Nation, State, and Cross-Strait Relations: Perspectives from Taiwan[1]

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I. Introduction: An Overview of the National Question in Taiwan

The problems surrounding the theoretical understanding of "nation" and "state" in Taiwan are among the most intriguing and most confusing in the contemporary world. Some might know that there is a so-called "separatist" or "independence" movement, often referred to as Taiwanese nationalism, that intends to turn Taiwan into a nation; some others might also know that there have been tensions between Taiwan and China that could lead to devastating military conflicts, as made manifest in the two missile crises in 1996 and 2000.

I use "national question" as a general term to refer to those issues pertaining to Taiwan's nation/nationalism, state, and cross-Strait relations. Although Taiwan's national question has been attracting more and more attention from both within and outside Taiwan during the past decade, the growing awareness of this problem has unfortunately been beset with misconceptions and misunderstandings. The aim of this essay is to clarify these issues by providing an alternative perspective through which to analyze Taiwan's national question. Such an analysis, it is hoped, may help bring new perspectives to break the current impasse.

I shall first point out and dispute the bias and insufficiencies of a number of popular images or "common sense" notions about Taiwan's national question. Next, I shall advance an institutional approach with a global perspective to view the problem. I argue that Taiwan's national

question is in essence an international problem embodied in institutional settings of the Republic of China (ROC) nation. The recent escalation of nationalist politics is the result of the growing institutional crises of the ROC nation, exacerbated by ethnic tensions within Taiwan and confounded by cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China. Consequently, the reduction of tensions and the avoidance of potential conflict between Taiwan and China can only come about through the efforts of people and states on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (i.e., a bottom-up solution) as well as an involvement of the international community.

II. Some Common Misunderstandings and Misconceptions

A. Regarding Taiwan's National Question

Two popular views dominate the current understanding of Taiwan's national question within the general public, both within and outside the island. The first is an ethnic explanation; the other is what can be called "the divided nation model." In spite of their popularity, both views are neither sufficient for the purposes of explaining Taiwanese nationalism, nor do they provide a comprehensive understanding of Taiwan's national question. As a matter of fact, the insufficiencies that emanate from these misunderstandings are partly accountable for what is at stake in the dispute surrounding Taiwan's national question.

1. The Ethnic Explanation

Ethnic tensions and conflicts between two dichotomous groups (the so-called "Mainlanders" and the "Taiwanese") are the most popular and convenient way of viewing Taiwan's national question. It is often held that the Mainlanders (those who fled from mainland China to Taiwan with the exiled KMT regime in 1949, and their offspring) tend to favor a Chinese identity and opt for future reunification with China. On the other hand, the Taiwanese (mainly Holo- but sometimes including the Hakka-speaking people who had settled on the island for several generations before the wave of immigrants who arrived with the KMT) tend towards a Taiwanese identity and thus favor Taiwan Independence (TI). Accordingly, the political camps can be divided roughly into two: the "Blue" (favoring unification) vs. the "Green" (favoring independence).

The ethnic explanation is insufficient at best and misleading at worst in that the so-called ethnic conflicts between Mainlanders and Taiwanese are themselves part of the *result* rather than the *cause* of Taiwan's national question. Imagine the following scenario: had Taiwan not been ceded to and colonized by Japan in 1895, and had Taiwan not been occupied by the exile KMT (*Kuomintang*, literally "national party") regime from mainland China in 1949, then it would have been highly probable that there would not be any distinction at all between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. Put another way, the dichotomy between the two "ethnic groups" is itself the product of Taiwan's national question, in which Taiwan's belonging to the state (be it the Qing Dynasty of imperial China, Japan, or the KMT) has been a shifting dispute.[2]

The ethnic explanation is impeded by the difficulty of characterizing Taiwanese nationalism, which runs against conventional wisdom about nations and nationalism and thus cannot be easily categorized. One of the most fatal and misleading characterizations of Taiwanese nationalism is to view it as a "separatist movement" that is comparable to, for example, Quebec vs. Canada or Catalonia vs. Spain. Quebec and Catalonia are separatist movements in that those national struggles seek separation from the states whose jurisdiction they are under. This, however, is not applicable to Taiwan. Contemporary Taiwan does not share the same political roof with China as Quebec does with Canada or Catalonia does with Spain. Hence the case for "Taiwan Independence" sounds rather confusing to many outsiders. The oft-asked question is: "Independence from whom?" If Taiwanese nationalism is understood as the struggle of the Taiwanese (the oppressed majority) against the Mainlanders (the ruling minority) during the KMT era, then why did nationalist politics in Taiwan escalate rather than decline after the year 2000, when ethnic Taiwanese became the ruling majority and the pro-Independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) replaced the KMT.

I am not suggesting that ethnic factors are irrelevant or unimportant in explaining Taiwan's national question. However, to view the problem of Taiwan's national question as originating from conflicts between these two ethnic groups is quite misleading. Ethnic problems and the national question are correlated, but they are not the same, nor can they be conflated with each other.

2. The "Divided-Nation Model"

The other popular misconception concerning Taiwan's national question is to view Taiwan as a part of the divided Chinese nation, the other part being mainland China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the national title "People's Republic of China." This view, held particularly in the early years, is still popular in scholarly discussions and is widely held by a majority of the Taiwanese population even today (although, as will be shown below, the popularity of such a view has receded considerably in recent years). Using the "Divided Nation" model to explain Taiwan's national question can be said to be only half-true, but the other half of that equation may help to illuminate the real nature of Taiwan's national question that necessitates further analysis.

Just like former Vietnam, pre-1990 Germany, and contemporary Korea, China and Taiwan viewed together *were* a divided nation, resulting from the Cold War structure after the Second World War. In this sense, Taiwan's national question, from its inception, was indeed an international problem, as the prolonged division between China and Taiwan was a Cold War strategy. However, if we try to understand Taiwan's national question from this divided nation model, it will become quite misleading—but by debunking such a misunderstanding, we can get closer to what is at stake in Taiwan's national question. Let me elaborate this in two points.

Firstly, although the division between Taiwan and China resembles other divided nations after WWII, such a fact is neither well known nor officially recognized. People know that Vietnam was once divided into North and South, and the division ended after a protracted war. It is also widely known that there used to be two Germanys, which became reunified in a dramatic fashion in 1990. As for Korea, it has thus far remained divided into North and South, and such a fact has also been widely acknowledged around the world. The case of China and Taiwan, however, is rather different. Most states in the world endorse the so-called "One China policy," which maintains that there is only one China in the world and that Taiwan is part of China. China, after all, is not considered a divided nation. Moreover, although Taiwan was once characterized as "Free China" before the 1970s, few people nowadays know that Taiwan bears the national title of "Republic of China" (ROC). Far fewer know that Taiwan/ROC is not recognized as a sovereign state. Quite the opposite, most people assume it is, because

it has its own government and army, exercises full democracy, and citizens elect their own president through a direct voting system. Such a discrepancy has planted tragic seeds for Taiwanese nationalism. I shall get to this in a later section.

