency, are increasingly seen as part of the large “lump” of immigrants and are mistakenly held to the same expectations of self-reliance.

Self-sufficiency also becomes the default model in cases where full citizenship is not extended to all members of a society. In the midst of globalization and increasing migration, the borders of citizenship – like those of states – blur and shift among ever-changing populations. Unfortunately for many, nation-based citizenship and rights are also lost in the shuffle. Saskia Sassen identifies a major disconnect between citizenship as a legal status and citizenship as public participation in her writings on second-class citizens who may be “authorized, but not recognized” and on undocumented immigrants

⁵⁰ Edwards, James R. Jr. “Public Charge Doctrine: A Fundamental Principle of American Immigration Policy.” Center for Immigration Studies [Backgrounder.] May 2001.

Note that refugees are given more entitlement to public assistance than are other types of immigrants, and thus aren’t strictly held to the threat of deportation on the grounds of being a “public charge.” Refugees are, however, still only able to sponsor non-refugee family members’ visas for U.S. admission if they concede their eligibility for public assistance. Also, a general negative stigma on welfare recipients may lead eligible refugees to reject services. See Chapter Three for more discussion on welfare stigma.

⁵¹ Kymlicka, 1995.

who are “recognized” for their work and contributions, “but not authorized.”⁵² Those with authorization, or legal citizenship, may not be consistently recognized for their participation in and deserved rights from society, evidenced by second-class citizenship and disenfranchisement in many poor and/or minority communities in the United States. Adversely, non-citizens or undocumented immigrants may make consistent contributions to society, but never enter into the legal form of citizenship in order to secure the rights earned by their duties.

The lines between legal citizenship, social citizenship, and a social contract of “rights and duties” are far from clear. Prior to 1996, all legal permanent residents were entitled to the same social rights (in terms of social welfare benefits) as were citizens, and gaining citizenship only granted access to political rights such as voting or holding public office. Yet since neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, citizenship is required to receive most forms of social assistance. Movements such as *California Proposition 187* attempted to extend this line of rights even further, by withholding all public services and education from non-citizens, particularly undocumented immigrants⁵³. The proposition was overturned, but exemplified the popular unrest over which rights should be accorded to legal citizens, denizens, or a broader pool of “social citizen” U.S. residents. Current debates over undocumented immigration focus on this social citizenship that is due to immigrants who contribute to the U.S. economy. This paper, however, attempts to broaden this debate by emphasizing the rights due to non-citizen, yet invited and legal resident populations such as refugees, and the risk of them falling into second-class citizenship.

⁵² Sassen, 2004.

⁵³ Mailman, Stanley. “California’s Proposition 187 and its Lessons.” *New York Law Journal*: Satterlee Stevens Burke & Burke. 3 January 1995.

IV. Integration and Adaptation

As significant gaps in citizenship and rights emerge and grow in immigrant-receiving countries, both scholar and policy-makers may ask *how* non-citizens and denizens might best be integrated into the membership of their host countries. Models of integration include views ranging from a Smithian, or liberal perspective of integration as a *laissez-faire* process requiring no state facilitation, to a Durkheimian view that immigration innately resists integration and instead promotes the rise of isolated ethnic enclaves, inter-group tensions, and a fragmented, volatile society.⁵⁴ Occupying the middle ground between these extremes is an “advocates” or “integrationists” argument that immigrants should be admitted at reasonable levels, but that all newcomers should be welcomed with the resources and political will to help facilitate their full integration and minimize potential negative consequences for other unskilled laborers and low-income populations.⁵⁵

In the United States, the paths and forms of integration have varied over the nation’s history, but all attempt to describe the process by which social cohesion is recreated between “native” populations and new flows of immigration. In past generations, integration was achieved by changing the national identity to fit the immigrants (e.g. expanding the definition and image of whiteness) or by forcing the immigrants to change and blend into the existing national image. This original theory of assimilation describes the process in which a foreign national identity is replaced by U.S.

⁵⁴ Hollifield, 2004.

⁵⁵ Martin, Susan. "The Politics of US Immigration Reform." *The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change*, ed. Sarah Spencer. Blackwell Publishing: Massachusetts. 2003.

culture and identity.⁵⁶ Yet this definition also rests on several contested assumptions: that all immigrants follow the same starting point and linear path to assimilation, that only one “end point” mainstream culture exists, and that a multiplicity of cultures would cause instability and weaken national identity.⁵⁷

This early analysis was based in the classical period of immigration, which lasted from the 1880s to 1930 and included over eighty percent European immigrants. However, as immigration into the United States diversified and ethnic identity politics grew popular in the 1970s⁵⁸, the assimilationist “melting pot” theory gave way to more contemporary models of immigrant integration.⁵⁹ Alejandro Portes’ theory suggests “segmented” or “downward assimilation” occurs into a lower-class, urban, minority alternative mainstream, and Richard Alba and Victor Nee also redefine 21st century assimilation as it occurs into a more multicultural, pluralistic mainstream.⁶⁰

The concept of assimilation has also been largely discarded in favor of terms that imply a reciprocal relationship between immigrants and the host society, such as “adaptation” or “critical adaptation.” This includes a concept of mutuality, raised by Douglas Massey and Ahmed Samatar, that adaptation requires effort and compromise by both states and immigrants, and that both groups must acknowledge one another and be impacted by the other’s existence.⁶¹ In particular, Massey criticizes the United States for

⁵⁶ Gordon, Milton. *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. Oxford University Press: New York. 1964.

⁵⁷ Gordon, 1964.

⁵⁸ Alba, Richard and Victor Nee. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. 2005.

⁵⁹ Glazer, Nathan and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. *Beyond the Melting Pot*. MIT Press: Cambridge. 1970.

⁶⁰ Alba and Nee, 2005.

⁶¹ Massey, Douglas S. "The American Side of the Bargain." *Reinventing the Melting Pot*, ed. Tamar Jacoby. Basic Books: New York. 2004.

Samatar, Ahmed I. "Beginning Again: From Refugee to Citizen." *Bildhaan; An International Journal of Somali Studies*. 4:1-15. 2004.

not upholding its end of an implicit “social contract” with the immigrants and refugees that are legally allowed into the country. Massey notes that 15 percent of all new immigrants are of African origin, and because they face the immense and often unanticipated challenges of discrimination and economic legacies of slavery and racial segregation, these new black immigrants tend to fall into a “downward assimilation” model of violence and poverty, low property values and poor education in poorly funded and failing schools.⁶²

My research analyzes the possibility of a “failure” of immigration – condemning legal refugees to the “bottom” of the economic and social melting pot – using the case study of Somali refugees in Minnesota. The paper advocates for an extension of the social contract model to illustrate the rights and duties owed to both newcomers and native Minnesotans, and possibility for co-existing identity under a community of “broadened belonging”

⁶² Massey, 2004.

CHAPTER THREE

Give Me Your Tired and Poor: U.S. Refugee Policy and Process

I. Value-Driven Policies

“Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state...Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”

United Nations Declaration of Human Rights

“The commitment of the United States to protecting and assisting refugees is deep and abiding. This commitment is part of our nation’s history and it goes to the very core of our values.”

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

New York City’s Statue of Liberty stands as a global symbol of freedom, safety, and refuge, and has welcomed newcomers “home” to American shores for over 120 years.

U.S. citizens and politicians often refer to the United States as a country built and sustained by immigrants and that, in turn, offers all newcomers the opportunity to pursue their own “American Dreams.” The appeal of life in the United States rests on values such as individual rights, liberty, and prospects of success and wealth; thus these same principles of hard work and self-made success underline national immigration and social welfare policies.

U.S. immigration policies mimic (and are mimicked by) international immigration policies in many ways. Across most industrialized, liberal democracy states, immigration policies are crafted according to two distinct views on migration: economic incentives and humanitarian incentives. An economic view, similar to the Smithian view in the previous chapter, suggests that immigrants be admitted for their skills and contributions to the national workforce. Adversely, a “public charge doctrine” of exclusion is grounded in the theory that any immigrant who requires excessive economic assistance becomes a “public burden” – no longer deserving to remain in the new country. The

American humanitarian view, on the other hand, is an extension of the Advocates view in Chapter Two and holds the United States accountable to high standards of living and a moral obligation to share the “American lifestyle” with others. Assuming a relative superiority of life in the United States, this perspective justifies refugee resettlement in American cities and towns and supports family reunification programs on a humanitarian basis.⁶³

The humanitarian paradigm reigned in U.S. policies for much of the latter half of the 20th century. The Hart-Cellar Act lifted the quotas system in 1965 to allow equal amounts of immigration from the Global South as well as from Western Europe, adding a distinct non-white character to the traditional white flows of immigrants from Europe. Fifteen years later, the Refugee Act established a formal system of accepting refugees and asylees. Whereas refugees had previously been admitted on an ad hoc and politically biased process, the Refugee Act modeled the United Nation’s admission guidelines from the 1949 Geneva Convention. The Refugee Act codified international protection into U.S. domestic policies, created a standard procedure for admitting refugees and asylum seekers, and established federally-funded programs of resettlement and public assistance for new refugees.

The Refugee Act was a monumental show of support for global refugees and resettlement programs in third party countries; the United States alone has admitted over 2.6 million refugees and asylees since 1975.⁶⁴ Through the Hart-Cellar and Refugee Acts, the U.S. government institutionalized values of ethnic diversity and support for victims of persecution. This humanitarian view of accepting foreigners into the United

⁶³ “Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight.” Urban Institute. 1994.

⁶⁴ “The United States Working to Advance Freedom and Human Dignity: The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.” Fact Sheet. August 4, 2006.

States prevailed throughout the late 20th century; however, swift changes in U.S. political ideology and social welfare state beginning in the mid-1980s soon eroded key elements of this immigration policy paradigm. This chapter outlines the basic character and process of refugee resettlement in the United States and Minnesota, and the ways in which internal political and economic changes (specifically welfare reform and September 11th) now threaten U.S. commitments to supporting refugee welfare and welcome.

II. Refugee Resettlement: A Public and Non-Profit Process

The first steps of the resettlement process begin overseas, where the State Department evaluates refugees for their potential for “successful resettlement” in the United States. The State Department monitors U.S. donations to refugee camps abroad, approves selected refugees for admission, and oversees the cultural orientation that refugees receive from international organizations to prepare for the United States.⁶⁵ These “voluntary resettlement agencies” (VOLAGs) teach about American culture and government as well as practical skills such as how to use foreign appliances.⁶⁶

Once the refugees finally arrive, however, the broader social processes of “resettling” and “adapting” are decidedly more complicated. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services takes over from the State Department to coordinate hundreds of public and non-profit refugee service providers across the country. Ten national VOLAGs are contracted to case manage new refugees and, with \$425 per capita over 90 days, provide each refugee with “core” resettlement services. *The Reception and*

⁶⁵ The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (U.S. State Department). <http://www.state.gov/g/prm/>

⁶⁶ Minnesota Historical Society Interview. 15 December 2006.

Placement Program is administered by each state's department of human services, funded by both public and private resources, and consists of:

- Sponsorship assurance
- Pre-arrival planning
- Reception
- 'Basic needs support' for at least 30 days⁶⁷
- Home visit(s)
- Case management (counseling, adjustment, referral services)
- Community orientation
- Referral to physical and mental health services, employment services, and education and training programs

This "R&P" program fills refugees' immediate food and shelter needs for their first 30 days, after which additional services – English classes, counseling, or welfare assistance – are the responsibilities of each refugee. Thus after this first month, refugees are served by a local network of public services, non-profit organizations, and community and family members to aid the long-term transitions and challenges of resettlement.


In Minnesota, the Department of Human Services (DHS) oversees local networks including partnerships between "mainstream"⁶⁸ and ethnic community-based efforts to serve refugee needs. DHS works primarily with high capacity mainstream organizations such as Lutheran Social Services of Minnesota and Catholic Charities to continue the same resettlement programs they've offered generations of refugees in Minnesota. DHS also provides technical support and capacity-building for smaller, community-based organizations that often arise to serve specific (and often new) refugee and immigrant

⁶⁷ According to the Minnesota Department of Human Services, 'Basic needs support' refers to decent, safe, and sanitary housing, essential furnishings, appropriate food and food allowances, necessary clothing and other basic necessities.

⁶⁸ The term "mainstream" was used by many of my interviewees to refer to the more established, native Minnesotan (and often white Christian) populations or employees in social service organizations. Mainstream organizations were named in opposition to ethnic- or community-based organizations that were comprised mostly of leaders from the migrant communities, although both types of organizations served similar populations. Because of their history, mainstream organizations were also considered to have more established practices and capacity to serve larger populations effectively, as opposed to younger community-led organizations.

communities. Known as Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs), these organizations are created and led by more established, former refugee members of the ethnic community to aid newcomers.

As shown below, an overall “resettlement infrastructure” is organically constructed, particularly in urban areas, to serve new refugees in a decentralized, public-nonprofit network of social services. This network of outside assistance, coupled with mutual efforts by old and new arrivals, has supported refugees in cities across the United States for decades. However, this collaborative support network is among the first elements of U.S. refugee resettlement to suffer from shifts in legislation and funding.



III. Minnesota's Resettlement Climate: Contradictions

The state of Minnesota, couched in the frozen prairie of the Upper Midwest, is known for its blustery winters, Scandinavian-settled farmlands, and proverbial "10,000 lakes."

