

Spring 4-29-2012

# Theology of Global Citizenship: Belonging Beyond Boundaries, God Within Boundaries

Jisoo Hong

Macalester College, jisoo89@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: [http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli\\_honors](http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors)



Part of the [International Relations Commons](#), and the [Political Theory Commons](#)

---

## Recommended Citation

Hong, Jisoo, "Theology of Global Citizenship: Belonging Beyond Boundaries, God Within Boundaries" (2012). *Political Science Honors Projects*. Paper 35.

[http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli\\_honors/35](http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/35)

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information, please contact [scholarpub@macalester.edu](mailto:scholarpub@macalester.edu).

THEOLOGY OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP  
Belonging Beyond Boundaries, God Within Boundaries

Jisoo Hong  
Macalester College 12'



THEOLOGY OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP  
Belonging Beyond Boundaries, God Within Boundaries

Though creating identity and belongingness under the sovereign requires an enclosure by boundaries, the very act of drawing boundaries imposes inevitable challenges. The limitations of the Westphalian system based on territorial boundaries are becoming more tangible with transnational flows threatening individual's sense of belonging and the state's exercise of sovereignty. Global citizenship is suggested as a possible "solution" transcending these arbitrarily drawn boundaries. Nonetheless, my political theological examination concludes that global citizenship is yet another translation of the human beings' old wish for belonging to, protection from, and unity under a "god," albeit with new boundaries that differentiate *us* from *them*.



## Contents

Acknowledgment	i
Preface	iii
<b>Introduction</b>	1
<b>Section I. Enclosing God Within Boundaries</b>	
i. The Divine Politics	6
ii. The Peace of Westphalia: Secular Translation of Theology	14
iii. The Need for the Enclosure: “Proving” Theology	21
<b>Section II. The Westphalian Fiction</b>	
i. Translated Theology, Translated Problems	
• <i>The Westphalian Deferral and Toleration</i>	33
• <i>The Paradox of the Enclosure: “Containing” the Uncontainable</i>	39
ii. Theatricalizing the Modern Fiction	43
<b>Section III. Creating A God Once More</b>	49
i. Freud’s <i>Group Psychology</i> , Christianity and the State	50
ii. Global Citizenship: Drawing Boundaries with the Wish to Transcend Boundaries	
• <i>Political Criticism of Global Citizenship</i>	59
• <i>Theology of Global Citizenship</i>	62
<b>Epilogue</b>	67
References	73



## **Acknowledgements**

I cannot thank enough my academic and honors advisor, Professor David L. Blaney, who has walked me through this “journey,” as he calls it. While giving me his full and ceaseless support, he took up the role of being a compass. From conceptualizing, finding resources, and final editing to moral support, he has helped me tremendously—this project could not have been finished without his guidance. In addition, I would like to show my gratitude for my examiners: Professor Andrew Latham, who opened up my research on the concept sovereignty, and Mr. Sergio Valverde, who helped me further my understanding of sovereignty. Professor Wendy Weber has also given me thoughtful comments when I presented at Macalester’s annual Pi Sigma Alpha Conference. Professor Zornitsa Keremidchieva has shown me some room for expansion at my honors defense. Professor Julie Dolan and the three peers from this year’s Honors Colloquium have provided me considerate advice and ideas for revisions. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my dear friends, including Nick Arciero and Angus McLinn for their moral support and Zack Albin for his copy-editing.



## Preface

I was fifteen when I decided to leave my family in South Korea and come to the U.S. alone. Now I have spent almost a third of my life here. Spending both my high school and college years—the time people say you develop your perspectives and form your personality—in the States, I have realized that I have become “assimilated.” Yet, I still cannot vote in elections. I still don’t know what TV shows my friends watched in their early childhood. I don’t have parents that help me move in and out or ask me to come home for holidays. I won’t be able to legally stay here relatively soon after graduation, and eventually, I will have to go back home, where those close to me constantly remind me how “American” I am. I’ve become too American for Korea, and yet, I am too Korean for America. Who am I? I’ve become nobody definable. I feel neither Korean nor American enough. I’d like to be “somebody.” I want to be a part of somewhere.

My honors thesis, “Theology of Global Citizenship: Belonging Beyond Boundaries, God Within Boundaries,” began from personal interest in a sense of belonging. Why is it such a big problem for me that I feel I have no place to belong? Why am I so uncomfortable with being on the borderline of two nationalities and cultures? It didn’t take me too long to figure out that it was not just me that felt misplaced. It is not difficult to find those with an unsatisfied feeling of belonging. Maybe it was not the right town you were raised in, not the right job or friend group you had, not the right values and norms you were exposed to, or maybe it was that you grew out of where you used to belong. In the end, every individual seems to experience a sense of misplacement and to wish for a comforting sense of belonging at a certain point in his/her life, as I can easily observe from my friends’ ceaseless worries about an uncertain future as they will soon graduate and enter a new world without a specific place of their own.

As someone deeply worrying about and craving for a secured sense of belonging, the concept of global citizenship does sound appealing. If I could identify myself as a global citizen, perhaps it could mean that I am “at home,” with somewhere to belong anywhere I go. In such a way, with its aspiration to transcend nation-state boundaries, global citizenship ultimately reflects humanity’s wish for a sense of belonging in today’s world, a world in which we somewhat arbitrarily live with the Westphalian system in post-Westphalian times. The need for a sense of belonging traces back to our first social interaction: parents, who play a god figure for the young. A complete sense of belonging is one of the oldest human wishes that can never be realized to a satisfying degree.

Yet, I simply cannot convince myself that global citizenship is “real” or that I must be a global citizen. And my research on global citizenship confirmed that my feeling was not so unfounded. But people kept talking about it. So I began the project in 2011 with the following questions: What is global citizenship? Why do we want this? Could its possible realization be better justified? Though it is not fully clear to me what global citizenship entails, I hope that global citizenship somehow moves beyond the territorial state system and promotes something more inclusive and accepting of the differences, the deviants, and the dynamics of life. This honors thesis is written in an effort to further the current understanding of global citizenship and also to point out the importance of emotional components—such as craving for a sense of belonging and protection—in constructing and managing identity. With the anticipation that my argument will neither persuade nor dissuade you of the possibility of actualizing of global citizenship, I present my political theological analysis of global citizenship.

## Introduction

We live with the Westphalian system in a post-Westphalian era. The processes named as “globalization” are speeding up as nation-states and other international actors like non-government organizations and transnational companies grow more independently. These unceasing transnational flows directly reveal the limitation of rigid boundary drawing and challenge the validity of key modern political concepts: state, sovereignty, and citizenship. In response, some scholars feel the demand to construct a new political realm, reflecting the need for more comprehensive forms of national or global political concepts. Among these concepts, global citizenship is offered as a possible substitute for the current concept of citizenship based on nationality and state boundaries, but its conceptualization nonetheless faces many challenges. Compared to Westphalian citizenship, its biggest conceptual flaw seems to be the fact that it cannot satisfy the prerequisite for establishing an identity, a sense of belonging, and sovereignty, all of which demand the existence of *the other*: without the external other, it is not possible to generate the internal *us*. But because global citizenship tries to move beyond the boundaries distinguishing *us* from *them* by definition, neither its conceptualization nor its full realization appears likely. This leads to a question: can the global citizenship discourse somehow defend itself: explain its protocols with the absence of boundaries in order to create identity and a sense of belonging?

Or, perhaps we should begin with a different, more foundational, question: why do we need to belong somewhere? The answer to this question is simple. We always desire, and furthermore need, a sense of belonging, through which we can define where we are and who we are. Sigmund Freud would say that it returns to the idea of parents for children. Parents set boundaries for children. Within these boundaries, they offer unbounded love and protection,

whereas punishment awaits behaviors that are beyond the boundaries of appropriateness as a means of proper guidance. Children grow up, but the parental love they received is not forgettable; people are terrified even by the vague notion of losing those that shaped their lives. We want our parents always to be there for us since the world without them seems just too enormous and chaotic; this is unimaginable. Following Freud's extension of this idea, it could be said that we need an enclosure; whether it is a group, a society, or even a nation that one belongs to, it defines the boundaries of what is acceptable and what is not within the enclosure. Once allowed within the enclosure, we feel at home in the world—unbounded in a sense so long as we stay within the boundaries. We are protected under the guidance of norms and rules of the enclosure. What we find in the enclosure is the paradox of bounded unboundedness. Such enclosure is a necessity for human beings.

Reflecting the basic human need for belongingness, such enclosure can be easily found in every group, every society, and every civilization because it is the enclosure that permits the existence of any social grouping. Each group depends on the enclosure for its own uniqueness, norms, rules, identity, and cohesion among its members. Religion, one of the oldest inventions of human beings, has drawn divine boundaries to construct morality, membership, and its parental figure: God. Within the boundaries of religion, people find love and an ordering of the universe; beyond the boundaries is a lawless, directionless disarray. Politics, another ancient human activity, is not an exception. For instance, modern states have their own enclosure based on territoriality. The enclosure provides the basis for national identity and sovereignty. Within its jurisdiction, each state plays a parental figure, “offering” protection, guidance, and governance.

However essential for human beings, the act of drawing boundaries and creating the enclosure inevitably sets limits which ultimately threaten the validity of the constructed being—

God or state. In the case of Christianity, the problem was that there could not be a mutual agreement on where the divine boundary ought to be drawn. After suffering a series of devastating wars in Europe, the contention among various sects of Christianity hypothetically removed religion from politics. The modern state system was a secular invention designed as a solution (at least partially) for religious conflicts that were to be contained within the state enclosure. Yet in post-modern era, this system faces problems. Though territorial boundaries grant the state jurisdiction over its land, they cannot cope with growing transnational flows. Unable to digest these flows, the fracturing enclosure is slowly revealing that the state is not the absolute sovereign.

I contend that the growing discourse on global citizenship is a direct response to the transgression of the territorial borders of the state by transnational flows that threaten national security and identity. By transcending boundaries, global citizenship seeks to be the ultimate fulfillment of our wish for belonging, protection, and for a god/parental figure. But as aforementioned, conceptualizing of global citizenship is a challenge because of the paradox between its wish for the absence of enclosure and the very need for boundaries in human group identity. Or, it is precisely this paradox that devises the basis for belongingness in global citizenship. Designed to overcome the limitations imposed by boundaries, the wish to transcend boundaries is the common factor across, and the binding force of, the global citizenship discourse. The possibility of its realization is difficult to foresee, but its logic in approaching the problem with boundaries is creative in its expression of our want for universal belonging and love.

With the intention to further the current discourse, this thesis offers a theological examination of global citizenship, arguing that global citizenship is yet another translated

identity reflecting human beings' inherent wish for belonging to, protection from, and unity under a "god" within new conceptual boundaries, based on the shared wish for the absence of the enclosure, different from the territorial enclosure in the Westphalian system. Hence, contrary to the claimed innate universality of global citizenship, there are boundaries nonetheless constructing the differentiation between *us* and *them* within the concept of global citizenship—just as medieval Christian politics and the modern state system have done.

To draw such conclusion, I take rather an unconventional approach in defining global citizenship as an identity based on the wish for the absence of the enclosure through Sigmund Freud's theory on group formation and Wendy Brown's analysis of his theory. I choose Freud for a few specific reasons. First of all, in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud explains group and identity formation through the mutual identification of each member's love for a shared object. The fact that he grasps the importance of commonness in group formation indicates the general applicability and agreeableness of his theory. Secondly, the connections between his theories on religion in *The Future of an Illusion* and on groups in *Group Psychology* can effectively demonstrate the relationship between our persistent, vulnerable need for a sense of belonging, theology/religion, and global citizenship. Because Freud's ideas on religion and group are complementary, a more interesting and in-depth discussion is possible.

In portraying global citizenship as another mode to satisfy human desire for a sense of belonging and security, I provide highly generalized pictures of the three periods to depict how every enclosure both creates its own god figure and, through the limitations set by its boundaries, endangers the legitimacy of the god figure. The first part of my argument captures the divine politics in medieval times when the Christian God was sovereign. As uniformity under God within his divine boundaries could not be achieved and differences in religion were recognized

as a source of discrimination, unrest, and disorder, the medieval theology was translated into the modern state system. However, as the second part of my argument shows, the modern secularization of theology was only a deferral of the unresolved problem of difference. As a result, the state experiences the limited capability of territorial boundaries. The last part of my thesis explores human beings' perpetual need for a god figure through Sigmund Freud's analysis of social grouping while suggesting that global citizenship involves creation of another god to fulfill our craving for an unbounded sense of belonging. I end my thesis with a brief summary and political implications of the theological approach to understanding global citizenship, along with a final thought on humanity's wish to belong.

## Section I. Enclosing God Within Boundaries

### i. The Divine Politics

It has been only a few centuries since the human world became separated from the divine world.<sup>1</sup> Unlike modern secularism (obliging strict detachment from religion at least in theory), medieval Europe yearned for a unity between the two. Medieval churches designed in the popular gothic style depict the wish to be closer to God. With their tall, narrow pointed towers reaching towards Heaven, the massive and glamorously ornamented medieval churches stand as if endowed with divinity on earth. As found in art, literature, morals, politics, and daily life—though the effective political power of Christian institutions may be contested—the indisputable, immense presence of Christianity characterizes medieval Europe. “Heaven was never too far from earth,” Carlos Eire writes: “The sacred was diffused in the profane, the spiritual in the material. Divine power, embodied in the Church and its sacraments, reached down through innumerable points of contact to make itself felt: to forgive or to punish, to protect against the ravages of nature, to heal, to soothe, and to work all sorts of wonders.”<sup>2</sup> As the father and ruler of all human beings, God governed earthly life by showing the right directions, urging people to follow his words, and guiding people through the troubles of life. Those living up to his words were to be rewarded with the celestial reunion with him in heaven, while those violating God’s words were to be damned and punished. Divine authority in the celestial sphere, too far away to see or reach even with the towers sharply projecting toward the sky, *symbolized* the absolute and final power governing all sectors of human life.

---

<sup>1</sup> Although the connection between God and politics has been present since ancient times, I begin the discussion in medieval times for the purpose of the paper.

<sup>2</sup> Eires, 1986: 1; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24

Because God was the ultimate ruler, political rulers had to justify their authority and power by somehow relating themselves to God, including declaring themselves as divinely appointed. The monarch took the title *Rex Dei Gratia* (king by the grace of God), emphasizing his “position as the vice-regent... of God” in the community.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the monarch embodied both celestial and terrestrial being; while he was physical and mortal as a human being, he was also sacred and immortal as a representative of God.<sup>4</sup> Yet, not all communities simply accepted their kings’ claim as *Rex Dei Gratia*; in some cases kings or emperors needed the Pope’s confirmation of their consecration in order to affirm the validity of their rule. For this reason, some kings could not and did not dispute papal assertions, which strengthened the centralization of papal power in their transferring of the final authority by accepting “that the canon law was valid without royal consent; that the Pope could annul secular laws; that the Pope could depose monarchs, transfer kingdoms, forbid conquests, allocate new lands, invalidate treaties; that it was the king’s duty to extirpate papally-defined heresies.”<sup>5</sup>

In this way, Christianity and politics became intertwined, and the Church gradually sought to centralize and strengthen its political power by restricting the number of recipients of its divine power to itself. In the eleventh century, the Church no longer tolerated equating the consecration of rulers with priesthood, distinguishing the Church’s power from these rulers. Furthermore, the Church excluded “royal consecration from the sacraments of the Church” in the following century.<sup>6</sup> Being more fully in charge of the divine authority and its distribution, the Church began exercising a more powerful status, as “a king could not repudiate the theocratic

---

<sup>3</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 63

<sup>4</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 64-65

<sup>5</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 64

<sup>6</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 65

pretensions of these authorities without undermining the argument, on which he increasingly relied, that he himself was a divinely appointed ruler in his own community.”<sup>7</sup>

Nonetheless, the extent of actual influence of the Church was restrained because, as F. H. Hinsley points out, “even in the full theocratic theory Pope and Emperor could not issue orders but could only exhort and advise.”<sup>8</sup> Somewhat paradoxically, divine law was not recognized as the unifying force of Europe until later when the Church ceased to support the monarchs, suppressing communities resisting monarchical power and allied itself with resistant *secular* communities. These communities sought to protect their right against the monarch’s further empowerment by defending their secular right under the protective umbrella of canon law. The desecularization of positive law in these communities helped prevent monarchical centralization, and accordingly, it also further centralized the papal rule.<sup>9</sup> It also meant desecularizing both the monarchs and the communities while interweaving all laws and rules under divine law, as Hinsley describes:

The conjunction of segmentary conditions within the kingdoms with the powerful spread of Christianity and with all the other circumstances which underlay the existence of authorities claiming universal authority within Christendom—a conjunction which produced the theocratic aspirations of the kings themselves—led in every society to a profound desecularization of thought. A process set in by which the law of the community was conflated with God’s law. The law which the ruler, as the elect of the community, bound himself to protect was initially a purely customary law of the kind which is characteristic of the early stages in the development of societies—the good old law which was a compound of ethics, religion, and acquitted private rights. This now became more confused, though never wholly equated, with divine law.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 65

<sup>8</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 65

<sup>9</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 66; Sergio Valverde (written comments to author, April 22, 2012) notes, “Actually, the Western Church had an ambivalent attitude towards politics from the beginning. While it acquired more territory, it never claimed to be a political unity, deferring to the Germanic kings on temporal power. The Eastern Church definitely concentrated political and divine power in one figure: the Tsar or Byzantine Caesar (caesaro-papism).” The point is well taken, since I make not distinction between the Roman Church and the Eastern European Church.