The second reason why the divided nation model does not fit Taiwan involves the democratic transformation of Taiwanese politics in the past few decades. Since the KMT took refuge in Taiwan in 1949, it has endeavored to maintain a Chinese identity and Chinese nationalism. Since 1988, when Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo to become the first "native-born" president, the situation began to change. Lee Teng-hui swung between Chinese and Taiwanese identities from time to time. Indeed, the momentum of nation building shifted from a Chinese nationalism (for unification) to a Taiwanese nationalism (for independence) during Lee's 12-year presidential term. The shift reached its peak in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election and the pro-Independence DPP became the ruling party. Since the DPP, established in 1987 and constituted in the main by Taiwanese rather than Mainlanders, does not bear the memory of the Chinese civil war as the KMT does, the legacy of the civil war is denied. For pro-Independence nationalists, the divided nation model certainly does not apply to Taiwan, since they never consider Taiwan and China a divided nation that should be reunified. Quite the opposite! In their view, Taiwan and China are "two different nations" instead of "a nation divided in two."

III. An Alternative Perspective and the Analytical Framework

If the ethnic explanation and the divided nation model cannot satisfactorily explain Taiwan's national question, and if Taiwanese nationalism cannot be perceived as a "separatist movement" as it usually is, how else can it be understood? I argue that the question must be viewed globally, from an institutionalist approach, in which two factors are emphasized: the one institutional, the other global or international.

The institutionalist approach to nations and nationalism is first theorized by sociologist Rogers Brubaker in his path-breaking *Nationalism Reframed*. Drawing on the insights from institutionalism and new institutionalism in various disciplines, Brubaker proposed that nation and nationhood can be better understood, not as substance but as institutionalized form, not as collectivity but as practical category, and not as entity but as contingent event.[3] In his original formulation, Brubaker

distinguishes between two aspects of institutionalization of nationhood and nationality: one concerning the territorial organization of political administration, the other concerning the classification of persons.[4] To take it a step further, I propose that such a distinction of institutions corresponds roughly to two "ideal types" of the nation-state: the civic-territorial model and the ethno-cultural model.[5] While such a distinction might seem banal today, it nonetheless has important implications for our understanding of the institutions of the nation. The civic-territorial model essentially concerns the political organization of the nation regarding sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship. The ethno-cultural model involves (re)presentation of the nation in the symbolic realm, including national culture, national history, the classification scheme of people, and the like. To be sure, no nation has in reality been founded solely on either of the two models. For those nations built on the ethno-cultural model, there are still institutions that define these nations in civic-territorial terms. Conversely, nations based on the civic-territorial model contain ethno-cultural elements in defining their nationhood. The weaving of these two types of institutions actualizes the existence of a specific nation. These two types of institutions, in turn, furnish the grids of the classification schemes on the political/territorial and the cultural/cognitive maps, respectively, on the worldwide level. They are highly correlated to each other, but neither can be reduced to the logic of the other.

Moreover, according to the property of relativity that we learn from the theory of new institutionalism, whether a social pattern or practice can be seen as an institution depends on the context of our analysis.[6] In the context of nationhood and nationality, the property of relativity brings us to what is known as the "institutionalist theory of world polity," developed by John Meyer and his colleagues.[7] Institutions of nationhood and nationality have to perform in two relative contexts: the domestic/national level and the global/international level.

Combining the above discussions, we can obtain a two-by-two table according to "types of institutions" and "levels of analysis" respectively. (See Table 1.)

With this analytical framework, I argue that the existence of a nation is hinged upon an ensemble of intersecting institutions that can be classified into civic-territorial and ethno-cultural types. Both types of institutions, moreover, have to be articulated on both the domestic and international levels. If either type fails to articulate at either level, the existence of the nation will be jeopardized and will most probably

Table 1: Civic-Territorial and Ethno-Cultural Institutions of Nationhood on International and National Levels

	Civic-territorial institutions (Political/territorial map)	Ethno-cultural institutions (Cultural/cognitive map)
International/ Global level	• International organizations • International law • Transnational arbitration system • Diplomacy	• International cultural grammar of nationhood* (Löfgren 1989) • International epistemic communities* (Haas 1992)
National/ Domestic level	• State sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship • Signifying institutions (national title, flag, anthem, etc.)	• "National culture" • Language • Cultural patrimonies • "Nation-view" and knowledge systems (History, literature, etc.)**

Note: *On the concepts of "international cultural grammar of nationhood" and "international epistemic communities," see further discussions in Wang (2004a).
**On the concepts of "nation-view" and "History" with a capital H, see Duara (1995).

result in an identity crisis. This is precisely the case of Taiwan ever since the 1990s. To be sure, the escalation of nationalist politics can be viewed as a reflection of the growing institutional failure of the ROC nation, which leads, on the one hand, to an identity crises in Taiwan, and on other, to a resentment towards China.

Before I set forth my analysis of those institutional failures of the ROC, a brief historical sketch will help to clarify things. Prior to 1889, when Taiwan became a province of the Chinese Empire by the Qing Dynasty, the island of Taiwan, known as *Formosa* to Westerners, had been partially occupied by the Dutch, Spanish, Americans, and the Japanese, some of whom established administrative offices for short-term rule. In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty and was under Japanese colonization for fifty years. As China was undergoing its modern nation-building process during the Republican period (from 1911 to 1945), Taiwan was becoming "Japanized" under Japanese colonialism at the same time.[8] After Japan's defeat in the Second World War in 1945, Taiwan was once again turned over to the then Chinese government, namely, the KMT regime. Four years later, the ruling KMT lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party and took refuge in Taiwan. Whereas the CCP founded the People's Republic of China and gradually gained international recognition as the representative state of China, the exiled KMT regime, insisting that its

national title remain the "Republic of China," continued to effectively be a state on Taiwan until 2000. While both the PRC and the ROC were competing to claim sovereignty over Taiwan by drawing on legacies of Chinese history, a third claim was made by nationalist supporters of the Taiwan Independence Movement, who insisted that Taiwan should become an independent nation-state that would be autonomous from China. The Democratic Progress Party, consisting of TI supporters in the main, was formed in 1986 and became the major opposition party.