Although an unlikely destination for any traveler, something about this North Star state has attracted a steady stream of immigrants and refugees from East Africa, Laos, and Thailand for over 20 years.⁶⁹ Aside from perhaps the inclement weather, most of these immigrants, enjoy the state and cite similar reasons for arriving: plentiful (skilled and unskilled) jobs, good public schools, an existing community of their ethnic or national origin, and a warm social welcome. Minnesota has a long history of progressive politics, a dynamic business community, and is nationally recognized for its abundant educational opportunities, relatively low urban poverty and crime rates, commitment to public health and safety, and overall high standard of living.⁷⁰

The Economist published an article in 1999 titled "Minnesota's Job Market: Land of 10,000 Opportunities," bringing national attention to the thriving economy and high citizen-participation rates common to Midwestern states.⁷¹ In addition to an active private sector, Minnesota has dynamic public and non-profit sectors and a social culture of "Minnesota nice" built up from generations of civic engagement and volunteerism facilitated by the Church and other faith communities. Minnesota is home to the nation's

⁶⁹ As mentioned earlier, Minnesota and the Twin Cities "attract" refugees initially through secondary migration, from other states in the country. Over time, however, popular locations with large ethnic communities will also persuade resettlement agencies to directly resettle refugees in areas with established communities (of the same ethnicity), thus adding to the attraction of the location.

⁷⁰ Minnesota was awarded first place in the United Way "State of Caring" Index for the past several years. State Policy Reports (considering factors such as economic performance, health, crime rates, and education) placed Minnesota at the top of the "Camelot Index." Carnegie Mellon University survey placed Twin Cities in top 10 of "Bohemian Index" for concentration of creative people. "Minnesota: High Quality of Life." University of Minnesota College of Education and Human Development. 27 March 2007. <http://www.education.umn.edu/MN/quality.html>.

⁷¹ Fennelly, Katherine. "Latinos, Africans and Asians in the North Star State: Immigrant Communities in MN." *Beyond the Gateway: Immigrants in a Changing America*, ed. Gozdzia, Martin. 2005.

first immigrant settlement houses and battered women's shelters, and was among the first states to accept Holocaust survivors into the United States in 1948.⁷² If a large job market first enticed Somalis to Minnesota, it is likely that the government and community support they receive persuaded them to stay, and invite their families to join them.

"Home-Grown Values" & Traditions of Public Service

Minnesota residents take pride in the values and traditions that make their state unique. A 2004 research project by Quinlin Rosner Research describes a sense of a "Minnesota Way" that reflects Twin Cities residents' commitment to strong communities, public education, natural resources, and tolerance of different ideas and cultures. Despite some urban-rural differences, the Twin Cities are politically left-leaning and have produced national figures such as former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and former Senator Paul Wellstone who both supported immigration and safety net programs for the poor. The state has long provided generous public assistance programs to all eligible individuals and families, and its statewide public education system is considered a national model.

Twenty-eight percent of state expenditures go to social welfare programs and the Twin Cities offer a plethora of social services, ranging from non-profit organizations and neighborhood associations to homeless shelters and food shelters.⁷³ Despite widespread racial and cultural homogeneity, Minnesota shows its institutional commitment to quality

⁷² These traditions continue today by the community centers of Pillsbury United Communities and Women's Advocates.

⁷³ Burt, Martha R., Rob Geen, and Amy-Ellen Duke. *New Federalism Project*. Urban Institute. 1997. <http://www.urban.org/publications/307314.html#minn>.

public services that assists its more disadvantaged, and often non-white, residents and citizens.

Changing Rhetoric

Yet, like the United States, Minnesota is not impervious to change. Despite a history of Democrats holding the majority in Congressional politics, Republicans have grown in power and in numbers in recent years. Soon after fiscal conservatism emerged on the national stage, it was felt in Minnesota as well, and budget cuts in historic social programs were justified by the “economic crisis” faced by state and local governments across the country. One Hennepin County employee admits that “the tone of Minnesota has changed over the last few years,” particularly since Governor Tim Pawlenty came into office on an anti-illegal immigration campaign and spawned negative media attention around undocumented immigrants and pushed (unsuccessfully) for drivers licenses to state one’s legal status.⁷⁴ The employee continued, saying “given the political flavor in Minnesota right now, you’ve got still some remaining liberals who are fine with extending benefits, but they’re saying let’s pick our battles and maybe this is one we don’t really want to fight.” According to this County employee, the future of Minnesota’s welcome and social programs for immigrants and refugees, despite its history, is increasingly subject to fluctuations in the budget.

⁷⁴ Hennepin County (OMS) Interview. 21 December 2006.

IV. Testing Refugee Support: Cracks in the Welfare State

As a nation of immigrants, the United States has also been a nation of nativists. At times we have offered, in Tom Paine's words, 'an asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty' from all parts of the world. At other times Americans have done the persecuting – passing discriminatory laws against the foreign-born, denying their fundamental rights, and assaulting them with mob violence, even lynchings. We have welcomed immigrants in periods of expansion and optimism, reviled them in periods of stagnation and cynicism. Our attitudes have depended primarily on domestic politics and economics, secondarily on the volume and characteristics of the newcomers. In short, American nativism has had less to do with 'them' than us.

“Cycles of Nativism in U.S. History,” The National Immigration Forum

As mentioned previously, the United States, and no state or city within the United States, is impervious to change. After decades of liberal social programs throughout the Great Society period and Civil Rights revolution, conservative Republicans such as former President Ronald Reagan promoted a swift change in the role of government and assistance for society's young, elderly, disabled, and working classes. Reagan joined Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom to advocate for a neoliberal shift that would touch economies around the world, as it restructured forms of public assistance and economic opportunities in the United States. Between 1996 and 2006, unprecedented change occurred in American values and views, particularly regarding foreigners: Democrats who had historically supported welfare programs turned against them on the basis of “economic inefficiencies,” and *laissez-faire* economics and immigration were believed to lift all U.S. residents out of poverty, through employment. To relieve overburdened budgets, non-citizens were phased out of key assistance programs and immigrants who threatened to place too large a burden on the state were restricted from entry. Then in 2001, a handful of Muslim men flew planes into the World Trade Center, and dark-skinned and Muslim foreigners across the United States were suspected as threats to national security.

Although other changes may have occurred over this decade, the economic and social reforms embodied in key events such as Welfare Reform and September 11th affected all Americans, and dramatically affected all non-citizens in America. Immigrants and refugees who arrived during this period entered a different America than had existed in the years following the Hart-Cellar and Refugee Acts. This chapter explores some of the specific ways in which America changed, tracing the policy and ideology shifts that set the context into which Somali refugees enter today.

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

According to an interviewee at DHS, the policy changes from 1996 have, above all other recent events, had the largest “downstream” effect on refugee and refugee families’ access to public assistance. “Welfare reform” refers to Congressional debates that occurred throughout the 1980s and early 1990s and culminated in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 to dramatically restructure the national welfare system. Welfare first came under attack by social and fiscal conservatives who criticized the system as inefficient and costly, and viewed “welfare checks” as disincentives to work, fostering a culture of unemployment and poverty. Public debates played off of perceptions of “welfare queen” single mothers who chose to live idly on the bill of the government, rather than looking for work. This popular – however exaggerated – image, as well as increasing the financial strain of funding the welfare program, generated bipartisan support for PRWORA, and Democratic President Bill Clinton signed the Act into law.

Welfare reform transformed the nature of public assistance by imposing new restrictions on eligibility and programs, including a five-year time limit. Formerly an ongoing cash assistance program, “Aid for Families with Dependent Children” was re-titled “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families” marking its new temporary nature. As expected, welfare caseloads and overall costs dropped dramatically - up to 75 percent - and as such both Republicans and Democrats hail the success of welfare reform.⁷⁵

Yet PRWORA also included lesser-known provisions with landmark impacts on non-citizen communities in the United States. The Act was the first piece of national legislation to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens in their eligibility for public benefits. Prior to 1996, any U.S. resident could qualify for welfare, citizens and non-citizens alike. After PRWORA, however, eligibility for most federally-funded benefits was tied to an additional factor: legal status. *Citizens* could receive assistance for up to five cumulative years throughout one’s lifetime, *refugees* could only receive assistance for their first five years in the United States,⁷⁶ *legal permanent residents* were barred from assistance for their first five years, and then could only receive benefits from the state, and *undocumented immigrants* were barred indefinitely from all national and most state-funded assistance.⁷⁷

These non-citizen provisions were added in response to claims that immigrants were weighing down welfare caseloads and perhaps coming to the United States expressly for the prospect of “free” benefits. Immigrants were using significant amounts

⁷⁵ Brookings Welfare Reform & Beyond Forum: “Should Legal Immigrants Receive Public Benefits?” The Brookings Institution. <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/transcripts/20020228.htm>. February 2002.

⁷⁶ Refugees can possibly still receive the same amount of welfare benefits as citizens, but instead of a lifetime of eligibility for up to five cumulative years of support, they are only eligible for their first five years. Refugees may only receive welfare benefits beyond their first five years of residence if: 1) they haven’t received benefits already for five full years, and 2) they naturalize and regain eligibility as citizens.

⁷⁷ Martin, Susan. “The Politics of US Immigration Reform.” *The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change*, ed. Sarah Spencer. Blackwell Publishing: Massachusetts. 2003.

of public assistance, evidenced by Congressional Research Service reports showing non-citizen welfare participation rates nearly doubled between 1989 (7%) and 1996 (12%).⁷⁸ Again, the Act had the anticipated effect of pushing non-citizens' welfare rates back down to 8 percent by 2001, and again was hailed an economic success.⁷⁹

To explain such dramatic falls in welfare use among citizens and non-citizens, many assume that low-income Americans have since found employment and raised their standard of living (or that non-citizens have naturalized). But Michael Fix, Vice President of the Migration Policy Institute challenges this conclusion with a concern that families may have left welfare, but without necessarily achieving full self-sufficiency. He commented at a Brookings Institution Welfare & Beyond Forum in 2002:

We see steep declines in benefit use for refugees, declines that we can't fully explain. We see especially steep declines among poor families living in states with fast-growing immigrant populations and poorest safety nets. And we see that naturalization and income gains do not explain most of these declines.⁸⁰

At least in part, state-funded assistance programs fill some of this welfare gap. Thirty-five states created additional allocations to fund assistance programs for non-citizens beyond what PRWORA proscribed.⁸¹ Many of these states chose to offer benefits to legal permanent residents, or chose to offer ongoing benefits (beyond five years) such as food assistance or Supplemental Security Income for elder and disabled refugees.

Nonetheless, gaps in coverage persist. For undocumented immigrants, neither federal nor state programs are open to them and, as one Hennepin County employee

⁷⁸ Fix, Michael E, Jeffrey S. Passel, and Kenneth Sucher. *Trends in Naturalization*. Urban Institute. 2003. <http://www.urban.org/publications/310847.html>

⁷⁹ Part of the drop in non-citizen welfare use may also be explained by rises in naturalization rates, as former non-citizen recipients could continue the program (up to five cumulative years) as citizens. Naturalization rates rose steadily since 1996, ending a 20-year-long downward trend. (see Brookings Forum, 2002.)

⁸⁰ Brookings Forum, 2002.

⁸¹ Several exceptions to the 1996 Act have also been made for specialized populations, granting benefits eligibility to immigrants who have served in the military, those with disabilities, minors under 18 years of age, and some retirees.

remarked, “many of them are on the streets.” Even for legal residents and refugees, one’s state of residence may mean the difference between receiving welfare and medical assistance, and receiving nothing in times of need. Fifteen states withhold nearly all benefits from non-citizen, and studies show increasing trends of immigrants relocating to states with expanding job markets, most of which happen to also be among the fifteen “weak safety net states.” Non-citizen populations are swiftly growing in states such as Texas and Ohio that offer virtually no safety net assistance to women, children, the elderly or disabled, or other non-citizens who may need government assistance.⁸² The most generous safety net providers, on the other hand, include historic immigration gateway states California, New York, and Texas as the top three, followed by an unlikely fourth place provider, Minnesota.⁸³ An ad hoc “patchwork policies” system has developed nationwide in non-citizen public assistance, widening the gap between strong and weak safety net states as well as between non-citizen communities with access to assistance and communities that have virtually none. As one’s access to assistance is contingent on state-provided programs, location, like legal status, has become another primary factor in immigrant and refugee welfare.

Cost-Shifting to the State and to Sponsors

A central purpose of welfare reform was to reduce the costs of the welfare program; in practice, however, these costs were not fully eliminated but shifted to different resource pools and absorbed under different forms of costs. Federal devolution allowed states the

⁸² Kaestner, Robert. “Should immigrants be singled out? Immigrants, self-sufficiency, and welfare reform.” *Policy Forum* . 15;3. University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs 2002.

⁸³ Nearly 17% of MN’s welfare caseloads are non-citizens. Cited from Wasem, Ruth Ellen. “State Policies on Immigrant Eligibility for TANF.” *CRS Report for Congress*. 23 April 2004.

choice of providing additional services for non-citizens, but most states have seen increased costs whether or not they offered additional services. Strong safety net states found themselves funding preventive anti-poverty and health insurance programs to supplement minimalist federal programs, whereas several weak safety net states suffered from costs associated with increased homelessness, poverty, and emergency medical treatment.⁸⁴

State and local governments' decisions regarding additional services involved complex cost-benefits and moral analyses, and either choice faced criticism on both sides by local interests. A Minnesota Hennepin County employee expressed this very dilemma in 2003, writing:

Should the County considering [sic] backfilling some service areas where the state has reduced or eliminated funding, or do we follow the funding cut decisions made by the legislature even if we disagree with them? What if cuts save money in the short term but will cost more in the long term? What if it means saying 'no' to individuals and groups of clients and providers?"⁸⁵

Many immigration advocates quickly pointed to the contributions that immigrants made – paying taxes and working – as justification for their receipt of public assistance. Yet even this claim does not relieve state and local budgets: immigrants' major economic contributions accrue at the national level, while assistance program costs were shifted onto the same local institutions that also absorb the up-front costs of adjusting to new immigrant populations. State and local institutions had traditionally borne the brunt of immigration costs by providing English classes, expanding public transportation systems, building affordable housing, and increasing funding to schools and health clinics for special resources such as translators and cultural training. The passage of PRWORA in

⁸⁴ Wasem, 2004.