<sup>10</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 67

As a consequence—at least hypothetically until the thirteenth century—the ruler of heaven was now the absolute lawgiver of the earth as well.<sup>11</sup>

The unity of medieval Europe under a Christian God, called *respublica Christiana* (Christian republic) and *populus Christianus* (Christian people), had “definite orders and orientations” within its jurisdiction.<sup>12</sup> Non-Christians and their territory were considered as objects of conquest and missionary work, and no intricate reasoning was necessary for conflicts with and wars against outsiders. The question of just and unjust wars mattered only in regard to Christian rulers. Wars among them were “bracketed wars,” still under the unity of the *respublica Christiana*, and they did not negate the unity.<sup>13</sup> Rather, they were “feuds in the sense of assertions of right, realization of right, or confirmations of a right of resistance, and they occurred within the framework of one and the same total order encompassing both warring parties.”<sup>14</sup> The internal unity of Christian Europe was structured to contain its internal divisions within its system and lines. It was one under one God.

However, such unity under Christian uniformity was only possible in theory.<sup>15</sup> The existence of diversity within and outside the unity could not be neglected. Not everyone

---

<sup>11</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 68; He writes, “In theory, all law, in the separate communities as in Christendom, was subsumed in the law of God and given a sanctity which placed it above all earthly authority.”

<sup>12</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 58; It is interesting to note here that the medieval Christian unity was called *respublica* since this reflects the doctrine of popular sovereignty, as Nicholas G. Onuf (1991: 36-37) writes:

That the people provide the ultimate rationale for any political arrangement is embedded in the very idea of a *res publica*. In Latin, *publicus* is an adjective for anything belonging to the people corporately; *res publica* refers abstractly to whatever belongs to the people. In the first instance, this must be their corporate identity and, by extension, political arrangements for the common good. Thus, as the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* reports, *res publica* is virtually synonymous with “body politic.”

<sup>13</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 58

<sup>14</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 58-59

<sup>15</sup> That there was never a unity can be observed from the three antecedents Nicholas G. Onuf (1991: 433-36) identifies for the concept sovereignty. The first of these antecedents is *majestas*, meaning “majesty.” Closely related to republicanism, it refers to “the awe-inspiring formality and dignity of some political arrangement, or person in a corporate sense. Majesty is not to be confused with ‘charisma’... [which] refers to awe-inspiring qualities some individual must display to become or remain ruler... In principle, majesty is not just divisible, it is *divided*—but only among corporate persons... Corporate persons each must perfect the form of organization most

submitted to divine law and frustration with the involuntarily imposed ideology of Christian Europe grew. As early as the thirteenth century, the secular movement against the Church began to expand. Increasing numbers of independent, quasi-independent, or national political units were formed in Italy, England, Spain, and France. They denied medieval Christian jurisdiction, whose order began to disintegrate as a consequence.<sup>16</sup>

The built-up tension and frustration from the oppressive unity was partially let out in the New World, which lay outside the legal jurisdiction of Christian Europe. The New World was “beyond the line” and an open space for freedom, meaning it was “an area where force could be used freely and ruthlessly.”<sup>17</sup> The activities and events beyond the line “remained outside the legal, moral and political values recognized on this side of the line,” and thus, they provided a space for “a tremendous *exoneration* of the internal European problematic.”<sup>18</sup> This ungoverned space indicated a contradiction to the claimed unity under one God. The freedom beyond the line utilized by Christian rulers and the recurring confrontation between Christian Europe and non-Christian, outsiders, barbarians, etc. directly refuted the Pope’s assertion to universal dominion and contradicted the divine unity.<sup>19</sup>

---

suited to their own level, which suggests that majesty would have a distinctive character at each level in the series. Although the majesty of the highest level would surely exceed that of lower levels, perhaps to a great and impressive degree, it nonetheless cannot be said to be final or absolute, thereby excluding the possibility of majesty, however modest, at other levels.” The second antecedent is *imperium*, which is typically translated as “supreme administrative power,” “rule,” and “dominion.” Its other meaning is empire, more specifically, the Roman Empire. Onuf explains that since the Roman Empire grew out of the republic, it still possessed some republican characteristics, “including the idea that rule was a constitutional matter, however great the powers of the emperor or capricious his conduct.” Thus, *imperium* “is rule by rules, not domination by brute force.” The third and last of sovereignty’s conceptual antecedents comes from the claim that people were superior to their leaders in the medieval church: “the populus is major, superior, potior, dominus.” Onuf writes, “Leaders then are ministers to the people. The doctrine of ‘popular sovereignty’ as it is now known, had nothing to say of *majestas*... *Imperium* is but a conditional grant of authority, and *majestas* no longer an incident of office.”

<sup>16</sup> Gross, 1948: 30; Schmitt, 2003: 65

<sup>17</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 94

<sup>18</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 94

<sup>19</sup> Gross, 1948: 30

The frustration with the impractical and unrealistic Christian claim to unity soon turned its direction of exoneration inward, toward Europe itself, especially as the need to rectify corruption in the Church became apparent. As a response to the Church's inability to provide sufficient justification for its unseen God and his power, there was a recognized demand to reinterpret and reconceptualize the meaning of Christian unity and what the role of the Church ought to be. So the Reformation movement led the way in the sixteenth century, and as a result, as Gross describes, "the Great Schism in the Church (1378-1417) and the rise of sects and eventually of the Reformation weakened correspondingly the authority of the Pope."<sup>20</sup> Protestants criticized "the ideological monopoly and material power of the Catholic Church" and accused the church of idolatry, of "substituting its own decree for those of God," and "directing the worshiper's attention not to God, but to material artifacts."<sup>21</sup> The reformers demonstrated their condemnation for the Catholic Church: "churches were sacked, images smashed and burned, relics overturned, and consecrated hosts fed to dogs and goats."<sup>22</sup> The determination to create a new vision of God and the Church proliferated through the whole of Europe, from Germany and Switzerland to France, the Netherlands, and England, which denotes that "the unity of the European religious vision was forever shattered."<sup>23</sup>

Not surprisingly, the Catholic Church was not inclined to give up its power and no one accepted any room for compromise to reshape Christianity into a more tolerant structure. The Catholic Church strived to suppress the Reformation and insisted on a return to orthodoxy as manifested in, for example, the Edict of Worms (1521), the Second Diet of Speyer (1529), and

---

<sup>20</sup> Gross, 1948: 30

<sup>21</sup> Eire, 1986: 55-56; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 26; Protestants here specifically mean Calvinists.

<sup>22</sup> Eire, 1986: 2; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24

<sup>23</sup> Eire, 1986: 2; see also Head, 1998: 95-96; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24-25

the Diet of Augsburg (1530).<sup>24</sup> Since neither the Church nor Protestants had any intention to take a step back and authorize the splitting of Christianity, the confrontation only escalated into an extensive period of hostility and violence: “In the end, princes loyal to Catholicism leapt to or were drawn into a defense of the Universal Church—a Counter Reformation led by the Habsburgs, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the papacy. German Protestants responded in kind, and both sides mobilized for war.”<sup>25</sup> Yet, there were also moments when the conflict was brought to a temporary and limited halt. The Peace of Augsburg officially ended the struggle between Catholic and Lutheran princes in 1555, but, it was “an initial and relatively meager attempt to come to terms with the problem of difference.”<sup>26</sup> Nonetheless, as Inayatullah and Blaney emphasize, the Peace of Augsburg was only a temporary remedy because those who signed it “had not yet given up the hope of re-establishing some sort of religious unity” and because it excluded Calvinists, Zwinglians, Anabaptists, and other sects.<sup>27</sup>

The unresolved contention among the different visions of uniform Christianity reached a climax during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) of the seventeenth century, one of the most traumatizing periods in European history. Inayatullah and Blaney note that the war “is infamous for the material devastation, but also for the social, moral, and psychic scars it left across Europe.”<sup>28</sup> Trevor-Roper writes in a similar manner that it was the “greatest and most destructive war in preindustrial Europe.”<sup>29</sup> Geoffrey Parker describes the Thirty Years’ War as follows: “the loss of people was proportionally greater than in World War II; the displacement of the people

---

<sup>24</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 27

<sup>25</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 27

<sup>26</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 27

<sup>27</sup> Asch, 1997: 10; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 27

<sup>28</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 29

<sup>29</sup> Trevor-Roper, 1962: 33; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 29

and the material devastation was almost as great; the cultural and economic dislocation persisted for substantially longer.”<sup>30</sup> Following Charles Weeks, Inayatullah and Blaney depict the destructiveness of the war more vividly: “the Thirty Years’ War was a total ideological war, ushering in a ‘modernist’ period in which the ‘unfolding disasters of war’—runaway inflation, spiraling military engagement, and a ‘phalanx of disease, hunger, and chaos’—crashed down on civilian populations.”<sup>31</sup>

In addition to spreading diseases and epidemics and the occurrence of torture and rape of even children and pregnant women, it was “the frenzy of killing” that dominated Europe.<sup>32</sup>

Toulmin describes how the hostility and the gap between the Protestant Reformation and the Counter-Reformation deepened with “the frenzy of killing”:

The longer the bloodshed continued, the more paradoxical the state of Europe became. Whether for pay or from conviction, there were many who would kill and burn in the name of theological doctrines that no one could give any conclusive reason for accepting. The intellectual debate between Protestant Reformers and their Counter-Reformation opponents had collapsed, and there was no alternative to the sword and the torch. Yet the more brutal the warfare became, the more firmly convinced the proponents of each religious system were that their doctrines *must be* proved correct, and that their opponents were stupid, malicious, or both.<sup>33</sup>

Chaos enveloped Europe during the Thirty Years’ War. What actually lay behind the surface of everyone’s certainty in his/her own belief was just a moral anarchy, confusion about what was right and wrong, what was humane and inhumane, and what Europe was and what it ought to be. There seemed to be neither movement toward nor hope for reconciliation among the different opinions on what God and Christianity ought to be, and only a deepening hatred remained in Europe.

---

<sup>30</sup> Parker, 1997: 192-193; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 20

<sup>31</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 29; they are using quotes from Weeks (1991: 213)

<sup>32</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 29-30

<sup>33</sup> Toulmin, 1990: 54; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 30

## ii. The Peace of Westphalia: Secular Translation of Theology

The Thirty Years' War, which has its origin in religious conflicts and intolerance, left Europe in devastation and revealed the dire need to construct a mechanism to prevent religious conflicts.<sup>34</sup> Accordingly, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was designed to consecrate a more tolerant model of Europe by, as Leo Gross writes, endorsing “the principle of toleration by establishing the equality between Protestant and Catholic states and by providing some safeguards for religious minorities.”<sup>35</sup> The Treaty of Osnabrück laid out the basic rules protecting religious minorities:

Subjects who in 1627 had been debarred from the free exercise of their religion, other than that of their ruler, were by the Peace [of Westphalia] granted the right of conducting private worship, and of educating their children, at home or abroad, in conformity with their own faith; they were not to suffer in any civil capacity nor to be denied religious burial, but were to be at liberty to migrate, selling their estates or leaving them to be managed by others.<sup>36</sup>

The Treaty of Osnabrück also provided the ground for assuring equality between Catholics and Protestants by granting the equal consulting and voting power while the Treaty of Münster specified sanctions for violations.<sup>37</sup> Founding a model for modern international law “by divorcing it from any particular religious background, and the extension of its scope so as to include, on a footing of equality,” the Peace of Westphalia announced a more tolerant community in Europe where people stood before judges regardless of their religions.<sup>38</sup>

The “secularization” of politics brought in the need for a new political institution called *the state*, designed to contain and relieve religious conflict and violence within their boundaries in order to foster religious tolerance. Accordingly, the Peace of Westphalia is normally granted

---

<sup>34</sup> Gross, 1948: 21; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24

<sup>35</sup> Gross, 1948: 21-22

<sup>36</sup> Ward and Acton, 1934: 412; quoted in Gross, 1948: 22

<sup>37</sup> Gross, 1948: 22, 25

<sup>38</sup> Gross, 1948: 26

as the historical event in international relations that marks “the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world. The old world, we are told, lived in the idea of a Christian commonwealth, of a world harmoniously ordered and governed in the spiritual and temporal realms by the Pope and Emperor.”<sup>39</sup> It marks the movement from the medieval world to the modern world, “from the idea of Europe as unified by Christianity to a European system of independent states, and from a web of overlapping and competing authorities to a modern system based on the demarcation of exclusive territorial jurisdictions.”<sup>40</sup>

In other words, distributing and containing the old God and his power to govern within borders, the states in the Westphalian system had become new *gods*, sovereign entities. No higher authority could stand above the state, which governs all sectors of life—economy, social norms, crimes, and political and religious disputes—within its jurisdiction. As a consequence, the state came to represent much of the current political system and it has “become virtually interchangeable” with the term political society; it is still just “the name we attach to one among the various political institutions which societies develop” for it embodies “a structure of command imposed upon the community in which it rules or attempts to rule.”<sup>41</sup> In our societies today, the state system strikes us as a “natural” or inherent structure in international politics. Considered as the sovereign entity that is responsible for and in charge of all matters within its enclosure, the state is our new “Father.” The Westphalian system symbolizes the secular translation of theology into politics.

A new modern state required a new justification for its for its existence and its exercise of

---

<sup>39</sup> Gross, 1948: 28

<sup>40</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 31

<sup>41</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 3, 16

political power. If it were God's divinity, his absolute and final authority, that granted political sovereignty and defined political structure, the Westphalian model required a corresponding secular substitute.<sup>42</sup> The divine power was hence converted into what is now called sovereignty, corroborating the idea "that final authority should rest within each independent community, that each community is in this sense self-determining."<sup>43</sup> Instead of being subject to the rule under the hegemonizing and homogenizing divine unity, each political community should supposedly "be governed by rules, norms, goals, and purposes that belong to it in some strong sense, that express the 'values and visions' implicit in the community's conception of the good life."<sup>44</sup> This means that it is only through the assumption of sovereignty that, a political entity can establish itself as a modern secular state; Hinsley notes the inseparable relationship between state and sovereignty, that "when a society is ruled by means of the state the concept of sovereignty is sooner or later unavoidable... the rise of state forms is a necessary condition of the notion of sovereignty."<sup>45</sup> Accordingly, he writes, "The concept of sovereignty will not be found in societies in which there is no state."<sup>46</sup> God and his divine power were always, in theory, at work together in the medieval

---

<sup>42</sup> Schmitt's explanation of Hugo Krabbe's discussion on the role of "spiritual forces" in the idea of state could be interesting here. Schmitt (1985: 22) explains and quotes Krabbe (1919: 39) on the difference between personal force in the medieval politics and spiritual forces, namely, laws. Schmitt writes, citing Krabbe:

"However one wants to approach it, the doctrine of the sovereignty of law is," as Krabbe says, "either a record of what is already real or a postulate that ought to be realized." The modern idea of the state, according to Krabbe, replaces personal force (of the king, of the authorities) with spiritual power. "We no longer live under the authority of persons, be they natural or artificial (legal) persons, but under the rule of laws, (spiritual) forces. This is the essence of the modern idea of the state." He continues, "These forces rule in the strictest sense of the word. Precisely because these forces emanate from the spiritual nature of man, they can be obeyed voluntarily." The basis, the source of the legal order, is "to be found only in men's feeling or sense of right." He concludes, "Nothing can be said further about this foundation: It is the only one that is real."

<sup>43</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 146; This does not mean that sovereignty is a new idea. Onuf (1991: 429) traces the concept sovereignty back to *majestas*—"the classical idiom of power and prerogative"—in ancient Greece and Rome.

<sup>44</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 146

<sup>45</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 17

<sup>46</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 22

politics. Correspondingly, state and sovereignty also require each other for their own existence as valid concepts.

The concepts of state and sovereignty always go hand in hand. Indeed, it is their shared historical background that permits sovereignty as the adequate and necessary method of legitimizing the state as the modern political authority.<sup>47</sup> Sovereignty has its foundation in the past methods of political legitimization, as seen in Hinsley's description:

Sovereignty is a concept by which men have sought to buttress older forms of legitimation and accountability or on which they have hoped to base new versions of these means by which power is converted into authority. Its function in the history of politics has been either to strengthen the claims of power or to strengthen the ways by which political power may be called to account... However delayed in the history of any society that stage may have been, sovereignty at its first inception has still been only a new solution of an existing problem, a new way of thinking about power and rule; and however novel this solution may have been when first formulated, it has still been only a development out of earlier solutions of that problem.<sup>48</sup>

In sum, the concept sovereignty emerged from the continuous problem of how to legitimize

---

<sup>47</sup> It should be pointed out that Hinsley (1986: 7, 17-18, 21) does not contend that the process of pairing sovereignty and state was simultaneous:

The stateless society—this is the most obvious difference [in comparison to the state]—has no single central symbol or instrument of rule, is acephalous and segmentary, whereas a single headship is the mark of the presence of the state.