Against this backdrop, the election of DPP-nominated Chen Shui-bian as President of the ROC in 2000 marked a watershed in Taiwan's history. Not only did it end the 55-year rule of the KMT on the island, but it also shifted the nation-building momentum of the ROC. However, as institutional analysis emphasizes the *path dependence* of historical development, there were enormous institutional legacies from the preceding KMT state that Chen's new government could hardly do without. Suffice it to say that most of the signifying institutions of the ROC—the national title, national anthem, and national flag that the proponents of the independence movement had long vowed to overthrow—were kept intact after Chen's inauguration. This reveals the analytical power of the institutionalist approach that this study shall demonstrate, as many institutional crises and predicaments that the KMT created still haunt the succeeding DPP government. The central argument of this essay holds that the recent identity crisis in Taiwan has deep historical roots in ROC's institutions. One cannot comprehend the situation after 2000 if one does not fully understand how the ROC institutions came into existence in the first place. The main body of the analysis, therefore, will focus on the situation *before* 2000, in which most references to the ROC government refer to the KMT state. The situation under the DPP rule, after 2000, will be discussed subsequently, and I shall show how ROC institutions have both enabled and constrained DPP's pursuit of an independent nationhood.

Due to space limitations and for the sake of clarity, the following analysis will focus mainly on civic-territorial types of institutions. The far more complicated situations concerning ethno-cultural institutions should be dealt with separately.[9]

IV. Institutional Failures of the ROC Nation and their Effects

The current institutional shell under which Taiwan has been conceived of as a nation-state is that of the "Republic of China" built by the KMT

after 1949. Indeed, the KMT invested enormous efforts in building the ROC nation on Taiwan for various reasons. One of the major reasons was to legitimate its rule over the island by claiming that Taiwan was part of China and that the KMT was the only legitimate government of China. The other reason was to "clean up" the existing colonial legacies that Japan had left in Taiwan. Ironically, while the KMT was quite successful in turning the Taiwanese people into Chinese by implementing these institutions, it unwittingly built a quasi-nation that was not originally intended. The pro-independence DPP took full advantage of this institutional shell to claim that Taiwan was already an independent nation-state when it came to power. More precisely, institutions of the ROC nation worked quite well on the domestic/national level (Table 1), but failed to function on the global/international level. These failures will be examined in three institutional sites: diplomacy, international organizations, and signifying institutions like national titles and the national flag.

A. The Tug of Diplomatic War: "Organized Hypocrisy" and ROC's Struggles for Sovereignty

One of the major tasks assumed by nationalism is to build (or maintain) a sovereign state, whereas state sovereignty, as Stephen Krasner has bluntly put it, is nothing more than "organized hypocrisy."[10] According to the logic of organized hypocrisy, sovereignty and territoriality are, to a large extent, dependent upon the approval by others, regardless of the de facto ruling capacity and jurisdiction of a regime. This is particularly relevant in the case of Taiwan. After its retreat to Taiwan, the KMT state still insisted that it was the only legitimate government of China, despite the fact that it had lost over 99% of its territory, including the capital Nanking (now Nanjing). Nonetheless, the backing of the United States ensured and perpetuated the persistence of such a fictitious claim of legitimacy. The majority of other states initially supported the ROC and accordingly refused to recognize the PRC. Although the 1950s and the 1960s saw a growing number of countries switching their recognition to PRC, the ROC was still able to maintain a greater number of diplomatic ties than the PRC (see Table 2). As the Cold War strategy by the West was to keep Communist China alienated from the world, the KMT state, maintaining the fiction of being the sole and legitimate government of the whole of China, still kept its seat as the representative of China in the U.N. The turning

point came in October 1971, when the General Assembly of the U.N. adopted Resolution 2758 recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative government of China and moved to "expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it."[11]

In fact, Taiwan was given a chance to remain in the U.N. in 1971, but its then-President, Chiang Kai-shek, refused to give serious consideration to that proposal, adhering to a belief in the nationalist doctrine that there could not be two Chinas.[12] No matter how "contingent" this decision might have been, it determined the institutional setup that was to decisively shape the development of Taiwan's nationalist politics in the later years.

As Anthony Giddens puts it, "[n]ation-states only exist in systemic relations with other nation-states."[13] Diplomatic relations, therefore, are one of the crucial manifestations of a state's sovereignty. Conversely, the lack of diplomatic relations implies the absence of state sovereignty and the non-existence of the nation. This is where organized hypocrisy assumes center stage. To compete for the claim of being the only legitimate state of the Chinese nation, the ROC and the PRC have been waging diplomatic wars—a zero-sum game—by extinguishing each other's diplomatic ties. Since the ROC and the PRC did not recognize each other, they did not allow double recognition either. When a third-party country established diplomatic ties with one side, the other side would sever formal relations with that country. Although in recent years the ROC has tried to loosen up this policy to compensate for its ever-deteriorating diplomatic situation, the PRC is holding more tightly to this zero-sum standpoint.

Table 2 illustrates the tug-of-war between the "two Chinas." Before 1971, the ROC was able to outnumber and out-maneuver its archrival in diplomatic ties. However, ever since 1971, this situation has reversed. The ROC's number of diplomatic ties dropped drastically after its expulsion from the U.N., while the 1980s witnessed the worst years of the ROC's diplomatic situation: the number of diplomatic ties dropped to 22, which accounted for merely 13% of the total countries in the world.

With the efforts of "pragmatic diplomacy" in the late 1980s, the situation improved somewhat, but only by a slight margin. The situation became worse after DPP's rule in 2000. As pointed out, the DPP has conveniently inherited the ROC's institutional shell to adduce the

Table 2: Countries with Diplomatic Ties to the ROC and the PRC, Selected Years*

Year	Total of Countries	ROC's diplomatic ties	Percentage	PRC's diplomatic ties	Percentage
1950		44		23	
60		59		42	
66		66		51	
69		69		50	
70		67		54	
71		56		74	
72	147	42	29%	85	58%
73	149	38	26%	89	60%
74	150	32	21%	97	65%
75	156	27	17%	106	68%
76	157	26	17%	111	71%
77	158	23	15%	114	72%
78	161	22	14%	116	72%
79	164	22	13%	120	73%
80	166	22	13%	124	75%
81	168	23	14%	124	74%
82	168	23	14%	125	74%
83	169	24	14%	129	76%
84	170	25	15%	130	76%
85	170	23	14%	133	78%
86	171	23	13%	133	78%
87	171	23	13%	133	78%
88	171	22	13%	136	80%
89	171	26	15%	135	79%
90	170	28	16%	135	79%
91	187	29	16%	138	74%
92	189	29	15%	152	80%
93	190	30	16%	159	84%
94	190	29	15%	160	84%
95	191	30	16%	161	84%
96	191	30	16%	161	84%
97	191	29	15%	161	84%
98	191	27	14%	163	85%
99	191	29	15%	162	85%
2000	191	29	15%	162	85%
01	191	28	15%	163	85%
02	192	27	14%	165	86%
03	192	27	14%	165	86%
04	192	26	14%	166	86%

Source: Wei 1991: 2; Gao 1994: 58-9; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan).

Note: *The numbers indicate the total of diplomatic ties at the end of each year.

claim that Taiwan is already an independent country. Actualizing such a claim, however, requires comprehensive diplomatic recognition. In response, the PRC has become ever more dogmatic on its "One China" policy and has taken harsher measures to oust Taiwan from the international arena. This leads us to another battleground, namely, international organizations.