⁸⁵ Taken from internal records on state health and welfare-to-work programs. Provided by Hennepin County Office of Multi-Cultural Services.

1996 only shifted costs more heavily onto the states and counties already burdened with large and growing immigrant populations.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1997 caused cost-shifting as well, placing additional financial responsibility on immigrants who wished to bring family members to join them in the United States. Informally known as “Ira-Ira,” the 1997 law legally activated the broad principles of the public charge doctrine and required all (non-refugee) immigrants to enter or remain in the U.S. based on *sponsorship*. Citizen or permanent resident family members and employers could sponsor new immigrants by agreeing to don full financial responsibility and concede their own eligibility for public benefits for the first five years. Because reuniting family in the new country is of such importance for immigrants, one Hennepin County manager critically questions the logic and effectiveness of the sponsorship principle:

I certainly understand where the federal government was coming from when they implemented [this law], but I also understand that if I had family member who was in a refugee camp and hungry and in less than hygienic conditions...I would sign anything they asked me to sign or that I thought I could sign in order to get that family member over to where I was and to have a better life. So, whether that means I thought I could actually take care of them or not, I sure as hell would say I could.⁸⁶

The sponsorship policy is certainly effective in keeping immigrants off of welfare caseloads, but despite its purpose of guiding immigrants to help support one another, the requirements may actually add downward pressure on their overall welfare. According to the interviewee cited above, immigrants may sign the affidavit of support for the family member with little thought to the additional monthly income, food, rent, and other costs that will be required. Hennepin County has had to reject several cases of new immigrants whose sponsors are unable to support them, but they are prohibited from virtually all benefits.

⁸⁶ Hennepin County (OMS) Interview. 21 December 2006.

Welfare Stigma

Additional causes for concern in immigrant welfare are the “chilling” and “spillover” effects that result from a negative casting of welfare and welfare recipients in the public debates as “lazy” or manipulating the system for free money. A Hennepin County lawyer explained that the stigma of receiving welfare, combined with the legal risk that accepting benefits poses to non-citizens (on account of the public charge doctrine), may explain why many immigrants have not applied for welfare, including low-income individuals who could qualify for the program.⁸⁷ Deportation fears caused many immigrants to avoid public services, either because they could be labeled “public charges” or their undocumented status could be exposed. For instance, *WIC*, a free nutrition education program for pregnant mothers and children is one of the few state-funded programs in Minnesota that is offered to anyone, regardless of legal status. Nonetheless, an employee speculates that their Latino clientele dropped over the past decade because of this “chilling” effect on undocumented Latina mothers with all public programs.⁸⁸

Other deterrents may include the known trend that immigrants who accept benefits are less frequently allowed to sponsor family members into the United States, or the barriers that undocumented immigrant parents face in maintaining benefits for their U.S.-born citizen children. Fix also comments on this “spillover effect” of absent assistance in mixed citizen-non-citizen families:

Now of course one of the lessons, at least for me, of welfare reform is that it's very difficult to target cuts at one population without having spillover effects on other populations... According to the census, 85% of children in families with a legal immigrant parent are themselves citizens, and in the wake of welfare reform what we see is that citizen children in these mixed status families

⁸⁷ Hennepin County (OMS) Interview. 1 December 2006.

⁸⁸ Hennepin County (WIC) Interview. 1 December 2006.

are less likely to receive TANF and food stamps and are more likely to be uninsured than poor kids in citizen families. We see the same kind of spillover effect among refugee populations.⁸⁹

Thus, the overall health and wealth of non-citizen populations has been at increased risk since welfare reform, despite nominal increases in their employment rates and decreased dependence on public programs. Economist George Borjas claims that food insecurity has risen among immigrant families, who may lack the income to buy nutritious food and yet are ineligible for healthy food programs such as Food Stamps.⁹⁰

Welfare reform, in my broader analysis of citizen *and* non-citizen communities, has mixed results. Although successful in reducing welfare caseloads and augmenting national employment rates, the reform and stigmatization of welfare recipients affects non-citizens so strongly that many eligible and needy families risk their welfare and health in order to avoid legal repercussions and to sponsor family members as new immigrants. Moreover, costs that were meant to be eliminated by trimming the program tend to resurface, perhaps in even larger amounts, at the state and local levels.

Welfare reform was an important first step in balancing the rights of assistance with the duties of work – exemplifying Douglas Massey’s “social contract” – yet in the ways in which the reform affected non-citizens, the policy fulfilled few of its original intentions. Instead of supporting a target needy population to achieve self-sufficiency, welfare reform has the potential of compounding poverty in individuals and outstripping state and local government budgets, while immigrants’ broader economic contributions continue to accrue to the federal budget.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Brookings Forum, 2002.

⁹⁰ Brookings Forum, 2002.

⁹¹ Note that these conclusions pertain only to the non-citizen-related effects of welfare reform.

V. Testing Refugee Support: September 11th Aftermath and Anxiety

Fear and loathing of foreigners reach such levels when the nation's problems become so intractable that some people seek scapegoats. Typically, these periods feature a political or economic crisis, combined with a loss of faith in American institutions and a sense that the national community is gravely fractured. Hence a yearning for social homogeneity that needs an internal enemy to sustain itself: the 'alien.' Nativists' targets have reflected America's basic divisions: class, race, religion, and, to a lesser extent, language and culture. Yet each anti-immigrant cycle has its own dynamics.

“Cycles of Nativism in U.S. History,” The National Immigration Forum

When two planes flew into the World Trade Center Towers on September 11, 2001, all U.S. residents felt the shock – citizens, immigrants, and refugees alike. This event had a tremendous impact on the ways in which all American residents viewed their personal and national security, the limits of civil liberties, and the image and values upon which they considered the nation to stand. For some, September 11th opened their eyes to terrorism and the possibility that civil violence, a sustained part of life in many war-torn regions of the world, could pierce the lives of American civilians as well. The PATRIOT Act incited sweeping changes in national laws in order to protect Americans and uncover possible threats before they materialized. Characterizations of Al Qaeda and ‘underground’ terrorist networks permeated public media and fears crept into the American psyche of an invisible enemy hiding within their midst, most likely foreign and Muslim. September 11th undoubtedly released a wave of stereotyping and suspicion toward Muslims, yet the full intensity of this effect is not documented, but rather absorbed in the memories of individuals.

Exaggerated fears, rumors, and isolated attacks against Somalis certainly contradict the popular image of the United States as a welcoming, tolerant, immigrant-receiving nation. Waves of xenophobia, particularly following events of war or threatened national security, are not uncommon in recent U.S. history: Japanese

Americans still recall the internment camps and hostilities they faced following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, the negative impact of September 11th may perhaps linger for Somali refugees in the economic recession that followed, further deepening the public resource scarcity of the 1990s.

Fears and Clashes with Government: Personal Accounts

September 11th ushered in a period of intense national grief. During this period of grief, Americans were touched and traumatized in unique ways, making the lasting effects of 9/11 not only economic and political, but personal. The personal characteristics of the hijackers became immediate relevant information, and thus the nation's interest in post-9/11 immigration shifted from how many immigrants enter the United States, to a stronger interest in *who* enters and their national origin, religion, ethnicity, and past history relative to potential terrorist organizations.⁹² The Immigration and Naturalization Service was reorganized into the Department of Homeland Security and transformed into an enforcement agency for this very purpose of monitoring suspicious-seeming immigrants in the United States. One of the 9/11 suspects had acquired his visa through a Minnesota flight school, and Homeland Security has since required all universities, training centers, and companies to regularly report the status of any foreigners they host. New background check requirements were added to an already backlogged visa application process, further slowing the flow of visitors and immigrants into the United States. Rumors circulated of applications for certain national groups, including Middle Easterners, East Africans, and Caribbeans, that were indefinitely waitlisted. A

⁹² Martin, 2003.

particularly controversial program, NSEER⁹³, required all adult males from Arab and Muslim countries to register and be interviewed annually in order to track their activities. The frequency of removal proceedings also spiked following September 11th, when hundreds of Arab males were deported for minor crimes under the “Ira-Ira” Act. Due process rights (to appeal and judge discretion) were also eliminated in deportation proceedings.⁹⁴

In Minneapolis and St. Paul, Somali individuals and communities were on the alert for their personal safety. One man was quoted on Minnesota Public Radio as developing fears about his wife walking to the store alone at night and was concerned that his children might hear anti-Muslim slurs as they walked to school. Yet above all, he was shocked and pained to hear his six-year-old son ask, after hearing of the search for Osama bin Laden, “is the government going to kill us, and all Muslims?”⁹⁵ Other Minnesotan Muslims remember being labeled “terrorists,” spat on, and told to “go back home” in the weeks and months following 9/11.⁹⁶ A Somali legal advocate claims that employers discriminate against Somalis, especially women wearing the *xijaab* since 9/11, by insisting that they remove their head covering, or by refusing to hire them at all. Although he’s received reports of Somali mistreatment on the job, he is doubtful that any of these cases could be tried and proven in court.⁹⁷

Police harassment and high-profile tragedies also incited community-wide anger and anxiety. Just weeks after the attacks, a 66-year old Somali elder was “punched in the

⁹³ National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEER)

⁹⁴ Martin, 2003.

“Important Immigration Issues” publication. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP. St. Louis, Missouri. January 2003.

⁹⁵ “Under a shadow: Somalis after 9/11.” *Minnesota Public Radio*. 9 September 2002.

⁹⁶ “Integrating Minnesota” Panel Discussion at Hamline University. St. Paul, Minnesota. 18 January 2007.

⁹⁷ Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis Interview. 7 December 2006.

face” while waiting at a bus stop, according to witnesses, and he later died in the hospital. Police disregarded witnesses who claimed the attacker was a tall white male, and although the medical examiner first claimed the death as resulting from natural causes, it was later verified as a homicide.

In another incident, a 28-year-old Somali man with a history of mental illness was shot repeatedly by six Minneapolis police when he charged at them with a machete and crowbar. The police claimed that they had followed appropriate procedure before shooting in self-defense, but the Somali and neighboring communities nonetheless were outraged and accused the officers of “excessive force.” One witness claimed that “they just unloaded their guns into him” and others suggested that the police could have disarmed him without a fatal result. “Police are going around kicking some people’s doors in,” said Omar Jamal, Executive Director of the Somali Justice Advocacy Center. “And now this: just shooting them and killing them just like Mogadishu and civil war. This isn’t what we expect.”⁹⁸ Jamal’s comments, although exaggerating the parallel between Mogadishu and Minneapolis, reflects a serious disappointment that certain Somalis feel in their treatment as invited immigrants to the United States.⁹⁹

In November of 2001, several money wiring services in Minneapolis were suspended and investigated for allegedly financing Islamic terrorists. Many Somalis were shocked – first, at the prospect of their charitable contributions being used for

⁹⁸ “Minneapolis press conference condemns cop killing of Somali youth; rally called.” *The Militant*, 25 March 2002;66: 12.

⁹⁹ These individual incidences and views are not intended to represent widespread opinions across the entire Somali population, nor do I claim that such experiences are common for all Somalis. I emphasize that, in most cases, minor incidences are exaggerated because of Somalis’ history of political persecution and mistrust of government, therefore, community perceptions of attack are far greater than actual recorded events. Statements that liken the United States police to that of Somalia, as I explain in the following chapters, is counterproductive to the process of adaptation and integration in the same way as is Americans’ blanket targeting of Muslims for terrorism. Neither accusatory assumption should be condoned.

terrorist groups, and second, at the devastating impact that would follow from family being unable to send money to support remaining members in Somalia or outside camps.

One man recalled:

When Al Barakaat was closed, everybody felt that other will be closed. Families back home were calling, [saying] ‘Will I be getting this month’s money, what’s going to happen?’ People here didn’t know. Some people here even went so far as, ‘Should I even go to these places to send money? What if I’m accused of sending money?’ Some people came to me, and said ‘Can I go to this one that’s open? Can they trace me back?’ We tell them sending money is not a crime.

Later the same year, the FBI conducted numerous “information gathering” interviews with young Somali men, again raising security concerns in this community. The executive director of a prominent community organization recalls how Somalis’ fears of the FBI were exaggerated by their history of political persecution in Somalia:

In Somalia there was a dictatorship for 20 years, and if the police knocked on your door, you were in real trouble. It’s not like, ‘come here and talk to us voluntarily... So I’m really sure that people will be worried if they were called by the police or the FBI for an interview...What we do not agree with is simply to have a net-casting of people, simply because of their religion, simply because of their ethnic background, or simply because of their country of origin. That is not the American way.¹⁰⁰

Although most events were minor personal injuries and isolated incidents, rumors spread swiftly throughout close communities and exaggerated the fears of all Somalis, some of whom admit that “what we hear in the community – so and so has been detained, so and so has been deported, so and so has been interrogated, all that kind of things – will also create more fear.”¹⁰¹ Post-9/11 events and fears prompted many Somalis to question the legal principles of their newly adopted home country.