It may nevertheless be later rather than sooner that the concept of sovereignty emerges in the wake of the rise of the state. The state can establish itself in a community without giving rise to this concept, even as a political community can exist without the state. In the history of societies, indeed, the appearance of the forms of the state has not usually been followed at once, if followed at all, by the discussion of political power in sovereignty terms. Nor is it possible to explain this delay by supposing that there has naturally been a time-lag between the appearance of the state and the beginning of any conscious analysis of the state's claims; for sovereignty has not been the first concept to emerge even when men have embarked on conscious analysis of its claims. If the state is a necessary condition of this concept, it is not a sufficient condition of it.

Another way of stating this point presents itself if we recall that the community may remain segmentary in many respects even after the forms of the state have been appeared, and even after they have been accepted, within it. Indeed this phase in the development of the relations between a community and its state has been experienced so widely as to justify the use of the term 'segmentary state' to connote the intermediate political system in which the administrative forms of the central state and the segmentary organization of power in the society are found in combination.

It is when a sufficient element in the community in which the state operates has sufficiently come to accept it and when, in the process of becoming accepted it and when, in the process of becoming accepted to this sufficient extent, the state has adjusted its forms and its outlook to the demands and conditions of the community—it is then and only then, at the point when the state is ceasing to be a segmentary state, that the concept of sovereignty has been newly coined.

<sup>48</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 25

power and rule in an evermore efficient and persuasive way. More specifically, it springs from the movement toward modernity against the Christian unity, as Inayatullah and Blaney argue, drawing on Leo Gross's words: "The principle of sovereignty is understood as the culmination of resistance to the hierarchical social order of Christendom, the idea that outside forces (God, pope, emperor) determine the life of each 'community,' weaving them into a single 'Christian Commonwealth.'"<sup>49</sup> The historical reflection and background of sovereignty show how it was interactively generated in accordance with the given social and political context in early modernity. In this way, sovereignty provides the state with the implements to legitimize its governance and converts its power into authority.

Accordingly, it should not be surprising that modern state sovereignty resembles medieval divinity. The definition of sovereignty is commonly considered to denote "the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the community," which does not seem to differ from the central qualities of medieval divine authority.<sup>50</sup> Both of them provide the means to justify political authority, indicating that the functions of divinity and sovereignty remain the same. In same way, medieval divinity grounded papal power and rule, sovereignty grants the state final and absolute authority to decide, regulate, and preside over society. However, political sovereignty's relation to theology is not just simple imitation or appropriation. It is rather that, to borrow Wendy Brown's words, "God is the original sovereign."<sup>51</sup> Brown further writes:

Political sovereignty may be a secularized theological concept, but secularization, we need remember, does not mean the end of religion... This means that sovereignty secularized for political purposes does not lose its religious structure or bearing, even as it ceases to have the direct authority of God at its heart... [Sovereignty] of a supreme, infinite, and supervenient power, is born of the human experience of smallness and vulnerability in a huge and overwhelming universe and that it harbors a desire for

---

<sup>49</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 146

<sup>50</sup> Hinsley, 1986: 17

<sup>51</sup> Brown, 2010: 59

protection, containment, and orientation in the face of this experience... [and] provides horizons and compass points for knowing and belonging.”<sup>52</sup>

In Brown’s description of sovereignty, it is perfectly applicable to replace the word sovereignty with God: “As a power, it is supreme, unified, unaccountable, and generative. It is the source, condition, and protector of civic life and a unique form of power insofar as it brings a new entity into being and sustains control over its creation. It punishes *and* protects. It is the source of law and above the law.”<sup>53</sup> Thus, state and sovereignty did not simply spring from theological historical background; rather, they are theological.

Carl Schmitt also draws the connection between state sovereignty and theology, focusing on the absoluteness of both. In *Political Theology*, he writes that he is not content with the traditional definition of sovereignty that, only slightly different from Hinsley’s definition, it is “the highest, legally independent, underived power.”<sup>54</sup> He reasons that there cannot exist such power in fact: “in political reality there is no irresistible highest or greatest power that operates according to the certainty of natural law.”<sup>55</sup> Since law is already a product of the state, it would be arbitrary if the state were to violate its own principle. In other words, the state may not override its constitution in judging cases acknowledged by and existing in the general norm because the norm is already “represented by an ordinary legal prescription.”<sup>56</sup> Instead of the generic definition, Schmitt offers a more specified “systematic, legal-logical” definition of sovereignty in his utmost famous expression: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”<sup>57</sup>

By exception, Schmitt means a situation that is not already represented in the existing

---

<sup>52</sup> Brown, 2010: 70-71

<sup>53</sup> Brown, 2010: 58

<sup>54</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 17

<sup>55</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 17

<sup>56</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 6

<sup>57</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 5

constitution or norm. The norm has its limitations because it “can never encompass a total exception,” but this does not convey that an exception means anarchy or chaos.<sup>58</sup> Rather, an exception is “the suspension of the entire existing [legal] order”—but not of the state.<sup>59</sup> There must be a normal situation in order for a legal order to exist, and it is only an exception when the situation exceeds the normal legal capacity to judge.<sup>60</sup> In the normal situation, legal precedent provides juridical guidance, meaning that autonomous decision making recedes to a minimum. In the case of the exception, by contrast, the norm is destroyed and law recedes, though the state remains.<sup>61</sup>

If the state and sovereignty are the modern translations of God and divinity, Schmitt writes that the exception embodies the miracle in theology, both of which are characterized by unlimited authority.<sup>62</sup> The sovereign is not simply someone who rules, but someone who holds a monopoly on the decision power over the exception:

All law is “situational law.” The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality. He has the monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the state’s sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most clearly the essence of the state’s authority.<sup>63</sup>

As the story goes, God proved himself by performing miracles. For the state, it is the decision power on the exception that proves everything: its rule, power, and existence. Thus for Schmitt, “The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the

---

<sup>58</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 6, 12-13

<sup>59</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 12

<sup>60</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 12-13

<sup>61</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 12

<sup>62</sup> Schmitt (1985: 36) originally wrote, “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.”; Schmitt, 1985: 12

<sup>63</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 12-13

exception.”<sup>64</sup> Even though the modern state may be a constructed being as Hinsley contends, it can *prove itself* as a sovereign being who practices its jurisdiction over people and territory. Therefore, the principal qualities of the state and its sovereignty embody a translation of God, “the original sovereign.”<sup>65</sup>

### iii. The Need for the Enclosure: “Proving” Theology

When Schmitt writes that “the exception *proves* everything”—“not only the rule but also its *existence*”—it is not the exception that legitimizes the sovereign’s existence in the first place.<sup>66</sup> Though sovereignty is what legitimizes the state’s exercise of jurisdictional power, it does not have the power to establish the state’s existence. Both divinity and sovereignty are employed to “prove” the authority and the existence of the Church and the State, but they are by no means internally absolute concepts that are self-legitimizing and self-justifying. As Wendy Brown notes, sovereignty has “no internal essence” although it “stands for autonomy, self-presence, and self-sufficiency.”<sup>67</sup> As I have already pointed out, with reference to Hinsley, it is a concept that is *constructed* in the course of history like other political concepts and institutions.

Rather, sovereignty appears “real” precisely because there *are* other equally sovereign beings. For Schmitt, a political entity’s existence is relational. It is completely dependent on the existence of other equal and parallel political entities, meaning that there always must be more than one entity in order to be political. The validity of a sovereign entity is almost automatically

---

<sup>64</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 15; Schmitt (1985: 15) explains an intriguing quotation in *Political Theology*: A Protestant theologian [Søren Kierkegaard] who demonstrated the vital intensity possible in theological reflection in the nineteenth century stated: “The exception explains the general and itself. And if one wants to study the general correctly, one only needs to look around for a true exception. It reveals everything more clearly than does the general. Endless talk about the general becomes boring; there are exceptions. If they cannot be explained, then the general also cannot be explained. The difficulty is usually not noticed because the general is not thought about with passion but with a comfortable superficiality. The exception, on the other hand, thinks the general with intense passion.”

<sup>65</sup> Brown, 2010: 59

<sup>66</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 15, emphasis added.

<sup>67</sup> Brown, 2010: 53

proven by the fact that there are also other entities exercising their sovereign power. In other words, it is *the other*, who is similar but different, is required to prove one's existence as a sovereign. As already well known in the political science discourse, sovereignty, identity, and entity are relative concepts.<sup>68</sup> Each requires a differentiation between the internal *us* from the external *them* in order to clarify who lies outside the jurisdiction of the respective entity. The need for the presence of *the other* also applies to generating a sense of belonging. We can only circumscribe ourselves as *us* because we are not *them*, and the state's existence becomes real because its exercise of power has effect on *us*, as opposed to the exercise of power by other state on *them*.

Schmitt stresses the existence of the other, or the external enemy in his terminology, as the foundational quality of political existence and identity. According to him, the essence of the *political* is derived from the distinction between friend and enemy: "The specific political to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy."<sup>69</sup> Schmitt contends that the distinction of friend and enemy indicates "the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation."<sup>70</sup> Political life then revolves around the friend-enemy grouping, "*deciding* who the enemy is and what to do about the enmity."<sup>71</sup> Those threatening the assumed uniformity of the internal *us* constitute the possible enemy, subject to at best toleration and at worst violence. The enemy is not simply a competitor, an opponent in conflict, or an object of hatred. It does not denote someone on a private level; rather, the enemy is always a collective public entity in a hostile relation. As Schmitt states, "An enemy exists only

---

<sup>68</sup> Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, 2008: 156

<sup>69</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 26

<sup>70</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 26

<sup>71</sup> Brown, 2010: 55

when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.”<sup>72</sup>

The word “fighting” here is the most crucial component of the enemy because, Schmitt argues, it is “the ever present possibility of combat” that elucidates the concept.<sup>73</sup> More specifically, it entails “the real possibility of physical killing,” in which case, as Schmitt continues, “the friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their *real* meaning.”<sup>74</sup> In this manner, the political entity involves “the most intense and extreme antagonism”; the more antagonistic a social entity is, the more political it is, and the friend-enemy relation also becomes more distinct.<sup>75</sup> Thus, what matters in the concept of the political is the possibility of physical expression of hostility; Schmitt takes this further when he writes that “what always matters is *only* the possibility of conflict.”<sup>76</sup> He concludes that the “real” friend-enemy grouping is “existentially so strong and decisive that the nonpolitical antithesis, at precisely the moment at which it becomes political, pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious, purely economic, purely cultural criteria and motives to the conditions and conclusions of the political situation at hand.”<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>72</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 28

<sup>73</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 32

<sup>74</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 31, emphasis added. He also writes, “What always matters is the possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war, and the decision whether this situation has or has not arrived.” Schmitt, 2007: 35

<sup>75</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 29; Klandermans and Simon (2004: 455), political psychologists, write in the similar manner as Schmitt in regards to enemy and political struggle:

Politicization of collective identity and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group’s relationship to its social environment. Typically, this process begins with the awareness of shared grievance. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group’s predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues.

<sup>76</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 39, emphasis added

<sup>77</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 38

Because the state is that which makes decisions differentiating friend and enemy, Schmitt regards the state as “an essentially political entity” that is always decisive and sovereign.<sup>78</sup> The state is decisive in the sense that there is no midway in its existence—“it exists or it does not exist”—and when it exists, it is the supreme, authoritative entity within itself.<sup>79</sup> Thus, in its “decisionism,” the political entity is sovereign; as Schmitt writes, “In the orientation toward the possible extreme case of an actual battle against a real enemy, the political entity is essential, and it is the decisive entity for the friend-or-enemy grouping; and in this (and not in any kind of absolutist sense), it is sovereign. Otherwise the political entity is nonexistent.”<sup>80</sup> The state draws the boundaries to distinguish itself from others and categorizes others as friend or enemy, and in doing so, it becomes the political sovereign.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, the friend-enemy grouping implies extreme consequences. The state possesses the power to wage (or not wage) a war against the enemy, which is “the existential negation” of them, and also the power to kill its own populace in

---

<sup>78</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 44; Schmitt’s recognition of the state as an essentially political entity does not mean that he argues that the state is the only possible political entity. Here, the possibility of combat deserves special attention. If this is what allows for the friend-enemy grouping, it means that the political is not restricted to the state. Indeed, although Schmitt does not think there actually are non-state political entities, he does not rule out the possibility of their existence. Schmitt (2007: 37) writes, “Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong enough to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy.” For example, when a religious community engages in wars against other religious communities, it “is already more than a religious community; it is a political entity.”

<sup>79</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 43-44

<sup>80</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 39; Wendy Brown (2010: 55) also writes, “Decisionism, which Schmitt defines as ‘pure will that bows before no sovereign truth.’ is *the* modality of political action because the political itself is sovereign, subject neither to norms nor to law, [and] accountable to nothing else.”

<sup>81</sup> Schmitt (2007: 34-35) further discusses the enemy-friend concept, including the concept of neutrality: The criterion of the friend-and-enemy distinction in no way implies that one particular nation must forever be the friend or enemy of another specific nation or that a state of neutrality is not possible or could not be politically reasonable. As with every political concept, the neutrality concept too is subject to the ultimate presupposition of a real possibility of a friend-and-enemy grouping. Should only neutrality prevail in the world, then not only war but also neutrality would come to an end. The politics of avoiding war terminates, as does all politics, whenever the possibility of fighting disappears. What always matters is the possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war, and the decision whether this situation has or has not arrived.

order to ensure its existence.<sup>82</sup> The state is the sovereign entity, making decisions regarding critical situations including the exception and lives of people.<sup>83</sup>

*Respublica Christiana* does not significantly differ from the state as an essentially political entity. Though Schmitt differentiates the political from the *purely* religious, *Respublica Christiana* by no means sustained itself in the exclusively religious realm. While practicing the decision power over the exception as reflected in different edicts declared, Christendom articulated a clear distinction between friend and enemy: Christians versus non-Christians or the Orthodox versus heresies. With God as the sovereign entity, those who deviated from “his words” constituted the enemy of Christianity, and paid for their transgressions in violence and “physical killing” in numerous religious wars. The Church had the power—or could call upon monarchs—to wage wars against its enemies and dispose of human lives for the sake of its righteousness. The intensity of its antagonism toward the other is well known: the Crusades during the 11th through the 13th centuries as a response to Muslim conquests; the violence used against indigenous populations of various parts of the world; and, of course, the internal wars among different Christian sects including the Thirty Years’ War. Until the 17th century when conflict within Europe became pervasive, the Church claimed the decision power to allocate resources for wars against its enemies, proving its majesty to its *others* as a political entity.

Yet, *Respublica Christiana* and the state are different political entities in that they draw the boundaries distinguishing themselves from others, insider from outsider, or who belongs to them from who does not, on different bases. Medieval Christian Europe used theological boundaries based on the *faith* of those believing in God. Within this Christian boundary, there

---

<sup>82</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 33, 46

<sup>83</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 38; Original text: “This [friend-enemy] grouping is therefore always the decisive human grouping, the political entity. If such an entity exists at all, it is always the decisive entity, and it is sovereign in the sense that the decision about the critical situation, even if it is the exception, must always necessarily reside there.”

was unity under one God, the absolute and final authority who governed the human world through his earthly representatives. As mentioned earlier, internal conflicts were considered as “bracketed” within the enclosure and did not disrupt the unity.<sup>84</sup> Outside the divine boundaries lay non-Christians, who could not benefit from God’s protection and governance and were subject to conquest and Christian conversion. Any entities opposed to God were considered the enemy, and could be accountable with hatred, physical punishment, and even war.

However, the problem with the theological boundaries was that faith was too intangible and ambiguous to be a concise and effective dividing line. The endless conflicts among different sects of Christianity—such as Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Zwinglians, and Anabaptists—were intended to correct this ambiguity in the “right” way. God’s “true” intentions were as abstract as his essence. Hence, there could not be a succinct or final demarcation for where God would have drawn the boundaries between the “true” Christian practice and heresies. As a result, there was bloodshed regarding what this theological boundary exactly should mean, what kind of faith God wanted, and whose God was the right one. In the end, ambiguities destabilized the idea of Christian Europe.

This led to the rise of the Westphalian system, which demanded a more secular and more tangible version of boundaries. Instead of impalpable, contentious, and invisible theological boundaries, the Westphalian system has visualized boundaries—it drew them onto a map—and as a result, territorial borders define each state’s being.<sup>85</sup> Bold and clear straight lines re-

---

<sup>84</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 58

<sup>85</sup> Schmitt (2003: 140) also writes on territoriality and secularization after religious conflicts: The first effective rationalization of the spatial form ‘state,’ in terms of both domestic and foreign policy, was achieved by the detheologization of public life and the neutralization of the antitheses of creedal civil wars. In other words, the supra-territorial loyalties of opposing sides in 16th and 17th century civil wars had been overcome, and creedal civil wars had ceased. The conflicts between religious factions had been resolved by a public-legal decision for the territorial domain of the state—a decision no longer ecclesiastical, but political, even state-political.

distributed, transferred, and mapped medieval divinity onto states. Territorial boundaries have drawn a finite and distinct space for each state, whose sovereignty is pertinent solely to the territory enclosed by its boundaries. These boundaries determine the distinction between internal and external and ascribe different identities of *us* and *them*. What is beyond boundaries is beyond *our* jurisdiction; it belongs to *their* jurisdiction. The exclusivity of sovereignty, as Inayatullah and Blaney suggest, “take[s] on a distinctly spatial or territorial character in that the territory of ruler/political community is subject to his/its exclusive jurisdiction.”<sup>86</sup> Thus, territorial boundaries represent jurisdictional boundaries, and the territorial enclosure “grants each state a protective shell for the exercise of sovereignty.”<sup>87</sup> Territoriality constructs the foundation for an internal rule, jurisdiction, and sovereignty, while leaving the external in an anarchy full of other equal states without a sovereign entity governing all of them.<sup>88</sup> The space in between internal jurisdictions is lawless, vulnerable to harm, without any guidance, and uncivilized. It is only within the internal space of territorial enclosure where a political structure can be found, as shown in Schmitt’s quote of an old maxim: “[a]ll law is law only in a particular location.”<sup>89</sup> Within their respective territorial enclosure, states behave as the sole sovereign unity—like

---

<sup>86</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 188; see also Kratochwil, 1995: 26, 269; Onuf (1998:131) adds, “If states are sovereign, then they have rights of possession and use with respect to their own territory but not the territory of others, except of course by agreement. Sovereign states function like rights-bearing individuals in liberal circumstances.”