B. Participation in International Organizations

Another institutional site in which state sovereignty is embodied is that of international organizations.[14] Indeed, the proliferation of international organizations should not be seen as the growing transcendence of the nation-state; on the contrary, it is one in which the universal scope of the nation-state has been established, and in which nation-statehood has been constructed.[15] Because the United Nations is the major institution of international society, expulsion from the U.N. thereby disqualified the ROC's membership in all U.N.-related organs and most intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Table 3 shows the declining memberships of the ROC in IGOs as compared with other "divided nations," such as Korea and formerly Germany.[16]

As we can see, Taiwan's membership in IGOs dropped drastically between 1966 and 1997, in sharp contrast to the PRC's rapid rise since the '70s. The late '80s witnessed Taiwan's worst years of international

Table 3: IGO Membership Figures for Taiwan (ROC), PRC, and Other "Divided Nations"

	Year					
Country	1960	1966	1977	1988	1997	2004
Taiwan (ROC)	22	39	10	6	11	46
PRC	2	1	21	37	52	544
Korea, South	19	29	39	42	51	500
Korea, North	2	3	12	22	18	195
Germany, West	70	85	87	82	83[1]	1237
Germany, East	4	5	34	47		
Hong Kong[2]	0	2	4	11	14	84

Source: Union of International Associations (1997/98), Appendix 3 – Table 3; Union of International Association (2004/05), Appendix 3 – Table 2; Weng (1990: 30), Table 1.
Note: [1]East and West Germanys were unified in 1990.
[2]Hong Kong was formerly a British colony before 1 July 1997, and is now a Special Administrative Region of the PRC.

connection, with its membership in IGOs plunging into single digit figures. That was not the case for the other "divided nations." Even North Korea, which has been known for its longtime international isolation, is in a better position than Taiwan. At the bottom of the table, Hong Kong is added as another case in point. A British colony in 1988 and a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in 1997, Hong Kong enjoyed better international connections than Taiwan, even though it did not have nation-state status. If we turn to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the story is different and more complicated (see Table 4). Although the PRC has deliberately obstructed Taiwan's membership in international organizations, it is simply impossible to bar Taiwan's entry into all NGOs, since there are too many of them (well over 20,000). This is considered advantageous by the ROC government and a chance to compensate for its losses on the diplomatic battlefield. Therefore, the state has deliberately (and desperately) promoted participation in all kinds of NGOs in order to symbolically "claim sovereignty."

In the 1970s, despite the fact that the PRC was able to reverse international diplomacy in favor of itself, China still remained quite isolated from international communities (with only 71 NGO memberships), while Taiwan was relatively more active in NGOs than its rival. Although the PRC's membership in the NGOs climbed in the 1980s and eventually exceeded that of the ROC in the 1990s, the ROC remained in better shape in the NGOs than it did in the IGOs, since its membership did not fall too far behind the PRC and that of other divided nations.

Table 4: NGO Membership Figures for Taiwan (ROC), PRC, and Other "Divided Nations

	Year					
Country	1960	1966	1977	1988	1997	2004
Taiwan (ROC)	108	182	239	574	908	2547
PRC	30	58	71	517	1136	3466
Korea, South	102	209	371	779	1200	3229
Korea, North	22	48	63	138	185	391
Germany, West	841	1115	1399	2406	3291[1]	10210
Germany, East	102	183	393	793		
Hong Kong[2]	93	164	312	690	1070	2800

Source: Same as Table 3.
Note: Same as Table 3.

Two factors account for the exacerbation of the institutional crises experienced by the ROC nation in the recent decades. The first concerns the rising role of the PRC. As shown in Table 4, PRC's memberships in NGOs doubled from 1988 to 1997, and then tripled from 1997 to 2004. This clearly indicates that China has become a much more active participant in international communities and is much more open to outsiders. The impacts on Taiwan are twofold: On the one hand, PRC's participation in either IGOs or NGOs often demanded the exclusion of Taiwan, or the downgrading of Taiwan's membership. As a consequence, the condition for Taiwan's participation in international communities, either in state or non-state terms, is becoming increasingly difficult. On the other hand, the PRC's rising role in international society has significantly changed outsiders' perceptions of "China" and "the Chinese." These impacts, profound and widespread in not only political but also cultural, social, and economic realms, shall be discussed in a later section.

The second factor for the ROC's worsening institutional crises lies in the discrepancy between the state and society in terms of their interaction with international communities. Combining Tables 3 and 4, we find that, on the one hand, the state experiences increasing constraints as its membership in IGOs significantly lags behind most other states, whereas, on the other hand, Taiwan's civil society has significantly increased its interaction with international communities. As the interaction between Taiwan and the global community accelerates, there emerges coterminously a rising awareness of the awkward situation of Taiwan in the international setting. There also emerges a rising collective anxiety within Taiwanese society concerning the country's membership/status in those international organizations, such as the United Nations, GATT/WTO, and the Olympics, among numerous others. Here we encounter a critical issue of Taiwan's national identity; namely, the signifying institutions, which include the naming system and representational symbols of the collectivity.

C. "What's in a Name?": The ROC and Its Misnomers

In his theoretical elaboration on language and symbolic power, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has made a point so illuminating to the case of Taiwan that it is worth quoting *in extenso*:

> The social sciences deal with pre-named, pre-classified realities which bear proper nouns and common nouns, titles, signs and acronyms. At the risk of unwittingly assuming responsibility for the acts of constitution of whose logic and necessity they are unaware, the social sciences must take as their object of study the social operations of *naming* and the rites of institution through which they are accomplished. But on a deeper level, they must examine the part played by words in the construction of social reality and the contribution which the struggle over classifications, a dimension of all class struggles, makes to the constitution of classed—classes defined in terms of age, set, or social position, but also clans, tribes, ethnic groups or nations.[17]

Few, if any, countries suffer from naming as much as Taiwan does. The politics of naming, characterized by Bourdieu as "rites of institution," has been playing a central part in nationalist politics, as the withdrawal of recognition of the ROC government has had a direct and profound impact on the naming system of Taiwan. Under pressure from the PRC, the national title "Republic of China," which implies "two Chinas," is no longer acceptable in most formal international settings. Unlike the case of other divided nations such as Korea and former Germany, U.N. Resolution 2758 has made it an institutional script that there is only "one China." This institutional script is very important in understanding Taiwan's national predicament. People know that there are "two Koreas" and that there used to be "two Germanys." However, to speak of "two Chinas" nowadays appears as nonsensical as "two Americas." On the other hand, the simple and straightforward term "Taiwan" was simultaneously unacceptable to the PRC nor desirable to the ROC under the rule of the KMT before 2000. The use of "Taiwan" in the official title implies that Taiwan is an independent nation-state, which neither the PRC nor the KMT state of the ROC before 2000 (both of whom insisted that Taiwan is part of China) would be pleased to see. As a result, "how to name the political community formed on this island" has become a thorny problem. Even abroad there are so many struggles to find a proper title for this community. They are best reflected in the variety of alternative official names used in the ROC's overseas representative institutions (including both official and "quasi" or "semi-official" liaison offices, shown in Table 5).