Economic Backlash

Perhaps the most ubiquitous and enduring effect of 9/11 on non-citizens, more so than isolated targeting, is felt in the national economy and funding streams for public and non-

¹⁰⁰ “Minnesota’s September 11.” *Minnesota Public Radio*. 9 September 2002.

¹⁰¹ “Under a shadow: Somalis after 9/11.” *Minnesota Public Radio*. 9 September 2002.

profit social programs. Although economic impact was minimized in the immediate wake of September 11th, businesses and employees have since felt the lingering effects of increasing national security and defense expenditures as the funding for internal projects dwindle.¹⁰² Tourist, hotel, dining, and travel industries also took serious hits in the months following the attacks, forcing companies to lay off hundreds of thousands of workers in 2002 alone.¹⁰³ Economic downturns in 2002 and 2003 reinforced the non-citizen restrictions in welfare eligibility, but the loss of federal resources also cut existing refugee and anti-poverty supports, including public and private funding for non-profit organizations, community centers, libraries, schools, and daycares.

Minnesota had been slowly taking benefits away from non-citizens since 2000, but severe budget cuts between 2002 and 2003 led to the reduction or elimination of several key assistance programs for all low-income populations, but particularly for non-citizen, low-income communities. Food stamps programs for legal permanent residents were cut, so that only permanent residents above the age of 50 could qualify for food assistance, a “basic need.”¹⁰⁴ Emergency medical care services were also cut for non-immigrant visitors, so that international students, tourists, and other temporary visitors are required to pay for emergency fees as out of pocket costs. Refugee cash assistance steadily dwindled, from 36 months of coverage to 18 months, to 12 months, and currently only covers their first eight months.

In the non-profit sector, funding from all sources has become more rare and difficult to secure. Mutual assistance associations struggle more to find funding, and

¹⁰² Makinen, Gail. “The Economic Effect of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment.” *Congressional Research Service*. 27 Sept. 2002.

¹⁰³ Taken from a Milken Institute report cited in “Terror Attacks: Economic recession to claim more U.S. jobs in new year: study.” *People’s Daily Online*. 12 January 2002.

¹⁰⁴ Hennepin County (OMS) Interview. 21 December 2006.

specifically for basic operating costs and broad populations. An employee at Brian Coyle Community Center, which serves the densest population of Somalis in the Twin Cities, remarks that he has lost some flexibility and autonomy in his services, saying:

Foundations, for the past 10 years, used to give grants to support services for anyone without a job, but now they only focus on narrow issues, like seniors or for crime prevention. So you have to adjust your mission, and sometimes it's hard. Foundations come out and check up on the org. You have to be very transparent. I only can serve about 6 out of 10 [clients], because of narrow funding, limited money in certain areas, and can only use volunteers.¹⁰⁵

Another Brian Coyle administrator agrees, speaking to the growing gaps in youth and health program funding:

The grants are also focused too narrowly. Foundations focus on funding *outcomes*, not operating costs. You know, there's no loose money anymore, for technology – and technology gets really expensive for nonprofits – for phones, heat, electricity. All the foundations want to fund a staff member and a particular program, but we have other costs too... There's less youth money, less for basic health needs, there's more targeted toward mental health... And recently there's been a downward cycle of funding from state and federal sources.¹⁰⁶

Even the state of Minnesota, despite its traditions of social liberalism and tolerance of newcomers, is impacted by changes in federal policy and economic resources. The “power of the purse” is illuminated in this case: states are allowed to create policies and elect leaders that resonate with the opinions and values of the state residents; however, shrinking federal resources translate into shrinking state and local resources.

¹⁰⁵ Brian Coyle Community Center Interview. 3 January 2007.

¹⁰⁶ Brian Coyle Community Center Interview. 3 January 2007.

CHAPTER FOUR

Triple Trauma: Adapting from Mogadishu to Minnesota

In Mombasa [Kenya], the refugees dwelt on spectral memories, of grenades falling, and of uncollected corpses rotting at the city's roundabouts. Distraught, I understood the deeper meaning of a Somali wisdom in which a high value is placed on owning one's own home, as this affords a greater sense of privacy, of self-honor and of dignity. My father, my son, one of my younger sisters and a nephew, who were among the first to arrive in the coastal city, shared rooms with people whom they had not known before. I remember my sister alluding to 'one's home being one's protector, a custodian to one's secrets, a sentry at the gate to one's sense of self-pride. Having no home of one's own and no country enjoying the luxury of peace: then perhaps one is a refugee.'

Nuruddin Farah, *Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora*

I. Being a Refugee

When civil war erupted in Mogadishu, Somali politicians, business owners, professors, nomads, fishermen, mothers, and children scattered. Over a tenth of the Somali population ended up in refugee camps across East Africa, with the largest camp holding over 100,000 refugees in Mombasa, Kenya. Some estimates claim that up to 900,000 Somalis were displaced by the violence: some, having means of travel and family abroad, left immediately, while others attempted to “outwait” the war and left only after months or years of diminishing hopes of seeing peace returned to Somalia.¹⁰⁷ An elder resident of south Minneapolis recalls, “I left Somalia in 1991. I never thought I would flee my home. I stayed in the country for eight months thinking a new government would be born. My family and I saw too many people dying and houses blown up and the fighting increased every day.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Wilhide, Anduin. *A Place to Call Home: The History of Immigration and Community Building in the Cedar-Riverside Neighborhood of Minneapolis*. University of Wisconsin-Madison. Undergraduate thesis. 2004.

¹⁰⁸ *Two Homes, One Dream: The Somalis in Minnesota*. The Somali Skyline Tower History Project; Minnesota Historical Society. Film. 2004. [Quotation translated from Somali.]

Less fortunate Somali refugees traveled for days, many by foot and without food or water, to camps hastily constructed in eastern Kenya and Ethiopia. “Identifying ourselves as refugees was not something we were ready for” says a Somali employee of a Minneapolis recreational center, Brian Coyle Community Center (BCCC).¹⁰⁹ Novelist Nurrudin Farah emphasizes this feeling in his post-war accounts, in which Somalis only reluctantly place themselves in the outcast, transitory, and vulnerable position of a *refugee*. Thousands of people waited in the refugee camps – some with family and friends, others without – for peace to return to Somalia. Young children were raised in the camps, and babies were born who would know little of their home country except its *legacy of conflict*. Many Somalis spent years in makeshift refugee camps with limited resources and education, yet increasingly after 1994, a small fraction of these refugees were selected for resettlement: those with U.S. resident family members or who were deemed most likely to “adjust” and “contribute” to American society. Facilitated by international organizations and governments, thousands of Somalis relocated for the third time to begin the process of reconstructing livelihoods, communities, and homes.

Whether Somalis resettled directly in Minnesota, or migrated from another state, they claim to have arrived (or remained) due to certain “pull factors.” Specific opportunities have attracted Somalis to Minnesota over time; initially they were drawn as international students and, later, for slightly different reasons, as refugees. Quality public schools and private universities and a growing job market attracted them to the Twin Cities in the 1980s and early 1990s and, as the population grew, an established Somali community with mosques, halal grocery stores, and state-funded social supports enticed refugees to arrive and to remain.

¹⁰⁹ *Two Homes, One Dream*, 2004.

Their arrival was not without difficulty, especially in regards to extreme Minnesota winter weather. One elder from a focus group describes his first experience with winter as complete bewilderment; a friend had prepared him for icy sidewalks, but he hadn't known to wear a hat, and feared during his first venture outside that his ears were "breaking off!"¹¹⁰ Surprise, confusion, and culture shock in regards to Minnesotan weather, landscape, and society were cited by many Somalis as their initial impressions of the United States.¹¹¹ Some were amazed by the size and beauty of the airport and urban lights as family members drove them home. Others were frightened by the sudden unfamiliarity of everything in their sight. One teenage girl recounts:

It was hard for me to come here, and when I stepped off the plane into America I knew that everything was gonna [sic] change, I knew that nothing was gonna be the same. It was hard for me, you know, seeing all these different people, seeing people that I'd never saw, just looking at people.¹¹²

Over the past fifteen years of Somalis migrating to the United States, thousands have been cheerfully greeted at airports by family members and friends that went before them.

II. Coping in Transition: Jobs, Housing, and Education

The rare opportunity to relocate to the United States offers the promise of new life and success, and thousands of Somalis have resettled in metropolitan Minnesota with such "American Dreams." Yet, as one community cleric explained, "many Somalis assume that once you go to America it's just blissfulness and enjoyment and fun and easy life. And that's not the case."¹¹³ A Hennepin County employee echoes this sense of disconnect between the American ideal and the refugee experience, explaining that:

¹¹⁰ Male Focus Group. 11 January 2007.

¹¹¹ Male and Female Focus Groups. 11-12 January 2007.

¹¹² *Two Homes, One Dream*, 2004.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

...From abroad, a lot of people think the United States is rich – we say we’re the most powerful nation – and so when [resettlement agencies] say ‘You’re going to the United States,’ [Somalis] believe that the United States is going to take care of them. I don’t know that that’s necessarily true, but I don’t think we do a good enough job up front of explaining that that’s not the case. When they got here, I think they expected things to be very different.¹¹⁴

Although the standard of living in the United States is a dramatic improvement on that of still embattled Somalia, or on refugee camps, many Somalis do struggle with financial and psychosocial challenges in their new home. They enter American life not only as refugees or immigrants, but many enter as low-income families, non-English speakers, and victims of psychological trauma in the throes of a yet another challenging transitional experience. This chapter argues that the specific challenges of employment, education, and residence and community, key elements in Somali refugees’ integration processes, have been made even more onerous in the wake of national policy and economic changes such as welfare reform and September 11th.

Abundant jobs, education, and housing were found to be three primary factors that first attracted Somalis to Minnesota’s Twin Cities.¹¹⁵ However, Somalis’ access to each of these life essentials has been impaired by changing legislation and social and economic climate since 1996; job markets narrowed, public spending declined, and negative stereotypes of welfare recipients, unskilled laborers, non-English speakers, and Muslims developed, inciting further negative effects on these populations. These changes threatened the social mobility opportunities for Somali refugees (particularly future generations) as well as negatively affect their self-esteem and identity formation as Somali-Americans. This research documents their challenges and the unique internal

¹¹⁴ Hennepin County (OMS) Interview. 21 December 2006.

¹¹⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I. “Beginning Again: From Refugee to Citizen.” *Bilhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*. 4:1-15. 2004.
Immigration in Minnesota: Discovering Common Ground. The Minneapolis Foundation. 2004.

support networks that Somalis employ to overcome obstacles and the threat of “triple trauma” in their own ethnic communities.

Barriers to Gainful Employment

Public debates over welfare programs and a “culture of dependency” have tainted the image of welfare recipients, creating a stereotype where refugees are assumed to be poverty-stricken, helpless, and unable to work to support themselves without ongoing assistance from tax-generated welfare programs. The Executive Director of New Americans Community Services, a resettlement agency and sliding fee scale health clinic in St. Paul, claims that “everyone assumes that we must be on welfare. But Somalis come here for work, not for welfare”¹¹⁶ and in fact, Somalis are considered among the least welfare dependent demographic groups in Minnesota – a “self-support” index measures that Somalis’ ratings rose from 30% in 1999 to over 80% in certain Minnesota counties.¹¹⁷

Most Somalis came to Minnesota – even from larger immigrant centers such as California or New York – in search of a large job market, yet job seeking, interviewing, and sustaining a job is often a near impossible task for new members of American society. There’s a need for well-paying job, especially because of the large ratios of income-earners to dependents in more traditional Somali families. A large, extended family concept is more feasible and common in Somalia than in the United States, where multiple incomes are necessary to support many children, and where occupancy limits often split extended families into multiple single-family apartment units. Moreover, if

¹¹⁶ New Americans Community Services Interview. 12 December 2006.

¹¹⁷ Associated Press. “Somali Refugees Hailed for Moving off Welfare Quickly.” February 2007. <http://www.minnesotamonitor.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=1228>.

women choose to work outside the home, they pay for daycare and transportation, whereas support from elder family members could supervise children if they lived in the home. Thus, considerable individual income is necessary to support a family, at least in their first few months in the United States, before other family members begin to work to contribute to the family wealth.

In addition, Somalis, like many Africans immigrants in the diaspora, also have financial obligations to family and community members “back home.” Whether in Somalia or living in refugee camps, family and clan members of Somali immigrants in the U.S. depend on remittances sent back to support their own livelihoods. This pressure to earn as much income as possible leads many Somali adults to take on two or three jobs to support families in Minnesota as well as in East Africa, and may discourage them from taking enough English learning classes.

The process of job searching and working regularly also incurs additional costs, such as transportation and child care for young children who might have otherwise stayed with extended family members in Somalia. The experience of sustaining a job may also be difficult for new refugees unaccustomed to non-Islamic traditions such as work on Friday, the Muslim holy day, and no allotted time or space for prayer throughout the day.

Underemployment is another difficult element, which describes not only many Somalis’ low wages, but also the low caliber of work and responsibility they are asked to complete, despite having considerable work experience. Like many other immigrants, and particularly those from developing countries, Somalis’ overseas degrees are not recognized, thus previous doctors and lawyers are required to pay to return to local schools for recertification. Some do complete additional degrees to continue their work

in the United States, however many accomplished individuals, in their first few months and years in the country are working in low-level jobs, undoubtedly affecting their self-confidence. Language is another factor, forcing immigrants' knowledge and skills to be "lost in translation." A Somali lawyer at Legal Aid claims:

These are doctors, lawyers, judges, poets, and all this but they're driving taxis instead because they can't make it here. For example, you remember the man who was just here... he is a poet. That disk was full of poems, thousands, and it would be a great asset to American society, if they were translated to English. But it would take a long time for him to translate them, and he can't afford to do that. He has to take care of his family here and also his family back home in Somalia.¹¹⁸

The choice between quality and quantity in income-earning activities is difficult, when pressure is put on refugees to gain money quickly in order to bring family members over and sustain their own lives here.