<sup>87</sup> Onuf, 1998:131; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 188

<sup>88</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 188) explain the “act of reciprocal recognition,” that “on the one hand, sovereignty constitutes states as existentially separate in that, by promoting their own sovereignty, they constitute themselves as discrete entities. On the other hand, by accepting the status of sovereign, states simultaneously constitute others as outside, alien, and competitors, but, nevertheless ... as sovereign others.” Such “an act of reciprocal recognition is necessary to create the condition in which states treat each other as discrete, disparate, and self-helping entities.” Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 147) also write, “In international society each political community is recognized as a sovereign equal, possessing the same rights and duties. This equality of status implies a duty of each political community to respect the sovereign of others (Hinsley, 1986: 258; Wight, 1977: 135), to allow different versions of the good life to be played out—mostly free from unwanted interference—behind the protection of sovereign boundaries.”

<sup>89</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 98

God.<sup>90</sup> The modern state exercises final and exclusive jurisdiction over its land, which implies that the essence of political power originates from and resides within the territorial enclosure.

Territoriality is the imperative element in the modern state system.

Schmitt emphasizes territoriality as the basis for political order and law. The inseparable relationship between territoriality and sovereignty owes its ties to land since “the model for imagining sovereignty was generally landed property.”<sup>91</sup> In *The Nomos of the Earth*, he extensively argues that law has been always terrestrially oriented and land appropriation always “takes first place.”<sup>92</sup> He begins his book with an account of how “law is bound to the earth and related to the earth” in a threefold way.<sup>93</sup> First, there is law within the earth itself because of the simple labor-reward relationship between farming and harvesting. Secondly, the earth “manifests law upon herself, as fixed boundaries.”<sup>94</sup> As human beings work on her land, lines and divisions become apparent, and accordingly, “the standards and rules of human cultivation of the earth become discernible.”<sup>95</sup> Lastly, the lines and divisions become even firmer: “the solid ground of the earth is delineated by fences, enclosures, boundaries, walls, houses, and other constructs.”<sup>96</sup> The earth thus bears law above itself—“as a public sign of order”—as it is “delineated” by

---

<sup>90</sup> Tully (1995: 64-67; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 43) explains the national unity based on uniformity within the state: “The sovereign people, in modern societies, ... establish a constitution that is legally and politically uniform: a constitution of equal citizens who are treated identically rather than equitably, of one national system of institutionalised legal and political authority rather than many, and a constitutional nation equal in status to all others.”

<sup>91</sup> Hann, 1998: 5; Brewer and Staves, 1995: 2; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 188; Inayatullah and Blaney also draw from other political theorists. They write that “Charles Beitz (1991: 243) refers to ‘a state’s domestic jurisdiction’ as a kind of ‘collective property right for the citizens of that state,’ with all the powers of exclusion that follow, and Barry Buzan (1991: 93) speaks of the territory of the state, including its population and resources, as ‘national property.’”

<sup>92</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 44

<sup>93</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 42

<sup>94</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 42

<sup>95</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 42

<sup>96</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 42

various walls and enclosures.<sup>97</sup> Orders and orientations are born within each distinct enclosure, and “forms of power and domination” are also distinct within the enclosure. In other words, if God first created Mother Earth and then other beings upon her, the Earth subsequently provided us with the basis for what we needed as human and political beings. When her vast land was divided, appropriated, and enclosed, the Earth gave birth to politics.

Schmitt’s emphasis on land appropriation as a requirement for law is well articulated when he explains the etymology of the word *nomos*. As Brown points out, Schmitt’s etymology of *nomos* may be contested, but his appreciation for “enclosure as a prerequisite of political order and law” cannot be overlooked.<sup>98</sup> Although *nomos* is generally translated as “law,” “regulation,” or “norm” today, its original meaning “was fundamentally a *spatial* term,” associated with land appropriation.<sup>99</sup> Its root comes from the Greek word *nemein*, which means both “to divide” and “to pasture.” Thus, *nomos* “is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes a spatially visible... [It] is the *measure* by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the form of political, social, and religious order determined by this process. Hence, measure, order, and form constitute a spatially concrete unity”<sup>100</sup> Thus, the “original act is *nomos*.”<sup>101</sup> Land appropriation takes precedent in *every* case as the foundation of all law: “land appropriation, both internally and externally, is the primary legal title that underlies all subsequent law,” such as territorial law and territorial succession, militia and the

---

<sup>97</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 42

<sup>98</sup> Brown, 2010: 45; The original text: “Schmitt’s etymology of *nomos* may be contested, and his emphasis on land appropriation as the essential foundation of all order may be overstated, but his appreciation of enclosure as a prerequisite of political order and law is difficult to set aside.”

<sup>99</sup> Brown, 2010: 44-45; see also Schmitt, 2003: 69-70

<sup>100</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 70; quoted in Brown, 2010: 45

<sup>101</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 78

national guard, and also the distinction between private and public law.<sup>102</sup>

Schmitt is not alone in announcing territoriality as the prerequisite for political sovereignty, jurisdiction, property ownership, institutions, public and private law.<sup>103</sup> John Locke, among others, explicitly emphasizes the importance of territoriality in political founding and sovereignty.<sup>104</sup> In the *Second Treatise on Government*, he explains how the social contract emerges as a reflection of the need to assure protection of the right to own property, while defining political power as “a right of making laws...for the regulating and preserving of property.”<sup>105</sup> Locke argues that when one consents to a government, one submits his/her land to that government’s jurisdiction; he writes, “it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt from the

---

<sup>102</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 46; see also Brown, 2010: 44

<sup>103</sup> For example, although I do not discuss them, Schmitt (2003: 47-48) identifies such theorists from Vico to Kant, to which Brown (2010: 44) adds from Machiavelli to Rousseau.

<sup>104</sup> Brown, 2010: 44; Innayatullah and Blaney (2004: 41) also explain Locke’s *Second Treatise*, which sound quite similar to Schmitt’s account other than that Locke focuses on property and ownership more than Schmitt does:

Though the world is originally “given to Mankind in common,” the appropriation of property by individuals is possible, even in a prepolitical “state of nature,” because the natural right to self-preservation allows the acquisition and consumption of the produce of nature by individuals. The mechanism for this appropriation of nature as property, Locke suggests, is the application of labor. Initially applying this logic to hunting and gathering, Locke extends it to ownership of the land: “as *much Land* as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his *Property*.” The requirement of cultivation and improvement allows Locke to assert that the enclosure of land does no injury to other claimants, since the application of human labor to land “does not lessen but increases the common stock of humankind.” The progressive enclosure of land as private property eventually produced settlements and cities that “came in time to set out the *bounds of their distinct Territories*.” Though the appropriation of property is justified by natural law and the territorial bounds of settlements might be negotiated by societies in the state of nature, a definitive demarcation of property rights and territorial boundaries depends on the formation of government(s)—the establishment by “*Compact*” of the institutions of rule definitive of a world civil societies. We might say, then, that these two enclosures—of landed property and territorial boundaries—operate in tandem: ownership and sovereignty equally establish exclusive rights of dominion, by which property owner and political community can exclude others from the benefits flowing from or attaching to objects of property and membership in community. Locke thus envisions a world of bounded territorial states, each containing a civil society in which landed property is the distinctively civilized form of entitlement and the industrious property owner is the epitome of a civilized citizen.

<sup>105</sup> Locke, 1963: 308; quoted in Brown, 2010: 44

jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject.”<sup>106</sup>

Thus, he “envisions a world of bounded territorial states” and for him, the essence of political power “is jurisdiction over the land.”<sup>107</sup>

To recount, “there was first the enclosure and then the sovereign.”<sup>108</sup> In the way God began the human world, land appropriation is “based on sacred orientations” and always marks the beginning.<sup>109</sup> It is “found at the beginning of the history... [at] the beginning of every historical epoch... land appropriation precedes the order that follows from it. It constitutes the original spatial order, the source of all further concrete order and all further law. It is the reproductive root in the normative order of history.”<sup>110</sup> Jost Trier states the same: “In the beginning was the fence. Fence, enclosure, and borders are deeply interwoven in the world formed by men, determining its concepts. The enclosure gave birth to the shrine by removing it from the ordinary, placing it under its own laws, and entrusting it to the divine.”<sup>111</sup> The state depends on its birth mother—namely, the enclosure—for everything. It has entrusted its exclusive sovereignty, governance, identity, and unity to the enclosure in order to contain the problem of difference.

In this respect, the Westphalian state system is just a container for the secular translation

---

<sup>106</sup> Locke, 1980: 64

<sup>107</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 41; Schmitt, 2003: 47; quoted in Brown, 2010: 44; These are Schmitt’s words describing Locke. Schmitt (2003: 47) further points out that Locke “understands jurisdiction in medieval terms, as sovereignty and dominion in general. For him, the occupation of a country is subjugation by whoever has jurisdiction over the soil. Domination is, first of all, rule only over the land and, only as a consequence of this, rule over the people who live on it.” Brown (2010: 44) also explains the importance of the enclosure for Locke: “Fences, titles, and enclosures are among Locke’s most fecund and ubiquitous metaphors in the *Second Treaties*; they secure freedom, representation, and limits to the right of rebellion, as well as actual territory.”

<sup>108</sup> I am borrowing words from Brown (2010: 45). She writes, “There is first the enclosure and then the sovereign. Or, put the other way around, it is through the walling off of space from the common that sovereignty is born.”

<sup>109</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 70

<sup>110</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 48; Brown, 2010: 44

<sup>111</sup> Trier, 1943: 232; quoted in Schmitt, 2003: 74 and Brown, 2010: 43

of theology; its essence has not changed from that of divine politics. The state is still in charge of the same duties to protect, provide a sense of belonging, and contain its people, and the superiority of its sovereignty corresponds to divine power. The existence of state is like the existence of God—it “is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm. The decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense absolute.”<sup>112</sup> As Schmitt writes, “The juridic formulas of the omnipotence of the state are, in fact, only superficial secularizations of theological formulas of the omnipotence of God.”<sup>113</sup> In other words, “the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver” through historical development, and thus, the modern political concepts are what were “transferred from theology to the theory of the state.”<sup>114</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 12

<sup>113</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 42

<sup>114</sup> Schmitt, 1985: 36

## Section II. The Westphalian Fiction

### i. Translated Theology, Translated Problems

#### *The Westphalian Deferral and Toleration*

Though it is difficult to convey all nuances, a translated work is meant to be as close as possible to the original work. Translating theological ideas into secular concepts carries along—rather than solves—the prevailing problems. More often than ideally, a final resolution for a highly disputable problem tends to rest on an intentional ignorance of the problem, as if looking away from the problem is almost the same as eliminating the source of the conflict. The Westphalian system follows a similar practice. The state system merely *displaced* the problem of difference into the state enclosure and thus silenced it in the international realm, despite its goal of ending religious conflicts as a source of an enormous political confrontation. Though the tension among the difference displaced in the state—no matter how pervasive—does not manifest as catastrophically as it did in the Thirty Years' War, the Peace of Westphalia was not an effective attempt to resolve the problem, but it merely deferred the problem. As Inayatullah and Blaney indicate:

While this was no mean achievement, the problem was not so much resolved as it was deferred—displaced into the domestic realm, where, it was hoped, it could be managed and contained... [T]he attempt to contain difference within the relatively autonomous units recognized by Westphalia deferred a deeper exploration and engagement of the problem of difference.<sup>115</sup>

---

<sup>115</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 32-33; They write:

Ronald Asch (1997: 193-94) notes that Westphalia was not a solution to the problem of religious difference, but, rather, it kept alive the religious conflicts of the previous century, confirming the existing status, rights, and privileges of the confessional churches, and thereby “perpetuating religious divisions,” albeit in a more “muted form.” Combined with a recognition of the independence of princes, the effect was to divide “Europe” into Catholic and Protestant spaces” and spur “the interstate construction of the continent” (Campbell, 1992: 51). Religious tolerance among sovereigns was made, in effect, a function of the balance of power among them (Keene, 1998: 21), but within the nascent states the situation was different. Despite the treaties’ relative embrace of religious liberty, the moral constraints placed on rulers were, as Krasner (1993: 244-45) observes, on a collision course with the sovereign’s right to dictate the faith of the realm as originally acknowledged in the Treaty of Augsburg and as supported by the emerging reality and theory of sovereignty. “[F]rom now on,” Toulmin (1990: 91) concludes, “established religion was the general rule.” ... [Furthermore] the consequences for religious liberty were not uniform across the newly sanctified

Despite the Westphalian hope, the problem of difference could not be enclosed within a mapped out space. Simply creating a new system with political power justified within a newly constructed enclosure is only a temporary pain killer for the persisting problem of difference.

However, the Westphalian state system was not a *simple* deferral of the problem; contrary to its generally received view as a movement toward toleration and diversity, it actually fostered uniformity.<sup>116</sup> As we have seen in the case of *Respublica Christiana*, uniformity is a prerequisite for unity. If uniformity cannot be achieved—and it rarely can—unity breaks. For an order to be established, there must be an enclosure with boundaries separating the internal from the external, and for the order to be maintained, there should be uniformity within the enclosure.<sup>117</sup> When the state institutes its constitution and obtains jurisdiction over its territorial enclosure, it establishes constitutional uniformity—a crucial binding and driving force—whose cohesiveness generates the basis for order and norms within its enclosure. It thus gives birth to an identity that distinguishes the internal from the external and that embodies “nation-ness,” which remains “the most universally legitimate value” in international society.<sup>118</sup>

This constitutional uniformity and “nation-ness” are too crucial to be amended, offended, or threatened, by those who differ from the normative uniformity. Difference is anticipated to

---

political units. Toulmin (1990: 92) describes a situation in which each state or domain individually faced “the continuing problem of religious conformity and toleration.” Despite the expectation of submission to a national faith, nonconforming minorities remained a troubling issue; others, thought to have been placed at a distance, were found within. And though, “[a]fter thirty years of bloodshed, few people still considered the price of imposing religious conformity worth paying,” Toulmin (1990: 92) reports, “the local pressure for conformity remained strong, and religious minorities were everywhere subject to some degree of discrimination or persecution” ... [Thus] the problem [of difference] was not so much resolved.

<sup>116</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 33) note, “The received view of Westphalia as a crucial point of transition to a more civilized era ignores the relatively negative impact of the experience of the war on thinking about difference.”

<sup>117</sup> I discuss the importance of uniformity across the members in a group in the last section, where Freudian understanding of social grouping yields that identification among the members based on a shared love/ideal is the binding force for a group.

<sup>118</sup> Anderson, 1983; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 147

complicate establishment and maintenance of order and peace in the state. It is treated as that which leads to “disorder and degeneration” while “uniformity or homogeneity naturally produces social order and stability.”<sup>119</sup> In the same manner that differing opinions on the *right* kind of religion brought detrimental outcomes in medieval times, cultural diversity is equated with political chaos and cultural homogeneity with political order in the state system.<sup>120</sup> Accordingly, the “unpleasant” difference is then silenced by the mainstream, dominant normative view. Superficial, but formal, constitutional uniformity provides the state with a medium to excuse itself from criticisms regarding its insufficient promotion of diversity and unfair treatment of those deviating from normative uniformity, although formal equality does not translate to fairness in reality.<sup>121</sup> Hence, the state is an “empire of uniformity” where “instead of recognizing the possibility of the overlapping of self and others, boundaries are rigidly drawn, carefully policed, and mapped onto the difference between good and evil.”<sup>122</sup>

The unrealistic, even fictive, uniformity enforced in the state inevitably generates *the other*, which is not only external but also internal to its boundaries; and, as in the case of medieval religious disputes, these *others* are treated as a problem. The similarity in norms and values found among those within the state provides the basis for establishing a stable identity that somehow differentiates a nation from others *in essence*.<sup>123</sup> Identity essentializes the

---

<sup>119</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 33

<sup>120</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 42; They write, “It appears to us, then, that the equation of cultural diversity and political chaos, on the one side, and cultural homogeneity and political order, on the other, is central to the legacy of political thinking bequeathed to us by this era.”