It is apparent from Table 5 that, for 1972, only 33% of overseas representative institutions used the formal national title of the ROC, while the majority used simply Taiwan. However, the situation significantly

Table 5. Official Titles Used in Taiwan's Overseas Representative Institutions*

	Year			
Titles	1972	1982	1992	2005
Republic of China	33%	11%	17%	22%
Taiwan	44%	11%	4%	2%
Chinese	11%	11%	2%	
Taipei		3%	67%	68%
Far East/Oriente[1]	11%	49%	4%	
ROC (Taiwan)[2]			6%	5%
Others[3]		14%		2%

Source: Compiled from Gao 1994: 124; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan).
Note: *Including embassies, consulates, and other "quasi-official" liaison offices in countries with no diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
[1]E.g., Far East Trade Service Inc. Lebanon Office; Centro Comercial Del Lejano Oriente, Lima, Republic del Peru.
[2]This formula uses the national title "ROC" followed by "Taiwan" in the parentheses in order not to be mistaken for China, the PRC.

changed in the '80s. In 1982, 49% of overseas foreign institutions that represented the ROC used the rather ambiguous and misleading term *Far East (Oriente)* as their official designated title. Fourteen percent of these institutions, mostly in European countries such as Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, and Holland, used even more confusing terms such as "Sun Yat-sen Center," as their official designated title. The combination of these two categories (63% in total) accounted for more than half of Taiwan's representative institutions in foreign countries whose official designated titles carried neither the ROC's national title, nor the geographical name of Taiwan, nor an ethno-cultural description of the ROC's Chinese identity. Beginning with the government's efforts at "pragmatic diplomacy" in the late '80s, the situation has undergone significant alteration again. But there is only marginal improvement in this new naming strategy due in no small measure to the PRC's increasing pressure on other countries. The use of the national title ROC increased marginally from 11% to 17%, but the more commonly known "Taiwan" dropped from 11% to a mere 4%. On the other hand, the misleading names such as "Far East" drastically dropped to 4%, while the most commonly used title (at 67%) is "Taipei," the putative capital city of Taiwan.[18] This formula appears to be acceptable to both the PRC and the ROC. From the PRC's point of view, "Taipei" defines only a local government, just as "Hong Kong" once did. Conversely

on the ROC's side, "Taipei" is interpreted as a political authority parallel to that of "Beijing" or "Washington," as is often used in Western media.

The problem of naming has also afflicted Taiwan's membership in international organizations. Among many others, four formulae stand out as the most noteworthy. On the IGO side, Taiwan appears as "Taipei, China" in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and as "Taiwan, China" in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).[19] On the NGO side, Taiwan appears as "Chinese Taipei" in the International Olympic Committee and as "Academy of Science located in Taipei, China" in the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).[20] In addition, an even more unusual title of "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" was used when the ROC government applied for membership in the GATT/WTO.

While the variety of these names appears confusing to outsiders, it is also admitted that, "if the name of our overseas representing institutions is too wide of the mark, it will not only derogate our nationhood, but also strike the self-esteems of our nationals."[21] One can imagine how confusing it is to a foreigner who needs to go to a "Far East Trade Service Inc." or a "Sun Yat-sen Center" in order to apply for a travel visa or other official document of Taiwan. For those who are from Taiwan, it is frustrating and sometimes humiliating to see that the name of their homeland appears under various guises. Even an ROC minister at the Sun Yat-sen Cultural Center in Belgium could not refrain from complaining: "Cultural Center? Who the hell knows what it is!"[22] For those nationalist supporters of Taiwan Independence, it has become common practice to ridicule the ROC's ever-changing names of its overseas institutions by characterizing the ROC as the "Republic of Cheating"[23] or as the "Republic of Confusion."[24]

Moreover, in addition to the national title, all signifying institutions pertaining to the ROC—from its national flag and national anthem to its passport and official documents—are not supposed to be accepted in international arenas. The importance of these institutions is, again, underscored in Bourdieu's insightful argument:

> The act of institution is thus an act of communication, but of a particular kind: it signifies to someone what his identity is, but in a way that both expresses it to him and imposes it on him by expressing it in front of everyone and thus informing him in an authoritative manner of what he is and what he must be.[25]

In other words, identity is about *both* self-recognition *and* recognition by others.[26] Thus, the failure of the ROC's institutions has led to an identity crisis of its nationals in that, in front of others, there is no institutional way for them to signify who they are in a definite, "authoritative" manner. To be sure, the signifying institutions of the ROC have only domestic, without international, credibility. This awkward situation in part accounts for the identity crisis in Taiwan. For instance, at the 1996 Olympic Games held in Atlanta, a Taiwanese overseas student was arrested by the U.S. police for waving the unrecognized national flag of the ROC. The arrest, made at the request of a PRC official, was based on the regulations of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). According to the IOC's regulations, it is prescribed that the national flag of Taiwan (whose membership appears as "Chinese Taipei" rather than the "ROC") should not appear throughout the Olympic Games, nor at any official occasion.[27] This incident involving an individual was considered an insult to the entire Taiwanese society, since it once again reminded the public of the humiliating fact that the collective representations of their community (national title, flag, anthem) were not allowed to appear in the Olympic Games or most other international occasions. There was significant news coverage of this incident in the mass media, people anxiously discussed "national dignity" in the public sphere, and TI nationalists took this opportunity to ridicule the unrecognized ROC nation and advocated turning it into the "Republic of Taiwan."[28]

The true irony of it all was in 2000 when the pro-TI DPP became the ruling party. Instead of a name change into "Republic of Taiwan," the national title remained the "Republic of China." It is apparent the insufficiency of the ethnic explanation of Taiwan's national question and the strength of institutional analysis. As Chen Shui-bian was elected the President of the ROC through a democratic election, his legitimacy stemmed from the institutions of the ROC. If he overthrows ROC's institutions, he runs the risk of losing his legitimacy of rule. More importantly, if Chen ruthlessly changes the national title to the "Republic of Taiwan," it would have been viewed as a serious and provocative act of "declaring independence." Neither the PRC nor the U.S. would allow this to happen. This involves the triad dynamics between U.S.-Taiwan-China, which lies beyond the scope of this essay; however, the organized hypocrisy it entails has had a profound impact that is worth further consideration.

V. The Trickle-Down Effects of Organized Hypocrisy: Identity Crises and Resentment

The failures and crises of the ROC nation have caused increasing difficulties to the Taiwanese people during the globalization process in the past decade or so. Globalization increases the scope for people to interact with the outside world through cross-border and trans-boundary activities, but the Taiwanese people are doing so only to find that their own country's institutions do not really work. This can be understood in light of what can be called "the trickle-down effects of organized hypocrisy," which is illustrated in Figure 1.