Since 1996: Dead-End Jobs and Public Scrutiny

The chilling effects of welfare haven't happened to a great degree among the Somalis because the community is still relatively new and most families are fully covered by insurance and assistance if they are eligible. However the new time sensitivity of welfare programs intensifies refugee's already strong pressure to work, persuading many to opt out of or shorten their English or professional recertification classes to begin unskilled jobs, many of which do not allow for advancement nor offer benefits or accommodate for Muslim prayer times.

Since 9/11 and increasing negative stereotyping of Islam and Muslims, religious discrimination has made it more difficult to secure and sustain employment. A focus group participant from a study in 2001 explained that "a woman with *xijaab* will get a job

¹¹⁸ Legal Aid Society Interview. 7 December 2006.

last, when it's impossible to get help, because companies don't like to hire us." Another participant was disgusted with the disrespect given to traditional Muslim women, saying:

I applied for a job with three Somali women who wore the *xijaab* — the veil worn by Muslim women as a religious obligation. The company hired me and told the women not to wear the *xijaab* if they in fact wanted the job. The women refused to do so and exited through the door. I was asked when I could start work, but I refused too and left that place. How can I work with a company which turned my culture and religion down?¹¹⁹

One Somali lawyer agreed that cases like these had increased dramatically following the attacks on the World Trade Center and publicity on Osama bin Laden and Muslim covering traditions in the Middle East. Yet there was little he could prove in court and resigned to the fact that "if you practice your religion, you face more scrutiny."

Barriers to Education and Advancement

In the United States, the proverbial 'land of opportunity,' education is often considered the key to social mobility. Ethnic communities, religious groups, regional residents, or any group that consistently builds social capital with applied skills and advanced degrees tends to "succeed" in terms of economic and social integration. Education is especially important in order for new immigrants to learn the language, history, ways and customs of survival and prosperity in the United States. One of the primary reasons that many Somalis, like other immigrants, chose Minnesota is its excellent education traditions. Quality public schools and institutions of higher education, including the University of Minnesota, make the Twin Cities a premier center for both private and public education. One interviewee from the Minnesota Historical Society described education as having "always been important to Somalis." She had been told that "when the war happened and there was no more infrastructure to provide that education, America became one, of a few

¹¹⁹ Robillos, Mia U. *Somali Community Needs Assessment Project: A report prepared for the Somali Resource Center*. Center for Urban and Regional Affairs. University of Minnesota. May 2001.

places, became an accessible place to go and get a quality education for their kids.”¹²⁰

This rings true in schools such as Metropolitan State University in St. Paul, Minneapolis Community and Technical College, Augsburg College, and the University of Minnesota, where the proportion of Somali students rose dramatically over the past ten years.

Education has also been an impetus of transformation in many Somali families, as young Somali women continue to receive advanced degrees, more so than young men, and new career doors open to them that didn't exist in traditional Somali custom. In response to the question “What opportunities do Somali teens encounter in the United States?” one staff member of the Brian Coyle Community Center emphatically says:

Education! ... I think that, as Somali women, we're taking advantage of the opportunity we have here because, if you go to the University of MN or you go to St. Mary or to Metro or any campus in Minnesota, you'll see a Somali woman... I think that's maybe, for some people, they're the first person to go to college in their whole family. They go because they want education, they go to school for their whole family and for themselves. To be a role model, for the young ones.¹²¹

For young people growing up in U.S. society, excelling in school and earning further degrees is a crucial step in amassing social capital and deepening roots in their new home.

The years of elementary and high school make up an especially difficult transition period, during which young people worry not only about excelling in classes, but forming personal identities that are accepted by their families, friends, teachers, and peers. In American schools, this socialization and peer learning occurs simultaneously with, and nearly more important than, academic training. Such an educational philosophy requires that student grade levels be determined by age rather than skill level, and thus most Somali youth are placed in schools with their age peers rather than at their level of education. Although in line with American social values, this decision has caused serious

¹²⁰ Minnesota Historical Society Interview. 15 December 2006.

¹²¹ *Two Homes, One Dream*, 2004.

concerns in Somali families where children and teenagers enter mainstream schools without adequate English or background knowledge to perform at the level of American peers. This raises a critical fear that the younger generations, many of whom were minimally educated at Koranic schools in refugee camps, if at all, will not gain the solid educational base required for advancement in the United States. Poor performance and drop-out rates are high across Twin Cities' immigrant communities, largely because of the linguistic disconnect and poor communication between students' parents and home life and what is expected of them in the schools. University of Minnesota professor and local immigration scholar Katherine Fennelly writes:

Parents need help making the bridge to school. Many cultures see their teachers/schools as assuming responsibility for educating children. Many immigrant children are from families working multiple jobs, so parents aren't around, and some families are quite impoverished. Young children are not really ready for school, because the parents/grandparent do not speak English and do not have access to bilingual preschool programs.¹²²

The co-ed culture of American classrooms can also be challenging for some Somalis, as they may be accustomed to Koranic school traditions of limited interaction between different genders. Although this is not a norm among all Somalis, *xijaab*-wearing girls especially may feel uncomfortable in classes such as gym where boys and girls are encouraged to wear uniforms of shorts and short-sleeved shirts in fairly aggressive play.¹²³

Developing self-esteem and a firm sense of identity is another crucial element of elementary and secondary education, and unfortunately marks another major battle for young Somalis transitioning to the multicultural environments of Twin Cities public schools. Somali traditions in dress, behavior, and values widely differ from the ideals of

¹²² Fennelly, Katherine. "State and Local Policy Response to Immigration in Minnesota." *Immigration's New Frontiers: Experiences from the Emerging Gateway States*, eds. Greg Anrig, Jr., and Tova Andrea Wang. The Century Foundation Press: New York. 2006.

¹²³ Robillos, 2001.

individualism and autonomy, and the liberal attitudes toward sex and drugs, that define contemporary American youth culture. Teenage girls may grapple with the pressure of upholding Somali traditions in the home, while at school or with friends, they may speak English and slang, go out on dates, and match their *xijaab* scarves with American shirts and shoes in a cross-cultural fashion statement.¹²⁴ Some girls have chosen to don the *xijaab* only after arriving in the States, to visibly identify with Somali culture, while others have minimized it or stopped wearing it altogether. The *xijaab* represents just one of the many cultural choices Somali youth make everyday to follow the ways of their parents or of their peers.

Since 1996: Weak Basic Education and Low Self-Esteem

While the need for bilingual and English language teachers soar, federal and state cuts in education funding only contribute to the overall decline in public school education in Minneapolis and St. Paul. One state legislator gave K-12 schools “a failing grade for the state, and a C in the Metro area,” explaining that “the results don’t lie – immigrant youth have high drop-out rates.¹²⁵” President Bush’s No Child Left Behind initiative strips funding and support from schools that perform below national standards, leaving inner-city schools with non-English speaking, chronically “underperforming” students with even less because they fail to achieve at the levels of mainstream American students. Instead of focusing on basic skills better suited to a student’s level, teachers are forced to “teach to the test,” at which point students either fail the exam and not graduate, or pass

¹²⁴ *Two Homes, One Dream*, 2004.

¹²⁵ Fennelly, 2006.

the exam and graduate without the baseline skills necessary to function well in society or continue in higher education. According to one foundation officer:

We have seen major disinvestments in after school programs, which are very important in young people's identity and social support, considering that their parents are pretty much employed. You have to have consistency, you have to challenge young people, and we are not doing that with after school programs. You have success stories, but if you look at the graduation rate, we are losing ground with immigrants and refugees, just as we have with African Americans and Native Americans.¹²⁶

Education as a "great equalizer" is threatened by both funding shortages and sudden influxes of non-English speaking children that require resources to be pulled from other areas for specialized attention and curricula. Definite strides have been made in improving the schools on tight budgets, especially in the St. Paul district; however, the future of education for today's Somali youth and the future quality of schools across the Twin Cities is threatened by limited resources and federal budget cuts.

Foreign dress, unfamiliar accents and behavior make Somali youth vulnerable to teasing by other students, and often the worst impact of September 11th is seen in schools, where U.S.-born students sometimes mock the *xijaab* (asking if the scarf is meant to cover a bald head) or call out Muslim classmates as 'terrorists.' Self-esteem building and identity constructions may be based on being identified as an "other" by their classmates and by mainstream media. This has damaging and long-term effects on second-generation Somalis and their self-confidence.

Barriers to Home, Family, and Community

In order to establish a true sense of home in a new place, one must first have a tangible, physical "home." Whether this translates as a three-story house or a single studio apartment, finding a space to call one's own is a crucial step in putting down roots and

¹²⁶ Fennelly, 2006.

“resettling.” At first glance, Minnesota seems like an ideal place to call home: the state has one of the highest home-ownership rates in the country and excellent living standards for families. The small print attached to these statistics, however, is that they only apply to Minnesotans of European descent. Less than half of Minnesota’s minorities are able to purchase homes and earn equity, a statistic among the lowest in the nation.¹²⁷

Because of refugees’ likelihood to receive low wages while supporting large families, they tend to congregate in high density, low-cost housing projects. Somali and other east African populations are most concentrated in complexes such as Riverside Plaza Apartments in South Minneapolis, or in St. Paul’s Skyline Towers on University Avenue. Both of these areas are locally dubbed “Little Somalia” or “Vertical Africa” because of the high concentrations of Somali, Oromo, Eritrean, and other African residents. Unfortunately, many of these same complexes are nick-named “ghetto in the sky” or “crack towers” because of the poverty, depression, poor upkeep, idle youth, and crime that have also come to characterize high density affordable housing. Yet there are few other options, as landlords in more affluent areas are far less inclined to rent to new Somali immigrants. One manager of a large complex explains this rationale, saying:

Homes and housing in Somalia are different than here. They cook with a lot more oil, and there are fire and safety issues. A recent issue came about when inspectors came and looked at traditional drapes and said they had to get rid of them because they were creating mold. We need to do community building and help people understand what mold does... Things don’t translate easily... As an owner, many people don’t want to have to deal with that or with food that is greasy and sticks to the walls or with the smells. To house the Somalis next to others isn’t always easy.¹²⁸

Adjusting to the laws and culture of housing in the United States may be as challenging for Somalis as it is for their landlords to facilitate the process, and particularly in the case of language barriers. Limited English proficiency hinders communication between

¹²⁷ *Success Stories*. African Development Center Newsletter. October 2006.

¹²⁸ Fennelly, 2006.

renters and landlords, further complicating the adjustment to an American system of monthly payments, regular inspections, advance notice of vacancy, and other rental guidelines. New and naïve immigrants could be taken advantage of or evicted by signing rental agreements and guidelines they don't fully understand.¹²⁹ Somalis may also be rejected from apartments because they, like all immigrants, lack rental history, or because their uniquely large families violate the occupancy rules of small 1 to 2-bedroom apartments, the units most commonly within their monthly budgets.

Poor housing, in combination with education and employment challenges, additionally has a strong effect on the family. In many Somali traditions, extended families lived together in large compounds with outdoor courtyards where elder members cared for young children, women managed the household, and men left the homes to gain income or gather food and necessities. In the United States, small apartments and occupancy rules force families into nuclear units, men's additional wives are considered single mothers, and elders are left alone – and isolated – in single-room apartments. Education may also strain traditional family structures, as more women become well-educated and employed and fewer men are able to fulfill their assumed role of financing family needs. Increasing numbers of families are now female-headed, yet this places additional responsibility on wives and daughters to both work and care for the home, while men's responsibilities and, by extension, their self-confidence and sense of purpose, decline. Families that were able to escape war in Somalia, survive in refugee camps, and relocate to the United States wholly intact are truly fortunate; sadly, several

¹²⁹ Robillos, 2001.

cases of domestic violence and divorce have emerged from the instability and tension from this family trauma.¹³⁰

Since 1996: Hostilities among Low-Income Minority Populations

Like in public education, federal budget cuts have had detrimental effects on the availability of affordable and “section eight” subsidized housing in Minneapolis and St. Paul. Programs for emergency housing and alternative financing options help some families, but the demand is still overwhelming and, as one official says, “I think we are doing some of our best work. [Unfortunately] the state cannot fill in all the gaps that the federal government created.”¹³¹ Gentrification projects across the Twin Cities are also raising property values out of the reach of many low-income, largely minority communities, including Somali and other refugee populations.

For their first 90 days in the United States, all refugees receive temporary housing as a part of the Minnesota Reception & Placement Program. But this generous accommodation doesn’t come without a price – recent refugee groups were given their immediate housing from a complex so high in demand that two years worth of low-income and minority residents were on its waiting list.¹³² When Somali refugees were given first preference in the new units, serious “trust issues” developed between African Americans and the Somalis, according to an employee of the Brian Coyle Community Center. In a post-9/11 period of economic instability, especially for historically disadvantaged communities such as the African Americans, Somalis were seen less as

¹³⁰ Molly Beutz et al. “The Government Response to Domestic Violence Against Immigrant and Refugee Women in the Minneapolis/St. Paul Metropolitan Area: A Human Rights Report.” Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights. 2004.

¹³¹ Fennelly, 2006.