<sup>121</sup> Tully, 1995: 64-67; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 43; Inayatullah and Blaney notes that Tully (1995: 1) “argues that the modern ideal of uniform constitutionalism serves as an impediment to our capacity to ‘recognize and accommodate cultural diversity’.”

<sup>122</sup> Tully, 1995: 1; the term “empire of uniformity” is quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 43); Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 11

<sup>123</sup> This is, Nietzsche (1991) would say, an incessant problem of categorization. Categorization allows human beings to comprehend the world. It allows us to perceive a tree as one of many trees and a leaf as one of many leaves. Based on the common ground such as language, which is a verbal expression of the categorization, we

characteristics of the national population and citizens, and consequently, those differing from the shared uniform vision of an identity cannot really be deemed the same as citizens. A national identity is then juxtaposed against others, being unique on its own and separating *us* from *them*. However, individuals who feel dislocated within the territorial boundaries cannot be ignored because their national identity is imposed instead of chosen. These individuals comprise *the others within*, who formally belong to the state without a sense of belonging. Inayatullah and Blaney depict how boundaries create both external and internal *others* who are perceived as threats:

The bounded political community constructs (and is constructed by) the other. Beyond its boundaries, the other lurks as a perpetual threat in the form of other states, antagonistic groups, imported goods, and alien ideas. The other also appears as difference within, vitiating the presumed but rarely, if ever, achieved 'sameness.' The other within the boundaries of the political community is 'managed' by some combination of hierarchy, eradication, assimilation or expulsion, and tolerance. The external other is left to suffer or prosper according to its own means (though its poverty or prosperity may be experienced as a threat.<sup>124</sup>

Just as difference is perceived as a threat to national uniformity, these *others within* are considered as a possible source of disharmony in the modern political structure, and Schmitt would point out here that the concept of the other—the enemy—involves the possibility of being subject to violence. The endless accounts of discrimination against minorities, anti-immigrant protestors, and irredentist movements only point to the fact that it is not even a vague possibility to achieve uniformity within a state.

But that is not the projected image of the state system. The Peace of Westphalia is

---

establish the most basic foundation in building a human society. However, what is really a tree or a leaf? Categorization entails an arbitrary equation of the similar but different. Human beings can only perceive and recognize an object through the process of categorization only as summarization. Hence, although we think that we can, we actually do not possess any ability to grasp reality as it is. That is the arbitrariness of categorization; though it is required in our life, its implementation automatically sets up a limitation at where reality meets deviations from the preexisting categories. Categories and boundaries presuppose a standard, uniformity that is arbitrary and unrealistic in some ways, to define and structure them. Consequently, they are incapable to appropriately grasp the complexity of reality as a whole as they pursue to precipitate a peaceful order from uniformity and homogeneity.

<sup>124</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 7

credited as a positive movement toward embracing diversity by at least promoting toleration as a protective layer preventing the problem of difference from unleashing itself in a more violent form (as seen in the Thirty Years' War). In reality, *the other within* becomes subject to “management” and “regulation” through the doctrine of toleration, not incorporation.<sup>125</sup> The concept of toleration is indeed highly conducive to the Westphalian deferral and accordingly to the perseverance and ignorance of difference.<sup>126</sup> Toleration represents intentional ignorance and endurance of a group disliked because of its difference, which demonstrates that it is applicable only when the existence and recognition of difference are presupposed.<sup>127</sup> In *Regulating Aversion*, Wendy Brown sees tolerance as *otherizing* in that “advocacy of tolerance toward others who are ‘different’ intensifies the totalizing features of the subject and identity formation... It reifies and exaggerates the ‘otherness’ of a tolerated subject by construing it as the product of a group identity representing.”<sup>128</sup>

Thus, as Inayatullah and Blaney report on the Westphalian system—“a negative utopia of toleration;” that is, “a world of live-and-let-live... preferable to the bloodletting associated with

---

<sup>125</sup> See Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 7, 33; For example, if the U.S. were to be characterized as a Christian democratic nation, groups in the U.S. that are culturally, religiously, or politically different are markedly characterized as *others* who are tolerated not incorporated.

<sup>126</sup> “The Westphalian deferral” is borrowed from Inayatullah and Blaney (2004)’s title for the first chapter.

<sup>127</sup> Brown (2006: 44) reports, “This regulatory individuation of the deviant, the abject, the other, suggests a further implication of the normalizing work of contemporary tolerance discourse. Tolerated individuals will always be those who deviate from the norm, never those who uphold it, but they will also be further articulated as (deviant) individuals through the very discourse of tolerance.”

<sup>128</sup> Brown, 2006: 45; Brown (2006: 28) writes regarding the otherness prevalent in the concept of toleration:

Generally, however, tolerance is less an extension toward a potentially intrusive or toxic difference than the management of the threat represented by that difference. It is a singular form of such management insofar as it involves the simultaneous incorporation and maintenance of the otherness of the tolerated element; again, this is what distinguishes tolerance from digestion, assimilation, or solubility, on the one side, and rejection, negation, or pollution on the other. What is tolerated remains distinct even as it is incorporated. Since the object of tolerance does not dissolve into or become one with the host, its threatening and heterogenous aspect remains alive inside the tolerating body. As soon as this ceases to be the case, tolerance ceases to be the relevant action. Tolerance as a term of justice, then, crucially sustains a status of outsidership for those it manages by incorporating it even sustains them as a potential danger to the civic or political body.

moral crusading across political and cultural borders”—“achieves far less than is claimed.”<sup>129</sup>

Toleration is neither “benignly positive” nor “moral,” but instead, it reflects a passive manner in approaching the problem since it does not involve acceptance, liking, or inclusion of the other.<sup>130</sup>

And yet, what toleration entails is far worse than simple ignorance of those who are “different.”

If the hegemonic value of the normativity pursued by the state is threatened, the state holds the legitimacy to consider “the availability of alternatives to tolerance,” including the possibility of

implementing violence.<sup>131</sup> Put differently, toleration is a tool utilized by the normative

uniformity of the state to undermine the possibility of a subaltern different disrupting the existing

hierarchy. It is the sign “of a buried order of politics,” masking “the role of the state in

reproducing the dominance of certain groups and norms.”<sup>132</sup>

The wish from diverse Christian sects in medieval times to establish a uniform order and value still prevails in the state’s vision for monotheistic uniformity, not subsuming—yet “tolerant”—of the different. There was simply too much faith entrusted to the capabilities of territorial boundaries in managing the problem of difference, and as a result, the hatred against “the enemy” remains unresolved.

---

<sup>129</sup> Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 6-7; Nandy (1987) coined the term “a negative utopia of toleration.”

<sup>130</sup> Brown, 2006: 8, 11

<sup>131</sup> Brown, 2006: 29; Brown (2006: 29) contends, “Tolerance not only produces, organizes, and marks subjects, it also delineates a purview and the availability of alternatives to tolerance.” Brown (2006: 10) also writes, “The recognition that discourses of tolerance inevitably articulate identity and difference, belonging and marginality, and civilization and barbarism, and that they invariably do so on behalf of hegemonic social or political powers, does not automatically negate the worth of tolerance in attenuating certain kinds of violence or abuse.”

<sup>132</sup> Brown, 2006: 14, 83-84; She writes, “Rather, the call for tolerance, the invocation of tolerance, and the attempt to instantiate tolerance are all signs of identity production and identity management in the context of orders of stratification or marginalization in which the production, the management, and the context themselves are disavowed. In short, they are the signs of a buried order of politics.” She continues:

In this vein, I will be arguing that the deployment of tolerance by the state is in part a response to a legitimacy deficit and, in particular, to its historically diminished capacity to embody universal representation. Tolerance discourse masks the role of the state in reproducing the dominance of certain groups and norms, and it does so at a historical moment when popular sensitivity to this role and this dominance is high, when those who have been historically excluded by norms of sex, race, ethnicity, and religion are vocal about such exclusion.

### *The Paradox of Enclosure: “Containing” the Uncontainable*

Despite what has been claimed, state boundaries do not establish absolute sovereignty. If territorial enclosure is a container designed to hold internal difference and to guarantee state sovereignty within its confinement, then today’s increasing transnational flows unceasingly penetrating state borders vividly signify that the enclosure no longer functions as a solid, impervious, hard container.<sup>133</sup> Or perhaps, this container is too hard to be flexible; without the means to digest the vast amount of flows, it cannot help but leaking and spilling. Accordingly, the monopoly of state sovereignty fractures as “transnational flows of capital, people, ideas, goods, violence, and political and religious fealty” compromise its protection and justification originating from within the enclosure.<sup>134</sup> Both formal and informal movements, such as migration, smuggling, crime, and terror, also blur state boundaries. As Wendy Brown writes: “These flows both tear at the borders they cross and crystallize as powers within them, thus compromising sovereignty from its edges and from its interior.”<sup>135</sup> The (supposed) internal unity and state sovereignty within the enclosure are disrupted, as is even the vague possibility of their ideal realization.

More fundamentally, political power must keep migrating due to the very nature of the

---

<sup>133</sup> I am using the container metaphor from Brown (2006: 118): “If in a Westphalian order the state is the container for the national and political sovereignty contributes the hard metal of this container, then it is unsurprising that contemporary nationalisms issue demands for rearticulated state sovereignty through visible signs of its containing powers.”

<sup>134</sup> Brown, 2010: 22

<sup>135</sup> Brown, 2010: 20-21; She continues:

Nation-state sovereignty has been undercut as well by neoliberal rationality, which recognizes no sovereign apart from entrepreneurial decision makers (large and small), which displace legal and political principles (especially liberal commitments to universal inclusion, equality, liberty, and the rule of law) with market criteria, and which demotes the political sovereign to managerial status. Nation-state sovereignty has also been eroded by the steady growth and importance of international economic and governance institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization. And nation-state sovereignty has been challenged by a quarter century of postnational and international assertions of law, rights, and authority that sometimes openly aim to subvert or supersede the sovereignty of states.

territory the state is founded upon.<sup>136</sup> As discussed earlier, the modern concepts of law, jurisdiction, and sovereignty fundamentally spring from land appropriation, but as Kurt Burch notes, “territory suggests more.”<sup>137</sup> Land appropriation implies *estates* that “comprise not real estate but the full range and bundle of rights possessed by anyone.”<sup>138</sup> But the modern idea of individual property rights, transferred from the monarchy, unbundle these rights, resulting in a complex web of “the multiple and overlapping property rights that currently construct social life.” As Burch describes, “Real property set the foundation for the claims by states’ rulers to be territorial rights-bearers—that is, landholding sovereigns. Mobile property and natural law underscored merchants’ claims to be right-bearers, too—that is, to be citizens possessing personal sovereignty and liberty.”<sup>139</sup> This means that there are “two forms of sovereignty and two forms of property.” While there is a state practicing sovereignty, a private individual “exercises limited personal sovereignty over herself and her possessions.”<sup>140</sup> However, the Westphalian understanding and usage of territory as the basis for its foundation did not incorporate the fact that *estates* entailed mobile property and individual right-bearers.

The powerful complication of unbundled property rights and mobile property was overlooked in the 17th century but is well grasped by today’s unleashed dynamics of capital.

---

<sup>136</sup> Burch, 1998: 139-52; Brown (2010: 23) points out that state sovereignty not just simply wanes but migrates. She writes:

As nation-state sovereignty wanes, states and sovereignty do not dimly decline in power or significance, but instead come apart from one another. States persist as non-sovereign actors, and many characteristics of sovereignty (though not its intact theological form) appear today in two domains of power are, not coincidentally, the very transnational domains of powers that the Peace of Westphalia emerged to contain within or subordinate to nation-states: political economy and religiously legitimated violence... [K]ey characteristics of sovereignty are migrating from the nation-state to the unrelieved domination of capital and God-sanctioned political violence.

<sup>137</sup> Burch, 1998: 143

<sup>138</sup> Burch, 1998: 143

<sup>139</sup> Burch, 1998: 144

<sup>140</sup> Burch, 1998: 145

Entangled with transnational capital and investment flows, states have a difficult time managing their economic crises. We can find such examples remarkably easily. For instance, though Greece and Italy are experiencing tremendous economic inflation, they are unable to provide independent solutions because they lack their own national currency and central bank system to regulate national economies. At the same time, international firms can still seek economic gains from them and domestic firms can move their business sites to other nations with cheaper production means to cope with the inflation, withdrawing more jobs from the two nations. The Euro zone crisis is only one of numerous examples showing that the state does not now and never did possess full sovereign power over territory.<sup>141</sup> Though the state owes its existence to the territorial enclosure, the territory was never truly enclosed as it stands for both landed and mobile property. This “diminishing” state sovereignty was not incidental to territoriality.

The mobility of property—goods, people, etc.—deconstructs the clear-cut state borders and blurs the distinction between *us* and *them*, which leads to a dispute over the state’s quintessential status as *the* political or *the* sovereign in Schmittean sense. The property rights shared by individuals across borders—“Is a Ford a U.S. car or an import?”—muddle the state’s decision power over identifying and determining its friends and enemies.<sup>142</sup> Brown explains:

---

<sup>141</sup> Burch (1998: 145) dwells on the question: “How might one reasonably claim absolute sovereign authority?” He answers that “absolute sovereignty” is a term translated from a property right in the 17th century (the Peace of Westphalia). He writes:

As a property right, sovereignty is the highest, most complete right of ownership (*dominium*); it combines both perfect title and possession. Such rights are variously called *proprietas plena* or *plenitudo potestatis* or full property. To label the rights *absolute sovereignty* in the seventeenth century connoted not absolute power or authority but absolute (pure, uncontested) *claims* to property. *Absolute sovereignty* is a redundancy intended to clarify and emphasize a legal claim to land or property. However, to translate these property rights into rights of authority, governance, and rule required unique conceptual and historical circumstances. Such circumstances arose in the seventeenth century. Moreover, these circumstances created incentives for vesting royal authority with greatly enhanced political power and status. Only in this situation do the *political* connotations of absolute sovereignty emerge, though the rights and powers remain far from absolute.

<sup>142</sup> Brown (2010: 82-83) explains:

The extent to which inside/outside distinctions comport ever less with the boundaries of nations and the activities of states is evident in the widespread associations of new immigrants with danger to the nation,

No longer is the state a consistent embodiment of supreme and decisive power or the agent of a consociation (friends) whose identity is constituted by an identifiable and unified *external* enemy. No longer is the political captured or organizable by state sovereign powers, or, put the other way around, no longer does sovereignty govern or contain the political.<sup>143</sup>

Though not containing the political, the quality of being “the sovereign” persists when the state performs its “roles” as a major actor in international realm, playing a variety of roles in different domains such as security, economics, and environmental regulation. Reacting “to the movements and imperatives of capital as well as to other global phenomena, ranging from climate change to transnational terror networks,” the state acts as a regulator, owner, consumer, and supplier in trading, a presider over human rights, and a protector of those whom belong to it.<sup>144</sup> Lacking “sovereign supremacy and majesty” while “invoking sovereign prerogative and guile,” the state has become an ambivalent entity.

Perhaps this is what the prefix *post* indicates in *post-Westphalian* times. The state is

---

pithily formulated by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1991—“the problem with which we are now faced has moved from one of immigration to one of invasion”—and more recently by exponents of civilizational clash in Europe, Australia, and North America. It is apparent, as well, in the growing prevalence and acceptability of two or more legal classes of citizenship in many Western democracies (“regular” citizens on the one hand, and resident aliens, on the other), something previously associated mainly with nondemocracies, colonial states, or states explicitly striving to preserve a particular religious, ethnic, or racial identity. It is apparent in growing stateless populations composed of refugees from “failed,” war-torn, or economically destitute states, refugees whose precise nation of origin becomes lost or irrelevant to their reception elsewhere in the world. It is apparently in the link, whether fantasized or actual, between new immigrant populations inside democracies and threats of terror from without and in illegal drug networks linking supply regions with demand sites. It is apparently in the globally dispersed sources of labor and materials in the manufacture of cars, machinery, electronics, and other consumer goods, a dispersion that makes it increasingly difficult to stamp products and even many firms with a national identity. (Is a Ford a U.S. car or an import?)