In the previous section, I have drawn on Stephen Krasner's argument that the aim of civic-territorial institutions is to pursue state sovereignty, which is nothing more than organized hypocrisy. Figure 1 illustrates an ideal situation in which two states (state A and state B) grant each other sovereignty through organized hypocrisy on the level of high politics. Through the mediation of institutional effects,



Figure 1: The "Trickle-Down Effects" of Organized Hypocrisy

the impact of organized hypocrisy may "trickle down" to the level of low or non-politics, which consists of fields and spheres that have been characterized as "private sectors," "civil society," or "life worlds" in different theoretical perspectives. If we use the term "politics" in its narrowest sense by confining it to practices and activities directly pertaining to the state (as in "high politics"), then most affairs on this level are ordinarily considered as being of a low- or non-political nature. It is on this lower level that the non-state sectors of "world society" or "global (civil) society" are conceived, while "world culture" takes shape. On the other hand, there are feedbacks moving from the lower to the higher levels, which provide the existing state with legitimacy, support, pressures, rebellions, and more.

Figure 1 shows only a simplified model between two states, but this would hold good and can be generalized to a multi-state system as well. Since the institutional effects of the state have been resilient and durable, and since recent globalization entails increasing interactions and interconnectedness not only on the high-politics, but also on the low- or non-politics level, Figure 1 suggests that organized hypocrisy is seen not only in state sovereignty, but also in daily life that is ostensibly of a nonpolitical or apolitical nature. Indeed, globalization may have undermined the foundations of the nation-state and/or state sovereignty in a variety of ways, but it may also have strengthened organized hypocrisy by reinforcing the institutional prerogatives of the existing nation-state. This explains why Taiwan's nationalist politics escalates rather than declines during the course of democratization and globalization. I shall analyze two aspects of this: identity crisis and resentment.

A. Struggles over Nomenclature and the Politics of Identity

The notion of identity implies something to be identified with. This "something," however, requires a name or a "signifier" to exist in the first place. The construction of social reality postulates the institution of nomenclature, which, in turn, is constitutive of individuals.[29] Without a name, the identity of actors cannot possibly be evoked. In this light, at the core of Taiwan's identity crisis we find the problem of naming: there is no way of naming these people and their collectivity. Insofar as "nationality" and "citizenship" are concerned, the terms "China" and "Chinese" have been preempted by the PRC. When the two terms are used, they are meant to refer to the PRC, not the ROC. This is further

complicated by the problematic terms "Taiwan" and "Taiwanese" as used to refer to nation and nationality. Many outsiders have been perplexed by the following question: If the name "Republic of China" has brought Taiwan infinite problems, why can't it just be replaced it with a new one such as the "Republic of Taiwan," or simply "Taiwan"? That would solve its problems all at once. But indeed, there are profound complexities that attend the adoption of these solutions.

By the 1990s, the KMT state of Taiwan had maintained that Taiwan was not a country, but the ROC was. Although this rhetoric has gradually eroded since Lee Teng-hui assumed power, such a doctrine has left strong institutional legacies that even the successor Chen Shui-bian, who used to maintain that all symbolic institutions of the ROC should be overthrown, cannot do without. Furthermore, the state of the PRC, for deep nationalistic reasons, does not allow "Taiwan" for a country name either. Since the PRC also claims its sovereignty over Taiwan by seeing it as part of Chinese territory, to turn Taiwan into a country name would in effect disqualify its claim over the island. The PRC's position is backed by its military forces, as it repetitively threatens to attack Taiwan should the latter declare independence. As a consequence, there is no way to name the political community of Taiwan insofar as nation and nationality are concerned. Neither "Taiwan/Taiwanese" nor "China/Chinese" can serve the function of signifying the political community on this island. The identity crisis is to a large extent related to the problem of naming, but it cannot be easily solved by simply changing the name, since the change of name itself is under severe constraints resulting from organized hypocrisy. Commenting on such a predicament, a journalist lamented:

> It is becoming increasingly difficult for our officials to refer to our own country. Our national title is surely "ROC," but to speak of the "Republic of China" to foreigners, nine out of ten times it will be mistaken for the PRC across the strait. To speak of the "ROC on Taiwan," it sounds awkward and the listeners can make neither head nor tail of what it means. But to speak of "Taiwan," we will be accused [by the PRC] of advocating Taiwan Independence. Thus, under the close examinations of the PRC, the unificationists, and the TI supporters, to refer to our country without making mistakes…is like walking on a high wire; a slight slip of the tongue will cause troubles… . Taiwan's current predicament lies exactly in not knowing how to be ourselves.[30]

Thus, we can argue that the primary problem is not so much about identity itself as about the problem of naming and the signifying institutions. Institutions signify the existence of a collectivity such as a nation; conversely, the malfunction or dysfunction of these signifying institutions jeopardizes the existence of such a collectivity. Only through this perspective can we understand why, whenever it comes to the thorny problem of the national question, there has been a rising anxiety that "Taiwan will gradually disappear from the world map," since there is no institutional way through which it can signify its existence. The non-existence of the society in the institutional settings is accompanied by the sentiment of being an "international orphan" in the global village. In such circumstances, a deep resentment eventually arises.

B. Resentment and "Chain Reaction"

The longtime isolation of Taiwan (as a collectivity) from international society has brought about profound psychological effects to the collective mentality in Taiwanese society that can be characterized as "resentment." I use this term to follow a Nietzschean-Schelerian tradition of analysis. As is widely known, Friedrich Nietzsche first introduced the concept of resentment to the world of modern thought, but it was another seminal German thinker, Max Scheler, who equipped the concept with full analytical power in his highly acclaimed but much neglected monograph *Ressentiment*.[31] In his analysis, resentment, a characteristic of the rising bourgeoisie, is the most powerful and influential psychological locomotive in modern society. There are two sociological conditions that jointly lead to the rise of resentment: one is "theoretical comparability" and the other is "the discrepancy between theoretical (expected) and factual (actualized) status." The impact of resentment, profound and long lasting, eventually leads to what Scheler called "value-shifts" or "transvaluations" in the modern world. In this sense, nationalism can be seen as a manifestation of transvaluations resulting from resentment, as Liah Greenfeld[32] has convincingly demonstrated in her comparative study of nationalism in five countries.