¹³² Hennepin County Interview. 7 December 2006.

fellow blacks and more as privileged competitors for limited jobs, resources, and services throughout the cities. Despite certain preferences they may receive through resettlement programs, all Somalis' rental assistance ends after 90 days, at which point they find themselves facing many of the same cultural and structural barriers to affordable housing as other immigrant and minority populations.

PRWORA limited refugees' eligibility for assistance to their first five years in the country. However, under the assumption that most refugees would naturalize at this point and become further eligible as U.S. citizens, Thus, according to the state, there's been no change in services for refugees. Yet the state fails to consider elderly refugees who may struggle in the naturalization process and interview. A Hennepin County employee describes the situation:

The one thing that probably has changed since post welfare reform is that – for refugees, asylees, permanent residents - they're only allowed to get SSI unless they become a citizen, for seven years...It affects a lot of elderly that can't get the [citizenship exam] waiver for language because they haven't been in the US long enough, haven't successfully learned English, and then they're not eligible to become a citizen, and they can't get SSI. And there are no exceptions – you either become a citizen or you're done. They go from getting \$603 a month to \$203 a month which obviously affects their lifestyle, their rent, living arrangements, ability to purchase for themselves, supplement their food budgets... obviously it's a huge impact on them.¹³³

Although Somalis in Minnesota today are predominantly refugees within their first few years of residence in the U.S., the existing population is expected to eventually naturalize, while more family members will be sponsored over as permanent residents. As the legal status of the Somali population becomes more heterogeneous – comprising both refugees and permanent residents – Somalis will experience the more restrictive effects of welfare reform. Sponsored non-refugee family members already exist in small numbers among Somalis in Minnesota and, although they may have experienced the same trauma and upset as other refugees, the fact that they were sponsored by affidavit

¹³³ Hennepin County (OMS) Interview. 21 December 2006.

invalidates them for all federal and many state benefits for their first five years in the country.

III. External Coping Strategies: Public Assistance & Outreach

A city-wide consortium exists of mainstream and community-based organizations that receive public and private funding to aid the resettlement and integration process. The state acts through the Department of Human Services to play an essential role funding and supervising this network, yet each service organization still retains considerable autonomy in how and to whom they provide support and services.

Minneapolis and St. Paul, as unique urban areas in a mostly rural state, offer a diverse selection of organizations to provide services to immigrant populations and similar services to the general population of needy individuals and families. These organizations take on different models of operation and service delivery, they function at different capacity levels, and often specialize their services around a particular socioeconomic or ethnic population or type of need, such as education or job training. Some organizations take on a combination of these approaches. The social services network acts with other elements of Minnesota's urban infrastructure such as Metro Transit low-cost transportation, sliding-fee scale health clinics, public hospitals such as Hennepin County Medical Center, various homeless shelters and soup kitchens, and public libraries to serve a wide variety of immigrant and refugee needs for resettlement and integration.

Hennepin County's Office of Multi-Cultural Services (OMS)¹³⁴ is part of the broader bureaucratic structure delivering social services to refugees and eligible immigrants. Since the office was established in early 2000, OMS has worked within Hennepin County government as a cultural and linguistic liaison or "ambassador" to help newcomers navigate both public and community-based social services. OMS determines immigrants' eligibility for public programs and refers clients to related county services in health, housing, childcare, and employment, or to community-based organizations with similar objectives. Lawyers are available on-site to guide the process of adjusting legal status. The office employs members of the major Minnesota immigrant communities so that their services are culturally and linguistically appropriate; OMS also hires its interpreters out for phone translating services and leads cultural competency trainings for all Hennepin County staff.¹³⁵

However, the structure of OMS and other county programs is determined by federal and state mandates, and many legal permanent residents, refugees who arrived more than five years past, and all undocumented immigrants are ineligible. Although many OMS employees represent the many cultural communities that the county serves, the leadership in the office consists of U.S.-born, long-time Hennepin County employees and the actual services provided by Hennepin County are administered by U.S.-born staff.

¹³⁴ Hennepin County includes the city of Minneapolis and the western suburbs of the Metro Area. St. Paul is covered under Ramsey County, however in many cases the two counties collaborate to serve major immigrant populations that exist in areas of both counties. However, Ramsey County does not have a peer office to the Office of Multi-Cultural Services. Immigrants and refugees receive special immunization and health screening, and WIC programs for women and family planning, but no office is dedicated as a liaison between newcomer populations and existing social service providers. (See Ramsey County website.)

¹³⁵ Hennepin County (OMS) Fact Sheet.

For the Somali community, OMS exists to reduce, albeit slightly, the cultural, linguistic, and religious barriers faced by new immigrants navigating the social services network. In the process of visiting OMS in the County's large, centrally located building, new immigrants will interact both with people of their own communities as well as other immigrant and mainstream communities and learn about both mainstream and community-based organizations. This, alone, will increase the level of self-sufficiency and comfort in new immigrants with new locations and new people, however the services they receive (if they are even eligible) may still continue the relationship of dependency criticized in direct public assistance programs.

State assistance services such as these are a central point of immigrant self-sufficiency debates because, although they have been cut dramatically since welfare reform in 1996, income and food assistance programs foster a relationship where recipients are dependent on the government and taxpayer revenues. These programs lack positive incentives for recipients to graduate off of assistance, and the five-year limit on cash assistance provides, at best, a negative incentive for leaving the program. Although a "culture of dependency" may exist, public benefits only cover a small percentage of the entirety of Somali immigrants' needs, which range far beyond inadequate income earnings to culturally appropriate health care, additional tutoring in schools, and more. The state cannot provide these services directly, nor can it fulfill the overarching goals of resettlement and reintegration relating to family and community health, safety, and the contributions that newcomers may offer to American society. Federal and state governments are able to provide direct monetary or food assistance to individuals, but

more developmental and capacity- and leadership-building activities are left to other institutions and actors.

IV. Internal Coping Strategies: Organizations & Community Interdependence

Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota & Brian Coyle Community Center

The Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota (CSCM) developed as an early and organic response to significant barriers felt in local Somali communities for basic resettlement and community health services. CSCM became the first established Somali organization in Minnesota in 1994, founded by several Somali men who wished to provide counsel and English training to newcomers and unite the local diasporic community across clan differences. CSCM is located in the Cedar-Riverside West Bank neighborhood of South Minneapolis, within walking distance of Riverside Plaza Apartments and the densest neighborhood concentration of Somali refugees and immigrants in the country. Currently operating under grants from the Bush Foundation and Pillsbury United Communities, CSCM employs 15 staff members (14 of which are East African) and is overseen by a 14-member Board of Directors (10 of which are East African). Its mission is “to strengthen the capacity of Somalis in Minnesota to become contributing members of society, while keeping their culture” and extensive programs in youth academic mentoring, job seeking, advocacy, women’s support, and public education and outreach are coordinated from an office space in the Brian Coyle Community Center.

CSCM has a unique relationship with the Brian Coyle Center, where the Center rents space to CSCM and other community organizations (including the Oromo

Community of Minnesota) and facilitates collaborative events and operations throughout the Center. Brian Coyle acts as a recreational center, offering community programming such as sports games in the gymnasium and summer camps, yet also lends its space for organizations like CSCM to use as offices or other outsider groups to use occasionally to reach out to East African neighboring residents.¹³⁶ Legal advocates and employment counselors come to Brian Coyle weekly to offer walk-in meetings with local residents, and the Center for Victims of Torture makes visits to the Center as a part of its neighborhood outreach “New Neighbors, Hidden Scars” project.

In this way, the Brian Coyle Center allows the social services to come to the new communities, rather than forcing newcomers to struggle with transportation and navigating the city to find the resources they need. Brian Coyle is one of nine community centers funded and coordinated by Pillsbury United Communities, a non-profit agency descendent from the late 19th century tradition of settlement houses to improve the quality of life in urban slums. The Pillsbury community centers serve over 30,000 Minneapolis residents each year and focus on strengthening relationships with individuals and families as well as partnering across sectors with public agencies, foundations, and other sister organizations.¹³⁷

The partnership between the Confederation of Somali Community and Brian Coyle Community Center is a strong example of the cross-fertilization and collaboration that is encouraged by the DHS between mainstream agencies and community-based MAAs. The Center, as a mainstream organization, has more developed capacity and offers professional training to its renting organizations, such as CSCM, that benefit from

¹³⁶ Brian Coyle Community Center Interview. 3 January 2007.

¹³⁷ Pillsbury United Communities. <http://www.puc-mn.org/>

working with and physically within the model of an older, more established organization with more stable programming. The common concern of CSCM and Pillsbury United is funding; CSCM faces overwhelming need for innovative programs such as its English language class, daycare, and skill-building program for East African women, yet funding shortages keep the waiting list nearly as long as the list of participants.¹³⁸

Interviewees at Brian Coyle and CSCM both admitted that Somali integration into mainstream Minnesota isn't likely to happen directly through their programs; the Cedar Riverside neighborhood is virtually all Somali and Oromo residents isolated by the Mississippi River and city highways. However, they stressed the importance of providing resettlement social services in an informal, communal environment and allowing an internal community to build among this "gateway" neighborhood of new Minneapolis residents. As one interviewee noted,

I see a resettlement agency being something like Lutheran Social Services, with offices and departments, like a government office. We offer the same services, but it's just a different approach. We're more holistic, casual... I wouldn't say it's a better way, but just a different model.¹³⁹

An interviewee at CSCM also mentioned the sense of ownership that local Somalis feel about the Center and CSCM as an organization made of their community members and serving community interests. "Somalis come and they feel like the organization is theirs," he said, "they feel welcomed."¹⁴⁰ Staff members give an extraordinary amount of attention to their clients, driving them to doctor's appointments and meetings, donating money when someone can't pay his or her monthly rent, writing letters to employers on their behalf and coaching them for citizenship interviews.

¹³⁸ Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota Interview. 10 January 2007.

¹³⁹ Brian Coyle Community Center Interview. 3 January 2007.

¹⁴⁰ Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota Interview. 10 January 2007.

CSCM is better than mainstream agencies (for example, the International Institute of Minnesota) because they have fewer people to serve and can focus on one community, they know the culture. New refugees can communicate with the CSCM leaders, even after hours and they have greater ownership over 'this is our community' and then when they become self-sufficient they get involved in the community to give back. They consider Brian Coyle 'their own home.'¹⁴¹

Voluntary contributions also come from the community – CSCM manages up to 80 volunteers each year to operate its programs, and over 30 Somali elders also work in the community to resolve disputes, domestic abuse issues, helping with cultural celebrations, and mentoring young people. Especially for families that are struggling with changes in social values, family and cultural dynamics, and general separation anxiety from being in such a foreign environment as the United States, community centers like Brian Coyle and CSCM help preserve a sense of home and guide families through cultural transitions by rebuilding family and community unity and strength.

African Development Center

Compared to other community-based social service organizations, the African Development Center (ADC) has a much more specialized focus and serves as a bridge to help established African immigrants improve their income and community development opportunities. The executive director had worked as a Wells Fargo banker for 12 years, transferred his financial and leadership skills to the African immigrant community in 2004 by establishing ADC as a catalyst for training, integrating, and generating wealth for entrepreneurial Africans. ADC services consist of extended trainings and workshops to orient Africans with American concepts such as credit scores, loans (with standard interest or interest-free Islamic financing), mortgages, and other elements of business and homeownership. Although many urban Somali men and women owned businesses

¹⁴¹ Brian Coyle Community Center Interview. 3 January 2007.

before the civil war, the concepts of American business and buying are often unfamiliar to them, and few established immigrants have been able to pass along this knowledge to lower classes in the community.

Business development among African immigrants to the Twin cities follows the trajectory of the many immigrant groups that have preceded us here. At first, everything is new. Most business start-ups stick to what they know, serving African customers in African neighborhoods. Then comes greater cultural familiarity and education in the ways of their adopted home. Today, more African entrepreneurs are pursuing success that embraces their ethnic niche but also looks beyond it to the great American mainstream.¹⁴²

As a community development corporation, ADC occupies an important role in building the leadership and self-sufficiency capacity of African immigrants in the Twin Cities. Their work is “beyond resettlement” in many ways, by investing in Somalis’ economic and social capital for long-term growth.

New Americans Community Services

New Americans Community Services developed out of the St. Paul mayor’s “New Americans Advisory Committee” in 2000 when cultural and linguistic barriers in employment searching and access to health care were identified as major concerns in St. Paul’s African community. One of the former members of the committee, a young Somali man, became Executive Director and has since guided New Americans into a leading health services and research-based organization for East Africans in the Twin Cities. New Americans is federally funded as a resettlement agency for its employment counseling program, and also recently opened a sliding-fee scale health clinic specializing in health care and nutrition education for East African immigrants. Its employees are majority East African as well, and its mission is:

¹⁴² *Success Stories*. African Development Center Newsletter. October, 2006.

...To strengthen the capacity of refugee and immigrant communities in the Twin Cities so that they may share and contribute to the educational, economic, and social well-being of U.S. American culture... to ensure that refugees and immigrants have access to needed services and relevant programs designed to assist them in achieving steady resettlement and long-term individual, family, and community-self-sufficiency.¹⁴³

The most unique element about New Americans is its growing focus on participatory research in African communities. It has already completed two initiatives on identifying barriers to health care and indicators of health disparities in these communities, and is in the early stages of a census undercount project to correct the 2000 census which, due to misidentifications and non-response, vastly undercounted many African immigrants in the Twin Cities. For each of these projects, however, the research was conducted by members of the East African community and directed and overseen by a group of community elders.