<sup>143</sup> Brown, 2010: 83

<sup>144</sup> Brown, 2010: 67-68; She further discusses the roles modern states play:

States remain important global actors in world markets, in the moral-political discourse of international human rights, and in a variety of international transnational relations... In their combined activities of supporting global markets and conferring belonging and protection to subjects, states today mediate tensions between global economic life and national political life. They are crucial regulators, owners, consumers, and suppliers of capital labor, resources, and goods, and they also work to offset the sometimes deleterious effects of globalization on the integrity of national political life. More than merely cleaning up after the domestic human and environmental damage done by capitalist production, as they did at the height of welfare state capitalism, all states increasingly shoulder the task of protecting national populations against the ravaging effects of open markets on everything, including the national imaginary.

everything but the absolute sovereign imagined in early modernity—in the way God’s power could never have realized in a *respublica Christiana*.<sup>145</sup> As we face this uncomfortable truth about the modern political system in post-Westphalian times, “[t]he autonomy of the political constitutive of the concept of political sovereignty has thus ceased to be an operative or convincing fiction.”<sup>146</sup>

## ii. Theatricalizing the Modern Fiction

Yet, the state remains tremendously significant as a political symbol. Regardless of its *fictiveness*, it is reckoned home for most of us. State governments are expected to ease and resolve most of the problems by presenting suitable policies reflecting domestic and international needs, to protect citizens from religious, capital, and environmental harm, and to represent what originates from the state—including, citizens, firms, and tradition for example—in the international realm. In other words, states are still where we belong, and we still depend on states for numerous matters in order to survive and to improve our lives, just as children depend on their parents. Brown draws attention to this persistent vitality of states for political belonging and protection by highlighting how national citizenship is of principal importance:

[S]tates remain a, if not *the* crucial emblem of political belonging and political protection. The plight of refugees and other stateless peoples is a reminder of the extent to which states remain the only meaningful sites of political citizenship and rights guarantees, as well as the most enduring emblems of security, however thin practices of citizenship have become, however compromised and unevenly distributed rights may be, even in democracies, however scored with fault lines is the *patria*’s protective capacity, and however important postnational constellations of governance such as the European Union have become.<sup>147</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> Brown, 2010: 67; She (2010: 21) details:

To speak of a post-Westphalian order is not to imply an era in which nation-state sovereignty is either finished or irrelevant. Rather, the prefix “post” signifies a formation that is *temporally after but not over* that to which is affixed. “Post” indicates a very particular condition of afterness in which what is past is not left behind, but on the contrary, relentlessly conditions, even dominates a present that nevertheless also breaks in some way with this past. In other words, we use the term “post” only for a present whose past continues to capture and structure it.

<sup>146</sup> Brown, 2010: 67

<sup>147</sup> Brown, 2010: 67-68

Although complications with the limited expressive skill of national identity and the discourse on global citizenship are growing, national identity remains the most fundamental political emblem along with the state.

The state's significance as the "emblem of political belonging and political protection" reflects the theology of state and sovereignty. As state sovereignty itself wanes, the symbolic value of state and sovereignty "becomes more manifest."<sup>148</sup> Although modern states failed to be the sovereign, they have not discontinued to exist, and as Brown writes, "The state can be divided, disunified, subordinated, even captured, and still survive."<sup>149</sup> They prevail as a powerful symbol (like God) guaranteeing protection and belonging for their members. God's divine power never wanes and his importance never fades, despite unbelievers and heretics. He always stands for the father of all creation, the omnipotent protector, and the almighty. He is more powerful because he is unseen, unverifiable, and unfalsifiable. What is necessary for believers is his symbolic existence as an object of their faith—that he is somewhere watching them, ready to punish and protect them. The same goes for the state. Absolute state sovereignty is nowhere to be found, but the state remains a symbol in which we place our faith; we still believe, despite evidence to the contrary, it has the power to protect us from harm, and we will fight against those intending to harm our modern god. The state lives on as the secular divine authority.

The state is not unresponsive to our faith; it seeks to assure us of its sovereignty. If, as Brown writes, "the fiction of state sovereignty is the secularization of the fiction of divine power,"

---

<sup>148</sup> Brown, 2010: 63; Brown (2010: 69) also writes, "Political sovereignty has always been something of a fiction... The detachment of sovereign power from the state in late modernity reveals this fiction more readily, which does not mean that states are finished as powerful actors, only as sovereign ones."

<sup>149</sup> Brown, 2010: 70

this fiction has to be convincing, repeatedly invoked and supported.<sup>150</sup> Otherwise, as the territorial enclosure, the protector and guarantor of the Westphalian fiction, further deteriorates, our anxiety escalates. When the absolute and final sovereignty fractures, we lose our God figure, the state, which protects us from the unpredictable dangers of the vast world, because “there can be no ‘sort of’ sovereign, any more than there can be a ‘sort of’ God.”<sup>151</sup> In addition, *compromised* territorial boundaries cannot differentiate inside from outside, *us* from *them*, friend from enemy, or lawfulness from lawlessness, and that blurred distinction cannot account for either order or peace. Lacking the means to maintain a stable identity in a chaos filled with “sort of” states, we lose ourselves. Without the feeling of an enclosed container, whether that be fictive or not, we are left too vulnerable, unprotected, and unbounded. We, as Brown puts, “wish for the powers of protection, containment, and integration promised by sovereignty, a wish that recalls the theological dimensions of political sovereignty.”<sup>152</sup> It is hence unbearable to think of “the detachment of sovereign powers from” states, which threatens “an imaginary of individual and national identity dependent upon perceivable horizons and the containment they offer.”<sup>153</sup> A mediocre god is not a god; it can never cope with our anxiety, and we do not need a god that does not benefit the human world. We need an absolute and final being.

Hence, if the fictive state lacks the power to fight off reality—where the fiction loses its power to compel belief—the fiction must be revised into a more realistic, well-built story. In order to prove its existence beyond as a theological and symbolic fiction, the state exaggerates its most “realistic,” or the seemingly least theological, component of its power: territorial

---

<sup>150</sup> Brown, 2010: 26

<sup>151</sup> Brown, 2010: 50

<sup>152</sup> Brown, 2010: 26

<sup>153</sup> Brown, 2010: 67, 26

boundaries. The solution that the state implements, as Brown tells us, is to theatricalize the boundaries; modern states continuously construct sturdy-looking walls at their borders as if it were a clever and simple remedy for curing the state's dwindling political power. Through these ugly-looking barricades of concrete walls, wire, and border patrols, states seek to theatricalize their sovereignty, though the walls does not indicate the strong sovereignty that it aspires to portray.<sup>154</sup> By physically visualizing the imaginative toughness of the territorial boundaries, the state turns its fiction into a perceptible "reality."

These walls are not effective at what they claim to engender, such as diminishing illegal immigration, violence, and cross-border crime activities; rather they function as a defense mechanism for the waning of sovereignty, producing a sort of psychological relief.<sup>155</sup> Brown argues, "As responses to contested and eroding state sovereignty, the new walls project an image

---

<sup>154</sup> Brown (2010: 121-23) discusses why walls must be ugly and how such ugliness is essential, "functioning as a theater of ugliness projected onto the other."

<sup>155</sup> Brown (2010: 37-38) points out that the importance of the walls' theatrical effect is also heightened when states continue to build the wall despite the ineffectiveness of what walls claim to engender, such as diminishing illegal immigration, violence, and cross-border crime activities. The wall including other barriers at the border between the U.S. and Mexico provides an example at hand. Though the exact cost of the wall is "difficult to establish," there is no doubt that it would be enormous, considering the cost "for original construction and for maintenance and repair over time... [and also] the costs of land acquisition and labor." But the wall fails to achieve its purpose of "deterring, as opposed to rerouting, the flow of illegal migration." Brown (2010: 37-38) further informs on the poor performance of the wall:

Proclamations of the wall's "success" refer only to the reduced illegal crossings and apprehensions in urban areas and not to illegal immigration and drug smuggling rates as a whole. While it is easier for the Border Patrol to catch illegal border crossers in open areas than in urban ones, where they can quickly disappear into neighborhoods, mountain, desert, sea, and tunnel smuggling operations have grown more sophisticated in response to the barrier. These operations and the counterresponses by the Border Patrol in turn increase the general level and geographical reach of violence and criminality at the border, including in precious peaceful remote regions. Moreover, by shifting migration to more geographically challenging areas, the barrier has dramatically increased both migrant deaths and the rate of permanent, rather than temporary migration in to the United States.

Furthermore, there is much support given to the construction of the walls, as observed in the authorized construction of the two-thousand-mile wall between the U.S. and Mexico (Brown, 2010: 110-111). What matters to the supporters is the fact that the walls stand at state borders as if they could protect them from transnational movements while relieving the fear.

of sovereign jurisdictional power and an aura of the bounded and secure nation.”<sup>156</sup> Walls embody the Westphalian ideal as a possible reality by visually defining and defending what they fail to enclose. They virtually clarify the blurred distinction between *us* and *them* and thus shape “collective and individual identity within as they aimed to block penetration from without.”<sup>157</sup>

In addition to the re-established order and law within the state, border walls also solidify the basis for the fictive God granting us his protection by satisfying our need for containment and horizons (or boundaries). We need not worry too much when we know that we belong somewhere. We can expect understanding, guidance and help from someone in our group. We will not be alone when misfortune finds us. State sovereignty, we think, cannot leak through the walls. With its secularized divine power, the state can huddle us together within its enclosure. This is the theatrical effect of the walls: “In the face of an increasingly unbounded and uncontrolled global order, walls figure containment that exceeds mere protection against dangerous invaders and that pertains instead to the psychic unmanageability of living in such a world.”<sup>158</sup> By visually boasting sovereignty, states are trying to retain and reinstate their essence of political power and presence, reassuring those who belong to them.

However, these walls are, in the end, only reminders of what states no longer have, what they no longer are, what they could never fully be. They “signal the loss of nation-state sovereignty’s *a priori* status and easy link with legal authority, unity and settled jurisdiction.”<sup>159</sup> The walls cannot achieve any tangible results for the actual problem—despite new technologies, authorized violence, stationed border patrols, and construction of multiple layers of barriers at

---

<sup>156</sup> Brown, 2010: 25; She writes, “Notwithstanding their strikingly physicalist and obdurate dimensions, the new walls often function theatrically, projecting power and efficaciousness that they do not and cannot actually exercise and that they also performatively contradict.”

<sup>157</sup> Brown, 2010: 40

<sup>158</sup> Brown, 2010: 118

<sup>159</sup> Brown, 2010: 84

state borders—because the limitations of the territorial enclosure were bound to the territorial container itself. The walls represent post-Westphalian politics; the modern state system seems to have passed its permitted duration.

### Section III. Creating A God Once More

The limitations of the territorial boundaries are becoming more tangible since enclosing what is not so containable is, though perhaps necessary and simplifying, has proven difficult. We can see a dialectical movement in the search for a solution to the current (in)effectiveness of the enclosure. On the one hand, the existing modern political structure rigorously refuses to acknowledge this inadequacy—by building walls around its border, for instance. On the other hand, thinkers and actors take a directly opposite stance in undertaking a project that responds to the problems of the enclosure by advocating for the transcendence of boundaries; by doing so, they establish the emerging notion of *global citizenship*. However, the global citizenship discourse remains ambiguous; what constitutes us as global citizens and its basis, such as human rights or global environmental problems, remains unclear. But all global citizenship advocates have one thing in common: they desire a new kind of membership that is intentionally designed to be beyond any confinement by territorial boundaries.<sup>160</sup> If citizenship, or more broadly, membership, finds its basis on some sort of a common ground, the cornerstone of global citizenship seems to be that it refutes modern territoriality, though, as I will show, its advocates tend to institute only a more refined vision of boundaries. In what follows, I approach the concept of global citizenship through Sigmund Freud's theory on group formation and define it as an identity based on the shared wish for the absence of the enclosure. Before applying Freud's theory to global citizenship, it is first important to explain his argument.

---

<sup>160</sup> See Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, 2008; Heater, 2008; and Benhabib, 2002; As Sergio Valverde (written comments to author, April 20, 2012) points out, it is true that imagining a form of "global" or "universal" citizenship is not necessarily new. Roman citizenship was "global," and many thinkers including Immanuel Kant did envisage cosmopolitanism. Yet, the growing discussion on global citizenship is only a recent phenomenon. This may be following a similar logic to Hinsley's (1986) description of the state and sovereignty. Even if there were movements towards establishing modern political concepts, the state system could not be founded until its moment came. The expanding discourse on global citizenship may perhaps indicate that its "right" time is approaching. For the purpose of the paper, I do not discuss the conceptual history of global citizenship and treat it as a current paradigm.

### i. Freud's *Group Psychology*, Christianity and the State

At first glance, Freud does not seem to leave any room for social groupings because he characterizes humanity “in nature” by selfish aggression. Freud sees “sexual rivalry and primary aggression” as the most basic qualities of human beings, from which little sociality can be expected.<sup>161</sup> On that account, man is not a “herd animal,” who “has an instinctual affinity for closeness, a primary gregariousness,” but a “horde animal,” who “is constituted by an external organizing principle that brokers a complex need for, rivalry with, endangerment by, and aggression toward others.”<sup>162</sup> However, for Freud, there is *Eros* constantly prompting a union of humans, though it is understood as primarily sexual and does not reflect some sort of conventional romantic love. Thus, driven by the desire for sexual satisfaction and aggression, man constantly seeks to bind with—and sometimes take over—a libidinal object, but it is difficult for aggressive humans to be able to be one with the object without hurting and being hurt by the aggressivity of others. Schopenhauer’s porcupine problem describes this ambivalence in love. When it comes to “love,” humans are like porcupines with quills, instinctually aggressive, as seen in Freud’s analogy borrowed from Schopenhauer:

A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold winter’s day so as to profit by one another’s warmth and so save themselves from being frozen to death. But soon they felt one another’s quills, which induced them to separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought them nearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that they were driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to the other.<sup>163</sup>

Though *Eros* brings us together socially, it also makes us vulnerable. As Brown infers from the porcupine problem, “While *Eros* impels us toward closeness with another, this very closeness makes [people] terribly vulnerable to injury and suffering. So we pull away, only to feel

---

<sup>161</sup> Brown, 2006: 157

<sup>162</sup> Brown, 2006: 157; Freud, 1975b: 62-77

<sup>163</sup> Freud, 1975: 41; Brown, 2006: 159

endangered by loneliness and fearful isolation.”<sup>164</sup> How can we overcome this situation where both being together and not being together are fearsome? Or as Brown phrases the question, “How do we become continuously huddling porcupines?”<sup>165</sup> How do we be bound ourselves together without disobeying our contradictory instincts? The same question is, in its simplest form: How can we *love*?

We begin learning to love when man is not allowed to express the libidinal drive. Freud discerns that “the libidinal situation rarely remains so simple,” so when satisfying Eros becomes difficult, one’s Eros transforms into a “passionless” love, serving “as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal.”<sup>166</sup> In other words, Eros can be the kind of love people generally talk about—“whether that of a child for its parents or that of an adult for a lover or friend”—when the instinctual sexual aims are inhibited and recirculated into a different outletting mechanism called idealization.<sup>167</sup> In this way, “love... is aim-inhibited Eros.”<sup>168</sup> The more the sensual impulses are repressed or set aside, the deeper the non-libidinal love becomes, and more illusions or idealized qualities are attributed to the love object.<sup>169</sup> The aim-inhibited affection involves “a displacement or rerouting of libidinal energy... into idealization of the object.”<sup>170</sup> Freud names this as “sexual overvaluation—the fact that loved object enjoys a certain amount of freedom from criticism, and that all its characteristics are valued more highly than those of

---

<sup>164</sup> Brown, 2006: 160

<sup>165</sup> Brown, 2006: 160

<sup>166</sup> Freud, 1975b: 54-56; His notorious account for children’s libidinal love for parents is one of the examples describing the situation in which the libidinal love takes a different form such as “affectionate” love (1975b: 55).

<sup>167</sup> Brown, 2006: 160

<sup>168</sup> Brown, 2006: 160

<sup>169</sup> Freud, 1975b: 56

<sup>170</sup> Brown, 2006: 160; Freud, 1975b: 56

people who are not loved, or than its own were at a time when it itself was not loved.”<sup>171</sup>

However, this idealization is “more than reverence for the object.”<sup>172</sup> We treat the object in the same way as our own ego, thereby generating “a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own” and gaining narcissistic satisfaction from the substitute: “We love it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego, and which we should now like to procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying our narcissism.”<sup>173</sup>

At the most severe level of sexual overvaluation, our ego and the idealized love object become inseparable, as Freud explains, “[T]he ego becomes more and more unassuming and modest, and the object more and more sublime and precious, until at last it gets possession of the entire self-love of the ego, whose self-sacrifice thus follows as a natural consequence. The object has, so to speak, consumed the ego... *The object has been put in the place of the ego ideal.*”<sup>174</sup> By becoming one with the love object through internalization, there stands no chance of losing our love. “The blindness of love” completely neglects any boundaries between the two beings.<sup>175</sup> In Freud’s psychoanalysis, the conventional vision of romantic pure love—whatever that may be (perhaps loving another just for the sake of the person or caring for another)—is not a possibility. Love instead follows a regressive, almost destructive, path for human beings subsuming the ego.

Though this may sound counter-intuitive, Freud contends that only when the love object

---

<sup>171</sup> Freud, 1975b: 56

<sup>172</sup> Brown, 2006: 160; Freud, 1975b: 56; Brown (2006: 160: 61) writes that “idealization itself, Freud explains, is more than reverence for the object. Rather, it is a way of satisfying one’s own need to be loved by projecting one’s ideals of goodness onto another. Idealization thus involves a circuitry of projection from the ego ideal of the lover onto the love object, a protection that produces a feeling (being in love) that in turn gratifies the ego’s own desire for love or self-idealization.”

<sup>173</sup> Freud, 1975b: 56

<sup>174</sup> Freud, 1975b: 56-57

<sup>175</sup> Freud, 1975b: 57; Brown, 2006: 163

is “lost or given up,” does social grouping become conceivable.<sup>176</sup> He sees a group as being composed of individuals who share love for one and the same *external* object, a leader or an ideal, that is needed as an ego ideal. The likelihood of group formation depends on how distant the love object is from any group members because if the love object were close enough to be obtained or possessed by one person, the group’s harmony would be disrupted and it would soon break apart. Idealization of the object from rerouted sexual tension affirms the prohibition on monopolizing the love of the shared object, and group members can be at ease without having to worry about jealousy and anger arousing from somebody else taking over the love object.