As I have pointed out elsewhere, current nationalist politics in Taiwan have been characterized by undisguised *ressentiment—ressentiment* towards each other and towards the outside world.[33] The two sociological preconditions of *ressentiment* are particularly relevant to

Taiwan. Taiwan's *de facto* statehood makes a majority of people think that Taiwan is *theoretically comparable* to other sovereign nation-states in terms of rights and status. However, there exists a huge discrepancy when it comes to actualizing such a right and status, since its counterparts rarely recognize it as a state, in addition to the fact that it has been constantly excluded from international society. What is worse, although Taiwan is not *officially* recognized as a state, many outsiders simply "misrecognize" Taiwan as a state. Such a confusing and inconsistent situation, which is herein characterized as a "neither-nor" status (neither a state nor a non-state), makes the contrast between "theoretical comparability" and the discrepancies (between the theoretical and the actual) even more acute and absurd. The issues thus involved are of various kinds, ranging from the most macro collective level, such as membership in the United Nations or WHO (World Health Organization), to the most micro individual level, such as passports and visas.[34]

The two sociological preconditions of *ressentiment* have existed for decades, but they had not received due attention from the wider public until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when democratization and ethnic mobilization undermined the KMT's rule as well as the legitimacy of the ROC. Furthermore, as Taiwanese society became more open to the outside world during the new tide of globalization, the discrepancies between "theoretical comparability" and the actual situation have become much more widely perceived. In such circumstances, *ressentiment* emerges as a result, and it is further fueled by increasing repression from the PRC. In other words, it is a response to the intensifying new Chinese nationalism that characterizes the PRC in recent years.

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003 provides us with vivid illustrations of the *ressentiment* in Taiwan. When the first case of SARS was reported, the entire Taiwanese society was overwhelmed by this previously unknown disease that was believed to be of external origin. Its spread was transnational and its containment called for international cooperation, but Taiwan was intentionally left out of these efforts and received little help from the outside world for apparent political reasons. Worse yet, the PRC officials grandly announced to the world that Taiwan had been well taken care of by the Chinese government's health system, notwithstanding the fact that Taiwan was not under PRC's jurisdiction. Such a fictitious claim infuriated almost the entire Taiwanese society. Moreover, when Taiwan attempted to apply for observer membership in the World Health Assembly in May, the appeal was denied for the seventh consecutive time. The Chi-



Figure 2: "Chain Reaction of Nationalist Politics in China and Taiwan"

nese officials even made several harsh and caustic comments towards Taiwan both during and outside of the meeting. The reaction from Taiwan's side burnt into an uproar of dismay. Some people used emotional words such as "beast country" or "evil bandits" to characterize China. A high official in Taiwan commented, "Communists were too detestable. We are pissed off."[35] Not only state officials were chagrined. A sense of injustice was widespread in public opinion. Advocates of Taiwan Independence seized this moment to reiterate their conviction that China was an uncivilized hegemonic power that Taiwan should remain independent from, and that Taiwan should make all the more effort to pursue a recognized statehood in international society.

The rising tide of nationalism in China in the past decade makes the PRC take an even harsher stance on the Taiwan issue. Not only does it issue numerous warnings against Taiwanese nationalism, but it has also been making more effort to oust Taiwan from international society. The effects of such acts, however, have had a contrary effect. The harsher Chinese nationalism becomes, the more it pushes Taiwan away. As Ernest Renan puts it, suffering is more powerful than joy to mobilize nationalist sentiments: "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort."[36] This is particularly true of the Taiwanese case. By making the Taiwanese people "suffer together," China's new nationalism has strengthened rather than weakened its Taiwanese counterpart.

The two nationalisms on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are therefore interlocked and mutually reinforcing. Their respective strengths intensify each other. The more nationalistic the one side becomes, the stronger its counterpart grows. The fundamentalists on both sides are mobilizing their followers for tragic sacrifice at all costs. This situation can be portrayed as "chain reactions," as illustrated in Figure 2.[37] As can be imagined, the possible result of their impact can be profound and devastating. War, for instance, is a possibility that worries many.

VI. Other Factors and Prospects: How to Untie the Gordian Knot?

As pointed out in the beginning, the divided-nation model tells only a half-truth of cross-Strait relations, while the other half of non-truth illuminates the very core of Taiwan's national question. All other divided nations after WW II sought reunification—Vietnam and Germany did it, while the two Koreas (North and South) are still on their way, slowly inching forward. The case of China and Taiwan is perhaps the only exception. Why?

I'm not suggesting that the lack of international recognition is the only cause of Taiwan's national question, nor am I hinting that, once Taiwan's international status is solved, its national question will disappear. The legacy of Japanese colonialism and the tragic February 28 Incident, in which the distinctions, along with the hostilities, between two major "ethnic groups" began to emerge, should not be left out of the picture. These factors certainly confound the problem. However, we can make a bold argument that, had there been an institutional script for "two Chinas" in international society, then Taiwan's national question would have taken a different shape and become much easier to solve. There might still be an independence movement, but its scope would not be as wide as we see today. Much of the appeal of Taiwanese nationalism has been constructed as a negative narrative, first against the Mainlanders and the KMT, and now against the PRC. The resentment against China has become deep-seated and widespread. There is a popular joke about elections, saying that the Chinese Communist Party is "the best campaigner" for the DPP (or TI), because the harsher China treats Taiwan, the farther it pushes Taiwanese people away from identification with China. The "One China policy" has strengthened the resentment of the Taiwanese people. By paralyzing the institutions of the ROC, it has brought great hardship to the Taiwanese people and

has thus forced them to lend sympathy or support to the ever-growing Taiwanese nationalism.

In addition, many Chinese people are actively and aggressively participating in "organized hypocrisy" by ousting Taiwan from international society, or by downgrading Taiwan's membership in non-governmental organizations. This forces Taiwanese participants to change their name into "Taiwan, China" or other forms that symbolically signify that "Taiwan is part of China."[38] These acts are not helpful in improving cross-Strait relations. In effect, by antagonizing the Taiwanese people and reinforcing their resentment, they are harmful acts.

As a matter of fact, the state and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait feel that they are bullied, mistreated, or discriminated against in international society. The resultant negative feelings of resentment further fuel nationalistic sentiments on both sides. The escalation of nationalism in both Taiwan and China is certainly not a good thing. It may fall into a vicious cycle ("chain reaction") in which the strengthening of the one will certainly lead to the strengthening of the other.

