Honors Projects

Values and Beliefs: A pragmatist critique of moral nihilism

J.P. Weismuller — Fri, 11 May 2012 14:16:35 PDT

Moral nihilism maintains that value judgments cannot be justified. In this paper I argue against two prominent nihilistic theories: error theory and expressivism. First I present a meta-valuation thesis, which holds that it would be more valuable if at least some value judgments were justified. Second I argue for a value-justification thesis, which holds that the greater value of value-justifying theories warrants a rejection of nihilistic theories. This latter thesis requires a pragmatist premise: justified beliefs are the most valuable of possible beliefs. With this premise and a critique of meta-ethical theory choice, I argue that meta-ethical justification proceeds via an atypical form of the method of reflective equilibrium. Since this particular method cannot produce a justification for error theory or expressivism, I conclude that these two forms of moral nihilism should be rejected in favor of more valuable meta-ethical theories.

A Defense of Public Justification

Simon Pickus — Wed, 19 Oct 2011 12:20:38 PDT

Patriotic Bias and Institutional Coercion

Gerbrand Hoogvliet — Mon, 17 Oct 2011 13:40:02 PDT

This thesis in political philosophy considers justifications for a bias towards compatriots in the allocation of resources. I reject arguments in support of national partiality that appeal to the intrinsic value of the nation as well as those based on analogies between the nation and the family. Instead I offer an impartial defense of the existence of special duties towards conationals as fellow participants in a nation state, based on the account offered by Michael Blake. The use of political power by the state gives rise to a greater degree of concern for the needs of compatriots than for the needs of foreigners. I extend Blake's argument by claiming the existence of a global basic structure, which is coercive in nature. This basic structure gives rise to a concern for distributive justice globally.

Time and Temporality: A Heiddegerian Perspective on McTaggart's A-series

Zachary Dotray — Thu, 14 Oct 2010 09:40:48 PDT

J.M.E. McTaggart first employed the now-standard distinction between the A- an B-series in an attempt to prove the unreality of time. I argue that McTaggart's analysis of time requires that a subject exist within the A-series, and as such lends itself to a Heideggerian conception of time, viewed both through Being and Time and Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's theory, that necessitates a 'personal' temporality in order to make 'world-time' intelligible. I also suggest that Heidegger's temporaility, formulated as a non-successive unity grounded in Dasein's existential constitution as being-in-the-world, circumvents McTaggart's preemptive charge of circularity and therefore also avoids the conclusion that time is unreal.

The Geometry of Intuitions: Reconsidering Kantian Constructivism

Michael McNulty — Thu, 25 Sep 2008 07:49:03 PDT

The role of visual methods in geometry is puzzling. Though diagrams can make a geometric theorem immediately evident, current rules of proper inference suggest that diagrams are mere heuristics-simply aiding in the psychological digestibility of a proof. Securing a justificatory role for visual methods involves describing how inference from a diagram guarantees the universality and the a:priority of a geometric theorem. Such an analysis is provided in Kant's synthetic a priori account of geometry. In this paper, Kant's theory is explicated and subsequently defended from attacks related to modern advances in predicate logic, relativistic physics, non-Euclidean geometry and formalism.

One Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Necessity and Normativity

Gregory P. Taylor — Tue, 05 Jun 2007 05:29:05 PDT

This thesis sketches an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus centering on his treatment of necessity and normativity. The purpose is to unite Wittgenstein’s account of logic and language with his brief remarks on ethics by stressing the transcendental nature of each. Wittgenstein believes that both logic and ethics give necessary preconditions for the existence of language and the world, and because these conditions are necessary, neither logic nor ethics can be normative. I conclude by erasing the standard line drawn between his philosophy and his ethics, and redrawing it between the philosophical and artistic presentations of his thought, the latter being what remains after the nonsensical status of the work is recognized.