For Freud, individuals never learn how to “love” each other. Humans bind to form a group based not on love for each other, but through mutual identification with one another based on each individual’s love for the shared love object. In the shared love object, individuals find the baseline for recognizing commonness with each other, and accordingly, they identify themselves with each other. The mutual identification produces a group, which Freud defines as “a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego.”<sup>177</sup> Then, a group takes on its own life. Within group coherence, not only the shared love is located but also a common ego is born.<sup>178</sup> Individual ego ideal, love object, and conscience are replaced by those of the group, and identification is hence “experienced as love even as it is a way of living our love for the unattainable object.”<sup>179</sup> We may be incapable of loving what we want to, and yet we can feel loved because the shared incapability to possess the love object yields to an attainable sense

---

<sup>176</sup> Freud, 1975b: 58

<sup>177</sup> Freud, 1975b: 61

<sup>178</sup> Freud, 1975b: 48-50, Brown, 2006: 162

<sup>179</sup> Brown, 2006: 163; Freud, 1975b: 48-49

of belonging. Freud contends that social grouping, though it requires replacement of ourselves (each individual's ego) by a common one, attracts us because it reflects our oldest, strongest, and most urgent wish for belongingness, love, and protection.<sup>180</sup>

His analysis of religion provides an exemplary case of such group formation. For Freud, religion is a creation contrived to overcome the unsatisfactory performance of civilization as a defense mechanism against nature. Even though the principal task of human civilization is to defend us from the unknowable and unpredictable workings of nature or "Fate," civilization itself imposes privation on the participating individuals because of civilization's imperfection and human beings' natural unsociability.<sup>181</sup> Thus, the burdened human life calls for consolation through religion, an illusion supplying narcissistic satisfaction.<sup>182</sup>

Freud explains that religion comes into a being in a few steps. First, nature is humanized. By treating death, a fact of nature, as an act of an evil, people obtain immediate relief because it generates a sense of control that the evil will can somehow be known, tamed, and prevented.<sup>183</sup> At this step, "[w]e are still defenseless, perhaps, but we are no longer helplessly paralysed; we can at least react."<sup>184</sup> This is, Freud writes, "a similar state of helplessness: as a small child, in relation to one's parents." The second step entails the creation of parents.<sup>185</sup> Nature is given the characteristic of a parent, or God, who is now in charge of three tasks: "they must exorcise the terrors of nature, they must reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate, ...and they must compensate

---

<sup>180</sup> Freud, 1975a: 38

<sup>181</sup> Freud, 1975a: 19-20; see also Freud's *Civilization and its discontents* (1962)

<sup>182</sup> Freud, 1975a: 19-20; see also Freud's *Civilization and its discontents* (1962)

<sup>183</sup> Freud, 1975a: 20

<sup>184</sup> Freud, 1975a: 20

<sup>185</sup> Freud, 1975a: 21

them for the sufferings and privations which a civilized life in common has imposed on them.”<sup>186</sup>

Lastly, God can only be the true protector when he stands on his own, withdrawn from and unaffected by nature. He has to be the lord of nature beyond doubt that he may be affected by the power of nature. As nature becomes autonomous, morality becomes God’s true domain.<sup>187</sup>

Distancing from the observable, such as nature, increases his power, and all human experiences start to make sense: “Everything that happens in this world is an expression of the intentions of an intelligence superior to us, which in the end, though its ways and byways are difficult to follow, orders everything for the best—that is, to make it enjoyable for us” eternally in the afterlife, the purpose of earthly living.<sup>188</sup> And we are eager to please God, to abide by and spread his words, and to be “moral” in God’s judgment because of our faith that he exists, that he is powerful, and that he would be responsive to our effort.

The “illusion” of a distanced, unseen, perfectly idealized God becomes ever stronger. He is far enough from his followers who idealize him to the extent that he is ascribed as a celestial, omnipotent being, and the distance between Earth and Heaven makes room for religious human binding. In the case of Christianity, the “illusion” that God “loves all the individuals in the group with an equal love” secures the members’ belonging by alleviating concerns over the dissolution of the group.<sup>189</sup> Christian community is bounded by God’s unbounded love for everyone, and his believers become a family of brothers and sisters, blurring a clear distinction of *I* and the external *they*.<sup>190</sup> There is a sense of trust, dependency, protection, and belonging among the members.

Under the umbrella of powerful love, individuals submit their ego and unite. He is who

---

<sup>186</sup> Freud, 1975a: 21-22

<sup>187</sup> Freud, 1975a: 22

<sup>188</sup> Freud, 1975a: 23

<sup>189</sup> Freud, 1975b: 33

<sup>190</sup> Freud, 1975b: 33

determines everything, and our lives become his. His happiness and satisfaction are the same as those of his believers, who contribute their whole life to please him. His ardent believers are eager to sacrifice their lives for his cause and even use physical violence to preach his words. With God, there is nothing impossible. And in return for his love, as in the case of the Thirty Years' War, God gets to practice massive power and control over his "children."

Here, Freud reminds us that Christianity "calls itself the religion of love," but God's powerful endless love has an end—it ends when one moves beyond his territory, or permitted boundaries.<sup>191</sup> The idealized God's equal love was only feasible because such idealization has artificially set up a safety net in which its idealization triumphs over the truth. Beyond the net's boundaries awaits a harsh truth that can tear apart the comfort and enthusiasm within a group. External beings pose a threat that is greatly hated by group members, as Freud describes that "a religion, even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it. Indeed every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all those whom it embraces; while cruelty and intolerance towards those who do not belong to it are natural to every religion."<sup>192</sup> Group unity, therefore, presumes hatred toward and disharmony with *the other* located beyond its boundaries.

Because of its own boundaries, Christianity was to be met with limitations. As Christians could not agree on where God's boundaries of morality were, they became disillusioned. In international relations, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia conveniently represents the moment when the Christian world wakes up from this illusion and grows "beyond" religion to the secular. Freud writes in the early twentieth century that we must move beyond the illusion of religion because, despite its soothing effects, religion does more harm than good. Claiming that times

---

<sup>191</sup> Freud, 1975b: 39

<sup>192</sup> Freud, 1975b: 39

have changed in *The Future of an Illusion*, he demands our disillusionment from Christianity by shifting what religion has done for humanity, such as setting the standard for morality, into a secular domain. What is intriguing, however, is Freud's almost unquestioned positivistic faith in science as an alternative to religion. Though Freud himself also sees the danger in arguing for science as the new savior of a (previously) religiously governed world because it may be just another illusion, he argues that it is worth a try:

[Y]ou must admit that here we are justified in having a hope for the future—that perhaps there is a treasure to be dug up capable of enriching civilization and that is worth making the experiment of an irreligious education. Should the experiment prove unsatisfactory I am ready to give up the reform and to return to my earlier, purely descriptive judgment that man is a creature of weak intelligence who is ruled by his instinctual wishes.<sup>193</sup>

Thus, faith in religion was translated into faith in secularism as the “right” direction.

But theology remains in secularism. The modern state system with secularized, visible territorial boundaries is probably not what Freud had in mind, but what is becoming clearer is that the modern world, in the end, is the secularized illusion of theology, as argued earlier. The state took over God's role, and territorial boundaries substituted his boundaries. Perhaps as long as we need governance from some sort of protective figure, religion lives within civilization, and whenever “the time,” the disillusioning moment, arrives, we will need a new, more convincing illusion.

The Westphalian state system, an illusion reified by boundaries, faces its own limitations parallel to Christian belonging. State boundaries inevitably generate a peculiar space for conflict. If religious boundaries were too ambiguous to be effective, the territorial ones are too rigid for the plasticity of what they try to contain. Lacking flexibility, modern territoriality results in dislocated individuals, “the other within,” multicultural and transnational beings. In addition, the

---

<sup>193</sup> Freud, 1975a: 61-62. Freud (1975a: 72) concludes the book by the statement: “No, our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere.”

constant influx of transnational flows seems to reveal the need to go beyond modern state system.  
(Is a Mexican citizen raised in the U.S. a Mexican or an American?)

Yet, this must not be surprising. On a theoretical level, it was somewhat expected that territorial boundaries would impose too many limitations, maybe even worse than with divine boundaries based on faith. The problem with the modern system is that it was a forced love. It could be said that the idealized love object is the deep faith in the Westphalian miracle of resolving the problem of difference by the secular reconstruction of political system. But the boundaries were not drawn based on this faith. Rather, they were forced onto a map and people were assigned to a state and then demanded to love it. This means that boundary-drawing, which differentiates *us* from *them*, occurs prior to (or separate from) the mutual identification process among members. Having skipped the crucial step in forming solid group identity such as finding a shared love object, modern states could not possibly be effective gods. The ideal situation would necessitate somehow persuading everyone to idealizing the state for each individual's own narcissistic satisfaction, but that is not a realistic expectation. Even if the state were the shared love object, there are too many different idealizations, visions and interpretations for it in order to achieve an internal unity—as in religion that could not control the “meaning” of God.

Today, we are left with feeble little gods who cannot bring us together, let us be at ease with ourselves, or relieve our anxiety and craving for a sense of belonging. The state and its sovereignty are no longer a convincing theology. State sovereignty is not the essential power in the globalizing world, and the state is incapable of living up to its divine prototype satisfying the most basic wishes of human beings. We have finally come to realize how the precise and narrow act of drawing boundaries is predestined to generate limitations on their validity and durability, creating a peculiar space for conflict. Accordingly, we are once again wishing for a *more* perfect

illusion, a god who is less delineated by territorial borders. Or, as Freud would say, the current political structure does not construct a group, whose mutual identification is “experienced as love even as it is a way of living our love for the unattainable object.”<sup>194</sup>

## **ii. Global Citizenship: Drawing Boundaries with the Wish to Transcend Boundaries**

### ***Political Criticism of Global Citizenship***

Though the concept of global citizenship is only at a rudimentary stage and has not yet been defined clearly, it is a direct response to our desire for a sense of belonging and protection and the dire need for an illusional god serving this need, while acknowledging the perceived arbitrariness of boundaries by positing faith in a transcendence of boundaries. Although the details of the envisioned shared object-ideal of global citizenship have not been clarified, all advocates of global citizenship share the idea of moving beyond the territorial enclosure. Different groups of global citizenship advocates have different values and reasons for their support. For instance, the global human rights argument assumes an indisputable moral precept for human beings, and accordingly, assumes that the respect and rights owed to each individual as a human being can override national identities and states’ laws. Thus, realization of universal human rights necessitates expansion of the concept of citizenship to a post-national realm.<sup>195</sup> Or, a global environmental problem could be a driving force for global citizenship.<sup>196</sup> A few non-governmental organizations and the United Nations have been indeed intervening in national policies from the regions that are important for preventing further aggravation of global climate change. These gestures directly point to the fact that movements going beyond national boundaries attempt to raise awareness among all people and to develop a “common ego” based

---

<sup>194</sup> Brown, 2006: 163; Freud, 1975b: 48-49

<sup>195</sup> Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, 2008: 165-166

<sup>196</sup> Heater, 2008:134-148

on a shared fate or a sense of concern (for human rights or possible global environmental disaster). Yet, in general, various rationales for global citizenship indicate the difficulty in singling out the shared love object or the ideal of the advocates. But a common factor remains: they all wish to transcend boundaries, to move beyond state territoriality, and to satisfy our ultimate desire for a sense of belonging. This is the idealized love object all group members share, which provides the basis for identification with one another and group formation. As the loved ideal, the wish to transcend boundaries is what attracts people to global citizenship.

In a way, it can be said that global citizenship is immensely creative and radical since it claims to completely negate enclosure, instead of merely amending the problems of the enclosure. However, the unboundedness of global citizenship is itself the biggest hurdle for the possible application. Imagining its possible realization—creating an identity that transcends and surpasses any bindings from boundaries—is tremendously troublesome. Global citizenship overturns how human groups and societies have worked out so far; we need and have always constructed a god with boundaries and constructed his sovereignty in relation to an unbounded, directionless, and chaotic world, but global citizenship cannot meet this need. As many critiques of global citizenship would point out, creating a sense of belonging and identity requires the existence of the other, distinguished by boundaries, which global citizenship negates literally by definition. One such critic, Derek Heater, claiming that world citizenship “was bound to be squeezed out of existence by...[the] national-citizenship,” concludes that “world citizenship is undefinable in theory, non-existent in practice and would be undesirable in any case.”<sup>197</sup> Brown also recognizes the problematic relationship between the paradoxical necessity of the enclosure and the global citizenship discourse when she asks, “This prerequisite could even constitute a fundamental

---

<sup>197</sup> Heater, 2008: 97, 134

challenge for advocates of global citizenship or democracy without borders: How is an unbounded polity possible?”<sup>198</sup>

Furthermore, the state remains strong despite its limitations. It is still challenging to intervene in state sovereignty—or the state’s “jurisdiction over the land” in Carl Schmitt’s words—because global citizenship lacks such legitimization for its exercise of political power.<sup>199</sup> Though the importance of universal application of human rights or solving global environmental problems may be recognized, it is thought more of as a nice symbolic and idealistic slogan rather than a realistic or politically achievable concept, as we can observe from current racial or religious conflicts, nationalist movements, violation of workers’ rights, illegal hunting and logging, and disappearance of the Amazon rainforest.<sup>200</sup> In addition, the importance of national identity has not declined by much. Seyla Benhabib concludes her discussion of citizenship rights and territoriality by stating that “the nation-state is the home of the modern citizen. The reconfiguration of citizenship beyond nation-state boundaries is necessitated by developments which themselves undermine the nation-state, even if they are blindly promoted by it as well.”<sup>201</sup> Brown also affirms that “states remain a, if not *the* crucial emblem of political belonging and political protection...however thin practices of citizenship has become.”<sup>202</sup>

---

<sup>198</sup> Brown, 2006: 45

<sup>199</sup> Schmitt, 2003: 47; quoted in Brown, 2010: 44; cited earlier in Section I-iii

<sup>200</sup> Benhabib (2002: 109-10) writes in regards to human rights and sovereignty:  
[T]here is a constitutive dilemma in the attempt of modern nation-states to justify their legitimacy through recourse to universalist moral principles of human rights, which then get particularistically circumscribed. The tension between the universalistic scope of the principles that legitimize the social contract of the modern nation and the claim of this nation to define itself as a closed community plays itself out in the history of the reforms and revolutions of the past two centuries... So far, Carl Schmitt is right... The rights of foreigners and aliens, whether they be refugees or guest workers, asylum seekers or adventurers, indicate that threshold, that boundary, at the site of which the identity of “we, the people” is defined and renegotiated, bounded and unraveled, circumscribed, or rendered fluid.

<sup>201</sup> Benhabib, 2005: 676

<sup>202</sup> Brown, 2006: 67-68

The biggest problem in conceptualizing global citizenship as a plausible replacement or supplement for national identity is that global citizenship is not political. As Schmitt points out, plurality is one of the prerequisite for the *political*. According to him, politics require entities and interactions or antithesis of friend and enemy. It is a concept that necessitates the existence of the other: “For as long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must, even if only in the most extreme case—and whether this point has been reached has to be decided by it—determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy.”<sup>203</sup> In other words, Schmitt continues, “The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity.”<sup>204</sup> Thus, it “cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world,” which means, “Universality at any price would necessarily have to mean total depoliticalization.”<sup>205</sup> A pan-citizenship is not a political membership. Its complete inclusivity, the indifference between *us* and *them* in the concept of global citizenship, removes the possibility of realizing global citizenship in the political realm. Thus, even though modern boundaries may pose restrictions, the feasibility of the wish to transcend boundaries seems to be more constricted, and accordingly, the global does not seem to be an adequate replacement/supplement for current political membership based on nation-states.

### ***Theology of Global Citizenship***

This nonetheless does not change the fact that there is a growing discourse on global citizenship. Reflecting one of our oldest but never satisfied wishes for love, belonging, protection, and god, global citizenship may be a politically impossible concept, but it is not necessarily unrealizable theologically. By presenting an ideal that transcends boundaries and involves a

---

<sup>203</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 49

<sup>204</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 53

<sup>205</sup> Schmitt, 2007: 53, 55

sense of universal belonging and protection, the concept of global citizenship goes beyond the political realm and enters instead a conceptually religious one. Freud's understanding of identity formation would see the wish to transcend boundaries as the cornerstone of fabricating global citizenship as an identity. Global citizens form a group constituted through their mutual identification with one another based on their shared love for the same (unattainable) object-ideal. This shared desire among its advocates provides the basis for forming global citizenship and sets up theological boundaries based on faith—similar to the ones in medieval times with a Christian God. Either a person values this wish or not, decides whether the person is an insider of global citizenship or not. If global citizenship were to be based on human rights, the external *other* becomes those who do not consent to the values of human rights. If it were formed on global environmental concerns, eco-violators lie external to the boundaries of being a global citizen. Thus, even if a person resides on the globe, he/she may be *the internal other* of global citizenship. With the presence of *the other*, human beings could come together and develop a sense of togetherness under the title of global citizenship.