Cross-Strait interactions during the past few years are another newly emerging and highly complicated issue that deserves a separate study. Although the political situation has been in a stalemate for decades, there has emerged a rapidly growing and expanding interaction between non-governmental sectors on both sides. The most significant is in the economic sector, as numerous Taiwanese business and enterprises swarm to invest in the PRC. What their impact on Taiwan's national question will be remains unknown, as there are too many variables that cannot be definitely determined. Some may hold an optimistic hope that the increasing interaction between Taiwan and China will help people on both sides understand each other and, thus, during the process, the "Taiwan problem" can be solved in a peaceful way. This can happen, but only on the presupposition that people on both sides can momentarily put aside their nationalistic view towards each other, and a better mutual understanding can be achieved during the process. From my observations during field studies of Taiwanese migrants in Shanghai, however, this does not seem to be the case.[39]

In terms of its international status, Taiwan can be said to be a political oddity in contemporary world politics. Although the PRC has reiterated time and again that the so-called "Taiwan problem" is a "domestic affair of China" and that it will not tolerate intervention by outsiders, such claims, stated in overt nationalistic tones, are themselves symptomatic of the international nature of Taiwan's national question. As

we have seen, Taiwan's relations with China have been internationally framed from its very beginning and have been reframed by international/geopolitical factors repeatedly—first by the imperial invasion and colonialism, then the Second World War, then the Cold War, and now the *Realpolitik* between strong powers such as the PRC, the U.S., and Japan, among others. It is now an open secret that the U.S. has used Taiwan as a card to play the game against China, and that it is in the U.S.'s best interests to play the "two-hand strategy" with Taiwan by keeping it a political oddity; in other words, by maintaining its ambiguous international status as neither a state nor a non-state—a quasi-state, indeed. While the U.S. does not allow Taiwan to become fully independent, it protects it from military acts by the PRC by arming the island. It is thus not surprising that the PRC often accuses those advocates of Taiwan Independence as being "lackeys of American Imperialism" because, by cooperating with the U.S., they are in effect getting in the way of PRC's interests in favor of those of the U.S. However, such an accusation is unjustifiable to the extent that the PRC does not really understand what the Taiwanese people have been suffering from because the main pillars of their social institutions do not hold.

If Taiwan's national question is indeed internationally framed by outside factors, it follows that there is room for outsiders to help the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to untie the Gordian knot. Here, Figure 1 is illuminating. State sovereignty is organized hypocrisy that can trickle down to ordinary people and daily life, but it does not mean that ordinary people must only be passive recipients of such hypocrisy. Indeed, there is room for ordinary people to maneuver against the state's hypocrisy, or even the hypocrisy itself can be changed. Some commentators have argued that six major actors are at play in the U.S.-Taiwan-China triad: the U.S. government, U.S. people, the Taiwanese government, the Taiwanese people, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people. The high politics on the intergovernmental level is perhaps out of reach for ordinary people, but if people on all the sides can better understand the current situation, then there is a better chance to untie the knot by resorting to a solution that flows from the bottom rather than from the top. In addition to pressuring their own governments, people of other nations can help civil society on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to reduce their feelings of resentment—resentment not only towards each other, but also against the outside world—by not endorsing organized hypocrisy in non-political issues as well as in daily life. Such an appeal might sound feeble or

even naïve to many, but it seems to be the most feasible and reasonable action that almost everybody can take, not only to reduce the tensions across the Strait, but to alleviate peoples' resentments embodied in various deleterious ideological forms, such as racism, terrorism, fundamentalism—and of course, nationalism. ◉

Notes

1. This paper is in part a result of the research project NSC93-2412-H-001-026 sponsored by the National Science Council, Taiwan. All Chinese names and characters are romanized in *pinyin*, unless there is a common usage that has gained wide popularity (e.g., Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek). To follow the convention in Taiwan, however, a dash is inserted between the second and third characters of the given name where applicable, although it is acknowledged that this practice does not conform to the *pinyin* rule developed by the People's Republic of China.

2. It should be also noted that the classification of these "ethnic groups" is in itself problematic and has been in dispute in Taiwan's nationalist politics. I use these two categories only for the purpose of illustration and convenience without indeed subscribing to them.

3. Brubaker 1996, p. 18.

4. Ibid., p. 30.

5. Smith 1991, p. 82; Brubaker 1992.

6. Jepperson 1991.

7. Meyer et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 1987.

8. As will be made clear later, Japanese colonialism had a profound impact on Taiwan's identity politics. For further reference, see Ching (2001) and Wu (2003).

9. For those who are interested, see Wang (2004a).

10. Stephen Krasner 1999.

11. United Nations 1971, p. 36.

12. Weng 1990: 61; Chen Lung-chu 1996: 191.

13. Anthony Giddens 1985, p. 4.

14. McNeely 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999.

15. Giddens 1985, p. 264; McNeely 1997.

16. The term "divided nation," put in quotation marks here, follows the conventional usage. However, if we take into consideration that the nation is parasitic on the state, then the notion of "divided nation" becomes problematic. This example shows once again how elusive the notion "nation" has become in our daily usage.

17. Bourdieu 1991, p. 105, italics in original.

18. However, one should not make the mistake of considering Taipei the capital of the ROC, since, according to the Constitution, the ROC's capital is Nanking (now Nanjing), located in mainland China. This is another example of institutional legacies that the new DPP government can hardly do without.

19. In both the cases of Interpol and ADB, the ROC as a member initially represented China until China itself became a member of these organizations in 1984 and 1986,

respectively. This brought into effect name changes. Thus, the ROC was renamed "Taiwan, China" in Interpol and "Taipei, China" in ADB. The ROC immediately protested against these name changes since both titles carried the political implication that Taipei/Taiwan was an inherent part of China (the PRC). But in order to avoid possible expulsion, the ROC compromised and accepted the ADB formula (Taipei, China) "under protest." However, it has not accepted the "Taiwan, China" formula so far, nor has it withdrawn its membership from Interpol (Weng 1990).

20. Ibid.

21. Gao 1994, p. 123.

22. *United Daily News*, 19 August 1994.

23. Zhuang 1995, p. 27.

24. For instance, see Lin Zhuo-shui 1992, pp. 71–74. Lin writes a short satire in which a European businessman, having no clue where to apply for travel documents for the "Republic of China" after mistakenly visiting the PRC's consulate, is further confused by Taiwan's various titles for overseas representative institutions (such as "Far East Trade Center").

25. Bourdieu 1990, p. 121.

26. Calhoun 1994, p. 20; Berger and Luckman 1967, p. 132.

27. *Central Daily News*, 3 August 1996, p. 2.

28. *Liberty Times*, 4 August 1996.

29. Berger and Luckmann 1967, p.132.

30. Zhang Hui-ying 1997.

31. In their writings, both Nietzsche and Scheler (Max Scheler 1998) intentionally use the French word *ressentiment* because they think there is no counterpart in German that can signify the same meaning. The English translation of Scheler's work retains the word in its French form. To make for a smooth read, however, I shall use "resentment" and "*ressentiment*" interchangeably.

32. Liah Greenfeld 1993.

33. See "*Ressentiment* in Modern Communities: Some Preliminary Reflections on Taiwan's Experience" (Wang 2004c). The discussion in this and the next few paragraphs has been carried out at further length in that essay.

34. I have discussed these issues at further length in other places. See Wang (2004a, 2004b).

35. *China Times*, 3 June 2003.

36. Renan 1996, p. 53.

37. As indicated in Figure 2, Chinese nationalism also has international causes that are not dealt with in this essay. For further discussions, see Wang (2004c).

38. Instances of this kind have been numerous, ranging from academic conferences to the cyberspace of the Internet. Many popular websites are pressured not to list Taiwan as a "country," while some list Taiwan as a "province of China."

39. Wang forthcoming.

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