This “participatory” method ensures that data collection will be more accurate in linguistically and culturally translating phrases, ideas, and often personal sentiments from the East African communities into publications for mainstream health provider communities. New Americans serves only a moderate number of clients, however its efforts in developing culturally appropriate research methods and building research skills and leadership in African immigrants greatly improves their self-sufficiency.

V. Review of Coping Strategies and Collective Efficacy Interpretation

Somali refugees had already exhibited a coping strategy of relocation by moving from other areas of the United States to Minnesota for its abundant economic resources, public spending, and tolerance for diversity. When these conditions began to change slightly

¹⁴³ New Americans Community Services. www.newamericans.us

between 1996 and 2006, however, this research indicates that Somali refugees reacted in two ways:

- 1) Requesting special accommodations or exemptions in order to maintain Islamic and Somali cultural traditions, and
- 2) Creating and relying more heavily on African- or Somali-led organizations in order to foster community cohesion and provide employment, education, and housing opportunities within Somali communities (rather than in mainstream companies and institutions).

- *Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota* (est. 1994) – A community and cultural center for recreation, special events, forums, youth mentoring, and information on local health and legal services.
- *African Development Center* (est. 2004) – Provides training in financial literacy and homeownership to support African immigrant entrepreneurs to purchase their own homes and operate small businesses, employing fellow African immigrants.
- *New Americans Community Services* (est. 2000) – An affordable health clinic focused on East African health; also offers job search counseling and conducts participatory action research with Africans.

The results of this study show that, in response to a decreasing job market and public resources and increasing social hostility, Somali refugees seem to retreat into their own communities and religious and cultural traditions for support. Despite their challenges, Somalis do not seem to be falling to the “bottom of the melting pot” to be burned. Instead their communities are thriving: gaining advanced degrees, starting hundreds of small

businesses, and beginning to finance their own homes. They embody U.S. immigration policies' emphasis on self-sufficiency as well as the sociological concept of collective efficacy that cohesive communities provide support and agency for collective problem-solving.¹⁴⁴ The executive director of New Americans Community Services highlighted Somalis' motivations in saying:

Somalis, when given the opportunity, to some degree, like self-sufficiency." That's first. Then secondly, we have bigger families and like sending money back home. We want to work hard, pay our bills here, and have enough to send back to family in Somalia or wherever. We have inter-family dependency... We just brought Africa here, brought Somalia here, with the way we depend on each other.¹⁴⁵

Thus, I speculate that this community strength results from a combination of African family tradition, the strength of diasporic bonds, and the unique need for Somalis to unite and overcome the divisions that still plague Somalia.

However successful a sense of collective efficacy may be in uniting and strengthening Somalis' collective capacity to keep themselves from the bottom of the melting pot, Douglas Massey might nonetheless deem them unfairly burdened by the state. This research also supports the conclusion that, because the political and social changes that occurred between 1996 and 2006 limited tolerance for both social and economic flexibility, Somalis are forced to adapt culturally in addition to losing funding for their internal organizational supports. Not only does America send the message that Somali culture and religion is potentially threatening (at least in its *association* with Islamic fundamentalists) and should be distanced from mainstream America, but that the institutions, charter schools, and cultural centers that do celebrate Somali traditions also cannot be funded by the state or mainstream America. Besides facilitating Somalis'

¹⁴⁴ Sampson, Robert J. "Neighborhood and Community: Collective Efficacy and Community Safety." *New Economy* 11:106-113. 2004.

¹⁴⁵ New Americans Community Services Interview. 12 December 2007.

initial relocation, the United States does much less of a widely-felt welcome – materially or symbolically – for the Somalis than was done for immigrants and refugees in years past.

Because of this growing imbalance, Somali communities may be at risk of becoming isolated and not fully reaching the last stage of resettlement, *integration*. Somalis, other minority and immigrant communities, and mainstream Minnesotans now face a collective challenge of initiating collaborative projects, engaging with one another, respecting one another's boundaries and limitations, and re-envisioning a new Minneapolis and St. Paul for all. The final chapter of this paper will address possible models for this collaborative process.

CHAPTER FIVE

At a Crossroads: Collaborative Models for Somali Resettlement

...Immigrants thrive best in socially and politically supportive environments that allow them to change most of their social and cultural practices at their own pace, while learning and adapting to important community practices more quickly. Doing so, in turn, allows immigrants to build up their confidence and sense of belonging gradually but deeply. At the heart of any successful integration model, however, lies continuous interaction and mutual adjustments and accommodations. A model grounded on equity and mutuality, and a more organic rather than forced pace of adaptation, holds the most promise.

Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Co-Director of the Migration Policy Institute

I. Defining Successful Resettlement

A central objective in this research is defining the concepts of “successful resettlement” and “integration” of refugees into a host country. These concepts have rarely, if ever, been clearly understood by public consensus: some only consider the “success” of refugees’ physical relocation to the United States, whereas others take a long term view of how and with what speed refugees assimilate, blend with, or interact with other non-refugees or other “mainstream Americans.” Varied visions of “successful resettlement” abound: from the image of a melting pot to that of a mixed salad, to the representation of refugee communities in positions of power in government or the economy.

The Minnesota Department of Human Services refers to “successful resettlement” primarily in terms of economic welfare and stability, identifying six specific outcomes that their programs are intended to facilitate in the short-, medium-, and long-term settlement of refugee families and children. The outcomes are as follows, as determined by standard performance measures:

1. Refugee families have stable housing
2. Refugees are naturalized citizens
3. Refugee families are living in safe environments
4. Refugee families are engaged with community services and support
5. Refugee families are fully functioning
6. Refugee families are economically self-supporting¹⁴⁶

Another view of “successful resettlement,” stated by the director of a local community-based non-profit, also refers to the welfare and ability of new refugees to “navigate the system” themselves and learn to access services for independent American living.¹⁴⁷ I find these goals for resettlement important, yet they are both missing an element of inter-group relations and long-term community building between refugee and native populations.

According to a recent report on Minnesota immigrant integration, the broader process of resettlement in fact consists of a two-part progression.¹⁴⁸ “Resettlement” proper refers to a short-term goal – the initial transition and relocation to a new country and immediate food, housing and employment needs of new refugees, as they become familiar with their new environment. The longer-term process of “integration” that follows – psychologically adapting to a new “home” and reintegrating into local social networks, economic, political, and cultural activities – may possibly take up to a lifetime. Integration in this sense occurs in different areas – economic, social, cultural/religious, and political – and requires different amounts of time for different individuals. The report states this process as one “through which newcomers become full and equal participants in all the various dimensions of society” and refers to a continuum (see below) of gradual acclimatization and adaptation.

¹⁴⁶ See Appendices F and G for descriptions of the outcomes’ performance measures.

¹⁴⁷ Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota Interview. 10 January 2007.

¹⁴⁸ *New Neighbors, New Opportunities*, 2003.

RESETTLEMENT/SETTLEMENT**INTEGRATION***Acclimitization**Adaptation*

According to this model, newcomers and U.S.-born individuals gradually move toward building a new synthesis of community that recognizes and respects them both. This is a more holistic and widely-encompassing definition of resettlement because it considers the short-term and long-term welfare of newcomers as well as the welfare of the entire community, which is broadened to include native and non-native populations. This model takes into account the negative long-term consequence of ensuring the welfare of one group over another, such as the competition over affordable housing resources that occurs between non-citizens and populations of color in the Twin Cities. If Somali refugees have first access to housing, they may be on their way to “successful resettlement” as a single community, but if this engenders hostility or failed trust between Somalis and other communities of color, the Twin Cities as a whole suffers from the strained relationship.

As explained in Chapter Two, Douglas Massey argued that the United States has not upheld its “end of the bargain” with refugees and in fact, with all immigrants, by divesting funds away from social services and public assistance and allowing tension to grow between native and non-native communities.¹⁴⁹ According to this concept of a social contract - particularly between refugees and the governments that invite them - how would we rate the Twin Cities and Somalis? What lessons are there to be learned for different geographical communities, such as Lewiston or Toronto, or for different immigrant groups, such as the Haitians or Hmong? How might the Twin Cities learn

¹⁴⁹ Massey, 2005.

from the failures and successes of other multicultural communities? In the remainder of this chapter, I extend this holistic model of *broadened belonging* to redefine communities of “successful resettlement,” offering an evaluation and recommendations for improvement in the Twin Cities according to this new theoretical model.

II. Integration as “Broadened Belonging”

Flows of immigration due to economic disparities and civil conflict now land many of the world’s most unique cultures, religions, languages, and people on the same neighborhood block. Such heterogeneity, however, is difficult to maintain and can quickly cause conflict if not carefully managed. The “internationalization” of the West Bank or Lake Street communities in Minneapolis, or of the Frogtown neighborhood in St. Paul, brings issues of foreign policy and stereotypes of faraway nations into a local context of urban struggle over jobs, housing, transportation, schools, and health care. Increasingly polarized national and state governments parallel an increasingly polarized American constituency, and as external foreign affairs and internal immigration politics both grow tenuous, voices from the local to the national levels call out for a shift to seeing immigration and immigrants in a new light.

A growing contingent of immigration experts now look beyond the images of melting pots and mixed salads, and instead referring to immigrant integration as a “two-way street.” This economic, socio-cultural, political, and religious form of *adaptation* follows the rights and duties or “social contract” model to ensure balance and conflict management as well as establish a starting point from which *belonging* and *social citizenship* may be broadened to include all newcomers. Demetrios Papademetriou of the

Migration Policy Institute encourages a focus on mutuality between the constructed dichotomies of “host community” and “newcomer community;” he advocates for integration as a “process through which, over time, newcomers and hosts form an integral whole.” Papademetriou also claims that such a model requires the expertise of public institutions as well as the private and non-governmental sectors in a collective effort to facilitate the process of integration. “Such cooperation,” he notes, “is at the heart of the virtuous circles so essential to solving difficult social problems.” Collaboration can occur in many ways, but requires a view of immigrants – whether Mexican, Salvadoran, Hmong, Vietnamese, Nigerian, or Somali – that acknowledges their agency as individuals and as communities to create opportunities for themselves.

Many newcomers in the United States opt to establish community organizations, begin small enterprises and create jobs for themselves and others, encourage the second generation to earn advanced degrees, and take leadership in their communities as they slowly expand to include more non-immigrant, mainstream individuals. This process is similar to that of assimilation, except that it includes a broadening and blending of different ethnic groups, rather than the absorption of one into another. According to this theoretical framework, diasporic identity and national identity act each as separate lenses that merge at the site of immigration and thus, over time, take on a new color as a new integrated whole. As a synthesis between Papademetriou’s “two-way street” model, Massey’s “social contract,” and the two-part progression outlined in the *NewNeighbors, New Opportunities* report, I offer this concept of *broadened belonging* to describe the community re-envisioning and development necessary to ensure long-term successful resettlement.

III. Twin Cities: Evaluation of Cross-Cultural Community

The terms “cultural brokering,” “bridging,” and “cultural liaison” resurfaced multiple times in my interviews, visits, and interactions with Somali refugees. The process of “brokering” refugee adjustment is done first by large, contracted resettlement agencies such as Catholic Charities; yet after 90 days, refugees must navigate this process virtually on their own. Public and non-profits organizations step in to aid this “brokering” between Somalis’ needs and U.S. systems of services, in order to ease any miscommunications and complications that may arise. Nevertheless, much of the interface and learning between Somalis and native-born Americans is done by individuals. Thus, in addition to balancing financial responsibilities, cross-cultural learning for all individuals is a crucial element in resettlement and integration to moderate the extreme views and clumsy stereotypes that develop between groups that lack real information about one another.

A certain amount of self-sufficiency is expected from newcomers to prevent the state from becoming overburdened, yet the state should also consider funding or setting an example of rhetorical support for the most rooted elements of newcomers’ identity, such as religion or traditional culture. If these two objectives are achieved, neither group should be economically overextended nor pressured to change the fundamental elements of its identity as a source of community cohesion and strength. Cross-cultural learning, or public education, then is the final necessary component to educate groups about one another, eradicate distorted stereotypes and fears, and create a common history upon which new conceptions of community can be constructed. Several remarkable examples

of contributions, leadership, and public education in the Twin Cities (see page 99 for chart) have helped to ease the burdens of change as Somalis entered this new space.

This is not to say that re-envisioning and rebuilding a community is without challenge. The ripple effects of national restrictionist policies increasingly “trickle down” into Minnesotan politics and economy, as public supports against poverty have dramatically waned since 2000. Somalis’ strongest coping strategies – requesting accommodations (such as labeling of halal foods in cafeterias or prayer spaces at their places of work) and creating internal organizations – are both sources of support and sources of tension, as they risk harming their future relationships with Minnesotans.

Several employees in public assistance offices and in public schools pick up on an “aggressive, dig every hole” assertive culture and behavior in some Somalis, and these few individuals have begun to taint the reputation of all Somalis.¹⁵⁰ One Hennepin County employee explains:

I think the [Somali] community is one that wants to work, wants to have their own money, wants to contribute. But they learn very quickly that there are rules and rights that protect them and entitle them to certain things that they, to some degree, not all, have become very demanding and vocal, for example the prayer or mediation rooms. It isn't a 'this would be wonderful if you could accommodate this' it's a 'I need this, I want this'... And I think part of that comes from their coming from a society pretty much of bartering, and the government officials were corrupt, and so they think the more pressure they put on you, the more likely they are to get what they want.¹⁵¹

She justified her comments, saying that “many of them are, besides being my staff, are my friends, and they’re just wonderful people in the community.” Setting the majority aside, however, she notices that a small section of overly assertive Somalis “are getting a stigma, and that hurts [all of] them.”