Global citizenship advocates' moral values further shows its connection to theology. Though Heater criticizes global citizenship for its unfeasibility, he also recognizes the role of “the moral precept that the individual has some responsibility for the condition of the planet and the rest of its inhabitants.”<sup>206</sup> The moral precept of global citizenship presupposes that its application and violation affect all individuals equally, as God loves his subjects equally. According to Freud's argument, morality is “God's true domain,” so if global citizenship finds itself almost purely on a moral precept to overcome the common threat to human morality, it

---

<sup>206</sup> Heater, 2008: 134, 136

creates *the other* in a theological or moral manner, instead of territorial.<sup>207</sup> Thus, if a nation were to violate human rights or aggravate environmental problems, it becomes the hostile other, subject to *possible* conflicts and punishments. The morality of global citizenship draws boundaries distinguishing its believers from non-believers.

Though realizing these moral values are undoubtedly difficult as many critics have pointed out regarding the impossibility in realizing global citizenship, a theological understanding of global citizenship reveals that the distance of the wish to transcend boundaries from reality or to actual fulfillment of the moral precept provides the never-breaking binding force for the group. Since Freud argues that social grouping is plausible only when the shared love object is “lost or given up,” that the wish to go beyond boundaries is so abstract and distant from reality today would only further support the group’s harmony and strength.<sup>208</sup> Indeed, global citizenship’s current importance as a distant symbol more than as a politically effective matter reveals its theology, but as in the case of God, being inapplicable and unrealizable is not equivalent to being ineffective. With faith or love as a method of justification, we generate what governs us. Only because it is so far away from reality, it is possible for us to imagine such an idealized vision for citizenship, and positing faith in the ideal(s) of global citizenship allows us to generate an indiscriminating god as long as the process of idealization and deepening faith comes about.

The group ego of global citizenship takes on its own life and starts generating effects as if it were a real matter. To put it in more Freudian terms, global citizenship serves as a substitutive mechanism for us to get narcissistic satisfaction for our unattained ego ideal, that is, unbounded and unconditional love and an infinite sense of belonging and protection. With such a peculiar

---

<sup>207</sup> Freud, 1975a: 22; discussed earlier in Section III-i

<sup>208</sup> Freud, 1975b: 58

wish to transcend boundaries, global citizenship eliminates active differentiation between *us* and *them* and adds a *universal* quality to it. As a result, global citizenship creates a “god” that is not enclosed but is enclosing of everything. It wishes to be the most engrossing and powerful—the most sovereign, beyond and above but at the same time inclusive of modern states. While offering universal belonging to everyone, including those undefinable in terms of national identities, global citizenship ultimately envisages a bigger, overarching “god.” The unprovable, unseen being can be much stronger than the provable, visible being.

In these unprovable, unseen boundaries, nothing can be a threat. Global citizenship does not intend to owe its validity of existence to the visibly outlined territorial boundaries. We could be dislocated beings in the state system, but we are always at home as global citizens. If it is no longer confined, then it is no longer penetrable; there is nothing to be penetrated. A war may complicate state boundaries and take away national homes of people. Marginalized citizens might be suffering from an imposed national identity. Those multicultural, immigrants, or world travelers may be frustrated legally and emotionally with their vague and incoherent national identity. But, under the frame of global citizenship, lies the power of an abstract concept that these people can depend on without having to worry about losing their identity—because the existence of global citizenship was never real to begin with. However, as long as you believe in it, it does not disappear.

Thus, global citizenship is another extension of theology in politics and another attempt for the ultimate fulfillment of humanity’s wish to belong. If the sovereign state was a secular god, who had overtaken the role of a Christian god with divine power, global citizenship is creating a new, divine, and moral god. For each newer “illusion,” a newer ideology adapts to suit the social and political scene more appropriately and finds a more coherent enclosure constructed by its

boundaries, within which the illusionary entity is justified and legitimized, only to discern that it is an illusion. Global citizenship seemingly aims to be the ultimate solution to end the terrifying cycle of constructing, destroying, and re-constructing boundaries by transcending boundaries. Yet, what really lies behind the want for the transcendence or even absence of boundaries is the desire for boundaries, the secured feeling of belonging, as the function of all boundaries remains the same. We may now belong beyond boundaries as global citizens, but the newly created governing god draws his own boundaries to enclose himself away from the heretics.

## Epilogue

Thus far I have examined three different eras—medieval, modern, and post-Westphalian times—in a highly stylized manner, regarding their enclosures by boundaries serving as the mechanism to create an identity, generate a sense of belonging and protection, and legitimize the exercise of political power. I emphasize that each era depends on a god figure. Each time we move on from one era to another, we have sought to diminish the problems with arbitrary boundaries. When the Christian God's boundaries proved to be too discriminating of and hostile to non-Christians or heretics, the Westphalian system tried to diminish religious intolerance by secularizing the international political structure, displacing religious matters, along with other possible conflicts occurring from difference, within the state's territorial boundaries. The state's territorial boundaries nonetheless could not supply an effective container to hold onto what it was supposed to. It was always the boundaries, drawn for important and urgent purposes, that eventually imposed limitations on what the legitimacy and effectiveness of the entity these very boundaries constructed. Hence comes the concept of global citizenship, creating an identity based on the shared wish to transcend boundaries. However, as I have argued, this wish moves global citizenship beyond the political realm, delineates theological boundaries between *us* and *the other*, and consequently constructs a god-like figure/ideal to which we could belong and from which we feel protected.

Though this “god” is becoming more graspable and real, it still depends largely on the state. For example, as Seyla Benhabib recognizes in her analysis of human rights and sovereignty, there are movements toward institutionalizing and “realizing” global citizenship, such as “the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; the creation of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR); the institution of the World Court, and, more recently, of an

International Criminal Court.”<sup>209</sup> At the same time, however, “there are still no global courts of justice with the jurisdiction to punish sovereign states for the way they treat refugees, foreigners, and aliens, nor is there a global law-enforcement agency that would carry out such injunctions... [V]oluntarily self-incurred obligations on the part of nation-states through the signing of treaties remain the norm”<sup>210</sup> This indicates that the modern state remains the sovereign entity in international politics, as Schmitt argued.

Nonetheless, the theological understanding of global citizenship would contest Benhabib’s assumption that realization of global citizenship or human rights would necessitate an entity that is inclusive of and in a way above all nation-states. Because global citizenship and the state are not exactly in the same political domain, they can coexist. And as we have seen in Christian politics in medieval times, religion and politics can be separate but constantly overlap, indicating that being theological does not necessarily mean purely religious or entirely apolitical. It is in this way that the theological approach to global citizenship yields more possibility to realization of global citizenship instead of simply dismissing it in the political realm. As more of an independent religion with rather secular moral values, global citizenship could be perhaps a competing force against states on some issues or even a corroborating or complimentary idea for national citizenship.

The possibility of such coexistence does not go unnoticed by scholars. Kwame Appiah’s “cosmopolitan patriot” actually encompasses being both a national citizen and cosmopolitan. He argues that the concept “cosmopolitan patriot” is where locates the rootedness in nature as source of “all the diversity we cosmopolitans celebrate,” and continues that “the cosmopolitan patriot can entertain the possibility of a world in which *everyone* is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a

---

<sup>209</sup> Benhabib, 2002: 109

<sup>210</sup> Benhabib, 2002: 110

home of his or her own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of the other, different, places that are home to other, different, people.”<sup>211</sup> So perhaps global citizenship would look like “cosmopolitan patriotism,” envisioning a synchronized world of individuals globally celebrating diversity while “rooted” in states.

One question remains. Whether the central value of global citizenship would be human rights, environmental problem, or more broadly, diversity, it cannot simply suppose that this matters to everyone. If human rights or environmental problems were to be the principal values of global citizenship, numerous conflicts can be reasonably anticipated—including the accusation that these values are another form of westernization—and there would be many *internal others* of the god of global citizenship. Many address such concerns. For example, Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, explains that the current international human rights standards are embedded in Western society, and that non-Western societies are not willing to accept the Western principles of human rights. Hence, the *international* standard of human rights is at a standstill, remaining merely as a Western faith set in opposition to other faiths.<sup>212</sup>

There are efforts to establish a model of globalization as an alternative to separatism. Walter Mignolo is one of the scholars seeking to offer a more inclusive model. He recognizes that the process of globalization has been a one-way process of homogenization, hegemonization, or colonization, of *the other*.<sup>213</sup> In globalization, only the dominant participates, whereas the subaltern has been “participated.” In order to overcome the shortcomings of homogenizing and hegemonizing globalization, he derives an alternative model of cosmopolitanism called “critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism,” in which “everyone participates instead of ‘being

---

<sup>211</sup> Appiah, 1998: 91

<sup>212</sup> An-Na’im, 1994: 8; quoted in Mignolo, 2000: 739

<sup>213</sup> Mignolo, 2000: 721-724

participated.”<sup>214</sup> Thus, his model of cosmopolitanism implies negotiating the difference between the dominant and the subaltern. According to Mignolo, this negotiation becomes possible through utilizing a tool called “border thinking,” defined as “the recognition and transformation of the hegemonic imaginary from the perspectives of people in subaltern positions.”<sup>215</sup> It is interesting that Mignolo named the tool for ideal cosmopolitanism as “border thinking” instead of—for instance—‘diverse’ or ‘multicultural’ thinking. Mignolo does not discuss why he specifically chose “border thinking,” but it is likely that he intended to depict some kind of hybrid activity in a border space created by the very act of drawing a border. A clear-cut border is only effective for dichotomy, so when it is drawn to distinguish non-dichotomies, it generates a space around the border. The border space creates room for hybrid activity, that is, border thinking, a manner of thinking of other possibilities, differing from the dominant homogenizing view. Hence, in Mignolo’s critical cosmopolitanism, diversity is celebrated across the universe with “conviviality across religious and racial divides.”<sup>216</sup>

Nonetheless, the realism of Mignolo’s border thinking remains contested, which indicates that his cosmopolitan model falls into the trap of assuming (or even imposing) a generalized value for everyone. First of all, hybrid activity has an inevitable propensity toward one or other of the sides of the borders because hybridity still exists *within* the bordering entities. Adjusting differences across the demarcated borders may not be as easy as we could hope for. Secondly, border thinking does not necessarily happen automatically. As Mignolo argues, it rather occurs when this hybrid activity *assumes* a goal of “diversality”—“diversity as a universal project.”<sup>217</sup>

---

<sup>214</sup> Mignolo, 2000: 743-744

<sup>215</sup> Mignolo, 2000: 736-737

<sup>216</sup> Mignolo, 2000: 740

<sup>217</sup> Mignolo, 2000: 743

He is certainly right when he asserts that “by definition, it [diversality] cannot be located in the hegemonic global designs” because his model of cosmopolitanism does not involve hegemonization of a dominant view.<sup>218</sup> However, his assumption of a general—homogenized—goal for cosmopolitanism appears a tension in his thinking, no matter how desirable “diversality” seems to be.<sup>219</sup> Mignolo’s “diversality” is probably more accepting of others by definition, but it is difficult to realistically expect that everyone will value the same thing, and thus those not valuing diversity as he advocates could nonetheless comprise *an other*. Consequently, a problem would persist in implementing Mignolo’s critical cosmopolitanism since there are no pragmatic ways to affirm diversality, diversity as a universal project.

As it can be observed from various arguments and counter-arguments regarding global citizenship and globalization, predicting the future of global citizenship is complicated. Maybe it will happen, maybe it will rather stay as a slogan, or maybe it will just disappear. It might exist along with modern states without discriminating *the other*, or not. Maybe everyone will finally enjoy human rights. Maybe everyone will all work together to ease environmental problems. We can only make hypotheses about global citizenship. Yet, there is one thing that can be said with certainty. Human beings will not cease to construct and deconstruct the world with imaginary boundaries in their search for the ultimate sense of belonging. Though this cycle is by no means unfruitful, perhaps we should now acknowledge the cycle and admit that it might be an endless journey. It may be the time to acknowledge that the destination of our search for belonging—that there is no final destination—would only be disappointing. This may alleviate our pain from predestined failures in achieving an ultimate sense of belonging. Friedrich Nietzsche’s aphorism, “Always at home,” seems appropriate as the last remark: “One day we reach our goal—and now

---

<sup>218</sup> Mignolo, 2000: 743

<sup>219</sup> Mignolo, 2000: 743

we point with pride to the long journeys we took to reach it. In truth we did not notice we were travelling. But we got so far because at each point we believe we were *at home*.<sup>220</sup>

---

<sup>220</sup> Nietzsche, 2001: 149 (aphorism 253)

## References

- Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 1983. *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.
- An-Na'Im, A. 1994. "What do we mean by universal?" *Index on Censorship*. 23 (4/5): 120.
- Appiah, Anthony Kwame. 1998. "Cosmopolitan Patriots," in Cheah, Pheng, and Bruce Robbins, eds. *Cosmopolitics: thinking and feeling beyond the nation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Asch, Ronald G. 1997. *The Thirty Years' War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-1648*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. "Citizens, Residents, and Aliens in a Changing World: Political Membership in the Global Era," in Hedetoft, Ulf, and Mette Hjort, eds. *The postnational self: belonging and identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2005. "Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship". *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 38 (4): 673-677
- Beitz, Charles. 1991. "Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs," in David Held, ed., *Political Theory Today*. pp.236-54. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bloemraad, Irene, Anna Korteweg, and Gokce Yurdakul. 2008. "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State". *Annual Review of Sociology*. 34: 153-70.
- Brewer, John, and Susan Staves. 1995. "Introduction," in John Brewer and Susan Staves, eds. *Early Modern Conceptions of Property*. pp.1-20. London and New York: Routledge.
- Brown, Wendy. 2006. *Regulating aversion: tolerance in the age of identity and empire*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, Wendy. 2010. *Walled states, waning sovereignty*. New York: Zone Books.
- Burch, Kurt. 1998. *"Property" and the making of the international system*. Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers.
- Buzan, Barry. 1991. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Issues in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Campbell, David. 1992. *Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Keene, Edward. 1998. *International Theory and Practice in the 17th Century: A New Interpretation of the Significance of the Peace of Westphalia*, manuscript, University of London.

- Krasner, Stephen D. 1993. "Westphalia and All That," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, pp.235-64. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.
- Eires, Carlos M. N. 1986. *War Against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Freud, Sigmund. 1962. *Civilization and its discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Freud, Sigmund, and James Strachey. 1975a. *The future of an illusion*. New York: Norton.
- Freud, Sigmund. 1975b. *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*. New York: Norton.
- Gross, Leo. 1948. "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948" *American Journal of International Law*. 42 (1): 20-41.
- Hann, C. M. 1998. "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Property," in C. B. Hann, ed., *Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition*. pp.1-47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Head, Randolph C. 1998. "Introduction: The Transformation of the Long Sixteenth Century," in John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman, eds. *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration before the Enlightenment*, pp.95-106. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Heater, Derek. *What Is Citizenship?* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. Print. 134-148
- Hinsley, F. H. 1986. *Sovereignty*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press.
- Inayatullah, Naeem, and David L. Blaney. 2004. *International relations and the problem of difference*. New York: Routledge.
- Klandermans, Bert and Simon, Bernd. 2004. "Politicized Collective Identity," in John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, eds. *Political Psychology: Key Readings*. pp.449-65. New York: Psychology Press.
- Krabbe, Hugo. 1919. *Die moderne Staatsidee*. Haag: Nijhoff.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1995. "Sovereignty as *Dominium*: Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?" in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*. pp.21-42. Baltimore, MD, and London: John Hopkins.
- Locke, John, and Peter Laslett. 1963. *Two treatises of government: a critical edition with an introduction and apparatus criticus*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Locke, John, and C. B. Macpherson. 1980. *Second treatise of government*. Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub. Co.

- Mignolo, Walter. 2000. "The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism." *Public Culture*. 12.3: 721-748.
- Nandy, Ashis. 1987. *Traditions, tyranny, and utopias: essays in the politics of awareness*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, Josefine Nauckhoff, and Adrian Del Caro. 2001. *The gay science: with a prelude in German rhymes and an appendix of songs*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm & Mügge, M. A. 1911. *Early Greek philosophy: And other essays*. New York: Macmillan.
- Onuf, Nicholas G. 1991. "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History." *Alternatives*. 16(4): 425-46.
- Onuf, Nicholas G. 1998. *The Republican Legacy in International Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parker, Geoffrey, ed. 1997. *The Thirty Years' War*, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Schmitt, Carl. 1985. *Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Schmitt, Carl, and G. L. Ulmen. 2003. *The Nomos of the Earth in the international law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press.
- Schmitt, Carl. 2007. *The concept of the political*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Toulmin, Stephen. 1990. *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Mdoernity*. New York: Free Press.
- Trevor-Roper, H. R. 1962. "Why Do Wars Begin?" *Horizon* 5(2): 32-41.
- Trier, Jost. 1943. "Zaun und Manring." *Beitragen zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*. 66:232
- Tully, James. 1995. *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ward, Adolphus William, and John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton Acton. 1934. *The Cambridge modern history. Vol. 1, The Renaissance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weeks, Charles Adrian. 1991. "Jacob Boheme and the Thirty Years' War." *Central European History*. 24(2-3): 213-21.
- Wight, Martin. 1977. "The Origin of the State-System: Chronological Limits," in Hedley Bull, ed., *Systems of States*. pp.110-28. Leicester: Leicester University Press.