¹⁵⁰ Kapteijns, Lidiwien and Abukar Arman. “Educating Immigrant Youth in the United States: An Exploration of the Somali Case.” *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*. 4:18-43. 2004.

¹⁵¹ Hennepin County (OMS) Interview. 21 December 2006.

Local media has also freely broadcast Somalis' requests for religious accommodation: of Somali taxi drivers refusing to transport alcohol or refusing to handle pork products as grocery cashiers, or of their requests for Somali signs and prayer rooms at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. Rumors also spread of public schools, unable to grant all the requests they receive from Somali parents, seeing Somali students move out to Koranic schools for more traditional education. Yet in these efforts to preserve their cultural traditions and sense of community, Somalis may isolate themselves from mainstream communities and jeopardize their children's opportunities to grow up bi-culturally and eventually merge into the cultural fabric of American society.

Moreover, as the economy wanes and jobs are scarce, economic mobility and the classic integration pattern of leaving ethnic enclaves is less likely to occur. One employee at the Brian Coyle Community Center claims that "[Somalis] are beginning to feel the wall and feel that they can't advance and move up...there are more Somali single parents, we're starting to see Somali gangs... it's like they're learning what institutional racism is."¹⁵² Some Somalis have left the city for rural areas in search of factory jobs, yet those that remain in the Twin Cities are beginning to find themselves "stuck in the underclass," and thus cling to tight-knit, culturally comfortable enclaves in Cedar-Riverside, Frogtown, and along University Avenue. A Brian Coyle Community Center administrator explains:

I think we're at a crossroads...usually this neighborhood turns over with new immigrant groups – before in the 1980s there were Vietnamese and Koreans here, and then it turned over to East Africans in the '90s. But it hasn't turned over yet [as I expected it would by this time]. It seems like the Somalis are afraid to leave because they're comfortable here, they have their mosques and their grocery stores. I have some friends who live out in Burnsville and their kids get taunted in school. It seems like no one wants to move out from this isolated area.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Brian Coyle Community Center Interview. 3 January 2007.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

The future long-term resettlement of Somali refugees is therefore at risk, as the result of compounding social and economic factors: negative associations of welfare dependents, enduring subtle racism and assumptions about the “privileges” deserved by immigrants and refugees, and fears over Muslims in the United States. A strong capacity for self-sufficiency certainly aids Somalis in their own welfare, but the United States context nonetheless threatens their prospects of successful integration into a broadened Twin Cities community. Pursuit of such integration is also challenging, as striking a balance between self-sufficiency and religious accommodation requires Minnesotans to see the more visible contributions that their own institutions make for new refugees as well as the subtle, self-sufficiency oriented contributions that Somalis offer to neighborhoods and schools, and to the national economy. In order to effectively re-envision and broaden belonging in a dynamic Twin Cities community, its members will need to dialogue, take stock of what contributions and burdens already exist, and collectively identify improvements.¹⁵⁴ The following charts serve as templates for this building process (see pages 99 and 100).

¹⁵⁴ Lidiwien Kapteijns and Abukar Arman suggest similar recommendations in a 2004 article in *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* including the following: dialogue and education across Minnesota communities and public institutions, outlining expectations and realistic compromises between Somalis and mainstream Minnesotans, engaging Somali youth and the elderly to develop positive self-images, and a focus on the challenges faced and positive contributions given by Somalis to their new neighborhoods and communities.

	NEW SOMALI REFUGEES	MINNESOTA MAINSTREAM
<i>BURDENS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Persistence in demanding special accommodations ▪ Use of welfare programs for income, rent, and food costs ▪ Specialized treatment in first 90 days transition ▪ Increased need for resources and assistance in public schools, workplaces, transportation, and hospitals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reduced funding and access for social services (incl. benefits, public schools, health insurance, subsidized child care) ▪ Negative legislation and media attention to illegal immigration ▪ Governor-initiated punitive programs ▪ Incidences of race- or religion-based attacks
<i>CONTRIBUTIONS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ High rates of employment ▪ Creation of small businesses ▪ Gaining advanced degrees ▪ Cultivation of leadership in more settled individuals ▪ Creation of organizations for resettlement services and “brokering” ▪ Creation of mosques and Koranic schools ▪ Revitalize neighborhoods and bring federal dollars into public schools 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Labeled Halal food in St. Paul schools ▪ Daily prayer accommodations in workplaces ▪ Culturally relevant English curricula in schools and adult basic education ▪ Minneapolis and St. Paul mayoral committees established on immigrant needs ▪ Minneapolis mayor present at Somali celebrations ▪ Preferential accommodations for transitioning refugees ▪ Public benefits for eligible refugees ▪
<i>PUBLIC EDUCATION</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cultural associations to celebrate and teach Somali culture ▪ Public documentaries explaining Islam, <i>xijaab</i> and experience of resettlement ▪ Published research reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Public forums held on local immigration environment ▪ Community events and publications on immigrants in Minnesota

IV. Policy Recommendations

For National Policy

- Establish state committees to monitor the welfare and needs of all new refugee communities as they transition from benefits-eligible refugee status to benefits-ineligible permanent resident status after five years, particularly SSI-recipients and communities with limited social support.
- Encourage national and state leadership that is supportive and speaks in practical and specific terms about immigrants.

For State Programs

- Share successful curricula and teaching methods between Minneapolis and St. Paul public schools curricula. Begin piloting St. Paul School's nationally known English learning programs in Minneapolis Public Schools.
- Create a parallel Office of Multi-Cultural Services in Ramsey County government.
- Hold public forums and encourage community research into relations between Somalis and police, ICE officers, and the FBI.

For Mainstream and Mutual Assistance Associations

- Conduct community needs assessments and evaluations of service delivery once every two years (may be done formally with a contracted consultant or informally, using elders).
- Foundations should set aside a minimum level of funding for basic operational costs for community-based organizations.
- Collaborate with Minneapolis Public Libraries to develop a Somali-American center for cross-cultural learning. Publicize this center in all libraries across the Twin Cities and outer suburbs.
- Increase work on leadership development in immigrant communities and capacity building for smaller organizations. Develop partnerships like Confederation of Somali Community and the Brian Coyle Community Center.

For Somalis

- Encourage young people to embrace biculturalism and seek community support for troubled teens.
- Accept that there is a limit on the amount of financial support the U.S. government can provide and pursue additional training and degrees to become self-sufficient.
- Approach neighbors of different backgrounds with respect and attempt to learn more about their historical background and values for life in the United States.

V. Suggestions for Future Research

This research offers an original contribution to a growing corps of literature on Somali immigrants in Minnesota and the locally felt consequences of national policy changes; however, this area of research could be far more fruitful with continued research.

Because African immigrants traditionally have made up such a small proportion of all U.S. immigrants, much more attention has been paid to larger and more historic groups, such as Mexicans, Chinese, or Japanese. Numerous case studies explain the particulars of Latin American ethnic groups or Asian groups, but the field of African immigrants and refugees is unique and slowly developing. More local and anthropological research is needed to accurately understand the social structures, community groups, divergent perspectives, and individuals that make up the larger concept of a “Somali Community” and the ways in which this diverse group can build community with the also diverse group of “Minnesotans.”¹⁵⁵ Specific study on Somali women, children, elderly, certain sectors of employment, and the experience of the second generation are important to this process.

Continued research could also address alternate models of integration and community-building as well as alternate views on the Twin Cities and the extent to which it embodies cross-cultural community. Moreover, the concept of “community” might be investigated in depth to extrapolate the elements which differentiate between a

¹⁵⁵ This is a suggestion for future research as well as a comment on the limitations of this study; time and language constraints prevented me from further delving into the particulars of Somali history and culture as well as their shared experience as a transitory community in refugee camps and in resettlement countries. Future studies should collaborate with Somali researchers to devise more culturally-appropriate methods of research and construct analyses that incorporate a fuller understanding of Somali history as well as the understanding of Minnesotan history that I bring to the analysis in this paper.

“community” as a group of people united simply by location or shared ancestry, and a “community” as a group of diverse interests and characteristics, yet united in a shared vision and collective struggle to achieve common goals.

Finally, I acknowledge that this research is only preliminary in its envisioning of greater inclusivity and collaboration in the Twin Cities; nonetheless, these salient and current issues should continue to be examined in classrooms and universities as well as in community forums and discussions.

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APPENDIX A
Letter to the Somali Community

The text of Lewiston Mayor Larry Raymond's letter to Somali elders:

October 1, 2002

For some number of months, I have observed the continued movement of a substantial number of Somalis into the downtown area of our Community. I have applauded the efforts of our City staff in making available the existing services and the local citizenry for accepting and dealing with the influx.

I assumed that it would become obvious to the new arrivals the effect the large numbers of new residents has had upon the existing Staff and City finances and that this would bring about a voluntary reduction of the number of new arrivals-it being evident that the burden has been, for the most part, cheerfully accepted, and every effort has been made to accommodate it.

Our Department of Human Services has recently reported that the number of Somali families arriving into the City during the month of September is below the approximate monthly average that we have seen over the last year or so. It may be premature to assume that this may serve as a signal for future relocation activity, but the decline is welcome relief *given increasing demands on city and school services.*

I feel that recent relocation activity over the summer has necessitated that I communicate directly with the Somali elders and leaders regarding our newest residents. If recent declining arrival numbers are the result of your outreach efforts to discourage relocation into the City, I applaud those efforts. If they are the product of other unrelated random events, I would ask that the Somali leadership make every effort to communicate my concerns on city and school service impacts with other friends and extended family who are considering a move to this community.

To date, we have found the funds to accommodate the situation. A continued increased demand will tax the City's finances.

This large number of new arrivals cannot continue without negative results for all. The Somali community must exercise some discipline and reduce the stress on our limited finances and our generosity.

I am well aware of the legal right of a U.S. resident to move anywhere he/she pleases, but it is time for the Somali community to exercise this discipline in view of the effort that has been made on its behalf.

We will continue to accommodate the present residents as best as we can, but we need self-discipline and cooperation from everyone.


Only with your help will we be successful in the future-please pass the word: We have been overwhelmed and have responded valiantly. Now we need breathing room. Our city is maxed-out financially, physically and emotionally.

I look forward to your cooperation.

Laurier T. Raymond, Jr.

Mayor, City of Lewiston, Maine

Primary* Refugee Arrivals to MN by Region of World 1979-2005




Southeast Asia
 Sub-Saharan Africa
 Eastern Europe
 FSU
 Other

Refugee Health Program, Minnesota Department of Health

*First resettled in Minnesota

Primary Refugee Arrivals, Minnesota, 2005



“Other” includes Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, China (also Tibet), Congo, Cuba, Eritrea, Guinea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe

APPENDIX E
State and Non-profit Partners in Refugee Resettlement

Adapted from <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/partners/index.htm>

International Organizations in Refugee Services

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Federal Agencies

Department of State; Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)
Department of Health and Human Services; Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
Executive Office of Immigration Review at Dept of Justice (DOJ)
Consortium of National Voluntary Agencies (VOLAGs)
Consortium of National Mutual Assistance Association (MAAs)

Minnesota State Refugee Coordinators and Agencies

Resettlement Programs Supervisor
New Americans Services
Department of Human Services
Hennepin County Department of Human Services
 Office of Multi-Cultural Services
Ramsey County

Local Affiliates of National Voluntary Agencies


Minnesota Council of Churches
Minnesota Council of Churches
Jewish Family & Children's Services of Minneapolis and St. Paul
International Institute of Minnesota
Lutheran Social Service
Catholic Charities
World Relief of Minnesota

Local Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs)

African Community Services
Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota
Somali Benadiri Community of Minnesota
Somali Community Resettlement
Somali Mai Community of Minnesota
Somali Women in Minneapolis
New Americans Community Services
African Development Center

Minnesota's Refugee Resettlement Program (Rebuilding refugee families and integrating new Minnesotans)

Minnesota vision - Refugees are part of the larger community; they make contributions and accept responsibilities like everyone else. They need to have equal opportunity and access to the things that make Minnesota great: quality education, healthy and safe environment, quality of life and good paying jobs. They, like everyone else, may need supports and services to achieve their full potential and realize their role in the changing Minnesota.



**Resettlement Programs Office
MN Department of Human Services**

Outcomes for refugee families and children

1. Refugee families have stable housing.
Performance measures: number of families living in unsubsidized housing; number of families in subsidized housing; number of families owning their homes.
2. Refugees are naturalized citizens.
Performance measures: number of individuals with filed application for permanent residency; number of individuals with filed application for naturalization; number of individuals that are naturalized.
3. Refugee families are living in safe environments.
Performance measures: Survey statements to indicate that parents are feeling -- a) their children are not at risk for criminal activities, b) their children are not harassed in school; c) they are safe in their homes.
4. Refugee families are engaged with community services and supports.
Performance measures: Specific programs and services utilized to resolve basic needs. Survey statements to indicate that refugee families have acceptable and culturally appropriate child care services.
5. Refugee families are fully functioning.
Performance measures: Survey statements to indicate that a) refugee families have reliable transportation; b) refugee families are participating in activities planned by school or ethnic organizations; c) on their own parents contacted appropriate persons or agency to address problems/issues.
6. Refugee families are economically self-supporting. Performance measures: rate of pay at job entry; job retention within 90 days, medical benefits, attainment of ESL SPL level 5 and above; job upgrade/ advancement within 1 year; welfare reduction or termination.

Revised: 02/10/06



Minnesota Department of Human Services

Gus P. Avenido Refugee State Coordinator

VOICE: (651) 431-3837
MN Relay: 711 or (800) 627-3529
FAX: (651) 431-7483

gus.avenido@state.mn.us